1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
NICHOLAS J. RANDALL and
FAN FENG,
Plaintiffs,
v.
OFFPLAN MILLIONAIRE AG d/b/a
PRIME ASSET INVESTMENTS LTD.;
CAPINVEST LLC;
JOACHIM OLIVER NEDELA;
STEPHEN JORDAN-QUAYLE a/k/a
STEPHEN JORDAN;
CARL DHIR a/k/a CARL DEAR;
CRESCENT REAL ESTATE
MANAGEMENT, INC.;
DANIEL J. DORAN, JR.; and
LUCRETIA L. DORAN,
Defendants. /
CASE NO.: 6:17-cv-2103-Orl-31TBS
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO COMPEL JURISDICTIONAL DISCOVERY FROM
DEFENDANT JOACHIM OLIVER NEDELA AND REQUEST FOR ORAL
ARGUMENT AND SUPPORTING MEMORANDUM OF LAW
Plaintiffs, Nicholas J. Randall ("Randall") and Fan Feng ("Feng") (collectively
"Plaintiffs"), by and through their undersigned counsel, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 37 and Local Rules 3.01(j) and 3.04(a),1 hereby move this Court to compel
Defendant Joachim Oliver Nedela ("Nedela") to provide jurisdictional discovery. After
initially agreeing to provide discovery, and obtaining an extension of deadlines on the
representation that more time was needed to prepare assembled documents for production,
1 Every single interrogatory and request for production included in Plaintiffs' pending
jurisdictional discovery requests (copies at ECF No. 64-4) is the subject of this request to
compel because Nedela has not objected or responded to any of them.
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Nedela now insists on discovery being taken in Switzerland pursuant to the Hague
Convention On the Taking of Evidence Abroad In Civil Or Commercial Matters (the "Hague
Convention procedures") and refuses to comply in any way with the pending jurisdictional
discovery unless Plaintiffs submit to the Hague Convention procedures. However, United
States precedent permits full discovery in the United States, and it supports that the Hague
Convention procedures are optional and would unduly protract and restrict discovery that is
both proper under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and essential to determining the
existence of personal jurisdiction over Nedela. Plaintiffs submit that oral argument or, in the
alternative, a status conference, would assist the Court and parties in resolving these issues.
In support of this Motion, Plaintiffs state as follows:
I. Procedural Background
On August 17, 2018, Nedela filed his Motion to Dismiss arguing, inter alia, this
Court lacks personal jurisdiction over him. (ECF No. 56.) In his accompanying declaration,
Nedela attested that he had nothing to do with the scheme alleged; he was not involved in
day-to-day operations; he never hired or had any relationship with the other individual
defendants; was never aware of communications with Plaintiffs; and had a merely nominal
role in the entity Offplan Millionaire AG. (E.g., ECF No. 56-1 at 7-8.)
Plaintiffs filed their Consolidated Preliminary Response on September 12, 2018,
which included a request for jurisdictional discovery. (ECF No. 64.) On September 12,
2018, Plaintiffs served on Nedela their First Set of Interrogatories Concerning Personal
Jurisdiction and First Request for Production of Documents Concerning Personal
Jurisdiction. (ECF No. 64-4.) Plaintiffs also served a notice of deposition on Nedela without
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specifying a date or place therein, but simultaneously requesting deposition dates and
offering to take the deposition at any location and any time convenient to Nedela.
On September 26, 2018, Nedela responded in opposition to Plaintiffs' request to
conduct jurisdictional discovery. (ECF No. 65.) In his opposition filing, Nedela argued that
Plaintiffs were not entitled to take jurisdictional discovery but did not raise any other specific
objections to the discovery requested. (See id.) Nedela also did not timely serve any
objections to the pending jurisdictional discovery, and has never served any objections or
responses to Plaintiffs' discovery.
On October 23, 2018, the Court entered an Order granting Plaintiffs' motion for
jurisdictional discovery and stayed their response to Nedela's Motion to Dismiss for forty-
five days "during which time they may engage in discovery that is limited to the
jurisdictional issues raised by Nedela." (ECF No. 66 at 11.) The Court recognized that
"Plaintiffs are entitled to obtain the limited jurisdictional discovery sought for the purpose of
responding to Nedela's motion to dismiss." (Id.)
On November 13, 2018, Plaintiffs and Defendant Nedela jointly moved for an
extension of the time to complete jurisdictional discovery and the deadline for Plaintiffs to
respond to Nedela's Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 67.) That request was premised on the
fact that Nedela had gathered more than 6,000 documents to review for responsiveness to
Plaintiffs' discovery requests and the difficulty in clearing a mutually convenient day to hold
Nedela's deposition. (Id. at 2) ("Documents gathered for review for responsiveness to
Plaintiffs’ jurisdictional document request exceed 6,000 in number, which requires adequate
time both for processing by Nedela’s counsel and for meaningful review by Plaintiffs’
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counsel in advance of the deposition of Nedela.") The Court granted the joint request of the
parties to require Nedela to respond to the jurisdictional interrogatories and requests to
produce by November 27, 2018, and to appear for deposition the week of December 17,
2018, as well as to require Plaintiffs to respond to the Motion to Dismiss by January 10,
2019. (Id. at 3; ECF No. 69 at 1.)
On November 27 and 30, 2018, Defendant Nedela for the first time informed the
Court of certain alleged obstacles to conducting the jurisdictional discovery under Swiss law
and sought relief from the jurisdictional discovery deadlines. (See ECF No. 70, 71). The
Legal Opinion Letter from Nedela's Swiss attorney reflects that his opinion was requested (at
least formally) only the day before, November 26, 2018. (ECF No. 70-1 at 1.)
On December 3, 2018, the Court denied, without prejudice, an additional extension of
time based on Defendant Nedela's request, noting that "[t]he Court does not know Swiss law
or how it impacts jurisdictional discovery in this case." (ECF No. 72 at 1.) The Court added
that it "does not now intend to strictly enforce the discovery deadline established in its
Order," but further instructed that "[w]hen the parties better understand the situation in
Switzerland, including the sequence, timing, and results of actions there, they should update
the Court which will, when it has more concrete information, entertain a motion to enlarge
the time for jurisdictional discovery." (Id. at 1-2.)
On January 10, 2019, Plaintiffs sought an additional brief extension of time through
January 22, 2019 (ECF No. 73), which the Court granted (ECF No. 74). On January 22,
2019, the parties filed a Joint Notice of Impasse Regarding Jurisdictional Discovery (ECF
No. 75), advising the Court of the impasse of their negotiations to conduct jurisdictional
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discovery of Nedela and briefly summarizing the parties' respective positions.
At present, given the parties' differing positions on how best to complete
jurisdictional discovery, Plaintiff is unable to identify a timeline to complete the pending
discovery or to substantively respond to Nedela's Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction. Regardless, it appears certain that compliance with the Hague Convention
procedures will impact the current Case Management and Scheduling Order, as the next
deadline (disclosure of Plaintiffs' expert reports) is set for June 12, 2019 and discovery on the
merits is set to close on August 2, 2019. (ECF No. 60 at 1.)
II. Relevant Factual Background
The Court granted jurisdictional discovery to resolve a genuine dispute of fact
necessary to decide the question of personal jurisdiction and to inform the Court's decision as
to the existence of jurisdiction and the merits of the case. (ECF No. 66, at 10.) Yet, as of
this filing, no jurisdictional discovery has been completed. Plaintiffs have not received any
substantive responses to any of the interrogatories or documents requests served on Nedela
on September 12, 2018, nor any dates to depose Nedela. The parties are unable to agree to a
process that is both timely and that ensures full compliance with the requested discovery.
Both sides engaged their own separate attorneys in Switzerland, who have advised
each side respectively, and have conferred directly, on the procedures imposed by Swiss law
on the taking of evidence. The parties' respective Swiss attorneys have provided legal
opinion letters that have been submitted to the Court. (See ECF Nos. 75-1, 75-2, 75-3, 75-4.)
However, the parties' counsel have reached differing conclusions about the most appropriate
and efficient means to proceed with the pending discovery.
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Nedela broadly claims that participating in the requested jurisdictional discovery
would expose him, his counsel, and Plaintiffs' counsel to criminal liability under Swiss law.
Notably, the premise of these claims is that discovery will or must be effectual in
Switzerland. From this premise, Nedela insists that Plaintiffs must follow the procedures set
forth in the Hague Convention procedures to conduct the pending discovery. (See ECF No.
75 at 7-9.) As Plaintiffs' Swiss counsel has explained, it is common for parties to conduct
discovery from United States litigation outside of Switzerland in another county, like
England, that does not have a "blocking statute" (laws restricting the taking of evidence on
behalf of a foreign state) like Switzerland.2 This alternative requires mutual agreement,
which Nedela's Swiss counsel flatly "dismisses." (ECF No. 75-4 at 1.)
Significantly, the parties' Swiss counsel have offered very different opinions about
the likely length of the delay introduced by Nedela's demand to comply with the Hague
Convention procedures to conduct jurisdictional discovery. Nedela's Swiss counsel has
opined that compliance with the Hague Convention procedures would take around two
months. To the contrary, it is the opinion and experience of Plaintiffs' Swiss counsel that
obtaining service of the discovery requests and deposition notice by the Swiss authorities
through the Hague Convention procedures in itself, takes approximately 3-6 months. (ECF
No. 75-1 at 2.) Plaintiffs' Swiss counsel has also warned that once Nedela is served through
the Swiss authorities, he has the opportunity to object to the scope of the discovery requests
under Swiss law (which is stricter than United States discovery law), and any objection
2 Plaintiffs' discovery requests cite the location of the production as Orlando, Florida or "such
alternative location as the parties may agree" (see ECF No. 64-4 at 10), and Plaintiffs' notice
of deposition served on Nedela intentionally did not specify a location so that the parties
could find a mutually convenient site in order to expedite the process.
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would take up to an additional one to two-and-a-half years to be resolved by the Swiss
judicial system. (Id. at 3.)
In addition, Plaintiffs' Swiss counsel has advised that compliance with the Hague
Convention procedures would not allow Plaintiffs to take jurisdictional discovery in the form
and scope it has been requested. (See id.)
III. Legal Standards for Motion to Compel
Discovery is intended to operate with minimal judicial supervision unless a dispute
arises and one of the parties files a motion requiring judicial intervention. S.L. Sakansky &
Assocs., Inc. v. Allied Am. Adjusting Co. of Fla., LLC, No. 3:05-cv-708-32MCR, 2007 WL
2010860, *1 (M.D. Fla. Jul. 6, 2007). Furthermore, according to the Middle District
guidelines, "[d]iscovery in this district should be practiced with a spirit of cooperation and
civility." Middle District Discovery (2015) at 1.
Under Rule 37, if a party fails to respond to an interrogatory or request for
production, or fails to attend a deposition, the party seeking the discovery may file a motion
to compel such response or attendance. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)(B)(i)-(iv), (d)(1)(A). The
party resisting discovery bears the burden of demonstrating specifically how any objected-to
request is unreasonable or otherwise unduly burdensome. Oliver v. City of Orlando, No.
606CV-1671-ORL-31DAB, 2007 WL 3232227, at *1-2 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 31, 2007) (citations
omitted). "The resisting party must make a particular and specific demonstration of fact and
cannot rely on simply conclusory assertions about the difficulty of complying with a
discovery request." Wagner v. Viacost.com, No. 06-81113-CIV, 2007 WL 1879914, at *1
(S.D. Fla. June 29, 2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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"Motions to compel discovery under Rule 37(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure are committed to the sound discretion of the trial court." Blue Heron Commercial
Group, Inc. v. Lee Webber & Gerald T. Filipiak, No. 2:18-CV-467-FTM-29CM, 2018 WL
6045252, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 19, 2018) (citing Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Westrope,
730 F.2d 729, 731 (11th Cir. 1984)).
IV. Legal Analysis
Defendant Nedela is insisting that Plaintiffs must comply with the Hague Convention
procedures as the only means of proceeding with the pending jurisdictional discovery, which
has already been authorized by this Court, while Plaintiffs believe the Hague Convention
procedures are not only unnecessary but will add unjustified delays and limitations to the
discovery. Plaintiffs submit there is ample authority supporting this Court's jurisdiction to
enforce jurisdictional discovery in the United States over Nedela. Plaintiffs also request oral
argument or, in the alternative, a status conference to address these jurisdictional discovery
issues, which almost certainly also will apply to discovery on the merits in this case.
A. Defendant Nedela Bears The Burden Of Demonstrating That Swiss Law Bars
This Discovery.
1. Nedela has made no showing of or offered evidence of any real threat of
prosecution under Swiss law.
The party relying on foreign law bears the burden of demonstrating that such law
actually bars the production or testimony at issue. E.g., United States v. Vetco, Inc., 691 F.2d
1281, 1289 (9th Cir. 1981); Roberts v. Heim, 130 F.R.D. 430, 436 (N.D. Cal. 1990); Alfadda
v. Fenn, 149 F.R.D. 28, 34 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). "In order to meet that burden, the party
resisting discovery must provide the Court with information of sufficient particularity and
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specificity to allow the Court to determine whether the discovery sought is indeed prohibited
by foreign law." Alfadda, 149 F.R.D. at 34.3 In practice, courts have found that the
producing party cannot merely cite foreign law that may bar discovery, but instead must
show how the production would actually violate foreign law, how the foreign government
has threatened criminal prosecution, or that the foreign judiciary has refused to allow such
discovery. E.g., Roberts, 130 F.R.D. at 436.
For example, in Roberts, the district court looked beyond the defendant's claim that
Swiss law would make cooperation criminal and granted a motion to compel a Swiss national
to appear for deposition in the United States and to produce documents and written discovery
in the United States. Id. The court found prosecution very unlikely under Articles 273
(prohibiting disclosure of "business secrets," which Nedela has raised in blanket fashion). Id.
at 436, 438 (noting that the Supreme Court rejected the argument in the Swiss government's
amicus curiae brief in Aerospatiale that foreign discovery would compel a violation of
Article 273 of Swiss law). Significantly, it found that, according to the Swiss Attorney
General, "Article 273 does not prohibit a person from divulging his own business affairs but
only from divulging the business affairs of others without their consent. [Defendant] has
made no showing that he is protecting any interest but his own." Id. at 436 (further noting
that no other person or entity filed a declaration claiming the requested discovery would
infringe the third party's interest, and that a protective order would sufficiently protect the
confidentiality of the discovery).
Defendant Nedela's submissions to the Court regarding this issue thus far (see ECF
3 Similarly, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 26(c) requires a party seeking a protective
order demonstrate "good cause," which requires particularity, for issuance of an order.
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Nos. 70, 71, 75, 75-2, 75-3, 75-4) do not meet this burden. Defendant Nedela has not
provided Plaintiffs with any support for his claims of potential criminal liability, other than
his counsel citing to two Swiss laws generally: Article 271 and Article 273 of the Swiss
Criminal Code. (See, e.g., ECF Nos. 75-2, 75-3.) While Plaintiffs do not deny that the Swiss
laws cited by Nedela exist, Plaintiffs do dispute both the existence of a legitimate threat of
prosecution and the laws' applicability to the actual discovery requested here.
Nedela must make a specific factual showing that Swiss law actually bars the
requested production and deposition or actually subjects him or his counsel to potential
criminal liability or threat of criminal prosecution. It is Plaintiffs' position that even if there
is no way to 100% guarantee that conducting the discovery (producing the documents and
sitting for deposition) outside of Switzerland will not violate these Swiss laws, Plaintiffs are
unaware of any actual precedent in Switzerland—and Nedela's counsel has offered none—of
any person being criminally prosecuted for engaging in discovery, particularly outside of
Switzerland. Indeed, several U.S. courts have noted that no Swiss judicial opinions have
surfaced for a party being prosecuted under this law. E.g., EFG Bank AG v. AXA Equitable
Life Ins. Co., No. 17-CV-4767 (JMF), 2018 WL 1918627, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2018).
In that 2018 case, the district court noted:
Decisions of the Swiss Federal Department of Justice and Police ("FDJP")—
an administrative, non-judicial body—indicate that Swiss law does not
preclude the voluntary production of documents by a private party and that
"voluntary" is defined broadly to include the production of discovery so long
as the party faces only procedural consequences rather than criminal sanctions
for its failure to produce.
Id. (refusing to reconsider order denying protective order to require Hague Convention
procedures be followed to obtain document production from a Swiss party).
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Given that the issue of compelling discovery from foreign (including Swiss) nationals
has come up regularly in United States courts, and that United States courts have routinely
compelled discovery in those situations, it is telling that there appears to be no instances of
Swiss prosecution in these circumstances.
2. Nedela has made no showing of or offered evidence that Swiss law specifically bars
production of the information or documents requested by Plaintiffs.
In addition, Nedela has not offered any explanation, analysis, or legal authority as to
how or why those Swiss laws would apply in this situation. Plaintiffs have genuine doubts
that they would apply and would place either party or their counsel in jeopardy of criminal
prosecution by Swiss authorities, especially if discovery was conducted outside of
Switzerland.
Fundamentally, the November 27, 2018 Legal Opinion Letter of Nedela's Swiss
counsel in itself does not clearly demonstrate that the pending jurisdictional discovery is
subject to Swiss penal laws. (See ECF No. 70-1, 75-2). For example, Nedela's Swiss
counsel assumed that the parties were "collect[ing] evidence in Switzerland" and that
"Plaintiffs intend to take evidence in Switzerland" (emphasis added), but that is not true.
(Id. at 1.) The Letter explains that Article 271 prohibits discovery activities "on Swiss
territory," which, again, is not the case here—or need not be the case as Plaintiff has not
demanded either a deposition or document production in Switzerland. (Id. at 2.) Only
Nedela has made that demand.
Moreover, Nedela's Swiss counsel use of vague language in describing the
applicability of two Swiss laws, Article 271 and Article 273 of the Swiss Criminal Code, to
this case is inadequate to meet his burden. (See, e.g., ECF Nos. 75-2, 75-3, 75-4.) While he
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warns in his Legal Opinion Letter that "any person who makes a manufacturing or trade
secret available to an external official agency a foreign organization or a private enterprise is
liable to a custodial sentences [sic]" (ECF No. 75-2 at 2), it is not asserted that the documents
in Nedela's possession, custody, or control requested by Plaintiffs actually contain
manufacturing or trade secrets. This blanket assertion is not supported by any declaration or
other evidence or specifics, and no privilege log has been provided or offered. There is no
way for Plaintiffs or this Court to evaluate this broad objection. Similarly, while Nedela's
Swiss counsel asserts that a production without a waiver or redaction of such sensitive
information would risk prosecution in Switzerland for unlawful data delivery (id. at 2),
Nedela's counsel has not identified the third party(s) affected and has not represented that a
waiver cannot be obtained from the third party or redactions cannot be made.
Notably, Nedela's United States counsel has represented that they reviewed around
6,000 potentially responsive documents between the first request for extension of time on
November 13, 2018 and their notice to the Court on November 27, 2018, raising this issue of
Swiss law4—so Nedela's counsel knows or should know exactly what those documents
contain and whether they are actually subject to these Swiss laws. (ECF No. 67 at 2.) Yet
neither Nedela's Legal Opinion Letters nor his recent Court filings specifically allege facts
demonstrating how Swiss law would be violated in this case, or allege that Nedela could not
have obtained such a waiver or perform such redactions in the intervening nine weeks since
obtaining that opinion. This makes the lack of specific assertions of the applicability of
4 Nedela's United States counsel has also represented in December 2018 that Nedela's Swiss
counsel was provided some or all of the 6,000 documents for review, which particularly
leaves this noticeable lack of specific assertions of the applicability of Swiss law inadequate
to meet Nedela's burden.
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Swiss law particularly conspicuous.
Nedela's appearance to defend this case in this District makes him subject to the
jurisdiction of this Court for purposes of, at the very least, jurisdictional discovery and
jurisdictional rulings. Precedent is clear that Nedela bears the burden of showing that the
pending discovery is effectively barred by Swiss law, and he has not done so. Other than
vague assertions about the possibility of liability under Swiss law, Nedela has not offered any
legal authority or specific facts to demonstrate that Swiss law would apply in these
circumstances or present a realistic threat of prosecution, or that conducting the discovery
outside Switzerland would not relieve these concerns.
B. Hague Convention Procedures Are Not Necessary, Warranted, or Efficient.
1. United States courts have held Hague Convention procedures are optional and
are skeptical of their applicability and practicality.
Precedent supports that the Hague Convention does not deprive the district court of
its jurisdiction to order, pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a foreign party to
produce evidence physically located within a signatory nation, such as Switzerland.
There is U.S. Supreme Court and Middle District of Florida precedent that the Hague
Convention procedures are optional. See Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v.
United States Dist. Court for So. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 536, 540-41, 107 S.Ct. 254,
296 L.Ed.2d 461 (1987) ("Aerospatiale"); accord Zamperla, Inc. v. I.E. Park SrL, No.
613CV1807ORL37KRS, 2014 WL 12614505, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 3, 2014); In re
Photochromic Lens Antitrust Litig., No. 8:10-MD-2173-T-27EAJ, 2012 WL 12904331, at *3
(M.D. Fla. May 2, 2012) ("The Hague Convention does not provide the exclusive or even
preferred method for obtaining discovery from foreign individuals."); accord Roberts, 130
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F.R.D. at 438.
Specifically, the Supreme Court has found that the Hague Convention sets forth
"optional" procedures for obtaining evidence abroad. Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 541-46. It is
well-settled that "the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure remain the 'normal method [] for
federal litigation involving foreign national parties' unless the facts of a given case "indicate
the 'optional' or 'supplemental' Convention procedures prove to be conducive to discovery.'"
Schindler Elevator Corp. v. Otis Elevator Co., 657 F. Supp. 2d 525, 528 (D.N.J. 2009)
(emphasis in original) (quoting In re Automotive Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 358 F.3d
288, 299 (3d Cir. 2004), and Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 536).
In the Aerospatiale case, the Supreme Court evaluated a French penal code provision,
similar to the Swiss blocking law at issue here, in finding that the Hague Convention does
not deprive the District Court of its jurisdiction to order, under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, a foreign party to produce evidence physically located within a signatory nation.
Id. at 541-46. The Hague Convention was intended to establish "optional procedures" for
obtaining evidence abroad. Id. at 541. Ultimately, determining whether to resort to optional
Hague Convention procedures requires scrutiny in each case of the particular facts, sovereign
interests, and likelihood that the Convention procedures will prove effective. Id. at 544.
Several opinions within the Eleventh Circuit, including the Southern District of
Florida, rely on Aerospatiale on this point, including one involving a deposition of a Swiss
national who was ordered to appear pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. E.g.,
Calixto v. Watson Bowman Acme Corp., No. 07-60077-CIV, 2008 WL 4487679, at *3 (S.D.
Fla. Sept. 29, 2008). There are numerous other district court rulings around the country that
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reaffirm that the Hague Convention procedures are optional. See, e.g., Schindler Elevator,
657 F. Supp. 2d at 528; Roberts, 130 F.R.D. at 435-37 (ruling it unnecessary to go through
the Hague Convention procedures to obtain deposition, written, and document discovery in a
global conspiracy case); EFG Bank AG, 2018 WL 1918627, at *2 (denying protective order
to require Hague Convention procedures be followed to obtain document production from
Swiss party").
It is readily apparent from the decisions of United States courts that they are
uniformly skeptical of defendants' pleas to require Hague compliance where there is an
established precedent that the Hague Convention procedures are optional. Given how easily
that the Hague Convention procedures can create substantial delays and impose new
restrictions on the scope of discovery, there is a recognized risk that requiring Hague
compliance upon defendant's mere insistence is ripe for abuse that can stymie the United
States legal system and prejudice plaintiffs.
2. Hague Convention Procedures would cause undue delay.
Moreover, complying with the Hague Convention is fraught with delays and
limitations. As United States courts have recognized, Hague Convention procedures
typically take longer and require more hurdles, which makes them less conducive than the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Schindler Elevator, 657 F. Supp. 2d at 527. At best, it
injects uncertainty about how much longer it will take to complete this preliminary
jurisdictional discovery.
Such delay will almost assuredly impact the Scheduling Order in this case. Plaintiffs
previously submitted a legal opinion letter from their Swiss counsel identifying the delays
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and restrictions imposed by the Hague Convention. (ECF No. 75-1.) In his experience as a
Swiss litigator, the single step of obtaining service of the discovery requests and deposition
notice by the Swiss authorities through the Hague Convention procedures takes
approximately three to six months.5 (Id. at 2.) This estimate does not even take into account
any other steps in the process, such as obtaining letters rogatory from this Court, translating
into German the application to the Swiss authorities and the discovery requests and discovery
order themselves, the additional time for Nedela to respond after service, and the like. (Cf.
id. at 2-3.) Plus, if Nedela chooses to object to the scope of the discovery requests under
Swiss law—and it is obvious that he will do so6—then any objection would take an
additional one to two-and-a-half years to be resolved by the Swiss judicial system. (Id. at 3.)
Nedela's counsel, without estimating the length of such a delay, characterizes this delay as
"negligible" by "international standards." (ECF No. 75-4 at 2.)
The protracted delays from complying with the Hague Convention procedures are not
merely hypothetical but are highly probable in this case. After all, Nedela had apparently
gathered 6,000 potentially relevant documents and was poised to produce them (after having
the discovery requests for nearly two-and-a-half months, and 35 days into the original 45-day
period to conduct jurisdictional discovery) when he then raised these Swiss law issues at the
eleventh hour before the response deadline. Although he identified these issues months ago,
he has not specifically informed Plaintiffs which requests may be objectionable under Swiss
5 That in itself poses a problem with the August 2, 2019 discovery deadline (which includes
all fact discovery on the merits, not just jurisdictional discovery). (ECF No. 60 at 1.)
6 Nedela's recent position statement (ECF No. 75 at 7-9) and the January 18, 2019 letter from
his Swiss counsel (ECF No. 75-4) make clear that his counsel deems the entirety of Plaintiffs'
discovery to risk violating Swiss law and advise Nedela against complying with the pending
discovery.
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law or sought to negotiate any narrower scope of those requests. Nor has he offered to
voluntarily produce any personal papers or stated that there are none. Furthermore, he has
not offered to waive objections under Swiss law to the requests, even though it is Plaintiffs'
understanding that the Swiss authorities will not sua sponte review and restrict discovery
requests unless the producing party objects.
At bottom, Nedela has offered no compromises and rejected outright all of Plaintiffs'
proposed compromises. Despite Nedela's professed desire to cooperate "but for" Swiss law
(see, e.g., ECF No. 75-4 at 1), his actions tell a different story and create genuine and
objectively reasonable concern in Plaintiffs that Nedela will engender delay at any
opportunity.
3. Hague Convention procedures would likely result in limiting scope of
pending discovery requests beyond Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Furthermore, Plaintiffs are unwilling to unnecessarily subject the discovery in this
case to the strictures of the Hague Convention procedures or Swiss law on the taking of
evidence, as Swiss authorities have a strict view of the proper scope of discovery and it
appears likely that the Swiss authorities whose permission Nedela wishes to seek, and with
which Nedela would base his compliance, would apply stricter substantive limitations on the
scope of the pending jurisdictional discovery requests.
Plaintiffs have good faith bases to believe that Nedela would rely on the Hague
Convention and Swiss law to avoid responding to the pending jurisdictional discovery in its
original form to the extent required under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Nedela's
latest submission from his Swiss counsel indicates a clear intent to object to the scope of the
requests. For example, in the January 18, 2019 letter from Nedela's Swiss counsel, it was
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represented that "most (if not all) of the documents requested and ordered to produce do not
belong to our client but to Offplan Millionaire AG as they are part of the company's business
files. Our client would hence first have to obtain these documents from a third party (i.e.
Offplan Millionare AG) which could be deemed as illegal in terms of Art. 271 . . . ." (ECF
No. 75-4 at 2). However, to the best of Plaintiffs' knowledge, these documents were already
gathered by and reviewed by Nedela's counsel in the United States because they were
documents in Nedela's possession, custody, or control.
Plaintiffs have genuine concerns that Nedela's insistence on using the Hague
Convention procedures is an effort to constrain the scope of Plaintiffs' jurisdictional
discovery to the point that his assertions of lack of personal jurisdiction cannot sufficiently be
corroborated. Plaintiffs' concerns that are objectively reasonable considering the
developments of the past few months. In his accompanying declaration in August 2018,
Nedela attested that he had nothing to do with the scheme alleged; he was not involved in
day-to-day operations; he never hired or had any relationship with the other individual
defendants; was never aware of communications with Plaintiffs; and had a merely nominal
role in the entity Offplan Millionaire AG. (E.g., ECF No. 56-1 at 7-8.) Yet, once discovery
was authorized by the Court, he had 6,000 documents potentially responsive to the request
for documents. (ECF No. 67 at 2.) Then, after agreeing to provide responses and appear for
depositions, at the last minute, Swiss law is raised as blanket grounds that ostensibly preclude
any participation whatsoever to any of the pending discovery requests (apparently unless the
scope of the request does not offend the much narrower Swiss law). (ECF Nos. 70, 71.)
Most recently, Nedela's counsel informed Plaintiffs that one of the defaulted
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defendants, Offplan Millionaire AG, which Plaintiffs allege that Nedela controlled, just
declared bankruptcy on January 11, 2019, apparently giving Nedela yet another new basis to
claim that he cannot produce responsive documents. (ECF No. 75-4 at 2.) It is far from clear
to Plaintiffs why the bankruptcy of Offplan would prevent Nedela from producing documents
already in his possession, custody, and control (namely, documents that were already
gathered by and reviewed by Nedela's counsel in the United States). These developments
give Plaintiff serious misgivings about Nedela's professed "full[] commitment" to discovery
in this case. (Cf. ECF No. 75-4 at 2.)
It is particularly telling that Nedela has taken an "all or nothing" approach to
objecting to Plaintiffs' jurisdictional discovery; not a single document has been produced, nor
single interrogatory answered. Conspicuously, Nedela has provided no explanation
whatsoever why he cannot answer Plaintiffs' interrogatories. (Cf. id. at 1) (addressing
depositions and document productions only.) He has not made any showing, particularized
or otherwise, why those certain Swiss laws would prevent him from answering under oath
Plaintiffs' interrogatories about such things as his personal employment at Co-
Handelszentrum GMBH (Document Request No. 1); his own meetings and communications
with the other defendants in the case (Request Nos. 2-5, 13-14); his first recollections of
Plaintiffs (Request No. 18); and his individual travel to Florida (Request No. 23). (ECF No.
64-4 at 6-8.) These are straightforward requests that go to issues that Nedela himself raised
in his declaration in support of his argument that the Court lacked personal jurisdiction over
him. (See ECF No. 56-1.) This wholesale refusal to respond to discovery and strong
indication of the intent to limit the scope of Plaintiffs' discovery belies Nedela's expressions
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of good faith cooperation in discovery and reinforces the need for jurisdictional discovery to
determine whether the assertions in Nedela's declaration are corroborated.
C. Case law supports this Court's right to enforce the full discovery under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure against Nedela outside of Switzerland.
Nedela has offered no explanation for his insistence that discovery must occur in
Switzerland. There is no Court order requiring discovery in Switzerland, and none of
Plaintiffs' discovery requests have directed that discovery be taken or produced in
Switzerland. Plaintiffs voluntarily offered to go outside this District—indeed, they offered to
meet Nedela anywhere at any time—to take his deposition for the sole purpose of making
this process easier and faster.
District courts, including in the Middle District of Florida, have permitted or ordered
discovery to be made outside of Switzerland (or the foreign country with a similar blocking
law). See Coca-Cola Foods v. Empresa Comercial Internacional De Frutas S.A., No. 96-
358-CIV-T-17C, 1997 WL 370121, at *6-7 (M.D. Fla. June 12, 1997) (Kovachevich, J.); see
also Schindler Elevator Corp., 657 F. Supp. 2d at 527; Trueposition, Inc. v. LM Ericsson Tel.
Co., 2012 WL 707012 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 6, 2012); Calixto, 2008 WL 4487679, at *3 (ordering
Swiss resident to appear for deposition pursuant to the Federal Rules); Triple Crown Am.,
Inc. v. Biosynth AG, No. CIV.A. 96-7476, 1998 WL 227886, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 30, 1998)
(ordering depositions of Swiss corporation's agents occur in U.S.); Ward-THG, Inc. v. Swiss
Reinsurance Co., No. 96 Civ. 8100(MBM), 1997 WL 83294, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 1997)
(same); Roberts, 130 F.R.D. at 437 ("[I]f this Court were to order [Defendant] to come to the
United States and give his deposition or to produce in the United States documents he now
holds in Switzerland or to respond to a request for admissions, he would not be subject to
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penal sanctions in Switzerland.").
In Coca-Cola Foods, the foreign defendants announced at the last minute that a
personal jurisdiction deposition scheduled in Switzerland might violate Article 271 (one of
the same Swiss laws that Defendant Nedela cites) and therefore failed to appear. 1997 WL
370121, at *6. As a sanction, the magistrate judge found, and the district judge agreed, that
the defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction in the Middle District of Florida, relying
partly on the finding that "defendants do not explain how appearing for a deposition outside
of Switzerland will subject them to potential criminal liability under Swiss Penal Code,
Article 271." Id. at *8.
This presents a situation analogous in many ways to a defendant's invocation in a
civil action of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. If Nedela is so
concerned that this discovery presents a realistic threat of prosecution for violating Swiss
law, he could simply consent to personal jurisdiction in this case. He cannot use Swiss law
as both a sword and shield to claim that a lack of personal jurisdiction defeats Plaintiffs'
claims against him and then to prevent discovery into his jurisdictional assertions—all the
while unduly delaying Plaintiffs' prosecution of this action. He has appeared to defend this
case and must therefore play by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Regardless, this Court is not prohibited from ordering discovery consistent with
United States rules and case law. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 691 F.2d 1384 (11th
Cir. 1982) (citing Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles Et Commerciales,
S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958)) (explaining the Supreme Court left the district courts
"wide discretion" to use other means of obtaining compliance with discovery of a foreign
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22
party, such as awarding sanctions other than dismissal or default or drawing inferences
unfavorable to the non-compliant party, in the absence of complete disclosures).
Significantly, if Nedela refuses to comply with the jurisdictional discovery, it is within this
Court's discretion to deem personal jurisdiction over Nedela established. See Coca-Cola
Foods, 1997 WL 370121, at *8.
Plaintiffs submit that it is well-recognized that even if a conflict exists between the
laws of the United States and those of a foreign country pertaining to the taking of evidence,
the United States courts have authority to order discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and are not divested of that authority merely because the United States and
Switzerland are signatories to the Hague Convention. For these reasons, Plaintiffs believe it
is in the interests of the efficient resolution of this dispute, and the just and efficient
resolution of this case as a whole, for the Court to intervene to compel Nedela's compliance
with jurisdictional discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and make clear that
compliance with the Hague Convention procedures is not required in this action.
D. Oral argument or, in the alternative, a status conference is appropriate.
Pursuant to Local Rule 3.01(j), Plaintiffs respectfully request this Court grant oral
argument or, in the alternative, a status conference before the Court to address the issues
raised herein. Plaintiffs submit that it would aid the Court and the parties to engage in a one-
hour oral argument before the Court following Nedela's response to this Motion. This will
ensure that the parties can provide the Court a "better understand[ing of] the situation in
Switzerland, including the sequence, timing, and results of actions there" so that the Court
can set deadlines to move this case forward. (ECF No. 72 at 1-2.)
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This case remains in a preliminary posture, indeed this Motion seeks to compel
discovery as to the preliminary issue of personal jurisdiction; however, there is no reason to
believe that many of these same issues, if not addressed now, will be reasserted if this case
becomes at issue and proceeds to discovery on the merits. Therefore, oral argument or a
status conference for one hour would be suitable to fully address the parties' respective
positions and to resolve this as soon as possible, which will potentially avoid a repeat of this
exercise during merits discovery.
V. Conclusion
Well-established precedent supports compelling Defendant Nedela to comply with
Plaintiffs' pending jurisdictional discovery without resort to the optional Hague Convention
procedures. There is no evidence that Swiss laws pose such a real risk of criminal
prosecution of Nedela and the parties' counsel that it outweighs use of the procedures
provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which are both the default procedures and
recognized as much more efficient. Nedela's insistence on use of the Hague Convention
procedures risks substantial delays and prejudice to Plaintiffs' ability to respond to Nedela's
assertion that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over him. It raises serious questions
about the motive for his change of heart just before complying with this discovery, his
reliance on blanket objections, and whether he will indeed be "fully committed" to participate
cooperatively in this litigation—in which he has chosen to appear and defend—in accordance
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs request that the Court:
(1) enter an Order compelling Defendant Nedela to respond to Plaintiffs'
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Jurisdictional Discovery as follows:
i. that Nedela substantively respond to Plaintiffs' First Set of
Interrogatories Regarding Personal Jurisdiction and First Request for
Production of Documents Regarding Personal Jurisdiction within 15
days of the Court's Order on this Motion;
ii. that Nedela make himself available for a deposition regarding personal
jurisdiction within 30 days of the Court's Order on this Motion;
iii. that the foregoing discovery be taken or produced in the United States
within this judicial district; and
iv. that Nedela's failure to provide discovery as specified in the Court's
Order will result in the waiver of Nedela's defense of lack of personal
jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37;
(2) grant a one-hour oral argument on this Motion or, in the alternative, set
a one-hour pretrial status conference for Plaintiffs and Defendant Nedela to address the
pending jurisdictional discovery raised in this Motion and the impact of the delays on
jurisdictional discovery on the Scheduling Order;
(3) extend the deadline for Plaintiffs' response to Nedela's Motion to
Dismiss to a date consistent with the deadlines the Court establishes for Nedela responding to
Plaintiffs' jurisdictional written discovery and completing the deposition; and
(4) provide any other relief this Court deem just and appropriate.
Dated January 28, 2019.
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BAKER, DONELSON, BEARMAN,
CALDWELL & BERKOWITZ, PC
SunTrust Center
200 South Orange Avenue, Suite 2900
Post Office Box 1549
Orlando, Florida 32802
Telephone: (407) 422-6600
Telecopier: (407) 841-0325
Counsel for Plaintiffs
By: s/ Hal K. Litchford
Hal K. Litchford
Florida Bar No. 272485
hlitchford@bakerdonelson.com
Marisa Rosen Dorough
Florida Bar No. 73152
mdorough@bakerdonelson.com
Spencer D. Leach
Florida Bar No. 110753
sleach@bakerdonelson.com
CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE PURSUANT TO L.R. 3.01(g)
I hereby certify that on January 25, 2019, counsel for the parties have conferred
regarding the nature of the relief requested in this Motion, and Defendant Nedela's counsel
has advised that he opposes the relief requested herein.
/s/ Hal K. Litchford
Hal K. Litchford
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on January 28, 2019, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document was electronically filed with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF
system, and a copy was thereby served upon:
Jesus E. Cuza, Esq.
Rebecca J. Canamero, Esq.
Holland & Knight LLP
701 Brickell Ave., Suite 3300
Miami, Florida 33131
jesus.cuza@hklaw.com
Rebecca.canamero@hklaw.com
Counsel for Defendant, Joachim Oliver Nedela
/s/ Hal K. Litchford
Hal K. Litchford
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