Advocates For Individuals With Disabilities Foundation Incorporated v. CP Maple Leaf 2 Llc

MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction Defendant CP Maple Leaf 2 LLC's Motion to Dismiss, MOTION to Dismiss Case

D. Ariz.September 28, 2016

Active/43783393.1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 L A W O F F I C E S S H E R M A N & H O W A R D L . L . C . 7 0 3 3 E A S T G R E E N W A Y P A R K W A Y , S U I T E 2 5 0 S C O T T S D A L E , A R I Z O N A 8 5 2 5 4 T E L E P H O N E : ( 4 8 0 ) 6 2 4 - 2 7 1 0 F A X : ( 4 8 0 ) 6 2 4 - 2 0 2 9 ( A Z B A R F I R M N O . 0 0 4 4 1 0 0 0 ) John Alan Doran (AZ Bar No. 012112) (JDoran@ShermanHoward.com) Lori Wright Keffer (AZ Bar No. 028144) (LKeffer@ShermanHoward.com) Matthew Hesketh (AZ Bar No. 029319) (MHesketh@ShermanHoward.com) Attorneys for Defendant UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF ARIZONA Advocates For Individuals With Disabilities Foundation, Inc., Plaintiff, v. CP Maple Leaf 2 LLC, Defendant. Case No. CV-16-3073-PHX-ROS DEFENDANT CP MAPLE LEAF 2 LLC’S MOTION TO DISMISS (Assigned to Hon. Roslyn O. Silver) (Oral Argument Requested) Defendant CP Maple Leaf 2 LLC (“Defendant”), by and through its counsel, hereby moves to dismiss the Complaint filed by Plaintiff Advocates for Individuals with Disabilities Foundation, Inc. (“AIDF”) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), and states as follows: I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND Plaintiff and closely associated parties, including Advocates for Individuals with Disabilities, LLC and David Ritzenthaler, have filed more than 1,000 nearly identical complaints in this State and District alone. Plaintiff identifies itself as a non-profit charitable foundation. (Compl. ¶ 1). In reality, according to the Arizona Attorney General, Plaintiff is an entity that engages in “‘trolling’ litigation tactics designed to induce defendants into quick pre-suit or post-complaint settlement[s] that merely enrich the Plaintiff.”1 Setting aside the motivations for Plaintiff’s decision to file suit against 1 See Arizona Attorney General Aug. 24, 2016 Press Release, “Arizona Attorney General’s Office Files Motion to Intervene In Attempt to Stop Serial Litigator,” available at: https://www.azag.gov/latest-news/arizona-attorney-general’s-office-files- Case 2:16-cv-03073-ROS Document 14 Filed 09/28/16 Page 1 of 10 Active/43783393.1 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Defendant, this Court need only decide one thing: whether it has jurisdiction to adjudicate this litigation.2 As Defendant will demonstrate, because Plaintiff has no standing and because Plaintiff’s claim is moot, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action and it must be dismissed. Defendant operates the facility located at 2740 N. Power Road, Mesa, Arizona (the “Property”). Plaintiff alleges that the Property is a “place of Public Accommodation” but does not identify the nature of Defendant’s business. Despite the fact that the Property has been in full compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Arizonans with Disabilities Act (“AzDA”) since at least June 22, 2016, the Complaint alleges violations of both Acts with respect to a parking lot located adjacent to the Property. Plaintiff, however, fails to allege that any disabled individuals have ever visited the Property or intend to visit the Property. Plaintiff also fails to allege how disabled individuals are denied access to the Property. Rather, Plaintiff merely alleges (1) the purported existence of barriers; (2) that disabled individuals are deterred from visiting; and (3) that disabled individuals are denied equal access. (Compl. ¶¶ 24, 25). Accordingly, Plaintiff lacks standing to bring a claim under the ADA. motion-intervene-attempt-stop-serial-litigator. This Court can take judicial notice of publicly-available documents and information published by government entities. United States v. Basher, 629 F.3d 1161, 1165 n.2 (9th Cir. 2011) (taking judicial notice of publicly available information on the Bureau of Prison’s Inmate Locator service); Daniels-Hall v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998-99 (9th Cir. 2010) (taking judicial notice of publicly-available information on state entity’s website where neither party disputed its accuracy). On September 23, 2016, Judge Talamante of the Maricopa County Superior Court granted the Arizona Attorney General’s Motion to Intervene and Consolidate 1,106 lawsuits filed by Plaintiff. See Arizona Attorney General Sept. 23, 2016 Press Release, “Judge Grants AZAG Motion to Consolidate 1,106 Lawsuits Targeting AZ Businesses,” available at: https://www.azag.gov/press-release/judge- grants-azag-motion-consolidate-1106-lawsuits-targeting-az-businesses. 2 This Court is likely aware of recent sua sponte Show Cause Orders issued by Judge Campbell and Judge Wake in nearly identical cases with identical allegations filed by Plaintiff, in which Judge Campbell and Judge Wake raised “serious questions about whether Plaintiffs have standing to proceed.” See Advocates for Individuals with Disabilities, LLC, et al. v. WSA Properties, LLC, Case No. CV-16-02375-PHX-DGC, August 15, 2016 Order to Show Cause, Doc. 13; Advocates for Individuals with Disabilities, LLC, et al. v. MidFirst Bank, Case No. CV-16-01969-PHX-NVW, September 8, 2016 Order to Show Cause, Doc. 20. Both courts ordered Plaintiffs to “show cause as to why” each case “should not be dismissed for lack of standing.” Id. Case 2:16-cv-03073-ROS Document 14 Filed 09/28/16 Page 2 of 10 Active/43783393.1 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Even if this Court determines that Plaintiff has standing to bring suit, which it does not, Plaintiff’s Complaint should nevertheless be dismissed as moot. As Defendant will demonstrate, the parking lot about which Plaintiff complains has been in full compliance with the ADA since at least July 2016—over a month before Plaintiff filed this litigation. Even though Defendant informed Plaintiff of these facts, Plaintiff nevertheless proceeded with this litigation. Plaintiff’s Complaint should be dismissed as moot, and Plaintiff should be assessed Defendant’s attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in defending this litigation. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) provides for dismissal of a complaint when the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. Article III standing is a true jurisdictional question and is therefore properly addressed in a Rule 12(b)(1) motion. Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Savage v. Glendale Union High Sch., 343 F.3d 1036, 1039 & fn. 2 (9th Cir. 2003). A Rule 12(b)(1) challenge may be facial or factual. Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). “In a facial attack, the challenger asserts that the allegations contained in a complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction.” Id. “By contrast, in a factual attack, the challenger disputes the truth of the allegations that, by themselves, would otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction.” Id. In resolving a factual attack, the court may review evidence beyond the complaint without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Id. (finding that district court may consider a “factual attack on jurisdiction” and, in doing so, may “review evidence beyond the complaint without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment”). Moreover, in conducting its analysis, the Court need not “presume the truthfulness of Plaintiff’s allegations.” Id. at 1038. Case 2:16-cv-03073-ROS Document 14 Filed 09/28/16 Page 3 of 10 Active/43783393.1 4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 III. ARGUMENT A. Plaintiff Lacks Standing Because Plaintiff Has Not Alleged an Actual or Imminent Concrete and Particularized Injury. In order to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts, a plaintiff must satisfy the case or controversy requirement of Article III of the United States Constitution. U.S. Const. art. III, § II; Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560. “Standing is an essential component of the ‘case or controversy’ requirement of Article III, § II of the United States Constitution.” Carroll v. Nakatoni, 342 F.3d 934, 940 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. Indeed, even if a defendant does not move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), “[f]ederal courts are required sua sponte to examine jurisdictional issues such as standing.” Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 954 (9th Cir. 2011). Critically, a plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000). In order to establish constitutional standing, a plaintiff bears the burden of proving: (1) an actual or imminent “concrete and particularized . . . injury-in-fact”; (2) a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of; and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560; Chapman, 631 F.3d at 946-47. Furthermore, the alleged injury must be “actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 555 (internal citations omitted). In addition, a plaintiff pursuing injunctive relief, which is the only relief available under the ADA, must demonstrate “a real and immediate threat of repeated injury” in the future. Chapman, 631 F.3d at 946. In cases under Title III of the ADA, in order establish an injury-in-fact, a plaintiff who has encountered alleged barriers must demonstrate: (i) a plausible intent to return to the alleged noncompliant property; or (ii) that she is deterred from returning. Chapman, 631 F.3d at 953. Put simply, a plaintiff must demonstrate that she is deterred from returning to a noncompliant place of public accommodation because she has encountered barriers related to her disability there. She must show she is personally Case 2:16-cv-03073-ROS Document 14 Filed 09/28/16 Page 4 of 10 Active/43783393.1 5 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 affected by the barrier. Spokeo v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1544 (2016), as revised (May 24, 2016); Chapman, 631 F.3d at 950. In Spokeo, the United States Supreme Court recently held that a plaintiff “cannot satisfy the demands of Article III standing by alleging a bare procedural violation.” 136 S. Ct. at 1544. The plaintiff in Spokeo alleged that information provided about him in a background report, such as his marital status, age, and education, was inaccurate. As a result, the plaintiff alleged that the company willfully violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) by failing to adopt procedures to ensure the accuracy of its reports. However, the Supreme Court held that while an alleged violation is sufficient to identify a “particularized” harm (it “must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way”), that harm also must be “concrete” (“actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical”). Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548. Likewise, in Chapman, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring his ADA claims because he did not allege what the barriers were or how the alleged barriers related to his physical disability so as to deny him “full and equal” access to the store. 631 F.3d at 944. Here, similarly, Plaintiff has not alleged: (i) that any particular disabled individual has visited the Property; (ii) that a particular disabled individual has been denied equal access to the premises; or (iii) that any particular individual has been deterred from returning to the Property. Instead, Plaintiff merely alleges that the Property is not accessible to individuals with disabilities because “it fails to identify van parking spaces by the designation ‘van accessible’ and or fails to maintain the minimum height of 60 inches (1525 mm) above the . . . ground surface.” (Compl. at ¶¶ 21-22.) Likewise, Plaintiff does not allege how it became aware of the purported violations or which individuals purportedly have been unable to access the Property. Rather, Plaintiff merely alleges that “third party individuals, including members of the Foundation,” are deterred from “conducting business or returning to Defendant’s Public Case 2:16-cv-03073-ROS Document 14 Filed 09/28/16 Page 5 of 10 Active/43783393.1 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Accommodation.”3 (Id. at ¶ 24). The ADA, however, does not permit Plaintiffs to seek relief for a non-specific harm allegedly suffered by anonymous persons. As the court in Chapman held, “Article III . . . requires a sufficient showing of likely injury in the future related to the plaintiff’s disability to ensure that injunctive relief will vindicate the rights of the particular plaintiff rather than the rights of third parties.” Chapman, 631 F.3d at 949 (emphasis added). Furthermore, Plaintiff fails to allege an intent to return to the Property. In evaluating whether a Plaintiff is likely to return, courts will consider: (1) the proximity of the place of accommodation to the plaintiff’s residence; (2) the plaintiff’s past patronage of the defendant’s business; (3) the definitiveness of the plaintiff’s plans to return, and (4) the plaintiff’s frequency of travel near the accommodation in question.” Bodley v. Plaza Mgmt. Corp., 550 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1088 (D. Ariz. 2008), aff’d, 331 F. App’x 547 (9th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). Here, Plaintiff does not allege that it ever visited the Property. Nor does Plaintiff allege that it is near or frequently travels near the Property. Plaintiff provides no facts whatsoever to allow the Court to examine whether Plaintiff is likely to return to the Property. Finally, Plaintiff fails to allege how the purported violation(s) relate to any disability. Chapman, 631 F.3d at 949. Instead, Plaintiff merely alleges that the Property lacks “adequate and or accessible parking spaces, sufficient designation or signage and or sufficient disbursement of such parking spaces.” (Compl. at ¶ 22.) Therefore, Plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts to establish standing to bring its ADA claim. Accordingly, the Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice. B. Plaintiff’s Claims Are Moot. “A case becomes moot – and therefore no longer a Case or Controversy for purposes of Article III – when the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Rosebrock v. Mathis, 745 F.3d 963, 971 3 Plaintiff makes passing reference to having a “relationship or association with individuals with disabilities and directed by David Ritzenthaler,” but makes no allegation that Mr. Ritzenthaler attempted to visit the property and was deterred from doing so. (Compl. ¶ 21.) Case 2:16-cv-03073-ROS Document 14 Filed 09/28/16 Page 6 of 10 Active/43783393.1 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal citations omitted). Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has observed that “because a private plaintiff can sue only for injunctive relief under the ADA, a defendant’s voluntary removal of alleged barriers prior to trial can have the effect of mooting a plaintiff’s ADA claim.” Oliver v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 654 F.3d 903, 905 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Brooke v. Elite Hospitality, LLC, No. 4:15-CV-0425-HRH, 2016 WL 3213223, at *5 (D. Ariz. June 10, 2016) (dismissing plaintiff’s ADA claim as moot and holding that, upon receipt of evidence that defendant had remediated allegedly non-compliant pool lifts, court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicated dispute). Here, the Complaint alleges purported violations of the ADA and the AzDA with respect to parking facilities located on the Property. More specifically, the Complaint alleges purported violations, allegedly observed “on or about 5/6/2016,” concerning: (1) the height of signage of accessible parking spaces; “and or” (2) the appropriate number and marking of “Van Accessible” parking spaces as set forth in §§ 216.5 and 502.6 of the 2010 ADA Standards of Accessibility Design. (Compl. at ¶¶ 21-22). However, as established by the Declaration of Edgardo Bantug, attached hereto as Exhibit 1, the Property has been in full compliance with Sections 216.5 and 502.6 of the 2010 ADA Standards for Accessibility Design since at least July 1, 2016.4 (Bantug Decl. ¶ 6). Indeed, as of at least July 1, 2016, more than a month before Plaintiff filed the Complaint, the signs for the accessible van parking spaces at the Property (i) included the International Symbol of Accessibility contained in the 2010 Standards; (ii) contained the designation “van accessible”; and (iii) measured at least 60 inches above the ground surface measured to the bottom of the sign. (Id. at ¶¶ 6-7). Mr. Bantug’s Declaration establishes that any non-compliant parking signs alleged to exist in the Complaint have been remediated and are no longer in dispute. Therefore, “it is absolutely clear that [D]efendant’s purported violation of the ADA could not be reasonably expected to recur.” Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 189 4 Counsel for Defendant informed Plaintiff’s counsel of Defendant’s compliance and requested that Plaintiff voluntarily dismiss the Complaint because Plaintiff’s claims were moot. (See J. Park August 15, 2016 letter to P. Strojnik, attached as Exhibit 2.) Plaintiff, however, ignored Defendant’s request. Case 2:16-cv-03073-ROS Document 14 Filed 09/28/16 Page 7 of 10 Active/43783393.1 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 (internal citations omitted). As a result, Plaintiff’s Complaint is moot and must be dismissed with prejudice. Id. C. Plaintiff’s State Law Claim Must Also Be Dismissed. In the event that Plaintiff’s ADA claims are dismissed, the Court must also dismiss Plaintiff’s AzDA claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Indeed, a district court does not have discretion to exercise supplement jurisdiction over a state law claim where federal claims are dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Herman Family Revocable Trust v. Teddy Bear, 254 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Brooke, 2016 WL 3213223, at *5 (declining to exercise jurisdiction over plaintiff’s AzDA claim following dismissal of ADA claim as moot). Consequently, Plaintiff’s claims arising out of the AzDA must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in conjunction with the dismissal of its ADA claims. Furthermore, the Arizona Legislature intended that the AzDA be consistent with the ADA. 1992 Ariz. Sess. Laws Ch. 224, § 1(C). As a result, federal case law is particularly persuasive here. Bodett v. Coxcom, Inc., 366 F.3d 736, 742 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining that federal case law is persuasive in interpreting the Arizona Civil Rights Act because it was intended to be consistent with Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act). As discussed above, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a plaintiff lacked standing to bring his ADA claims because he did not allege what the barriers were or how the alleged barriers related to his physical disability so as to deny him “full and equal” access to the store. Chapman, 631 F.3d at 944. Plaintiff has not alleged: (i) that any particular disabled individual has visited the Property; (ii) that a particular disabled individual has been denied equal access to the premises; or (iii) that any particular individual has been deterred from the Property. Consequently, this Court should also dismiss Plaintiff’s state law claim. IV. CONCLUSION Plaintiff has not sustained an injury in fact and, therefore, lacks standing in this matter. In addition, Plaintiff’s claims are moot. As a result, this Court does not have Case 2:16-cv-03073-ROS Document 14 Filed 09/28/16 Page 8 of 10 Active/43783393.1 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims. For the foregoing reasons, Defendant CP Maple Leaf respectfully requests that the Court enter an order granting its motion and dismissing Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant CP Maple Leaf with prejudice. Defendant further requests that, if this Court dismisses Plaintiff’s complaint, that the Court award Defendant its attorneys’ fees and costs incurred as the prevailing party under the ADA. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 28th day of September, 2016 SHERMAN & HOWARD L.L.C. By: /s/John Alan Doran John Alan Doran Lori Wright Keffer Matthew A. Hesketh 7033 East Greenway Parkway, Suite 250 Scottsdale, Arizona 85254 Attorneys for Defendant Case 2:16-cv-03073-ROS Document 14 Filed 09/28/16 Page 9 of 10 Active/43783393.1 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ORIGINAL electronically filed this 28th day of September 2016: with a copy transmitted through the ECF system this 28th day of September 2016 to: Peter Strojnik STROJNIK P.C. 1 East Washington Street, Suite 500 Phoenix, AZ 85004 Attorneys for Plaintiff Fabian Zazueta 40 North Central Ave., Suite 1400 Phoenix, AZ 85004 Attorney for Plaintiff /s/Lori Hinkel Case 2:16-cv-03073-ROS Document 14 Filed 09/28/16 Page 10 of 10 Exhibit 1 to Defendant CP Maple Leaf 2 L.L.C.'s Motion to Dismiss Case 2:16-cv-03073-ROS Document 14-1 Filed 09/28/16 Page 1 of 17 Exhibit 1 to Defendant CP Maple Leaf 2 L.L.C.'s Motion to Dismiss Case 2:16-cv-03073-ROS Document 14-1 Filed 09/28/16 Page 2 of 17 Exhibit 1 to Defendant CP Maple Leaf 2 L.L.C.'s Motion to Dismiss Case 2:16-cv-03073-ROS Document 14-1 Filed 09/28/16 Page 3 of 17 Exhibit 1 to Defendant CP Maple Leaf 2 L.L.C.'s Motion to Dismiss Case 2:16-cv-03073-ROS Document 14-1 Filed 09/28/16 Page 4 of 17 Exhibit 1A to Declaration of Edgardo Bantug Case 2:16-cv-03073-ROS Document 14-1 Filed 09/28/16 Page 5 of 17 Exhibit 1A to Declaration of Edgardo Bantug Case 2:16-cv-03073-ROS Document 14-1 Filed 09/28/16 Page 6 of 17 Exhibit 1A to Declaration of Edgardo Bantug Case 2:16-cv-03073-ROS Document 14-1 Filed 09/28/16 Page 7 of 17 Exhibit 1A to Declaration of Edgardo Bantug Case 2:16-cv-03073-ROS Document 14-1 Filed 09/28/16 Page 8 of 17 Exhibit 1A to Declaration of Edgardo Bantug Case 2:16-cv-03073-ROS Document 14-1 Filed 09/28/16 Page 9 of 17 Exhibit 1A to Declaration of Edgardo Bantug Case 2:16-cv-03073-ROS Document 14-1 Filed 09/28/16 Page 10 of 17 Exhibit 1A to Declaration of Edgardo Bantug Case 2:16-cv-03073-ROS Document 14-1 Filed 09/28/16 Page 11 of 17 Exhibit 1A to Declaration of Edgardo Bantug Case 2:16-cv-03073-ROS Document 14-1 Filed 09/28/16 Page 12 of 17 Exhibit 1A to Declaration of Edgardo Bantug Case 2:16-cv-03073-ROS Document 14-1 Filed 09/28/16 Page 13 of 17 Exhibit 1A to Declaration of Edgardo Bantug Case 2:16-cv-03073-ROS Document 14-1 Filed 09/28/16 Page 14 of 17 Exhibit 1A to Declaration of Edgardo Bantug Case 2:16-cv-03073-ROS Document 14-1 Filed 09/28/16 Page 15 of 17 Exhibit 1A to Declaration of Edgardo Bantug Case 2:16-cv-03073-ROS Document 14-1 Filed 09/28/16 Page 16 of 17 Exhibit 1A to Declaration of Edgardo Bantug Case 2:16-cv-03073-ROS Document 14-1 Filed 09/28/16 Page 17 of 17 Exhibit 2 to Defendant CP Maple Leaf 2 LLC's Motion to Dismiss Case 2:16-cv-03073-ROS Document 14-2 Filed 09/28/16 Page 1 of 2 Exhibit 2 to Defendant CP Maple Leaf 2 LLC's Motion to Dismiss Case 2:16-cv-03073-ROS Document 14-2 Filed 09/28/16 Page 2 of 2