Reply To Opposition

Reply

Cal. Super. - 4th Dist.March 5, 2018

© 00 39 a wn BA W O N = N N N N N N N N O N e m e m e m e m p m e k p m e m c o NN O N Ln kA W N = O O X N N N R E W I N D R O Marc A. Trachtman, Esq. [SBN 167820] Kelsey E. Quist, Esq. [SBN 309876] TRACHTMAN & TRACHTMAN, LLP ELECTRONICALLY FILED 23046 Avenida De La Carlota, Suite 300 Superior Court of California, Laguna Hills, CA 92653 County of Orange Telephone: (349) 282-0100 12/04/2018 at 11:45:00 AM Facsimile: (949) 282-0111 } Clerk of the Superior Court By & Clerk, Deputy Clerk Attorneys for Defendant MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INc. SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ORANGE CHANDLER KENNEDY, an individual; | CASE NO.: 30-2018-00977407-CU-PO-CJC LEILAH FRANKLIN, an individual, [Assigned for All Purposes to Plaintiff, Hon. John C. Gastelum, Department C11] DEFENDANT MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC.’S REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT VS. MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Delaware Corporation.; SHANE BERSIEK, an individual; SEAN BERSIEK, an individual; and DOES 1- 25 inclusive, Date: December 11, 2018 Time: 2:00 p.m. Defendants. Dept: C11 Reservation No.: 72896454 COMPLAINT FILED: 03/05/18 TRIAL DATE: None lL. PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION IMPROPERLY RELIES UPON NEW FACTS NOT ALLEGED IN PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendant Marriott International, Inc.’s (“Marriott”) Demurrer (“Opposition”) improperly relies on new facts not alleged in Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that - DEFENDANT MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC.’S REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT © 00 39 a wn BA W O N = N N N N N N N N O N e m e m e m e m p m e k p m e m c o NN O N Ln kA W N = O O X N N N R E W I N D R O appear on the face of the pleading under attack, or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.2d 311, 318 (emphasis added); Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 (emphasis added). Therefore, the purpose of a general demurrer is to determine the sufficiency of the complaint and the Court should only rule on matters disclosed in that pleading. lon Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881 (emphasis added). No other extrinsic evidence can be considered. Id. (emphasis added); see also George v. Automobile Club of Southern Calif. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1130. Here, Plaintiffs rely on several new facts contained in their Opposition that were not properly alleged in their SAC. Plaintiffs’ Opposition references “Defendants, who were hotel guests and had been consuming alcohol at the Marriott . . .” and cites to page 3, paragraphs 9, 11, and 15-18 of their SAC. [Opposition at p. 2, lines 3-5.] Nowhere in Plaintiffs’ SAC do Plaintiffs allege that Defendants were hotel guests or that Defendants had been consuming alcohol at the Marriott prior to the incident. These new facts are not contained within the four corners of Plaintiffs’ SAC, and thus are improper extrinsic evidence that must be discarded by this Court. Similarly, Plaintiffs’ Opposition also references “Plaintiffs who were about to enter the Marriott . . .” and cites to page 3, paragraph 10, lines 19-20 of their SAC. [Opposition at p. 2, lines 6-7.] Nowhere in Plaintiffs’ SAC can this statement be found. On the contrary, page 3, paragraph 10, lines 19-20 of Plaintiffs’ SAC states: “Plaintiffs CHANDLER KENNEDY and LEILAH FRANKLIN witnessed the attack and ran over to take the injured third-party to safety when suddenly defendants violently and with intent to cause great bodily injury and harm punched Plaintiff CHANDLER KENNEDY in the forehead.” [SAC, p. 3, 10:19-20.] Finally, Plaintiffs’ Opposition makes reference to the surveillance video of the incident in order to allegedly argue that Marriott breached its duty of care to Plaintiffs. Specifically, Plaintiffs’ Opposition claims: mn 2 DEFENDANT MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC.’S REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT © 00 39 a wn BA W O N = N N N N N N N N O N e m e m e m e m p m e k p m e m c o NN O N Ln kA W N = O O X N N N R E W I N D R O “Surveillance video of the incident provided by Defendant MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC. (Marriott) clearly shows as yet unidentified employees of Marriott employees (sic) standing in the lobby, looking through the glass wall between the lobby and the entryway vestibule on the Marriott property, witnessing the beating for several minutes and literally doing nothing either to stop the incident or notify police even though Plaintiff Chandler Kennedy can be seen on her knees, dripping blood onto the ground from her head wound and looking into the lobby at the Marriot employees and gesturing for help. The surveillance video demonstrates that the first and only action taken by Marriott employees was following the altercation when the employees entered the entryway vestibule to clean up the blood. This is a visible manifestation of negligent training and supervision and failure to reasonably protect Defendant’s patrons.” [Opposition, p. 2, lines 11-21.] There are several problems with the allegations above. First and foremost, the surveillance video, in and of itself, is extraneous evidence that cannot be considered by this Court when ruling on Marriott's demurrer. lon Equip. Corp., supra, 110 Cal.App.3d at 881. Second, the surveillance video is not incorporated by reference anywhere in Plaintiffs’ SAC, so as to allow this evidence to be properly before this Court. Plaintiffs’ SAC does not allege that Marriott employees “witnessed the beating for several minutes and did nothing to stop the incident or notify police.” This is notably more specific than the vague allegations contained within the SAC, which do not pass muster. Moreover, Plaintiffs also make reference to the claim that Plaintiff Chandler Kennedy “can be seen . . . looking into the lobby at the Marriott employees and gesturing for help,” citing page 2, lines 11-17 of their SAC. [Opposition at p. 2, lines 15-17.] Again, this allegation is nowhere to be found in Plaintiffs’ SAC. The primary function of a pleading is to give the other party notice so that it may prepare its case. Leet v. Union Pac. R.R. Co. (1944) 25 Cal.2d 605, 619. Plaintiffs’ Opposition asserts new facts not contained within its pleadings which purports to give no notice to Marriott in defending against Plaintiffs’ claims. Thus, Plaintiffs’ misleading and erroneous citations and exaggerated allegations must be discarded by this Court as inappropriate extraneous evidence unsuitable in a demurrer. mn -3- DEFENDANT MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC.’S REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT © 00 39 a wn BA W O N = N N N N N N N N O N e m e m e m e m p m e k p m e m c o NN O N Ln kA W N = O O X N N N R E W I N D R O Il. PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO ALLEGE FACTS SUFFICIENT TO IMPOSE A LEGAL DUTY ON MARRIOTT TO PREVENT A RANDOM, UNFORESEEABLE ASSAULT Determination of whether a duty is owed is an issue of law for the court. Kentucky Fried Chicken of Calif, Inc. v. Sup. Ct. (Brown) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 814, 819. Under general principles applicable to determine the liability of a landowner or occupier for injury to persons on premises held open to the public, the court in determining existence and scope of duty to protect business invitees from criminal conduct of third parties balances foreseeability of harm against burden of duty; if the burden is high, high foreseeability of harm may be required, but lesser degree of foreseeability may be required if there are strong public policy reasons for preventing the harm, or the harm can be prevented by simple means. Id. at 819. A. Plaintiffs Were Neither Guests Of Marriott Nor Invitees Of Marriott So As To Qualify For The “Special Relationship” Exception To The General “No Duty” Rule Citing to Breaux v. Gino's, Inc. and the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 314(A), Plaintiffs’ Opposition claims that a “special relationship” existed between Marriott and Plaintiffs that triggers a duty to undertake “relatively simple measures such as providing assistance to their customers who become ill or need medical attention and that they are liable if they fail to act.” Breaux v. Gino's, Inc. (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 379, 382; Rest. 2d Torts § 314A. Plaintiffs’ SAC then fails to specify any “simple measures” Marriott could have taken to prevent Plaintiffs’ injuries. Plaintiffs’ reasoning is flawed for several reasons. The general rule in California is that a person is ordinarily not required to take affirmative steps to help or protect others, even if it would be easy to do so and the person is in grave danger. Paz v. State of Calif. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 550, 558. This general “no duty” rule is also set forth in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314, which states: mn 4- DEFENDANT MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC.’S REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT OO 00 9 AN Wn BA W N N N N N N N N N O N e m e m e m e m p m e k p m e m c o NN O N Ln kA W N = O O X N N N R E W I N D R O “The fact that [an] actor realizes or should realize that action on his part is necessary for another's aid or protection does not of itself impose upon him a duty to take such action.” Rest.2d Torts § 314. Comment (c) of Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 314, adds: “The rule stated in this Section is applicable irrespective of the gravity of the danger to which the other is subjected and the insignificance of the trouble, effort, or expense of giving him aid or protection.” Rest.2d Torts § 314, Comment (c). Thus, “defendants are not liable in tort for a pure failure to act for the plaintiff's benefit; the fact that the defendant foresees harm to a particular individual from his failure to act does not change the general rule.” 4. Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts 853 (2000). While there are a number of exceptions to the general “no duty” rule outlined above, Plaintiffs have failed to allege sufficient facts to establish they fall within one of the delineated exceptions. Among the most prominent exceptions to the general “no duty” rule are the following: (1) peril created by defendant, and (2) “special relationship.” As Plaintiffs do not allege that Marriott created the sudden assault and battery to Plaintiffs (allegedly perpetrated by Defendants Sean and Shane Bersiek), Marriott will necessarily focus on the “special relationship” exception. The Restatement (Second) of Torts recognizes five such relationships as “special relationships” (1) carrier-passenger, (2) innkeeper-guest, (3) landowner-invitee, (4) custodian-ward, and (5) employer-employee. 6 Witkin, Summary of California Law, Torts §§ 1177-1204. Plaintiffs’ Opposition allegedly purports to claim that a “special relationship” existed either under the innkeeper-guest or landowner-invitee categories. However, Plaintiffs’ SAC fails to allege sufficient facts to prove that either of these categories of “special relationship” existed so as to trigger a duty. The relationship between an innkeeper and its guests and between a possessor of land and those who enter in response to the landowner’s invitation is just such a “special relationship.” Lopez v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 780, 789 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs’ SAC fails to allege facts that Plaintiffs were registered -5- DEFENDANT MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC.’S REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT © 00 39 a wn BA W O N = N N N N N N N N O N e m e m e m e m p m e k p m e m c o NN O N Ln kA W N = O O X N N N R E W I N D R O guests or invitees of Marriott at the time of the incident. As mentioned above, the statement that Plaintiffs “were about to enter the Marriott” is not contained anywhere within Plaintiffs’ SAC. Arguably, neither were Plaintiffs invitees of Marriott at the time of the incident, as the front entryway doors were locked to the public, and access was granted only to registered guests of the hotel via their room key(s). There are simply no facts alleged in Plaintiffs’ SAC that Plaintiffs were registered guests of the Marriott, invited on Marriott's property, or even intended to enter the Marriott prior to the incident. Moreover, the case law cited by Plaintiffs in support of an alleged “special relationship” is notably unavailing. Breaux v. Gino's, Inc. involved the owner and operator of a restaurant in an action for the wrongful death of plaintiff's wife, who choked while eating at the restaurant. Breaux v. Gino's, Inc. (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 379. The Court of Appeal in Breaux affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, holding that the restaurant had met its duty to the decedent by summoning an ambulance promptly, and had no duty to remove, assist in removing, or attempt to remove food which had become stuck in another person’s throat. Id. at 382 (citing Health and Safety Code Section 28689). Breaux presumed a “special relationship” existed since the decedent was a customer of the restaurant at the time of the incident. Id. at 381. Here, Plaintiffs fail to allege sufficient facts that they were guests or invitees of Marriott at the time of the incident - and thus no “special relationship” existed to trigger Marriott's affirmative duty to act. [NOTE: Regardless, Marriott's employee did promptly call 911 once the sudden assault (which originated on public sidewalk) approached Marriott's property.] Similarly, Kentucky Fried Chicken of Cal., Inc. v. Superior Court involved a patron of a fast-food restaurant who brought an action against the restaurant after he had been held hostage by an armed robber. Kentucky Fried Chicken of Cal., Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 14 Cal.4th 814. The plaintiff, a customer at a Redondo Beach restaurant operated by KFC, was seized and held at gunpoint by a robber who threatened to seriously injure plaintiff if the KFC employee did not give him the money in the cash register. Id. at 817- 18. The complaint alleged that KFC failed to provide proper security and failed to 6- DEFENDANT MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC.’S REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT OO 00 9 AN Wn BA W N N N N N N N N N O N e m e m e m e m p m e k p m e m c o NN O N Ln kA W N = O O X N N N R E W I N D R O properly train its employees in how to respond to criminal activity to avoid endangering or further endangering its customers. Id. at 818. The Supreme Court ultimately held that the restaurant did notowe a duty to its patrons to comply with the armed robber’s unlawful demand for surrender of money or property in order to avoid increasing the risk of harm to its patrons. Id. at 824. The Supreme Court reasoned, “[t]he situation is not comparable to that of a shopkeeper who, on the basis of experience, has reason to know that potentially injurious unlawful conduct may occur in the future and for that reason has a duty to take action to deter or prevent that conduct.” Id. This Court should likewise find Marriott did not owe a duty to avoid increasing the unforeseeable risk of harm to Plaintiffs (non-patrons) created by a sudden, unanticipated criminal assault. There is nothing in the SAC to suggest Marriott or its employees were able to differentiate between victim and aggressor, or recognized Plaintiffs as guests/patrons of the hotel. Absent such facts, Marriott did not owe Plaintiffs a legal duty to act. Even if this Court finds Plaintiffs sufficiently pled facts to establish a “special relationship,” which Marriott wholly disputes, Plaintiffs have failed to show that the admittedly “sudden” assault (see Plaintiffs’ SAC, qf] 10-11) amounted to a “known danger” or “imminent and known peril” so as to impose an affirmative duty to act on the part of Marriott. See Rest. 2d Torts, § 344"; Kentucky Fried Chicken, supra, 14 Cal.4th at 823; Taylor v. Centennial Bowl, Inc. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 114, 121. B. Plaintiffs Have Failed To Plead Sufficient Facts To Establish Such A Random, Unforeseen Crime Could Be Reasonably Anticipated By Marriott As frequently recognized, a duty to take affirmative action to control the wrongful acts of a third party will be imposed only where such conduct can be reasonably anticipated. Francis T. v. Village Green Owners Assn. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 490, 499-501. ' Section 344 reads: A possessor of land who holds it open to the public for entry for his business purposes is subject to liability to members of the public while they are upon the land for such a purpose for physical harm caused by the accidental, negligent, or intentionally harmful acts of third persons . . . and by the failure of the possessor to exercise reasonable care. . .” Plaintiffs fail to allege facts sufficient to establish such a purpose here. -7- DEFENDANT MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC.’S REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT OO 00 9 AN Wn BA W N N N N N N N N N O N e m e m e m e m p m e k p m e m c o NN O N Ln kA W N = O O X N N N R E W I N D R O Contrary to Plaintiffs’ senseless statement that “foreseeability is not the issue,” foreseeability is a crucial factor in determining the existence of a duty. Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hospital (1985) 38 Cal.3d 112, 123; Lopez v. McDonald's Corp. (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 495, 506. Moreover, the Supreme Court has held in cases where the burden of preventing future harm is great, a high degree of foreseeability may be required. Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center (1993) 6 Cal.4th 666, 678 (disapproved on other grounds by Reid v. Google (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512). Plaintiffs’ SAC suggests that Marriott was “required to take reasonable precautions to protect patrons from the risk, by and not limited to having additional security on the premises.” [SAC 4 30.] However, the Supreme Court in Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center held that the scope of an owner's duty to tenants and patrons? did not include providing security guards in common areas. Ann M., supra, 6 Cal.4th at 675-76. The Supreme Court concluded, “while there may be circumstances where the hiring of security guards will be required to satisfy a landowner’s duty of care, such action will rarely, if ever, be found to be a ‘minimal burden.” Id. at 679 (citing Hollywood Blvd. Venture v. Superior Court (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 901, 905.) The monetary costs of security guards is not insignificant. /d. Moreover, the obligation to provide patrols adequate to deter criminal conduct is not well defined. Id. Because no one really knows why people commit crime, no one really knows what constitutes ‘adequate’ deterrence in any given situation. Id. As a result, Ann M. held that the degree of foreseeability required for the scope of a landlord's duty to include the hiring of security guards rarely, if ever, can be proven in the absence of prior similar incidents of violent crime on a landlord’s premises. Id. To hold otherwise would be to impose an unfair burden upon landlords and would force landlords to become the insurers of public safety, contrary to 2 Marriott emphasizes that the cases cited by Plaintiffs presume a tenant and/or patron relationship, which determines the scope of the owner’s/landlord’s duty. Plaintiffs have failed to allege sufficient facts to establish they were patrons of Marriott. The Supreme Court held in Ann M. that the purpose of plaintiff's presence on the land, while not determinative, may have some bearing on the liability issue and is to be considered along with other factors weighing for and against imposition of duty.” Ann. M., supra, 6 Cal.4th at 674-75. -8- DEFENDANT MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC.’S REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT OO 00 9 AN Wn BA W N N N N N N N N N O N e m e m e m e m p m e k p m e m c o NN O N Ln kA W N = O O X N N N R E W I N D R O well established policy in this state. Id. (citing Riley v. Marcus (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 103, 109). Just as Ann M. held that violent criminal assaults were not sufficiently foreseeable to impose a duty upon Pacific Plaza to provide security guards in the common areas, neither do the facts alleged by Plaintiffs suffice to impose a duty on Marriott to provide additional security outside their locked hotel doors to prevent random, unforeseeable crime. Plaintiffs’ SAC, while asserting the vague, conclusory statement that Marriott allegedly knew about prior physical altercations which occurred on their grounds, fails to sufficiently describe how these prior altercations were so similar as to impose an affirmative duty to act. See O'Hara v. Western Trees Corp. (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 798, 802 (duty imposed where landlord had known of several previous rapes of tenants, conditions indicating likelihood rapist would repeat attacks, landlord induced tenant to rent apartment without disclosing known information, falsely assured tenant premises were safe and patrolled at all times, and failed to share knowledge of suspect's mode of operation and composite drawings of suspect). A landowner has no duty to take measures to prevent unexpected and random crimes. Nicole M. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1246-47 (emphasis added). lll. PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO PLEAD SUFFICIENT FACTS TO SUPPORT THEIR CLAIM FOR NEGLIGENT HIRING, SUPERVISION, AND RETENTION Plaintiffs’ SAC similarly fails to establish a cause of action for Negligent Hiring, Supervision, and Retention (collectively “Negligent Hiring”), since it fails, at a minimum, to allege facts sufficient to establish an essential element of the claim - i.e. that Marriott knew or should have known that its employee was/became unfit/incompetent and this unfitness/incompetence created a particular risk of harm to others. Judicial Council of California Civil J ury Instructions, Instruction CAC 426. Liability will only be imposed on an employer for Negligent Hiring if it “knew or should have known that hiring the employee created a particular risk or hazard and that particular harm materializes.” Phillips v. TLC Plumbing, Inc. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 9- DEFENDANT MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC.’S REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT © 00 39 a wn BA W O N = N N N N N N N N O N e m e m e m e m p m e k p m e m c o NN O N Ln kA W N = O O X N N N R E W I N D R O 1133, 1139. Plaintiffs’ SAC improperly attempts to use the underlying facts of this incident, as it unfolds, to allegedly establish prior knowledge by Marriott of the unfitness of its employee(s). [SAC | 28.] This makes zero sense. Plaintiffs’ SAC fails to allege any facts that the employees involved in this incident were somehow unfit and/or incompetent prior to this incident, such that the employee’s unfitness/incompetence (of which Marriott knew or should have known prior to the incident), caused or contributed to Plaintiffs’ risk of harm. The theory of negligent hiring encompasses the particular risk by an employee with a history of the specific conduct at issue. J uarez v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 377. Without specific factual allegations that Marriott's employees displayed a pattern or history of unfit/incompetent behavior, prior to this incident, Plaintiffs’ cause of action for negligent hiring must fail as a matter of law. IV. CONCLUSION A Demurrer should be sustained without leave to amend if there is no reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment. Pomona College v. Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1716, 1721 [“If there is no liability as a matter of law, leave to amend should not be granted.”]; State of California Auto. Dismantlers Ass'n v. Interinsurance Exchange (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 735, 741-42; La Vista Cemetery Ass'n v. American Sav. & Loan Ass’n (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 365, 369. “The burden of proving such reasonable possibility is squarely upon the plaintiff.” Blank, supra, 39 Cal.3d at 318. For the reasons set forth herein, Defendant Marriott International, Inc. respectfully requests that this Honorable Court sustain this Demurrer without leave to amend the Third Cause of Action and the Fourth Cause of Action in the Second Amended Complaint by Plaintiffs Chandler Kennedy and Leilah Franklin. DATED: December 4, 2018 TRACHTMAN & TRACHTMAN, LLP /s/ Kelsey E. Quist By: Marc A. Trachtman Kelsey E. Quist Attorneys for Defendant MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC. -10- DEFENDANT MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC.’S REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT OO 00 9 AN Wn BA W N N N N N N N N N O N e m e m e m e m p m e k p m e m c o NN O N Ln kA W N = O O X N N N R E W I N D R O PROOF OF SERVICE Kennedy, et al. vs. Marriott International, Inc., et al, Case No. 30-2018-00977407-CU-PO-CJ C STATE OF CALIFORNIA ) ) Ss. COUNTY OF ORANGE ) |, Erika Sorensen, declare: | am a citizen of the United States and employed in Laguna Hills, California. | am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within-entitled action. My business address is 23046 Avenida De La Carlota, Suite 300, Laguna Hills, CA 92653. On December 4, 2018, | served a copy of the within document(s): DEFENDANT MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC.’S REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT by placing the document(s) listed above in a sealed envelope with Xl postage thereon fully prepaid, in the United States mail at Laguna Hills, California addressed as set forth below. Igor Fradkin, Esq. Nandor B. Krause, Esq. Daniel Azizi, Esq. Shain A. Wasser, Esq. Downtown L.A. Law Group Severson & Werson, A Professional 3460 Wilshire Blvd., #950 Corporation Los Angeles, CA 90010 One Embarcadero Center, Suite 2600 T: (213) 389-3765 San Francisco, CA 94111 F: (877) 389-2775 T: (415) 398-3344 Attorneys for Plaintiffs Chandler F: (415) 956-0439 Kennedy and Leilah Franklin Attorneys for Defendants Shane Bersiek and Sean Bersiek | am readily familiar with the firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice, it would be deposited with the U.S. Postal Service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid in the ordinary course of business. | am aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if the postal cancellation date or the postage meter date is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing identified in this affidavit. | declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct. Executed on December 4, 2018, at Laguna Hills, California. /s/ Erika Sorensen Erika Sorensen, Declarant -11- DEFENDANT MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC.’S REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT