Reply To Opposition

Reply

Cal. Super. - 4th Dist.December 23, 2019

30-201 © o o J Oo Oot Bx Ww Nd = N O N O N N N N DN D N D N H E H H E E E e J Oo O t kx Ww W N H O O © N o O t kx Ww ND = OO Electronically Filed by Superior Court of California, County of Orange, 07/23/2020 03:42:00 PM. )-01119997-CU-FR-CJ C - ROA #69 - DAVID H. YAMASAKI, Clerk of the Court By e Clerk, Deputy Clerk. Curt R. Craton, SBN 122392 ccraton@cratonlaw.com Robert E. Tokar, SBN 221725 rtokar@cratonlaw.com CRATON, SWITZER & TOKAR LLP 100 Oceangate, Suite 1200 Long Beach, California 90802 Tel: (562) 628-5533 Fax: (562) 490-8604 Attorneys for MARK MESSINGER, PALM SPRINGS GOLD REFINERY, LLC, and LAGUNA COINS GOLD-CARDS & COINS SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ORANGE, CENTRAL JUSTICE CENTER MYLES TAMSEN, etc., et al, Case No. 30-2019-01119997-CU-FR-CJC laintiff REPLY BY DEFENDANTS Plaintift, MESSINGER, PSGR, AND LAGUNA VS. TO PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED MARK MESSINGER, etc., et al, COMPLAINT Defendants. (By Fax) Date: July 30, 2020 Time: 1:30 p.m. Dept: C22 Res. ID. 73329182 Judge: Hon. Glenn Salter Filed: December 23, 2019 Trial: August 25, 2021 Defendants Mark Messinger, Palm Springs Gold Refinery, LLC, and Laguna Coins Gold- Cards & Coins submit this reply to plaintiffs’ opposition to the demurrer to the first amended com- plaint (“FAC”). Dated: July 23, 2020 CRATON, SWITZER & TOKAR LLP Fen Curt R. Craton, attorneys for Mark Messinger, Palm Springs Gold Refinery, LLC, and Laguna Coins Gold-Cards & Coins 1 REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT © o o J Oo Oot Bx Ww Nd = N O N O N N N N DN D N D N H E H H E E E e J Oo O t kx Ww W N H O O © N o O t kx Ww ND = OO TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No TABLE OF AUTHORITIES... o.oo eee esses e eee sees eeae ees 3 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES........cooiiiiiiiieeeeeeeiiieeeeee e , 4 I. PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO DISCLOSE THE MEET-AND-CONFER EFFORTS THAT ACTUALLY OCCURRED BEFORE DEFENDANTS FILED THE INSTANT DEMURRER TO THE FAC oii IT. PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT KRISTEN TAMSEN, GEORGE VAN VLIET, AND GAIL VAN VLIET ARE REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST ON THE FRAUD CLAIM ....cciiiiiiiiiieiiiiee cece ITI. PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT MYLES AND GEORGE ARE REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST ON ANY CLAIM .....cccooviiiiiiiiiiieeinieeee IV. PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT MARK MESSINGER AND GOLD - CARDS & COINS INC. ARE PROPERLY JOINED AS DEFENDANTS IN THE GABE: es ims suis sues snus sms ses ses soos sas sss ss sie sis 550s ss sis 555 i953 55s ss V. PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT MESSINGER AND LAGUNA ARE PROPERLY JOINED AS CO-CONSPIRATORS .......cccccceviiieeirnnn VI. PLAINTIFFS DID NOT ALLEGE TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE AGAINST THESE DEMURRING DEFENDANTS .......otiiiiiiiiece eects CCITT UIST css sos sos sss es sss sos sss es ss 0 53ts s 1510 15505 50 E5008 S004 910 5508 5505 E508 S03 30 Ft 9608 FS 2 REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT © o o J Oo Oot Bx Ww Nd = N O N O N N N N DN D N D N H E H H E E E e J Oo O t kx Ww W N H O O © N o O t kx Ww ND = OO TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Berman v Bromberg (1997) 56 Cal. App. 4th 936 ....c.ccoooiiiiiiiiiiieeeeeeeeeeeceeee eee, 8 Founding Members of Newport Beach Country Club v Newport Beach Country Club, Inc. (2003) 109 Cal. App. 4th 944 .....cooovviiiiieeeeeeeeeeceee e e eee eev 8 Frost v Witter (1901) 132 Cal. 421 ....oooieeeiiieeeeeeeeeee ee eee ee ee e v e eens 5,6 Hurt v Haering (1922) 190 Cal. 198... eect eee eee eevee eee ee eeeens 5,6 Kaczorowski v Mendocino County Bd. of Supervisors (2001) 88 Cal. App. 4th 564.......... 7 Kaufman & Broad Bldg. Co. v City & Suburban Mortgage Co. (1970) 10 Cal. App. Lippert v Bailey (1966) 241 Cal. App. 2d 876 ......cvvviiieieeeeiieeeeeecieeee eevee eee eee 5,6 Mission Viejo Emergency Med. Assocs. v Beta Healthcare Group (2011) 197 Cal. APP. AER 1146 ooo e eee eee aaaaerraar---- 8 Quality Wash Group V, Ltd. v Hallak (1996) 50 Cal. App. 4th 1687 ....cccceeevvvvrivriiiinnnn... 8 Tracy Press Inc. v Superior Court (2008) 164 Cal. App. 4th 1290.......ccccoeeeiiiiiriiiiiiiiienn.... 7 Van Zant v Apple, Inc. (2014) 229 Cal. App. 4th 965........ooovviiiiiieeiiiicieeee eee, 7 Windham at Carmel Mountain Ranch Ass'n v Superior Court (2003) 109 Cal. App. AER TIB2 cities eee sabes ete es abet eshte eset e eshte es sabae een 6 Statutes Code Civ. Proc. §§425.10(2)(1),430.10(L) .evvurureeeeeeeerreeiiiiiieeeeeeeeeeeeiiiiiieeeeeeeeeeerersnieeaeeeaaeeeens 5 Code CoV. PrOC. §367 uence eect eee eee eect eee eee aerate ee eee eee eeas aaa ee eeaaeeeens 5 Code Cav. PrOC. §379 uuu ieee eee eee eee eee eee eee eee eee eee a eee esas esas aeeaeeeeeereens 7 Code Civ. Proc. §389 cue iii eee eee eee eee eee eee eee eee a aaa aeaaens 7 Other Authorities 4 Witkin, California Procedure, Pleading §§34-35 (5th ed 2008) .........ccevvvvvriiiiieeeeeeennnns 5 3 REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT © o o J Oo Oot Bx Ww Nd = N O N O N N N N DN D N D N H E H H E E E e J Oo O t kx Ww W N H O O © N o O t kx Ww ND = OO MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES I. PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO DISCLOSE THE MEET-AND-CONFER EFFORTS THAT ACTUALLY OCCURRED BEFORE DEFEND- ANTS FILED THE INSTANT DEMURRER TO THE FAC Plaintiffs falsely accuse the defendants of failing to meet and confer before filing demurring to the FAC. Plaintiffs rely on “Exhibit A” attached to their opposition. But Exhibit A reflects the meet-and-confer efforts that took place on the original complaint, not on the FAC. (Tokar decl., 45.) Contrary to plaintiffs’ contention, defense counsel initiated and conducted meet- and-confer efforts on the FAC after the discussions memorialized in Exhibit A and after plaintiffs filed their FAC. (Tokar decl., 6-8.) Those subsequent discussions were them- selves memorialized in writing. (Tokar decl., 46-8, Exhs. 1-2.) Plaintiffs’ counsel was a party to the emails memorialized in Exhibits 1 and 2 but failed to disclose them to the court. Exhibits 1 and 2 together with attorney Tokar’s accompanying declaration establish that defense counsel indeed met and conferred with plaintiffs’ counsel before demurring to the FAC. II. PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT KRISTEN TAMSEN, GEORGE VAN VLIET, AND GAIL VAN VLIET ARE REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST ON THE FRAUD CLAIM The fraud claim in the FAC is alleged by all four plaintiffs. But, as pointed out in the demurrer, the FAC alleges that only plaintiff Myles Tamsen was present during the contract negotiations. The other three plaintiffs (Kristen, George, and Gail)! were not present. Axiomatically, they could not have relied on a representation that was never 1 This brief will identify plaintiffs by their first names for convenience, not out of disrespect. 4 REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT © o o J Oo Oot Bx Ww Nd = N O N O N N N N DN D N D N H E H H E E E e J Oo O t kx Ww W N H O O © N o O t kx Ww ND = OO communicated to them and that they never heard. Therefore, those three plaintiffs do not have standing as real parties in interest to assert fraud. With certain exceptions not applicable to this case, every action must be prose- cuted in the name of the real party in interest. (Code Civ. Proc. §367.) The complaint must contain a statement of facts constituting the cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc. §§425.10(a)(1),430.10(e).) A cause of action arises from the breach of, impingement on, or interference with, a primary right of the real party in interest, by the alleged defend- ant, contrary to a primary duty. (Hurt v Haering (1922) 190 Cal. 198, 200; Frost v Witter (1901) 132 Cal. 421, 426; Lippert v Bailey (1966) 241 Cal. App. 2d 376, 381; 4 Witkin, California Procedure, Pleading §§34-35 (5th ed 2008).) This is known as the “primary rights” doctrine. A cause of action is pleaded by stating (1) the facts from which the plaintiff's primary right and the defendant's corresponding duty arise and (2) the facts constituting the defendant's delict, or wrong. (Kaufman & Broad Bldg. Co. v City & Sub- urban Mortgage Co. (1970) 10 Cal. App. 3d 206, 215.) The FAC does not allege any facts that establish Kristen, George, and Gail are real parties in interest to the fraud claim. As cited in the demurrer, fraud must be as- serted by the person to whom the false representation was made; the person who justifi- ably relied on the representation; and the person to whom the representation was in- tended. The FAC alleges that Kristen, George, and Gail were not present to negotiate the contract. As such, the seller made no representations to them; they did not rely on representations they did not hear; and they could not have been persons to whom the seller intended to make the representations. Therefore, they are not real parties in in- terest, and the court should sustain the demurrer to their fraud claim. III. PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT MYLES AND GEORGE ARE REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST ON ANY CLAIM A similar argument applies to plaintiff Myles Tamsen and George Van Vliet. In order for Myles and George to be real parties in interest on any of the myriad 5 REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT © o o J Oo Oot Bx Ww Nd = N O N O N N N N DN D N D N H E H H E E E e J Oo O t kx Ww W N H O O © N o O t kx Ww ND = OO of claims alleged in the FAC, they must have suffered harm as a consequence of the breach of, impingement on, or interference with a primary right that they hold. (Hurt; Frost; Lippert; Witkin, supra.) Someone who is not a party to a contract has no standing to enforce the contract or to recover extra-contract damages for wrongful withholding of benefits to the contracting party. (Windham at Carmel Mountain Ranch Ass'n v Superior Court (2003) 109 Cal. App. 4th 1162, 1172.) According to Exhibit A attached to the FAC, neither Myles nor George was a cus- tomer who sold the metal bars to defendant PSGR. Exhibit A of the FAC identifies the “Customer” as “Kristen Tamsen / Gail Van Vliet.” Thus, according to plaintiffs’ own exhibit, the owners who sold the metal bars were Kristen and Gail, not Myles or George. As cited in the demurrer, specific facts recited in an exhibit supersede contradic- tory facts generally alleged in the body of a pleading. In this case, Plaintiffs proffer Exhibit A as the memorialization of the contract for the sale of the metal bars. The FAC alleges that Myles negotiated the terms of sale stated in Exhibit A. As the negotiator of the contract and the only plaintiff present for the negotiations, Myles was in a better position than the buyer to know who owned the metal bars and, thus, who needed to be identified as the sellers. Myles identified only Kristen and Gail as the sellers, not himself or George. Moreover, the FAC alleges no facts to explain why he or George were not identified as sellers if they, too, owned the metal bars. Therefore, the recitation in Ex- hibit A that Kristen and Gail were the only sellers supersedes all contradictory allega- tions in the body of the FAC claiming that Myles and George also were sellers. Given that Exhibit A of the FAC excludes Myles and George as sellers of the metal bars, they were not parties to the contract and cannot be persons who were damaged by a defendant’s wrongdoing. Under the primary rights doctrine cited above, Myles and George cannot be real parties in interest if they were not parties to the contract and suffered no harm as a consequence of alleged wrongdoing, and they could not have suf- fered harm if, as Exhibit A shows, they were not the owners who sold the metal bars. As such, Myles and George are not real parties in interest. (Windham, supra.) Therefore, 6 REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT © o o J Oo Oot Bx Ww Nd = N O N O N N N N DN D N D N H E H H E E E e J Oo O t kx Ww W N H O O © N o O t kx Ww ND = OO the court should sustain the demurrer on the grounds of improper joinder of Myles and George as a co-plaintiffs in the case. IV. PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT MARK MESSINGER AND GOLD - CARDS & COINS INC. ARE PROPERLY JOINED AS DEFENDANTS IN THE CASE Joinder of a defendant to a cause of action must proceed under either the compul- sory joinder rules (Code Civ. Proc. §389) or the permissive joinder rules (Code Civ. Proc. §379). Section 389(a) provides that a person subject to service of process whose joinder would not deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction must be joined as a necessary party if (Van Zant v Apple, Inc. (2014) 229 Cal. App. 4th 965, 973; Tracy Press Inc. v Superior Court (2008) 164 Cal. App. 4th 1290, 1297; Kaczorowski v Mendocino County Bd. of Supervisors (2001) 88 Cal. App. 4th 564, 568): e In the person's absence, complete relief cannot be accorded among those already joined as parties; or e The person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action, and not joining this person would, as a practical matter, impair or impede his or her ability to protect that interest or create a substantial risk of subjecting a party to multiple or inconsistent obligations. Section §379(a) provides that all persons may be joined in one action as defendants if there 1s asserted against them: e Any right to relief, jointly, severally, or in the alternative, in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences, and if any question of law or fact common to all these persons will arise in the action; or e A claim, right, or interest adverse to them in the property or controversy that is the subject of the action. Applying these rules, the facts alleged in the FAC establish that Messinger and Gold - Cards & Coins Inc. (hereafter referred to by its trade name, “Laguna”) are not properly joined as co-defendants in this case. As previously discussed, the FAC alleges that the terms of the contract are embodied in Exhibit A. Neither Messinger nor Laguna 7 REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT © o o J Oo Oot Bx Ww Nd = N O N O N N N N DN D N D N H E H H E E E e J Oo O t kx Ww W N H O O © N o O t kx Ww ND = OO are identified in Exhibit A as parties to the contract. The only parties to the contract identified in Exhibit A are Kristen and Gail as the sellers and PSGR as the buyer. It follows that any harm Kristen and Gail suffered in connection with the loss of the metal bars must have resulted from the actions of the buyer, PSGR, not third persons Messinger or Laguna who were not parties to the transaction. Plaintiffs try to overcome this defect in their FAC by arguing in their opposition that the check attached as Exhibit B to the complaint introduces an ambiguity, which allows plaintiffs to (1) name Messinger and Laguna as co-defendants and (i1) go on a fishing expedition in discovery to prove they are properly joined. That argument is re- futed by the face of the check itself. The check attached as Exhibit B to the FAC reveals unambiguously that the payer of the purchase money was defendant PSGR-the same party identified as the buyer in Exhibit A. Therefore, rather than bolstering plaintiffs’ argument, Exhibit B actually torpedoes their argument by reinforcing the plain language of the contract showing PSGR alone was the buyer, not Messinger or Laguna. Plaintiffs also mistakenly rely on conjecture, speculation, and subjective interpre- tation about what the terms on the face of Exhibit A actually mean. That is not how contract law works in California. “Evidence of the undisclosed subjective intent of the parties is irrelevant to determining the meaning of contractual language. ... Rather, it 1s the outward manifestation or expression of assent that is controlling.” (Berman v Bromberg (1997) 56 Cal. App. 4th 936, 948 (citations omitted).) By focusing on the ob- jective intent of the parties, evidenced mainly by the words of their agreement, as the controlling factor in interpretation of the contract, California courts recognize the so- called objective theory of contract. (Mission Viejo Emergency Med. Assocs. v Beta Healthcare Group (2011) 197 Cal. App. 4th 1146; Founding Members of Newport Beach Country Club v Newport Beach Country Club, Inc. (2003) 109 Cal. App. 4th 944, 956.) Interpretation of a written contract is a question of law. (Quality Wash Group V, Ltd. v Hallak (1996) 50 Cal. App. 4th 1687, 1694.) 8 REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT © o o J Oo Oot Bx Ww Nd = N O N O N N N N DN D N D N H E H H E E E e J Oo O t kx Ww W N H O O © N o O t kx Ww ND = OO On demurrer, the facts are not in dispute because the demurrer admits all allega- tions in the pleading for purposes of ruling on the demurrer. The words of the contract that the plaintiffs attached as Exhibit A to their FAC identify only Kristen and Gail as the sellers and PSGR as the buyer. Exhibit B confirms PSGR as the buyer by reflecting PSGR as the payer of the purchase money. In other words, the writings that the plain- tiffs have attached to their FAC reveal no ambiguity as to who the parties to the trans- action were. Messinger and Laguna were not parties to the contract. Neither were Myles or George. Therefore, as a matter of law, Messinger, Laguna, Myles, and George are all defectively joined as parties to this case. V. PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT MESSINGER AND LAGUNA ARE PROPERLY JOINED AS CO-CONSPIRATORS As cited in plaintiffs’ opposition, a conspiracy requires (1) formation and operation; (2) an overt act; and (3) resulting damage. (Oppos., 11:7-10.) The FAC fails to allege any facts showing (1) the formation and operation of an agreement in which Messinger or Laguna participated or (2) an overt act by either of them in furtherance of such agreement. Therefore, Messinger and Laguna are improperly joined as co-defendants under a conspiracy theory. VL PLAINTIFFS DID NOT ALLEGE TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE AGAINST THESE DEMURRING DEFENDANTS For some reason not explained in the opposition, plaintiffs try to get mileage out of an argument that these demurring defendants (Messinger, PSGR, and Laguna) failed to address the cause of action for intentional interference. (Oppos., 15:12-20.) But, the reasons these defendants did not address that cause of action is because it is alleged against defendant Alex Nguyen, who is represented by separate, independent counsel. Indeed, his counsel has filed a separate demurrer to the FAC on his behalf. It would be 9 REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT © o o J Oo Oot Bx Ww Nd = N O N O N N N N DN D N D N H E H H E E E e J Oo O t kx Ww W N H O O © N o O t kx Ww ND = OO imprudent for Messinger, PSGR, and Laguna to demur on behalf of Nguyen. Therefore, it was entirely appropriate for these demurring defendants to not address the cause of action for intentional interference. CONCLUSION Plaintiffs’ opposition has failed to refute the misjoinder of Myles Tamsen and George Van Vliet as co-plaintiffs to in that they were not parties to the contract and thus have no standing to assert a claim arising from the sale of the metal bars. Likewise, plaintiffs have failed to refute the misjoinder of Kristin Tamsen, George Van Vliet, and Gail Van Vliet as co-plaintiffs to the fraud claim in that they were not present during the sale and thus could not have relied on anything the buyer repre- sented. Plaintiffs have failed to refute the misjoinder of Messinger and Laguna as co-de- fendants in that the contract (Exhibit A) reveals PSGR was the sole buyer and neither Messinger nor Laguna were parties to the transaction. Plaintiffs have failed to explain or otherwise overcome the defect in their allega- tions that cause every cause of action they allege to contradict their own Exhibit A. Therefore, the entire FAC fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Last, the misjoinders and plethora of contradictory allegations throughout the FAC render each cause of action uncertain. Therefore, the entire FAC is subject to de- murrer for uncertainty. For the foregoing reasons, the court should sustain each and every demurrer to the FAC. Dated: July 23, 2020 CRATON, SWITZER & TOKAR LLP EN Curt R. Craton, attorneys for MARK MESSINGER, PALM SPRINGS GOLD RE- FINERY, LLC, and LAGUNA COINS GOLD- CARDS & COINS f:\clients\messm\tams\motns\drm by messm\reply - dmr fac.docx 10 REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT © 00 3 a Wn hb” WwW ND = NN N N N N N N N ND = E e e m e m e a e m e m c o NI O N Ln BA W I N D = O O 0 DN W D = O PROOF OF SERVICE I am over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. My business address is 100 Oceangate, Suite 1200 Long Beach, CA 90802, which is in Los Angeles County, CA. On July 23, 2020, I served the document(s) entitted REPLY BY DEFENDANTS MESSINGER, PSGR, AND LAGUNA TO PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEMUR- RER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT as follows: [1 BYMAIL. Iencloseda copy in a sealed envelope addressed to each person on the attached Service List and deposited the same with the United States Postal Service at Long Beach, California, with the postage fully prepaid for First-Class Mail. >X] BY OVERNIGHT DELIVERY. enclosed a copy in a sealed envelope provided by an overnight delivery carrier addressed to each person on the attached Service List and deposited the same for collection and overnight delivery at an office or a regularly utilized drop box of the overnight delivery carrier. [1 BY FACSIMILE SERVICE. Based on an agreement of the parties to accept service by fax transmission, I faxed a copy to the persons at the fax numbers on the attached Service List. No error was reported by the fax machine that I used and a copy of the record of the fax transmission, which I printed out, is attached. [] BY EMAIL OR ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION. Based on a court order or an agreement of the parties to accept service by email or electronic transmission, I caused a copy to be sent to the persons at the email addresses on the attached Service List. I did not receive, within a reasonable time after the transmission, any electronic message or other indi- cation that that the transmission was unsuccessful. [1] BY PERSONAL SERVICE. I personally delivered a copy to the persons at the addresses on the attached Service List. (1) For a party represented by an attorney, delivery was made to the attorney or at the attorney’s office by leaving a copy in an envelope clearly labeled to identify the attorney being served with a receptionist or an individual in charge of the office. (2) For a party, delivery was made to the party or by leaving a copy at the party’s © 00 3 a Wn hb” WwW ND = NN N N N N N N N ND = E e e m e m e m e m e m co NI O N Un A W D R O D 0 N N W = Oo residence with some person not less than 18 years of age between the hours or 8 in the morning and 6 in the evening. Tam [_] a member of the bar or [<] employed by a member of the bar at whose direction this service is made. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on July 23, 2020, at Long Beach, California. Samantha Fabrigas © 00 3 a Wn hb” WwW ND = NN N N N N N N N ND = E e e m e m e a e m e m c o NI O N Ln BA W I N D = O O 0 DN W D = O Grant Puleo Christopher M. Champine Duane Morris LLP 750 B Street, Suite 2900 San Diego, CA 92101-4681 Douglas S. Honig Law Office of Douglas S. Honig 501 Civic Center Drive West Santa Ana, CA 92701 SERVICE LIST Attorneys for Myles Tamsenn, Kristin Tam- sen, George Van Vliet, and Gail Van Vliet Attorneys for Alex Nguyen dba Infinity