Plaintiffs Opposition To Defendants Motion To Strike Portions of Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint

Opposition

Cal. Super. - 4th Dist.September 10, 2018

eo 0 9 A Un Re W N m= N O N O N N N N NN N O N O E Em em em p w md em ew em WW NN AN Wn A W N = S o 0 NN R W O N m e AEGIS LAW FIRM, PC SAMUEL A. WONG, State Bar No. 217104 ALI S. CARLSEN, State Bar No. 289964 9811 Irvine Center Drive, Suite 100 Irvine, California 92618 Telephone: (949) 379-6250 Facsimile: (949) 379-6251 swong@aegislawfirm.com acarlsen@aegislawfirm.com Attorneys for Plaintiff, WALTER COLLINS ELECTROMICALLY FILED Superior Court of Califarnia, County of Orange 02/22/2019 at 10:25:00 AM Clerk of the Superior Court By & Clerk, Deputy Clerk SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF ORANGE WALTER COLLINS, an individual, Plaintiff, vs. HOAG MEMORIAL HOSPITAL PRESBYTERIAN, a California business entity; and DOES 1 through 20 inclusive, Defendants. CASE NO. 30-2018-01017579-CU-OE-CJC Assigned for all purposes to Hon. Layne Melzer, Dept. C12 PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT Date: March 7, 2019 Time: 2:00 p.m. Dept.: C12 Oo 0 N N Un RA W N = N O N N N O N N N N O N O N m E mm em p m p d p m p m p m e m ee 0 NN S N Wn Bs W N = O Y E N N N B R E W I N Re I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiff WALTER COLLINS (“Plaintiff”) submits this Opposition to Defendant HOAG MEMORIAL HOSPITAL PRESBYTERIAN’s (“Defendant”) Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint (“Motion™). Not only does Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) set forth facts sufficient to support a finding that Defendant acted with malice, oppression, or fraud towards Plaintiff, Plaintiffs FAC describes the multiple instances in which Defendant knowingly denied Plaintiff a good faith reasonable accommodation, retaliated against him by issuing unjustified, pretextual disciplinary action following his requests for accommodation and medical leave, and then ultimately wrongfully terminated Plaintiff's employment. Plaintiff’s FAC goes on to describe that such conduct was done, ratified, or authorized by individuals at Defendant who were officers, directors and/or managing agents. As Plaintiff’s FAC contains more than sufficient facts to support a finding of punitive damages, Defendant’s Motion must be denied. Should the Court be inclined to grant Defendant’s Motion, Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court grant leave to amend. II. PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGATIONS This is a wrongful termination, disability discrimination, and failure to accommodate claim. Through this action, Plaintiff seeks damages, including punitive damages, for the adverse employment actions he suffered at the hands of Defendant. Plaintiff worked for Defendant as a security guard from October 3, 2016 to his wrongful termination on May 29, 2018. FAC 9 10, 15. In February 2017, Plaintiff provided Defendant with his restrictions for light duty work from his health care provider because he had begun to experience significant swelling in his extremities. FAC q 11. Instead of grant the restrictions, or engage in any sort of interactive process, Defendant denied the request, and forced Plaintiff to begin a leave of absence. Ibid. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff suffered a massive stroke and was placed off work to recover. FAC 12. In preparing to return to work, Plaintiff provided Defendant with documentation setting forth minor restrictions upon his return to work that included limiting any prolonged standing, walking or sitting. FAC 9 13, 14. Plaintiff suggested to Defendant that a stool would help ; 2 PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFF'S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT Oo 00 NN O N Lh RR W N DN N N N N N O N N N mm e m e m e m e m p e je m m d e m ed 0 N O N Ln BA W N = O OV N N N BR W N = o comport with his restrictions. FAC § 14. Even though Plaintiff's request was straightforward and supported by medical documentation, Defendant simply gave Plaintiff the run-around, claiming it needed more clarification before it would provide Plaintiff with any accommodations, including the stool. FAC { 14. Shortly thereafter, in retaliation for taking his medical leave and requesting a reasonable accommodation, Plaintiff received a written warning that ultimately led to his termination. FAC 9 15-17, 57-65. IOI. LEGAL ARGUMENT A. The Legal Standard Governing Motions to Strike As with demurrers, motions to strike are generally distvorsd. The policy of the law is to construe the pleadings “liberally . . . with a view to substantial justice.” CCP § 452. Thus, purely technical objections generally receive short shrift. To withstand a motion to strike an allegation of punitive damages, a plaintiff must plead ultimate facts showing entitlement to such relief. Clazson v. Sup. Ct. (Pedus Services, Inc.), 67 Cal. App. 4th 1253, 1255 (1998). Courts are increasingly liberal, however, as to what constitutes sufficient “fact-pleading” on a claim for punitive damages and will accept even conclusory characterizations of a defendant’s conduct as “malicious” and “oppressive” where the facts alleged in the complaint provide a sufficient basis for such characterizations. See e.g., Perkins v. Sup. Ct. (General Tel. Directory Co.), 117 Cal. App. 3d 1, 6- 7 (1981); Clauson, supra, 67 Cal. App. 4th 1253. However, “[w]hat is important is that the complaint as a whole contain sufficient facts to apprise the defendant of the basis upon which the plaintiff is seeking relief.” See Perkins, supra, 117 Cal. App. 3d at 6. In ruling on a motion to strike, the Court must “read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth.” Clauson, supra, 67 Cal. App. 4th at 1255. Defendant challenges Plaintiff’s entitlement to punitive damages on the grounds that he failed to allege sufficient facts, and failed to allege the identity of the sufficiently senior managing agent of Defendant who was involved in the decisions alleged in the FAC. However, the allegations of Plaintiffs FAC are more than sufficient. Not only has Plaintiff pled sufficient facts that support a finding of punitive damages against Defendant, he pleads that such actions were done by managing agents of Defendant and/or such actions were ratified or authorized by such 3 PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFF'S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT NO 0 3 O N RA W N = N N N N N NN N O N N N N e m mm em e m p m e m e d p m e d je 0 uN S N n n B R A W N = O 0 N N N R W =e oo managing agents. B. Plaintiff’s Complaint States Facts Sufficient to Support a Request for Punitive Damages Under Cal. Civ. Code Section 3294, “malice” is “conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff...” Id., subd. (c¢) (1). Similarly, “oppression,” is “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.” California Civil Code § 3294, subd. (c) (2). Indeed, evidence of intentional discrimination is evidence upon which a claim for punitive damages may be based. See Tomaselli v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 25 Cal. App. 4th 1269, 1286 (1994). Defendant argues in its Motion that Plaintiff’s FAC does not support a claim for punitive damages because “Plaintiff himself admits that Hoag engaged in the interactive process as was working with him and his doctor to identify whether Hoag could accommodate any of Plaintiff’s reasonable accommodations”... See Motion at p. 5. Defendant’s argument wholly misstates the allegations of the FAC. Read as a whole, and taking the allegations as true, Plaintiffs FAC actually alleges that Defendant refused to engage in an interactive process, and refused to provide a reasonable accommodation to Plaintiff. Specifically, Plaintiff’s FAC alleges that “Plaintiff informed Hoag of his restrictions, however, Hoag denied Plaintiff’s request, and refused to engage in any sort of interactive process to determine any accommodations” forcing Plaintiff to begin a leave of absence instead. FAC q 11. Plaintiff further alleges that after returning from his leave after recovering from a massive stroke, Defendant refused to grant reasonable accommodations for, among other things, a stool, and instead, gave Plaintiff the run-around on these very basic, run-of- the-mill requests for accommodation. FAC 9 13-16. Plaintiff’s FAC further alleges that when he returned from his leave, and following Defendant’s denial of his requests for accommodation, Defendant presented Plaintiff with pretextual disciplinary actions that ultimately led to his wrongful termination. FAC 7 16-17. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that the pretextual disciplinary actions and wrongful termination were discriminatory and done in retaliation for engaging in protected activity by, requesting and taking a medical leave of absence, and requesting a 4 PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFF'S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT No OO 0 9 NN Wn Ww 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 reasonable accommodation. FAC f 16-17. These specific factual allegations support a finding of intentional conduct on the part of Defendant that was designed to cause injury to Plaintiff in conscious disregard for his rights. See, e.g., Perkins v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d 1, 5-7 (1981) (allegations that the defendant “wrongfully and intentionally” invaded the plaintiff's privacy and shut off his telephone service “in retaliation” for prior complaints pled sufficient motive to establish malice for purposes of punitive damages). C. Plaintiffs Complaint States Facts Sufficient to Support a Request for Punitive Damages by an Entity Defendant Defendant further contends that Plaintiff was required to and failed to allege specific allegations of fraud, malic, or oppression that were authorized or ratified by any “sufficiently senior ‘managing agent’ of Hoag.” Motion at p. 6. This argument is wholly without merit. Critically, Defendant fails to cite to any authority that requires Plaintiff to allege and identify the specific “sufficiently senior ‘managing agent’ of Hoag who committed the actions. See Opposition at p. 6. Indeed, such a requirement, if it existed (which it doesn’t), is illogical. Employees aren’t typically consulted when being wrongfully terminated, and thus, oftentimes are unaware of the identities of the individuals who had any involvement in the termination decision. In litigation, however, a plaintiff has tools at his disposal that will enable him to learn who at the company made the decisions, who participated in such decisions, and who is responsible for implementing policies, among other things. A plaintiff need only plead ultimate facts that show an entitlement to punitive damages, not the evidence by which he intends to prove them. Clauson v. Superior Court, 67 Cal. App. 4th 1253, 1255 (1998); Green v. Palmer, 15 Cal. 411, 415 (1860). Moreover, an officer/director/managing agent of the company need not have made the decision himself; liability for punitive damages can be triggered simply where an officer/director/managing agent of a company is aware of such actions and simply fails to act. See Roberts v. Ford Aerospace, 224 Cal. App. 3d 793 (1990). As Plaintiff pled specific facts sufficient to establish an entitlement to punitive damages, and plead that the offending actions were authorized and/or ratified by one or more of Defendant’s officers, directors, and/or managing agents, Plaintiff>s complaint sufficiently pleads an entitlement 5 PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT OO 0 NN A N Wn Rh W N N N O N N N N N N O N mm e m mm p m p m e m e m p m e d je QW N O N nn RA W N = O O N S N NN RE W N D N = to punitive damages against Defendant as an entity defendant. Given the circumstances outlined at length in the Complaint and the case law on point, there is little doubt that, if Plaintiff can prove his allegations at time of trial, he would be allowed to request and obtain punitive damages. D. Plaintiff must be Given the Opportunity to Amend his Complaint if Necessary If amending the Complaint is necessary to support a request for punitive damages, Plaintiff should have the opportunity to amend his Complaint. Liberal interpretation and amendment of pleadings is strongly favored to allow resolution on the merits in furtherance of substantial justice between the parties. Dieckmann v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. App. 3d 345, 352 (1985). If there is a reasonable possibility that a defect in the complaint can be cured by amendment, leave to amend should be granted. Minsky v. City of Los Angeles, 11 Cal. 3d 113, 118 (1974). The strong policy in favor of amendment to pleadings is reflected in California Code of Civil Procedure § 473, which gives the court significant discretion to permit the amendment of pleadings in the furtherance of justice. California Code of Civil Procedure § 473(a)(2); see also Higgins v. Del Faro, 123 Cal. App. 3d 558, 564-565 (1981); Rainer v. Community Memorial Hosp., 18 Cal.App.3d 240, 251-256 (1971). If the original pleading has not framed the issues in an articulate and precise manner, a plaintiff should not be precluded from having a trial on the merits. Honig v. Financial Corp. of America, 6 Cal.App.4th 960, 965 (1992). Therefore, should amendment of the Complaint be necessary to request punitive damages, Plaintiff must have the opportunity to amend. 1" I" I" 1" 1" i" " I" nn 6 PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFF'S FIRST : AMENDED COMPLAINT NO 00 N N Un Bh W N N N N O N N N N N O N O N m m e m pe d e m p m p m e m p m p m 0 N N BR W N = D V N S N B R A W N E S IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, this Court should overrule Defendant’s Motion. Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant intended to harm Plaintiff and further engaged in fraud and/or oppression in doing so in violation of California law, and that such actions were authorized or ratified by officers, directors, and/or managing agents of Defendant. The law requires nothing more. In the alternative, should this Court decide to sustain the Motion, Plaintiff requests leave to amend his FAC. DATED: February 22,2019 AEGIS LAW FIRM, PC By: Us [- Samuel A. Wong Ali S. Carlsen Attorneys for Plaintiff WALTER COLLINS 7 PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT NO 00 9 NN Wn Re W N J t Oo 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, the undersigned, am employed in the County of Orange, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action; am employed with Aegis Law Firm PC and my business address is 9811 Irvine Center Drive, Suite 100, Irvine, California 92618. On February 22, 2019, I served the foregoing document entitled: e PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT on all the appearing and/or interested parties in this action by placing [| the original [X] a true copy thereof enclosed in sealed envelope(s) addressed as follows: Joshua R. Mino Godes & Preis, LLP 300 Spectrum Center Drive, Suite 1420 Irvine, CA 92618 Attorneys for Defendant: Hoag Memorial Hospital Presbyterian [1 (BY MAIL) I am readily familiar with the firm’s practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with the U.S. Postal Service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid at Irvine, California in the ordinary course of business. I am aware+ that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postage cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing this affidavit. (Cal Code Civ. Proc. § 1013(a); Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 5(a); Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 5(c).) X] (BY OVERNIGHT MAIL) I am personally and readily familiar with the business practice of Aegis Law Firm PC for collection and processing correspondence for overnight delivery, and I caused such document(s) described herein to be deposited for delivery to a facility regularly maintained Federal Express for overnight delivery. (Cal Code Civ. Proc. § 1013(c); Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 5(c).) 1 (BY ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION) I caused s11aid document(s) to be served via electronic transmission to the addressee(s) listed above on the date below. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1010.6(6); Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 5(b)(2)(E); Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 5(b)(3).) [1] (BY PERSONAL SERVICE) I delivered the foregoing document by hand delivery to the addressed named above. (Cal Code Civ. Proc. § 1011; Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 5(b)(2)(A).) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on February 22, 2019, at Irvine, California. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE