Plaintiffs_opposition_to_motion_for_summary_judgmentOppositionCal. Super. - 4th Dist.February 5, 2019 1 |ZFATY | BURNS ISAAC R. ZFATY, State Bar No. 214987 2 J|IRYAN N. BURNS, State Bar No. 215939 660 Newport Center Drive, Suite 470 3 ||Newport Beach, CA 92660 Telephone: (949) 398-8080 4 | Facsimile: (949) 398-8081 irz@zfatyburns.com 5 [mb@zfatyburns.com 6 | Attorneys for Plaintiff BRIANT HUMPHREY 7 8 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 2 FOR THE COUNTY OF ORANGE - CENTRAL JUSTICE CENTER 10 11 [[BRIANT HUMPHREY, an individual Case No.: 30-2019-01049287-CU-BC-CJC oo Assigned for All Purposes to: 12 Plaintiff, Hon. James Crandall VS. 13 PLAINTIFF BRIANT HUMPHREY'S PAYSAFE MERCHANT SERVICES CORP, a \ 14 || Delaware corporation, and DOES 1 through 25 OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S inclusive, MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 15 16 Defendants. Filed Concurrently Herewith: 1. Separate Statement of Undisputed 17 Facts 18 2. Declaration of Briant Humphrey 19 Date: January 2, 2020 20 Time: 1:30 p.m. Dept: C-33 21 27 Trial Date: February 3, 2020 Action Filed: February 5, 2019 23 24 25 26 27 28 ZFATY | BURNS 660 NEWPORT CENTER DRIVE SUITE 470 NEWPORT BEACH CALIFORNIA 92660 (949) 398-8080 PLAINTIFE’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 1 Plaintiff BRIANT HUMPHREY (“Plaintiff”) respectfully submits the following 2 [Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment 3 [[(“MSJ”) filed by Defendant PAYSAFE MERCHANT SERVICES CORP. (“Defendant”) as 4 (follows: 5 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 6 I. INTRODUCTION 7 Plaintiff and Defendant (together, “the Parties”) were the lone parties to a written contract 8 || which entitles Plaintiff to commissions on revenues derived from merchants he referred to 9 [|Defendant. He quickly originated an immediately productive relationship with a major client who 10 [primarily processes monthly rental payments for large scale property managers. 11 In the interim, despite this early success, he has without explanation been denied his 12 ||commissions on the revenues related to that client, denied the accounting data to which he is 13 | contractually entitled, had his further referral of additional clients obstructed by the very 14 |[company with which he contracted to refer them, and suffered the wrongful and unnecessary 15 [termination of his contract with the company. 16 Plaintiff contends not only that the one major account was a successful origination 17 | entitling him to substantial commissions, but that he referred several other major prospects with 18 |[which Defendant either failed or wrongfully refused to consummate processing relationships. 19 || Then, when he began following up to request updates as to the payments upon which his 20 |[commissions were to be based, Plaintiff encountered only evasion and stone-walling. In light of 21 ||Defendant’s assertion that the business attributable to this referral is insubstantial, it remains a 22 |[mystery why they were unwilling for so long to provide him even the most basic information 23 |[related to those revenues. Only after he had retained counsel and commenced the litigation 24 |[process did Defendant provide the required information. 25 Meanwhile, Defendant went out of its way to ensure that Plaintiff could not perform his 26 |[obligation under the contract to refer qualified clients to Defendant. This is reflected not only in 27 |[its bad-faith refusal to provide commissions and accounting, which frustrated the entire incentive 28 |Isystem upon which the referral contract is based, but also in Defendant’s active undermining S60 NEWPORT CENTER DRE NeweoRT Bex ot am acno -1- PLAINTIFE’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ZFATY | BURNS OO 00 JI A N Ln BA W N = ND N N N N N N ND m m e m em e m e m e m e m e m ~N O N Ln A W D , O L N N N N W N -= oO 28 660 NEWPORT CENTER DRIVE SUITE 470 NEWPORT BEACH CALIFORNIA 92660 (949) 398-8080 and/or down-playing of Plaintiff’s relationships with prospective clients. Defendant entered into a written contract. That it apparently shortly thereafter began to perceive that contract as undesirable is not sufficient grounds to ignore its obligations under that contract. Plaintiff performed his portion of the contract until such time as Defendant made it abundantly clear that it was not interested in performing its portion. Left with little choice, Plaintiff brought this action. II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND On or about November 28, 2017, the Parties entered into that certain Referral Agreement (the “Agreement”). (Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Fact; "SSUE" No. 1.) The Agreement was essentially one for business development services rendered by Plaintiff to Defendant. Defendant is a payment processing business. Pursuant to the Agreement, Plaintiff was charged with identifying and facilitating relationships with prospective customers, specifically, merchants with substantial payment processing needs. The Parties’ general intent was that these relationships would generate significant revenues for Defendant, and in turn, commensurate commissions for Plaintiff. A. The Agreement. The Agreement is a simple referral-commission agreement for business development purposes. (SSUF No. 1.) It established a contractual relationship whereby Plaintiff agreed to attract and secure client relationships on behalf of Defendant, and Defendant to compensate Defendant in the form of commissions for securing such relationships. The term of the Agreement was three (3) years. The essence of the Agreement is that Plaintiff would refer to Defendant “Referred Merchants that are candidates for credit card or direct debit processing relationships” with Defendant. B. The RentTrack Provision. Paragraph 2(A)ii of the Agreement deals specifically with one merchant in particular, RentTrack LLC (“RentTrack™), RentTrack is designated in the Agreement as “Existing Accepted Merchant.” A central fact in this case is that the PaySafe-RentTrack relationship originated with Plaintiff. (SSUF No. 2.) The Agreement provides that, in the specific case of RentTrack, Mr. Es PLAINTIFE’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ZFATY | BURNS OO 00 JI A N Ln BA W N = ND N N N N N N ND m m e m em e m e m e m e m e m ~N O N Ln A W D , O L N N N N W N -= oO 28 660 NEWPORT CENTER DRIVE SUITE 470 NEWPORT BEACH CALIFORNIA 92660 (949) 398-8080 Humphrey was to receive 50% of the fees or charges paid by Renttrack to Paysafe or any of its affiliates minus certain costs and commissions. (SSUF No. 22) Payments to Mr. Humphrey were to be made no later than 45 days after the close of the month in which the fees were received by Paysafe. Moreover, Paysafe agreed to make available to Mr. Humphrey “summary reports containing data backing up the transactions for the corresponding payment of the monthly Commission.” In short, Mr. Humphrey is contractually entitled both to the commissions and the information required to ensure that the commissions are precise and accurate. C. Defendant Evades Its Contractual Obligations. Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s claims lack merit because, it alleges, he has not referred three Accepted Merchants per quarter since the inception of the Agreement. Plaintiff has already acknowledged that those relationships have not happened. But Defendant’s telling of why they have not happened ignores the stark reality of its own conduct. Since January 2018, Defendant has ignored Plaintiff’s requests for accounting. Mr. Humphrey has received less than $100 on his commissions on the RentTrack account. Moreover, for reasons that remain unclear, he was progressively “phased out” of the information loop, and despite numerous requests was never provided the basic information Defendant is required to provide him. Mr. Humphrey wrote several written requests to Carla Erlick requesting this information and has received no response until Defendant was required by law to respond to discovery in this matter. And even then, Defendant has provided only the most surface-level data with regard to the revenues and performance of the RentTrack account. The evidence shows that the RentTrack account has indeed been processing in the interim, and to substantially greater productivity than Defendant’s MSJ suggests. (SSUF No. 24.) Indeed, data reports from APEX, the internal Paysafe reporting system, show significant discrepancies between what Defendant is reporting to Plaintiff and what it’s internal records would show. As such, Plaintiff should be receiving both payments substantially greater than the de minimus compensation he has thus far received. (Declaration of Humphrey, | 3-4.) 111 _3- PLAINTIFE’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 1 D. Defendant’s Conduct Rendered Plaintiff’s Performance Impossible. 2 Defendant fails to appreciate that by refusing to provide Plaintiff with either commissions 3 |or the relevant information about those commissions to which he was entitled completely 4 [lundermined the Agreement. But that was not the sole problem Plaintiff encountered in trying to 5 ||perform on Defendant’s behalf. 6 In sum, there remain several triable issues of material fact in dispute. Plaintiff provides 7 |[herewith substantial evidence that Defendant is indeed processing significant numbers by way of 8 | the RentTrack relationship, but has not paid Plaintiff anything but a few dollars in connection 9 [[therewith. Plaintiff will also show that Defendant’s own conduct, not any failure by Plaintiff, is 10 [responsible for the lack of successful referrals. Defendant cannot meet its burden to eliminate all 11 |[such triable issues of material fact and as such, this Motion should be denied. (Declaration of 12 (|Humphrey, | 3-4.) 13 III. LEGAL ANALYSIS 14 A. Legal Standard for Motions for Summary Judgment. 15 Under Cal. Civ. Proc. § 437c (f)(1) states in pertinent part: 16 “A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or 17 more issues of duty, if that party contends that the cause of action has no merit or that 18 there is no affirmative defense thereto, or that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, or both, or that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as 19 specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or 20 did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs. A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative 71 defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.” (Emphasis added). 22 Summary judgment is a drastic measure which deprives the losing party of trial on the 23 |\merits.” Bahl v. Bank of America (2001) 89 Cal. App.4™ 389, 395. The moving party’s evidence 24 lis to be strictly construed and that of the opposing party liberally construed in order to safeguard 25 ||the latter’s right to trial. See Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal. App.4™ 832, 838. “The 26 [court must therefore consider what inferences favoring the opposing party a fact finder could 27 [reasonably draw from the evidence .... Only when the inferences are indisputable may the court 28 | decide the issues as a matter of law. If the evidence is in conflict, the factual issues must be ZFATY | BURNS 660 NEWPORT CENTER DRIVE SUITE 470 NEWPORT BEACH CALIFORNIA 92660 (949) 398-8080 4. PLAINTIFE’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 1 [resolved against granting the motion, because that allows the future development of the case and 2 |lavoids errors.” Id., at 838-39. 3 A motion for summary judgment shall only be granted if all papers submitted show that 4 |[there is no triable issue as to any material fact. Cal. Civ. Proc. § 437c. Where the defendant is the 5 [[moving party, he or she may meet the burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit by 6 [[proving either that (1) one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established, or (2) 7 |[there is a complete defense to that cause of action. Once that burden is met, the burden shifts to 8 | the plaintiff to show the existence of a triable issue of one or more material facts with respect to 9 [/that cause of action or defense. (/d.) 10 A party who seeks a court’s action in his or her favor bears the burden of persuasion 11 | thereon. Evid. Code. § 500. Thus, “from commencement to conclusion, the party moving from 12 |lsummary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact 13 |land he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 14 [| Cal.4™ 826, 850. Since the burden of proof at trail in this case is by a preponderance of evidence, 15 | a party must only present evidence showing the matter to be more likely true than not in order to 16 [raise a triable issue of fact on a summary judgment motion. /d. At 857. 17 Any doubt as to the propriety of granting a motion for summary judgment is resolved in 18 [favor of the party opposing the motion. Stationers Corp. v. Dunn & Bradstreet, Inc., (1965) 62 19 ||Cal.2d 412, 417. 20 In Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 25 Cal.4th 826, 845 (2001) our Supreme Court held, 21 |[“From commencement to conclusion, the moving party bears the burden of persuasion that there 22 |lis no genuine issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law... [I]f a 23 |[plaintiff who would bear the burden of proof by a preponderance of evidence at trial moves for 24 |lsummary judgment, he must present evidence that would require a reasonable trier of fact to find 25 |[any underlying material fact more likely than not.” 26 “In moving for summary judgment, a "plaintiff . . . has met" his "burden of showing that 27 there is no defense to a cause of action if" he "has proved each element of the cause of action 28 |[entitling" him "to judgment on that cause of action. Once the plaintiff . . . has met that burden, the S60 NwPORT CNTER Dive NeweoRT Bex {0495955080 -5- PLAINTIFE’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 1 |[burden shifts to the defendant . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists 2 [fas to that cause of action or a defense thereto.” Id. at 849; citing Cal. Civ. Proc. § 437¢ (0)(1). 3 “Thus, a plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion that "each element of" the "cause of action" 4 [lin question has been "proved," and hence that "there is no defense" thereto.” Id. at 850. 5 B. Defendant Fails to Negate the Breach of Contract Claim as a Matter of Law. 6 To prevail on the MSJ, Defendant must prove as a matter of law, that Plaintiff cannot 7 [prove any of the following: 8 (1) the existence of a contract; 9 (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for non-performance; 10 (3) defendant’s breach; 11 (4) damages to plaintiff therefrom. Acoustics, Inc. v. Trepte Construction Co. 12 (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d 887, 913. 13 Here, Defendant has not been able to prove as a matter of law, that it is entitled to 14 |{judgment on the breach of contract claim. Plaintiff alleges multiple breaches of the Agreement, 15 [including the failure to pay commissions on, and the failure to provide accounting information 16 [with regard to, the Rent Track account. 17 1. Plaintiff’s Cursory Reports are Insufficient to Establish the Lack of a Triable 18 Issue of Material Fact. 19 Plaintiff submits herewith data reports from the internal APEX system of PaySafe. Those 20 |[numbers appear to indicate that Plaintiff should be receiving substantially greater commissions 21 | than Defendant has thus far paid. (Declaration of Humphrey, { 4, Exhibit "A".) For reasons that 22 |[remain unclear, these reports were not provided by Defendant itself. But the net effect is that 23 |[Plaintiff is left to suspect and claim that Defendant has not disclosed the whole of its revenues 24 ||attributable to the RentTrack account. 25 The combined lack of commission and lack of information both support Plaintiff’s claims. 26 |[It is unreasonable to consider this confluence of events to be mere happenstance. While 27 |[Defendant has provided Plaintiff with surface-level numbers purporting to encompass the 28 ||PaySafe-RentTrack universe, Plaintiff is at least entitled to a full accounting of the RentTrack ZFATY | BURNS 660 NEWPORT CENTER DRIVE SUITE 470 NEWPORT BEACH CALIFORNIA 92660 (949) 398-8080 -6- PLAINTIFE’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 1 [account from the date of the Agreement through the present, including all money attributable to, 2 [land transactions completed involving, the RentTrack account. For example, the reports provided 3 ||do not appear to account for any property managers being directly billed under the RentTrack 4 [laccount. (SSUF No. 27, Humphrey Decl., 22.) The figures provided by Defendant do not 5 ||sufficiently account for what their internal numbers appear to indicate according to the APEX 6 [[system. 7 C. Summary Judgment is Improper Where Damages Remain Question for Trial. 8 There remains a triable issue of material fact as to what amount Plaintiff is owed. 9 |[Defendant simply argues in a conclusionary effort that Plaintiff was owed a nominal amount of 10 [commission and the case is moot now because such amounts have allegedly been paid. Not so. 11 || There remains a valid accounting question as the amount of revenue actually earned by 12 ||Defendant as a result of Plaintiff's referrals. Defendant's attempt to pick and choose what they 13 ||believe Plaintiff is owed does not grant them a right to summary judgment. Because issues of the 14 |fcalculation of damages apparently remain to be determined, it is not appropriate to grant 15 |[summary judgment for appellant at this time. (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil 16 || Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 1996) 10:40.1, p. 10-17 [summary judgment or 17 |ladjudication improper where amount of damages raises factual issue].) The correct procedure 18 [below would have been a motion to bifurcate the issue of liability, which the parties could have 19 [tried upon the undisputed facts. [Citation.] A decision on the issue of liability against the party 20 |fon whom liability is sought to be imposed does not result in a judgment until the issue of 21 |[damages is resolved.” (Department of Industrial Relations v. UI Video Stores, Inc., (1997) 55 22 |[Cal.App.4th 1084, 1097.) 23 D. Defendant’s Conduct Frustrated or Prevented Plaintiff’s Full Performance. 24 Defendant’s allegations that Plaintiff failed to meet his contractual obligations to refer 25 |[three Accepted Merchants per quarter is self-serving, ignoring a fundamental problem upon 26 |[which Plaintiff’s suit rests. Plaintiff alleges Defendant acted in bad faith not only in denying him 27 | the accounting and commissions to which he remains entitled in connection with the RentTrack 28 poe Coen ve ChrorAGZE0 (049) 308-8080 7. PLAINTIFE’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 1 | relationship, but also restricted Plaintiff's ability from discussing the matters directly with 2 [[Paysafe. 3 Frustration of purpose ordinarily pertains to supervening events. It may also be 4 [lestablished where, at the time a contract is made, a party's principal purpose is substantially 5 [frustrated without the party's fault, by a fact of which the party has no reason to know and the 6 ||nonexistence of which is a basic assumption on which the contract is made. It is not enough that 7 |/the transaction will become less profitable for the affected party or even inflict a loss. The 8 | frustration must be so severe that it is not fairly to be regarded as within the risks the party 9 |[assumed under the contract. (FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima, (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367.) 10 Moreover, pursuant to Civil Code § 1511, " [t]he want of performance of an obligation, or 11 [lof an offer of performance, in whole or in part, or any delay therein, is excused ... to the extent 12 |... such performance or offer is prevented or delayed by the act of the creditor, or by the 13 |loperation of law, even though there may have been a stipulation that this shall not be an excuse 14 |... [and to the extent] the debtor is induced not to make it, by any act of the creditor intended or 15 [naturally tending to have that effect, done at or before the time at which such performance or 16 [offer may be made, and not rescinded before that time." 17 It is true that (1) the Agreement obligates Plaintiff to refer three Accepted Merchants per 18 ||quarter, and (2) Plaintiff admits that for reasons that remain to be adjudicated the required 19 |[number of Accepted Merchant relationships were not established. But it is not accurate to say that 20 |[Plaintiff failed to refer his required number of Accepted merchants. Indeed, Plaintiff referred 21 |[several other merchants that should have been perfectly acceptable, including Fedex and St- 22 [Joseph Healthcare. (Declaration of Humphrey, 5.) 23 Ultimately, however, Defendant’s conduct artificially constrained Defendant’s market for 24 |[potential referrals and discouraged the very purpose of the Agreement. 25 E. Defendant’s Conduct Constitutes A Breach Of The Implied Covenant Of Good Faith 26 And Fair Dealing. 27 Defendant's MSJ also fails to negate the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 28 S60 NEWPORT CENTER DRE NeweoRT Bex ot am acno -8- PLAINTIFE’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 1 [that is required in every contract. "There is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in 2 [levery contract that neither party will do anything which will injure the right of the other to 3 [[receive the benefits of the agreement." (Comunale v. Traders & General Ins. Co., (1958) 50 4 [Cal.2d 654, 658.). "Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing 5 [lin its performance and its enforcement." The covenant of good faith finds particular application in 6 || situations where one party is invested with a discretionary power affecting the rights of another. 7 |[Such power must have been exercised in good faith." (Carma Developrs (Cal.), Inc v. Marathon 8 [Development California, Inc., (1992) 2 Cal.4th 342, 371-372.) 9 Notably, such a claim is not proper for a motion for summary judgment. "The issue of 10 |[whether the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing has been breached is ordinarily a 11 [question of fact unless only one inference can be drawn from the evidence." (Hicks v. E.T. 12 ||Legg & Associates, (20010) 89 Cal. App.4th 496, 509.) 13 Here, Defendant has not proven that it acted entirely in good faith in allowing Plaintiff to 14 |labide by his requirements under the Agreement. For example, Defendant restricted Plaintiff's 15 {line of communication and essentially "black listed" him from communicating directly with the 16 |[Montreal office for Paysafe, which was a necessary line of communication. 17 IV. CONCLUSION 18 For the reasons set forth herein as well as those to be articulated at the hearing on this 19 |[Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff Briant Humphrey hereby respectfully requests the Court 20 |[deny the Motion in its entirety. 21 22 [[Dated: December 18, 2019 ZFATY | BURNS 23 1 24 C=: RYAN N. NS 25 Attorneys for Plaintiff BRIANT HUMPHREY 26 27 28 ZFATY | BURNS 660 NEWPORT CENTER DRIVE SUITE 470 NEWPORT BEACH CALIFORNIA 92660 949) 398-8080 (649) 9. PLAINTIFE’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OO 00 JI A N Dn BA W N N S N N ND N N N N N = e m e m e m e m e m e m p m e m 0 NN O N Ln BR A W I N D = OO N N N N R E W N = Oo PROOF OF SERVICE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF ORANGE. I, Angelina L. Hammeras, am employed in the County of Orange, State of California. 1 am over the age of 18 years of age and not a party to the within action. My business address is 660 Newport Center Drive, Suite 470, Newport Beach, CA 92660. On December 19, 2019, I served the foregoing document(s) described as: 1. PLAINTIFF BRIANT HUMPHREY’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; 2. SEPARATE STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS; and 3. DECLARATION OF BRIANT HUMPHREY SEE SERVICE LIST [1] BY FIRST CLASS MAIL: I placed the above-referenced document(s) in a sealed envelope, with postage thereon fully prepaid, and deposited said envelope in the U.S. Postal Service mailbox at 3 Park Plaza, Irvine, California on the date stated above, addressed to each of the named parties listed on the SERVICE LIST. [ 1 BY PERSONAL DELIVERY: On this date I caused a true copy of the above- referenced document to be delivered by hand to each of the parties listed on the SERVICE LIST by using the services of Quantum Legal Support. [ X ] BY ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION: I caused the above-referenced document(s) to be sent by electronic mail to the e-mail addresses of each party listed on the SERVICE LIST. Executed on December 19, 2019 at Irvine, California. [X ] (STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct. [ 1 (FEDERAL) Ideclare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct and that I am employed in the office of a member of the bar of this Court at whose direction the service was made. ~ ~ (dD A ‘Angelina L/Hammeras|__ / OO 00 JI A N Dn BA W N N N N N N N N N N E E e m e m e m e m e m em e m 0 NN O N Ln BR A W I N D = OO N N N N R E W N = Oo SERVICE LIST Briant Humphrey v. Paysafe Merchant Services Corp. OCSC Case No.: 30-2019-01049287-CU-BC-CJC Gary A. Nye, Esq. Daron Barsamian, Esq. RPNA 5820 Canoga Ave., Suite 250 Woodland Hills, CA 91367 Tel: (818) 992-9999 Fax: (818) Email: gan@rpnalaw.com; dab@rpnalaw.com; emarlyin @rphnalaw.com; schirin@rpnalaw.com; Attorneys for Defendant PAYSAFE Merchant Services Corp.
