Christopher Hamilton, Appellant,v.John Miller et al., Respondents.BriefN.Y.May 7, 2014 To be argued by: Mo Athari, Esq. Time Requested: 15 Minutes SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS CHRISTOPHER HAMILTON, Plaintiff/Appellant, -against- Index #: 09-9673 COA NO.: APL-2013-00182 JOHN MILLER, DAVID MILLER, JULES MUSINGER, DOUG MUSINGER AND SINGER ASSOCIATES, Defendants/Respondents, PLAINTIFF APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF ATHARI & ASSOCIATES, LLC WARD GREENBERG HELLER Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant Hamilton & REIDY, LLP Mo Athari, Esq. Attorneys for Defendants/Respondents 258 Genesee Street - 6 th Floor Singer Associates & Musinger Utica, NY 13502 Attn: Thomas E. Reidy, Jr., Esq (315) 733-9820 300 State Street, Suite 600 (315) 733-9821(f) Rochester, NY, 14614 (585) 454-0726 (585) 231-1910(f) SLIWA & LANE Attorneys for Defendants Miller Attn: Stanley J. Sliwa, Esq. 237 Main Street, Suite 840 Buffalo, NY 14203-2715 (716) 853-2050 (716) 853-2057(f) ____________________________________________________________________________ Dated: October 15, 2013 i TABLE OF CONTENTS QUESTION PRESENTED ................................................................................................ 1 REPLY ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................... 1 CASES Derdiarian v. Felix Contractor Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 308(N.Y. 1980) ............................ 2 Gayle v. City of New York, 92 N.Y.2d 936 (N.Y. 1998) .......................................... 3 Giles v. Yi, 105 A.D.3d 1313 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep't 2013) ............................... 3 Hamilton v Miller, 106 A.D.3d 1476 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep't 2013) ................... 3 Juarez by Juarez v. Wavecrest Mgmt. Team, 88 N.Y.2d 628 (N.Y. 1996) ............... 4 Martin v. Volvo Cars of N. Am., 241 A.D.2d 941 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep't 1997) ......................................................................... 2 Parker v. Mobil Oil Corp., 7 N.Y.3d 434 (N.Y. 2006) .............................................. 2 People v. Wesley, 83 N.Y.2d 417 (N.Y. 1994) ......................................................... 3 Pommells v. Perez, 4 N.Y.3d 566 (N.Y. 2005) ......................................................... 2 Robinson v Bartlett, 95 A.D.3d 1531 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep't 2012) .................... 3 Sewar v. Gagliardi Bros. Service, 51 N.Y.2d 752 (N.Y. 1980) ................................ 2 Sweet v. Sheahan, 235 F.3d 80 (2d Cir. N.Y. 2000) ................................................. 3 Walton v. Albany Community Dev. Agency, 279 A.D.2d 93 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep't 2001) ............................................................................................................. 2 ii STATUTES AND REGULATIONS 42 USC §4851 ............................................................................................................ 3 42 USC §4851(b) ....................................................................................................... 3 SECONDARY SOURCES Pattern Jury Instructions 2:70 .................................................................................... 2 Page 1 QUESTION PRESENTED Q: Was the Order of the Appellate Division, refusing to take judicial notice of the universal knowledge that low level lead poisoning causes injury to the brain, based on accepted scientific authority, and further compelling plaintiff to provide evidentiary material during discovery, entered April 26, 2013 properly made? REPLY ARGUMENT THE FEDERAL ACT CREATES A PRESUMPTION ATTACHING DEFINITE PROBATIVE VALUE, ALLOWING THE COURT TO DRAW AN INFERENCE FROM ITS CONNECTION WITH OTHER KNOWN FACTS Respondents oppose the relief sought by claiming that there is no question of law here, and that this court does not have the power to disturb “the wisdom or providence of any exercise of discretion” (Respondent Miller‟s Brief at p. 20). Respondents further argue that judicial notice “will result in a dramatic misapplication” “effectively depriv[ing]” a landlord defendant of their “right to have” “causation determined by a trier-of-fact” thereby “usurp[ing] the jury‟s role” based on “far reaching” “factual findings made by a group of politicians in Washington” (Respondent Miller‟s Brief at p. 25, 16). These arguments avoid the issue of law here. At elevated blood lead levels, neurocognitive and neurobehavioral deficits occur which can rise to the level of a DSM disorder (R. 878-879). Further, the CDC and EPA have found that, in Page 2 comparison, any claim of “residual confounding by social environment” is “speculative” (R. 862) and that even after adjustment for confounding factors “including quality of care giving [euthenics], parental intelligence [eugenics], and socioeconomic status”, negative impacts from lead exposure are “robust” (R. 878). Causation, an element of plaintiff‟s case, is first and foremost a question of law (Sewar v. Gagliardi Bros. Service, 51 N.Y.2d 752, 759 (N.Y. 1980)). “An act or omission is regarded as a cause of an injury if it was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury, that is, if it had such an effect in producing the injury that reasonable people would regard it as a cause of the injury” (PJI 2:70; Derdiarian v. Felix Contractor Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 308, 314-315 (N.Y. 1980)) and any “expert evidence presented by defendants” should only be “relevant on the issue of damages” (Walton v. Albany Community Dev. Agency, 279 A.D.2d 93, 97 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep't 2001); Martin v. Volvo Cars of N. Am., 241 A.D.2d 941, 943 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep't 1997)) as there is no statutory threshold of injury here (Pommells v. Perez, 4 N.Y.3d 566, 572 (N.Y. 2005)). In toxic tort cases “It is well-established that an opinion on causation should set forth a plaintiff's exposure to a toxin, that the toxin is capable of causing the particular illness (general causation) and that plaintiff was exposed to sufficient levels of the toxin to cause the illness (specific causation)” (Parker v. Mobil Oil Corp., 7 N.Y.3d 434, 448 (N.Y. 2006)). Plaintiff asked the Court to decide the Page 3 question of law inherent in the inquiry here, or to take Judicial Notice of the dose- response relationship (People v. Wesley, 83 N.Y.2d 417, 423-424 (N.Y. 1994)), a question of law (Gayle v. City of New York, 92 N.Y.2d 936, 937 (N.Y. 1998)). The IAS court refused (R. 13) and the appellate division committed error by addressing the issue simply as factual in nature (Hamilton v Miller, 106 A.D.3d 1476, 1477-1478 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep't 2013) [“the court was not required to take judicial notice of the factual findings … inasmuch as causation is one of the disputed issues to be determined at trial”]). Does low-level lead poisoning, or an elevated lead level, cause injury to the brain? 42 USC §4851 provides this universal knowledge and the relevant CDC and EPA publications provide the scientific basis for the specific dose response (Robinson v Bartlett, 95 A.D.3d 1531, 1534 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep't 2012)). Judicial notice does not relieve plaintiff from having to prove exposure to the toxin at sufficient levels, but the Fourth Department found that “there is no „signature injury‟ that is linked to lead exposure” at any level or dose (Giles v. Yi, 105 A.D.3d 1313, 1317 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep't 2013)), rejecting federal law that was specifically designed to end “the current confusion over reasonable standards of care”, and to “educate the public concerning the hazards and sources of lead- based paint poisoning and steps to reduce and eliminate such hazards” (42 USC §4851(b); Sweet v. Sheahan, 235 F.3d 80, 94 (2d Cir. N.Y. 2000)) and