To Be Argued By:
KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN
Time Requested: 30 Minutes
APL-2014-00317
New York County Clerk’s Index No. 190134/10
Court of Appeals
STATE OF NEW YORK
In Re: New York County Asbestos Litigation
RUBY E. KONSTANTIN, Individually and as Executrix of the Estate of
DAVE JOHN KONSTANTIN, deceased,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
—against—
630 THIRD AVENUE ASSOCIATES, et al.,
Defendants,
TISHMAN LIQUIDATING CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellant.
REPLY BRIEF FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
d
E. LEO MILONAS
DAVID G. KEYKO
ERIC FISHMAN
PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW
PITTMAN LLP
1540 Broadway
New York, New York 10036
Telephone: (212) 858-1000
Facsimile: (212) 858-1500
KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN
SHEILA L. BIRNBAUM
JANE M. BYRNE
WILLIAM B. ADAMS
QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART
& SULLIVAN, LLP
51 Madison Avenue, 22nd Floor
New York, New York 10010
Telephone: (212) 849-7000
Facsimile: (212) 849-7100
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant Tishman Liquidating Corporation
June 23, 2015
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... III
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 1
ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................. 3
POINT I
RESPONDENT IS UNABLE TO DEFEND THE “ROUTINE”
CONSOLIDATION OF ASBESTOS CASES HAVING LITTLE IN
COMMON WITH EACH OTHER ................................................................. 3
A. TLC Did Not Waive Its Objection To Consolidation ........................... 3
B. Respondent Misstates The Standard For Consolidation Under
CPLR 602(a) .......................................................................................... 5
1. CPLR 602(a) Does Not Create A Presumption In Favor
Of Consolidation ......................................................................... 5
2. Practical Concerns Cannot Justify Consolidation Without
Regard To CPLR 602(a) ............................................................. 7
C. Generalizations Of Facts And Law Are Insufficient To Show
The Commonalities Necessary For Consolidation Under CPLR
602(a) ................................................................................................... 12
1. The Cases Lack Substantial Common Issues Of Fact .............. 14
(a) Different Worksites, Occupations, And Products .......... 14
(b) Different Diseases ........................................................... 16
(c) Different Health Statuses ................................................ 18
(d) Different Durations ......................................................... 18
(e) Different Defendants, Counsel, And Witnesses ............. 19
2. The Cases Lack Substantial Common Issues Of Law .............. 20
ii
3. TLC Had No Burden To Disprove Commonality .................... 23
D. CPLR 602(a) Prohibits Consolidation Where, As Here, It
Prejudices A Defendant’s Substantial Right To A Fair Trial ............. 24
POINT II
RESPONDENT FAILS TO DEFEND THE FIRST
DEPARTMENT’S LACK OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE CPLR IN
AFFIRMING THE $8 MILLION DAMAGES AWARD ............................ 29
A. This Court Has Authority To Review The First Department’s
Misapplication Of CPLR 5501(c) And 5522(b) ................................. 29
B. Remand Is Necessary So That The First Department Can Apply
The Proper Legal Standard Under CPLR 5501(c) And 5522(b) ........ 31
1. The First Department Did Not Expressly Compare
Damages Awards Or Provide Its Reasoning............................. 31
2. The First Department’s Determination Of Past Pain And
Suffering Is Legally Flawed ...................................................... 33
3. A Common Attribute Of Cancer Progression Cannot
Sustain The Unprecedented Award For Future Pain And
Suffering .................................................................................... 34
4. This Court’s Guidance Remains Needed To Curb
Spiraling Pain-And-Suffering Verdicts In Asbestos Cases ...... 35
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 36
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
Akely v. Kinnicutt,
238 N.Y. 466 (1924) ........................................................................................... 13
In re Asbestos Litig. (McPadden),
173 F.R.D. 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) .......................................................................... 15
Bender v. Underwood,
93 A.D.2d 747 (1st Dep’t 1983) ......................................................................... 24
Bischofsberger v. A.O. Smith Water Prods.,
No. 107352/2005, 2012 WL 4462393,
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. Sept. 19, 2012) .............................................................. 7, 16
Bradford v. John A. Coleman Catholic High Sch.,
110 A.D.2d 965 (3d Dep’t 1985) ........................................................................ 27
Carroll v. A.W. Chesterton Co.,
No. 190259/09 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. Aug. 25, 2010) ......................................... 14
Chiacchia v. Nat’l Westminster Bank USA,
124 A.D.2d 626 (2d Dep’t 1986) .......................................................................... 6
City of New York v. Maul,
14 N.Y.3d 499 (2010) ......................................................................................... 13
Curry v. Am. Standard,
No. 08-CV-10228, 2010 WL 6501559 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2010) ..................... 19
Donlon v. City of New York,
284 A.D.2d 13 (1st Dep’t 2001) ......................................................................... 32
Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
77 N.Y.2d 377 (1991) ..................................................................................... 8, 21
FGL & L Prop. Corp. v. City of Rye,
66 N.Y.2d 111 (1985) ......................................................................................... 12
iv
Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc.,
518 U.S. 415 (1996) .......................................................................... 29, 31, 32, 35
Geraci v. Probst,
15 N.Y.3d 336 (2010) ........................................................................................... 4
Gibbons v. Groat,
22 A.D.2d 996 (3d Dep’t 1964) .......................................................... 6, 13, 20, 22
Harby Assocs., Inc. v. Seaboyer,
82 A.D.2d 992 (3d Dep’t 1981) ...................................................................... 6, 22
Hendrix v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc.,
776 F.2d 1492 (11th Cir. 1985) .......................................................................... 25
Johnson v. Celotex Corp.,
899 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1990) ............................................................................... 6
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.,
455 U.S. 422 (1982) ............................................................................................ 12
Malcolm v. National Gypsum Co.,
995 F.2d 346 (2d Cir. 1993) .............................. 11, 12, 14, 18, 19, 24, 25, 26, 27
Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig. (Abrams),
No. 108667/07, 2014 WL 3689333 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. July 18, 2014) .......... 15
Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig. (Adler),
No. 190181/11, 2012 WL 3276720
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. Aug. 7, 2012) .......................................................... 7, 17, 21
Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig. (Assenzio),
No. 190008/12, 2013 WL 1774051 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. Sept. 7, 2013) .......... 19
Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig. (Ballard),
No. 190102/2008, 2009 WL 2996083,
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. Sept. 9, 2009) .............................................................. 14, 25
Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig. (Barnes),
No. 010321/2007, 2008 WL 1730004 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. Apr. 7, 2008) ....... 19
Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig. (Baruch),
111 A.D.3d 574 (1st Dep’t 2013) ....................................................................... 13
v
Matter New York City Asbestos Litig. (Bernard),
99 A.D.3d 410 (1st Dep’t 2012) ......................................................................... 13
Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig. (Brooklyn Naval Shipyard Cases),
188 A.D.2d 214 (1st Dep’t 1993), aff’d, 82 N.Y.2d 821 (1993) ........................ 11
Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig. (Capozio),
22 Misc. 3d 1109(A) (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 2009) .............................................. 15
Matter of New York City Asbestos Litigation (Conti),
No. 114483/02, 2011 WL 1826854 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. May 2, 2011) ........... 14
Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig. (In Extremis Apr. 2011/Fifos Aug. 2009),
No. 190323/10, 2011 WL 5118158 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. Sept. 7, 2011) .......... 15
Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig. (Konstantin),
121 A.D.3d 230 (1st Dep’t 2014) ................................................. 4, 20, 23, 33, 34
Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig. (Konstantin),
24 N.Y.3d 1216 (2015) ....................................................................................... 29
Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig. (Maltese),
89 N.Y.2d 955 (1997) ......................................................................................... 28
Penn v. Amchem Products,
85 A.D.3d 475 (1st Dep’t 2011) ......................................................................... 31
People v. Finch,
23 N.Y.3d 408 (2014) ........................................................................................... 4
People v. Morris,
21 N.Y.3d 588 (2013) ......................................................................................... 13
Plummer v. Rothwax,
63 N.Y.2d 243 (1984) ......................................................................................... 13
In re Raymond Dean L.,
109 A.D.2d 87 (4th Dep’t 1985) ........................................................................... 7
Rios v. Smith,
95 N.Y.2d 647 (2001) ......................................................................................... 30
vi
In re Seventh Judicial Dist. Asbestos Litig. (Wambach),
190 A.D.2d 1068 (4th Dep’t 1993) ..................................................................... 13
Skelly v. Sachem Cent. Sch. Dist.,
309 A.D.2d 917 (2d Dep’t 2003) ........................................................................ 12
Soto v. Maschler,
24 A.D.2d 893 (2d Dep’t 1965) ............................................................................ 8
Symphony Fabrics Corp. v. Bernson Silk Mills, Inc.,
12 N.Y.2d 409 (1963) ........................................................................................... 6
Tate by McMahon v. Colabello,
58 N.Y.2d 84 (1983) ........................................................................................... 30
United States v. Solomonyan,
451 F. Supp. 2d 626 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) ............................................................ 6, 25
Matter of Vigo S.S. Corp. v. Marship Corp. of Monrovia,
26 N.Y.2d 157 (1970) ........................................................................................... 5
Statutes
CPLR 602(a) ............................................................... 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 24, 28
CPLR 901 ................................................................................................................. 13
CPLR 3403(a)(6) ........................................................................................................ 8
CPLR 3407 ................................................................................................................. 8
CPLR 5501(c) ....................................................................... 2, 29, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35
CPLR 5522(b) ....................................................................... 2, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 35
Other Authorities
Peggy L. Ableman et al., The Consolidation Effect: New York City Asbestos
Verdicts, Due Process and Judicial Efficiency, 14 Mealey’s Asbestos
Bankruptcy Report No. 9 (Apr. 2015) .............................................................. 8, 9
Gen. Ct. Reg. 2012-01, In Re: Mass Tort & Asbestos Programs (Pa. Ct. Comm.
Pleas, Phil. Cnty. Feb. 15, 2012) ........................................................................ 10
vii
Helen E. Freedman, Selected Ethical Issues in Asbestos Litigation, 37 Sw. U. L.
Rev. 511 (2008) .................................................................................................. 10
N.Y. PJI 2:120 .......................................................................................................... 21
N.Y. PJI 2:216 .......................................................................................................... 21
David D. Siegel, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons. Laws of N.Y., Book
7B, CPLR 3403:4 .................................................................................................. 7
INTRODUCTION
Respondent’s brief acknowledges that consolidation of asbestos cases for
trial in New York continues to be “routine,” but urges this Court to approve that
practice by interpreting CPLR 602(a) to allow such consolidation based on only
the most general similarities among cases. Respondent’s interpretation departs
from established precedent, raises serious due process concerns, and runs against
the tide in other jurisdictions. The trial below presents a textbook example of why
this Court should reaffirm the need for faithful application of CPLR 602(a) as
much in the asbestos context as elsewhere.
To begin with, there is no longer any need for any “asbestos exception” to
CPLR 602(a). As Respondent cannot dispute, unlike several decades ago when
asbestos actions overwhelmed New York courts, there is no longer a deluge of
asbestos-related cases involving plaintiffs who worked at the very same sites or
were exposed to the very same asbestos materials. To the contrary, the asbestos
cases being “routinely” consolidated today, like the cases at issue here, typically
involve plaintiffs claiming exposure to asbestos at different worksites, in different
occupations, from different products, made by different defendants, for different
durations, resulting in differing diseases and health statuses, under different legal
theories. Joint trial in such cases fails to promote any meaningful judicial
economy.
2
Moreover, joint trial of such disparate cases risks fundamental unfairness
and prejudice to defendants, as Respondent’s brief itself unintentionally confirms.
Respondent offers (Br. 18-19) a two-page list of just a few of the repeated
instructions, corrections, and cautions that the trial court was compelled to give in
order to try to help jurors keep the different cases straight. Respondent attempts to
blame this “very, very disjointed” trial (A384) on early court closing hours and a
tardy juror, but that suggestion is baseless. The very admonitions Respondent cites
were necessary only because the evidence in two very different cases was
confusingly intermingled at trial, increasing the chance that the jury would
misattribute each case’s facts to the other. A joint trial so conducted violates the
basic due process principle that each case be decided on its own merits. For these
reasons, the First Department’s Decision and Order should be vacated, and the case
remanded for a new and separate trial.
Respondent devotes little space to explaining why, alternatively, the
judgment below should not be remanded for further remittitur pursuant to CPLR
5501(c). In that statute, the Legislature specifically directed the Appellate Division
to scrutinize a damages award challenged as excessive by comparing it with
similar cases in order to keep damages for comparable injuries in a tight range.
And CPLR 5522(b) directs the Appellate Division to provide a written reasoned
analysis for each remittitur decision. Those requirements enable meaningful
3
comparison with future cases, necessary to avoid spiraling damages awards.
Respondent does not dispute that the First Department failed to follow either
requirement here, suggesting merely that those rules may be ignored as too
burdensome. But a court may not ignore a legislative mandate. And doing so here
would risk a continued escalation of damages awards in asbestos cases. If not
remanded for new trial, the case should be remanded for further remittitur.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
RESPONDENT IS UNABLE TO DEFEND THE “ROUTINE”
CONSOLIDATION OF ASBESTOS CASES HAVING LITTLE IN
COMMON WITH EACH OTHER
A. TLC Did Not Waive Its Objection To Consolidation
Respondent errs in suggesting that TLC’s consolidation challenge is
unpreserved because it did not object to the “trial ruling” joining “‘these two
cases.’” Resp. Br. 35 (quoting A447-48). To the contrary, TLC timely objected to
consolidation by joining the papers filed by all defendants opposing plaintiffs’
motion for consolidation, which objection the trial court overruled. A1167,
A1171.1 TLC’s appeal from the final judgment includes that order, as the First
Department held. Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig. (Konstantin), 121
1 As Respondent acknowledges (Br. 9 n.3), these joint motion papers were
filed only in one case, Altuchoff, and not in Dummitt or Konstantin. See App. Br. 9
n.5, 16 n.8.
4
A.D.3d 230, 241 (1st Dep’t 2014) (A22). TLC had no obligation to renew its
objection during trial to preserve it. See, e.g., People v. Finch, 23 N.Y.3d 408, 413
(2014) (“[A] lawyer is not required, in order to preserve a point, to repeat an
argument that the court has definitively rejected. When a court rules, a litigant is
entitled to take the court at its word.”) (citations omitted); Geraci v. Probst, 15
N.Y.3d 336, 342 (2010) (“[An] issue … placed squarely before the court” on
“arguments … sufficient to alert Supreme Court to the relevant question [is]
sufficiently preserved … for appellate review.”). The First Department correctly
so held. 121 A.D.3d at 241 (A22) (“Nor was a renewed objection to consolidation
necessary after the court whittled down the cases to [Konstantin’s] and Dummitt’s
only.”).
In any event, the trial court acknowledged during trial “the fact [that] the
defendants”—which included TLC—“have objected to the consolidation of the
actions for trial from the inception” (A449), and it evaluated TLC’s post-trial
objection to consolidation on the merits (A85-86), as did the First Department, 121
A.D.3d at 242-46 (A23-31). The consolidation issue thus was squarely presented
to both the trial court and the First Department, ruled on by both courts, and is
properly preserved for this Court’s review.2
2 TLC’s reference to the defendants in Dummitt during trial reflects its
effort to help the jury distinguish between the two cases—not, as Respondent
argues (Br. 37 (citing A934)), TLC’s acquiescence to consolidation.
5
B. Respondent Misstates The Standard For Consolidation Under CPLR
602(a)
On the merits, Respondent treats asbestos-related cases as a unique category
of litigation—cases that should be “routinely” joined for trial because of their
purportedly broad similarities and need for expedited consideration. But there is
no unstated “asbestos exception” to CPLR 602(a). Asbestos cases, like all others,
must “involv[e] a common question of law or fact” before consolidation is
permitted. CPLR 602(a).
1. CPLR 602(a) Does Not Create A Presumption In Favor Of
Consolidation
Respondent errs at the threshold by repeatedly misstating the CPLR 602(a)
standard. Respondent, for example, incorrectly asserts (Br. 60) that “consolidation
is favored by the courts and should be granted unless the opposing party
demonstrates prejudice ….” In fact, as this Court has held, the movant must first
show “a plain identity between the issues involved in the two controversies,”
before the burden shifts to the party opposing consolidation to show “prejudice to a
substantial right.” Matter of Vigo S.S. Corp. v. Marship Corp. of Monrovia, 26
N.Y.2d 157, 161-62 (1970); see also Johnson v. Celotex Corp., 899 F.2d 1281,
1285 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Considerations of convenience and economy must yield to a
paramount concern for a fair and impartial trial.”). Similarly, Respondent’s
contention (Br. 34, 65) that there is a “presumption in favor of joinder” unless the
6
defendant demonstrates a “miscarriage of justice,” rests on a case that applied the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, under which there is indeed “a preference …
for the joint trial of defendants indicted together,” and “[a] defendant raising a
claim of prejudicial spillover bears an extremely heavy burden[ and] must show
that he may suffer prejudice so substantial that a miscarriage of justice will occur.”
United States v. Solomonyan, 451 F. Supp. 2d 626, 650 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (quotation
marks omitted). No such standard applies to consolidation under CPLR 602(a).
Respondent also suggests (Br. 41) that “a single common issue suffices” for
consolidation but cites only cases in which, unlike here, a single issue was the crux
of the disputes in the consolidated cases. See, e.g., Harby Assocs., Inc. v.
Seaboyer, 82 A.D.2d 992, 992 (3d Dep’t 1981) (common issue was a single “city-
ordered demolition” of a block of buildings); Chiacchia v. Nat’l Westminster Bank
USA, 124 A.D.2d 626, 628 (2d Dep’t 1986) (common issue was parties’ divorce
and asset dispute); see also Symphony Fabrics Corp. v. Bernson Silk Mills, Inc., 12
N.Y.2d 409, 413 (1963) (when two arbitrations arose from same set of
transactions—sale of silks from manufacturer to seller to buyer—consolidation
was appropriate because same issues would arise “[w]ith or without a
consolidation”). Those cases comport with the principle—which Respondent
disregards—that commonality must involve “at least … some important rules of
law and some substantial issues of fact,” Gibbons v. Groat, 22 A.D.2d 996, 997
7
(3d Dep’t 1964) (emphasis added), not tangential similarities at a high level of
generality, as here.
2. Practical Concerns Cannot Justify Consolidation Without Regard
To CPLR 602(a)
Respondent also offers several practical reasons that purportedly support
consolidation here, none of which justifies abandonment of the statutory
requirements of CPLR 602(a) and constitutionally guaranteed due process.3
First, Respondent argues (Br. 29) that, without consolidation, future
terminally-ill asbestos plaintiffs will not see their day in court. But the
“accelerated trial preferences for terminally-ill asbestos plaintiffs” (id.) do not
warrant special treatment for consolidation. Each of the authorities that
Respondent cites addresses when actions should be set for trial,4 not whether they
should be consolidated. None allows consolidation without regard for statutory
3 Respondent cites (Br. 30) two cases as evidence that courts “routine[ly]”
deny consolidation, but those cases are the exception that proves the rule. See
Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig. (Adler), No. 190181/11, 2012 WL
3276720, at *9 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. Aug. 7, 2012) (denying consolidation of one
plaintiff’s case because “[n]one of the Malcolm factors … weigh in favor of a joint
trial”); Bischofsberger v. A.O. Smith Water Prods., No. 107352/2005, 2012 WL
4462393, at *4 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. Sept. 19, 2012) (denying consolidation due to
overwhelmingly “unique” exposure, state-of-the-art, defenses, and defendants).
4 See NYCAL Amended Case Management Order (TLC’s Compendium of
Unreported Authorities (“App. Comp.”) 39-41 (¶¶ XIII(A)(1); XIV(A) VIII(a)(1));
CPLR 3403(a)(6), 3407; In re Raymond Dean L., 109 A.D.2d 87, 88 (4th Dep’t
1985); Soto v. Maschler, 24 A.D.2d 893, 893 (2d Dep’t 1965); David D. Siegel,
Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons. Laws of N.Y., Book 7B, CPLR 3403:4
(TLC’s Reply Compendium of Unreported Authorities (“Reply App. Comp.”) 37).
8
prerequisites.5 Moreover, consolidation does not even necessarily result in
speedier dispositions,6 and thus asbestos plaintiffs would not automatically get
their day in court sooner as a result of consolidation.
Second, Respondent contends (Br. 28) that “‘barring’ the consolidation of
asbestos actions would render administration of the entire New York County Civil
Part unworkable.” Faithful application of CPLR 602(a) is a far cry from a “bar” on
consolidation,7 but in any event, Respondent does not dispute TLC’s showing
(App. Br. 22-23) that, since 2007, the number of new asbestos-related filings
nationally has hovered around 20% of 2001 levels. Indeed, Respondent admits
(Br. 27-28) that there are now fewer asbestos filings than several decades ago.
And again, consolidation would not help clear the courts’ case load as a matter of
course. A faithful application of CPLR 602(a) would not disable the New York
civil justice system.
5 While Respondent suggests (Br. 3) that CPLR 602(a) be “liberally-
construed,” “even a remedial statute must be given a meaning consistent with the
words chosen by the Legislature,” Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co., 77 N.Y.2d 377, 385
n.1 (1991) (cited in Resp. Br. 45).
6 See Peggy L. Ableman et al., The Consolidation Effect: New York City
Asbestos Verdicts, Due Process and Judicial Efficiency, 14 Mealey’s Asbestos
Bankruptcy Report No. 9, at 12-13 (Apr. 2015) (Reply App. Comp. 13-14); see
also infra, at 11.
7 Contrary to Respondent’s repeated assertions (Br. 1, 23 n.7, 28), TLC
does not seek to “bar” consolidation of asbestos cases but argues only that “CPLR
602(a) bars the prejudicial consolidation of asbestos actions lacking any common
issue of fact or law apart from asbestos exposure.” App. Br. 18 (emphasis added).
9
Third, Respondent questions (Br. 32-34) the well-documented conclusion
that consolidated asbestos cases generate much higher average damages for
plaintiffs than individual cases.8 But Respondent’s rebuttal of the scholarly studies
is unpersuasive.9 Nor is Respondent correct to assert (Br. 32) that TLC’s chart
(App. Br. 27) is “inaccurate” because it does not include older verdicts that
Respondent references. See App. Br. 26 (chart contains verdicts “from 2009 to the
present”).10 Respondent argues that Hillyer shows that individual awards may be
high, but that only demonstrates that outlier verdicts can occur in all contexts. The
evidence amply supports the conclusion that, on average, consolidated trials
unfairly favor plaintiffs. Indeed, as TLC explained (App. Br. 29-30), many other
8 Even more recent studies confirm this effect. See Ableman, supra, Reply
App. Comp. 2 (from 2010 to 2014, “consolidated verdicts are 250% more per
plaintiff than NYCAL awards in individual trial settings”).
9 For example, Bordens’s and Horowitz’s article is not an “analysis of an
80-case joint trial” (Resp. Br. 33 n.12) but a research study on the basis of which
the authors conclude that consolidation “significantly affects the outcome of a
trial” (App. Comp. 123), and that consolidation may work only when “the cases
making up each class of plaintiffs [are] similar” (App. Comp. 118). Respondent
also discounts (Br. 33 n.12) White’s conclusion that asbestos plaintiffs are
statistically more likely to win in a consolidated trial than plaintiffs in individual
trials as limited to cases consolidating non-disabled and disabled plaintiffs. In fact,
White found that in consolidation cases generally “evidence that is relevant to one
plaintiff’s case may affect other plaintiffs’ cases.” App. Comp. 153. Moreover, in
a separate study that Respondent does not address, White determined that certain
asbestos defendants “appear callous,” which may spill over on other defendants,
“mak[ing] jurors more sympathetic to plaintiffs.” App. Comp. 149.
10 Respondent also incorrectly contends (Br. 32) that the Peraica and Dietz
trials were improperly categorized in TLC’s chart. See Ableman, supra, Reply
App. Comp. 15.
10
jurisdictions have recently substantially curbed the use of trial consolidation in
asbestos cases based on a widespread concern about unfair outcomes.11
Fourth, Respondent defends (Br. 30) “routine” consolidation of asbestos
cases by arguing that “in extremis asbestos actions generally share significant
common questions of law and fact.” But the question is not whether, at some
abstract level, actions share “general[]” common issues, but whether particular
substantial facts and important issues overlap so significantly that consolidation
could result in judicial efficiencies without prejudice to defendants. And while, as
TLC explained (App. Br. 22), asbestos actions may have tended to have common
11 Contrary to Respondent’s contentions (Br. 25-26 & n.8), five jurisdictions
judicially prohibited consolidation of asbestos actions—San Francisco, on the
ground that such consolidation was improper (App. Comp. 90-91); Delaware, by
ordering that multiple plaintiffs cannot litigate together unless the claims relate to
the same person or his/her household (App. Comp. 67); Michigan, in view of
“traditional principles of due process” (App. Comp. 156 (Markman, J.,
concurring)); and also Mississippi and Ohio, where the respective Supreme Courts
promulgated generally applicable rules of civil procedure barring consolidation
(App. Br. 29 nn.17-18).
Kentucky, Kansas, and Georgia prohibited consolidation of asbestos actions
legislatively and though those dockets are smaller than those in New York (Resp.
Br. 26 n.8), New York has a disproportionately large number of asbestos filings
(App. Comp. 152), in part because it allows consolidation. See Helen E.
Freedman, Selected Ethical Issues in Asbestos Litigation, 37 Sw. U. L. Rev. 511,
517 (2008) (App. Comp. 101) (“Consolidations have provided an overly hospitable
environment for weak cases.”).
And still other jurisdictions have strictly limited consolidation of asbestos
cases including by, for example, prohibiting consolidation of pleural mesothelioma
cases with non-pleural mesothelioma cases. See Gen. Ct. Reg. 2012-01 (§ 6(e)) In
Re: Mass Tort & Asbestos Programs (Pa. Ct. Comm. Pleas, Phil. Cnty. Feb. 15,
2012) (Reply App. Comp. 32).
11
facts and law decades ago, such as when plaintiffs worked at a single site like the
Brooklyn Navy Yard, see Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig. (Brooklyn Naval
Shipyard Cases), 188 A.D.2d 214, 225 (1st Dep’t 1993), aff’d, 82 N.Y.2d 821
(1993), that is no longer the case. Along similar lines, Respondent is incorrect to
suggest (Br. 29) that consolidation necessarily speeds disposition of cases. See
Reply App. Comp. 13-14. Thus, even if in cases such as Brooklyn Naval Shipyard,
where there were substantial common facts and law, consolidation could result in
judicial efficiencies, the same does not follow when there is no commonality and a
trial requires constant interruption for limiting and cautionary instructions, as here
(see Resp. Br. 18-19).
Fifth, Respondent is incorrect in suggesting (Br. 34) that any deprivation of
due process at trial is “academic” because defendants can ask for remittitur.
“[C]onsolidation should not be granted” at all if “prejudice to a substantial right is
shown,” Skelly v. Sachem Cent. Sch. Dist., 309 A.D.2d 917, 917 (2d Dep’t 2003),
and consolidation that results in prejudice requires vacatur of the judgment and
new trial, Malcolm v. National Gypsum Co., 995 F.2d 346, 354 (2d Cir. 1993), not
simply remittitur of damages.
Finally, Respondent’s interpretation of CPLR 602(a) as permitting
consolidation of disparate cases based on commonalities at only the highest level
of generality raises serious due process concerns. Due process requires that a party
12
have “the opportunity to present [one’s] case and have its merits fairly judged.”
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 433 (1982). That is not possible
where, as here, cases with only the most generic of similarities are consolidated for
trial. Since “statutes are to be construed so as to avoid constitutional issues if such
a construction is fairly possible,” FGL & L Prop. Corp. v. City of Rye, 66 N.Y.2d
111, 120 (1985), CPLR 602(a) should be interpreted to prohibit consolidation
based on abstract and generalized commonalities.
C. Generalizations Of Facts And Law Are Insufficient To Show The
Commonalities Necessary For Consolidation Under CPLR 602(a)
The Malcolm factors, considered by many courts in New York in evaluating
commonality in asbestos actions, are intended to assist courts in “strik[ing] the
appropriate balance as to consolidation vel non”—to determine whether
“considerations of judicial economy” are present, in view of “a paramount concern
for a fair and impartial trial.” 995 F.2d at 350. If the factors are applied at an
impermissibly high level of generality, however, there are no efficiency gains and
a substantial risk of injury to defendants’ fair-trial right. The First Department
here generalized commonality to such a degree as to conceal the absence of any
real-world efficiency gains and the prejudice to defendants from consolidation.
13
Respondent seeks (Br. 43, 60-61) to insulate this error of law12 from scrutiny
by asking this Court to defer to the lower courts’ decisions, but the only authority
Respondent offers for this requested “deference” comes from entirely different
procedural contexts.13 As explained below, Respondent’s generalizations of the
facts and the law are insufficient under CPLR 602(a) to support the result here.14
12 Contrary to Respondent’s contention (Br. 38), TLC repeatedly referenced
this standard of review (e.g., App. Br. 31, 57).
13 See People v. Morris, 21 N.Y.3d 588 (2013) (admission of evidence);
Plummer v. Rothwax, 63 N.Y.2d 243 (1984) (Article 78 petition regarding re-trial);
City of New York v. Maul, 14 N.Y.3d 499 (2010) (class certification); Akely v.
Kinnicutt, 238 N.Y. 466 (1924) (pre-CPLR 901 class certification); see also Matter
of New York City Asbestos Litig. (Baruch), 111 A.D.3d 574 (1st Dep’t 2013) (not
mentioning deference); In re Seventh Judicial Dist. Asbestos Litig. (Wambach),
190 A.D.2d 1068 (4th Dep’t 1993) (same); Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig.
(Bernard), 99 A.D.3d 410 (1st Dep’t 2012) (same). Moreover, that the CPLR
602(a) consolidation standard differs from the CPLR 901 class certification
standard (Resp. Br. 39 n.18), demonstrates the irrelevance of cases like Maul and
does not support a higher threshold for finding “abuse of discretion as a matter of
law” in consolidation cases. And in any event, in Maul, this Court emphasized
“four common allegations that transcend and predominate over any individual
matters.” 14 N.Y.3d at 512. And in Akely, which predated both CPLR 602(a) and
CPLR 901, this Court approved effectively a securities fraud class action. 238
N.Y. at 473. There are no such similarities on facts or law here.
14 As TLC showed in its opening brief (App. Br. 31-41) and shows again
below, these cases share no common issues of fact or law when considered at the
appropriate level of specificity. But even if one or more of the Malcolm factors
could be said to tip in Respondent’s favor—and none does—Respondent still has
not demonstrated there were sufficient “important rules of law and … substantial
issues of fact” in common, Gibbons, 22 A.D.2d at 997, to justify consolidation
here.
14
1. The Cases Lack Substantial Common Issues Of Fact
(a) Different Worksites, Occupations, And Products
Respondent does not contest that Mr. Konstantin and Mr. Dummitt
performed different work in different occupations in different worksites and were
allegedly exposed to different asbestos-containing products. Instead, Respondent
treats (Br. 47) the worksite and occupation factors as a single “type of asbestos
exposure” factor. Respondent’s argument (id.) that all “occupational, products-
based” exposure cases may be tried together would allow legions of disparate
defendants to be swept together into consolidated trials with no efficiency gains
and grave risks of prejudice.15 Nor is there any precedent supporting such a broad
and general theory of commonality. To the contrary, Malcolm explained that a
common worksite is relevant to consolidation because it establishes, for example,
“common ownership, … suppliers or … practices.” 995 F.2d at 353. Evaluating
the “type of exposure” bypasses such particularized considerations. Moreover,
15 It is also not supported by the cases upon which Respondent relies. In
Matter of New York City Asbestos Litigation (Conti), No. 114483/02, 2011 WL
1826854, at *2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. May 2, 2011) (cited in Resp. Br. 47), for
example, the court permitted consolidation because “[a]ll of the plaintiffs claim
exposure to insulation and valves” and two defendants “are common to all”
plaintiffs. See also Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig. (Ballard), No.
190102/2008, 2009 WL 2996083, at *5 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. Sept. 9, 2009) (“[A]ll
plaintiffs were exposed … by working directly with the material.”); Order, Carroll
v. A.W. Chesterton Co., No. 190259/09 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. Aug. 25, 2010) (filed
Sept. 3, 2010) (Reply App. Comp. 24) (plaintiffs had “overlapping exposures, that
is, exposures to various of the same asbestos-containing products as well as
exposures that occurred in the same manner”).
15
Respondent’s assertion (Br. 49) that consolidation here led to “a fairer result”
because it enabled a jury “to compare one worksite to another,” In re Asbestos
Litig. (McPadden), 173 F.R.D. 87, 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (quotation marks omitted),
is incorrect because, as Respondent elsewhere argues (Br. 37) and the trial court
ruled (A939), such cross-references between consolidated cases are improper.
Respondent likewise contends (Br. 50) that lack of a common industry is
irrelevant because “state-of-the-art evidence in asbestos actions is not industry-
specific,” asserting (Br. 51 n.23) that Matter of New York City Asbestos Litigation
(Abrams), No. 108667/07, 2014 WL 3689333 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. July 18, 2014),
was “incorrect[]” in concluding otherwise. But the authority upon which
Respondent relies reaffirms that state-of-the-art evidence is common when
plaintiffs worked in similar industries or settings. See, e.g., Matter of New York
City Asbestos Litig. (Capozio), 22 Misc. 3d 1109(A), at *2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty.
2009) (common state-of-the-art evidence where plaintiffs, “engaged in similar
occupations in the construction trades,” were “exposed to the same type of asbestos
containing insulation … at comparable commercial work sites and residential work
sites”); Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig. (In Extremis Apr. 2011/Fifos Aug.
2009), No. 190323/10, 2011 WL 5118158, at *3 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. Sept. 7,
2011) (“The state of the art testimony will be substantially the same for [plaintiffs
exposed] in the 1950s and [those exposed] in the 1960s” where they “all claim
16
significant maritime exposure”); see also Bischofsberger v. A.O. Smith Water
Prods., No. 107352/2005, 2012 WL 4462393, at *4 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. Sept. 19,
2012) (where exposed person “was in the Navy at the time of the claimed
exposure,” “there are unique facts related to state of the art”).16 The lack of a
common industry here thus unsurprisingly led to disparate state-of-the-art
testimony. See A598-605 (Dr. Castleman’s testimony as to joint compounds used
on construction sites, relevant to Mr. Konstantin’s case); A607-08 (Dr.
Castleman’s testimony as to the packing and gaskets used in boiler rooms, relevant
to Mr. Dummitt’s case).
(b) Different Diseases
Respondent effectively endorses consolidation of all mesothelioma cases,
asserting (Br. 5) that, “since both Plaintiffs suffered from mesothelioma—the only
known cause of which is asbestos exposure—the same medical and scientific
principles for causation were presented in both cases.” While Respondent relies
(Br. 53) upon one expert’s generalized statement that “[m]esothelioma is
mesothelioma” (A1075), that statement was made in reference to an article, not the
16 Respondent incorrectly contends (Br. 51) that the trial court ruled that
state-of-the-art evidence is not industry-specific. In fact, the court noted that the
jury should consider “what the defendants knew or should have known at the time”
(A179), and that defendants cannot ignore that which is known generally (A884,
RA67) or in “relevant other fields” (RA75).
17
two cases here. And Respondent cannot contest there are the substantial and
important differences between the diseases.17
Moreover, Respondent fails to acknowledge (Br. 53-57) the evidence that
Mr. Konstantin’s and Mr. Dummitt’s different diseases raised different issues as to
causation because Mr. Dummitt’s pleural mesothelioma is common whereas (as
the trial court found (A449)) Mr. Konstantin’s mesothelioma of the tunica
vaginalis is extremely rare. There were no common causation experts in the two
cases. See A477-99, A568-69 (Dr. Markowitz in Konstantin); A1075 (Dr. Siroky
in Konstantin); A209 (Dr. Moline in Dummitt) (cited in Resp. Br. 5). And there
was no common expert testimony on any of the purported commonalities that
Respondent cites.18
17 See Adler, 2012 WL 3276720, at *11 (denying consolidation of
peritoneal mesothelioma case with pleural mesothelioma cases because it is a
“distinct disease,” with a “different classification code,” “different risk factors,”
and a “unique” “underlying etiology”). Contrary to Respondent’s argument (Br.
55 n.29), Adler did not consider that the plaintiff at issue was female. Indeed, the
Philadelphia court, see supra, at 10 n.11, prohibited consolidation of pleural and
non-pleural mesothelioma cases on the ground that “[p]leural mesothelioma is a
disease that is distinct from mesotheliomas originating in other parts of the body
….” Reply App. Comp. 32.
18 Contrary to Respondent’s suggestion (Br. 56), Mr. Konstantin’s case
would not have required “evidence regarding pleural mesothelioma” even if tried
individually, for it would have been unreasonable for Mr. Konstantin to attempt to
prove defendant’s failure to exercise a workplace duty of care by relying on
evidence of a different disease than the one with which he was diagnosed.
18
(c) Different Health Statuses
Respondent recognizes (Br. 57) that “Mr. Konstantin testified at trial but Mr.
Dummitt testified via videotape,” but fails to acknowledge that Mr. Dummitt’s
counsel told the jury that “Mr. Dummitt is home. He is too sick to be here.” A183
(emphasis added). Mr. Dummitt’s absence—combined with his counsel’s
acknowledgement of the reason—“present[ed] the jury with a powerful
demonstration of the fate that await[ed]” Mr. Konstantin. Malcolm, 995 F.2d at
351-52 (quotation marks omitted).19 These different health statuses favored
separate trials even though, as Respondent notes (Br. 57), mesothelioma is
typically fatal, for such a high-level commonality would obviate the health status
factor entirely. Nor is this solely an issue of prejudice, as Respondent asserts (id.).
Before prejudice may be considered, see infra, at 24-28, there must be sufficient
commonality of facts such as plaintiffs’ health statuses, which there is not here.
(d) Different Durations
Respondent does not dispute that Mr. Konstantin and Mr. Dummitt were
allegedly exposed to asbestos-containing products during different time periods,
but asserts (Br. 52) that only the “last date of exposure” matters, not the relative
duration of exposure. Duration matters, however, because the state of the art as to
asbestos varies over time, see Curry v. Am. Standard, No. 08-CV-10228, 2010 WL
19 Respondent incorrectly states (Br. 58) that a relevant inquiry is whether
Mr. Dummitt was prejudiced because the jury saw his testimony on video.
19
6501559, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2010) (no consolidation where “the variation
between the degree and duration of Curry and Gitto’s asbestos exposure[] would
likely require presentation of different, complex evidence in each case” on the
state-of-the-art). Indeed, Malcolm compared the duration of plaintiffs’ asbestos
exposure, 995 F.2d at 351, and the cases Respondent cites analyze whether a
plaintiff’s “period” of exposure is “outside those periods alleged by the other
plaintiffs.” Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig. (Assenzio), No. 190008/12,
2013 WL 1774051, at *4 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. Sept. 7, 2013) (emphasis added);
see also Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig. (Barnes), No. 010321/07, 2008
WL 1730004, at *4 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. Apr. 7, 2008) (severing plaintiff in part
due to different time periods of exposure). Respondent’s suggested interpretation
again sweeps too broadly, effectively advocating for consolidation of all cases
where the exposure ended, for example, in the 1970s.
(e) Different Defendants, Counsel, And Witnesses
Finally, Respondent does not seriously contest that the trial had no
commonality between defendants or their counsel,20 asserting only (Br. 59) that
“[b]oth Plaintiffs” called three experts: Moline, Castleman, and Hatfield. That is
not correct. As to Dr. Moline, Plaintiffs’ counsel represented at trial that “she is
not going to be addressing the Konstantin case in any way and she is not going to
20 Defendant Aurora Pumps, represented by different attorneys than those
for TLC (A216-17), was out of the trial in the first week (A277).
20
be talking about testicular cancer, mesothelioma or mesothelioma of the tunica
vaginalis in any way.” A209. With respect to Mr. Hatfield, the trial court stated:
[T]o the extent Mr. Hatfield testified in connection with
both cases, you may consider his testimony in connection
with both cases. If there was only evidence presented in
one case, the evidence refers to that case only. I cannot
at this point make these determinations.
A945. At best, Mr. Hatfield’s “shared testimony” concerned “the methods for
measuring dust release from the manipulation of products,” hardly a “substantial
issue[] of fact,” Gibbons, 22 A.D.2d at 997. And, as discussed above, Dr.
Castleman offered separate testimony as to state-of-the-art relevant to Mr.
Konstantin’s case (A598-605) and as to Mr. Dummitt’s (A607-08). Moreover,
Respondent’s two-page bulleted list of instructions, corrections, and directions to
the jury (see Resp. Br. 18-19, see also Resp. Br. 6) demonstrates the jury confusion
these experts caused.
2. The Cases Lack Substantial Common Issues Of Law
Respondent does not dispute that, as the trial court acknowledged, the two
cases raised “a different set of laws” (A969) and “separate legal issues” (A951).
Yet, like the First Department, 121 A.D.3d at 245 (A28), Respondent argues (Br.
44) that the law was common because both cases were based in negligence. That
sweeping characterization of the distinct causes of action at issue here would
21
permit consolidation of wholly disparate cases in virtually every asbestos context,
without regard to any relevant efficiencies or prejudice.
Viewed at a more appropriate level of specificity, a failure-to-maintain-safe-
workplace theory (at issue in Konstantin) differs markedly from a failure-to-warn
theory (at issue in Dummitt). Even the Pattern Jury Instructions (“PJI”) that
Respondent cites (Br. 45) illustrate the difference: The “Labor Law § 200”
instruction provides that one of the relevant inquiries is whether the employer
“fail[ed] to use reasonable care to provide a safe workplace,” N.Y. PJI 2:216,
whereas the “Strict Products Liability” instruction provides that a company “is
liable for injury” from a defective product, which “is defective if it is not
reasonably safe,” N.Y. PJI 2:120. Even if both refer to safety, that is all the more
reason that the cases should not have been consolidated, because “similar but
distinct elements” of the law are likely to cause jury confusion. See Matter of New
York City Asbestos Litig. (Adler), No. 190181/2011, 2012 WL 3276720, at *11
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. Aug. 7, 2012).21
Nor did this Court hold in Enright, 77 N.Y.2d 377 (cited in Resp. Br. 45),
that failure-to-warn and failure-to-maintain-safe-workplace are similar, negligence-
21 Contrary to Respondent’s argument (Br. 45 n.20), Adler is not
distinguishable because FELA has a “greatly relaxed proximate cause burden”;
rather, that court denied consolidation of one plaintiff’s case because it was “the
only one that will involve the negligence standard of care as provided by FELA
and not that of strict product liability.” 2012 WL 3276720, at *11.
22
based theories. Rather, in Enright, this Court declined to allow a “so-called ‘third
generation’ plaintiff” to pursue a strict-liability cause of action, under precedent
already forbidding a negligence cause of action in similar circumstances. Id. at
380, 383-84.22
Respondent also argues (Br. 45) that there were “numerous legal issues
common to both cases … addressed at trial.” But Respondent cites only five
instances, each of which is a joint objection to Plaintiffs’ counsel’s conduct23 or a
joint request,24 and none of which illustrates any similarity of “important rules of
law.” Gibbons, 22 A.D.2d at 997.
Finally, Respondent’s reliance (Br. 45-46) on legal theories against
nonparties is also misplaced. The legal claims against the nonparty joint-
compound manufacturers that appeared on the verdict sheet and were allocated
liability for negligent failure to warn (A979) were not similar to the claims against
Crane, which itself did not manufacture any asbestos-containing products. It also
has no bearing on commonalities at trial that “Mr. Konstantin asserted negligent
22 Moreover, though Harby Associates, 82 A.D.2d at 992 (cited in Resp.
Br. 41, 44), held that “causes of action couched generally in negligence” could be
joined, there was no question in that case that the actions, arising out of a single
“city-ordered demolition” of buildings, all “alleg[ed] essentially negligence.”
23 See RA7 (Plaintiffs’ video playback); RA84 (same, during closing);
RA89 (jury charge).
24 See RA70 (reading names of all dismissed defendants); RA72 (specific
jury instruction).
23
failure to warn claims against [the nonparty] joint compound manufacturers, but
resolved those claims prior to trial.” Resp. Br. 46 n.21. Nor is it relevant for
Respondent to suggest (Br. 46) that the defendants in Dummitt “attempted to
assert” premises liability claims against nonparty shipyards (RA42, 67-68), for as
Respondent admits (Br. 13 n.5, 69), those claims were not on the verdict sheet
because there was virtually no evidence submitted as to them at trial.25
3. TLC Had No Burden To Disprove Commonality
In response to TLC’s argument (App. Br. 41-42) that the First Department
further erred in placing the burden on TLC to show that the actions had no
common issues of law or fact, Respondent contends (Br. 60) that the First
Department’s reasoning merely “identif[ied] Appellant’s arguments.” But that
ignores that the First Department held consolidation proper because “TLC has
failed to articulate why the differences in the environment[,] … job duties,” and
health statuses mattered, and “why the differences between pleural and peritoneal
types of mesothelioma are sufficiently significant.” 121 A.D.3d at 244 (A27).
That analysis improperly shifted the burden of disproving commonality onto TLC.
25 There is also no basis for Respondent’s assertion (Br. 47) that the
“illogical conclusion” of TLC’s argument is “that different claims in a single case
should be severed.” Severance of claims in a single case is not governed by CPLR
602(a) and has no relevance here.
24
D. CPLR 602(a) Prohibits Consolidation Where, As Here, It Prejudices A
Defendant’s Substantial Right To A Fair Trial
Even if the First Department’s standard for commonality were not unduly
permissive, a new separate trial is still warranted because the First Department
erred in determining that consolidation risked no prejudice to TLC’s substantial
right to a fair trial. See App. Br. 42-50. Respondent suggests (Br. 61) that TLC’s
argument raises “nothing more than the ‘possibility’ of prejudice” from jury
confusion, unfair bolstering of claims, and the repeated recklessness charge. But
that is the relevant inquiry in the post-trial context; as Malcolm itself stated, the
issue is whether “there is an unacceptably strong chance” that prejudice infected
the consolidated trial. Malcolm, 995 F.2d at 352; see also Bender v. Underwood,
93 A.D.2d 747, 748 (1st Dep’t 1983) (defendant’s substantial right to fair trial and
due process is violated by “possibility of confusion for the jury.”).
Respondent’s arguments as to each asserted ground of prejudice fall
similarly short. First, with respect to jury confusion, Respondent does not dispute
that the trial court itself apologized multiple times to the jury for the fragmented
and “piecemeal presentation” of evidence (A374-75), and correctly described the
trial as “very, very disjointed” (A384). TLC also cited (App. Br. 45-46) at least
two instances of misspeaking by the trial court (A172-73, A176); and one instance
of an abdication of the court’s duty to assist the jury in distinguishing between the
two cases (A945), evidencing how difficult it was for even the court to keep track
25
of the evidence. Indeed, Respondent confirms (Br. 61) that the trial was
“unwieldy” by providing (Br. 18-19) a two-page bulleted list of just some of the
instructions, corrections, and directions that the court or Plaintiffs’ counsel directed
to the jury in an effort to disentangle the evidence in the two cases. Respondent
also admits (Br. 67) that Plaintiff’s counsel had to “consistently differentiat[e]
between the evidence presented in these cases” (citing A208, A375, A723, A728,
RA44).
Respondent nevertheless seeks to minimize the prejudice by treating the trial
court’s instructions as a cure-all.26 But as the Second Circuit stated in Malcolm,
notwithstanding “the number of precautions the district court took to assure that
each case maintained its identity … the sheer breadth of the evidence made these
precautions feckless in preventing jury confusion.” 995 F.2d at 352. And to the
extent certain cases erroneously treat prejudice in the asbestos context as curable
by “jury trial innovations” such as “written juror questions,” e.g., Matter of New
York City Asbestos Litig. (Ballard), No. 190102/2008, 2009 WL 2996083, at *10
26 The conclusion in Solomonyan, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 650 (cited in Resp.
Br. 34, 65), that limiting instructions can cure prejudicial spillover is irrelevant
because, as discussed supra, at 6, that case was decided under a distinct federal
criminal standard. And in Hendrix v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 776 F.2d 1492
(11th Cir. 1985) (cited in Resp. Br. 67), the court found limiting instructions
helpful because there was already “striking similarity” between the claims of the
plaintiffs, who were “insulators [who] worked out of the same union hall …
frequently on the same jobs.” Id. at 1496.
26
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. Sept. 9, 2009), that only demonstrates that NYCAL courts
mistakenly view consolidation of asbestos cases as “routine,” and do not seriously
evaluate the risk of prejudice to defendants.
Respondent attempts (Br. 63-64) to shift blame for the “disjointed” trial to
Defendants (for requesting legal rulings, which the trial court found were all
“appropriately raised” (A454)); to one tardy juror (for delaying proceedings); and,
most significantly, to the State of New York (for budget cuts that resulted in early
court closing hours). But Respondent does not explain how the closing hours
policies forced “disjointed” testimony (A384), mixing of the evidence (A944-45),
and a confusing bevy of instructions (Resp. Br. 18-19). See App. Br. 45-46.
Moreover, that an individual trial “would have still been impacted by the closing
hour policies” to some extent (Resp. Br. 64) is a further reason that the cases
should not have been consolidated, as consolidation served to magnify the
problems caused by the policies.
Respondent also points (Br. 68-72) to the verdicts as evidence of a lack of
confusion, but the opposite is true. The skewed allocation of liability (76% to TLC
and 99% to Crane, neither of which manufactured the asbestos-containing products
at issue), as well as the sheer magnitude of the verdicts ($19 million and $32
million)—which the trial court reduced by nearly 70% overall—are, contrary to
Respondent’s contention (Br. 68), “hard to explain,” Malcolm, 995 F.2d at 352.
27
The purported distinctions that Respondent raises between the verdicts, each of
which the trial court remitted to the identical amount, do not suggest otherwise.27
Second, Respondent does not dispute that the mutual bolstering of claims is
prejudicial and renders consolidation inappropriate. See, e.g., Bradford v. John A.
Coleman Catholic High Sch., 110 A.D.2d 965, 965 (3d Dep’t 1985) (reversing
erroneous consolidation of “negligence actions by different plaintiffs seeking to
recover for injuries sustained in two separate football games”). Indeed, the outsize
verdicts—totaling $51 million—and the skewed allocation of fault, see supra, at
26, constitute perhaps the best evidence of bolstering here. Respondent suggests
(Br. 71) only that any prejudice is harmless because of remittitur.28 But remittitur
cannot moot prejudicial errors, Malcolm, 995 F.2d at 354 (prejudice from
consolidation requires reversal), and a party does not “benefit[] immensely” (Resp.
Br. 71 n.34) from being able to seek review of an issue erroneously decided in the
first place. That is particularly true because the remittitur standard is often
incorrectly applied, see Point II, infra; App. Br. 54-60.
27 For example, the jury found nonparties liable only in Mr. Konstantin’s
case but not in Mr. Dummitt’s case because, according to Respondent (Br. 69),
Crane did not present evidence about the nonparties in Dummitt.
28 Respondent’s argument (Br. 71 n.34) that there is no “inflated baseline”
because the “remitted awards do not ‘deviate materially’ from other comparable
awards” assumes the conclusion in question.
28
Third, Respondent does not contest that as a result of the repeated erroneous
recklessness charges in both cases, the jury was primed to look for recklessness,
resulting in the unacceptable risk that it would find TLC liable or award substantial
damages for reasons untethered to the evidence.29 Respondent notes (Br. 64) that
TLC does not “independently challenge” the recklessness finding, but that is no
response to TLC’s assertion of prejudice from the repeated charge.
Finally, Respondent asserts (Br. 72) that this case “exemplifies how
consolidation should work.” Respondent’s examples (Br. 73) provide no support
for depriving TLC of an individualized adjudication of the claims asserted against
it: the “three common experts” in fact generated confusion and required
confounding cautionary instructions; the claim of “a speedier disposition” lacks
support; and consolidation did not “help[] to foster” settlement but at best unfairly
forced it. Consolidation of these disparate cases was highly prejudicial to TLC
and, accordingly, this Court should interpret CPLR 602(a) to warrant a new trial
here.30
29 The recklessness charge against TLC, for example, was baseless (see
App. Br. 48-50), as TLC had not “intentionally done an act of an unreasonable
character in disregard of a known or obvious risk,” causing a high probability of
harm, “with conscious indifference to the outcome.” Matter of New York City
Asbestos Litig. (Maltese), 89 N.Y.2d 955, 956-57 (1997).
30 Contrary to Respondent’s contention (Br. 73 n.36), potential prejudice to
a plaintiff from vacatur of an improper consolidation order does not bear on the
question whether such an order should be vacated.
29
POINT II
RESPONDENT FAILS TO DEFEND THE FIRST DEPARTMENT’S LACK
OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE CPLR IN AFFIRMING THE $8 MILLION
DAMAGES AWARD
In CPLR 5501(c) and 5522(b), the Legislature directed the Appellate
Division to “tighten[] the range of tolerable awards” by comparing prior awards
for similar injuries and to memorialize its reasoning for future litigants and courts.
Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 425 (1996) (emphasis added).
Respondent does not deny that the First Department here, like other panels before
and since, failed to comply with those requirements. This Court’s guidance is
needed now to bring the Appellate Division into compliance with the legislative
mandate.
A. This Court Has Authority To Review The First Department’s
Misapplication Of CPLR 5501(c) And 5522(b)
Respondent argues (Br. 74) that TLC’s challenge to the $8 million damages
award is outside this Court’s review. This Court previously rejected this very
argument in denying Respondent’s motion to dismiss, 24 N.Y.3d 1216 (2015), as
did the First Department in granting leave to appeal (A5-6). As before, this
argument mistakenly assumes that TLC seeks to have this Court remit damages to
a lesser amount. Not so. Rather, TLC contends (App. Br. 56-60) that the First
Department did not apply the correct legal standard under CPLR 5501(c) in
approving the $8 million damages award or explain the “factors it considered in
30
complying” with that provision as CPLR 5522(b) requires. TLC thus seeks
“vacatur and remand to the First Department” so that the First Department—not
this Court—can “assess the excessiveness of the award under the proper standard.”
App. Br. 50. This Court is fully empowered to do so in order to ensure adherence
to the legal standard that the Legislature established.31
Nor does TLC contend on appeal that the First Department abused its
discretion because it affirmed an award that is excessive under the circumstances.
Rather, as discussed, TLC contends that the First Department erred as a matter of
law in not applying the correct standard to determine whether the $8 million award
was excessive. Indeed, the First Department certified that “its determination was
made as a matter of law and not in the exercise of discretion” (A6), which
Respondent does not acknowledge.
31 Respondent’s reliance on Rios v. Smith, 95 N.Y.2d 647 (2001) (cited in
Resp. Br. 74), is misplaced. In that case, this Court declined to review only the
amount of the damage award, not whether the Appellate Division applied the
proper legal standard. Id. at 654. Further, Respondent’s citation to Tate by
McMahon v. Colabello, 58 N.Y.2d 84 (1983) (cited in Resp. Br. 74), actually
supports TLC’s position. There, this Court was asked to consider whether, during
summation, trial counsel had referred to an improper standard for measuring pain
and suffering—the so-called “per diem” standard. Id. at 88. This Court noted that
the propriety of the “per diem” standard was an unsettled issue of law, but declined
to consider the issue because it concluded that counsel had not made any reference
to that standard. Id. Here, in contrast, the legal standard for remittitur of damages
is properly presented for review.
31
TLC’s argument that the First Department did not comply with CPLR
5501(c) and 5522(b) is thus well within this Court’s authority to review.
B. Remand Is Necessary So That The First Department Can Apply The
Proper Legal Standard Under CPLR 5501(c) And 5522(b)
On the merits, Respondent does not acknowledge the history, purpose, or
even the language of CPLR 5501(c)—each of which demonstrates that the
Appellate Division must “look to awards approved in similar cases” to ensure a
“tight[] range of tolerable awards.” Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 425; see App. Br. 52.
Nor does Respondent confront the requirement in CPLR 5522(b) that the Appellate
Division “set forth in its decision the reasons” for its remittitur ruling, including
the “factors it considered.” This Court should reinforce the Appellate Division’s
obligation to comply with these provisions and remand to the First Department for
further proceedings on TLC’s request for remittitur.
1. The First Department Did Not Expressly Compare Damages
Awards Or Provide Its Reasoning
The First Department’s decision lacks any citation to or analysis of prior
asbestos-related awards, including recent decisions like Penn v. Amchem Products,
85 A.D.3d 475 (1st Dep’t 2011). Respondent contends (Br. 76) that this omission
“is of no moment,” but neither of Respondent’s purported justifications has merit.
First, Respondent contends (id.) that the First Department was not required
to look to comparable precedent because “in no two cases are the quality and
32
quantity of such damages identical.” But “analysis of appealed verdicts using
CPLR 5501(c) is not optional,” and “[c]ase comparison cannot be expected to
depend upon perfect factual identity.” Donlon v. City of New York, 284 A.D.2d 13,
16 (1st Dep’t 2001); see also Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 425 (“New York state courts
look to awards approved in similar cases.”). Respondent offers no reason that the
First Department could not undertake the required comparative analysis on
remand, and any “[p]erceived difficulties” in undertaking that analysis “cannot
provide a basis for judicial nullification of the current law.” Donlon, 284 A.D.2d
at 16. Indeed, Respondent’s assertion (Br. 77) that on other occasions the
Appellate Division may have addressed remittitur “without a comparison to other
cases” only reinforces the need for this Court’s guidance as to the proper
interpretation and application of CPLR 5501(c) and 5522(b).
Second, Respondent suggests (Br. 77) that any error by the First Department
in not following CPLR 5501(c) is harmless because the trial court “remitted
damages here and clearly compared this award to others.” The Legislature,
however, specifically tasked the Appellate Division, not trial courts, with the
responsibility of enforcing CPLR 5501(c) and 5522(b), seeking “‘more careful
appellate scrutiny’” of damages awards than under the prior “shocks the
conscience” review. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 423 (quoting 1986 N.Y. Laws 2021,
33
Ch. 266, § 1) (emphasis added). Reliance on the trial court’s discussion of
previous awards does not comply with the statutory mandate.
2. The First Department’s Determination Of Past Pain And
Suffering Is Legally Flawed
In contravention of CPLR 5501(c), the First Department affirmed the $4.5
million award for past pain and suffering without identifying an appropriate
analogue for Mr. Konstantin’s pain and suffering in order to determine what
constitutes reasonable compensation. 121 A.D.3d at 255 (A46); see App. Br. 57-
58. There is no dispute that, for the 13 months prior to his diagnosis, Mr.
Konstantin’s harm from a hydrocele (a “collection of fluid” often unrelated to
cancer) differed in kind from the later pain and suffering more traditionally
associated with mesothelioma and its treatment. A409; A461. The First
Department was thus obligated under CPLR 5501(c) and 5522(b) to identify
previous awards for injuries comparable to the hydrocele and determine whether
the award here materially deviates from what New York courts have found
reasonable. It did not do so. Respondent does not account for this obligation,
discussing (Br. 74-75) only Mr. Konstantin’s post-diagnosis pain and suffering.
Nor is there any merit to Respondent’s footnoted assertion (Br. 75 n.37) that
TLC “explicitly invited the Appellate Division to employ a uniform calculation” of
pain-and-suffering damages. While TLC provided a chart of recent remitted
asbestos decisions to the First Department, as Respondent acknowledges (id.), TLC
34
argued that the total amount awarded should be “at most $3.8 million” based on a
maximum of $100,000 per month for 38 months, which did not include the 13 pre-
diagnosis months. TLC has never argued that the First Department must apply a
uniform per-month calculation, though the calculation of a per month average is a
useful metric to compare pain-and-suffering awards that cover periods of different
lengths.32
3. A Common Attribute Of Cancer Progression Cannot Sustain The
Unprecedented Award For Future Pain And Suffering
The First Department’s affirmance of the $3.5 million award for future pain
and suffering based on the alleged metastasis of Mr. Konstantin’s mesothelioma is
legally flawed as well. Respondent does not dispute that metastasis is “not unusual
in cancer progression” (App. Br. 59) and does not itself justify a concededly
“unprecedented” award under CPLR 5501(c) (121 A.D.3d at 255 (A47)).
Respondent instead states (Br. 76 n.38), without support, that metastasis is
“entirely different” in the mesothelioma context because those individuals
“typically do not live long enough for that unique type of metastasis to occur.”
Even accepting that argument as true, it does not account for the fact that
32 Respondent elsewhere suggests (e.g., Br. 76 n.38) that high damages are
appropriate because Mr. Konstantin’s pain and suffering lasted 51 months, longer
than the average survival period for those diagnosed with mesothelioma. But the
length of pain and suffering without more cannot justify materially deviating
verdicts. If anything, a long pain-and-suffering period merits additional judicial
scrutiny as the nature of the harm likely changed considerably over time, as was
the case here.
35
metastasis, by itself, does not distinguish Mr. Konstantin’s pain and suffering from
the great majority of persons with cancer (see App. Br. 59 n.33). This supposed
distinguishing characteristic thus cannot, as a matter of law, support an
unprecedented award, and remand is necessary so that the First Department can
consider the circumstances here against those in comparable cases as CPLR
5501(c) and 5522(b) require.
4. This Court’s Guidance Remains Needed To Curb Spiraling Pain-
And-Suffering Verdicts In Asbestos Cases
The First Department’s Decision and Order reinforces the need for this
Court to ensure that New York courts do not abdicate their responsibility to ensure
that non-economic damages awards, particularly in the asbestos context, are not
excessive. App. Br. 54-56. In light of the consistently increasing size of asbestos-
related verdicts—which have doubled over the past ten years despite the
increasingly peripheral nature of the defendants (see App. Br. 54)—clear
instructions regarding the application of CPLR 5501(c) and 5522(b) are necessary
to ensure the appropriate use of remittitur and a “tight[] range of tolerable awards.”
Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 425. Much in the same way, because the CPLR mandates
that courts look to previous Appellate Division decisions, and the federal courts
look to those decisions as well, see id. at 421, this Court’s guidance and remand for
additional consideration are necessary to allow better comparison of this case with
future ones.
36
CONCLUSION
The First Department’s Decision and Order should be vacated and the case
remanded for new trial or further remittitur.
Dated: New York, New York
June 23, 2015
Respectfully submitted,
E. LEO MILONAS
DAVID G. KEYKO
ERIC FISHMAN
PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW
PITTMAN LLP
1540 Broadway
New York, New York 10036
(212) 858-1000
eleo.milonas@pillsburylaw.com
david.keyko@pillsburylaw.com
eric.fishman@pillsburylaw.com
____________________________
KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN
SHEILA L. BIRNBAUM
JANE M. BYRNE
WILLIAM B. ADAMS
QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART &
SULLIVAN, LLP
51 Madison Avenue, 22nd Floor
New York, New York 10010
(212) 849-7000
kathleensullivan@quinnemanuel.com
sheilabirnbaum@quinnemanuel.com
janebyrne@quinnemanuel.com
williamadams@quinnemanuel.com
Counsel for Defendant-Appellant Tishman Liquidating Corporation
/s/ Kathleen M. Sullivan