No. APL-2017-00002 To be argued by:
ANDREW W. AMEND
30 minutes requested
Supreme Court, New York County, Index No. 100274/13 (Cons.)
State of New York
Court of Appeals
NEW YORKERS FOR STUDENTS’ EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS (“NYSER”), et al.,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
-against-
THE STATE OF NEW YORK, et al.,
Defendants-Appellants.
MIRIAM ARISTY-FARER, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
-against-
THE STATE OF NEW YORK, et al.,
Defendants-Appellants.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS
BARBARA D. UNDERWOOD
Solicitor General
STEVEN C. WU
Deputy Solicitor General
ANDREW W. AMEND
Senior Assistant Solicitor General
PHILIP V. TISNE
Assistant Solicitor General
of Counsel
ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN
Attorney General of the
State of New York
Attorney for Appellants
120 Broadway
New York, New York 10271
(212) 416-8020
(212) 416-8962 (facsimile)
Dated: March 15, 2017
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................ iv
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ........................................................ 1
ISSUES PRESENTED ..................................................................... 4
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ......................................................... 5
A. Constitutional and Statutory Background ...................... 6
1. The State’s constitutional obligation to ensure
the opportunity for a sound basic education ............ 6
2. The Campaign for Fiscal Equity litigation .............. 8
3. Public-education spending in New York
between CFE and the financial crisis of 2008-
2009 ......................................................................... 13
4. Public-education funding in New York since
the financial crisis of 2008-2009 ............................. 16
5. New York City’s one-time ineligibility for
specific funds due to its delay in implementing
a revised evaluation system for teachers and
principals ................................................................ 18
B. The Present Actions ....................................................... 20
1. The NYSER action .................................................. 20
2. The Aristy-Farer action .......................................... 23
C. Proceedings in Supreme Court ...................................... 25
D. The First Department’s Decision .................................. 27
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont’d)
Page
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT ................................................ 31
ARGUMENT .................................................................................. 31
POINT I
THE NYSER PLAINTIFFS’ EDUCATION ARTICLE CLAIMS
MUST BE DISMISSED AS TO THE HUNDREDS OF SCHOOL
DISTRICTS FOR WHICH THE COMPLAINT CONTAINS NO
SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS ............................................................... 31
A. This Court’s Precedents Mandate That
Educational Deficiencies Be Pleaded on a District-
Specific Basis. ................................................................. 33
B. Only District-Specific Allegations Can Satisfy This
Court’s Requirement That Plaintiffs Concretely
Identify Educational Deficiencies and Causes
Attributable to the State. ............................................... 37
C. The NYSER Complaint Fails to Meet These
Standards as to All School Districts for Which It
Alleges No (or Nearly No) Facts. ................................... 40
D. Allegations of Educational Deficiencies in One or
Two Districts Cannot Support a Claim as to Any
Other District. ................................................................ 43
POINT II
THE NYSER PLAINTIFFS’ THEORIES OF LIABILITY PREMISED
ON FOUNDATION AID AND CFE III FAIL AS A MATTER OF LAW
AND SHOULD BE REJECTED ......................................................... 49
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont’d)
Page
A. The NYSER Plaintiffs’ Claim Based on the State’s
Revisions to Foundation Aid Does Not Allege a
Violation of the Constitution. ........................................ 49
B. The NYSER Plaintiffs’ Claim That the State Has
Not Complied with This Court’s Decisions in CFE
Also Fails. ....................................................................... 54
1. Plaintiffs’ claim that the State has violated
statewide funding obligations under CFE fails
because CFE imposed no such obligations. ............ 54
a. The CFE litigation was limited to New
York City only. ................................................. 54
b. As to New York City, this Court issued
only a narrow, declaratory ruling
endorsing a specific proposed funding
increase. ........................................................... 56
2. The complaint alleges facts showing that New
York City’s public schools have received
increased funds well exceeding the remedial
estimate this Court endorsed in CFE III. .............. 58
POINT III
THE ARISTY-FARER PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO STATE A CLAIM
UNDER THE EDUCATION ARTICLE ................................................. 63
CONCLUSION ............................................................................... 68
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Page(s)
Affronti v. Crosson,
95 N.Y.2d 713 (2001) ................................................................. 62
Bd. of Educ., Levittown Union Free Sch. Dist. v.
Nyquist,
57 N.Y.2d 27 (1982) ........................................................... passim
Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State,
100 N.Y.2d 893 (2003) ....................................................... passim
Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State,
29 A.D.3d 175 (1st Dep’t 2006) .................................................. 58
Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State,
8 N.Y.3d 14 (2006) ............................................................. passim
Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State,
86 N.Y.2d 307 (1995) ......................................................... passim
Cole v. Mandell Food Stores, Inc.,
93 N.Y.2d 34 (1999) ................................................................... 66
Dufur v. Lavin,
101 A.D.2d 319 (3d Dep’t 1984) ................................................. 66
Dunham v. Townshend,
118 N.Y. 281 (1890) ................................................................... 62
Godfrey v. Spano,
13 N.Y.3d 358 (2009) ................................................................. 62
Matter of Aliessa v. Novello,
96 N.Y.2d 418 (2001) ................................................................. 52
Matter of Markowitz v. Serio,
11 N.Y.3d 43 (2008) ................................................................... 60
v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (cont’d)
Cases Page(s)
Matter of Siwek v. Mahoney,
39 N.Y.2d 159 (1976) ................................................................. 62
Mavroudis v. State Wide Ins. Co.,
102 A.D.2d 864 (2d Dep’t 1984) ................................................. 67
N.Y. State Ass’n of Small City School Dists., Inc.
v. State,
42 A.D.3d 648 (3d Dep’t 2007) ............................................. 35, 36
New York Civil Liberties Union v. State,
4 N.Y.3d 175 (2005) ........................................................... passim
Paynter v. State,
100 N.Y.2d 434 (2003) ....................................................... passim
People v. Knox,
12 N.Y.3d 60 (2009) ............................................................. 52, 53
Reform Educ. Financing Inequities Today (R.E.F.I.T.)
v. Cuomo,
86 N.Y.2d 279 (1995) ........................................................... 33, 45
Rovello v. Orofino Realty Co.,
40 N.Y.2d 633 (1976) ........................................................... 41, 62
Valley Cadillac Corp. v. Dick,
238 A.D.2d 894 (4th Dep’t 1997) ............................................... 66
Laws
N.Y. Const. art. XI, § 1 ................................................................. 1, 6
Ch. 53, 2007 N.Y. Laws 573 ........................................................... 13
Ch. 53, 2008 N.Y. Laws 593 ........................................................... 13
Ch. 53, 2010 N.Y. Laws 1187 ......................................................... 17
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (cont’d)
Laws Page(s)
Ch. 53, 2012 N.Y. Laws (L.R.S.) .................................................... 19
Ch. 53, 2016 N.Y. Laws (L.R.S.) .................................................... 17
Ch. 57, 2007 N.Y. Laws 2410 ......................................................... 14
Ch. 57, 2009 N.Y. Laws 2657 ......................................................... 16
Ch. 57, 2012 N.Y. Laws (L.R.S.) .................................................... 19
Ch. 57, 2013 N.Y. Laws (L.R.S.) .................................................... 20
Ch. 103, 2010 N.Y. Laws 3987 ....................................................... 18
Education Law § 3602 .............................................................. 15, 17
State Finance Law
§ 22 ............................................................................................. 14
§ 23 ............................................................................................. 14
8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 100.5 ....................................................................... 64
Miscellaneous Authorities
Council of the City of New York, Hearing on the Fiscal
Year 2014 Executive Budget for the Department of
Education (June 4, 2013), available at
http://tinyurl.com/NYCCouncil2014BudgetHrg ........................ 25
Jennifer Medina, For New York, $700 Million in School
Aid, N.Y. Times, Aug. 25, 2010, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/25/nyregion/25nyra
ce.html ........................................................................................ 19
Jennifer Medina, New York Fails to Get Grant of $700
Million for Schools, N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 2010,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/30/
education/30top.html?fta=y ....................................................... 19
vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (cont’d)
Miscellaneous Authorities Page(s)
John R. Higgitt, Practice Commentaries to C.P.L.R.
3211, 7B McKinney’s Consol. Laws of N.Y. (2016) ................... 41
N.Y. State Div. of the Budget, 2007-2008 Executive
Budget Briefing Book (Jan. 31, 2007), available at
https://www.budget.ny.gov/pubs/archive/fy0708archi
ve/fy0708littlebook/BriefingBook.pdf .................................. 14, 15
N.Y. State Div. of the Budget, New York State 2007-08
Enacted Budget Financial Plan 57 (Apr. 19, 2007),
available at https://openbudget.ny.gov/historicalFP/
fy0708archive/fp0708/2007-08EnactedBudgetReport.
pdf ........................................................................................ 13, 14
N.Y. State Div. of the Budget, New York State 2008-09
Enacted Budget Financial Plan (May 1, 2008),
available at https://openbudget.ny.gov/historicalFP/
fy0809archive/enacted0809/2008-09EBReportFinal.
pdf ........................................................................................ 13, 14
N.Y. State Div. of the Budget, New York State 2009-10
Enacted Budget Financial Plan (Apr. 28, 2009),
available at https://openbudget.ny.gov/historicalFP/
fy0910archive/enacted0910/2009-10EnactedBudget-
FINAL.pdf .................................................................................. 16
N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, 2014-15 State Aid Handbook
(Feb. 2, 2015), available at
https://stateaid.nysed.gov/publications/handbooks/
handbook_2014.pdf .................................................................... 15
N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, Fiscal Analysis & Research
Unit, A Guide to the Headings of the Fiscal Profile,
available at http://www.oms.nysed.gov/faru/
PDFDocuments/FARUWEBSITEFISCALAPPENDI
X.pdf ........................................................................................... 60
viii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (cont’d)
Miscellaneous Authorities Page(s)
N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, Fiscal Analysis & Research
Unit, Column Headings in Each Spread Sheet,
http://www.oms.nysed.gov/faru/Profiles/datacolumns
1.htm .................................................................................... 60, 61
N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, Fiscal Analysis & Research
Unit, Master File for 2013-14, available at
http://www.oms.nysed.gov/faru/Profiles/profiles_
cover.html ............................................................................ 53, 61
N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, Fiscal Analysis & Research
Unit, The Fiscal Profile Reporting System,
http://www.oms.nysed.gov/faru/Profiles/profiles_cove
r.html ......................................................................................... 60
Overview Information; Race to the Top Fund; Notice
Inviting Applications for New Awards for Fiscal
Year (FY) 2010, 74 Fed. Reg. 59836 (Nov. 18, 2009) ................. 18
Press Release, N.Y. State Governor, Unprecedented
Expansion of School Aid Tied to Accountability (Jan.
31, 2007), available at http://worldcat.org/arcviewer
/1/AO%23/2008/03/17/0000083244/viewer/file183.ht
ml ................................................................................................ 51
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
These consolidated appeals—New Yorkers for Students
Educational Rights v. State (“NYSER”), and Aristy-Farer v. State—
raise critical issues concerning the well-established pleading
requirements necessary to state a claim for increased public-school
funding under the Education Article of the New York Constitution,
see N.Y. Const. art. XI, § 1. As this Court has repeatedly held,
district-specific allegations of serious educational deficiencies are a
core, indispensable element of an Education Article claim. In these
appeals, however, the courts below held that the plaintiffs could
proceed to trial on Education Article claims concerning hundreds of
school districts for which they have made no allegations whatsoever
about educational deficiencies. Plaintiffs’ claims as to such districts
must be dismissed as a matter of law, and the Appellate Division,
First Department’s ruling to the contrary should accordingly be
reversed.1
1 The Appellate Division also held that the NYSER plaintiffs
had adequately alleged deficiencies to state an Education Article
claim (their fourth cause of action) as to two districts, New York
City and Syracuse, for which the complaint contains some specific
2
Thus, as a threshold matter, plaintiffs’ theories of liability
violate the requirement that Education Article claimants
sufficiently allege district-specific deficiencies. Moreover, even
setting this defect aside, the First Department also erred in
endorsing the plaintiffs’ theories of Education Article liability for
other reasons as well.
The NYSER plaintiffs assert that the State can be held liable
under the Education Article based solely on (a) the Legislature’s
adjustments to previously enacted statutory funding formulas
(specifically those providing for a category of state aid known as
Foundation Aid) after the 2008-2009 financial crisis; and (b) the
Legislature’s alleged failure to maintain funding at the levels
endorsed by this Court in Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State
allegations. While the State does not agree with this determination,
it does not ask this Court to review that ruling. The State does urge
this Court to dismiss the NYSER plaintiffs’ other causes of action
as to all school districts, including New York City and Syracuse, for
the reasons explained below. And the State reserves its right to
contest in other phases of this litigation, including summary
judgment, the adequacy of the NYSER plaintiffs’ allegations and
evidence as to New York City and Syracuse under their fourth
cause of action.
3
(“CFE III”), 8 N.Y.3d 14 (2006). But neither the prior statutory
funding formulas nor this Court’s decision in CFE III established a
constitutional floor for statewide education funding. Therefore,
claims alleging that funding fell below those levels do not state a
violation of the Education Article. The statutory funding formulas
were designed to surpass constitutional requirements, not to
establish a constitutional minimum for any district, much less for
every district. And CFE III determined only that a particular
funding calculation was reasonably designed to remedy specific
educational deficiencies in New York City alone; it thus did not
establish a strict constitutional minimum even in New York City,
much less in any other district. And the New York City school
district has since received increased funding well above the level
endorsed in CFE III, in any event.
Finally, the First Department also erred in failing to dismiss
the complaint in Aristy-Farer, which deals only with New York City
and raises a narrower Education Article claim about the City’s one-
time ineligibility for a specific annual funding increase making up
only a small portion of its education budget. The complaint contains
4
no allegations about the current level of educational services in
New York City and makes no effort to establish a causal link
between any educational deficiencies and the specific funding
decision being challenged. The Aristy-Farer plaintiffs have thus
also failed to satisfy this Court’s well-established pleading
requirements for Education Article claims.
ISSUES PRESENTED
1. Did the NYSER plaintiffs fail to state a claim concerning
the hundreds of school districts as to which the complaint lacks
concrete, district-specific allegations of (a) gross and glaring
educational deficiencies that deny public school students the
opportunity to receive a sound basic education, and (b) causes
attributable to the State—both of which must be pleaded under this
Court’s precedent?
2. Did the NYSER plaintiffs fail to state a claim by failing
to make the required allegations of educational deficiencies and
causation and by instead attempting to rely solely on allegations
concerning (a) the Legislature’s adjustments to previously enacted
5
statutory funding formulas and (b) the Legislature’s alleged failure
to maintain funding at levels endorsed by this Court in CFE III?
3. Did the Aristy-Farer plaintiffs fail to state a claim by
failing to allege (a) educational deficiencies that deny New York
City public school students the opportunity to receive a sound basic
education, and (b) a causal link to the lone funding decision
challenged in the complaint?
The Appellate Division, First Department, answered all three
questions in the negative.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
These appeals involve two complaints that were initially filed
as separate actions in Supreme Court, New York County: Aristy-
Farer v. State (Index No. 100274/13) and NYSER v. State (Index
No. 650450/14). While the two complaints set forth separate and
distinct factual allegations and claims for relief, both complaints
claim that the State has violated its school funding obligations
under the Education Article and this Court’s decisions in the
Campaign for Fiscal Equity (“CFE”) litigation, and the two were
6
consolidated for decision in the trial court and the First
Department. Accordingly, this Statement begins with an overview
of the law pertinent to both actions, then discusses the distinct
claims made in each case, and finally explains the procedural
history.
A. Constitutional and Statutory Background
1. The State’s constitutional obligation to
ensure the opportunity for a sound basic
education
Under the New York Constitution, the Legislature has both
the authority and the duty to “provide for the maintenance and
support of a system of free common schools, wherein all the children
of this state may be educated.” N.Y. Const. art. XI, § 1. This
provision “imposes a duty on the Legislature to ensure the
availability of a sound basic education to all the children of the
State.” Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 86 N.Y.2d 307,
315 (1995) (“CFE I”); see also Bd. of Educ., Levittown Union Free
Sch. Dist. v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d 27, 47 (1982) (“Levittown”). And
courts, as the arbiters of constitutional norms, are “responsible for
7
adjudicating the nature of [the] duty” imposed by the Education
Article. CFE I, 86 N.Y.2d at 315.
This Court has endorsed a cautious and measured role for the
judiciary in adjudicating claims asserting a violation of that duty,
given that matters of education financing and policy are
quintessentially the domain of the executive and legislative
branches. The “determination of the amounts, sources, and
objectives of expenditures of public moneys for educational
purposes, especially at the State level, presents issues of enormous
practical and political complexity.” Levittown, 57 N.Y.2d at 38. Such
questions strike at the “the very essence of our governmental and
political polity,” and their resolution thus appropriately is “largely
left to the interplay of the interests and forces directly involved and
indirectly affected, in the arenas of legislative and executive
activity.” Id. at 38-39.
Judicial involvement in such matters is, therefore,
“normally . . . inappropriate.” Id. at 39. This deference “is justified
not only by prudent and practical hesitation in light of the limited
access of the Judiciary to the controlling economic and social facts,”
8
but also by the Court’s “abiding respect for the separation of powers
upon which our system of government is based.” CFE III, 8 N.Y.3d at
28 (quotation marks omitted).
2. The Campaign for Fiscal Equity litigation
The three decisions in the CFE litigation constitute this
Court’s most extensive consideration of the obligations imposed by
the Education Article. This Court’s first decision provided a
“template” of the types of allegations that a court “must consider”
in evaluating a claim to enforce those obligations. CFE I, 86 N.Y.2d
at 317. The second decision adjudicated the sufficiency of plaintiffs’
trial evidence of educational deficiencies in the New York City
school district. See Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 100
N.Y.2d 893, 902-03, 908-25 (2003) (“CFE II”). The third decision
considered the question of remedy. See CFE III, 8 N.Y.3d at 27.
Plaintiffs in CFE alleged that the State had failed to provide
students in a single school district—the New York City school
district—with the opportunity to receive a minimally adequate
sound basic education. CFE I addressed the State’s motion to
dismiss the complaint. The Court held that the State’s
9
constitutional obligation required it to ensure that school districts
provide the “physical facilities and pedagogical services and
resources” necessary to allow students an opportunity to obtain
“basic literacy, calculating, and verbal skills.” 86 N.Y.2d at 316-18.
Plaintiffs had adequately pleaded the State’s failure to satisfy this
obligation by alleging “gross educational deficiencies” in both
educational inputs (such as teaching, curricula, school facilities,
classrooms, supplies, textbooks, libraries, and computers) and
educational outputs (such as test results and graduation rates). Id.
at 317, 319.
The trial court then held a trial that spanned seven months
and included the testimony of 72 witnesses and 4,300 exhibits.
Based on extensive evidence of gross deficiencies in both
educational inputs and outputs, the court concluded that the State
had failed to provide students in New York City the opportunity for
a sound basic education. This Court upheld that determination in
its second decision in the CFE litigation. See CFE II, 100 N.Y.2d at
902-03, 908-13.
10
In deference to the Legislature, however, this Court did not
order any specific funding remedy because it did not have “the
authority, nor the ability, nor the will, to micromanage education
financing.” Id. at 925. Instead, the Court directed the State to
“ascertain the actual cost of providing a sound basic education in
New York City,” to take steps to reform school financing to ensure
that New York City students have sufficient resources to have the
opportunity for a sound basic education, and to enact accountability
reforms. Id. at 930. This Court’s remedial order was limited to New
York City, although it noted that the State “may of course address
statewide issues if it chooses.” Id. at 928.
In response, then-Governor Pataki commissioned a study to
ascertain the cost of providing the opportunity for a sound basic
education. That study concluded that approximately $1.93 billion
in additional operating funds (i.e., excluding transportation, debt
service, and capital expenditures) from all sources (i.e., federal,
state, and local) would provide constitutionally adequate
11
educational services in New York City.2 CFE III, 8 N.Y.3d at 21-27
& n.3. The study also reviewed education spending statewide and
concluded that applying the same methodology would result in a
$2.45 estimate for the entire State, including the $1.93 billion
figure for New York City, though New York City was the only
district at issue in CFE and the only one for which the State was
directed to supply a remedy. See id. at 21, 23-24.
On the third and final appeal in the CFE litigation, this Court
deferred to the State’s analysis as a reasonable estimate prepared
by the elected branches, and declared that “the constitutionally
2 The $1.93 billion figure was derived from an analysis
conducted by Standard & Poor’s (S&P) that compared two sets of
numbers: (i) spending estimates of the costs of providing a sound
basic education (excluding capital, debt, and transportation costs),
and (ii) relevant spending figures for 2002-2003. See CFE III, 8
N.Y.3d at 21-27. This Court endorsed the $1.93 billion estimate,
subject to two one-time-only adjustments agreed to by the State. Id.
at 27; see also Br. for Defs.-Resp’ts.-Cross-Appellants at 26 & n.6,
CFE III, 8 N.Y.3d 14 (Index No. 111070/93) (“State Br.”). First, the
$1.93 billion estimate was to be adjusted to take into account a later
version of a certain cost index used by S&P (the Geographic Cost of
Education Index, or GCEI). See CFE III, 8 N.Y.3d at 23, 25, 27.
Second, the $1.93 billion estimate was to be adjusted for inflation
to reflect 2004-2005 dollars. See id. at 27; State Br., supra, at 26 &
n.6.
12
required funding for the New York City School District includes . . .
additional operating funds in the amount of $1.93 billion” from all
sources, subject to the two one-time-only adjustments agreed to by
the State. Id. at 27. The Court noted, however, that its decision
would not foreclose the elected branches from making “a policy
choice to exceed the constitutional minimum.” Id.
In doing so, the Court did not rule on the sufficiency of public-
education spending as to any other district. It also did not impose
any requirement that increased funds for New York City be phased
in over a particular period of time or direct the State to revisit its
determination of the amount of funds needed going forward.
Indeed, it affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision to strike a trial
court requirement that the State perform “costing-out studies every
four years” in the future.3 See id. at 32.
3 The Court also affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision to
strike a trial-court requirement that the “New York City
Department of Education prepare a comprehensive ‘sound basic
education’ plan, to ensure accountability.” CFE III, 8 N.Y.3d at 32.
The Court noted that “a new and costly layer of city bureaucracy is
not constitutionally required,” and that “[i]t is undisputed that
there are minimally adequate accountability mechanisms now in
place for the evaluation of New York schools.” Id.
13
3. Public-education spending in New
York between CFE and the financial
crisis of 2008-2009
In 2007, the year after CFE III was decided, the Legislature
enacted significant modifications to state support for public
education in New York that went well beyond the proposed New
York City-only funding increase that this Court approved in CFE
III. Two such changes are relevant here.
First, the State substantially increased overall education
funding statewide. Education appropriations rose by $1.76 billion
in 2007, see Ch. 53, 2007 N.Y. Laws 573, and by a further $1.75
billion in 2008, see Ch. 53, 2008 N.Y. Laws 593.4 The financial plans
prepared in each of those years by the State Division of the Budget
(DOB) anticipated additional funding increases in subsequent
years, though no funds were appropriated to satisfy those proposed
4 See N.Y. State Div. of the Budget (DOB), New York State
2007-08 Enacted Budget Financial Plan 57 (Apr. 19, 2007); DOB,
New York State 2008-09 Enacted Budget Financial Plan 62 (May 1,
2008).
14
funding levels.5 See State Finance Law § 22(4) (requiring
Governor’s executive budget submitted annually to the Legislature
to include financial plan with three-year financial projection); id.
§ 23(3) (requiring update to financial plan and three-year projection
within thirty days after enactment of annual budget).
Second, the Legislature created a new program, called
Foundation Aid, that altered the State’s method of apportioning
general operating aid among school districts. Enacted as part of the
Budget and Reform Act of 2007, see Ch. 57, pt. B, § 13, 2007 N.Y.
Laws 2410, 2444-45 (codified as amended at Education Law
§ 3602(4)), Foundation Aid is a formula used to calculate per-pupil
education funding for each district. Simplifying greatly, the formula
essentially calculates a base per-pupil amount, based upon
amounts spent on educating students in successful school districts,
which is then adjusted on a district-specific basis for regional cost
5 See DOB, New York State 2007-08 Enacted Budget Financial
Plan, supra, at 57; DOB, New York State 2008-09 Enacted Budget
Financial Plan, supra, at 62. These out-year projections reflected
the Governor’s 2007 proposal to increase education funding
substantially over four years. See, e.g., DOB, 2007-2008 Executive
Budget Briefing Book 29-30 (Jan. 31, 2007).
15
factors and the additional costs of educating certain high-need
students. That figure is then further adjusted according to a phase-
in provision, which as originally enacted made districts eligible to
receive the maximum per-pupil allocation of Foundation Aid after
four years. See Education Law § 3602(4)(a)-(b).6
In adopting these education funding statutes, the Legislature
went far beyond the scope of CFE III. Whereas CFE had addressed
public schools only in New York City, the Legislature substantially
increased funding for all school districts in the State. In addition,
even as to New York City, the legislation called for an increase in
total funding well beyond the levels specified in CFE III. In
particular, the legislation was proposed by then-Governor Spitzer
as part of a plan designed to increase total state and city funding to
New York City by $5.4 billion over the course of four years—more
than twice the $1.93 billion total proposed increase that this Court
endorsed in CFE III.7
6 See also N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t (SED), 2014-15 State Aid
Handbook 7-13 (Feb. 2, 2015).
7 See, e.g., DOB, 2007-2008 Executive Budget Briefing Book,
supra, at 29-30. (See also R. 144-145 [¶¶ 39-41].)
16
4. Public-education funding in New York
since the financial crisis of 2008-2009
After the 2008-2009 financial crisis, the State was forced to
close a $20.1 billion budget gap—“the largest budget gap ever faced
by the State”—in enacting the 2009-2010 state budget.8 The
Legislature closed that gap through a series of measures enacted in
April 2009 as part of that year’s budget that included tax increases
and across-the-board spending cuts.9
Education spending was affected in several ways, including
changes to the State’s public-education funding formulas. For
instance, the Legislature eliminated a planned Foundation Aid
increase for the 2009-2010 school year and extended the phase-in
period for Foundation Aid from four years to seven years—thus
delaying the time at which school districts would receive their
maximum per-pupil allocation of Foundation Aid. See Ch. 57, pt. A,
8 DOB, New York State 2009-10 Enacted Budget Financial
Plan 4 (Apr. 28, 2009).
9 DOB, New York State 2009-10 Enacted Budget Financial
Plan, supra, at 12-16.
17
§ 13, 2009 N.Y. Laws 2657, 2663-64 (codified at Education Law
§ 3602(4)(b-1)).
The Legislature also enacted the Gap Elimination
Adjustment (or GEA), a formula that apportioned reductions to
formula-based aid among school districts according to certain
district-specific factors, including relative wealth and student need.
See Ch. 53, 2010 N.Y. Laws 1187, 1242-45; see also Education Law
§ 3602(1)(j)(17). The Gap Elimination Adjustment essentially
revised the multiple formulas used to calculate total aid to school
districts in a manner that, practically speaking, further reduced the
amount of aid that school districts could expect to receive compared
to the prior formulas enacted in 2007. The Legislature temporarily
extended the Gap Elimination Adjustment after 2011, but finally
phased it out altogether in 2016. See Ch. 53, 2016 N.Y. Laws
(L.R.S.) at 172.
18
5. New York City’s one-time ineligibility
for specific funds due to its delay in
implementing a revised evaluation
system for teachers and principals
Additional circumstances also affected state aid for the New
York City school district—specifically, as relevant here, the
district’s delayed implementation of a new annual professional
performance review (APPR) system for teachers and principals.
In 2010, the Legislature mandated that all school districts put
in place new, more rigorous APPR systems to rate teacher and
principal effectiveness. See Ch. 103, § 1, 2010 N.Y. Laws 3987,
3987-89 (creating Education Law § 3012-c). As of 2012, however,
the APPR mandate was largely unimplemented, threatening the
State’s eligibility for funds under the federal Race to the Top
program.10
10 The Race to the Top program established an approximately
$4 billion federal grant fund to be allocated in a multiphase
competitive process among the States. See Overview Information;
Race to the Top Fund; Notice Inviting Applications for New Awards
for Fiscal Year (FY) 2010, 74 Fed. Reg. 59836, 59840 (Nov. 18,
2009). To qualify, state applicants were required to establish
evaluation systems for teachers and principals. Id. at 59844. New
York State’s initial application for Race to the Top funds was
19
The Legislature thus enacted an “APPR Compliance
Provision” in 2012 that conditioned certain state aid increases on a
school district’s having implemented a compliant APPR system. See
Ch. 53, 2012 N.Y. Laws (L.R.S.) at 139-42; Ch. 57, pt. A, § 1, 2012
N.Y. Laws (L.R.S.) at 3-4. The APPR Compliance Provision led
approximately 99 percent of school districts to adopt new APPR
systems. But New York City still did not do so, making it ineligible
for an approximate $290 million state-aid increase for the 2012-
2013 school year alone (which would have been added to the nearly
$7.5 billion in state aid the City received that year). (R. 13 [¶ 28],
17 [¶ 43].)
The state Commissioner of Education, under authority
conferred by the Legislature, resolved New York City’s
noncompliance through binding arbitration on June 1, 2013 (R. 15
rejected, in part because it did not include a plan for revising its
evaluation system; but the State’s second-round application,
submitted shortly after the APPR system was enacted, resulted in
a federal grant of nearly $700 million. See, e.g., Jennifer Medina,
For New York, $700 Million in School Aid, N.Y. Times, Aug. 25,
2010, at A1; Jennifer Medina, New York Fails to Get Grant of $700
Million for Schools, N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 2010, at A22.
20
[¶ 34]), thereby removing the statutory bar to the City’s receipt of
state aid increases thereafter. See Ch. 57, pt. A, § 7-a, 2013 N.Y.
Laws (L.R.S.) at 9-10. Accordingly, the sole impact of the APPR
Compliance Provision in New York City was a one-time-only failure
to qualify for a specific state aid increase in a single school year.
B. The Present Actions
1. The NYSER action11
The NYSER action was brought by a statewide education
advocacy organization and parents of students attending public
schools in nine separate school districts across the State. They
purport to bring claims for relief in every school district in the State.
They assert four causes of action.
In their first cause of action, the NYSER plaintiffs claim that
the State has violated the Education Article by not providing New
11 While the Aristy-Farer action was filed first, this section
begins with the NYSER action because the NYSER plaintiffs
challenge a far broader set of public-education funding measures.
An overview of the NYSER plaintiffs’ claims thus helps to provide
context for understanding the comparatively narrow challenge
raised in Aristy-Farer.
21
York City’s public schools “the minimum constitutional level of
operational funding mandated by the Court of Appeals in CFE III.”
(R. 190 [¶ 191(a)].) But the NYSER plaintiffs do not allege that the
New York City school district receives less than the additional
$1.93 billion in overall operating funds that this Court endorsed in
CFE III. Rather, they claim that the State violated CFE III by
failing to fund Foundation Aid at the level that was originally
proposed when that program was created in 2007—a claim
premised on the Legislature’s subsequent adoption of the GEA,
APPR Compliance Provision, and other statutory adjustments
described above. (R. 190-191 [¶ 191].)
The second cause of action also relates to Foundation Aid. The
NYSER plaintiffs claim that the level of aid proposed when the
Foundation Aid program was created constitutes a constitutional
floor of minimum funding needed to provide students throughout
the State with a sound basic education. (R. 143-146 [¶¶ 38-44].) The
NYSER plaintiffs claim that the State has violated the Education
Article in every school district throughout the State by reducing the
22
Foundation Aid program below the level originally enacted by the
Legislature. (R. 191-193 [¶ 193].)
The third cause of action claims that the State violated the
Education Article by (i) failing to implement an adequate “system
of accountability” to ensure that state aid is sufficient to provide
students with the opportunity for a sound basic education, and
(ii) failing to provide school districts “information” and “guidance”
about courses and materials that students must receive to ensure
that they are afforded the opportunity for a sound basic education.
(R. 193-194 [¶ 195].)
The fourth cause of action alleges more generally that the
State has violated the Education Article by failing—in each of the
nearly 700 school districts across the State—to provide students
with the opportunity to obtain a sound basic education. (R. 194
[¶ 197].) This claim is based predominantly on allegations of
deficient educational inputs and outputs in the New York City
school district, including allegations of inadequate numbers of
teachers and other education professionals (R. 164-165 [¶¶ 95-96]);
deficient educational services for at-risk students, English
23
language learners, and students requiring special education
programs (R. 166 [¶¶ 101-104], 167-170 [¶ 107-115]); overly
crowded classes in inadequate classroom facilities using outdated
and deficient teaching supplies (R. 170-173 [¶¶ 116-120, 122-126]);
and resulting low achievement on proficiency measures and high
school graduation rates (R. 175 [¶¶ 132-133]). The NYSER
complaint further contains four additional paragraphs about
educational inputs and outputs in the Buffalo, Rochester, and
Yonkers school districts (R. 176-177 [¶¶ 136-139]), and a handful of
additional paragraphs about Syracuse (R. 160-163 [¶¶ 85-92]). There
are no allegations at all about the educational services in any of the
almost 700 other school districts for which the NYSER plaintiffs
purport to bring their Education Article claim.
2. The Aristy-Farer action
The Aristy-Farer action involves the APPR Compliance
Provision alone. The Aristy-Farer plaintiffs are parents of students
attending public schools in the New York City school district. In
their operative complaint, the Aristy-Farer plaintiffs claim that the
State’s one-time “withholding” of state aid increases from New York
24
City pursuant to the APPR Compliance Provision deprived students
in that school district of the opportunity for a sound basic education
in violation of the Education Article.12 (R. 28 [¶¶ 84-85].)
The Aristy-Farer plaintiffs do not allege any facts about
educational services at schools in the New York City school district.
There is no allegation about the number of teachers, the quality of
physical facilities, or the supply of textbooks and other materials
available in that district. There is no allegation that those
educational services are so deficient at schools throughout the
district that they effectively deprive students in the entire district
of the opportunity to obtain a sound basic education. And there is
no factual allegation showing that any deficiency in educational
inputs or outputs is caused by the New York City school district’s
one-time ineligibility, pursuant to the APPR Compliance Provision,
12 The Aristy-Farer plaintiffs also claim that the APPR
Compliance Provision violates the due process and equal protection
clauses of the New York Constitution, although those claims were
dismissed by the First Department, and plaintiffs have not cross-
appealed.
25
for a state aid increase making up a small fraction of its overall
annual budget.13
C. Proceedings in Supreme Court
The Aristy-Farer plaintiffs commenced their action in
Supreme Court, New York County, in February 2013 and filed their
second amended complaint—the pleading operative here—in July
2013. The State moved to dismiss the Aristy-Farer complaint in
September 2013 (R. 33-34), arguing that the complaint failed to
allege that the New York City school district was providing
students with deficient education services—an essential element of
an Education Article claim (R. 53-57). Supreme Court (Mendez, J.)
denied the motion in an April 2014 order (R. 4-7), and the State
timely appealed (R. 2-3).
13 For the 2014 fiscal year, the New York City Department of
Education, which administers the New York City school district,
reported a total budget of approximately $24.9 billion. See Council
of the City of New York, Hearing on the Fiscal Year 2014 Executive
Budget for the Department of Education at 6 (June 4, 2013). The
state aid increase for which the City was ineligible due to the APPR
Compliance Provision is less than 1.5 percent of the reported total
budget of $24.9 billion.
26
Meanwhile, the NYSER plaintiffs had commenced their
action in February 2014, and filed an amended complaint in March
2014. The State moved to dismiss the amended NYSER complaint
in May 2014 (R. 199-200) and, while that motion was pending, the
NYSER plaintiffs moved to consolidate their action with Aristy-
Farer. The consolidation motion was granted and, in November
2014, Supreme Court (Mendez, J.) denied the State’s motion to
dismiss the NYSER action.14 (R. 126-130.) The State timely
appealed. (R. 124-125.)
14 The City of Yonkers moved to intervene in the NYSER
action before it was consolidated with the Aristy-Farer action. After
the two actions were consolidated, Supreme Court (Mendez, J.),
granted Yonkers’ motion to intervene, but the Appellate Division
reversed that order and denied Yonkers’ intervention motion (R.
389-390). Yonkers did not seek leave to appeal, and thus the
Appellate Division’s order denying Yonkers’ intervention motion is
not before the Court.
27
D. The First Department’s Decision
The State’s two appeals were resolved in a single order issued
by the First Department on September 8, 2016.15 The First
Department’s order affirmed the denial of the State’s motions to
dismiss in most respects.
First, the First Department held that the NYSER plaintiffs
adequately stated an Education Article claim based on the State’s
alleged failure to comply with the funding level endorsed by this
Court in CFE III. (R. 378-379.) The court rejected the State’s
argument that such a claim must be limited to “New York City
only.” (R. 376.) Although CFE III was expressly limited to the New
York City school district, see CFE III, 8 N.Y.3d at 27, the court
nevertheless held that CFE III’s requirement of additional
education aid applied “by extension” to every other school district
in the State. (R. 378.) Accordingly, the court held that plaintiffs
could pursue an Education Article claim based on their allegation
15 The order also disposed of the State’s appeal from the trial
court’s decision granting Yonkers’s motion to intervene. See supra
at 26 n.14.
28
that state education aid fell below the “CFE minimum” (R. 379),
which required the State to provide a funding increase of “at least
$1.93 billion . . . for the City of New York (and, by extension, at least
$2.45 billion statewide)” (R. 378).16
Second, the First Department held that the NYSER plaintiffs
stated a viable Education Article claim by alleging “systemic
district-wide educational deficiencies that are attributable to a lack
of funding by the State.” (R. 379-380.) Specifically, the court held
sufficient the plaintiffs’ allegations of deficient educational inputs
and outputs for the New York City and Syracuse school districts.
(R. 383.) The court acknowledged that the NYSER complaint
contained no comparable allegations about other school districts—
it included only a few scant allegations about Buffalo, Rochester,
and Yonkers, and nothing at all about every other school district.
The court nonetheless declined to dismiss the plaintiffs’ Education
Article claims “insofar as they relate to the hundreds of districts as
16 The Appellate Division also concluded, wrongly, that this
Court in CFE III left standing a requirement that the State
implement the needed funding increases over four years. (R. 378.)
29
to which there are no particularized pleadings.” (R. 383.) The court
reasoned that the NYSER plaintiffs could seek relief for every
school district based solely on “alleged systemic deficiencies in at
least one or two districts” (R. 384) because as a “practical matter,
actionable deficits identified in one district will require
modification of the formula, necessarily affecting calculation of
funding for all districts” (R. 383).
Third, the First Department sustained part of the NYSER
plaintiffs’ claim for additional accountability mechanisms.
Although the court recognized that the State’s accountability
measures had been approved in CFE III (see supra at 12 n.3), the
court concluded that the NYSER plaintiffs should be entitled to
“explor[e] the adequacy of [those] accountability mechanisms” in
light of the “significant funding adjustments over the 10 years since
CFE III was handed down.” (R. 384-385.) The court, however,
rejected the NYSER plaintiffs’ claims insofar as they required the
State to provide information because that request was “not
sufficiently related to the State’s funding duty” under the
Education Article. (R. 385.)
30
Finally, the First Department sustained the Aristy-Farer
plaintiffs’ Education Article claim. (R. 388-389.) This conclusion
was not based on the sufficiency of the allegations in the Aristy-
Farer complaint; the court did not conclude, for instance, that that
pleading set forth adequate factual allegations of deficiencies in
educational inputs or outputs caused by insufficient state education
aid for New York City. Instead, the court permitted the Aristy-Farer
plaintiffs to proceed to discovery on their Education Article claim
because the Aristy-Farer action and the NYSER action involved the
same “nucleus of operative facts” and had been consolidated; under
those circumstances, the court did not “find it appropriate to permit
one to go forward without the other.” (R. 388-389.)
The First Department granted the State’s separate motions
in the Aristy-Farer action and the NYSER action for leave to appeal
to this Court.
31
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction under C.P.L.R. 5602(b)(1) because
the Appellate Division granted appellants’ motions for leave to
appeal in NYSER and Aristy-Farer on December 15, 2016. (R. 391-
392.) The questions raised were decided by Supreme Court (R. 4-7,
126-130) and the Appellate Division (R. 368-369, 378, 380-386, 388-
390), and are preserved for this Court’s review by appellants’
arguments in support of their motions to dismiss the complaints
(see R. 6, 129) and on appeal (see R. 375, 379, 383-385).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE NYSER PLAINTIFFS’ EDUCATION ARTICLE
CLAIMS MUST BE DISMISSED AS TO THE HUNDREDS
OF SCHOOL DISTRICTS FOR WHICH THE COMPLAINT
CONTAINS NO SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS
The First Department recognized that the NYSER plaintiffs
identified systemic educational deficiencies in only two school
districts (New York City and Syracuse). Nonetheless, and despite
well-established precedent to the contrary, the First Department
permitted plaintiffs to proceed with their Education Article claims
32
against all of the other nearly 700 school districts in the State. (R.
383.) This Court should reverse. As this Court has made clear,
allegations about specific educational deficiencies in particular
school districts are the irreducible predicate for relief under the
Education Article. The NYSER plaintiffs’ failure to comply with
this well-established pleading requirement requires the dismissal
of all of their Education Article claims as to all school districts for
which the complaint contains no (or essentially no) allegations.17
17 As previously noted (see supra at 1 n.1), the State does not
ask this Court to review the Appellate Division’s determination
that the NYSER plaintiffs adequately identified educational
deficiencies in New York City and Syracuse, but reserves its right
to contest the adequacy of plaintiffs’ allegations and evidence as to
these districts in future phases of this litigation. Moreover, as
explained infra in Point II, certain of plaintiffs’ theories of liability
fail as a matter of law even as to New York City and Syracuse
notwithstanding plaintiffs’ allegations of educational deficiencies in
those districts.
33
A. This Court’s Precedents Mandate That
Educational Deficiencies Be Pleaded on
a District-Specific Basis.
This Court has consistently required specific allegations and
proof of inadequate educational services in the particular school
district where relief is sought. In its earliest decisions construing
the scope of the State’s duty under the Education Article, for
instance, this Court held that allegations (and proof) of unequal
educational services throughout the State could not support a claim
for relief. See Reform Educ. Financing Inequities Today (R.E.F.I.T.)
v. Cuomo (“R.E.F.I.T.”), 86 N.Y.2d 279, 283-84 (1995); Levittown, 57
N.Y.2d at 36-38. The Court explained that minimally adequate
educational services are “all that [students] are guaranteed by our
Constitution,” R.E.F.I.T., 86 N.Y.2d at 285, and that an entitlement
to relief thus arises only where “the educational facilities or services
provided in the school districts” are inadequate, Levittown, 57
N.Y.2d at 38.
The same principle—that a plaintiff’s entitlement to relief
under the Education Article arises from allegations of inadequate
educational services in a school district—animated the Court’s
34
decision to dismiss the claims in Paynter v. State, 100 N.Y.2d 434
(2003). There, the plaintiffs did not allege “any deficiency in
teaching, facilities or instrumentalities of learning” in their school
district. Id. at 440. This Court thus squarely confronted and
rejected the contention that a plaintiff is not “required to allege
inadequate educational services to state a claim” for relief under
the Education Article. Id. at 441 (quotation marks omitted).
Instead, the Court made clear that “allegations that the State
somehow fails in its obligation to provide minimally acceptable
educational services” were required to state a claim for relief under
the Education Article. Id.
Most recently in New York Civil Liberties Union v. State
(“NYCLU”), 4 N.Y.3d 175 (2005), this Court again confirmed the
principle that inadequate educational services in a particular
school district are the necessary predicate for relief under the
Education Article. There, the plaintiffs sought relief for alleged
inadequate educational services, not in their school districts, but in
individual schools within their districts. Id. at 178, 181-82. In
rejecting those claims, this Court observed that a plaintiff is only
35
entitled to relief under the Education Article based on “district-
wide” failures. Id. at 181. The district-specific scope of the State’s
obligation under the Education Article, this Court explained,
derived from the tradition of “local control and participation in
education” embedded in the Constitution. Id. (quotation marks
omitted). The Education Article reflects this tradition of local
control by making the State “responsible for providing sufficient
funding to school districts,” as the local units constitutionally
entitled to “make the basic decisions on funding and operating their
own schools.” Id. at 182. And because the State’s obligation under
the Education Article runs to school districts, the plaintiffs were not
entitled to relief where they did not allege inadequate educational
services by a school district. See id. at 181 (“In identifying
individual schools that do not meet minimum standards, plaintiffs
do not allege any district-wide failure.”).
Relying on this Court’s decision in NYCLU, the Third
Department dismissed Education Article claims under
circumstances materially identical to those presented by the
NYSER action. See N.Y. State Ass’n of Small City School Dists., Inc.
36
v. State, 42 A.D.3d 648 (3d Dep’t 2007) (“Small City School Districts”).
The plaintiffs in Small City School Districts alleged that school
districts for small cities suffered constitutional deficiencies as a result
of lower per-student funding than that provided to noncity school
districts. Id. at 652. The Third Department affirmed dismissal of the
complaint because it included no factual allegations “specific to the
four school districts” represented by plaintiffs who had standing. Id.
Although the complaint contained aggregate statistics and
generalized data about small-city school districts, “no district-wide
failure” was alleged “for any particular district,” and no facts or
statistical data were alleged to show that the four districts with
representative plaintiffs were “actually experiencing the problems
reflected by the aggregate statistics.” Id. It was thus “impossible to
determine” whether those plaintiffs were “actually aggrieved,” and
the complaint was properly dismissed. Id.
37
B. Only District-Specific Allegations Can Satisfy
This Court’s Requirement That Plaintiffs
Concretely Identify Educational Deficiencies
and Causes Attributable to the State.
The First Department’s conclusion that the NYSER plaintiffs
could proceed with Education Article claims against every school
district in the State despite the absence of any allegations as to the
overwhelming majority of those districts cannot be squared with
this Court’s well-established pleading requirements for Education
Article claims.
As this Court has held, a cause of action under the Education
Article has two essential elements: “the deprivation of a sound basic
education, and causes attributable to the State.” NYCLU, 4 N.Y.3d
at 178-79. The first element recognizes the State’s obligation to
afford students the opportunity to achieve the “basic literacy,
calculating, and verbal skills” that are needed to function
“productively as civic participants.” CFE I, 86 N.Y.2d at 316. This
Court has provided a “template” of relevant facts that a court “must
consider”—and that a plaintiff accordingly must plead—in evaluating
whether a school district provides constitutionally adequate
educational services. Id. at 317-18.
38
This template includes the identification of “gross and glaring”
(as opposed to isolated or sporadic) deficiencies in essential
educational inputs—such as “minimally adequate physical facilities
and classrooms which provide enough light, space, heat, and air to
permit children to learn”; “minimally adequate instrumentalities of
learning such as desks, chairs, pencils, and reasonably current
textbooks”; and “minimally adequate teaching of reasonably up-to-
date basic curricula . . . by sufficient personnel adequately trained to
teach those subject areas.” CFE II, 100 N.Y.2d at 907 (quotation
marks omitted); see also Levittown, 57 N.Y.2d at 48. In addition, a
plaintiff must plead deficient educational outputs in the form of
inadequate student outcomes, such as low test scores or poor results
on other measures of student achievement. See Paynter, 100 N.Y.2d
at 440; see also CFE II, 100 N.Y.2d at 914-19.
The second element of an Education Article claim is
causation. “[E]ven gross educational inadequacies are not, standing
alone, enough to state a claim under the Education Article.”
NYCLU, 4 N.Y.3d at 178-79. Instead, a plaintiff must also
demonstrate a “causal link” between the deprivation of adequate
39
educational opportunities and some failure by the State. CFE I, 86
N.Y.2d at 318; see also Paynter, 100 N.Y.2d at 441. Causation is
critical to any Education Article claim because, as this Court has
recognized, “there are a myriad of factors which have a causal
bearing” on poor educational outputs, CFE I, 86 N.Y.2d at 317, and
“causes of academic failure may be manifold, including such factors
as the lack of family supports and health care,” Paynter, 100 N.Y.2d
at 441.
These pleading requirements are premised on the
fundamental understanding that plaintiffs bringing claims for
increased education funding under the Education Article must
make specific allegations about particular school districts as a
threshold matter. Indeed, as this Court explained in NYCLU, “a
claim under the Education Article requires that a district-wide
failure be pleaded” because districts “are the local units responsible
for receiving and using state funding, and the State is responsible
for providing sufficient funding to school districts.” 4 N.Y.3d at 182.
Only through district-specific allegations can a plaintiff establish—
and a court meaningfully evaluate—the concrete deficiencies in
40
educational inputs and outputs, and the causal connection to some
failure by the State, that are critical to stating an Education Article
claim.
C. The NYSER Complaint Fails to Meet These
Standards as to All School Districts for
Which It Alleges No (or Nearly No) Facts.
Accordingly, the First Department erred by effectively
exempting the NYSER plaintiffs from well-established pleading
requirements for hundreds of school districts about which their
complaint is wholly (or nearly) silent. For instance, named plaintiff
Kathryn Barnett seeks relief from the State in the form of
additional funding for the Wyoming Central School District, but the
NYSER complaint does not allege that the schools in that district
have ever failed to provide Barnett’s children with constitutionally
adequate educational services. (R. 137 [¶ 8].) Plaintiff Rolando
Garita likewise claims an entitlement to relief, but he does not
allege that the Truman Moon Elementary School, where his
daughter is allegedly a student, or any other school in the
Middletown City School District fails to provide students with the
opportunity for a sound basic education. (R. 137 [¶ 13].) The same
41
is true for the plaintiffs seeking relief on behalf of the William Floyd
School District (R. 138 [¶ 15]), the Spencer-Van Etten Central
School District (R. 138 [¶ 17]), and the Hermon-DeKalb Central
School District (R. 139 [¶ 22]). None of these plaintiffs has alleged
in any way the critical element giving rise to the State’s obligation
under the Education Article—namely, that the “educational inputs
locally” are constitutionally inadequate. Paynter, 100 N.Y.2d at
442.
As a matter of basic pleading law, therefore, the failure by
each of these plaintiffs to allege facts which, if true, would entitle
them to relief requires that their Education Article claims be
dismissed. That is, the State’s motions to dismiss as to these
plaintiffs—and as to every school district in the NYSER action as
to which there is no allegation of deficient educational services—
should have been granted because the facts alleged in the NYSER
complaint are not “sufficient to state all the necessary elements of
a cognizable cause of action,” Rovello v. Orofino Realty Co., 40
N.Y.2d 633, 635 (1976); see also John R. Higgitt, Practice
Commentaries to C.P.L.R. 3211, 7B McKinney’s Consol. Laws of
42
N.Y. at 48 (2016) (dismissal required where complaint “has
identified a cognizable cause of action but failed to assert a material
allegation necessary to support the cause of action”).
To be sure, the NYSER complaint briefly mentions three other
school districts besides New York City and Syracuse—Buffalo,
Rochester and Yonkers. But the First Department correctly declined
to treat the allegations about these three school districts as sufficient,
instead relying on the erroneous principle, discussed below, that
allegations against New York City can support claims concerning
every district in the State. The complaint devotes just five wholly
inadequate paragraphs in total to these three districts. None of those
paragraphs contains a single factual allegation concerning the
educational inputs specific to those districts—i.e., teaching, curricula,
facilities, classrooms, or instrumentalities of learning. Moreover, the
complaint’s scant assertions concerning student performance in
Buffalo, Rochester, and Yonkers—consisting of scoring statistics from
language arts testing and high school graduation rates from a single
year—do not make up for the paucity of other allegations, especially
given that “causes of academic failure may be manifold,” Paynter,
43
100 N.Y.2d at 441. These allegations are wholly inadequate to
satisfy this Court’s strict pleading standards for Education Article
claims.
D. Allegations of Educational Deficiencies
in One or Two Districts Cannot Support
a Claim as to Any Other District.
The First Department acknowledged that the NYSER
plaintiffs had made no specific allegations concerning hundreds of
school districts, but nonetheless excused that pleading failure by
essentially inferring educational deficiencies in every school district
in the State the NYSER plaintiffs’ allegations of “systemic
deficiencies in at least one or two districts” (R. 384). This inference
fails as a matter of simple common sense: numerous
considerations—such as demographics, district management,
relative wealth, student need, geographic concentration, and a host
of other factors—make the experience of one school district unique
from others. There is thus no justification for presuming, for
instance, that the experience in the New York City school district,
which serves well over one million students, is the same as or even
remotely comparable to the experience of the Hermon-DeKalb
44
Central School District, a rural upstate district serving fewer than
four hundred students—including plaintiff Andy Willard’s children
(R. 139 [¶ 22]).
Indeed, in the CFE litigation, this Court rejected the very
inference that the First Department effectively drew here. After
finding that the CFE plaintiffs had proved an Education Article
violation as to the New York City school district, this Court refused
to require a statewide remedy. See CFE II, 100 N.Y.2d at 928. The
Court observed that the plaintiffs there had prevailed “owing to a
unique combination of circumstances” and that other plaintiffs “in
other districts who cannot demonstrate a similar combination may
find tougher going in the courts.” Id. at 932.
Inferring deficiencies in one school district from deficiencies
in another is also deeply suspect in light of the fact that school
districts are subject to substantial local control and administration
that may vary widely from one district to another. The framers of
the Education Article largely preserved the long-standing system
under which local school districts were the principal organ
providing educational services in the State. See Paynter, 100 N.Y.2d
45
at 442; R.E.F.I.T., 86 N.Y.2d at 284; Levittown, 57 N.Y.2d at 47-48.
Local control reflects important constitutional values: “the
residents of such districts have the right to participate in the
governance of their own schools,” while the State’s duty is focused
on “provid[ing] funding sufficient to bring the educational inputs
locally available up to a minimum standard.” Paynter, 100 N.Y.2d
at 442. Given the importance and centrality of local control, there
is no basis for the First Department’s inference that educational
deficiencies in one school district may automatically be imputed to
another.
“[J]urisprudential constraints” also counsel against the
inference drawn by the First Department. CFE II, 100 N.Y.2d at
928. The primary responsibility for implementing the Education
Article lies with the executive and legislative branches, especially
with respect to public school financing. The “determination of the
amounts, sources, and objectives of expenditures of public moneys
for educational purposes, especially at the State level, presents
issues of enormous practical and political complexity.” Levittown,
57 N.Y.2d at 38. Judicial involvement in decisions about spending
46
on public education is therefore “normally . . . inappropriate.” Id. at
39. Such involvement is justified only in the extraordinary
circumstance where deficiencies are so acute, and the State’s
responsibility so clear, that it is appropriate for a court to intrude
into a sensitive policy area generally reserved for the other
branches of government. Requiring Education Article plaintiffs to
supply concrete allegations of district-specific deficiencies severe
enough to entitle them to the drastic remedy of judicial intervention
in this sensitive area is critical to keeping the judiciary’s role within
the narrow bounds that this Court has repeatedly emphasized as an
essential matter of public policy.
Finally, there is no merit to the First Department’s reasoning
that the NYSER plaintiffs’ challenge to a statewide funding
formula exempted them from the well-established requirement to
plead district-specific deficiencies. The First Department concluded
that plaintiffs in school districts with no alleged constitutional
injury could proceed with claims so long as there was at least one
plaintiff in a school district who did allege a constitutional injury,
because “actionable deficits identified in one district will require
47
modification of the formula, necessarily affecting calculation of
funding for all districts.” (R. 383.)
But the First Department’s conclusion rests on a faulty
premise. The mere fact that the State’s funding formulas may be
inadequate as to one particular school district does not suggest that
they will be inadequate as to other districts. To the contrary, the
defect may arise from the State’s failure to tailor its funding
formulas to the specific district in question—thus allowing the
State to remedy the defect by adjusting its funding of a specific
district while leaving other districts alone. Moreover, the State
could respond to any proven educational deficiencies by taking
other measures to remedy the specific defects identified in
particular school districts—for instance, by providing targeted aid
or grants that are not part of the funding formula, or by passing
legislation or implementing regulatory reforms to ameliorate the
school district’s operations in some respect. There is no basis for the
First Department’s assumption that only one remedy would be
available here.
* * *
48
Thus, the courts below should have dismissed all of the
NYSER plaintiffs’ Education Article claims as to school districts for
which the complaint contains no (or nearly no) specific factual
allegations. Specifically, the first, second, and fourth causes of
action should be dismissed as to these school districts because they
directly challenge state funding decisions and thus plainly
implicate this Court’s pleading requirements for education-funding
claims. Moreover, the third cause of action—challenging the State’s
“education funding accountability mechanisms”—should likewise
be dismissed (except for those portions not dismissed by the First
Department, as to New York City and Syracuse) because the
adequacy of those mechanisms “is directly related to the State’s
funding duty,” as the First Department recognized (R. 385-386),
and it would make no sense to impose a mandate to adopt
accountability mechanisms if there is no viable underlying funding
claim.
49
POINT II
THE NYSER PLAINTIFFS’ THEORIES OF LIABILITY
PREMISED ON FOUNDATION AID AND CFE III FAIL
AS A MATTER OF LAW AND SHOULD BE REJECTED
Even setting aside plaintiffs’ pleading deficiencies, the First
Department also erred in allowing the NYSER plaintiffs to proceed
on their first and second causes of action because those claims rest
on fundamentally flawed theories of constitutional liability. This
Court should accordingly dismiss the first and second causes of
action in their entirety.
A. The NYSER Plaintiffs’ Claim Based on the
State’s Revisions to Foundation Aid Does
Not Allege a Violation of the Constitution.
The NYSER plaintiffs’ second cause of action is premised on
the assumption that the Foundation Aid program, as originally
proposed in 2007, established a constitutional standard for the
amount of state education aid required to provide students in the
State with the opportunity for a sound basic education. (R. 143-146
[¶¶ 38-44].) By reducing the Foundation Aid program below the
level originally proposed, the NYSER plaintiffs claim, the State
fails to provide students with the opportunity for a sound basic
50
education in violation of the Education Article. (R. 191-193 [¶ 193].)
This claim fails for numerous reasons.
First, the NYSER plaintiffs simply misinterpret the State’s
2007 public-education funding statutes as the Legislature’s
establishment of a constitutional baseline that would tie its hands
going forward, either as to New York City or as to the rest of the
State. The Legislature created no such baseline—to the contrary, it
far exceeded what this Court had approved the year before in
CFE III.
As to New York City—the only school district at issue in the
CFE litigation—the Court in CFE III explicitly pointed out that
proposed funding increases above the State’s $1.93 billion estimate
would be a “policy choice to exceed the constitutional minimum.” 8
N.Y.3d at 27 (describing Governor Pataki’s proposed operating
funding increase of $4.7 billion for New York City) (emphasis
added). The Foundation Aid program, which was part of a project
to provide New York City with more than twice the funding increase
approved by this Court (see supra at 13-15), was just such a policy
choice.
51
Indeed, by plaintiffs’ own allegations, the State’s 2007
statutes provided for funding increases that were more generous
than both the $1.93 billion estimate approved by CFE III as to New
York City and the $2.45 billion statewide estimate calculated using
the same methodology. As the NYSER plaintiffs themselves allege,
the fiscal analysis underlying the 2007 legislation’s funding
formulas incorporated a number of weightings that were higher
than those utilized by the analysis approved of in CFE III. (R. 143-
144 [¶ 38]). The 2007 legislation thus did not set a constitutional
standard; it exceeded—by billions of dollars—the funding estimate
that this Court had already found constitutionally acceptable.
Indeed, then-Governor Spitzer said of the school aid funding
provisions he proposed, and later signed into law in 2007, that they
would provide not the constitutional minimum, but rather “more
than sufficient funds to address the school funding needs
highlighted by the Campaign for Fiscal Equity Lawsuit.”18
18 See Press Release, N.Y. State Governor, Unprecedented
Expansion of School Aid Tied to Accountability (Jan. 31, 2007)
(emphasis added).
52
Moreover, fundamental constitutional principles are in
substantial tension with plaintiffs’ theory that the funding statutes
enacted in 2007 operated to define the level of funding required by
the New York Constitution’s Education Article. Under separation-
of-powers principles, the courts, and not the political branches, are
the arbiters of the scope of a constitutional right, and the political
branches cannot preempt such judicial review merely by enacting
legislation. CFE II, 100 N.Y.2d at 925; see also Matter of Aliessa v.
Novello, 96 N.Y.2d 418, 432 n.14 (2001) (“Given our system of
separation of powers, a lawmaking body may not legislatively
declare that a statute meets constitutional criteria.”). Thus,
legislation—even if adopted for the purpose of carrying out
constitutional responsibilities—does not set a constitutional norm
binding on future lawmakers.
To the contrary, all acts of the Legislature—including the
post-2007 statutes challenged here—are entitled to a strong
presumption of constitutionality. See, e.g., People v. Knox, 12
N.Y.3d 60, 69 (2009). That presumption applies equally to the
statutory scheme enacted in 2007 and to the public-education
53
funding statutes the State has adopted in 2008 and subsequently.
See id. at 69 (presumption of constitutionality attaches to
legislation that amends earlier legislation).
Second, the NYSER plaintiffs’ challenge to reductions in
Foundation Aid fails because a plaintiff cannot adequately allege a
claim under the Education Article merely by alleging deficiencies in
funding—and only one component of state funding, at that. The
level of state funding by itself cannot establish an Education Article
claim absent allegations that the funding has a causal connection
to a particular school district’s failure to provide a sound basic
education. See, e.g., NYCLU, 4 N.Y.3d at 178-79. Moreover, state
aid is just part of the billions of dollars of funding that school
districts receive annually from all sources, including a “combination
of local, state and federal sources.” CFE II, 100 N.Y.2d at 904. See
also infra at 60-61 (discussing increased operating aid to New York
City school district from all sources following CFE III). Federal and
local funds together accounted for some $35 billion of the $60 billion
spent by the State’s public schools in 2013-2014. See SED, Fiscal
Analysis & Research Unit (FARU), Master File for 2013-14 (row
54
676). See infra at 60 n.20. Thus, allegations that the State has not
provided funding in a given amount cannot establish a per se failure
to provide the educational opportunities the Constitution requires,
without consideration of (a) whether the level of funding has caused
a deficiency in educational services, and (b) whether funding from
other sources may combine with state funding to satisfy the
constitutional requirement.
B. The NYSER Plaintiffs’ Claim That the
State Has Not Complied with This
Court’s Decisions in CFE Also Fails.
The NYSER plaintiffs’ first cause of action—that the State
has not complied with this Court’s directive in CFE and therefore
must increase public-education funding on a statewide basis—is
likewise fatally flawed and should be dismissed.
1. Plaintiffs’ claim that the State has
violated statewide funding obligations
under CFE fails because CFE imposed
no such obligations.
a. The CFE litigation was limited
to New York City only.
The First Department mistakenly held that the NYSER
plaintiffs could survive dismissal merely by alleging that the State
55
has failed to comply with statewide funding obligations supposedly
created by this Court’s decision in CFE III. The first major flaw in
that reasoning is that CFE III did not create statewide funding
obligations: it did not involve any school district other than New
York City, and accordingly did not result in any determination of
the adequacy of educational funding or resources as to any other
district.
This Court’s language throughout the CFE litigation was
clear on this point. In CFE II, it explained that “the case presented
to us, and consequently the remedy, is limited to the adequacy of
education financing for the New York City public schools, though
the State may of course address statewide issues if it chooses.” 100
N.Y.2d at 928 (emphasis added). To be sure, as this Court made
clear, the State was free to respond to the CFE decisions by
implementing statewide reforms. But the Court’s statement that
the State “may . . . address statewide issues if it chooses,” id., means
exactly what it says: because no statewide violations were found,
the State was free to address statewide reform as a policy matter,
but was not compelled to do so. The NYSER plaintiffs’ claim that
56
CFE somehow created a constitutional duty to increase educational
funds statewide is thus utterly lacking in support.
b. As to New York City, this Court
issued only a narrow, declaratory
ruling endorsing a specific proposed
funding increase.
The First Department further misstated (R. 378; see also R.
142-143 [¶¶ 35-37]) the nature of this Court’s ultimate remedial
holding in CFE III. Contrary to its conclusion, this Court did not
direct the Legislature to appropriate a specific sum of money, or to
consider a range of acceptable funding increases and select a figure
within that range, or to phase in the selected funding increase over
a particular period of time. Nor did it require the Legislature to
revisit the adequacy of its estimate in future years by undertaking
subsequent cost studies or applying inflationary adjustments in
perpetuity.
Rather, the Court issued a declaration endorsing the State’s
estimate of increased operating funding as a reasonable
determination of “the constitutionally required funding for the New
York City School District.” CFE III, 8 N.Y.3d at 27. The limited form
57
of this Court’s remedial order was no accident. In CFE II, the Court
rejected as “problematic” the request for an order “issuing
guidelines to the Legislature for restructuring the system and
directing—with strict timetables—that the necessary resources be
provided.” CFE II, 100 N.Y.2d at 925. Such an order, the Court
noted, would require judicial intrusion into “matters of
policymaking” as to which courts have “neither the authority, nor
the ability, nor the will, to micromanage.” Id. Rather, the Court in
CFE II merely directed the State to “ascertain the actual costs of
providing a sound basic education in districts around the State.” Id.
at 930 (quotation marks omitted). The Court’s decision in CFE III
to issue a declaration endorsing the State’s estimate of that “actual
cost” was thus a model of judicial restraint in sensitive areas of
fiscal policy appropriately left to the legislative and executive
branches. And, as we explain below, there is no merit to plaintiffs’
assertion that those branches failed to respond appropriately.
58
2. The complaint alleges facts showing
that New York City’s public schools
have received increased funds well
exceeding the remedial estimate this
Court endorsed in CFE III.
In CFE III, this Court found constitutionally sufficient a
proposal to increase “funding for the New York City School District
. . . in the amount of $1.93 billion, adjusted with reference to the
latest version of the GCEI and inflation since 2004.” 8 N.Y.3d at 31.
The necessary adjustments increased this amount by $0.37 billion,
to $2.3 billion above a baseline funding level of $12.62 billion for the
New York City public schools during the 2002-2003 school year.19
See Record on Appeal at 4875, 5833, CFE III, 8 N.Y.3d 14 (Index
No. 111070/93).
19 As noted above (see supra at 11 n.2), the State agreed to a
pair of one-time-only adjustments to the $1.93 billion figure, to
account for a regional cost index called the GCEI, and to adjust for
inflation to reflect 2004-2005 dollars. See Campaign for Fiscal
Equity, Inc. v. State, 29 A.D.3d 175, 180-81, 184 (1st Dep’t 2006);
State Br., supra, at 26 & n.6. A panel of referees appointed by the
trial court estimated that these two adjustments would require
increasing the State’s estimate by just $0.37 billion. See Record on
Appeal at 5852-5853, CFE III, 8 N.Y.3d 14 (Index No. 111070/93).
59
The New York City school district indisputably has received
far more funding than the estimate endorsed in CFE III. In fact, the
NYSER complaint affirmatively pleads that operating funds for the
New York City school district exceed that estimate. The NYSER
plaintiffs allege that, in 2013, $1.993 billion represented 11.4
percent of the New York City school district’s “operating
expenditures,” and that $2.707 billion represented 15.4 percent of
the district’s “total operating budget.” (R. 156-157 [¶ 74].)
Extrapolating from these allegations, the NYSER plaintiffs allege
that the New York City school district’s “operating budget” in 2013
was at least $17.464 billion—that is, at least $4.84 billion more
than the district received in 2002-2003, and at least $2.54 billion
more than the funding increase this Court endorsed in CFE III. And
in the First Department, the NYSER plaintiffs similarly conceded
that education aid for the New York City school district has
“increased by more than $1.93 billion since 2007-2008.” Br. for Pls.-
Resp’ts at 55, NYSER v. State, 143 A.D.3d 101 (Index Nos.
100274/13, 650450/14). The NYSER plaintiffs’ own allegations and
60
statement in this proceeding thus require that their first cause of
action be dismissed.
Public records maintained by SED further confirm that state
funding of the New York City school district has exceeded CFE III
levels. Those records, which are published on SED’s website, set
forth the operating funds available to each school district in the
State, including the New York City school district. See SED, FARU,
The Fiscal Profile Reporting System;20 see also Matter of Markowitz
v. Serio, 11 N.Y.3d 43, 52 (2008) (“A public record, in ordinary
speech, refers to a record that any member of the public can look at
and copy.”). Those data reveal that, in 2013-2014, operating funds
for the New York City school district were more than $21.7 billion—
that is, $9.08 billion more than the district received in 2002-2003,
20 SED publishes detailed financial data in Microsoft Excel
files, in which each school district occupies a row and the columns
correspond to various categories of revenues and expenditures,
including total state revenue (column H), local revenue (column I),
federal revenue (column J), and total revenue (column K). SED,
FARU, Column Headings in Each Spread Sheet; see also SED,
FARU, A Guide to the Headings of the Fiscal Profile.
61
and $6.78 billion more than the estimate this Court endorsed in
CFE III.21
The First Department refused to dismiss the NYSER
plaintiffs’ first cause of action because, in the court’s view, SED’s
figures could not be considered at this procedural posture, and there
was a live dispute over whether “the net effect” of measures enacted
after CFE III “has been to reduce educational aid below the $1.93
billion floor” endorsed in CFE III (R. 377). But there is no such
dispute. By their own pleading, the NYSER plaintiffs have
conceded the fact that cannot be disputed: that operating aid for the
New York City school district far exceeds the “$1.93 billion floor”
endorsed in CFE III. The Court thus need not rely on SED’s figures.
21 Row 323 of the SED fiscal profile spreadsheet for 2013-2014
contains data for the New York City school district. Cell AG323 in
that spreadsheet contains the City’s total expenditures of
approximately $23.7 billion for 2013-2014. When amounts for
transportation (approximately $1.1 billion, see cell AD323) and debt
service (approximately $0.9 billion, see cells AE323, AF323) are
removed, the remaining sum is approximately $21.7 billion. See
SED, FARU, Master File for 2013-14; see also SED, FARU, Column
Headings in Each Spread Sheet.
62
In any event, SED’s figures may be considered here. As
uncontroverted matters of public record, the First Department
could “of course” take judicial notice of SED’s figures. Matter of
Siwek v. Mahoney, 39 N.Y.2d 159, 163 n.2 (1976) (“Data culled from
public records is, of course, a proper subject of judicial notice.”); see
also Affronti v. Crosson, 95 N.Y.2d 713, 720 (2001). Indeed, the
NYSER plaintiffs have never challenged the accuracy of these
“incontrovertible” figures, so it would be “idle to send the case back
for a new trial for the sole purpose of admitting” them. Dunham v.
Townshend, 118 N.Y. 281, 286 (1890). And since SED’s figures
“establish conclusively” that the NYSER plaintiffs’ first cause of
action must be dismissed, they may be considered at this posture
despite not being explicitly alleged in the NYSER complaint.
Rovello, 40 N.Y.2d at 636; see also Godfrey v. Spano, 13 N.Y.3d 358,
374 (2009).
63
POINT III
THE ARISTY-FARER PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO STATE
A CLAIM UNDER THE EDUCATION ARTICLE
The Aristy-Farer plaintiffs fail to allege either of the essential
elements of a claim under the Education Article for many of the
reasons discussed above.22 First, they do not allege any specific
shortcomings in the educational services provided by the New York
City school district—the only district as to which the Aristy-Farer
plaintiffs seek relief. The complaint therefore fails to allege any
deficiency in educational inputs,23 which alone requires dismissal.
See, e.g., Paynter, 100 N.Y.2d at 440-41.
22 The Aristy-Farer complaint asserts only one cause of
action—i.e., that the State’s one-time “withholding” of state aid
increases from New York City pursuant to the APPR Compliance
Provision deprived students in that school district of the
opportunity for a sound basic education in violation of the
Education Article. (R. 28 [¶¶ 84-85].) To the extent that the Aristy-
Farer plaintiffs’ claim relies on the same theories advanced in the
NYSER complaint, the claim fails for the reasons explained above.
23 This failure is especially conspicuous when compared with
the Aristy-Farer plaintiffs’ earlier pleadings in this case: those
complaints, while also failing to state a claim, included at least
some attempt to identify educational inputs that plaintiffs claimed
would be reduced due to the APPR Compliance Provision. (See
Initial Complaint ¶ 31; Amended Complaint ¶ 40.) The current
pleading makes no such effort.
64
Instead, the Aristy-Farer complaint contains allegations only
of poor student test results: in four paragraphs, it alleges that about
twenty percent of New York City public school students (including
those who drop out before ninth grade) graduate from high school
“college and career ready,” as that term is defined by the Board of
Regents. (R. 26-27 [¶¶ 77-79].) But the “college and career ready”
standard plaintiffs cite “exceed[s] notions of a minimally adequate
or sound basic education” that the Constitution guarantees. CFE I,
86 N.Y.2d at 317; see also CFE II, 100 N.Y.2d at 907-08 (adopting
Regents’ standards, however ambitious, as definition of a sound
basic education would improperly “cede to a state agency the power
to define a constitutional right”). The record shows that plaintiffs
seek a standard that “‘correlates with success in first-year college
courses’” and is higher than the score needed to graduate and earn
a high school diploma (R. 26 [¶ 76] (complaint equating “college and
career ready” with scores of at least 75 on the Regents Examination
in English and at least 80 on the Regents Examination in
Mathematics)); cf. 8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 100.5(b)(7)(ix) (requiring scores of
65 on Regents Examinations to earn a diploma). This Court has
65
rejected the claim that the constitutional right to a sound basic
education is measured by performance at that level. See CFE II, 100
N.Y.2d at 907-08.
Second, the Aristy-Farer plaintiffs make no effort to attribute
any causal link between the one-time denial of an increase in state
aid due to the APPR Compliance Provision and any inadequacy in
educational services. The Aristy-Farer plaintiffs fail to identify any
mechanism by which this temporary pause in state funding
resulted in concrete reductions in the New York City school
district’s educational services. And they fail to explain why that
district’s funding is inadequate, when overall funding—including
local revenues which have increased substantially in recent years—
have gone up by more than $6 billion between 2003-2004 and 2012-
2013. See supra Pt. II.B.2. In addition, plaintiffs’ limited allegations
concerning educational outcomes date from June 2012 (R. 26
[¶ 77]), but the APPR Compliance Provision did not have any effect
on New York City funding before June 2013. Student performance
data from a year earlier cannot support a causal connection
between the APPR Compliance Provision and any supposed
66
educational deficiencies purportedly reflected in the performance
data.
The First Department did not conclude that the Aristy-Farer
complaint adequately alleged an Education Article claim. Rather,
the court essentially treated the Aristy-Farer action as if it were
governed by the separate pleading in the NYSER action. (R. 388-
389) But the Aristy-Farer plaintiffs—who are represented by the
same counsel representing the NYSER plaintiffs—were given
multiple opportunities to amend their pleadings; they have never
filed a pleading with allegations or claims like those asserted in the
NYSER action.
A pleading is not an empty formality. See, e.g., Valley Cadillac
Corp. v. Dick, 238 A.D.2d 894, 894 (4th Dep’t 1997) (claim must be
dismissed where pleading is defective and no motion is made to
conform pleadings to proof at trial); Dufur v. Lavin, 101 A.D.2d 319,
324 (3d Dep’t 1984), aff’d, 65 N.Y.2d 830 (1985) (same). Rather,
pleadings serve crucial purposes, including apprising parties of the
factual and legal bases of the pleader’s claims and preventing
surprise. See, e.g., Cole v. Mandell Food Stores, Inc., 93 N.Y.2d 34,
67
40 (1999); see also, e.g., Mavroudis v. State Wide Ins. Co., 102
A.D.2d 864, 864 (2d Dep’t 1984) (issues framed by pleadings
determine scope of discovery). Those purposes would be seriously
undermined if the Aristy-Farer plaintiffs could proceed with their
claims for relief without actually alleging that they are legally
entitled to that relief.
The First Department was seemingly influenced by the view
(R. 388-389) that it would be unfair to dismiss the Aristy-Farer
claims while permitting the NYSER claims to proceed, but that
view is mistaken. Any differential treatment is fully justified by the
plaintiffs’ respective decisions to file separate pleadings, based on
different allegations of fact and asserting distinct claims for relief.
And in any event, any relief that is awarded in the NYSER action
with respect to the New York City school district will accrue to the
benefit of the Aristy-Farer plaintiffs. This Court should not
fundamentally distort its Education Article jurisprudence to
sustain the sufficiency of the Aristy-Farer claims under these
circumstances.
CONCLUSION
All of the claims in the Aristy-Farer complaint should be
dismissed; the first and second causes of action in t he NYSER
complaint should be dismissed in their entirety; and the third and
fourth causes of action in the NYSER complaint should be
dismissed to the extent they relate to school districts other than
New York City and Syracuse .
Dated: New York, NY
March 15, 2017
BARBARA D. UNDERWOOD
Solicitor General
S TEVEN C. Wu
Deputy Solicitor General
ANDREW W. AMEND
Senior Assistant Solicitor General
PHILIP V. TISNE
Assistant Solicitor General
of Counsel
Respectfully submitted,
ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN
Attorney General of the
St ew York
~m:nellan t s
Assistant Solicitor General
120 Broadway
New York, NY 10271
(212) 416-8020
Reproduced on Recycled Paper
68
AFFIRMATION OF COMPLIANCE
Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of the New York Court of Appeals (22
N.Y.C.R.R.) § 500.13(c)(l), Philip V. Tisne, an attorney in the Office of the
Attorney General of the State of New York, hereby affirms that according to
the word count fe ature of the word processing program used to prep are this
brief, the brief contains 11,952 words, which com ies with the limitations
stated in§ 500.13(c)(l) .