The People, Respondent,v.David Bookman, Appellant.BriefN.Y.September 7, 2016DlSTRlCT A TIORNEY QUEENS COUNTY l~MQUEENSBOULEVARD KEWGARDENS, NEW YORK 11415-1568 Richard A. Brown Disbict Attorney The Judges of the Court of Appeals Court of Appeals Hall 20 Eagle Street Albany, New York 12207-1095 Re: People v. David Bookman APL-20 16-00027 Submission Pursuant to Rule 500.11 Your Honors: May20, 2016 {718) 286-6000 www.queensda.org The People submit this letter in support of this Court's sua sponte examination of the merits pursuant to Section 500.11 of this Court's Rules of Practice, and in support of the affirmance of defendanfs judgment of conviction. As a threshold matter, the People urge the Court to decide this case pursuant to Section 500.11. The two questions raised by defendant present mixed questions of law and fact subject to limited review in this Court, rendering the case particularly suited to resolution under this Court's expedited procedure. See N.Y.C.R.R. § SOO.ll(b) ("Appeals may be selected for alternative review on the basis of ... mixed questions of law and fact or affinned findings of fact, which are subject to a limited scope of review"). Specifically, defendant raises two issues regarding the recovery of the illegal handgun he was convicted of possessing: whether there existed an adequate basis for stopping the vehicle in which he was riding and whether the police had probable cause to believe that the substance the officer observed in the car's console was a controlled substance, allowing a further search of the vehicle and the recovery of the weapon. This Court has routinely treated issues of this nature as mixed questions. See, e.g. People v. Shabazz, 99 N.Y.2d 634 (2003) ("The legality of a motor vehicle stop and search presents a mixed question of law and fact that may not be disturbed in this Court unless the finding of the Appellate Division lacks any record basis"); People v. Gomcin, 8 N.Y.3d 899 (2007)(probable cause a mixed question). Moreover, here, the questions defendant raises directly implicate the lower courts' credibility findings with regard to the People's witness People v. David Bookman Indictment No. 2921120 10 Page2 at the suppression hearing and the reasonable inferences drawn from that testimony by those courts. Indeed, whether the large, five-by-two inch decoration hanging in the middle of the car's windshield, along with a heart-shaped item also measuring several inches, were sufficient to obstruct the driver's view (Defendant's SSM Letter at 7), whether the officer credibly testified that there was a cloudy white powdery substance in the bag on the console (id.at 12), and whether the officer reasonably concluded, based on his specific training and experience, that the substance was cocaine (id) - all depend on the lower courts' acceptance of the proffered testimony, the weight those courts accorded that testimony, and the inferences they drew from the facts the witness recounted. As such, these arguments present quintessential mixed questions of law and fact which can only be reviewed to determine whether there is any record basis for the lower courts' detenninations. See, e.g., People v. McRay, 51 N.Y.2d 594, 601 (1980) ("where the facts are disputed, where credibility is at issue or where reasonable minds may differ as to the inference to be drawn from the established facts, this court, absent an error of law, will not disturb the fmdings of the Appellate Division and the suppression court"). Because this case can readily be disposed of on this ground, no further briefing is required. Moreover, this case can be resolved on another ground without the necessity of reviewing the merits at all - defendant's knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to appeal. It is well established that a court need not engage in a particular litany in securing a waiver of appeal during a guilty plea. People v. Lopez, 6 N.Y.3d 248, 253 (2006). Essentially, the record must demonstrate that defendant understood the consequences of the waiver, and that the right to appeal was not co-mingled with the others extinguished by the plea. People v. Sanders, 25 N.Y.3d 337, 341-42 (2015). Here, the court explained to defendant that he had a right to appeal and that this right was separate from and in addition to the rights that he would ordinarily give up by pleading guilty. Defendant, for his part, openly agreed to give up the right to appeal on the record, and he also executed a written waiver of his right to appeal, further establishing that defendant was aware of the rights waived and the consequences of his actions. People v. Ramos, 7 N.Y.3d 737 (2006). Because review of the merits is precluded on this ground, full briefing is unnecessary. In any event, whether addressed under Section 500.11 or otherwise, the record established that the Appellate Division correctly affinned defendant's conviction because the testifying officer had reasonable cause to believe' that the hanging sandal and heart-shaped necklace were sizeable obstructions that violated the Vehicle and Traffic Law's mandate that the driver have a "full and clear" view of the road, and, as a result, there was adequate cause to stop the car. Indeed, as this Court has repeatedly announced in the context of automobile stop cases "probable cause does not require proof sufficient to warrant a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt." People v. Guthrie, 25 N.Y.3d 130, 133 (2015)(holding that officer's reasonable belief that defendant violated the Vehicle and Traffic Law supported finding of probable cause irrespective of whether mistake was of law or fact). To pass scrutiny, a 1The case Jaw uses both "reasonable cause" and probable cause interchangeably, as discussed further on pages 13-14. See People v. Guthrie, 25 N.Y.3d 130 (2015); People v. Robinson, 97 N.Y.2d 341, 353-354 (2001); see also People v. Maldonado, 86 N.Y.2d 631, 635 (1995) ("reasonable cause means probable cause). People v. David Bookman Indictment No. 2921/2010 Page3 vehicle stop will be valid if an officer has probable cause to believe that a traffic violation occurred, regardless of any additional motivations. People v. Robinson, 91 N.Y.2d 341 (200 I). If an officer articulates "credible facts" establishing reasonable cause to believe that the law was violated, the stop is proper. !d., at 354. Here, as the Appellate Division found, the officer's testimony regarding the large, five~by-two inch hanging decorative sandal as well as the heart-shaped necklace was sufficient to conclude that these objects interfered with or obstructed the driver's view of the road through the windshield, given the officer's specific description of the size of those items, the location of the objects in the center of the windshield, and the fact that the officer was able to observe the items from a car-length away from a rear vantage point, through the car's back windshield. Thus, the officer's belief that the sandal and necklace were sufficient to either "interfere with the view of the operator" or obstruct a "full and clear view of the road," V.T.L § 375(30), was objectively reasonable and constituted probable cause to believe that a traffic infraction was committed. In addition, the Nissan had a defective brake light which, while not the basis of the Appellate Division's decision, provided an independent basis for stopping the vehicle. In light of this ample record support, this Court need not further examine defendant's claim. Likewise, it was entirely reasonable, in light of this officer's training and experience in the identification of controlled substances, for the officer to believe that the cloudy plastic bag with powdery residue contained a quantity of cocaine. This claim, which was not raised in the Appellate Division at all, is meritless. This Court has frequently upheld automobile searches based on an officer's observation of controlled substances and drug paraphernalia, when that belief is rooted in the officer's training and experience. See, e.g, People v. Bennett, 70 N.Y.2d 891 (1987)(offlcer had a reasonable belief that bags in defendant's vehicle were drug packaging where belief was rooted in police training and experience). Indeed, this Court has held that charges in accusatory instruments were sufficient based on such allegations alone. See People v. Smalls, 26 N.Y.3d 1064 (2015). And prior decisions ofthis Court have also validated searches based on an officer's mistaken, but reasonable, belief that a crime was committed. See Guthrie, 25 N.Y.3d at 130. Here, Officer Sparks testified that he received training in the identification of controlled substances and previousJy encountered narcotics in simiJar packaging, and that- based on this training and experience- the officer believed that the bag contained cocaine residue. And although defendant argued at the hearing that the bag did not appear cloudy, the suppression court viewed the condition of the bag and credited the officer's testimony. Similarly, the suppression court credited Officer Sparks' testimony that he believed that the cloudy substance in the bag was cocaine based upon his training and experience. Because there was record support for the suppression court's determinations, no further review is available here. FACTUALANDLEGALBACKGROUND The Crime and Arrest On November 2, 2010, Officer Colin Sparks was patrolling the area of 881h Avenue and Parsons Boulevard in Queens County. While stopped behind a Nissan Altima in the left tum lane, Sparks noticed that the car had a defective brake light, and observed substantial obstructions hanging from the rearview mirror. Defendant was seated in the rear passenger seat of the Nissan, with co-defendants Reedy and Robinson seated in the driver's People v. David Bookman Indictment No. 2921/2010 Page4 side and front passenger seat. Upon approaching the vehicle to issue a traffic citation, Sparks observed a clear plastic bag that appeared to contain cocaine residue. Sparks then ordered the individuals out of the vehicle, and placed them under arrest. At the precinct, Sparks searched the car for further narcotics. When Sparks opened the trunk, he saw a newspaper with the butt end of a loaded flreann sticking out of it. Subsequently, defendant admitted, post-Miranda, to Officer Sparks and Detective Wright that the substance in the bag was cocaine and that it belonged to co-defendant Reedy. For these crimes, defendant and his cohorts were arrested and charged with two counts of Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Second De~ee (Penal Law§ 265.03[1]; § 265.03[2]) (Queens County Indictment Number 2921/2010).2 On June 8, 2011, the court held a Dunaway!Huntley/Mapp hearing. In a written decision dated July 25, 2011, the Honorable Gregory Lasak denied suppression of the gun and defendant's statement. The Dunawav/Huntlev/Mapp Heari11r On the afternoon ofNovember 2, 2010, Officer Colin Sparks was on routine vehicle patrol in Queens County. By that time, Sparks was a veteran of the New York City Police Department with three years' police experience, having received training in the identification and detection of narcotics at the academy (Sparks: 1 0). 3 At approximately 4:40 p.m., Sparks' police car stopped directly behind a Nissan Altima in the left hand tum lane, and Sparks observed that the car's center brake light had malfunctioned. At that time, Sparks noticed obstructions hanging from the rearview mirror, specifically, a novelty sandal and "big heart-shaped necklace"(Sparks: 6-7). The hanging sandal was approximately two inches wide, and four or five inches in length, and hanging four to five inches in the area from the bottom of the mirror to the top of the dashboard (Sparks: 23, 45). The heart shaped necklace measured approximately two to three inches in length and one to two inches in height (Sparks: 45). Both items were substantial enough to be seen from Sparks' police car. Following this observation, the police stopped the Nissan using their turret light, and activating their sirens. (Sparks: 7). Officer Sparks approached the Nissan on the driver's side, with his partner on the passenger side. Co-defendant Reedy sat in the driver's seat, with co-defendant Robinson seated in the front passenger seat, and defendant in the rear passenger seat {Sparks: 7-8). Next, Sparks requested Reedy's license and registration,4 and 2Co-defendant Reedy was also indicted for Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the First Degree, Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Second Degree, and various traffic infractions, including section 375(30) of the Vehicle and Traffic Law which pertained to the hanging obstructions. 3Citations preceded by the witness' name refer to the hearing transcript. ~on cross-examination, Sparks indicated that he observed the bag with residue in the cup bolder after co-defendant Reedy produced identification documents (Sparks: Cross: 26). A subsequent laboratory analysis report indicated that the cloudy substance was not a controlled substance. During cross-examination, the bag was opened in court, and Sparks maintained that the bag was still "clear and cloudy" (Sparks: 33). People v. David Bookman Indictment No. 2921/2010 PageS noticed a "cloudy" plastic bag containing a "white, powdery substance"- which Sparks believed to be cocaine residue (Sparks: 1 0). In fact, Sparks had encountered controlled substances inside vehicles on prior occasions, and also had observed narcotics inside plastic bags similar to the one inside the Nissan (Sparks: 10-11 ). Officer Sparks then ordered all the vehicle occupants out of the car, and arrested them. Both officers briefly searched the driver's side area for safety, and called for back-up (Sparks: 11, 46). The Nissan and its passengers, including defendant, were transported back to the precinct (Sparks: 12). Sparks returned to the precinct, began processing the arrest, and searched the car from front to back for further narcotics (Sparks: 12-13). When Sparks opened up the trunk, he observed the butt of a loaded nine millimeter High Point pistol protruding from a folded-up newspaper (Sparks: 71) Sparks recovered the gun, and removed the magazine to safeguard it (Sparks: 14). Fallowing the search, Officer Corecsus informed S ,garks that defendant wanted to make a statement. Sparks then brought defendant to the 103 Precinct Detective Squad, where Detective Wright administered Miranda warnings to defendant (Sparks: 15-16). The officers inquired about the firearm, and how defendant found himself in the vehicle (Sparks: 19). Defendant stated that co-defendant Reedy picked him up from the train station, and they drove around. When they stopped, Robinson got into the car, and asked defendant for his newspaper. Robinson took defendant's newspaper, wrapped the gun in it, and placed it in the trunk (Sparks: 19-20). Defendant further admitted that the cocaine belonged to co- defendant Reedy. The Court's Decision After the parties' written submissions and oral argument, the court issued a written decision on July 25, 2011, denying defendant's motion to suppress physical evidence. Notably, the court fully credited the officer's testimony, and found the police had "probable cause to stop the vehicle when Police Officer Sparks observed a "defective taillight" and an "obstruction hanging from the rear view mirror" (Decision: 3,5). Furthermore, the hearing court determined that the hanging items constituted violations of the Vehicle and Traffic Law. Nex~ the hearing court, crediting 0 fficer Sparks' testimony concerning the bag with the powdery substance, found that Sparks' belief, based on his training and experience, that the bag appeared to contain a controlled substance gave him probable cause to believe that the car contained further contraband, and thus, the search and recovery of the gun was proper (Decision: 5). Additionally, the hearing court determined that defendant's statements were voluntarily given after Miranda warnings were administered. Thus, the hearing court found that the gun and the statements were admissible, and denied defendant's motion in its entirety. The Plea On January 10,2014, defendant appeared with counsel before the Honorable James Griffin, Supreme Court, Queens County. On that date, defendant pleaded guilty to People v. David Bookman Indictment No. 2921/2010 Page6 Attempted Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Second Degree (Penal Law §110/ 265.03[1]), with a promised sentence of three years' incarceration and five years' post- release supervision, to run nunc pro tunc with his Maryland case (P: 2-4).5 The prosecutor placed on the record that the waiver of appeal as a condition of the offer had been discussed. (P: 4). The court asked defendant if he had fully discussed the plea with his attorney, and defendant acknowledged that he had (P: 5). Defendant also acknowledged that his mind was clear at that time. !d. The court then discussed the waiver of appeal as follows: THE COURT: Do you understand that even when you plead guilty, you still have a right to appeal, however, here as part of this plea bargain arrangement, you are giving up that right. Do you understand that? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Sir. THE COURT: Do you freely give up your right to appeal? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. (P:6). Next, the court separately infonned defendant of the other rights relinquished by his plea. SpecificalJy, the court instructed defendant that he was giving up his right to a trial, to be presumed innocent until proven guilty, to have his attorney cross-examine the witnesses against him at that trial, to present witnesses or testify on his own behalf, to remain silent, and to have the District Attorney's office prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (P: 6). Defendant stated that he understood that he was giving up these rights by pleading guilty (P: 6). The court then asked if anyone was forcing defendant to plead guilty, and defendant answered, "No" (P: 7). Finally, the court asked defendant if he was pleading guilty because he was in fact guilty, and defendant replied, "Yes, Sir" /d. In addition, defendant signed a written waiver of his right to appeal.6 In it, he agreed to give up his right to appeal "from the judgment of conviction or sentence," including "all issues that may validly be waived" (Waiver of Right to Appeal, 1). ld. He also expressly waived the right to challenge any enhanced punishment determination and the right to file post-conviction motions (Waiver of Right to Appeal ~ 2-7). Defendant acknowledged that he waived these rights voluntarily and intelligently, and that he was afforded a full opportunity to discuss the waiver with counsel and the court. Under the same language, defendant's attorney also signed the written waiver. Finally, the court endorsed the waiver of appeal at the bottom stating that defendant appeared before the court with his counsel, and signed the waiver along with his attorney's advice and consent. 5Citations preceded by a "P'' refer to the plea minutes. 6 A copy of the written waiver of appeal is annexed to this letter. People v. David Bookman Indictment No. 2921/2010 Defendant's Appeal to the Appellate Division Page7 In March 2015, defendant, though counsel, filed a brief in the Appellate Division, Second Department. Defendant claimed that his waiver of his right to appeal was invalid, and that the hearing court erred in fmding that the vehicle stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the People failed to show that the hanging items were "obstructions" as set forth by the Vehicle and Traffic Law. On April 17, 2015, the People filed a brief in response to defendant's appeal. The People argued that defendant's waiver of appeal was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary due to the written waiver and the court's colloquy; therefore, the suppression issue need not be reached. Additionally, the People asserted that the hearing court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress the gun. Moreover, the People contended that the hearing court - which heard the witness and saw the evidence - properly credited the officer's testimony. And, because Officer Sparks' testimony sufficiently demonstrated that the sandal and heart necklace were significant enough to constitute obstructions within the meaning of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, he had probable cause to stop the vehicle. On September 30,2015, the Appellate Division, Second Department, affinned defendant's judgment of conviction. People v. Bookman, 131 A.D .3d 1258 (2d Dept. 20 15). Initially, the Second Department held that defendant's waiver of his right appeal was invalid, because the plea court purportedly failed to adequately explain the nature of the right to appeal and the record was silent regarding the circumstances under which defendant executed the written waiver. Bookman, 131 A.D.3d at 1259. The majority then held that defendant's claim that there was no probable cause to stop the Nissan was meritless. The Court, citing both Guthrie and Robinson, noted that the credible evidence adduced at the hearing was sufficient to establish reasonable cause to believe that section 375(30) of the Vehicle and Traffic Law had been violated. Emphasizing that probable cause "does not require certainty/' the Appellate Division found that Sparks' testimony about the size, dimensions, and positions of the hanging sandal and heart~shaped necklace pennitted the inference that these objects were significant enough to "obstruct or interfere"with the driver's view of the road. Bookman, 131 A.D.3d at 1260, citing V.T.L. § 375(30). Moreover, the court noted the record support for the suppression court's finding that Officer Sparks' testimony was credible, and specifically addressed the one dissenting justice's complaint that the officer failed to issue a surrunons for the obstructions. The court noted that it was entirely reasonable for Officer Sparks not to issue a summons where the "case had escalated from one involving ... a misdemeanor drug possession to one involving a class C violent felony, thereby diminishing the importance of the traffic violations even more." /d., at 1260-1261. The Second Department also noted that the traffic violations appeared on the indictment, furthering the officer's credibility. Because the majority concluded that the vehicle stop was proper since the hanging sandal and heart-shaped necklace were obstructions as set forth by the Vehicle and Traffic Law, the court declined to discuss the inoperative brake light. The decision was silent regarding the officer's observation of the plastic bag of drug residue because defendant had not raised this claim. In his dissent, Justice Austin stated that defendant' s conviction should be reversed and the indictment dismissed because the People did not prove that the sandal and People v. David Bookman Indictment No. 2921/2010 PageS heart-shaped necklace were obstructions. The dissent argued that the proper inquiry on appeal was whether the "pretext" stop of the Nissan was legally sufficient, and contended that the People failed to carry this burden, requiring the People to establish that the hanging objects truly obstructed the driver's view of the road. Further, and as noted in the majority opinion the dissent raised issues regarding the officer's credibility, faulting his description of the hanging sandal and necklace as too conclusory to establish a violation. Moreover, the dissent tacitly questioned the officer's credibility, faulting him for failing to voucher the sandal and necklace, photograph them, or issue the driver a summons, and noted that the car left the precinct with the items still inside. Thus, the dissent concluded, there was insufficient evidence at the hearing demonstrating that the hanging objects obstructed or interfered with the driver's view of the road, and the stop was unconstitutional. !d., at 1262-1265. On January 8, 2016, Justice Austin granted defendant's motion for leave to appeal to this Court. ARGUMENT OFFICER SPARKS' TESTIMONY AS TO THE SIGNIFICANT SIZE AND CENTRAL LOCATION OF THE HANGING SANDAL AND HEART-SHAPED NECKLACE, ALONG WITH HIS TESTIMONY REGARDING HIS TRAINING AND EXPERlENCE AND HIS OBSERVATIONS OF THE POWDERY SUBSTANCE, PROVIDE AMPLE RECORD SUPPORT FOR THE LOWER COURT'S FINDINGS THAT THE STOP AND SEARCH WERE PROPER. Because Officer Sparks reasonably believed that the four-to-five inch long and two-inch wide sandal and "big" heart-shaped necklace were significant enough to amount to an obstruction proscribed by the Vehicle and Traffic Law, there was probable cause for him to stop the Nissan.7 Similarly, the officer's belief that the powdery residue in the cloudy plastic bag in the Nissan's center console was cocaine was also reasonable, based on his specific training and experience in the detection of narcotics, and his prior encounters with narcotics packaged in a similar fashion. Moreover, both these issues involve mixed questions of law and fact, and since there was abundant record support for the determinations of the courts below, neither issue requires further review by this Court. Additionally, there was nothing in finn regarding defendant's waiver of appeal. Similar to People v. Sanders, 25 N.Y.3d 337 (20 15), the plea court took care to explain to defendant that the right to appeal was separate from the other rights he was waiving by pleading guilty, specifically informing defendant that he would ordinarily retain the right to appeal even though he was pleading guilty, but that here he was being asked to give up that 1Defendant incorrectly describes the hanging decorative items as either "small" or "miniature," (Defendant's Letter: 1-2). Officer Sparks' description ofboth items indicates that these items were substantial in size, particularly when their lengths and widths are combined. People v. David Bookman Indictment No. 2921/2010 Page9 right as well. Defendant then expressly agreed to give up his right to appeal and also signed a detailed written waiver explaining his right to appeal in which he acknowledged once again that he was waiving that right. Nevertheless, defendant claims that the Appellate Division properly invalidated his waiver of appeal, criticizing the plea court's purportedly vague instructions on the rights waived, and urging the court to disregard the written waiver. He also contends that the stop was unconstitutional because Officer Sparks allegedly provided no testimony about whether the ornaments "blocked [the driver's] view through any window," and, in his view, provided only conclusory testimony regarding the hanging items (Defendant's Letter at 7-8). Defendant raises a new claim, not advanced in the Appellate Division, that Officer Sparks' belief that the white, powdery substance inside the plastic bag was cocaine residue was unreasonable. Defendant's claims are aU meritless. At the outset, the record shows that the court properly informed defendant that he had a right to appeal that he would ordinarily retain after a guilty plea and that he was relinquishing that right as a condition of his plea. Moreover, the inferences drawn by the courts below from the detailed hearing testimony that the dangling novelty sa.ndal and heart-shaped necklace were sufficiently large and centrally located to constitute violations of the Vehicle and Traffic Law were amply supported by Officer Sparks' very specific testimony regarding the size, shape, and location of those items and his ability to see them from at least a full car-length away through the rear window of the Nissan. Similarly, the hearing court was entitled to credit Sparks' testimony about his observations and training that the white powdery substance making the plastic bag cloudy was a controlled substance. The order of the Appellate Division should thus be affirmed. A. Defendant validly Waived His Right to Appeal. Defendant waived his right to appeal both orally during the plea colloquy and in writing. In order for such a waiver to be valid, the record must show that the waiver was knowingly and voluntarily made. People v. Johnson, 14 N.Y.3d 483,486 {2010); People v. Callahan, 80 N.Y.2d 273 (1992); People v. Seaberg, 74 N.Y.2d 1 (1989). While the court must ensure that a defendant understands that the right he is waiving is in addition to those automatically forfeited by the guilty plea, Johnson, 14 N.Y.3d at 486, this Court has recently re-emphasized that no specific language is mandated for the waiver to be upheld, People v. Sanders, 25 N.Y.3d 337, 341-42 {2015). Though the analysis involves various factors like a defendant's age and background, as long as a defendant understands the consequences and import ofhis waiving his appellate rights, the waiver will be enforced. I d., at 341; Johnson, 14 N.Y.3d at 486. Moreover, a detailed written waiver may ameliorate an otherwise insufficient colloquy between defendant and the court. See generally People v. Ramos, 7 N.Y.3d 737 (2006) ("[e]ven if there were any ambiguity in the sentencing court's colloquy," executed written waiver of appeal may establish that defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to appeal); see also Sanders, 25 N.Y.3d at 342, fn 2. (acknowledging relevance of written waiver while holding one is not necessary for a valid waiver); People v. Lopez, 6 N. Y .3d 248, 257 (2006 )(recommending written waiver). Indeed, People v. David Bookman Indictment No. 2921120 l 0 Page 10 in Ramos, the written waiver was sufficient to cure a terse colloquy, part of which included the defendant's one~word response to the court's question of whether defendant understood the conditions ofher plea. Ramos, 7 N.Y.3d at 737. This Court held that the "detailed written waiver" corrected any ambiguities presented by any gaps in the court's instructions. !d. Here, the complete record, including defendant's signed written waiver, sufficiently demonstrates that defendant understood that he was waiving his right to appeal. Prior to the plea colloquy, the prosecutor stated that the waiver of appeal had been specifically discussed by the parties, an assertion not disputed by counsel or defendant (P: 4). The court then began the colloquy itself by ensuring that the defendant had "fully discussed" the case with his lawyer to which defendant responded affirmatively (P: 5). Next, the court explained to defendant, on the record, that he was giving up his right to appeal. The court asked defendant if he understood that he had the right to appeal even though he was pleading guilty but that he was giving up that right in this case (P. 5). Defendant replied unequivocally, "Yes" (P: 5). The Court thus secured an express oral waiver from the defendant of his right to appeal, after explaining that the right he was relinquishing was separate from and in addition to the rights he would ordinarily lose by pleading guilty. In addition, defendant signed a written waiver of appeal in this case, further establishing that he fully comprehended the consequences of waiving this right. Defendant's written waiver specified in its first paragraph that defendant was "advised of, and waive[ d], [his] right to appeal from the judgment of conviction and sentence," including "any and all issues that may validly be waived" (Waiver of Right to Appeal,~ 1). Next, the waiver explained the right to appeal, including language informing defendant of his right to have counsel assigned, and to "submit a brief and/or have argument before the appellate court on any issues relating to the conviction and sentence." !d. 8 Thus, the waiver of appeal contained a more comprehensive discussion of the right to an appeal than commonly used by plea courts, augmenting the sufficiency of this defendant's waiver. Given the detailed instruction encompassed by the written waiver, including its language relating to defendant's waiver of all issues arising from his conviction and sentence, it is hard to imagine that defendant would fail to grasp that he was freely waiving his right to appeal in this case. As the written waiver in this case spelled out the right defendant was waiving in great detail including the appeJlate process itself, there can be little question that defendant understood the right he was waiving. AdditionalJy, the waiver itself establishes that it was signed knowingly and voluntarily. Not only does the waiver bear defendant's signature, but it is also signed by his attorney of record. Indeed, the language in the written waiver where the defendant and counsel signed states that defendant waived his right [to appeal] ''voluntarily and knowingly after being fully informed of them by my attorney ... standing beside me." Further, that clause states that "[defendant] had a full opportunity to discuss these matters with [his] attorney, and any questions I may have had have been answered to my satisfaction." By 8The waiver was comprehensive in nature, explaining to defendant that he also waived his right to post-conviction motions and applications, such as "motions to vacate his conviction and set aside this sentence," and "habeas corpus petitions in state and federal court" (Waiver of Right to Appeal, 1 2). People v. David Bookman Indictment No. 292112010 Page 11 signing below this language, both defendant and his counsel affirmed that the waiver was discussed, signed in open court, and freely executed. Accordingly, the written waiver, coupled with the specific inquiry of the court, were adequate to support the knowing and voluntary character of defendant's relinquishment of his right to appeal. As a result, review of defendant's suppression issue is precluded. Further, this was not defendant's first exposure to the criminal justice system, as defendant had a prior Maryland conviction. As this Court has previously determined that a defendant's background is relevant in determining the validity of a waiver, see Sanders, 25 N.Y.3d at 342,/n 2. this factor too weighs heavily in favor of upholding the waiver here. The record in this case is analogous to, and in some respects far better than, other cases in which this Court has upheld the validity of a plea waiver. In Sanders, 25 N. Y.3d at 337, the plea court merely asked the defendant, who had prior exposure to the criminal justice system, if he understood that he had a right to appeal, if he discussed it with his attorney, and if he voluntarily waived it. The court did not explain the right any further and did not expressly inform the defendant that this right was separate from the rights ordinarily waived, and no written waiver supplemented the colloquy. This Court nevertheless upheld the waiver. In People v. Nicholson, a companion case decided together with People v. Lopez, 6 N.Y.3d at 257, the plea court described the nature of the right being waived, but again did not expressly inform the defendant that the right to appeal was separate from the other rights being waived, and the defendant did not sign a written waiver. This Court held, "A better practice might have been to explain to defendant that though he ordinarily retains the right to an appeal even after pleading guilty, in this case he was being offered a particular plea by the prosecution on the condition that he give up that right. It would be even better to secure a written waiver including such explanation (as in Lopez). The record is, however, sufficient to satisfy this Court that defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to appeal." !d. Here, the court followed both of the practices recommended in Lopez, but absent from both that case and Sanders. Indeed, the court specifically told defendant that he would ordinarily have the right to appeal after pleading guilty: the court asked, "Do you understand that even when you plead guilty, you still have a right to appeal., The judge then explained that defendant was being asked to forego that right in this case: "however, here as part of this plea bargain arrangement, you are giving up that right" (P: 5-6). This is precisely what this Court recommended in Nicholson. Moreover, the court secured a detailed written waiver explaining the rights defendant was giving up, again as recommended in Nicholson. In addition, the written waiver was similar to the written waiver in Ramos, which this Court held sufficient to remedy any ambiguity in an extremely terse, essentially one-word colloquy during the plea allocution regarding the waiver of appeal. Nevertheless, defendant argues that waiver was invalid and that Sanders is distinguishable. First, defendant contends that the court's colloquy in Sanders was better than the one here, as the Sanders court explicitly informed the defendant he had a right to appeal his "conviction and sentence." Second, defendant claims that unlike the Sanders defendant who had five convictions, his single prior felony renders him less experienced with People v. David Bookman Indictment No. 2921/2010 Page 12 the criminal justice system, and therefore unable to comprehend the waiver. In both instances, defendant misses the mark. The few additional words in Sanders "conviction and sentence" did little, if anything, to elaborate on the basic right to appeal briefly mentioned in Sanders, and their absence here thus cannot be fatal to validity of the waiver. The record here shows that defendant clearly responded that he understood that he was waiving his right to appeal, which was separate from his other waived rights, and there is no reason to believe that the addition of the phrase from Sanders would have somehow rendered an otherwise invalid waiver valid. Such a conclusion would be wholly inconsistent with the Court's repeated admonitions, re- iterated in Sanders itself, that "a trial court need not engage in any particular litany when apprising a defendant pleading guilty of the individual rights abandoned." Similarly, contrary to defendant's further claim, Sanders does not affirmatively require a plea court to inform defendant as to what specific court an appeal could be taken (Defendant's Letter at 11). Here, unlike Sanders, there was a written waiver of the right to appeal, which explained far more than would have been explained by the few additional words defendant now insists on. In fact, this written waiver explained the appellate process, including the right to counsel, the right to file a brief in an appeHate court, and the right to have oral argument. This explanation was considerably more valuable to the defendant than the name of the court to which the appeal would be taken. Likewise, defendant's lesser prior contact with the criminal justice system does not defeat the validity of the waiver. Nothing in Sanders, nor in any other case of this Court, requires a specific number of convictions in order to validate an express, though short, waiver of the right to appeal. Defendant's prior contact showed some familiarity with the criminal justice system, and this, together with the court's colloquy, the written waiver, and defendant's express acknowledgments, was sufficient to establish that defendant understood that he was waiving his right to pursue his case in a higher court. Next, defendant argues that there was no evidence in the record that defendant discussed the written waiver with his attorney (Defendant's Letter at 11). But the written waiver is part of the record, and itself establishes that defendant discussed the written waiver and the rights he was giving up with counsel. Indeed, adjacent to the signature line, the waiver states "I waive these rights voluntarily and knowingly after being fully informed of them by my attorney" and then reiterates, for both clarity and emphasis, "I have had an opportunity to discuss these matters with my attorney"(Waiver of Right to Appeal~ 7). As both counsel and defendant signed the waiver underneath this language, the document supports the conclusion that counsel and defendant specifically discussed the waiver of the right to appeal, that defendant understood his rights as explained to him, and that he agreed to waive them. In addition, the waiver pontains a provision, endorsed with the court's own signature, stating that "the above-named defendant appeared before the court ... and in open court, in the presence of this court ... and with the advice and consent of his attorney, signed [the waiver] ." Thus, the written waiver contains a further statement by the court that the waiver was executed in the presence of the court, upon counsel's advice, and whoJly People v. David Bookman Indictment No. 2921/2010 Page 13 voluntarily by defendant. Thus, defendant's claim that nothing in the record shows that defendant discussed the written waiver with counsel is simply incorrect. Similarly unpersuasive is defendant's argument that the written waiver should not be considered because the court failed to mention it during the colloquy. Again, the waiver itself explains the circumstances under which it was made - including the date on which it was signed, the fact that counsel and defendant spoke about the rights discussed in it, the fact that it was executed in open court before the judge, and the fact that defendant freely gave up his right to appeal as part ofthe plea bargain. This Court has rarely invalidated written waivers, doing so in limited instances where there was no showing that such written waiver was knowingly and voluntarily made. People v. DeSimone, 80 N.Y.2d 273, 283 (1992)(invalidating written waiver where record was completely silent regarding waiver of appeal). In this case, the written waiver itself, supplemented by the oral colloquy, provided ample evidence that defendant's bargained-for written waiver was freely executed. Finally, defendant's complaint that the waiver did not specifically mention the suppression issue does not preclude defendant's waiver of that issue. To the contrary, this Court has specifically held that a general waiver of the right to appeal, as here, encompasses all rights that can validly be waived, including the right to appeal a suppression determination. People v. Kemp, 94 N. Y.2d 831, 833 ( 1999)(holding general waiver of appeal included suppression issue). Here, the written waiver used all inclusive language sufficient to inform defendant that he was waiving his right to pursue his case in another, higher court. In short, the totality of the record in this case, including both the oral colloquy informing defendant that he was being asked to waive an additional right, specifically the right to appeal, along with the detailed written waiver in which he acknowledged that he had discussed the rights contained in the waiver with his attorney, understood them, and waived them, establish that defendant's waiver of his right to appeal was valid. B. There Is Record Support for the Lower Courts' Determinations That Officer Sparks Reasonably Believed That the Large Sandal and Heart-shaped Necklace Hanging in the Middle of the Windshield Violated the Vehicle and Traffic Law Ban on Obstructions That Interfere with the Driver's "Full and Clear" Vision. Regardless of the propriety of the waiver of appeal, Officer Sparks had adequate grounds to stop the Nissan because he had probable cause to believe that the vehicle committed a traffic infraction. As the Appellate Division found, Officer Sparks' observations of the hanging obstructions from a car-length away through the rear windshield of the Nissan; his detailed description of the size of the sandal five inches in length and two inches wide, as well as the size of the heart shaped object; and his very specific testimony placing these items in the middle of the viewing area of the windshield, all provided ample support for the findings of the courts below that he reasonably beJieved defendant committed a Vehicle and Traffic Law violation, thus authorizing the stop. At the outset, defendant's challenge to the legality of the car stop is, as noted above, a mixed question of law and fact, and, thus, this Court can only review the issue to decide whether the lower courts' determinations are supported by the record. An issue ordinarily presents a mixed question of law and fact "where the facts are disputed, where People v. David Bookman Indictment No. 292112010 Page 14 credibility is at issue or where reasonable minds may differ as to the inference to be drawn from the established facts." See, e.g .• McRay, 51 N.Y.2d at 601. In the search and seizure context, this Court has routinely held that issues regarding the inferences drawn from the facts to constitute reasonable suspicion or probable cause present mixed questions oflaw and fact See, e.g., People v. Omowa/e, 18 N.Y.3d 825, 827 (2011); People v, McFarlane, 21 N.Y.3d 1034 (2013). This includes questions concerning whether there exists sufficient grounds to conduct a stop of a motor vehicle. See People v. Mercado, 25 N. Y.3d 936 (20 15); People v. Shabazz, 99 N. Y.2d 634 (2003 ); People v. Valerio, 95 N. Y.2d 924 (2000). In such circumstances, the Court may only determine whether there exists any record support for the fmdings below, and this is so even where "different conclusions may not have been unreasonable." People v. Williams, 18 N.Y.3d 834, 836 (2011). Here, the issues raised by defendant tum on the inferences drawn from the facts. Whether the five-by-two inch sandal and the heart necklace also measuring several inches that were hanging in the center of the windshield prevented a "full and clear" view of the road, requires an assessment of the inferences to be drawn from the testimony, as credited by the courts below. Similarly, the inference to be drawn from Officer Sparks' testimony that he could see these items from a car-length away, stationed behind the car and thus through the Nissan's rear window, requires an appraisal of the type and weight of the inferences to be drawn. At the very least, "reasonable minds may differ" over these questions, and they are therefore mixed questions, permitting only limited review here. In any event, the vehicle stop was lawful. Since Robinson, New York courts have upheld car stops where the police officer articulates credible facts establishing reasonable cause to believe that an individual violated the Vehicle and Traffic Law. People v. Robinson, 97 N. Y.2d 341, 354 (200 1 ). In these situations, "reasonable cause" and "probable cause" are used interchangeably. On several occasions, this Court has established that probable cause exists when the facts or circumstances known to the officer sufficiently support a reasonable belief that a traffic offense has been or is being committed. People v. Maldonado, 86 N.Y.2d 631, 635 (l995)(quoting People v. Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417, 423 [ 1985]). Probable cause does not require perfection, nor does it require proof beyond a reasonable doubt at a suppression hearing. People v. Guthrie, 25 N.Y.3d 130, 133 (2015). The touchstone of the inquiry is whether the officer's belief that a violation occurred was reasonable. I d. In this context, both this Court and the United States Supreme Court have held that where an officer makes a reasonable mistake of fact or law the resulting vehicle stop remains valid, as police officers are often called to make split-second decisions, and are thus entitled to some margin of error. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S.Ct 530, 535-536 (2014); Guthrie, 25 N.Y.3d at 140. Indeed, even if the traffic violation is a mere "pretext" to investigate another offense, as long as probable cause supports the traffic violation, the stop does not violate either the Federal or New York State Constitutions. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (2001); Robinson ,91 N.Y.2d at 349. The stop in this case fully complies with these decisions. On these facts, the hanging sandal and heart-shaped necklace gave the officer reasonable cause to believe that the driver violated the provision of the Vehicle and Traffic Law prohibiting obstructions in the windshield. This is supported by the language of the statute itself, which is violated People v. David Bookman Indictment No. 29211201 0 Page 15 whenever an item "interferes" with the driver's view or prevents "a full and clear view" of the road.9 Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375 (30). At the suppression hearing, there was sufficient proof illustrating that the large novelty sandal and dangling heart-shaped necklace violated this section of the Vehicle and Traffic Law. Officer Sparks testified that he was directly behind the Nissan when he saw the sandal and heart-shaped necklace, which he described as "obstructions" hanging from the car's rear view mirror (Sparks: 6). Sparks further indicated that the sandal was hanging "four or five inches" between the mirror and the dashboard, and was "about two inches wide" (Sparks: Cross: 23 ). Regarding the "big" heart shaped necklace, Sparks testified that this particular item was "one to two inches" in height, and hung ''two to three inches" in length, and was also hanging from the mirror by a string (Sparks: 7, 44-45). Both items were displayed between the bottom of the rear view mirror and the top of the dashboard. It follows that these items were hanging "in such a manner as to interfere with the view of the operator through the windshield," as both objects were therefore blocking the center part of the windshield in an area where the driver would otherwise have a clear view. In addition, the fact that the officer was able to see the items from a car-length away, through the back windshield of the Nissan, and described the items as "obstructionsn(Hearing: 6) supports the inference that the objects were interfering with a clear road view. Moreover, Sparks indicated that he approached the vehicle to issue a citation for these items {Sparks: 24). Thus, the record supports a finding that the sandal and heart necklace were hanging in such a fashion as to interfere or obstruct the driver's view of the road through the windshield, and thus, violated Section 375(30) of the Vehicle and Traffic Law. Other courts have found violations of Section 3 7 5 (30) in similar cases, where an officer's testimony establishes a reasonable belief that dangling items from rearview mirrors were obstructions as set forth in that statute. In People v. Harrington, 30 A.D.3d 1084 (4th Dept. 2006), the Fourth Department upheld the recovery of drugs from a car where the initial stop was based on "numerous air fresheners" hanging from the rearview mirror. The Harrington court noted that the suppression hearing testimony showed that the items obstructed the driver's view, and upheld the officer's stop. /d Similarly, in People v. Carver, 124 A.D.3d 1276, 1280 (4th Dept. 2015), the police stopped a car because of an object hanging from the rearview mirror. In Carver, the proceeds of a burglary and burglar's tools were subsequently recovered from the car. /d., at 1277. On appeal, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that his counsel was ineffective. In discussing the legality of the initial stop, the Fourth Department noted that the officer "stopped the vehicle because he observed an item hanging from the rear-view mirror and a sticker on the front windshield, both of which constitute violations of the Vehicle and Traffic Law." /d., at 1280. Because of that 9Section 375(30) of the New York State Vehicle and Traffic Law specifies that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person to operate a motor vehicle with any object placed or hung in or upon the vehicle ... in such a manner as to obstruct or interfere with the view of the operator through the windshield, or prevent him from having a clear and full view of the road." See V.T.L. § 375(30). People v. David Bookman Indictment No. 2921120 10 Page 16 testimony, the court found that the defense attorney there had "no grounds to challenge the legality of the stop." I d. By contrast, sparse or silent records will not justify traffic stops based on this statute. In People v. Diodato, there was no violation of Section 375 (30) of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, because the record was silent on the issue of whether the hanging object was an obstruction withing the meaning of the Vehicle and Traffic Law. People v. Diodato, 4 Misc.3d 127(A), 127(A) (N.Y. App. Tenn. 2004). Moreover, in People v. David, the officer observed a vehicle traveling at twenty miles an hour on an open highway, observed "some objects" hanging from the rearview mirror, and the defendant was not wearing a seat belt. People v. David, 223 A.D.2d 551, 551 (2d Dept. 1996). There, the court disbelieved that officer's testimony regarding the infractions, as that officer made no inquiry regarding them. David, 223 A.D.2d at 553. Here, like Carver and Harrington, and unlike Diodato and David, Officer Sparks' testimony was specific enough to demonstrate that the hanging sandal and heart necklace were significant obstructions and fell within the statute. The officer specifically testified about the substantial length and width of the novelty sandal, five inches long and two inches wide, as well as the dimensions of the heart necklace, also several inches in both directions. The record shows that the items were dangling in the space between the mirror and the dashboard, in the middle of the windshield. And Sparks testified that he could see the sandal and heart while stationed behind the Nissan, presumably through the back window of that car. Thus, as the courts below determined, the police officer reasonably determined that the two items hanging in the middle of the windshield were sufficient in size and placement to "interfere" with the driver's "full and clear'' view of the road. Indeed, unlike Diodato, Officer Sparks described the dimensions of the items, and unlike David, Officer Sparks' testimony was fully credited by the trial court. Thus, the record demonstrates that Officer Sparks conducted a lawful car stop, based upon a violation ofV.T.L. § 375 (30). Moreover, the stop would nonetheless have been lawful even if the items were revealed not to constitute obstructions, because the dimensions recalled by Sparks on the stand were adequate to show his reasonable belief that they were obstructions within the meaning of the statute. Guthrie, 25 N.Y.3d at 130. Indeed, this Court held in People v. Guthrie that an officer's mistake of law will not result in suppression where it is objectively reasonable. /d., at 140; see also Heien, 135 S.Ct. at 536. Here, there can be no question that Officer Spark's interpretation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law section was at least objectively reasonable, even if ultimately mistaken, because it was supported by lower court determinations finding violations under similar circumstances. Furthermore, even if the stop was a mere pretext to investigate another crime, which is belied by the record here, that also would not render the stop unconstitutional. Robinson, 91 N.Y.2d at 349. Nevertheless, much like the dissent, defendant argues that the People failed to offer "objective relevant facts and circumstances" showing that the ornaments interfered with the driver's view of the road (Defendant's Letter at 8). Defendant further complains that the officer never specifically testified that the objects interfered with the driver's view, and People v. David Bookman Indictment No. 2921/201 0 Page 17 argues that it is unworthy of belief that these items could do so, particularly since the Nissan's driver was fairly tall (/d. at 8, 10). In all instances, defendant is wrong. For one, defendant's insistence on testimony that the items "obstructed" the driver's view is misplaced, as the testimony here was more than sufficient without such a conclusory phrase. Indeed, the record is rife with details regarding how the items were hanging, how long and wide they were, and where precisely they were hanging. This was supplemented with the officer's testimony of his own ability to view these items even from behind defendant's vehicle, a car-length away. The only logical inference from these details, coupled with the fact that Sparks' pointedly used the word "obstructions" when describing these items, is that the hanging sandal and heart necklace were indeed hanging in a manner interfering with the driver's view. It is unlikely that the officer would have used that particular and unequivocal word if there was no way the hanging items could have interfered with the driver's view of the road. The officer was not, then, required to further state in a conclusory or summary fashion that the items "obstructed" the driver's view. Indeed, such a conclusion would only be valid if it were accompanied by the precise details that the witness here testified to. See People v. Dodt, 61 N.Y.2d 408 (1984) {summary testimony that defendant matched description given was insufficient without testimony regarding descriptions). Since the officer's testimony was detailed enough to set forth reasonable cause to believe that the ornaments constituted a traffic infraction, the determinations of the courts below must be upheld. Likewise, this Court should reject defendant's claim that Officer Sparks' testimony was deficient because he did not specifically take the driver's height into account. All that is required is a reasonable basis to believe the statute is violated, and the driver's stature was not an indispensable consideration before stopping the vehicle. Even assuming such a consideration would be appropriate on the trial of such a charge, the officer needed only objective credible facts to believe that a violation had occurred, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See Robinson, 91 N.Y .2d at 354. Nor was the officer required to literally sit in the driver's seat and simulate the driver's size to re-enact the driver's viewpoint before he could "reasonably believe" there was a violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law. Indeed, the stop would not and could not have been based on any such demonstration, as no such simulation could have occurred until after stopping the vehicle. Any such testimony was thus unnecessary for the purposes of the hearing. At the very least, the testimony provided a record supporting the detenninations of the courts below that the officer had adequate ground to believe a violation had occurred before the vehicle stop was conducted. Next, defendant argues that it is "inconceivable," given the size of the sandal and heart necklace, that these items would obstruct a driver's view (Defendant's Letter at 8). But it was surely not "inconceivable" that the sandal, a solid five-by-two inch object, together with a dangling heart on a chain which was also several inches in diameter, both of which were positioned in the middle of the windshield and presumably moving with the movements ofthe car, would have "interfered" with the driver's view. Indeed, both the hearing court and the Appellate Division found it plausible, and those inferences were supported by the record. As such, no further review of this issue is available. People v. David Bookman Indictment No. 292112010 Page 18 Defendant also argues that the Vehicle and Traffic Law never intended for such items to violate the statute (Defendant's Letter at 8}. He contends that if these items were obstructions, commonplace items like rosary beads, E-Z passes, and GPS devices would violate the statute. Again, defendant's argument misses the mark. First, defendant's claim that the Legislature never intended novelty items to violate this section of the Vehicle and Traffic Law is specious at best. Indeed, this contention is contradicted by the statute on its face, which reads "any object ... placed or hung in the vehicle" can be an obstruction. Because novelty items hanging in a vehicle between the rearview mirror and the dashboard in the windshield fit this definition, these items are clearly contemplated by the statute. Second, whether other objects like E-Z passes or similar items might violate the statute, depending on where they are placed, raises factual case-by-case issues that cannot be resolved based on the testimony here about the specific objects observed by Officer Sparks. Thus, a conclusion here that the objects observed provided reasonable cause to stop the car would not compel a similar conclusion whenever other, differently placed items are attached to a windshield or rearview mirror. E-Z pass units, for example, are commonly found on the comers or far above the rearview mirror, and, if so placed, would fail to conflict with the obstruction statute. Rosary beads, also cited by defendant and the dissent below, are generally far smaller than the items in this case, and are not a solid obstruction, like the items hanging here. They too, would presumably not conflict with the statute. Further, items like GPS units are frequently located on the dashboard, which would not, by their position, interfere with the view of the road through the windshield. And if an E-Z pass, or any other sizeable item, were placed below the rearview mirror in the middle of the windshield and sufficiently sizeable, then those items, too, might quite reasonably violate the tenns of Section 375(30). Absent specific information on the size and location of such items, no categorical determination could be made. Third, the lower courts have been sensitive to differences in hanging items, and only allowed stops where there is specific testimony as to their size or the conclusion that they obstructed the driver's view is reasonable. Compare Harrington,30 A.D.3d at 1084 and Carver, 124 A.D.3d at 1280; with Diodato, 4 Misc.3d at 127(A); and David, 223 A.D.2d at 551. Thus, this Court need not fear that an affirmance here will, as defendant warns, open the floodgates to stopping any vehicle with any common item dangling from the mirror or affixed to the windshield. Defendant's attempt to raise the specter of unfettered police power to stop vehicles for common novelty items is unavailing for other reasons as well. Indeed, this Court addressed and dismissed the excessive police power argument in Robinson itself, stating"[ w ]e are not confounded that police officers must exercise their discretion on a daily basis. Nor are we surprised at the assertion that many New Yorkers violate the Vehicle and Traffic Law. But we cannot equate the many combinations of police officer discretion and traffic violations as arbitrary police conduct. . . "Robinson, 91 N.Y.2d at 358. Because the requirement of probable cause to believe that a traffic infraction occurred is one that can be uniformly applied to all manner of vehicle stops, and the Vehicle and Traffic Law is a sufficient measure of the lawfulness of police conduct, this case presents no reason to abandon Robinson. Indeed, as this Court recognized in Robinson, there is no better or more uniformly applicable rule. People v. David Bookman Indictment No. 2921/20 I 0 Page 19 Defendant's additional claim that Sparks' testimony was deficient because he never testified that the driver operated the Nissan in a manner suggesting that the hanging obstructions interfered with his view of the road by, for example, swerving or going off the road also fails (Defendant's Letter: 8-9). Indeed, the statute requires no such behavior. In effect, defendant imposes a higher burden on law enforcement than does the Vehicle and Traffic Law. The People's case at the hearing sufficiently established a reasonable belief that Section 375(30) was violated, and no more was required for the stop. Further, defendant implicitly attacks the officer's credibility- as did the dissent below - arguing that it was suspect because Sparks never vouchered the hanging obstructions. First, this presents an issue of credibility resolved against defendant by the courts below. That credibility determination cannot be reviewed here. Second, as noted by the majority below, once Sparks observed the cloudy bag that he believed contained a quantity of cocaine residue, and later discovered a loaded firearm inside the trunk, the case evolved from a misdemeanor charge to a C violent felony offense. People v. Bookman, 131 A.D.3d 125 8, 1261 (2d Dept. 20 15). In light of that, the officer properly used his discretion not to voucher the items. Likewise - and as correctly noted by the majority - the fact that Sparks' never issued a traffic summons for the sizeable ornaments is of no moment, as the necessity to issue the summons diminished when the officer observed what appeared to be cocaine in the car. Moreover, the record shows that Sparks intended to issue the summons right up until he observed the cocaine (Sparks: 7-8). In this regard, the fact that these obstructing ornaments were not vouchered, and that no summons was issued, fail to undermine the officer's credibility, an issue which is, in any event, beyond this Court's power to review. Additionally, defendant argues that Vehicle and Traffic Law violations only lie where both the regulated object is present along with the impairment the regulation is designed to prevent. To support this contention, defendant cites to examples such as tinted window cases. See People v. Osborne, 158 A.D.2d 740 (3d Dept. 1990){upholding car stop for tinted windows where police also had information that defendant's vehicle was involved in drug trade). Defendant also relies on People v. Hines, 155 A.D.2d 722 (3d Dept. 1989), where the officer testified that the defendant's headlights were "dazzling" to demonstrate the level of specificity required to establish probable cause. But this requirement is fully met in this case. Here, the regulated items- namely, the dangling sandal and heart-shaped necklace -were described in detail, and Officer Sparks's testimony regarding the obstructions and his ability to see them from a car-length away behind the Nissan, provided a reasonable belief that these "obstructions" were indeed interfering with the view through the windshield. Further, Sparks' testimony here was far more detailed than the witness in Hines, where the stop was upheld, as Sparks was able to give approximate lengths and widths of these objects. By comparison, the officer's use of "dazzling" in Hines is far more conclusory than Sparks' testimony that the ornaments actually were "obstructions" because of their size and placement. As such, Sparks testimony established a reasonable belief that the driver committed a traffic infraction, and there was probable cause for the vehicle stop. People v. David Bookman Indictment No. 2921/2010 Page 20 In addition to the hanging sandal and heart-shaped necklace, the vehicle stop was also predicated on a defective brake light. It was undisputed that one of the Nissan's rear brake lights was not working, and Sparks specifically testified that the defective brake light provided one of the reasons for the stop. Nor was it unreasonable for Sparks to conclude that the defective brake light constituted a violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law. Section 375(19) of the Vehicle and Traffic Law states that "the operation, parking or standing on a public highway or street in this state of a motor vehicle or trailer ... which is defectively equipped and lighted is hereby prohibited." See V.T.L. § 375(19). This alone provided adequate reason to believe the car was in violation of the statutory requirements. Defendant argues, however, that the brake light did not violate the Vehicle and Traffic Law because subsection( 40)(b) provides that "at least two" brake lights are required, and the Nissan possessed two functioning brake lights out of the three. See V.T.L. § 375(40)(b). But the fact that a vehicle must be equipped with at least two brake lights does not address whether a vehicle equipped with an additional brake light that is defective violates subsection 19. Thus, Officer Sparks could reasonably believe that the defective brake light violated the Vehicle and Traffic Law. Moreover, Officer Sparks conclusion is valid even if, in hindsight, it were concluded that no violation had occurred. Indeed, in Heien, the Supreme Court held that a North Carolina brake light statute that was subject to more than one interpretation provided justification for a stop even though it was eventually decided that the vehicle was not in violation of the statute. The Court observed that reasonableness is the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment and "[t]o be reasonable is not to be perfect, and so the Fourth Amendment allows for some mistakes on the part of government officials, giving them 'fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community's protection."' Heien, 13 5 S.Ct at 536, (citing Brinegar v. United States, 33 8 U.S. 160, 176 (1949). This includes reasonable mistakes of law. /d.; see also Guthrie, 25 N.Y.3d at 137. The Supreme Court noted that just as with mistakes of fact, "an officer may 'suddenly confront' a situation in the field as to which the application of a statute is unclear- however clear it may later become," and thus a law enforcement officer is entitled to some margin of error in this regard. Both the officer in Heien and Officer Sparks here confronted just such problems in interpreting their respective jurisdictions' brake light statutes, and, thus, here, like Heien, any mistake of law by the officer in the field did not, by itself, invalidate the stop. Thus, Officer Sparks' testimony provided ample cause for the determinations of the court below that a violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law ban on obstructions had occurred, and this is so even if different inferences could be drawn from the evidence. See McRay, 51 N.Y.2d at 60l;see also People v. Leach, 21 N.Y.3d 969 (2013). In light of this Court's mixed question decisions, and the abundant record support illustrating that Officer Sparks reasonably believed that the items were obstructions under the Vehicle and Traffic Law, this Court should reject defendant's claim. People v. David Bookman Indictment No. 2921/2010 Page 21 C. The Lower Courts' Findings That Officer Sparks Reasonably Believed That the White Powdery Substance in the Plastic Bag Was Cocaine Was Supported by the Testimony at the Hearina: and Is Beyond Further Review. Both the hearing court and the trial court credited Officer Sparks' testimony that he believed, based on his training and experience, that the white powdery substance that appeared as a cloudy residue in the plastic bag on the car's console was cocaine. That determination was supported by Officer Sparks' testimony itself about the condition of the bag and the plastic bag itself, which was produced before the hearing court for its inspection. Because this issue presents a mixed question of law and fact, and because there is record support for the determination, no further review is available in this Court. Initially, whether the officer testified truthfully, whether the bag appeared cloudy and contained a white powdery substance, and whether the officer could detennine that the white powdery substance was cocaine, are all questions that involve issues of credibility or the inferences to be drawn from the testimony. Thus, like the issue of the basis for the car stop, these issues present mixed questions ofJaw and fact. See People v. McRay, 51 N.Y.2d 594,601 (1980); Leach, 21 N.Y.3d 969 (2013); People v. Jose, 94 N.Y.2d 844 (1999); People v. Ortiz, 83 N.Y.2d 840 (2004). And a determination on a mixed question must be upheld even if a contrary finding might also have been reasonable under the circumstances, so long as there is record support for the lower courts' determinations. Leach, 21 N.Y.3d at 972. In addition, this Court owes deference to the findings ofthehearingcourt, which had the opportunity to see and hear the witnesses and observe the physical evidence produced at the hearing. See, e.g., People v. Prochilo, 41 N.Y.2d 459 (1977); People v. Wheeler, 2 N.Y.3d 370 {2004); People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383 (2004). Here, the evidence was more than sufficient to support the determination of the court below. The testimony at the hearing amply supported the lower court's determinations that Officer Sparks' reasonably believed that the plastic bag inside the center cupholder contained drug residue. When he first observed the bag, Sparks was standing directly in front of the driver's side window {Sparks:lO). Sparks indicated that the plastic bag was "clear," and appeared to have a "white, powdery substance inside of it," which he believed to be cocaine (Sparks: 1 0). Most significantly, Sparks described his training in the identification of controlled substances while at the Police Academy (Sparks: 1 0}, and that in his three-year tenure with the New York City Police Department, he had encountered controlled substances in bags similar to the one inside the Nissan's center console (Sparks: 11). On the stand, Sparks testified that his belief that the powdery substance inside the "sandwich-size" bag was based in this training and experience. And Sparks stated that he searched the Nissan because he believed that further narcotics would be inside the car (Sparks: 13, 28). This record is detailed enough to support the lower court's findings that Sparks reasonably believed that the bag contained cocaine, and that there was probable cause to believe further drugs could be found in the car. Indeed, Sparks' belief was corroborated by defendant himself. When asked, post-Miranda, about the bag, defendant responded that the "cocaine was Mr. Reedy's" {Sparks: 20). Defendant's admission supports the officer's testimony, as it appeared to defendant too, that the bag contained cocaine. People v. David Bookman Indictment No. 2921120 10 Page22 The adequacy of Officer Sparks' testimony as a basis for the belief that the substance identified was cocaine finds ample support in this Court's caselaw. In People v. Edwards, 14 N.YJd 741 (2010), this Court upheld the prolonged extension of a vehicle stop on the ground that a sheriffs deputy observed cocaine residue on the defendant's hands, a conclusion not based on any field testing. 10 This Court concluded, "Because drug residue was first seen while the police had a justifiable basis to continue the detention for the traffic infraction, that observation provided probable cause to arrest and search defendant, and the subsequent impoundment and inventory search of the vehicle were valid." ld. at 142. Here, too, the observation of the cocaine residue in the plastic bag on the console provided grounds for a further arrest and search. This Court has also upheld charges against sufficiency challenges in accusatory instruments based on similar observations. Under these cases, an officer's averment that a particular powdery substance is cocaine, when rooted in his or her training and experience in narcotics detection, is sufficient to support a charge in an information of seventh degree criminal possession of a controlled substance, even without any field testing. People v. Smalls, 26 N.Y.3d 1064 (2015); accord People v. Kalin, 12 N.Y.3d 225 (2009)(holding that information charging misdemeanor drug possession was sufficient where officer, relying on his narcotics training, set forth sufficient facts identifying substance as heroin based on its appearance and packaging). In Smalls, this Court upheld an officer's statement that residue inside a glass pipe was a controlled substance, reaffirming the notion that an officer's training in the appearance of such drugs was enough to establish a facially sufficient information. Here, as in Smalls, Officer Sparks was trained in narcotics recognition. And, like Smalls, the description of the residue provided support for the officer's conclusion that the substance inside the bag was cocaine residue. Smalls, 26 N.Y.3d at 1065. If these types of averments are sufficient to charge a defendant with a crime, as this Court has held, surely an officer must be able to arrest on this basis.11 Nevertheless, defendant faults the officer's testimony regarding the bag as insufficient on several grounds. First, he points out that the officer failed to specify how often he encountered narcotics in sandwich bags (Defendant's Letter at 13). But this fact in no way renders the officer's belief unreasonable, as no specific number of encounters need be articulated in order to show the officer's familiarity with cocaine residue. Indeed, this Court in Smalls imposed no such mandate even for charging defendant in an information. Moreover, Officer Sparks also testified to his training in narcotics detection, and thus his prior experience was not the only ground for his conclusion. Given that the officer was trained in cocaine detection, and the fact that cocaine is often white and powdery and 1 0While the sununary decision of this Court does not contain a full recitation of the facts, the Fourth Department decision provides one. 11Nearly identical inquiries are involved in both the "reasonable cause to believe that defendant committed the charged offense, for facial sufficiency, Kalin, supra, at 228-229, and the probable cause analysis, People v. Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417,423 (1985). Thus, it follows that these cases are applicable here. People v. David Bookman Indictment No. 292112010 Page23 frequently packaged in plastic bags, it was a reasonable inference from this testimony that the bag contained drugs. Furthermore, defendant contends that it was unreasonable to believe that the plastic bag contained drugs because the bag could have contained any other innocuous substance like a "powdered doughnut." But probable cause does not require the elimination of all possible inferences of innocence no matter how speculative. People v. Wharton, 46 N.Y.2d 924 (1979)("totality" of the circumstances weighed in favor of finding probable cause despite any innocent explanation for defendant's conduct). Indeed, even proofbeyond a reasonable doubt may be established without eliminating innocent inferences. See, e.g., People v. Norman, 85 N.Y.2d 609, 620 (1995); People v. Deegan, 69 N.Y.2d 976 (1987). It was enough here, just as in Smalls, that the officer articulated his training and experience in narcotics detection, to permit the inference that he could distinguish between innocuous powders and controlled substances. Thus, Officer Sparks was not required to rebut the inference, wholly unarticulated at the hearing, that the powdery substance could have been powdered sugar or a similar substance. Additionally, defendant claims that Sparks lacked probable cause since the bag was purportedly empty when opened at the hearing, tacitly challenging the officer's credibility (Defendant's Letter at 12). This claim is belied by the record. At the outset, the hearing court and the Appellate Division credited the officer's testimony, and, as his account contained nothing that was manifestly erroneous or untrue, that determination is beyond the further review of this Court See McRay, 51 N.Y.2d at 601. More importantly, the bag was not, as defendant alleges, barren when opened at the suppression hearing. The record shows that there was still some white coating inside the bag when opened in court (Sparks: 32). In any event, the bag was produced before the hearing court, which had the advantage of observing it and determining for itself the appearance of the bag and the substance in it. Indeed, the record shows that at the hearing, it was the court that opened up the bag, and not the officer (Sparks: 32). In this manner, the court was uniquely able to view the bag and its contents, and thus, there was record support for its finding that Sparks reasonably believed the cloudy substance was cocaine residue. This Court should, as it ordinarily does, defer to the superior position of the trial court in making a credibility determination. Proch i/o, 41 N.Y.2d at 759 (1977). Moreover, there can be little question that the item corroborated precisely what the officer testified to, or the court would undoubtedly not have credited the officer's testimony in this regard, as it expressly did in its opinion (Decision: 3-5). Put another way, the suppression court was entitled to reject defendant's argument at the hearing that the bag failed to corroborate the officer's testimony, and that determination, made by the court with its advantage of seeing the bag, should not now be second-guessed. Further, defendant argues that there must be an additional factor, other than an officer's belief that contraband is present based on his training and experience, to supply probable cause. Curiously, defendant attempts to support his claim that there was no probable cause to search the Nissan with cases in which probable cause was found and the events took place in a drug-prone location, People v. Jones, 90 N.Y.2d 835 (1997), or involved highly distinct drug packaging like white paper wrapped in dark plastic, to negate the officer's belief here. People v. Alvarez, 100 N.Y.2d 549 (2003). None of these cases are controlling. The fact that additional factors may have been present in those examples does People v. David Bookman Indictment No. 292112010 Page 24 not preclude the determination that the officer's belief here was a reasonable one, and none of those cases impose a requirement of further corroboration of the officer's belief. To the contrary, this Court held in People v. Edwards, 14 N.Y.3d at 741, and People v. Smalls, 26 N.Y.3d at 1067, that there were adequate grounds for the conclusion that the defendant possessed a controlled substance, even without any additional corroboration. Defendant's reliance on People v. Davis, 36 N.Y.2d 280 (1975), is also misplaced. In that case, the offic.er was unclear in his testimony about whether or not he saw the glassines of heroin, unlike here where the officer clearly indicated that he saw a bag which appeared cloudy and had a powdery substance inside. Davis, 36 N.Y.2d at 280 As the facts supporting probable cause are far more compelling in this case than Davis, this Court should not disturb the Appellate Division's determination. Nor does the fact that the substance proved not to be cocaine in the end eJiminate the reasonableness of the officer' s belief. An officer's mistake of law or fact, if objectively reasonable, wiJJ not invalidate probable cause. Guthrie, 25 N.Y.3d at 137; Heien, 135 S.Ct at 535-536; see also Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995)(holding that mistaken belief that warrant for defendant's arrest existed did not invalidate search); see also Michigan v. DeFi/lippo, 443 U.S. 31, 34 (1979)(defendant' s arrest valid even where ordinance was subsequently held unconstitutional). Defendant nevertheless argues that the mistake of fact and mistake of law cases are inapplicable because the officer's belief regarding the drugs was unreasonable (Defendant's Letter at 15). But there is no cause to believe this is so. Having encountered a white powdery substance looking similar to cocaine in packaging consistent with his prior observations, Officer Sparks was entitled to act accordingly, even if he was ultimately mistaken. Since this Court, and the United States Supreme Court, have upheld searches when law enforcement is mistaken in either fact or Jaw as long as the mistake was reasonable, the instant case should be governed by these rules. In sum, the issues raised by defendant are unreviewable because they were waived when he waived his appeal. Moreover, the lower court's determinations are supported by the record based both on the officer's detailed testimony as to the obstructions justifying the stop and his testimony regarding the recognition and seizure of the powdery substance, permitting a further search ofthe vehicle. Because the issues raised are mixed questions of law and fact, no further review is available in this Court. cc: Paul Skip Laisure, Esq. 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