18 Cited authorities

  1. United States v. Difrancesco

    449 U.S. 117 (1980)   Cited 1,313 times   5 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause is not always a bar to a government appeal of a sentence
  2. People v. Lingle

    2011 N.Y. Slip Op. 3308 (N.Y. 2011)   Cited 475 times
    Holding that a defendant's right to appeal after a resentencing is "limited to the correction of errors or the abuse of discretion at the resentencing proceeding"
  3. Earley v. Murray

    451 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2006)   Cited 347 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the Due Process Clause prohibited DOCS from administratively adding PRS terms to inmates' sentences and ordering habeas petitioner's PRS term excised
  4. People v. Sparber

    2008 N.Y. Slip Op. 3946 (N.Y. 2008)   Cited 328 times   5 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, by imposing PRS terms, DOCS usurped the judicial function as defined by New York law; only the sentencing court has the authority to impose the PRS component of the sentence and must do so at the time of sentencing
  5. People v. Williams

    14 N.Y.3d 198 (N.Y. 2010)   Cited 234 times
    Holding that “after release from prison, a legitimate expectation in the finality of a sentence arises and the Double Jeopardy Clause prevents reformation to attach a PRS component to the original completed sentence”
  6. People v. Ramirez

    89 N.Y.2d 444 (N.Y. 1996)   Cited 168 times
    Upholding consecutive robbery sentences where the defendant forcibly took the belongings of two security guards in a hotel parking lot
  7. People v. Mills

    2008 N.Y. Slip Op. 9854 (N.Y. 2008)   Cited 51 times
    Noting that “[s]urely the Legislature did not intend fresh crimes to trigger resentencing opportunities,” when it rejected the argument that a defendant who violated parole could be resentenced for the underlying offense under similar statutory reforms enacted in 2005
  8. People v. Buss

    2008 N.Y. Slip Op. 9851 (N.Y. 2008)   Cited 51 times
    In Buss we analyzed section 70.30 based on the language of the statute, and applied our interpretation of the requirements of section 70.30 to SORA. Nothing in the case suggests that our interpretation of section 70.30 was dependent on SORA, or limited to SORA cases.
  9. U.S. v. Silvers

    90 F.3d 95 (4th Cir. 1996)   Cited 55 times
    Holding "district court's action [in a § 2255 proceeding] of reinstating [defendant's] previously-vacated [lesser included] conspiracy conviction, after vacating his CCE conviction on grounds that did not affect the conspiracy conviction, was appropriate and did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause"
  10. In Matter of New York v. Rashid

    2011 N.Y. Slip Op. 1316 (N.Y. 2010)   Cited 21 times

    No. 205. Argued October 19, 2010. Decided November 23, 2010. APPEAL, by permission of the Court of Appeals, from an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the First Judicial Department, entered December 22, 2009. The Appellate Division affirmed an order of the Supreme Court, New York County (Daniel P. Conviser, J.; op 25 Misc 3d 318), which had (1) granted respondent's motion to dismiss a petition seeking sex offender civil management of respondent pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law

  11. Section 70.45 - Determinate sentence; post-release supervision

    N.Y. Penal Law § 70.45   Cited 714 times
    Setting period of post release supervision for a determinate sentence as five years
  12. Section 70.40 - Release on parole; conditional release; presumptive release

    N.Y. Penal Law § 70.40   Cited 246 times
    Stating that any time spent in custody from the date of delinquency to the time that service of the sentence resumes will be credited against the term or maximum term of the interrupted sentence, provided certain conditions are met
  13. Section 440.40 - Motion to set aside sentence; by people

    N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 440.40   Cited 128 times

    1. At any time not more than one year after the entry of a judgment, the court in which it was entered may, upon motion of the people, set aside the sentence upon the ground that it was invalid as a matter of law. 2. Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision one, the court must summarily deny the motion when the ground or issue raised thereupon was previously determined on the merits upon an appeal from the judgment or sentence, unless since the time of such appellate determination there has