The People, Appellant,v.Sparkle Daniel, Respondent.BriefN.Y.June 2, 2016APL-2015-00025 To be argued by T. CHARLES WON (30 minutes) _______________________________________________________ COURT OF APPEALS State of New York _______ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Appellant, -against- SPARKLE DANIEL, Defendant-Respondent. _______________________________________________________ APPELLANT’ S REPLY B R I E F _______________________________________________________ ROBERT T. JOHNSON District Attorney Bronx County Attorney for Appellant Bronx, New York 10451 Tel (718) 838-7097 Fax (718) 590-6523 JOSEPH N. FERDENZI PETER D. CODDINGTON T. CHARLES WON Assistant District Attorneys of Counsel _______________________________________________________ Date Completed: July 30, 2015 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i STATEMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 ARGUMENT POINT THE APPELLATE DIVISION MISAPPLIED THIS COURT’S PRECEDENT IN DECIDING THAT DEFENDANT’S PRE-MIRANDA REMARKS, WHICH THE APPELLATE DIVISION ACKNOWLEDGED WERE “BRIEF” AND DID NOT ADMIT ANY CRIMINAL CONDUCT, RENDERED HER POST- MIRANDA STATEMENTS TAINTED AS A MATTER OF LAW... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES People v. Daniel, 122 A.D.3d 401 (1st Dept. 2014). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 2, 3, 5 People v. Ferro, 63 N.Y.2d 316 (1984).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 3 STATUTES Penal Law § 125.25(3). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 i COURT OF APPEALS STATE OF NEW YORK -----------------------------------------------------------------------X THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Appellant, -against- SPARKLE DANIEL, Defendant-Respondent. -----------------------------------------------------------------------X APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF STATEMENT Appellant, the People of the State of New York, submits this reply brief in further support of its appeal from an Order of the Appellate Division, First Department, entered on November 6, 2014 (122 A.D.3d 401), reversing a judgment of the Supreme Court, Bronx County (Carter, J., at hearing and at trial), rendered October 25, 2010, convicting defendant, after jury trial, of Second Degree Murder (Penal Law § 125.25[3]), and sentencing her to an indeterminate term of imprisonment of from 25 years to life ARGUMENT POINT THE APPELLATE DIVISION MISAPPLIED THIS COURT’S PRECEDENT IN DECIDING THAT DEFENDANT’S PRE-MIRANDA REMARKS, W H I C H T H E A P P E L L A T E D I V I S I O N ACKNOWLEDGED WERE “BRIEF” AND DID NOT ADMIT ANY CRIMINAL CONDUCT, RENDERED HER POST-MIRANDA STATEMENTS TAINTED AS A MATTER OF LAW. Defendant erroneously contends that the Appellate Division applied the proper standard in determining that Detective Nicholas Ciuffi’s pre-Miranda questions constituted interrogation. The fault in defendant’s argument lies in that, while the Appellate Division cited the objective standard set forth in People v. Ferro, 63 N.Y.2d 316 (1984), an analysis of the court’s decision reveals that it actually applied an inappropriate subjective standard. The Appellate Division’s conclusion that “the detective’s statements to [defendant] were plainly intended to elicit incriminating statements” was based solely upon he fact that the detective allegedly “admitted to [it] at the hearing.” People v. Daniel, 122 A.D.3d 401, 403, fn. 2 (1st Dept. 2014). But, as the Ferro decision teaches, Detective Ciuffi’s subjective intent in asking the questions at issue cannot be the sole basis for a finding that the defendant was subjected to interrogation. 2 In Ferro, this Court was careful to point out that: because [t]he latter portion of this definition [of interrogation] focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police, the question is not what was the subjective intent of the police but rather what words or actions, in light of their knowledge concerning the suspect, they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. Ferro, 63 N.Y.2d at 322-323 (emphasis added). In referring to the objective standard required by Ferro, the Appellate Division overlooked the above emphasized portion. 1 Furthermore, the Appellate Division made no determination that any detective would have reasonably believed that the brief questions posed to defendant would have caused her to make an incriminating response -- which is the proper standard. Defendant, too, offers no explanation as to how Detective’s Ciuffi’s pre-Miranda questioning can be reasonably viewed as likely to elicit an incriminating statement. Therefore, the Appellate Division erred by relying solely upon Detective Ciuffi’s subjective intent to make that determination. While disputing whether the Appellate Division had misapplied this Court’s precedent in deciding that defendant’s pre-Miranda statements had rendered her post- The quoted portion of the Ferro decision included in the Appellate Division’s decision1 reads: “the term interrogation under Miranda refers . . . to any words or actions on the part of the police . . . that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an response.” Daniel, 122 A.D.3d at 403, fn. 2 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 3 Miranda statements tainted as a matter of law, defendant acknowledges that, even if the issue presents a mixed question of law and fact, this Court can still review it if the Appellate Division’s decision lacks support from the record (see defendant’s brief, p. 36). Here, as detailed more fully in the People’s main brief, pp. 40-41, the record does not support the Appellate Division’s conclusion that Detective Ciuffi intended to elicit a pre-Miranda confession from defendant and that the post-Miranda statements were tainted. Briefly, at the suppression hearing, while discussing the point when the Miranda warnings were read to defendant, the prosecutor asked, “[a]t this point, did you feel that where this conversation was going might lead to [defendant] saying something incriminating?” Detective Ciuffi replied, “I certainly hoped so” (A69- A70). Focusing upon the detective’s response only, defendant, as did the Appellate Division, claims that the detective “confirm[ed] that, in his mind at least, this was an interrogation” (defendant’s brief, p. 46). When viewed in context of the preceding colloquy, the detective’s response does not depict him as believing that he had been interrogating defendant. In arguing that the police engaged in a single continuos interrogation, defendant does not dispute the People’s position that her pre-Miranda statements did not constitute an admission of guilt. Defendant merely re-iterates the Appellate 4 Division’s erroneous contention that her “pre-Miranda statement ‘plainly tended to incriminate her by acknowledging that she knew something about the murder of an elderly woman and by placing herself at the scene of the crime, with the victim and the other alleged perpetrator’” (defendant’s brief, p. 51, quoting Daniel, 122 A.D.3d at 404). Defendant makes no attempt to refute the People’s explanations as to why the pre-Miranda statement was not incriminatory. Instead, tacitly revealing her lack of conviction that the statements were incriminatory, defendant argues that “[t]he absence of a pre-Mirandized inculpatory statement alone does not preclude an inquiry as to whether the statements are the result of a continuous chain of events” (defendant’s brief, p. 50). Defendant focuses upon the surrounding circumstances to argue that the pre- and post-Miranda statements were a single continuous event, instead of offering any basis for this Court to conclude that the pre-Miranda statement would have coerced defendant into making her post-Miranda statements. In sum, the Appellate Division misapplied this Court’s precedent in deciding that defendant’s brief, non-incriminatory pre-Miranda statement had tainted her post- Miranda statement as a matter of law. The decision should be reversed and the matter remitted to the court for consideration of the remaining claim. At the least, it should be remanded for the court to review the issue of whether Detective Ciuffi had 5 engaged in pre-Miranda interrogation under the proper objective standard. 6 CONCLUSION THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT, SHOULD BE REVERSED AND THE CASE REMITTED TO THE APPELLATE DIVISION TO DETERMINE THE SOLE UNDECIDED ISSUE OF WHETHER DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO A JURY CHARGE ON THE DURESS DEFENSE. Respectfully submitted, ROBERT T. JOHNSON District Attorney Bronx County Attorney for Appellant By: ____________________ Joseph N. Ferdenzi ____________________ Peter D. Coddington ____________________ T. Charles Won JOSEPH N. FERDENZI PETER D. CODDINGTON T. CHARLES WON Assistant District Attorneys of Counsel JULY 2015 7