The People, Respondent,v.Norman E. Ramsey, Appellant.BriefN.Y.May 31, 2016APL-2015-00266 To Be Argued By: Brandon P. Rathbun, Esq. Estimated Time: 10 minutes COURT OF APPEALS STATE OF NEW YORK THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent, – against – NORMAN E. RAMSEY, Defendant-Appellant. BRIEF AND APPENDIX OF THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK APL-2015-00266 J. Anthony Jordan, Esq. Washington County District Attorney 383 Broadway, Bldg. C Fort Edward, New York 12828 Telephone: (518) 746-2525 By: Brandon P. Rathbun, Esq. Assistant District Attorney Dated: March 14, 2016 i TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii QUESTIONS PRESENTED v PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 1 STATEMENT OF FACTS 1 ARGUMENTS: POINT I WASHINGTON COUNTY COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED APPELLANT’S LOCAL COURT APPEAL DUE TO HIS FAILURE TO PROPERLY PERFECT THE SAME. 4 A. THE RULES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION REQUIRES THE FILING OF AN AFFIDAVIT OF ERRORS 5 (i) Plain Meaning 7 (ii) Course of Legislation 11 (iii)Legislative Purpose and the Quest for Common Sense 13 CONCLUSION 17 ii COURT OF APPEALS STATE OF NEW YORK THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent, -against- NORMAN E. RAMSEY, Defendant-Appellant. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Court of Appeals Cases: Majewski v Broadalbin-Perth Cent. School Dist., 91 NY2d 577 [1998]…..…….. ..6 Matter of ATM One v Landaverde, 2 NY3d 472 [2004]………………………….. .7 Matter of DaimlerChrysler Corp. v Spitzer, 7 NY3d 653 [2006]..………………. 13 Mowczan v Bacon, 92 NY2d 281 [1998]…………………………………………. .7 Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assn. v City of New York, 41 NY2d 205 [1976]………… 6 People v Ballman, 15 NY3d 68 [2010]……………………………………...…… 13 People v Duggan, 69 NY2d 931[1987]……………………………………..……. 11 People v Kinchen, 60 NY2d 772 [1983]……………………………………… …..14 People v Litto, 8 NY3d 692 [2007]…………………………………….……….. 6, 7 People v Robinson, 95 NY2d 179 [2000]……………………………………….. …6 People v Robinson, 72 NY2d 989 [1988]……………………………………….. ..10 Tompkins v Hunter, 149 NY 117 [1896]…………………………………………. ..6 iii Appellate Division First Department Cases: People v Calderon, 223 AD2d 380 [1st Dept 1996]……………………………. ..14 People v Brisko, 219 AD2d 493 [1st Dept 1995]……………………………….. ..14 People v Velez, 223 AD2d 414 [1st Dept 1996]………………………………… .14 Appellate Division Third Department Cases: People v Colwell, 103 A.D.2d 169 [3d Dept 1984]……………………………… .10 County Court Cases: People v Bartholomew, 31 Misc3d 698, [Broome County Ct 2011]……………..6, 9 New York Constitution: NY Const art III, § 13…………………………………………………………… ..13 NY Const art VI, § 28[c]…………………………………………………………. 12 Statutes: Criminal Procedure Law Art. 460………………………………………………… 4 Criminal Procedure Law § 460.10……………..……. ...4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15 Judiciary Law § 211……………………………………………………………….12 Judiciary Law §§ 290……………………………………………………….. ..5, 7, 8 Judiciary Law § 294…………….………………………………………….. ...5, 7, 8 Judiciary Law § 295…………………………………………………………… 8, 16 Penal Law § 135.05………………….……………………………………………...1 iv Penal Law § 130.52[1] …………………………………………………………….1 Rules: 22 NYCRR 30.1 ………………………………………………………………….12 Other Sources: McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 92 [a]…………………………6 Administrative Order 245/08 …………………………………………………11, 12 Senate Bill 5561 (2013-2014) …………………………………………………….13 William Glaberson, In Tiny Courts of N.Y., Abuses of Law and Power, NY Times, Sept. 25, 2006 ………………………………………………………...12 William Glaberson, Small-Town Justice, With Trial and Error, NY Times, Sept. 26, 2006 ………………………………………………………..12 William Glaberson, How a Reviled Court System Has Outlasted Critics, NY Times, Sept. 27, 2006 ………………………………………………………..12 v COURT OF APPEALS STATE OF NEW YORK THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent, -against- NORMAN E. RAMSEY, Defendant-Appellant. QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. Did the Washington County Court: Criminal Term properly dismiss Appellant’s appeal for failure to properly perfect the same? Answer: Yes. 1 COURT OF APPEALS STATE OF NEW YORK THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent, -against- NORMAN E. RAMSEY, Defendant-Appellant. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT Appellant Norman E. Ramsey appeals from the Washington County Court’s order of May 27, 2015, which dismissed Defendant’s appeal for failure to properly perfect the same (R 42) 1 . Appellant’s application for leave to appeal to this Court was granted by an order dated October 16, 2015 (People v Ramsey, 26 NY3d 1010 [2015] [Rivera, J]). Appellant is not presently incarcerated on the charges that are the subject of this appeal. STATEMENT OF FACTS On September 21, 2014, Defendant was arrested and charged with one count of unlawful imprisonment in the second degree, in violation of § 135.05 of the 1 Numbers proceeded by “R” refer to Record on Appeal. Those proceeded by “A” refer to Appellant’s Appendix submitted with his brief. Those proceeded by “RA” refer to Respondant’s Appendix submitted with this brief. 2 Penal Law, and one count of forcible touching, in violation of § 130.52[1] of the Penal Law (R 3-5). Appellant was arraigned on September 21, 2014, at the Hudson Falls Village Courthouse. The proceeding was electronically recorded and subsequently transcribed. The transcribed minutes from the arraignment contain ten “[inaudible]” references and two references to “[s]omeone in the background” attempting to speak (R 14-18). Appellant’s matter adjourned to September 30, 2014, at which point defense counsel requested a CPL § 730 exam and one was examed ordered by the court (R 19-24). This proceeding was electronically recorded and subsequently transcribed. The transcribed minutes contain five “[inaudible]” references and four references to people speaking in the “background,” or multiple people attempting to speak at the same time, thus making any transcription of these conversations impossible (R 19-24). On November 4, 2014, Appellant again appeared with counsel in the Hudson Falls Village Court (R 25). This proceeding was electronically recorded and subsequently transcribed. The one-page, transcribed minutes contain one “[inaudible]” reference and three references to “background” noise, again making any transcription of conversations impossible (R 25). Appellant returned to court on November 18, 2014, with counsel, at which point he entered a guilty plea to one count of forcible touching with the 3 understanding sentencing would be up to the Hon. Matthew Mabb, however the People agreed to ask for no more than nine months incarceration (R 12, 26-27). The court subsequently imposed a sentence of four months incarceration, a five- year full order of protection, and a conditional discharge with various fines, fees, and surcharges (R 13, 27-31). This proceeding was electronically recorded and subsequently transcribed. The transcribed minutes contain eight “[inaudible]” references and seven references to times in which matters were not able to be transcribed for various reasons (R 26-31). A Notice of Appeal was filed on the defendant’s behalf on November 19, 2014. (R 2). On November 28, 2014 the defendant filed both a “Notice of Right to Appeal” and an “Affidavit of Indigence and Request for Assigned Counsel on Appeal and Extension of Time” (hereinafter “Affidavit of Indigence”) with the Washington County Clerk (A 1,2). Paragraph (4) of the “Notice of Right to Appeal” states, in pertinent part, that “If no Court Stenographer was used, then you must file an Affidavit of Errors with the Justice Court within thirty days of filing of the Notice of Appeal and serve a copy on the District Attorney” (A 1) (emphasis added). Additionally, paragraph (6) of the Affidavit of Indigence states: “I also need the assistance of an attorney to prepare an affidavit of errors and to assist in the preparation of a record for appeal. Accordingly, I request an extension of time to complete these matters.” (A 2). (emphasis added). 4 Thereafter, Appellant-Counsel was assigned and the defendant’s brief and record on appeal was filed, but no affidavit of errors was filed. On March 25, 2015, the People filed a Motion to Dismiss the Appellant’s appeal (R 33-34). Defendant subsequently filed an Opposition to the People’s Motion to dismiss on March 31, 2015 (R 35-38). The Hon. Kelly S. McKeighan granted the People’s motion based upon the defendant’s failure to properly perfect his appeal (R 39- 42). This appeal ensued. ARGUMENT POINT I WASHINGTON COUNTY COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED APPELLANT’S LOCAL COURT APPEAL DUE TO HIS FAILURE TO PROPERLY PERFECT THE SAME. The sole issue on appeal is whether the term “recorded by a court stenographer” includes the mechanical recording of court proceedings which are subsequently transcribed. Article 460 of the Criminal Procedure Law governs the taking and perfection of appeals in the courts of the State of New York (CPL Art. 460). Specifically, subdivisions (2) and (3) of CPL § 460.10 set forth the process by which an appeal is taken as of right from a local criminal court to a county court or to an appellate term of the supreme court. These subdivisions create a separate and distinct 5 procedure for perfecting an appeal depending on whether the proceedings are “recorded by a court stenographer” (CPL § 460.10 [2], [3]). Where the proceedings are recorded by a court stenographer, the appellant is required to file a notice of appeal with the court from which the order or judgment was entered within 30 days of said order or judgment (CPL § 460.10 [2]). Where the proceedings are not recorded by a court stenographer, the appellant is required to file an affidavit of errors with the court from which the order or judgment was entered within either 30 or 60 days of the entry of said order or judgment, depending on whether a notice of appeal was filed (CPL § 460.10 [3][a]). A court stenographer, as defined by law, is an officer of the court who must file an oath of office (Judiciary Law § 290, 294). Court proceedings recorded by a mechanical device and then transcribed at a later date are not proceedings recorded by a court stenographer. Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that where the local criminal court proceedings are mechanically recorded, as they were in the present matter, the appellant is required to file an affidavit of errors with the local criminal court. A. THE RULES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION REQUIRES THE FILING OF AN AFFIDAVIT OF ERRORS As stated in Appellant’s brief “‘[t]he primary consideration of the courts in the construction of statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the 6 Legislature’” (People v Bartholomew, 31 Misc3d 698, 700 [Broome County Ct. 2011], quoting McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 92 [a]). As this Court has held, “[i]t is fundamental that a court, in interpreting a statute, should attempt to effectuate the intent of the Legislature” (Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assn. v City of New York, 41 NY2d 205, 208 [1976]). In effectuating the intent of the Legislature the “clearest indicator… is the statutory text, the starting point in any case of interpretation must always be the language itself, giving effect to the plain meaning thereof” (Majewski v Broadalbin-Perth Cent. School Dist., 91 NY2d 577, 583 [1998]). It should always be presumed that the Legislature selected the verbiage of any statute for a specific purpose. Therefore, “[i]f the words chosen have ‘a definite meaning, which involves no absurdity or contradiction, [then] there is no room for construction and courts have no right to add or take away from that meaning” (People v Robinson, 95 NY2d 179, 182 [2000], quoting Tompkins v Hunter, 149 NY 117, 123 [1896]). If the intent of the statute cannot be delineated by the plain language then “[n]ext, in construing a statute, the courts frequently ‘follow the course of legislation on the subject, the lineage of the act being thought to illuminate the intent of the legislature’” (People v Litto, 8 NY3d 692 [2007], quoting McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1 Statutes § 124 at 255). Additionally, “[i]n matters of statutory and regulatory interpretation, [this Court has] recognized that: 7 ‘legislative intent is the great and controlling principle, and the proper judicial function is to discern and apply the will of the [enactors]. Generally, inquiry must be made of the spirit and purpose of the legislation, which requires examination of the statutory context of the provision as well as its legislative history’” Matter of ATM One v Landaverde, 2 NY3d 472, 477 [2004], quoting Mowczan v Bacon, 92 NY2d 281 [1998]). (i) Plain Meaning “The plain meaning of the language of a statute must be interpreted ‘in the light of conditions existing at the time of its passage and construed as the courts would have construed it soon after its passage’” (People v Litto, 8 NY3d at 697). The statutory language relevant to this appeal was enacted in 1970 and took effect on September 1, 1971 (CPL § 460.10 [legislative history]). Since that time several legislative amendments have shaped the current CPL § 460.10, however, subdivisions two and three, which deal with appeals taken from local criminal courts, have remained untouched (Id). Therefore, the language of current subdivision (3) of CPL § 460.10 must be interpreted “in the light of conditions existing” in 1970, and “construed as the courts would have construed” in 1971 (see Litto, at 697). Article 9 of the Judiciary Law provides guidance when seeking to define the plain meaning of “stenographic minutes.” A stenographer is an officer of the court and must file an oath of office (Judiciary Law §§ 290, 294). A stenographer has a 8 sworn statutory duty to take full stenographic notes of the testimony and of all other proceedings in each cause tried or heard (Judiciary Law § 295). A stenographer shall take complete stenographic notes of every ruling or decision of the presiding judge, and when the trial is by jury each and every remark or comment of the presiding judge together with each and every exception taken to a ruling, decision, remark or comment by or on behalf of any party to the action (Id.). A stenographer creates the transcript of the proceedings in real time, allowing them to request parties slow down, or speak one at a time, to ensure that the stenographic transcript is a full and accurate record of the proceedings that occurred, that is their sworn duty to do so (Judiciary Law § 295). The provisions of Judiciary Law defining the duties of a court stenographer were last amended in 1965 (Judiciary Law §§ 290, 294, 296) (legislative history). At the time CPL § 460.10(3) was enacted in 1970, the duties of the stenographer were already clearly defined, therefore construing “stenographic transcript” as anything other than a transcript created by a stenographer in real time would be to ignore the plain meaning of the language of the statute. The Appellant relies on the Barlett Commission’s (herein after the “Commission”) commentary in interpreting the statute. While this reliance is well 9 founded, his interpretation thereof is misguided (A 3-7) 2 . The Commission did observe that the “affidavit of errors” procedure is “make-shift” at best. But the contention of this appeal is not what procedure works best, it is what “recorded by a court stenographer” meant in 1971. “Recorded by a court stenographer is neither complex nor ambiguous in its meaning,” especially when considering the “Staff Comments” which accompanied the proposed Criminal Procedure Law (People v Bartholomew, 31 Misc 3d at 700). The Commission stated in their staff comments that: “The procedure was devised as a method of prosecuting and handling appeals from the lowest criminal courts which… rarely if ever enjoyed the services of recording stenographers… …While stenographic recording of town and village court proceedings is still unavailable for the most part in many communities… (A 7) (emphasis added). These two references to stenographic recordings in the staff comments, when read in context with each other, clearly refers to the stenographic recordings taking place simultaneously with the proceedings. As the current in-court mechanical devices were not installed in local courts until the first part of this century, it is clear the Barlett Commission did not intend “recorded by a court stenographer” to include a transcription of the mechanical recording of the court proceedings. 2 Appellant included a copy of the pertinent parts of the Commission’s report in his appendix. However, portions are illegible so an additional copy has been included in Respondent’s Appendix. 10 Appellant’s contention that a strict constructionist interpretation is inconsistent with past decisions is patently untrue. First, Appellant relies on People v Robinson in which the Court stated that the requirement that the local criminal court file a “return” which “summarize[s] evidence, facts or occurrences in or adduced at the proceedings… was satisfied by the transcript of an electronic recording” (72 NY2d 989 [1988], citing CPL § 460.10 [3][d]). The Court’s decision in Robinson addressed how the record on appeal could be created; not how an appeal from a local court is perfected (see CPL § 460.10 [3]). It should be noted that if the lower court does adopt the transcript of the mechanical recording, and there are contentions in the affidavit of errors that cannot be resolved by reference to the transcript, the appellant has the ability to apply to the appellate court for an order requiring a the lower court to file an amended return (CPL § 460.10 [3][e]). Appellant now asks the Court to extend their ruling in Robinson and exalt substance over procedure, which cannot be permitted since the procedure must be strictly followed. “[T]he right of appeal (except in capital cases) is a statutory privilege, not a matter of constitutional right, and jurisdiction thereof cannot be assumed unless there is statutory authority for its exercise and the procedural requirements for taking an appeal have been strictly followed…” (People v Colwell, 103 AD2d 169, 171 [3d Dept. 1984] [emphasis added]; see People v 11 Duggan, 69 NY2d 931[1987] [affirming dismissal of appeal where the People filed an affidavit of errors instead of a notice of appeal when the lower court proceedings were stenographically recorded and transcribed]). In the case before this Court, the Appellant failed to follow the statutory requirements for taking an appeal. As such, the County Court’s decision to dismiss the appeal was correct and should be affirmed. (ii) Course of Legislation As stated supra, current CPL § 460.10 (3) was enacted in 1970, took effect on September 1, 1971, and since that time has never been amended (CPL § 460.10 [legislative history]). Therefore, the legislature did not intend “recorded by a court stenographer” to include the transcript of a mechanical recording. Though no amendments have been made to CPL § 460.10 (3), there have been two instances of legislative and judicial action in the past ten years, both of which tend to establish that “recorded by a court stenographer” does not include the transcript of mechanical recordings. On May 21, 2008, then-Chief Administrative Judge Ann Pfau issued Administrative Order 245/08 (AO/245/08), requiring “each town and village court of the Unified Court System to mechanically record all proceedings that come before the court” (A 17). Appellant contends that the dismissal of his appeal undermines AO/245/08, and asserts that the need for an affidavit of errors was 12 rendered obsolete by the enactment of AO/245/08. AO/245/08 was not born out of the idea that there needs to be an easier way to effectuate an appeal from local justice courts. Instead, the AO/245/08 was spawned by numerous reports of abuse of law and power in local criminal courts throughout the state (A 8-33). Furthermore, it is not AO/245/08 that aids in the interpretation of “recorded by a court stenographer.” Rather it is the rule that granted the Chief Administrative Judge the power to issues such order (22 NYCRR 30.1). On November 14, 2006, Title 22, Part 30.1, of the NYCRR was enacted by then-Chief Justice of the Court of Appeals Judith S. Kaye, pursuant to her rights under Article VI, section 28(c), of the New York State Constitution, and § 211(1) of the Judiciary Law. Said rule states: “The chief administrator of the courts may require the mechanical recording of testimony and of other proceedings in cases in a town or village justice court. The mechanical recording of proceedings in accordance with this rule shall not affect the right of the court or any litigant therein to employ a stenographer to take minutes of such proceedings manually.” (Id). Noticeably, the Chief Justice, after consultation with the Administrative Board of the Courts, and with the approval of the Court of Appeals, worded the rule in such a way as to permit a stenographer to take minutes manually, should any party so choose (Id.; Judiciary Law § 211 [1]; NY Const art VI, § 28[c]). If the Chief Justice of the Court of Appeals, the Administrative Board of the Courts, 13 or the Court of Appeals as a whole, intended for transcripts of mechanical recordings to replace “court stenographers,” this caveat would not have been necessary. The second legislative/judicial action which supports this Respondent’s argument started in early 2013 when Senator Michael F. Nozzolio introduced Senate bill 5561 (“S. 5561”) which seeks to amend section CPL § 460.10 (3) to read “…recorded by a court stenographer or by mechanical or electronic means” (A 34-5). As included with almost every piece of legislation, S.5561 was accompanied by a “Sponsor Memo” which states, in pertinent part: “This is one in a series of measures being introduced at the request of the Chief Administrative Judge upon the recommendation of her Local Courts Advisory Committee” A 37- 9). Both the Chief Administrative Judge and the legislature have recognized that the only way to enact, repeal, or amend the laws of this state is by legislative action, not judicial legislation (see NY Cons art III, § 13). (iii)Legislative Purpose and the Quest for Common Sense “‘When presented with a question of statutory interpretation, our primary consideration is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature[,]’” and typically the “text itself is generally the best evidence of legislative intent” 14 (People v Ballman, 15 NY3d 68 [2010], quoting Matter of DaimlerChrysler Corp. v Spitzer, 7 NY3d 653, 660 [2006]). CPL § 460.10 defines two possible procedures by which an appeal is “taken” from a local criminal court. First, if the proceedings were recorded by a court stenographer, a notice of appeal is filed. (see CPL § 460.10 [2]). If the proceedings in the court were not recorded by a stenographer, an affidavit of errors is filed, regardless of whether the appellant elects to file a notice of appeal as well (see CPL § 460.10 [3]). In interpreting the purpose behind this delineation, it is important to understand the purpose of appellate review. Most importantly, the purpose behind any appeal is for the appellate court to review the proceedings below and make sure rule of law, and the rule of justice, are properly followed. To this end, the most important aspect to any appeal is a complete and accurate record. Lack thereof makes appellate review difficult and can often times prove to be fatal to the appellant’s argument. “Appellate ‘review is precluded by lack of an adequate record that includes, among other things, the minutes of any adjournments’” (People v Calderon, 223 AD2d 380, 381 [1st Dept 1996] quoting People v Brisko, 219 AD2d 493, 494 [1st Dept 1995]; see People v Velez, 223 AD2d 414 [1st Dept 1996]; People v Kinchen, 60 NY2d 772 [1983]). 15 Additionally, as recognized by the Barlett Commission, the intent of the legislature with respect to the relevant statutes was to ensure the best “record” possible on any appeal. “The court’s ‘return,’ though hardly an ideal basis for litigation and determination of an appeal, was the best that could be contrived in the way of a ‘record’” (A 7). It is clear from the transcripts in the present matter that the transcription of a mechanical recording is not a more ideal mode of establishing an adequate record, which is the ultimate purpose behind CPL § 460.10. In only 18 pages of transcript there are 24 “inaudible” potions on the recording and 16 references to background “noise” which were unable to be transcribed (R 14-31). Most importantly, the crux of Appellant’s initial appeal was that his plea on November 18, 2014, was not knowingly, voluntary, and intelligent (A 40-9). The transcription of the mechanical recording of Appellant’s plea contains eight “inaudible” references and seven references to background noise which not only made transcription impossible, but also made appellate review impossible (R 26- 31). Ideally, had Appellant filed an affidavit of errors, as required under the CPL, the local criminal court could have reviewed the mechanical recording—even had it transcribed—and filled in the inaudible gaps and background noise in the court’s “return.” 16 Lastly, the considerable ineptness of the current local court recording system with respect to establishing a “record” needs to be acknowledged. A digital audio recording does not create text from spoken word, it simply records “sound” and cannot delineate background noise from speech related to the underlying proceedings. Additionally, the transcriptionists who transcribe the recorded audio cannot attest to the accuracy and integrity of the record as it happened in real time. The only thing the transcriptionist can attest to is the accuracy of the transcript as it relates to the often inaudible recording. Simply put, the transcription of an audio recording are not the same as a record created by a court stenographer and cannot comply with the mandates of the laws of this State. Each stenographer specified in this chapter or the civil practice act, surrogate's court act, court of claims act or New York city civil court act must take full stenographic notes of the testimony and of all other proceedings in each cause tried or heard. Such stenographer shall take complete stenographic notes of each ruling or decision of the presiding judge, and when the trial is by jury each and every remark or comment of such judge during the trial, when requested so to do by either party, together with each and every exception taken to any such ruling, decision, remark or comment by or on behalf of any party to the action. Judiciary Law § 295. It is evident from the incomplete and inadequate transcript relating to this appeal that the digital recording systems in the local courts around the state, especially in the more rural areas, are far from ideal. The Court should also 17 consider the many issues that would arise should they rule in Appellant’s favor e.g. either partial recordings or no recordings will not be discovered until after the proceedings are complete, and inadvertent recording of confidential discussions with clients, among other problems, will not be discovered until the recordings are transcribed. CONCLUSION Appellant’s request that the Court sacrifice statutory construction and procedural justice in the name of procedural and technological efficiency is without merit. The plain language of the current law, first enacted in 1970 and unchanged since, and the rules of statutory interpretation, requires the Court to affirm the Decision and Order of the Criminal Term of the Washington County Court. Dated: March 14, 2016 Fort Edward, NY Respectfully submitted, Brandon P. Rathbun, Esq. Assistant District Attorney 383 Broadway, Bldg. C Fort Edward, New York 12828 Telephone: (518) 746-2525 18 COURT OF APPEALS STATE OF NEW YORK _____________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent, -against- NORMAN RAMSEY, Defendant-Appellant. _____________________________________________ CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO RULE 2105 CPLR I, Brandon P. Rathbun, being an Assistant District Attorney for J. Anthony Jordan, District Attorney for Washington County, and being a duly sworn attorney admitted to practice in the State of New York, do hereby certify, pursuant to Rule 2105 CPLR, that the foregoing papers on appeal have been personally compared by me with the originals and found to be a true and complete copy. Dated: March 14, 2016 _________________________ BRANDON P. RATHBUN, ESQ.
