§Why CasetextPricing

The People, Respondent,v.Tyrell Norris, Appellant.

Brief

23 Cited authorities

  1. People v. Lingle

    2011 N.Y. Slip Op. 3308 (N.Y. 2011)   Cited 480 times
    Holding that a defendant's right to appeal after a resentencing is "limited to the correction of errors or the abuse of discretion at the resentencing proceeding"

  2. People v. Finnegan

    85 N.Y.2d 53 (N.Y. 1995)   Cited 240 times
    In Finnegan, the Court of Appeals refused to read into another section of the VTL a requirement that the police affirmatively take certain steps, reasoning that because the Legislature did not impose such an obligation, the courts should not do so in the Legislature's place. Finnegan, 647 N.E.2d at 760-761.

  3. People v. Thompson

    60 N.Y.2d 513 (N.Y. 1983)   Cited 154 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the Appellate Division may modify a bargained-for sentence without allowing the People to withdraw their consent to the plea

  4. State v. Bautista

    7 N.Y.3d 838 (N.Y. 2006)   Cited 46 times
    In People v. Bautista, 7 N.Y.3d 838, 823 N.Y.S.2d 754, 857 N.E.2d 49 (2006), we held that no statutory provision authorizes a defendant to appeal from an Appellate Division order affirming the denial of the defendant's resentencing application pursuant to the 2005 Drug Law Reform Act (L. 2005, ch. 643) (id. at 838–839, 823 N.Y.S.2d 754, 857 N.E.2d 49).

  5. People v. Machado

    90 N.Y.2d 187 (N.Y. 1997)   Cited 48 times
    In People v. Machado (90 N.Y.2d 187, supra), a Rosario violation was discovered after sentencing, but before defendant's direct appeal was heard.

  6. People v. Laing

    79 N.Y.2d 166 (N.Y. 1992)   Cited 57 times
    In People v Laing (79 N.Y.2d 166, 170-71, 172, supra), we cautioned that "this Court may not resort to interpretative contrivances to broaden the scope and application" of unambiguous statutes to "create a right to appeal out of thin air" in order to "fill the void, without trespassing on the Legislature's domain and undermining the structure of article 450 of the CPL" (see also, People v De Jesus, 54 N.Y.2d 447, 449, supra; People v Gersewitz, supra, 294 N.Y., at 169; but see, People v Bachert, supra, 69 N.Y.2d, at 600).

  7. People v. Discala

    45 N.Y.2d 38 (N.Y. 1978)   Cited 82 times
    Holding that denial of lesser included offense was not abuse of discretion where the coercion used by defendant did not lack a heinous quality; rather, "the malevolent nature of the threat [was] at once obvious in defendant's proposal to kill or have the victim killed"

  8. People v. Hernandez

    98 N.Y.2d 8 (N.Y. 2002)   Cited 30 times

    40 Decided May 7, 2002. APPEAL, by permission of an Associate Judge of the Court of Appeals, from an order of the Appellate Term of the Supreme Court in the First Judicial Department, entered April 6, 2001, which, among other things, (1) reversed, on the law, an order of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, New York County (Arthur M. Schack, J.), dismissing a misdemeanor complaint charging defendant with resisting arrest, disorderly conduct, and consumption of alcohol in a public place, (2)

  9. People v. Vaughan

    62 A.D.3d 122 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009)   Cited 19 times

    March 24, 2009. APPEAL from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Vincent M. Del Giudice, J.), entered October 17, 2006. The order denied defendant's motion pursuant to the Drug Law Reform Act of 2004 (L 2004, ch 738, § 23) to (a) vacate a sentence of that court (Sheldon Greenberg, J.), imposed May 22, 1990 upon his conviction of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and assault in the

  10. People v. Steven Acevedo

    2010 N.Y. Slip Op. 3472 (N.Y. 2010)   Cited 15 times
    In People v Acevedo (14 NY3d 828 [2010]), we held that neither circumstance is present when a court imposes a determinate sentence under the 2004 DLRA. Such resentencing constitutes "alteration of the existing sentence as authorized by law" (id. at 831), rather than imposition of a new sentence or of an additional term of imprisonment.