OppositionOppositionCal. Super. - 4th Dist.July 3, 2018AN nn BA W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 23 26 27 28 RICHARD E. QUINTILONE II (SBN 200995) ANDREW H. HAAS (SBN 276143) GEORGE A. ALOUPAS (SBN 313112) ELECTRONICALLY FILED rE oe fe aR PLL Ls Superior Court of Califarnia, ’ County of Orange LAKE FOREST, CA 92630-4961 TELEPHONE NO. (949) 458-9675 03/13/2019 at 05:36:00 PM FACSIMILE NO. (949) 458-9679 Clerk of the Superior Court EMAIL: REQ@QUINTLAW.COM; AHH@QUINTLAW.COM; GAA@QUIN By & Clerk, Deputy Clerk Attorneys for Plaintiff, KATIE KELLY, an individual, SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ORANGE -- CENTRAL JUSTICE CENTER KATIE KELLY, an individual, Case No.: 30-2018-01003202 Plaintiff, Assigned for all Purposes to: Hon. Walter Schwarm VS. Dept.: C-19 CINNABAR EQUESTRIAN OPERATIONS, PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO INC., a California Corporation; SILVER- DEFENDANTS’ DEMURRER TO BRONZE CORPORATION, a California PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED Corporation; and DOES 1 through 100, COMPLAINT; DECLARATION BY inclusive, ANDREW H. HAAS, ESQ. Date: April 2, 2019 Defendants. Time: 1:30 p.m. Dept.: C-19 Complaint Filed: July 3, 2018 FAC Filed: November 13, 2018 OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER AN nn BA W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 23 26 27 28 L INTRODUCTION Defendant’s Demurrer should be stricken because it does not comply with California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1113(f) because “A memorandum that exceeds 10 pages must include a table of contents and a table of authorities.” Moreover, “a memorandum that exceeds the page limits of these rules must be filed and considered in the same manner as a late-filed paper.” California Rule of Court 3.1113(g). A judge has the discretion to refuse to consider a late-filed paper. If the judge does so, the minutes or order must so indicate. California Rule of Court 3.1300(d). The Court should not consider the demurrer and overrule it on its face because it exceeds ten (10) pages and does not include a table of contents or a table of authorities. See Defendant’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s First amended Complaint, p. 11. Judges have broad discretion under Cal. Rules of Court 3.1300(d) to refuse to consider papers without a prior court order finding good cause for the late submission. Rancho Mirage Country Club Homeowners Ass’n v. Hazelbaker (2016) 2 Cal. App.5th 252. Defendant’s Demurrer cannot be sustained. A demurrer is not the place to challenge disputed facts. “[A] hearing on a demurrer cannot be turned into a contested evidentiary hearing.” Unruh- Haxton v. Regents of University of California (2008) 162 Cal. App.4th 343, 365. On review, the appellate court liberally construes the pleading in a reasonable manner and will liberally construe the pleading so as to achieve substantial justice between the parties, not to summarily dispose of a defective pleading that can be salvaged or amended as they can be here. Leonte v. ACS State and Local Solutions, Inc. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 521, 525; Page v. Los Angeles County Probation Dept. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1141. The appellate court is also not concerned with how or even if Plaintiff can prove her allegations at trial. Canton Poultry & Deli, Inc. v. Stockwell, Harris, Widom & Woolverton (2003) 109 Cal. App.4th 1219, 1226; N.V. Heathorn, Inc. v County of San Mateo (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1526, 1531. The appellate court will ignore erroneous or confusing labels or captions by the pleader; it is focusing on the facts alleged. Sunset Drive Corp. v. City of Redlands (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 215, 218-219; Ananda Church of Self-Realization v. Massachusetts Bay Ins. Co. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1273, 1281. Thus, the defendant cannot set forth arguments in their demurrer that, if proven true, would defeat plaintiff's complaint. Gould v. Maryland Sound Industries, Inc. (1995) 31 2 OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER AN nn BA W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 23 26 27 28 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1144. The appellate court will presume that Plaintiff can prove the facts alleged. Hill v. City of Santa Barbara (1961) 196 Cal.App.2d 580, 585. Plaintiff has alleged facts in the Complaint that are not contradicted by the exhibits and judicially noticed documents. The court must assume the truth of Plaintiff’s allegations. California Public Employees’ Retirement System v. Superior Court (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 174, 178, disapproved of on other grounds in State Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners v. Superior Court (2009) 45 Cal.4th 963. Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) alleges: (1) Breach of Contract; (2) Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; (3) Intentional Interference with Prospective economic Relations; (4) Negligent Interference with Prospective Economic Relations; and (5) Premises Liability. The FAC clearly apprises Defendants of the claims against them as well as the terms of the Boarding Agreement. On or around December 2010, Plaintiff received a call from Ms. Robin Borders of Defendant CINNABAR informing her that there were stalls available for Plaintiff to become a Trainer. (FAC | 15). Defendant SILVER-BRONZE leased the land to Defendant CINNABAR. (FAC qq 14, 29, 67). CINNABAR knew that Plaintiff had many clients that she trained to ride horses and arranged from Plaintiff to move in on or around March 2012 and induced her to enter into the contract based on many promises and made many promises after the parties signed the Boarding Agreement (Id.). Over time, the services promised to Plaintiff in the Boarding Agreement from Defendants began to disappear, which resulted in the horses being under-fed, the stalls deteriorating and not being kept to even the bare minimum standard, with nothing being done by Defendants to effectively remedy these issues. (FAC 16-23). The deplorable conditions came to a head in October 2017, when Plaintiff’s horse “Can’t Catch Cole” suffered a catastrophic injury to his leg while lying down and putting his leg through rotted wood at the base of his stall resulting in flesh from his leg being torn to the bone. (FAC [ 23). Plaintiff complained to Defendants regarding the deplorable conditions at the equestrian preserve only for such complaints to fall on deaf ears. (FAC q 25). Shortly after reporting these conditions, Plaintiff was informed by Defendant CINNABAR that her Boarding Agreement would be terminated effective May 15, 2018. (FAC (26). Plaintiff sufficiently plead all the elements of each claim making the Demurrer moot. Discovery is at issue and sworn responses and additional documents are being produced after this opposition is due. For 3 OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER AN nn BA W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 23 26 27 28 example, though the Defendant produced the very contract it claims it is uncertain about, that can be cured by amendment to the existing Complaint. Finally, there are enough facts pled that would support a jury’s finding of “malice, oppression or fraud” warranting punitive damages. Based on the facts that were pled in Plaintiff’s Complaint, Defendants’ Demurrer and Motion to Strike Punitive Damages should be denied, or in the alternative, the Court should grant Plaintiff leave to amend to cure any deficiencies. IL. THERE IS NO BASIS TO SUSTAIN THE DEMURRER In the construction of a pleading, for the purpose of determining its effects, its allegations must be liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice between the parties. Code of Civil Procedure § 452 Liberal interpretation is the standard and as such this Court must construe pleadings liberally as against a demurrer. Gerritt v. Fullerton Union High School District, (1938) 24 Cal. App.2d 482, 486; Sexter v. Phillip Morris, Inc., (1975) 54 Cal. App.3d 7, 18; Perez v. Golden Empire Transit Dist. (2012) 209 Cal. App.4th 1228 (holding that where allegations are subject to different reasonable interpretations, court must draw “inferences favorable to the plaintiff, not the defendant”). Plaintiff's allegations must be accepted as true for the purpose of ruling on the demurrer. Del E. Webb Corp., v. Structural Materials Co., (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 604. For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded. Serrano v. Priest, (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591. Applying the foregoing authority, the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s Complaint must be judged liberally. Defendants’ contention that the allegations lack sufficient factual bases or are uncertain must be overruled. Plaintiff has set forth suitable facts, which would entitle Plaintiff to relief. Accordingly, Defendants’ Demurrer should be overruled in its entirety. III. BREACH OF CONTRACT IS SUFFICIENTLY PLED Defendants’ claims that the contract is uncertain, that it cannot be ascertained from the pleadings whether the contract in question is written, oral, or implied by conduct yet fails to note that it held the only fully signed Boarder Agreement involving the plaintiff that it only recently produced. Further, Plaintiff attached a true and correct copy of the Boarding Agreement that contained all of the terms of the agreement, satisfying the purpose of the requirements under Gilmore and Otworth, as cited by Defendants. Additionally, Plaintiff sufficiently alleged a breach of the Boarding Agreement and training Contract as 4 OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER AN nn BA W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 23 26 27 28 well as the allegations establish there is a disputed issue of fact as to any oral representations and whether they might fall under the parol evidence rule. The rule is limited to oral evidence that “contradicts” the terms of the contract. In some circumstances, California law will allow the introduction of outside evidence to clarify contract terms and evidence of post contract modifications are almost always allowed. California Code of Civ. Procedure 1856(g). A. Plaintiff Has Sufficiently Alleged the Terms of the Boarding Agreement and Attached a Copy Including the Sufficient, Material Terms to the Contract. Defendant possess the only fully signed copy of the Boarding Agreement which was later produced. Filing a demurrer to challenge the Pleadings relating to a contract that was provided to the Plaintiff through Discovery is improper. Plaintiff pled the existence of a Boarding Agreement, and even attached part of the Boarding Agreement to her Complaint. Defendant seeks to demur based on the Contract attached to the FAC not being a fully executed agreement, however, does not actually provide authority for this contention. Instead Defendants mistakenly rely on language cited in the demurrer, to avoid a circumstance where “a portion which may be material has been omitted, the complaint is insufficient.” See Demurrer, p. 3, line 23, citing Gilmore v. Lycoming Fire Ins. Co. (1880) 55 Cal. 123, 124. Defendants’ reliance on Gilmore is misplaced as the full terms of the agreement were attached. See FAC, Exhibit A. Further, Plaintiff has since been able to obtain a fully executed agreement. Attached herein is a true and correct copy. See Exhibit A to Declaration by Andrew H. Haas, Esq. - Fully Executed Boarding Agreement. Whether the contract contains the signatures of the parties does not change the terms already set forth in the non-executed agreement as the terms of the contract were plead sufficiently in Plaintiff’s FAC. Even assuming arguendo that the non-executed agreement was insufficient under the law at this very early stage, by attaching the executed agreement herein, demonstrates how easily this can be corrected, that the court should grant leave to amend. Regarding Defendants’ other argument that it cannot be ascertained from the pleadings whether the contract was written, oral, or implied, Plaintiff pleads both the existence of a written Boarding Agreement (FAC qq 13, 30, and 36) and Defendants acknowledge the existence of same in their Demurrer. There is also no uncertainty with regard to the cause of action because the existence of the Boarding Agreement was pled, and the breach of the Boarding Agreement occurred when Defendants failed to upkeep the equestrian 5 OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER AN nn BA W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 23 26 27 28 preserve as it degraded to deplorable and dangerous conditions as was properly pled, then terminated the Boarding Agreement when Plaintiff complained about the conditions. (FAC {[] 25, and 26). As such, Plaintiff pled sufficient facts to allege a Breach of Contract. B. The Oral Training Contract is Not Barred by the Parol Evidence Rule Defendants’ assertion that the parol evidence rule is grounds to sustain a demurer is unsupported. No authority has been provided that there is precedent for an evidentiary rule barring a cause of action. Even if the argument carried merit, which it does not, it would not on its own erase all triable issues of fact for a jury to resolve. Moreover, Defendants misapply the rule because the rule only bars “prior...or...contemporaneous” oral agreements, not agreements entered into after the formation of a written contract. Such oral statements are relevant for a number of purposes including, but not limited to modification and performance of the contract. Further, Defendants do not show how the oral agreements “contradict” the written contract, as they appear to be additional terms not directly contradicted by anything in the Boarding Agreement. In addition, as stated above, California has made exceptions to the parol evidence rule to show there was fraud at the inducement of the contract, and Defendants seek to misuse the rule to preclude evidence of Defendants committing fraud at the outset and during the performance of the contract. Pursuant to California Code of Civ. Procedure 1856(g), “This section does not exclude other evidence ... to establish illegality or fraud.” Richard v. Baker (1956) 141 Cal.App.2d 857, 863; CCP § 1856, subds. (f) & (g); Edwards v. Centex Real Estate Corp. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 15, 42;2 Witkin, Cal. Evidence, supra, Documentary Evidence, § 97, p. 218.) C. Plaintiff Can Assert for Breach of Contract for the Benefit of a Third Party A contract made expressly for the benefit of a third person may be enforced by the third person at any time before the contracting parties rescind it. Cal. Civ. Code § 1559. Consequently, where one person for a valuable consideration engages with another to do some act for the benefit of a third person, and the agreement thus made has not been rescinded, the party for whose benefit the contract or promise was made, or who would enjoy the benefit of the act, may maintain an action against the promisor for the breach of the promisor’s engagement. Washer v. Independent Mining & 6 OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER AN nn BA W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 23 26 27 28 Development Co., 142 Cal. 702 (1904); Johnson v. Holmes Tuttle Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 160 Cal. App. 2d 290, 325 P.2d 193 (2d Dist. 1958). IV. THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION IS SUFFICIENTLY PLED. There is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every contract that neither party will do anything which will injure the right of the other to receive the benefits of the agreement. Comunale v. Traders & General Ins. Co. (1958) 50 Cal.2d 654, 658 (internal citation omitted). The issue of whether the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing has been breached is ordinarily “a question of fact unless only one inference [can]be drawn from the evidence.” Hicks v. ET. Legg & Associates (2001) 89Cal.App.4th 496, 509 (internal citation omitted). A. Plaintiffs Claims Against Cinnabar Should Stand. Here, Plaintiff has pled enough facts to allege a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by Defendants. As was stated in Plaintiff’s Complaint, Defendants have engaged in conscious and deliberate acts to frustrate the purpose of Plaintiff's benefit to the Boarding Agreement, such as failing to upkeep the stalls, failing to clean the wash racks, and even permitting the abuse of the horses as was caught on videotape, among other things. (FAC 30). Defendants knew or should have known that these actions were going on and did nothing to prevent it. Thus, as presently pled, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to allege a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing against Defendants. B. Plaintiff’s Claim Against Silver-Bronze Should Stand. Contrary to the assertions by Defendants, Plaintiff is not “a stranger” to the contract. As stated above, Plaintiff is a third-party beneficiary to the commercial lease agreement between Cinnabar and Silver-Bronze. Plaintiff was ultimately injured by Cinnabar’s failure to maintain the grounds as required by its contract, and required by law, and zoning ordinances, and fell flat of their duty. Silver-Bronze failed to enforce its own standards under the lease agreement which resulted in numerous violations and failed to maintain a safe place and carry out the contract in good faith. Therefore, this claim should survive demurrer as it presents a triable issue of fact for the jury. V. INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE IS SUFFICIENTLY PLED The five elements for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage are: (1) an economic relationship between the plaintiff and some third party, with the probability of future economic 7 OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER AN nn BA W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 23 26 27 28 benefit to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant’s knowledge of the relationship; (3) intentional acts on the part of the defendant designed to disrupt the relationship; (4) actual disruption of the relationship; and (5) economic harm to the plaintiff proximately caused by the acts of the Defendant.” Youst v. Longo (1987) 43 Cal.3d 64, 71, fn. 6. A plaintiff need only plead that the conduct alleged to constitute the interference was independently wrongful, i.e., un lawful for reasons other than that it interfered with a prospective economic advantage. Crown Imports, LLC v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal. App.4th 1395, 1404. “Commonly included among improper means are actions which are independently actionable, violations of federal or state law or unethical business practices, e.g., violence, misrepresentation, unfounded litigation, defamation, trade libel or trade mark infringement.” PMC, Inc. v. Saban Entertainment, Inc. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 579, 603 (internal citation omitted). Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint allegse independently wrongful acts committed by Defendants sufficient to survive demurrer. Defendants refererence to Plaintiff’s conclusion that Defendant “engaged in wrongful conduct.” See Demurrer, p. 2, line 9. Moreover, Defendants oversaw an equestrian preserve where the horses were being abused and underfed, the stalls were kept in deplorable conditions which resulted in a catastrophic injury to Plaintiff’s horse “Can’t Catch Cole,” the overcharging of fees to Plaintiff from Defendants, and the owner of Defendant CINNABAR using the preserve as his own personal dumping site. (FAC q 30). Also, when Plaintiff signed the Boarding Agreement, Defendants knew that Plaintiff would have clients and that both Plaintiff and Defendants would monetarily benefit. (FAC qq 15, 36, and 46). The intentional acts above are were done to disrupt the economic relationship between Plaintiff and her 25-30 clients, all culminating in the termination of the Boarding Agreement. As such, Plaintiff has stated sufficient facts to allege Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Relations. Further, Plaintiff alleges sufficient facts that Silver-Bronze was complicit in the wrongful acts by failing to ensure the safety of the animals, trainers and visitors and that the tenants were in compliance with the code and proper standard of care. VI. THE FAC SUFFICIENTLY PLEADS NEGLIGENT INTERFERENCE The tort of negligent interference with prospective economic advantage is established where a plaintiff demonstrates that (1) an economic relationship existed between the plaintiff and a third party 8 OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER AN nn BA W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 23 26 27 28 which contained a reasonably probable future economic benefit or advantage to plaintiff; (2) the defendant knew of the existence of the relationship and was aware or should have been aware that if it did not act with due care its actions would interfere with this relationship and cause plaintiff to lose in whole or in part the probable future economic benefit or advantage of the relationship; (3) the defendant was negligent; and (4) such negligence caused damage to plaintiff in that the relationship was actually interfered with or disrupted and plaintiff lost in whole or in part the economic benefits or advantage reasonably expected from the relationship.” North American Chemical Co. v. Superior Court (1997) 59Cal. App.4th 764, 786. The tort of negligent interference with economic relationship arises only when the defendant owes the plaintiff a duty of care. Limandri v. Judkins (1997) 52 Cal. App.4th 326, 348. Here, there was an economic relationship that existed between Plaintiff and her clients for which Defendants were aware. Defendants were negligent in their maintenance and upkeep of the equestrian preserve and were either grossly negligent or acted purposefully to abuse the horses at the equestrian preserve. (FAC q 30). These acts alone disrupted the relationship with Plaintiff and her clients, but the damage was truly done when Defendant CINNABAR terminated the Boarding Agreement on or around May 15, 2018 after Plaintiff complained about the deplorable conditions at the equestrian preserve and the treatment of the horses there. (FAC { 26). As such, Plaintiff has stated sufficient facts to allege a Negligent Interference with Prospective Economic Relations claim. VII. THE FAC ALLEGES SUFFICIENT FACTS FOR PREMISES LIABILITY “It is now well established that California law requires landowners to maintain land in their possession and control in a reasonably safe condition.” Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center (1993) 6 Cal.4th 666, 674. The proper test to be applied to the liability of the possessor of land . . . is whether in the management of his property he has acted as a reasonable man in view of the probability of injury to others . ..” Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 119. Here, the Boarding Agreement does in fact impose a duty on Defendant CINNABAR to provide board, feed, and reasonable stall cleaning for the boarder, in this case Plaintiff, and her horses. As was explained in Plaintiff’s Complaint, this duty was breached when Defendant CINNABAR failed to provide adequate feed, failed to keep the stalls reasonably clean and safe for the horses, and permitted employees of Defendant CINNABAR to abuse the horses. (FAC {[ 30). Defendants’ failure to keep the equestrian 9 OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER AN nn BA W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 23 26 27 28 preserve and the stalls in a safe condition resulted in a catastrophic injury to Plaintiff’s horse’s leg in October 2017. (FAC (23). As such, Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts to allege a premises liability claim. VIII. PLAINTIFF IS REQUESTING LEAVE TO AMEND Courts are very liberal in permitting amendments, not only where a complaint is defective in form, but also where substantive defects are apparent: “Liberality in permitting amendment is the rule, if a fair opportunity to correct any defect has not been given.” Angie M. v. Superior Court (Hiemstra) (1995) 37 Cal. App.4th 1217, 1227; Stevens v. Superior Court (API Auto Ins. Services) (1999) 75 Cal. App.4th 594. In fact, unless the complaint shows on its face that it is incapable of amendment, denial of leave to amend constitutes an abuse of discretion, irrespective of whether leave to amend is requested or not. McDonald v. Superior Court (Flintkote Co.) (1986) 180 Cal. App.3d 297, 303-304; see also City of Stockton v. Superior Court (Civic Partners Stockton, LLC) (2007) 42 Cal.4th 730, 747 (holding that where plaintiff has not had opportunity to amend complaint in response to demurrer, “leave to amend is liberally allowed as a matter of fairness unless the complaint shows on its face that it is incapable of amendment”). As such, if the Court does find that there are defects in the Complaint, the Court should grant leave to amend for Plaintiff to fix such defects. Here, Plaintiff even attempted to meet and confer with Defendants regarding a stipulation for leave to amend the complaint to add causes of action. See Exhibit B to Declaration by Andrew H. Haas, Esq. - February 20, 2019 Meet and Confer Letter. IX. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court overrule Defendants’ demurrer to the Complaint, or, in the alternative, Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court to grant Plaintiff leave to amend in order to cure any defects that are in the Complaint. Dated: March 19, 2019 QUINTILONE & ASSOCIATES By: RICHARD E. QUINTILONE II, ANDREW H. HAAS GEORGE A. ALOUPAS Attorneys for Plaintiff KATIE KELLY 10 OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER OO 00 J A Ln Bx W N = N N N N N N N N N mm e m e m e m e m e m e m e m e m c o NN A N Un RA W O N D = O OO N N N R E W I N D = O PROOF OF SERVICE I, the undersigned, declare as follows: I am a citizen of the United States, over the age of 18 years, and not a party to the within action. I am an employee of or agent for Quintilone & Associates, whose business address is 22974 El Toro Rd., Suite 100, Lake Forest, CA 92630-4961. On March 19, 2019, I served the foregoing document(s): DECLARATION OF AHH, ESQ. ISO OF OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE on the following parties in this action addressed as follows: SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST X (BY MAIL) 1 caused a true copy of each document, placed in a sealed envelope with postage fully paid, to be placed in the United States mail at Lake Forest, California. I am "readily familiar" with this firm's business practice for collection and processing of mail, that in the ordinary course of business said document(s) would be deposited with the U.S. Postal Service on that same day. I understand that the service shall be presumed invalid if the postal cancellation date or postage meter date on the envelope is more than one day after the date of deposit for mailing contained on this affidavit. (BY PERSONAL SERVICE) 1 delivered each such document by hand to each addressee above. (BY OVERNIGHT DELIVERY) 1 caused a true copy of each document, placed in a sealed envelope with delivery fees provided for, to be deposited in a box regularly maintained by Federal Express or Overnight Express. I am readily familiar with this firm's practice for collection and processing of documents for overnight delivery and know that in the ordinary course of Quintilone & Associates’ business practice the document(s) described above will be deposited in a box or other facility regularly maintained by Federal Express or Overnight Express or delivered to a courier or driver authorized by Federal Express or Overnight Express to receive documents on the same date it is placed at Quintilone & Associates for collection. (BY FACSIMILE) By use of facsimile machine number 949.458.9679, I served a copy of the within document(s) on the above interested parties at the facsimile numbers listed above. The transmission was reported as complete and without error. The transmission report was properly issued by the transmitting facsimile machine. X (BY ELECTRONIC SERVICE) 1 delivered each such document by electronic means pursuant to California Civil Code, Code of Civil Procedure, the Local Rules and/or FRCP § 5(b)(2), et seq. Executed on March 19, 2019 at Lake Forest, California. (FEDERAL) I declare under penalty of perjury that the above is true and correct. X (STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury that the above is true and correct. ANDREW H. HAAS -1- PROOF OF SERVICE OO 00 J A Ln Bx W N = ID DN DN N N N N Y Y m = = = = es e s e l e s co N N L t A W N = O OO N N N B A W ND = O Evan A. Berman, Esq. Arlene N. Olson, Esq. BERMAN BERMAN BERMAN SCHNEIDER & LOWARY, LLP 11900 W. Olympic Blvd., Ste. 600 Los Angeles, CA 90064-1151 Tel.: (310) 447-9000 Fax: (310) 447-9011 Email: eaberman@b3law.com anolson @b3law.com Q&A Case No.: 18.01386 SERVICE LIST Attorneys for Defendants D- PROOF OF SERVICE
