Akopyan v. Second Judicial District Court et al

MOTION for Summary Judgment

D. Neb.September 30, 2016

-1- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 CHRISTOPHER J. HICKS Washoe County District Attorney MICHAEL W. LARGE Deputy District Attorney Nevada State Bar Number 10119 P.O. Box 11130 Reno, NV 89520-0027 mlarge@da.washoecounty.us (775) 337-5700 ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA * * * ARPINE AKOPYAN, Plaintiff, vs. SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, JOEY ORDUNA HASTINGS, Defendants. / Case No. 3:15-cv-00593-MMD-WGC DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT Defendant, Second Judicial District Court (“Defendant”), by and through its counsel of record, CHRISTOPHER J. HICKS, Washoe County District Attorney, and MICHAEL W. LARGE, Deputy District Attorney, hereby moves for summary judgment. This motion is based // // // // // // // // Case 3:15-cv-00593-MMD-WGC Document 32 Filed 09/30/16 Page 1 of 16 -2- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 upon the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities, attached exhibits, and all other documents, papers, and pleadings on file with this Court. Dated this 30th day of September, 2016. CHRISTOPHER J. HICKS District Attorney By /s/ Michael W. Large MICHAEL W. LARGE Deputy District Attorney P.O. Box 11130 Reno, NV 89520-0027 mlarge@da.washoecounty.us (775) 337-5700 ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT Case 3:15-cv-00593-MMD-WGC Document 32 Filed 09/30/16 Page 2 of 16 -3- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES This is a wrongful termination suit. Plaintiff Arpine Akopyan (“Plaintiff”) asserts that she was terminated from employment with the Second Judicial District Court (“Second Judicial District Court” or “Defendant”) in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1967 based on religious and national origin discrimination, and retaliation for engaging in a protected activity.1 In actuality, Plaintiff was terminated from her position as a deputy clerk with Defendant less than 3 months into her 6 month probationary period because of repeated errors in her performance, being late to work on several occasions, and because of her attitude. Plaintiff’s claim for religious discrimination is without merit because Defendant’s reasonably accommodated her request to take Armenian Christmas off of work. Plaintiff’s claim for national origin discrimination fails because Plaintiff was terminated for a legitimate non- discriminatory reason. Finally, Plaintiff’s claim for retaliation must be dismissed because there is no evidence that she was engaging in a protected activity. Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment because no genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to Plaintiff’s claims. I. STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS On November 4, 2013, Plaintiff was hired as Deputy Clerk by the Second Judicial District Court. (Ex. 1 at ¶3). During the first six months of employment, all new hires by Defendant are probationary employees. (Id. at 6); (Ex. 4). Probationary employees are at-will and are not entitled to take vacation or unpaid leave. (Id.). On November 15, 2013, Plaintiff requested to be excused from work on January 6, 2014 to observe Armenian Christmas. (Ex. 1 at 5); (See also Dkt. # 5 at ¶16). Despite her probationary status, Defendant informed Plaintiff that she would be permitted to use paid sick // 1 Plaintiff originally asserted age, sex, gender, religion, national origin, and “freedom of sexual expression” discrimination and retaliation. Plaintiff has since voluntarily dismissed her claims based on age, sex, gender, and “freedom of sexual expression.” Case 3:15-cv-00593-MMD-WGC Document 32 Filed 09/30/16 Page 3 of 16 -4- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 leave in order to observe Armenian Christmas. (Ex. 1 at 5)(Ex. 5); (See also Ex. 10 at #2) (Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Req. for Admis.); (Ex. 11 at #4) (Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Interrog.). Over the course of her employment with the Second Judicial District Court, Ms. Akopyan was late to work on at least two occasions. (Ex. 1 at ¶6, 10)(Ex. 3)(Ex. 10). On one of these occasions, Ms. Akopyan was inappropriately dressed and was sent home to change into different attire. (Ex. 1 at ¶6)(Ex. 3). Additionally, several errors attributable to Ms. Akopyan’s work were brought to the court’s attention. (Ex. 1 at 7-9)(Ex. 7)(Ex.8)(Ex. 9); (Ex. 10 at #’s 2-5)(Ex. 11 at # 5-9). On January 2, 2014, Craig Franden, IT Manager for the Court, sent an email documenting that Ms. Akopyan was late coming into work. (Ex. 1 at 10)(Ex. 8). On January 2, 2014, Ms. Akopyan sent an email to Joey Orduna Hastings, Clerk of the Second Judicial District Court, complaining about a meeting that she had with another court employee Kathy Piccolo on December 31, 2013. (Ex. 9). In the letter, Ms. Akopyan complains about the unprofessionalism of Ms. Piccolo, complains about Defendant’s sick leave policy and complains about the fact that the meeting occurred behind closed doors. (Id.). On January 2, 2014, a meeting was held between Joey Orduna Hastings, Julie Wise, and Ms. Akopyan. (Ex. 1 at ¶12). During the meeting, Ms. Hastings addressed Ms. Akopyan about the importance of being on time to work and asked about Ms. Akopyan being late earlier that day. (Id.). Ms. Akopyan acted defiantly by rolling her eyes. Ms. Hastings addressed Ms. Akopyan about her previous tardiness and violation of the dress code policy (Id.) Ms. Hastings addressed Ms. Akopyan’s concern about the apparent inflexibility of the sick-leave policy. (Id.). Ms. Akopyan suggested the policy be changed and that the Human Resource Manager be fired. (Id.). The meeting ended when Ms. Hasting terminated Ms. Akopyan from her employment. (Id.). // // Case 3:15-cv-00593-MMD-WGC Document 32 Filed 09/30/16 Page 4 of 16 -5- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY On June 18, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Nevada Equal Rights Commission and the EEOC. (Dkt #5 at ¶8). On September 8, 2015, Plaintiff received a dismissal of the charges and a right to sue letter. (Id). On December 7, 2015, Plaintiff filed suit in the United State District Court for the District of Nevada against Defendant alleging violations of Title VII and the ADEA. (Id. at ¶1). Plaintiff claimed that Defendant discriminated against her on the basis of sex, gender, religion, national origin, and “freedom of sexual expression” and retaliated against her for engaging in a protected activity under Title VII. (Id. at ¶¶23-27). Plaintiff also asserted age discrimination under the ADEA. (Id. at ¶26). On March 15, 2016, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss. (Dkt. #9 at 1). The Motion to Dismiss is still pending before this Court. On June 20, 2016, Plaintiff and Defendant stipulated to dismiss Plaintiff’s age, sex, gender, and “freedom of sexual expression” discrimination claims with prejudice. (Dkt. #31) (Stipulation and Order for Dismissal of Claims based on Sex, Gender, “Freedom of Sexual Expression” and Age Discrimination).2 The remaining claims are religious and national origin discrimination, and retaliation for engaging in a protected activity. III. LEGAL ARGUMENT A. Introduction Plaintiff alleges religious and national origin discrimination and retaliation for engaging in a protected activity. Plaintiff claims that her dismissal from her position as a deputy clerk for Defendant was the result of religious discrimination, national origin discrimination and retaliation. Each of these claims fail. First, Plaintiff’s religious discrimination claim fails because Defendant’s permission for Plaintiff to use paid sick leave to observe Armenian Christmas was a reasonable accommodation for her religious conflict. Second, Plaintiff’s national origin discrimination claim fails because 2 Pursuant to the stipulation and order, Sections II(A), II(B), II(C)(l) of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss are moot. Additionally, while named in the Complaint, Joey Orduna Hastings has never been served in this case. Case 3:15-cv-00593-MMD-WGC Document 32 Filed 09/30/16 Page 5 of 16 -6- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 Plaintiff has failed to prove that she was qualified for her job and that similarly situated non- Armenian employees received more favorable treatment. Third, Plaintiff’s retaliation claim fails because Plaintiff has failed to show that she engaged in a protected activity and that this activity was the proximate cause of her termination. B. Standard for Summary Judgment A party is entitled to summary judgment where there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. A genuine issue of material fact is one that would permit a rational trier of fact to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986) (citing First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253 (1968)). When determining whether the moving party is entitled to summary judgment, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. The moving party bears the initial burden of production and must make a prima facie showing that it is entitled to summary judgment. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). However, a defending party who moves for summary judgment is not required to make an “affirmative evidentiary showing” of an absence of a genuine issue of material fact for a claim for which it does not bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167) (Bork, J., dissenting)). Rather, a defending party may show an absence of evidence supporting one or more prima facie elements to be entitled to summary judgment. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 323 (“a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial”). To avoid summary judgment, the claimant must affirmatively demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 256. // // // Case 3:15-cv-00593-MMD-WGC Document 32 Filed 09/30/16 Page 6 of 16 -7- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 C. Analysis Plaintiff asserts that her termination from employment on January 2, 2014, was the result of national origin discrimination, religious discrimination, and retaliation. The crux of Plaintiff’s claim is her request to take January 6th to celebrate Armenian Christmas. Plaintiff asserts that her termination was a result of this request and accordingly, Defendant has unlawfully discriminated against her. Plaintiff’s assertion disregards factual reality and is not legally viable under Title VII. As argued in the pending Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. However, even if Plaintiff is allowed to amend her Complaint to state a proper claim for religious and national origin discrimination, her claims are without merit. Moreover, Plaintiff does not and nor has produce any evidence that she was retaliated against for engaging in a protected activity. 1. Defendant’s permission for Plaintiff to take January 6th off to celebrate Armenian Christmas constitutes a reasonable accommodation under Title VII. Plaintiff’s religious discrimination claim fails because Defendant’s permission to use paid sick leave to observe Armenian Christmas was a reasonable accommodation for her religious conflict. Title VII provides, in relevant part: (a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer (1) to fail to refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Title VII religious discrimination claims are analyzed using a two-part framework. Heller v. EBB Auto Co., 8 F.3d 1433, 1438 (9th Cir. 1993). To establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination, an employee must prove: 1) a bona fide religious belief, the practice of which conflicted with an employment duty; 2) notice to the employer of the belief and conflict; and 3) threatened or actual discriminatory treatment, including discharge, due to the inability to fulfill Case 3:15-cv-00593-MMD-WGC Document 32 Filed 09/30/16 Page 7 of 16 -8- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 the job requirements. Id. If the employee establishes a prima facie case, the burden of proof shifts to the employer who must establish “good faith efforts to accommodate the employee’s religious practices,” unless such accommodation would impose undue hardship. Id. at 1438-40; see also Am. Postal Workers Union, San Francisco Local v. Postmaster Gen., 781 F.2d 772, 777 (9th Cir. 1986) (“employee has a correlative duty to make a good faith attempt to satisfy his needs through means offered by the employer”); Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 68 (1986) (“it [reasonable accommodation requirement] did not impose a duty on the employer to accommodate at all costs.”). Whether an employer has provided reasonable accommodation for an employee’s religious conflict is a case-by-case inquiry that hinges on the unique facts of each case. Anderson v. Gen. Dynamics Convair, Etc., 589 F.2d 397, 400 (9th Cir. 1979). The Supreme Court has stated that, “any reasonable accommodation by the employer is sufficient to meet its accommodation obligation.” Philbrook, 479 U.S. at 68 (emphasis added) (insisting that employer need not consider particular accommodations); see also Am. Postal Workers Union, San Francisco Local, 781 F.2d at 776 (explaining that employer must show “some initial step to reasonably accommodate the religious belief of that employee”) and Burns v. S. Pac. Trans. Co., 589 F.2d 403, 405 (9th Cir. 1979) (explaining that employer must make “more than a negligible effort to accommodate the employee”) (citing Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 77 (1977)). Moreover, once the employer provides a reasonable accommodation, it need not consider an employee’s proffered alternatives. Philbrook, 479 U.S. at 68 (“Where the employer has already reasonably accommodated the employee’s religious needs…[t]he employer need not further show that each of the employee’s alternative accommodations would result in undue hardship.”). On November 15, 2013, Plaintiff requested to take January 6, 2014 off of work to celebrate Armenian Christmas. (Ex. 1 at ¶5)(Ex. 2). Despite the conflict with her probationary status, Defendant permitted Plaintiff to use paid sick leave in order to eliminate her religious Case 3:15-cv-00593-MMD-WGC Document 32 Filed 09/30/16 Page 8 of 16 -9- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 conflict. (Id.) Moreover, Plaintiff readily admits that Defendant provided this reasonable accommodation. (Ex. 10 at 2); (Ex. 11 at 4); Compare Samuels v. We’ve Only Just Begun Wedding Chapel Inc., No. 2:13-cv-00923-APG-PAL, 2015 WL 9200392, at *2 (D. Nev. Dec. 15, 2015) (employer flatly denied employee’s request for religious leave saying, “…if I allow you to take off for a special holiday I would have to allow everyone that works here to take off for special holidays.”). As argued in the Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff has not adequately plead a claim for religious discrimination under Title VII. She does not allege that she held a bona fide religious belief that conflicted with an employment duty, nor does she allege notice to the employer of the belief and conflict. Assuming arguendo that Plaintiff had stated a prima facie claim under Title VII for religious discrimination, by granting permission on November 15, 2013, for Plaintiff to use paid sick leave in order to observe Armenian Christmas, Defendant provided a reasonable accommodation for Plaintiff’s religious beliefs by allowing her to take the day off using accrued sick leave. For this reason, there is no genuine issue of material fact in regards to the reasonable accommodation, and Defendant is entitled to summary judgment. 2. Plaintiff’s national origin discrimination claim fails because Plaintiff has failed to prove that she was qualified for her job and that similarly situated employees who were not Armenian received more favorable treatment. Plaintiff cannot provide any evidence to support a prima facie case of discrimination based on national origin. Moreover, even if Plaintiff were to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, her termination from employment was based on a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason; specifically her job performance, attitude, and tardiness. In order to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment, Plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) she belonged to a protected class; (2) she was qualified for her job; (3) she was subjected to an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated employees not in her Case 3:15-cv-00593-MMD-WGC Document 32 Filed 09/30/16 Page 9 of 16 -10- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 protected class received more favorable treatment. Anthoine v. N. Cent. Ctys. Consortium, 605 F.3d 740, 753 (9th Cir. 2010) see Moran v. Selig, 447 F.3d 748, 753 (9th Cir.2006); see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). If a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, the burden shifts to defendants to provide non-discriminatory reasons for the adverse action. Anthoine, 605 F.3d at 753. At this point, “the prima facie case ‘drops out of the picture,’ and a court evaluates the evidence to determine whether a reasonable jury could conclude that defendants discriminated against [the plaintiff] based on [national origin].” Id. (quoting Cornwell v. Electra Cent. Credit Union, 439 F.3d 1018, 1028 (9th Cir. 2006). As an initial matter, as argued in the Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff fails to adequately plead that she is a member of a protected class. Plaintiff alleges that she asked to celebrate Armenian Christmas, but nowhere in the Complaint does she actually allege that she is Armenian or of Armenian descent. Assuming, for the purposes of this motion, that Plaintiff is Armenian or of Armenian descent, Plaintiff can still not make out a prima facie case of national origin discrimination. Unlike other claimants who successfully establish a prima facie case of national origin discrimination, Plaintiff has failed to prove that she was qualified for her job. Plaintiff seemingly claims that she was qualified for her job merely because she was hired by Defendant, but has not alleged or provided any evidence that she actually was. Plaintiff fails to produce any evidence that similarly situated non-Armenian employees received more favorable treatment. Plaintiff merely claims that she “was treated differently because she is not White-Anglo-Saxon-Protestant” and fails to provide a single, concrete example of differential treatment. Compare Kang, 296 F.3d at 819 (“Kang presented direct evidence that Yoon abused him and required Koreans to work longer hours.”); Okeke, 927 F.Supp.2d at 1025 (“Okeke has alleged that he was disciplined more often than similarly situated non-Nigerians, that he was denied a raise when other non-Nigerians were not, and that he was terminated for an infraction when others similarly situated were not terminated for the same Case 3:15-cv-00593-MMD-WGC Document 32 Filed 09/30/16 Page 10 of 16 -11- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 infraction.”). Plaintiff has failed to provide any concrete examples of how similarly situated non- Armenian employees were treated differently. For these reasons, Plaintiff has failed to prove that similarly situated non-Armenian employees received more favorable treatment. Plaintiff’s bare assertions that similarly situated non-Armenian employees received more favorable treatment are insufficient to establish a prima facie case of national origin discrimination. For this reason, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment. Legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for termination Assuming arguendo, Plaintiff could establish a prima facie case for national origin discrimination, summary judgment is still appropriate because under the McDonnell-Douglas burden shifting framework, Plaintiff’s employment was terminated for a legitimate non- discriminatory reason. Through this lawsuit, Plaintiff ignores the reasons for her employment termination. Plaintiff was a probationary employee and she was bad at her job. In simpler terms, Plaintiff was an at-will employee and she was late to work on multiple occasions and committed several errors in her work. (Ex. 1 at ¶¶6- 10)(Ex. 3) (Ex. 7)(Ex.8)(Ex. 9); (Ex. 10 at #’s 2-5)(Ex. 11 at # 5-9). On one of these occasions, Ms. Akopyan was inappropriately dressed and was sent home to change into different attire. (Ex. 1 at ¶6)(Ex. 3). When all of these issues were brought to her attention, Plaintiff did not accept any responsibility but instead acted insubordinately, suggested that the Court Clerk fire the Human Resource Manager. (Ex. 1 at ¶12). Left with no alternative, Plaintiff’s employment was terminated. On January 2nd, Plaintiff sent an email to Joey Orduna Hastings complaining about a meeting that she had with the Human Resource Manager and the sick-leave policy. (Ex. 9). Later that day, during a meeting with Joey Orduna Hastings and Julie Wise, Plaintiff acted insubordinately, suggested that the Human Resource Manager be fired and refused to acknowledge her tardiness. (Ex. 1 at ¶12). Consequently, Ms. Hastings terminated her employment due to her work product errors, her tardiness to work and her attitude. As an at-will Case 3:15-cv-00593-MMD-WGC Document 32 Filed 09/30/16 Page 11 of 16 -12- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 employee, no reason was necessary for the termination, but Defendant had ample support for the legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Plaintiff’s termination. (Ex. 10 at 6) (Plaintiff admits that she was terminated because of the “dress code violation of November 21, 2013,” “tardiness of November 21, 2013” and “Plaintiff’s email received by her on January 2, 2014.”). Therefore, Defendant had a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiff during her probationary period. Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on the national origin claim. 3. Plaintiff’s retaliation claim fails because Plaintiff has failed to show that she engaged in a protected activity and that her activity was the proximate cause of her termination. Plaintiff’s retaliation claim fails because Plaintiff has failed to show that she engaged in a protected activity and that her activity was the proximate cause of her termination. Title VII provides, in relevant part: (a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees…because he [employee] has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(a). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show that 1) she engaged in a protected activity, 2) she suffered an adverse employment action, and 3) there was a causal link between her activity and the employment decision. Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 965 (9th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff’s retaliation claim fails because Plaintiff has failed to show that she engaged in a protected activity. An employee engages in protected activity when she has “opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter or… made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(a); Learned v. City of Bellevue, 869 F.2d 928, 932 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Thomas v. City of Beaverton, 379 F.3d 802, 812 (9th Cir. 2004) (opposing Case 3:15-cv-00593-MMD-WGC Document 32 Filed 09/30/16 Page 12 of 16 -13- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 retaliation against another employee is protected activity); Trent v. Valley Electric Ass’n Inc., 41 F.3d 524, 527 (9th Cir. 1994) (complaining to office manager about sexually offensive remarks during training seminar is protected activity); and Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th Cir. 1987) (filing Title VII grievances and cooperating in Title VII investigations are protected activities). In her Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that she engaged in protected activity when she emailed Ms. Hastings about “the gross violation of Civil Rights based on race, religion, sex, or national origin, and mistreatment of her [Ms. Hastings’] staff toward [sic] Plaintiff.” (Docket #5 ¶20). Rather than providing proof of opposition to an unlawful employment practice or participation in a Title VII proceeding, Plaintiff merely asserts that the email pertained to a “gross violation of Civil Rights.” Id. The email to which Plaintiff refers pertains to a meeting that occurred between Plaintiff and Human Resource Administrator Kathy Piccolo on December 31, 2013. (Ex. 9.). In the email, Plaintiff complains about Defendant’s sick leave policy and the fact that the meeting occurred behind closed doors. Id. Because neither closed-door meetings nor limited sick leave policies are unlawful employment practices under Title VII, Plaintiff’s email to Joey Orduna Hastings does not constitute opposition to unlawful employment practices. Plaintiff’s retaliation claim also fails because Plaintiff has failed to prove that her alleged protected activity was the proximate cause of her termination. In order to establish a causal link between the protected activity and the termination, a claimant must prove that the protected activity was the but-for cause of termination. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, ------- U.S. -- ------, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013) (a but-for standard requires proof that termination would not have occurred in absence of protected activity). In her Complaint, Plaintiff summarily asserts that her email to Joey Orduna Hastings was the reason for her termination without providing any evidence of causation. (Docket #5 ¶¶20-21). But see Green v. Lew, No. 2:13-cv-00740-KJD-VCF, 2014 WL 4471637 at *10-11 (D. Nev. Case 3:15-cv-00593-MMD-WGC Document 32 Filed 09/30/16 Page 13 of 16 -14- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 2014) (retaliation claim dismissed on summary judgment when employee failed to introduce direct or circumstantial evidence of causal connection between employee’s chairmanship of a diversity and equal employment commission and denial of a promotion). Plaintiff conveniently ignores the multitude of reasons justifying her dismissal, specifically her tardiness, inappropriate dress, and poor work product and claims retaliatory dismissal. See (Exs.1-8, 10-11). Even if Plaintiff had made out a prima facie case of retaliation, Plaintiff’s tardiness, inappropriate dress and poor work product are legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for her dismissal. See Cummings v. Valley Health System, LLC, No. 13-cv-00479-APG-GWF, 2016 WL 590455 at *5 (D. Nev. 2016) (causation not established where employee claiming retaliation was disciplined on numerous occasions); Vazquez v. Valley Hosp. Med. Ctr., No. 2:13-CV-2125 JCM (VCF), 2015 WL 4038671 at *4 (D. Nev. 2015) (causation not established where employee claiming retaliation violated employee confidentiality). Because Plaintiff has failed to prove that her alleged protected activity was the proximate cause of her termination, Plaintiff has failed to make out a prima facie case of retaliation. For this reason, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment. IV. CONCLUSION Accordingly, Defendant hereby moves this Honorable Court for an order granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Dated this 30th day of September, 2016. CHRISTOPHER J. HICKS District Attorney By /s/ Michael W. Large MICHAEL W. LARGE Deputy District Attorney P.O. Box 11130 Reno, NV 89520-0027 mlarge@da.washoecounty.us (775) 337-5700 ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT Case 3:15-cv-00593-MMD-WGC Document 32 Filed 09/30/16 Page 14 of 16 -15- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE Pursuant to FRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an employee of the Office of the District Attorney of Washoe County, over the age of 21 years and not a party to nor interested in the within action. I certify that on this date, I deposited for mailing in the U.S. Mails, with postage fully prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing document in an envelope addressed to the following: Arpine Akopyan 430 Fox Hills Court Oakland, CA 94605 Plaintiff IN PRO SE Dated this 30th day of September, 2016. /s/ C. Theumer C. Theumer Case 3:15-cv-00593-MMD-WGC Document 32 Filed 09/30/16 Page 15 of 16 -16- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 EXHIBIT INDEX Exhibit 1 Declaration of Julie Wise………….………………………………………..3 pages Exhibit 2 WC 000001 - WC 000002……………………………………………........2 pages Exhibit 3 WC 000004…………………………………………………………………1 page Exhibit 4 WC 000010 - WC 000012…………………………………………………3 pages Exhibit 5 WC 000014 - WC 000015…………………………………………………2 pages Exhibit 6 WC 000020 - WC 000021…………………………………………………2 pages Exhibit 7 WC 000024 - WC 000025…………………………………………………2 pages Exhibit 8 WC 000037…………………………………………………………………1 page Exhibit 9 WC 000153…………………………………………………………………1 page Exhibit 10 Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Requests for Admission…………..…5 pages Exhibit 11 Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Interrogatories.…………………….. 11 pages Case 3:15-cv-00593-MMD-WGC Document 32 Filed 09/30/16 Page 16 of 16 Case 3:15-cv-00593-MMD-WGC Document 32-1 Filed 09/30/16 Page 1 of 4 Case 3:15-cv-00593-MMD-WGC Document 32-1 Filed 09/30/16 Page 2 of 4 Case 3:15-cv-00593-MMD-WGC Document 32-1 Filed 09/30/16 Page 3 of 4 Case 3:15-cv-00593-MMD-WGC Document 32-1 Filed 09/30/16 Page 4 of 4 Case 3:15-cv-00593-MMD-WGC Document 32-2 Filed 09/30/16 Page 1 of 3 Case 3:15-cv-00593-MMD-WGC Document 32-2 Filed 09/30/16 Page 2 of 3 Case 3:15-cv-00593-MMD-WGC Document 32-2 Filed 09/30/16 Page 3 of 3 Case 3:15-cv-00593-MMD-WGC Document 32-3 Filed 09/30/16 Page 1 of 2 Case 3:15-cv-00593-MMD-WGC Document 32-3 Filed 09/30/16 Page 2 of 2 Case 3:15-cv-00593-MMD-WGC Document 32-4 Filed 09/30/16 Page 1 of 4 Case 3:15-cv-00593-MMD-WGC Document 32-4 Filed 09/30/16 Page 2 of 4 Case 3:15-cv-00593-MMD-WGC Document 32-4 Filed 09/30/16 Page 3 of 4 Case 3:15-cv-00593-MMD-WGC Document 32-4 Filed 09/30/16 Page 4 of 4 Case 3:15-cv-00593-MMD-WGC Document 32-5 Filed 09/30/16 Page 1 of 3 Case 3:15-cv-00593-MMD-WGC Document 32-5 Filed 09/30/16 Page 2 of 3 Case 3:15-cv-00593-MMD-WGC Document 32-5 Filed 09/30/16 Page 3 of 3 Case 3:15-cv-00593-MMD-WGC Document 32-6 Filed 09/30/16 Page 1 of 3 Case 3:15-cv-00593-MMD-WGC Document 32-6 Filed 09/30/16 Page 2 of 3 Case 3:15-cv-00593-MMD-WGC Document 32-6 Filed 09/30/16 Page 3 of 3 Case 3:15-cv-00593-MMD-WGC Document 32-7 Filed 09/30/16 Page 1 of 3 Case 3:15-cv-00593-MMD-WGC Document 32-7 Filed 09/30/16 Page 2 of 3 Case 3:15-cv-00593-MMD-WGC Document 32-7 Filed 09/30/16 Page 3 of 3 Case 3:15-cv-00593-MMD-WGC Document 32-8 Filed 09/30/16 Page 1 of 2 Case 3:15-cv-00593-MMD-WGC Document 32-8 Filed 09/30/16 Page 2 of 2 Case 3:15-cv-00593-MMD-WGC Document 32-9 Filed 09/30/16 Page 1 of 2 Case 3:15-cv-00593-MMD-WGC Document 32-9 Filed 09/30/16 Page 2 of 2 Case 3:15-cv-00593-MMD-WGC Document 32-10 Filed 09/30/16 Page 1 of 6 Case 3:15-cv-00593-MMD-WGC Document 32-10 Filed 09/30/16 Page 2 of 6 Case 3:15-cv-00593-MMD-WGC Document 32-10 Filed 09/30/16 Page 3 of 6 Case 3:15-cv-00593-MMD-WGC Document 32-10 Filed 09/30/16 Page 4 of 6 Case 3:15-cv-00593-MMD-WGC Document 32-10 Filed 09/30/16 Page 5 of 6 Case 3:15-cv-00593-MMD-WGC Document 32-10 Filed 09/30/16 Page 6 of 6 Case 3:15-cv-00593-MMD-WGC Document 32-11 Filed 09/30/16 Page 1 of 12 Case 3:15-cv-00593-MMD-WGC Document 32-11 Filed 09/30/16 Page 2 of 12 Case 3:15-cv-00593-MMD-WGC Document 32-11 Filed 09/30/16 Page 3 of 12 Case 3:15-cv-00593-MMD-WGC Document 32-11 Filed 09/30/16 Page 4 of 12 Case 3:15-cv-00593-MMD-WGC Document 32-11 Filed 09/30/16 Page 5 of 12 Case 3:15-cv-00593-MMD-WGC Document 32-11 Filed 09/30/16 Page 6 of 12 Case 3:15-cv-00593-MMD-WGC Document 32-11 Filed 09/30/16 Page 7 of 12 Case 3:15-cv-00593-MMD-WGC Document 32-11 Filed 09/30/16 Page 8 of 12 Case 3:15-cv-00593-MMD-WGC Document 32-11 Filed 09/30/16 Page 9 of 12 Case 3:15-cv-00593-MMD-WGC Document 32-11 Filed 09/30/16 Page 10 of 12 Case 3:15-cv-00593-MMD-WGC Document 32-11 Filed 09/30/16 Page 11 of 12 Case 3:15-cv-00593-MMD-WGC Document 32-11 Filed 09/30/16 Page 12 of 12