Apple Inc. v. Qualcomm Incorporated

RESPONSE in Opposition re MOTION to Exclude

S.D. Cal.March 25, 2019

CASE NO. 17-CV-00108-GPC-MDD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Juanita R. Brooks (SBN 75934) brooks@fr.com Seth M. Sproul (SBN 217711) sproul@fr.com FISH & RICHARDSON P.C. 12390 El Camino Real San Diego, CA 92130 Telephone: (619) 678-5070 / Facsimile: (619) 678-5099 Ruffin B. Cordell (D.C. Bar #445801; Admitted Pro hac vice) cordell@fr.com Lauren A. Degnan (D.C. Bar #452421; Admitted Pro hac vice) degnan@fr.com FISH & RICHARDSON P.C. 1000 Maine Avenue, S.W., Suite 1000 Washington, D.C. 20024 Telephone: (202) 783-5070 / Facsimile: (202) 783-2331 William A. Isaacson (D.C. Bar #414788; Admitted Pro hac vice) wisaacson@bsfllp.com Karen L. Dunn (D.C. Bar #1002520; Admitted Pro hac vice) kdunn@bsfllp.com BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP 1401 New York Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20005 Telephone: (202) 237-2727 / Facsimile: (202) 237-6131 Attorneys for Plaintiff and Counterclaim-Defendant Apple Inc. (Counsel for the CMs and Additional Counsel listed below Signature Line) UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA IN RE: QUALCOMM LITIGATION, Case No. 3:17-CV-00108-GPC-MDD [Consolidated with Case No. 3:17-CV-01010- GPC-MDD] APPLE INC. AND THE CONTRACT MANUFACTURERS’ OPPOSITION TO QUALCOMM INCORPORATED’S MOTION REGARDING BCPA EVIDENCE [REDACTED VERSION] Judge: Judge Gonzalo P. Curiel Courtroom: 2D Case 3:17-cv-00108-GPC-MDD Document 1058 Filed 03/25/19 PageID.115235 Page 1 of 14 -i- CASE NO. 17-CV-00108-GPC-MDD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 1 ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................... 2 I. The BCPA Evidence Is Relevant To The CMs’ Antitrust Claims. ............ 2 II. BCPA Evidence Is Relevant To Apple’s Jury-Triable Defenses To Qualcomm’s Tortious Interference And FRAND Claims. ......................... 5 III. Apple’s Antitrust Claims And Defenses Are Jury Triable. ........................ 6 IV. Neither The BCPA Evidence Nor The Court’s BCPA Order Should Be Excluded Under Rules 401 And 403. .......................................................... 7 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 9 Case 3:17-cv-00108-GPC-MDD Document 1058 Filed 03/25/19 PageID.115236 Page 2 of 14 -1- CASE NO. 17-CV-00108-GPC-MDD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 INTRODUCTION Qualcomm’s Motion Regarding “BCPA Evidence” is fundamentally flawed. The BCPA Evidence is relevant to both Apple’s and the CMs’ antitrust claims, the latter of which are indisputably jury triable. The Court has recognized—and Qualcomm grudgingly concedes (Mot. 5–6, 8)—that Apple’s theory “includes a component that relies upon the BCPA independently; that there’s the claim that the BCPA operated as some sort of gag order in order to maintain and perpetuate this anticompetitive behavior.” 3/21/19 Tr. at 12:20–24. Apple’s First Amended Complaint details the provision’s “role in Qualcomm’s multi-faceted scheme to evade FRAND and exclude chipset competitors.” Dkt. 83 ¶ 628; see also id. ¶¶ 159, 161, 624. Nor is it possible to understand Qualcomm’s anticompetitive “no license, no chips” scheme without understanding Qualcomm’s goal of avoiding patent exhaustion claims, as expressly referenced in BCPA Section 7. Critically, the CMs make nearly identical allegations, with their Counterclaims containing at least thirty-five paragraphs detailing the BCPA’s role in Qualcomm’s multi-faceted anticompetitive scheme, including both the BCPA’s gag clause and Qualcomm’s retaliatory enforcement of it. No. 17-CV-01010, Dkt. 88 (“CM Counterclaims”) ¶¶ 214, 230–32, 238, 246–72, 314, 316–19. The BCPA Evidence is also relevant to Apple’s and the CMs’ defenses to Qualcomm’s jury-triable claims, such as tortious interference and breach of the Qualcomm–CM SULAs, because it demonstrates that Apple was justified in withholding payments to the CMs for Qualcomm royalties, including as a result of Qualcomm’s retaliatory withholding of BCP payments. Apple and the CMs are permitted to present the entirety of their claims and defenses to the jury. And, of course, the BCPA Evidence is relevant to Apple’s breach of contract claims (Counts I–IV of its Complaint). Apple must present evidence to the jury Case 3:17-cv-00108-GPC-MDD Document 1058 Filed 03/25/19 PageID.115237 Page 3 of 14 -2- CASE NO. 17-CV-00108-GPC-MDD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 because judgment has not been entered on those claims.1 The evidence Qualcomm seeks to exclude is core to Apple’s and the CMs’ jury- triable claims and defenses. This evidence is not unfairly prejudicial for purposes of Rule 403; it is instead evidence unfavorable to a party, in this case Qualcomm. ARGUMENT I. The BCPA Evidence Is Relevant To The CMs’ Antitrust Claims. Like Apple, the CMs challenge Qualcomm’s unique business model, which includes not only its “no license, no chips” policy, but also its wide-ranging scheme of “other exclusionary and anticompetitive conduct.” CM Counterclaims ¶¶ 11, 155. It is fallacious to argue, as Qualcomm does, that the “CMs cannot avail themselves of Apple’s BCPA-based antitrust theories.” Mot. 6. Antitrust plaintiffs commonly rely on evidence of conduct causing harm to competition, even when some of that conduct is not directly related to themselves. That is certainly the case here, where the evidence will indisputably include conduct relating to numerous other customers such as Samsung, LGE, Sony, Motorola, Lenovo, and Blackberry. Qualcomm’s attempt to exclude evidence of anticompetitive conduct—including its effort to discipline Apple for engaging with antitrust agencies—is based on no cognizable doctrine of relevance. The CMs specifically allege that, under the BCPA, “Qualcomm sought to gag Apple and prevent it from bringing its concerns to law enforcement or challenging Qualcomm’s compliance with FRAND commitments,” which “has the purpose and effect of keeping Qualcomm’s monopoly power safe from the rule of law.” Id. ¶¶ 230– 32. The CMs also allege that Qualcomm “retaliated against Apple” for testifying to the KFTC by withholding BCPA rebates, “in furtherance of its scheme to thwart government enforcement worldwide of competition laws.” Id. ¶¶ 251–53, 271. As the Court’s BCPA Order states, “enforcing the BCPA so as to punish Apple for 1 These claims are for the jury to decide. Dkt. 1026-1 at 33 (parties agree that Counts I, II, and issues under Count IV are for the jury); but see id. at 35 (Count III and issues under Count IV for Court). Case 3:17-cv-00108-GPC-MDD Document 1058 Filed 03/25/19 PageID.115238 Page 4 of 14 -3- CASE NO. 17-CV-00108-GPC-MDD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 responding to regulatory investigations would deter parties from responding to regulatory investigations and have the effect of concealing ongoing illegal conduct to the detriment of the public and perpetuating improper conduct.” Dkt. 1029 at 23 (emphasis added). Moreover, Qualcomm’s Motion incorrectly presumes that the BCPA stands alone. Rather, the BCPA was negotiated as a package deal with the First Amendment to the Transition Agreement (“FATA”), an agreement designed to foreclose Qualcomm’s competitors from Apple’s business through 2016 in exchange for royalty rebates. Dkt. 83 ¶¶ 100–103, 115.2 The significance of the FATA cannot be understood without the BCPA. As Bruce Sewell, Apple’s former General Counsel who negotiated the BCPA, testified, “ .” Ex. E (Sewell Dep.) at 127:22–128:5. One would not have been signed without the other, and the interplay between these contracts will be a part of the CMs’ jury-triable antitrust claims. Even if the BCPA Evidence were not expressly mentioned in the CMs’ pleadings, it would remain directly relevant to the anticompetitive harm they have suffered. Qualcomm’s overbroad argument that the Court should exclude all “evidence regarding Apple’s BCPA-related “‘gagging’ and ‘retaliation’ theories” (Mot. 8) would deprive the CMs of the ability to introduce evidence going to the heart of their antitrust claims. Qualcomm has long maintained its above-FRAND monopoly pricing in part by evading legal challenges to its royalty demands. By requiring that customers agree to Qualcomm’s preferred licensing terms before they can buy Qualcomm’s baseband 2 Qualcomm’s motion does not seek to exclude the fact that that Qualcomm provided rebates to Apple under the BCPA as part of a total package of agreements constituting a single agreement in 2013. Mot. 9. Exclusion of the BCPA Evidence would be doubly prejudicial to Apple’s and the CMs’ ability to explain this package of agreements and the terms thereof. Absent consideration of the restrictions the BCPA placed on Apple, the evidence about the 2013 package of agreements will be incomplete and misleading. Case 3:17-cv-00108-GPC-MDD Document 1058 Filed 03/25/19 PageID.115239 Page 5 of 14 -4- CASE NO. 17-CV-00108-GPC-MDD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 chipsets (“no license, no chips”), Qualcomm has “functionally foreclosed” the CMs and other licensees from “bilateral negotiations in the shadow of the law.” CM Counterclaims ¶ 152; see also Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Qualcomm Inc., 2017 WL 2774406, at *13 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2017) (“because Qualcomm’s ‘no license-no chips’ policy prevents OEMs from resorting to a neutral arbiter to determine a reasonable royalty rate, an OEMs’ bilateral licensing negotiations with Qualcomm do not occur ‘in the shadow of the law,’ and thus do not adequately reflect a reasonable FRAND royalty rate.”). Qualcomm has also avoided FRAND challenges by imposing gag clauses on Apple and others,3 who otherwise had incentive to litigate Qualcomm’s licensing practices. Combined, Qualcomm’s “no license, no chips” policy and gag clauses have foreclosed challenges to its license demands, resulting in elevated, above- FRAND royalties, including royalties on exhausted patents. CM Counterclaims ¶ 155. Qualcomm’s “no license, no chips” business model is unique not only among patented component suppliers, but also within Qualcomm. Qualcomm itself sells other components exhaustively, without a separate patent license, in markets such as Wi-Fi chipsets, where it faces competition. Qualcomm’s unique business model has no function other than to exclude competition and evade U.S. patent law’s doctrine of exhaustion. The BCPA’s gag clause, which prohibits exhaustion challenges, demonstrates that Qualcomm wanted to guard against challenges to its business model. The relevance of the BCPA’s gag clause to the CMs’ claims is illustrated by the FTC’s reliance on the clause as evidence during the trial before Judge Koh. The FTC asked Jeff Williams, Apple’s COO, whether Qualcomm made “demands of Apple under the BCPA,” to which Williams responded that “the BCPA would terminate if we pursued legal action against Qualcomm, if we challenged FRAND, if we … brought up exhaustion, if we induced anybody else.” Ex. A (Trial Tr., Jan. 14, 2019) at 887:13–19. 3 E.g., Apple’s Reply to Qualcomm’s Supplemental Response to Apple’s Separate Statement of Facts in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment on BCPA Counterclaims (Dkt. 772-1) ¶ 14. Case 3:17-cv-00108-GPC-MDD Document 1058 Filed 03/25/19 PageID.115240 Page 6 of 14 -5- CASE NO. 17-CV-00108-GPC-MDD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Qualcomm’s avoidance of FRAND and patent exhaustion litigation affects all direct and indirect licensees—not merely the individual companies that Qualcomm deterred through “no license, no chips” and gag clauses. If any company had succeeded in challenging Qualcomm’s FRAND evasion, the result would have extended to other licensees by means of Qualcomm’s FRAND commitments and . The “patent holder is obligated to license all implementers on reasonable terms.” Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 2013 WL 2111217, at *18 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013) (emphasis added); see also Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1230–31 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (applying Microsoft). And Ex. B § 5.6, Ex. C § 5.4. II. The BCPA Evidence Is Relevant To Apple’s Jury-Triable Defenses To Qualcomm’s Tortious Interference And FRAND Claims. Apple is entitled to present its antitrust contentions to the jury in defense to Qualcomm’s claim for tortious interference with the CMs’ SULAs. Apple asserts the affirmative defense of justification to tortious interference.4 The parties agree that the defense is jury triable (Dkt. 1026-1 at 37), and Apple’s antitrust allegations are central to it. Apple will present evidence that it had a financial interest in the SULAs between the CMs and Qualcomm because it paid the CMs for the royalties charged by Qualcomm on iPhones and iPads. Apple will demonstrate that it acted reasonably in withholding royalty payments from the CMs because Qualcomm’s anticompetitive conduct, including “gagging” and “retaliation,” resulted in above-FRAND royalties, including royalties on exhausted patents. 4 To succeed on its justification defense, Apple must prove that: (1) Apple had a financial interest in the contractual relations between Qualcomm and the CMs; (2) Apple acted to protect its own financial interest; (3) Apple acted reasonably and in good faith to protect its financial interest; and (4) Apple used appropriate means to protect it. Dkt. 1047-6 (Apple and the CMs’ Revised Proposed Jury Instructions) at 168; see also CACI 2210. Case 3:17-cv-00108-GPC-MDD Document 1058 Filed 03/25/19 PageID.115241 Page 7 of 14 -6- CASE NO. 17-CV-00108-GPC-MDD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 In addition, as part of its tortious interference claim, Qualcomm seeks to recover royalties withheld by Apple that are the equivalent to the BCP Payments first withheld by Qualcomm. To demonstrate that Apple does not owe these royalties, Apple must be allowed to put on evidence of Qualcomm’s withholding, as well as the surrounding circumstances and timing thereof. Qualcomm has already revealed that it plans to argue that Apple “just stopped paying one day.” Ex. D (Cook Dep.) at 153:24–25. Unless Apple witnesses are allowed to explain why they made the decision to withhold (e.g., id. at 154:3–14), the jury will hear a skewed explanation of Qualcomm’s tortious interference claim. Apple will also rely on Qualcomm’s anticompetitive conduct to prove that Qualcomm cannot satisfy the first element of its tortious interference claims: the existence of a contract—here, the SULAs between Qualcomm and each CM.5 Apple will contend that the SULAs are illegal because they were used to violate, and do violate, the antitrust laws, precluding Qualcomm from claiming tortious interference. III. Apple’s Antitrust Claims And Defenses Are Jury Triable. Contrary to what Qualcomm contends (Mot. 5), Apple’s antitrust claims and defenses—which rely on BCPA Evidence—are jury triable or may be jury triable, and in any event, even without a full set of advisory verdicts, warrant an advisory jury. First, the Court has stated that it does not want to burden the jury with the duties of an advisory jury because the antitrust and patent claims are already complicated. 3/14/19 Hr’g Tr. at 5:3–14. Based on this, Qualcomm now urges that Apple’s antitrust claims should not be tried to the jury, while Apple contends that they should be tried to the jury where they entirely overlap with the CMs’ jury-triable antitrust claims. 5 The elements of Qualcomm’s tortious interference claim, which Qualcomm must prove with respect to each SULA, are: (1) there was a SULA between Qualcomm and each of the CMs; (2) Apple knew of each SULA; (3) Apple’s conduct prevented the CMs’ performance of each SULA, or made the CMs’ performance more expensive or difficult; (4) Apple intended to disrupt the performance or knew that disruption of performance was certain or substantially certain to occur; (5) Qualcomm was harmed; and (6) Apple’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing such harm. Dkt. 1047-6 at 167. Case 3:17-cv-00108-GPC-MDD Document 1058 Filed 03/25/19 PageID.115242 Page 8 of 14 -7- CASE NO. 17-CV-00108-GPC-MDD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Qualcomm offers no authority holding that the results of separate antitrust trials with Apple and the CMs would be binding on these different parties. Separate trials for judge and jury-triable issues would be highly inefficient and cause mass confusion where the claims and defenses for judge and jury substantially overlap.6 Second, as explained in Apple’s revised jury instructions submission, Apple’s defense of antitrust illegality (which is also raised by the CMs) is jury triable. Dkt. 1047-1 (Apple and CMs’ Revised Proposed Jury Instructions Cover Submission) at 4– 5, Dkt. 1047-6 at 181 (citing cases). Apple asserts this defense to, for example, Qualcomm’s claim of tortious interference and Qualcomm’s request for FRAND- related declarations. Qualcomm contends that this defense is for the Court, not the jury. Mot. 6 n.2. But Qualcomm provides no case law in support of its assertion. Id. (citing only Dkt. 1047-2 at 3, which provides no authority). Third, the Court has indicated that, where there is a fair question whether certain defenses are jury triable, an advisory jury should be empaneled on the disputed issues. 3/14/2019 H’rg Tr. at 5:15–20. As reflected in the parties’ dispute, there is also no clear legal answer on whether Apple’s affirmative antitrust claims require a jury. An advisory jury is therefore appropriate on those claims. Dkt. 1047-1 at 4. IV. Neither The BCPA Evidence Nor The Court’s BCPA Order Should Be Excluded Under Rules 401 And 403. Qualcomm argues that both the BCPA Evidence and the Court’s BCPA Order should be excluded under Rules 401 and 403. Mot. 1, 4–8. Qualcomm’s argument is premised on the assertion that the BCPA Evidence is relevant “only to Apple’s ‘gagging’ and retaliation antitrust theories,” and that “Apple has not identified any other claim to which the regulatory investigations are relevant.” Id. at 6, 7. For the reasons discussed above, this premise is false. The evidence is highly probative to both 6 Such a suggestion also conflicts with the Court’s Scheduling Order, which scheduled all claims and defenses of Apple, the CMs, and Qualcomm to be heard over 35 hours per side starting April 15, 2019. Dkt. 749 at 1. Case 3:17-cv-00108-GPC-MDD Document 1058 Filed 03/25/19 PageID.115243 Page 9 of 14 -8- CASE NO. 17-CV-00108-GPC-MDD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Apple’s and the CMs’ jury-triable claims and defenses, including Apple’s affirmative BCPA claims, which remain in the case.7 Qualcomm also suggests that the BCPA Evidence can be construed only as improper propensity evidence. Mot. 7. But Apple and the CMs do not intend to use the BCPA Evidence to suggest that Qualcomm has a propensity for violating antitrust laws as demonstrated by its violation of foreign antitrust laws. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). Instead, Apple and the CMs intend to use the BCPA evidence for “another purpose”—to demonstrate that Qualcomm’s imposition of the BCPA’s gag clause on Apple (and similar clauses on others) and retaliation against Apple for cooperating with law enforcement were themselves anticompetitive acts under the antitrust laws that had the purpose and effect of excluding competitors. Qualcomm’s citations to cases where other litigation was used for propensity purposes are therefore inapposite. Similarly, none of Qualcomm’s citations support its claim that the “prejudicial effect with respect to foreign antitrust proceedings is especially great.” Mot. 7–8. Unlike here, the excluded “foreign findings” in Um Corp. v. Tsuburaya Products Co., went to the ultimate issue and did not “tend to make any facts more or less probable.” 2017 WL 5983766, *8–9 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2017). In Guidi v. Inter-Continental Hotels Corp., specific indicia of unreliability reduced the probative value of the evidence. 2003 WL 1907904, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2003). And in Sugar Association, Inc. v. McNeil-PPC, Inc., the court expressly recognized that evidence of other proceedings and litigation may be admissible if relevant to the issues in the case at hand. 2008 WL 4755611, at *2 n.3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2008). None of the cases involved anticompetitive retaliation for cooperating with agency investigations— which necessarily requires introduction of evidence concerning the agency proceedings. 7 Qualcomm’s argument that introducing the BCPA Evidence will lead to mini-trials on tangential topics is also a red herring. Mot. 7. Qualcomm’s gag clauses and retaliation against Apple are squarely relevant to numerous core claims and defenses. Case 3:17-cv-00108-GPC-MDD Document 1058 Filed 03/25/19 PageID.115244 Page 10 of 14 -9- CASE NO. 17-CV-00108-GPC-MDD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Qualcomm argues that the Court’s BCPA Order should also be excluded, claiming that it could unfairly influence the jury. But all of the cases Qualcomm cites concern dismissed claims that either had no bearing on the facts that remained at issue or involved different standards of proof.8 Here, the Court’s determination that Apple did not breach the BCPA must form part of the jury instructions in this case concerning the proper interpretation of the BCPA. For example, Apple’s compliance with the BCPA’s terms is an element of Apple’s BCPA breach claim (Dkt. 1047-6 at 153; see also CACI 303), and therefore the jury should be instructed that Apple has complied with the BCPA. The BCPA instruction also bears on the merits of Apple’s justification defense to Qualcomm’s tortious interference claim: the fact that Apple was in compliance with the BCPA when Qualcomm withheld nearly $1 billion in 2016 is probative of whether Apple’s subsequent withholding was justified. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court should deny Qualcomm’s motion. 8 In Northwest Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Koch, 424 F. App’x 621 (9th Cir. 2011), the proponent of the evidence argued that the court’s ruling that the defendant had previously made false statements demonstrated that he had made false statements years later. Br. for Appellee and Cross-Appellant, 2010 WL 6201211, at *60. This is the very definition of prohibited propensity evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). In Rios v. Tilton, the court’s determination that there was “some evidence” the plaintiff was gang affiliated was a separate issue, under a separate evidentiary standard, from the plaintiff’s procedural due process claims. 2016 WL 29567, at *4–5 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2016). Similarly, in Burdett v. Reynoso, the court’s ruling that there was “probable cause” to arrest the plaintiff was not relevant to the plaintiff’s civil claims, which included use of excessive force and assault and battery. 2007 WL 4554034, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2007). And in Oyarzo v. Tuolumne Fire District, the court determined that the fact that previous claims had been dismissed was irrelevant to those that remained. 2013 WL 5718882, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2013). Case 3:17-cv-00108-GPC-MDD Document 1058 Filed 03/25/19 PageID.115245 Page 11 of 14 -10- CASE NO. 17-CV-00108-GPC-MDD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Dated: March 25, 2019 Respectfully submitted, By: /s/ William A. Isaacson Juanita R. Brooks, SBN 75934, brooks@fr.com Seth M. Sproul, SBN 217711, sproul@fr.com FISH & RICHARDSON P.C. 12390 El Camino Real San Diego, CA 92130 Phone: (619) 678-5070; Fax: (619) 678-5099 Ruffin B. Cordell (D.C. Bar No. 445801; pro hac vice) cordell@fr.com Lauren A. Degnan (D.C. Bar No. 452421; pro hac vice) degnan@fr.com FISH & RICHARDSON P.C. 1000 Maine Avenue, S.W., Suite 1000 Washington, D.C. 20024 Phone: (202) 783-5070; Fax: (202) 783-2331 William A. Isaacson (D.C. Bar No. 414788; pro hac vice) wisaacson@bsfllp.com Karen L. Dunn (D.C. Bar No. 1002520; pro hac vice) kdunn@bsfllp.com BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP 1401 New York Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20005 Phone: (202) 237-2727; Fax: (202) 237-6131 Attorneys for Plaintiff and Counterclaim-Defendant Apple Inc. By: /s/ Jason C. Lo Theodore R. Boutrous, Jr., SBN 132099, tboutrous@gibsondunn.com Richard J. Doren, SBN 124666 rdoren@gibsondunn.com Daniel G. Swanson, SBN 116556, dswanson@gibsondunn.com Michele L. Maryott, SBN 191993 mmaryott@gibsondunn.com Jason C. Lo, SBN 219030, jlo@gibsondunn.com Case 3:17-cv-00108-GPC-MDD Document 1058 Filed 03/25/19 PageID.115246 Page 12 of 14 -11- CASE NO. 17-CV-00108-GPC-MDD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Jennifer J. Rho, SBN 254312, jrho@gibsondunn.com Melissa Phan, SBN 266880, mphan@gibsondunn.com GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP 333 South Grand Avenue Los Angeles, CA 90071 Tel: (213) 229-7000; Fax: (213) 229-7520 Cynthia E. Richman, DC Bar No. 492089, pro hac vice crichman@gibsondunn.com GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP 1050 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20036 Tel: (202) 955-8500; Fax: (202) 467-0539 Attorneys for Defendants, Counterclaimants, and Third-Party Plaintiffs Compal Electronics, Inc., FIH Mobile Ltd., Hon Hai Precision Industry Co., Ltd., Pegatron Corporation, and Wistron Corporation Hugh F. Bangasser, pro hac vice hugh.bangasser@klgates.com Christopher M. Wyant, pro hac vice chris.wyant@klgates.com J. Timothy Hobbs, pro hac vice tim.hobbs@klgates.com K&L GATES LLP 925 Fourth Avenue, Suite 2900 Seattle, Washington 98104 Tel: (206) 623-7580; Fax: (206) 370-6371 Caitlin C. Blanche, SBN 254109, caitlin.blanche@klgates.com K&L GATES LLP 1 Park Plaza Twelfth Floor Irvine, CA 92614 Tel: (949) 253-0900; Fax: (949) 253-0902 Attorneys for Defendant, Counterclaimant, and Third-Party Plaintiff Wistron Corporation Case 3:17-cv-00108-GPC-MDD Document 1058 Filed 03/25/19 PageID.115247 Page 13 of 14 -12- CASE NO. 17-CV-00108-GPC-MDD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document has been served on March 25, 2019, to all counsel of record who are deemed to have consented to electronic service via the Court’s CM/ECF system per Civ. L.R. 5.4(d). Any other counsel of record will be served by electronic mail, facsimile and/or overnight delivery. Executed on March 25, 2019. /s/ William A. Isaacson William A. Isaacson Case 3:17-cv-00108-GPC-MDD Document 1058 Filed 03/25/19 PageID.115248 Page 14 of 14