Reply_to_opposition_to_motion_to_compel_special_interrogatoriesReplyCal. Super. - 4th Dist.July 24, 2017HS W N O o e ~ 3 AN Wn 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 235 26 27 28 LAW OFFICES OF JAMES P. WOHL James P. Wohl (SBN No. 34866) 1925 Century Park East, Suite 2140 Los Angeles, CA 90067 Phone: (310) 557-2349 Attomeys for Plaintiff Perry Krinitt SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF ORANGE - CENTRAL JUSTICE CENTER PERRY KRINITT, Plaintiff, VS. DR. DAVID ASHKENAZE, MD: ADVANCED ORTHOPEDIC SPECIALISTS OF ORANGE COUNTY, Defendants. ELECTROMICALLY FILED Superior Court of Califarnia, County of Orange 01/03/2019 at 04:33:00 PM Clerk of the Superior Court By & Clerk, Deputy Clerk Case No. 30-2017-00933355-CU-MM-CJC Assigned for All Purposes to: Hon. Layne H. Melzer, Judge Dept. C12 Action Filed: July 24, 2017 REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSE TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET ONE, AND REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST DEFENDANT DR. DAVID Soa ats M.D. IN THE SUM OF 37S Date: January 10, 2019 Time: 2:00 p.m. Dept: C12 Reservation 1D: 72931807 REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSE TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET ONE NO 0 0 1 O N in B W RN ee 0 R D N N Y N N R BR ) m e e m e m e d e m e m p e d e a p e d e m 0 1 O N nr B W N = O D N ) N h Rm W N ee OO I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Perry Krinitt (“Plaintiff”) respectfully submits herewith his Reply to the Opposition of Defendant Dr. David Ashkenaze to Plaintiff’s motion for an order compelling a further response to Plaintiff’s Special Interrogatories, Set One (“Special Interrogatories™), and for sanctions against Defendant Dr. David M. Ashkenaze' in the sum of $9,375 for his misuse of the discovery process. The primary argument set forth in the Opposition by Defendant Dr. David Ashkenaze is the claim that “plaintiff was bound to include the text of special definitions contained in the interrogatories in his separate statement. . . . His failure to do so violates California Rules of Court, rule 3.1345, and prejudices the defendant and the Court.” (Opp. 6:22-24). Let it be clearly understood that the “definition” to which Defendant Dr. David Ashkenaze has objected, and upon which Defendant Dr. David Ashkenaze has based his refusal to respond is the term “YOU.” Let is also be clearly understood that the statute upon which Defendant Dr. David Ashkenaze claims Plaintiff failed to file a conforming separate statement, and warranting denial of the entire motion provides in pertinent part: (¢) Contents of separate statement A separate statement 1s a separate document filed and served with the discovery motion that provides all the information necessary to understand each discovery request and all the responses to it that are at issue. The separate statement must be full and complete so that no peo is required to review any other document in order to determine the full request and the full response. Material must not be incorporated into the separate statement by reference. The separate statement must include-for each discovery request (e.g., each interrogatory, request for admission, deposition question, or inspection demand) to which a further response, answer, or production is requested-the following: (1)The text of the request, interrogatory, question, or inspection demand; (2)The text of each response, answer, or objection, and any further responses or answers; Because there are additional defendants in this action, and because these interrogatories have been directed solely to Dr. David M. Ashkenaze, he is referred to herein by his full name to avoid any perplexity as to the party to whom this motion is directed. REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSE TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET ONE 2 Oo © 9 N n Bs W N 0 N O N N N R N N B ) m m em em e m e m e m e m e m me s © 3 y n R W NY -= O O ® N N d s W N e e (3)A statement of the factual and legal reasons for compelling further responses, answers, or production as to each matter in dispute; (4)If necessary. the text of all definitions. instructions. and other matters required to understand each discovery request and the responses to it; The Merriam-Webster Dictionary provides the definition of the term “if necessary” as “if it is needed.” https. //www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/if%20necessary Merriam-Webster further defines the term “you” as “the one or ones being addressed -used as the pronoun of the second person singular or plural in any grammatical relation except that of a possessive.” (ld., /you.) As noted in recent Assembly Bill No. 2230, Chapter 317, approved by Governor Jerry Brown on September 10, 2018, and filed with the Secretary of State on that same date (approved by a vote of 78-1), our legislature passed the bill that will boost the efficiency of our courts for all concerned by giving the option to eliminate vast amount of extraneous paperwork that can bog down the legal process. The effort by Plaintiff to avoid bogging down the legal process in his determination that the definition of the term “you” was necessary in the context of the discovery posed to Defendant Dr. David M. Ashkenaze should not be a basis upon which the Court should warrant denial of the entire motion. And if it is determined that the definition of the word “you” is required to understand each discovery request and the responses to it (Rule 3.1345 (¢)(4) supra, Plaintiff requests the opportunity to re-notice the motion and file a separate statement which includes such definition.? I. ARGUMENT A. Plaintiffs Motion is Not Defective and Should Not Be Denied The argument set forth by Defendant Dr. David M. Ashkenaze revolves around a ? Defendant Dr. David M. Ashkenaze has not provided any case law to support the osition that the definitions are required. Attached hereto, as informational only, is a ruling in the matter led Saillant v. Gibson Dunn & Grutcher, Inc., Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. BC609319, wherein Hon. Frederick C. Shaller, Judge ruled that upon a hearing a motion to compel which failed to include definitions in the separate statement, that the motion to compel was permitted to be re-filed within 20 days to include a separate statement which includes definitions where necessary. (Exhibit P) REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSE TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET ONE 3 SS O e N N Wn B W ) N N 0 N N N N R O R Y m e e m me t e m e m pe d a e w e m XR N A Un Bs W N em O Y d N RS W N claim of Plaintiff’s “failure to bring a motion to compel further responses with a separate statement that is complete and compliant with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1345.” (Opp. 7:12-14). Defendant Dr. David M. Ashkenaze seeks to persuade by way of his own re-writing of the code itself, claiming that “Rule 3.1345 requires that Plaintiff’s supporting statement include the ‘special definitions’ included in the question, and certainly the ones to which the defendant objected.” (Opp 714-16). Rather, in truth, the code does not require the inclusion of definitions, but rather it provides: “If necessary. the text of all definitions, instructions, and other matters required to understand each discovery request and the responses to it.” California Rules of Court, rule 3.1345. Here, the term objected to by Defendant Dr. David M. Ashkenaze, upon which he has forced Plaintiff to file this motion to compel his response, is simply the term “you.” The interrogatories which are the subject of this motion were posed to the single Defendant: Dr. David M. Ashkenaze. The responses to the interrogatories were provided by the single Defendant: Dr. David M. Ashkenaze. The claim that Defendant Dr. David M. Ashkenaze cannot, for example, determine the meaning of the term “your” in response to a query requesting his age (Special Interrogatory No. 1) or internships, residencies and/or fellowship (Special Interrogatory No. 3) flies in the face of good faith responses required by the Discovery Act. The claim that the term “you” renders the interrogatory “overly broad, vague, ambiguous, and unintelligible” appears to fly in the face of Defendant Dr. David M. Ashkenaze’s obligation to provide responses to discovery in a straightforward manner. California Civil Procedure ("CCP") § 2030.210 provides, in pertinent part, that: "The party to whom interrogatories have been propounded shall respond in writing under oath separately to each interrogatory by...An answer containing the information sought to be discovered." CCP § 2030.220 provides, in pertinent part, that: "Each answer in a response to interrogatories shall be as complete and straightforward as the information reasonably available to the responding party permits..." [emphasis added] REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSE TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET ONE 4 S O 3 AN B W R ) B N N N N N N N N m m m r d e m e m e d e e pe e m es © N N nh Rs W N = O O N N R W Defendant Dr. David M. Ashkenaze seeks to claim that the separate statement violates Rule 3.134 in two ways: (1) “it is not full and complete so that no person is required to review any other document in order to determine the full request and the full response” and (2) “it fails to include the text of all definitions required to understand each discovery request and the response to it.” (Opp 7:26-8:1) (1) Defendant Dr. David M. Ashkenaze ignores the fact that the language in Rule 3.134 is quite simple, in that it seeks to compel the inclusion of any other document in order to determine the full request and response: in this case, the claim by Defendant Dr. David M. Ashkenaze is incorporated solely in the use of the term “you” which the Court should not find vague and ambiguous in the context of discovery which has been propounded solely to Defendant Dr. David M. Ashkenaze. (2) Defendant Dr. David M. Ashkenaze also patently ignores the fact that the Rule 3.134 does not require the inclusion of definitions but rather states that definitions are to be included “if necessary.” In support of the proposition that Plaintiff has failed to follow the rule of court regarding separate statement, Defendant Dr. David M. Ashkenaze cites Mills v. U.S. Bank (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 871. However, Mills discusses the failure of Plaintiffs’ separate statement to set forth U.S. Bank's full response to each of the interrogatories and requests for production at issue. Instead, that separate statement repeatedly grouped together several discovery requests, and then stated "in relevant part." Such is not the case here! First, the rule of court does not require the inclusion of definitions, nor does the failure to include the definition of the term “you” render the interrogatories “extremely confusing.” In contrast to the claims of Defendant Dr. David M. Ashkenaze, Plaintiff’s separate statement sets forth a separate listing of each interrogatory in dispute, the response thereto, and the reason a further response is required. Mills is inapposite. REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSE TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET ONE 5 LO 0 2 N n BR WwW RN BN N N N N N R R MN - mm se d e m e m e m em e m e m pe s xX N N n k W N = O O N N R W O N == B. Historical Discovery Obstacles’ In this relatively short-lived action, Defendant Dr. David M. Ashkenaze has made discovery largely impossible. Although the subject of this Motion to Compel seeks the discovery of information related to 36 interrogatories, for which Defendant Dr. David M. Ashkenaze has objected to on the basis that the term "you" renders the interrogatory overly broad, vague, ambiguous and unintelligible, Plaintiff has been unable to take any depositions in this matter, including the deposition of Defendant Dr. David M. Ashkenaze and Plaintiff's treating physicians. Additionally, although Defendant Dr. David M. Ashkenaze agreed to provide supplemental responses to 17 Special Interrogatories (following meet and confer efforts between the parties), and such supplemental responses were promised by letter dated November 13, 2018 (Exhibit D) such supplemental responses were only received on December 27, 2018, and consist primarily of objections (Exhibit QQ); and, were received at a time when Defendant Dr. David M. Ashkenaze is clearly aware of the pending hearing on his Second Motion for Summary Judgement, the opposition to which is due January 17, 2019 (which now does not allow sufficient time to file a motion to compel further responses to the insufficient supplemental responses provided by Defendant Dr. David M. Ashkenaze). In an effort to obviate disputes among the parties and because of the prior difficulties in obtaining any discovery from Defendants, Plaintiff provided definitions in the Special Interrogatories to avoid the claim of "confusion." The history of unheard-of incivility and lack of candor by Defendant Dr. David M. Ashkenaze and his counsel in this action have led this case down a never-before seen road of terse exchanges and refusals to cooperate. Even during the meet and confer efforts related to the discovery which is the subject matter of this motion, counsel for Defendant Dr. David M. Ashkenaze threatened "severe monetary sanctions" (Exhibit D, page ? Plaintiff's Motion for Appointment of Discovery Referee is pending hearing on January 17, 2019. REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSE TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET ONE 6 S O ® N B W N - P R N N D RN ND N N N = mm m e e a e d ee d e m a e e ee Co O ~~ A N B A W N = , S O E N N N T R W N 2)(emphasis added). Inquiry was made by Plaintiff for the authority to support the threatened "severe monetary sanction” by letter dated November 15, 2018 (Exhibit F) to which counsel for Defendant Dr. David M. Ashkenaze failed to respond by letters dated November 15, 2018 (Exhibits G and H). Then, on December 18, 2018 after an appearance before the Court, Defendant Dr. David M. Ashkenaze's counsel replied to "Dearest James" (Exhibit (emphasis added). In a further effort to resolve disputes, counsel for Plaintiff sent a letter dated November 19, 2018 and again requested authority for the threat of "severe" sanctions (Exhibit J). By letter dated November 19, 2018, counsel for Defendant Dr. David M. Ashkenaze simply advised that the subject of the discovery disputes would be addressed with the Court (Exhibit K). On November 28, 2018, Defendant Dr. David M. Ashkenaze’s attorney Rebecca J. Hogue, sent a letter in an apparent effort of addressing their threat, without providing authority for the threat of "severe" sanctions (Exhibit L). On December 4, 2018, Plaintiff responded and once again advised that Plaintiff awaits authority for the threat of severe sanctions (Exhibit M). Subsequently, Ms. Hogue sent a letter on December 5, 2018 advising that all further inquiries and concerns about the case should be directed to Mr. Do or to Ms. Cahill (Exhibit N). Once again, Plaintiff was left in the lurch, without any meaningful response to meet and confer efforts and against requested authority for the threat as well as advice to Defendant Dr. David M. Ashkenaze that Plaintiff would seek the appointment of a discovery referee (Exhibit O) which Plaintiff has been forced to do. C. Definition of "YOU" The primary argument set forth in the Opposition by Defendant Dr. David Ashkenaze is the claim that Plaintiff ". . . .was bound to include the text of special definitions contained in the interrogatories in his separate statement. . . . His failure to do so violates California Rules of Court, rule 3.1345, and prejudices the defendant and the REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSE TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET ONE ol OW 0 0 O N n r Bs W N N R ND N Y N N N ND = me s o m = e m e a ee = e m © NN n k W N = O C 0 d N W BR W N e s Court." (Opp. 6:22-24). The "definition" upon which Defendant Dr. David Ashkenaze has objected, and upon which Defendant Dr. David Ashkenaze has based his refusal to respond is the term "YOU." Defendant Dr. David M. Ashkenaze maintains a corporation with the California Secretary of State "David M. Ashkenaze, M.D., Inc." In an effort to avoid the prior difficulties in obtaining any discovery from Defendants, Plaintiff had provided a definition of the term "YOU." "YOU" or "YOUR" shall mean and refer to the Responding Party, and such party's family members, relatives, children, predecessors, successors, affiliated companies, associations, partnerships, limited partnerships, servants, employees and/or agents, and if not an individual, its officers, directors, partners, predecessors, successors, affiliated companies, associations, partnerships, limited partnerships, servants, employees and/or agents. D. Failure to Provide a Privilege Log Aside from the primary argument by Defendant Dr. David M. Ashkenaze that the Separate Statement is insufficient, it appears the only other argument set forth in the Opposition relates to the claim that discovery seeks the disclosure of attorney-client privileged information (Opp. 9:25-10:13). Defendant Dr. David M. Ashkenaze claims that communications between his appointed carrier and counsel are not discoverable. However, Defendant Dr. David M. Ashkenaze has not provided a privilege log if such privilege is claimed. Where a response claims an objection on the basis of attorney-client privilege, CCP § 2030.240 provides: “If only a part of an interrogatory is objectionable, the remainder of the interrogatory shall be answered.” Further, CCP § 2017.010 provides: "Any party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved ... if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence ... " Responding Party has failed to offer to produce a privilege log relating to any claims of privilege herein. REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSE TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET ONE 8 SOS 0 3 nn B W N e N N N N N N N N N m e e ee ee ee e m e e e e e e e e 0 N N S N Wn R W = O O 0 N N l w = HI. CONCLUSION For all of the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff Perry Krinitt respectfully requests that the Court grant his Motion to Compel Further Responses in its entirety, together with sanctions against Defendant Dr. David Ashkenaze ("Ashkenaze") in the sum of $9,375. Dated: January 3, 2019 LAW OFFICES OF JAMES P. WOHL By WL em James P. Wohl, Esq. Attorneys for Plaintiff Perry Krinitt REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSE TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET ONE 9 OO 00 ~~ & wn Ks WW N = 0 N N N hh RA W N = O O R N N N R W NY = O DECLARATION OF JAMES P. WOHL I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the following facts are true and correct, that I have personal knowledge of the facts contained herein, if called as a witness, I could and would testify competently thereto. L. 2, © ® N I am over the age of 18 and am not a party to the within action. I am an attorney at law, licensed to practice in all the courts in the States of California, Hawaii and New York, and before the United States Supreme Court. I am the counsel of record for Plaintiff Perry Krinitt, in the within matter. I have personal knowledge of the following facts and if called upon to testify I could and would testify competently thereto, except for those facts which are declared upon the basis of information and belief, and as to those facts I believe them to be true. The action herein was filed by Plaintiff, in propria persona, on July 24, 2017. Plaintiff has been under the care and treatment of his physicians and recently underwent a revision surgery to his hip and Plaintiff is recovering from the surgery. Plaintiff engaged my firm to represent him in the litigation on July 12, 2018. A Motion for Summary Judgement is set for hearing on January 31, 2018. The trial date in this matter is set for March 4, 2019. In this relatively short-lived action, Defendant Dr. David M. Ashkenaze has made discovery largely impossible. Although the subject of this Motion to Compel seeks the discovery of information related to 36 interrogatories, for which Defendant Dr. David M. Ashkenaze has objected to on the basis that the term "you" renders the interrogatory overly broad, vague, ambiguous and unintelligible, Plaintiff has been unable to take any depositions in this matter, including the deposition of Defendant Dr. David M. Ashkenaze and Plaintiff's treating physicians. REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSE TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET ONE 10 SS WO 0 N d O N nn R W N O R N N N D N D N RN D D me t m u ma me b e ea Re ed me d e e 0 N A N Wn PR W N ee O 0 0 N N t h W N ee 10. 11. 12, 13. 14. Additionally, although Defendant Dr. David M. Ashkenaze agreed to provide supplemental responses to 17 Special Interrogatories (following meet and confer efforts between the parties), such supplemental responses were promised by letter dated November 13, 2018 (Exhibit D) such supplemental responses were only received on December 27, 2018 and consist primarily of objections (Exhibit Q); all exhibits attached hereto are true and correct copies of the documents represented. The history of unheard-of civility and lack of candor by Defendant Dr. David M. Ashkenaze and his counsel in this action have led this case down a never-before seen road of terse exchanges and refusals to cooperate. Even during the meet and confer efforts related to the discovery which is the subject matter of this motion, counsel for Defendant Dr. David M. Ashkenaze threatened "severe monetary sanctions" (Exhibit D, page 2)(emphasis added). Inquiry was made for the authority to support the threatened "severe monetary sanction" by letter dated November 15, 2018 (Exhibit F) to which counsel for Defendant Dr. David M. Ashkenaze failed to respond by letter dated November 15, 2018 (Exhibits G and H). Then, on December 18, 2018 after an appearance before the Court, Defendant Dr. David M. Ashkenaze's counsel replied to "Dearest James" (Exhibit I)(emphasis added). In a further effort to resolve disputes, I sent a letter dated November 19, 2018 and again requested authority for the threat of "severe" sanctions (Exhibit J). By letter dated November 19, 2018, counsel for Defendant Dr. David M. Ashkenaze simply advised that the subject of the discovery disputes would be addressed with the Court (Exhibit K). On November 28, 2018, attorney Rebecca J. Hogue, sent a letter in an apparent effort of addressing the threat, without providing authority for the threat of "severe" sanction (Exhibit L). On December 4, 2018, I responded and once again advised that Plaintiff awaits authority for the threat of severe sanctions (Exhibit REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSE TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET ONE 11 OO 0 J O&O wn B= WwW o N rN r o N o [ 3 ] r o I . ) N o N O - P a - - - p i t - -_- J t -_ - ~~ SN Wn + WwW N = S O oo SN Wn H W - JPW/cm cc: Client; Margaret M. Cahill. Esq. Exhibit G From: Khuong Do Sent: Thursday, November 15, 2018 3:34 PM To: James Wohi, Margaret Cahill Cc: Christine McCain Subject: RE: Jim: Read my meet and confer letter again. Thank vou. Khuong Do, Esq. SCHMID & VOILES 333 City Boulevard West, Suite 720 | Orange, CA 92868 Tele: 714-940-5514 | FAX: 714-940-5594 THIS IS A CONFIDENTIAL E-MAIL and may contain information that is privileged or otherwise protected from disclosure. If you are not the mtended recipient and received this e-mail in error, please notify me inunediately by reply e-mail or by telephone call, and do not read or save this e-mail; it should be deleted from your system in its entirety, PLEASE NOTIFY ME IMMEDIATELY BY REPLY E- MAIL OR BY TELEPHONE AT (714) 940-3514, AND DESTROY THE ORIGINAL TRANSMISSION AND ITS ATTACHMENTS WITHOUT READING OR SAVING THIEM TO DISK. ANY DISSEMINATION. DISTRIBUTION OR COPYING OF THIS COMMUNICATION AND ANY ATTACHMENTS IS STRICTLY PROHIBITED. THANK YQU. From: J.P.W. [mailto:jpw1901@pacbell.net] Sent: Thursday, November 15, 2018 2:10 PM To: Margaret Cahill; Khuong Do Cc: Christine McCain Subject: Please see the attached PDF. LAW OFFICES OF JAMES P. WOHL 1925 Century Park East, Suite 2140 Los Angeles, CA 90067 (310) 657-2349Error! Filename not specified. CONFIDENTIALITY STATEMENT The information contained in this email message is protected under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. 2510-2521, contains confidential information, and may be protected by attorney-client and/or attorney/work product privileges. It is only for the use of the individual named above and privileges are not waived by sending by email. If the person receiving this email is not the named recipient, use, dissemination, distribution, or copying of the email is prohibited. If received in error please destroy and notify us by telephone at 310-557-2349. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act NOTICE: Federal law requires us to notify you that this office is attempting to collect a debt. Any information obtained will be used for that purpose. All included information is proprietary and confidential and is for the use of the intended recipient only. We are required by IRS Circular 230 to inform you that any statements contained herein are not intended or written to be used, and cannot be used, by you or any other taxpayer, for the purpose of avoiding any penalties that may be imposed by Federal Tax Law. Call Send SMS Add to Skype You'll need Skype Credit Exhibit H From: J.P.W. Sent: Thursday, November 15, 2018 3:49 PM To: Margaret Cahill; Khuong Do Cc: Christine McCain Subject: Re: Your message just received, thank you Hello Khuong; And thank you for the response. Please be sure that | have re-read the letter. It is only the inclusion of the word "severe" with respect to the identified four special interrogatories which struck a chord with me as to the source of its use. Regards, James LAW OFFICES OF JAMES P. WOHL 1925 Century Park East, Suite 2140 Los Angeles, CA 90067 (310) 557-2349 CONFIDENTIALITY STATEMENT The information contained in this email message is protected under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. 2510-2521, contains confidential information, and may be protected by attorney-client and/or attorney/work product privileges. It is only for the use of the individual named above and privileges are not waived by sending by email. If the person receiving this email is not the named recipient, use, dissemination, distribution, or copying of the email is prohibited. if received in error please destroy and notify us by telephone at 310-557-2349. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act NOTICE: Federal law requires us to notify you that this office is attempting to collect a debt. Any information obtained will be used for that purpose. All included information is proprietary and confidential and is for the use of the intended recipient only. We are required by IRS Circular 230 to inform you that any statements contained herein are not intended or written to be used, and cannot be used, by you or any other taxpayer, for the purpose of avoiding any penaities that may be imposed by Federal Tax Law. On Thursday, November 15, 2018, 3:34:24 PM PST, Khuong Do wrote: Jim: Read my meet and confer letter again. Thank you. Khuong Do, Esq. SCHMID & VOILES 333 City Boulevard West, Suite 720 | Orange, CA 92868 Tele: 714-940-5514 | FAX: 714-940-5594 THIS IS A CONFIDENTIAL E-MAIL and may contain information that is privileged or otherwise protected from disclosure. If you are not the intended recipient and received this e-mail in error, please notify me immediately by reply e-mail or by telephone calf. and do not read or save this e- mail; it should be deleted from your system in its entirety. PLEASE NOTIFY ME IMMEDIATELY BY REPLY E-MAIL OR BY TELEPHONE AT (714) 940- 5514. AND DESTROY THE ORIGINAL TRANSMISSION AND ITS ATTACHMENTS WITHOUT READING OR SAVING THEM TO DISK. ANY DISSEMINATION, DISTRIBUTION OR COPYING OF THIS COMMUNICATION AND ANY ATTACHMENTS IS STRICTLY PROHKIBITED. THANK YOU. From: J.P.W. [mailto:jpw1301@pacbell.net] Sent: Thursday, November 15, 2018 2:10 PM To: Margaret Cahill; Khuong Do Cc: Christine McCain Subject: Please see the attached PDF. LAW OFFICES OF JAMES P. WOHL 1925 Century Park East, Suite 2140 Los Angeles, CA 90067 (310) 557-2349Error! Filename not specified. CONFIDENTIALITY STATEMENT The information contained in this email message is protected under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. 2510-2521, contains confidential information, and may be protected by attorney-client and/or attorney/work product privileges. It is only for the use of the individual named above and privileges are not waived by sending by email. If the person receiving this email is not the named recipient, use, dissemination, distribution, or copying of the email is prohibited. If received in error please destroy and notify us by telephone at 310-557-2349. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act NOTICE: Federal law requires us to notify you that this office is attempting to collect a debt. Any information obtained will be used for that purpose. All included information is proprietary and confidential and is for the use of the intended recipient only. We are required by IRS Circular 230 to inform you that any statements contained herein are not intended or writien to be used. and cannot be used. by you or any other taxpayer, for the purpose of avoiding any penalties that may be imposed by Federal Tax Law. Call Exhibit I From: Khuong Do Sent: Tuesday, December 18, 2018 4:37 PM To: Christine McCain Cc: James Wohl, Margaret Cahill; Malou Malate Subject: RE: Krinitt v. Ashkenaze Dearest James: I wholeheartedly agreed with Judge Melzer’s advisement that if he was you, he would have completed Dr. Thomas’ deposition on 11/15/18 when it was confirmed by all parties as well as Dr. Thomas. As for the deposition of Dr. Lauchlan Chambers, I once again refer you the objection we served on 11/2/18 (46 days ago) in response to the notice of deposition and direct vour specific attention to the holding in St. Mary Medical Center v. Superior Court (Mennella) (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1531. In the past 46 days since being served with that objection, you have not undertaking any steps to seek a court ordered as required by the St. Mary holding which permits you to take Dr. Chamber’s deposition. Have a pleasant day. Khuong Do, Esq. SCHMID & VOILES 333 City Boulevard West, Suite 720 | Orange, CA 92868 Tele: 714-940-5514 | FAX: 714-940-5594 THIS IS A CONFIDENTIAL E-MAIL und may conta information that is privileged or otherwise protected from disclosure. If you are not the intended recipient and received this e-mail in error, please notify me immed lately by reply e-mail or by telephone call, and do not read or save this e-mail; it should be deleted from your system in its entirety. PLEASE NOTIFY ME IMMEDIATELY BY REPLY Li- MAIL OR BY TELEPHONE AT (714) 940-5511, AND DESTROY THE ORIGINAL TRANSMISSION AND ITS ATTACHMENTS WITHOUT READING OR SAVING THEM TO DISK. ANY DISSEMINATION, DISTRIBUTION OR COPYING OF THIS COMMUNICATION AND ANY ATTACHMENTS 1S STRICTLY PROMIBITED. THANK YOU. From: Christine McCain [maiito:Christine@wohl-law,com] Sent: Tuesday, December 18, 2018 2:48 PM To: Khuong Do Cc: James Wohi; Margaret Cahill Subject: Krinitt v. Ashkenaze The following is dictated by James P. Wohl Dear Khoung, I'm sorry that you were not feeling well today, but | think you will agree with me that it is very important for us to work together after the Court’s observations in order to get the depositions completed. On the way out of the Courtroom, | asked you whether you would find out if Dr. Ashkenaze had time this week or next week for deposition. | should have included the weekends. If he does not have time, please give me the earliest date that we can secure his deposition. Once we have that date, we will take the laboring ore once again to get a date for Dr. Thomas's deposition soon after. On another front, please advise whether you will agree to allow the deposition of your expert without the necessity of a Court hearing. thank you in advance for the anticipated cooperation in this attempt to schedule the deposition in time for Plaintiff to be able to put together a meaningful response to the MS). Best regards, James Law Offices of James P. Wohl 1925 Century Park East, Suite 2140 Los Angeles, CA 90067 (310) 557-2349 The information contained in this email message is protected under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. 2310- 2321, and may also be protected by attorney-client and/or the attorney/work product privileges. It is intended only for the use of the individual named above and the privileges are not waived by virtue of this having been sent by email. If the person actually receiving this email or any other reader of the email is not the named recipient, any use, dissemination, distribution, or copying of the communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please immediately notify us by telephone at 310-557-2349 and return the original message to us at christine@wohi-law.com Exhibit J From: Christine McCain Sent: Monday, November 19, 2018 4.27 PM To: Margaret Cahill, James Wohl; Khuong Do Cc: Malou Malate Subject: RE: Krinitt The following is dictated by James P. Wohi Dear Margaret, The latest accusation you have is a failure to meet and confer in good faith. Unfortunately, your Mr. Do failed to respond to my letter requesting authority for his threats for “sever” sanctions so that it was necessary for us to file the motions to compel because, despite your apparent wish to have done something that was never done, Mr. Do's November 13, 2018 responsive meet and confer letter responded to say what responses he would supplement and what he was not going to supplement. Naturally, without his intransigence, with respect to a very critical issue involving what appears to be yet another threat, we had no choice but to move ahead and file. Naturally, if your defense of the motion is to bring up the foregoing, we will but to respond to the opposition by presenting to the court the truth facts. Your final statements “if that is how you wish to proceed, so be it” appears to lay the onus of stone-casting upon us, and just, once again, side steps the veracity of your statements and the failures to explain them. Should you decide not to conduct this litigation in another manner, the necessity of a discovery referee, as exemplified in the correspondence, and apparently from your latest directives with respect to demanding discovery in a fashion which ignores the notices served, has become more and more obvious. As always, we thank you in advance for your courtesy and cooperation. Very best regards, James From: Margaret Cahill Sent: Friday, November 16, 2018 6:01 PM To: Christine McCain ; James Wohi ; Khuong Do Cc: Malou Malate Subject: RE: Krinitt Thank you for your letter. | do not believe that a discovery referee is warranted. | see you have even gone ahead and filed a motion to compel although | have not yet reviewed it. This is despite the Meet and Confer process, which you have not engaged in in good faith. We attempted to engage in good faith discussion to resolve the issues which included providing additional time for you to file a motion to compel. You have unnecessarily filed a motion to compel. If thats how you wish to proceed. So be it. Margaret Cahill, Esq. Exhibit K From: Khuong Do Sent: Monday, November 19, 2018 4:37 PM To: James Wohl Cc: Malou Malate; Margaret Cahill; Christine McCain Subject: RE: Krinitt Jim: “Intransigence” is filing a motion to compel further response to get Dr. Ashkenaze’s birth place when it is clearly stated in the CV that was produced. It is compelling Dr. Ashkenaze to give his age when he provided his birthdate in another interrogatory. Such is the refrain of vour motions to compel further responses so we will address them with Judge Melzer. Khuong Do, Esq. SCHMID & VOILES 333 City Boulevard West, Suite 720 | Orange, CA 92868 Tele: 714-940-3514 | FAX: 714-940-5594 THIS IS A CONFIDENTIAL E-MAIL and may contain information that is privileged or otherwise protected from disclosure. If vou are not the intended recipient and received this e-mail in error, please notify me immediately by reply e-mail or by telephone call, and do not read or save this e-mail: it should be deleted from your system in its entirety. PLEASE NOTIFY ME IMMEDIATELY BY REPLY E- MALL OR BY TELEPHONE AT (714) 940-5514, AND DESTROY THE ORIGINAL TRANSMISSION AND [TS ATTACHMENTS WITHOUT READING OR SAVING THEM TO DISK. ANY DISSEMINATION, DISTRIBUTION OR COPYING OF THIS COMMUNICATION ANDY ANY ATTACHMENTS 1S STRICTLY PROHIBITED. THANK YOU. From: Christine McCain [mailto:Christine@wohl-law.com] Sent: Monday, November 19, 2018 4:27 PM To: Margaret Cahill; James Wohl; Khuong Do Cc: Malou Malate Subject: RE: Krinitt The following is dictated by James P. Wohl Dear Margaret, The latest accusation you have is a failure to meet and confer in good faith. Unfortunately, your Mr. Do failed to respond to my letter requesting authority for his threats for “sever” sanctions so that it was necessary for us to file the motions to compel because, despite your apparent wish to have done something that was never done, Mr. Do’s November 13, 2018 responsive meet and confer letter responded to say what responses he would supplement and what he was not going to supplement. Naturally, without his intransigence, with respect to a very critical issue involving what appears to be yet another threat, we had no choice but to move ahead and file. Naturally, if your defense of the motion is to bring up the foregoing, we will but to respond to the opposition by presenting to the court the truth facts. Your final statements “if that is how you wish to proceed, so be it” appears to lay the onus of stone-casting upon us, and just, once again, side steps the veracity of your statements and the failures to explain them. Should you decide not to conduct this litigation in another manner, the necessity of a discovery referee, as exemplified in the correspondence, and apparently from your latest directives with respect to demanding discovery in a fashion which ignores the notices served, has become more and more obvious. As always, we thank you in advance for your courtesy and cooperation. 1 Very best regards, James From: Margaret Cahill Sent: Friday, November 16, 2018 6:01 PM To: Christine McCain ; James Wohl ; Khuong Do Cc: Malou Malate Subject: RE: Krinitt Thank you for your letter. | do not believe that a discovery referee is warranted. | see you have even gone ahead and filed a motion to compel although | have not yet reviewed it. This is despite the Meet and Confer process, which you have not engaged in in good faith. We attempted to engage in good faith discussion to resolve the issues which included providing additional time for you to file a motion to compel. You have unnecessarily filed a motion to compel. If that is how you wish to proceed. So be it. Margaret Cahill, Esq. SCHMID & VOILES 333 City Boulevard West, Suite 720 Orange, CA 92868 714-940-5557 (direct) 714-940-5594 (fax) 949-466-2710 (cell) mcahill@schmidvoiles.com THIS IS A CONFIDENTIAL E-MAIL and may contain information that is privileged or otherwise protected from disclosure. If you are not the intended recipient and received this e-mail in error, please notify me immediately by reply e-mail or by telephone call, and do not read or save this e-mail; it should be deleted from your system in its entirely. PLEASE NOTIFY US IMMEDIATELY BY REPLY E-MAIL OR BY TELEPHONE AT (714) 940-5557, AND DESTROY THE ORIGINAL TRANSMISSION AND {TS ATTACHMENTS WITHOUT READING OR SAVING THEM TQ DISK. THANK YOU. From: Christine McCain [mailto:Christine@wohl-law.com] Sent: Friday, November 16, 2018 5:53 PM To: Margaret Cahill; James Wohl; Khuong Do Cc: Malou Malate Subject: RE: Krinitt Please see the attached letter from James. Thank you. Christine Exhibit LL LOS ANGELES DENA J. HAYDEN LAMBIRTH DEBORAH §. TAGGART DENISE H. GREER MICHAEL V, LAMB KATHLEEN D. McCOLGAN RODNEY G. TOMLINSON BRADLEY C. CLARK PATRICK W. MAYER* JOHNS. CAYLEY JULIA E. MURRAY MYRNA L. DINCOGNITO ADAM R. JAMES RONAN J. DUGGAN JENNIFER K. VILLEBRO* PALO ALTO MICHELE RALEY James P. Wohl, Esq. SCHMID & VOILES ATTORNEYS AT LAW 333 CITY BOULEVARD WEST SUITE 720 ORANGE, CALIFORNIA 92868 TELEPHONE (714) 940-5555 FAX (714) 940-5594 E-MAIL mcahill@schmidvoiles.com DIRECT DIAL (714) 940-5557 November 28, 2018 LAW OFFICES OF JAMES P. WOHL 1925 Century Park East, Suite 2140 Los Angeles, CA 90067 Re: Case Name: Our Clients: Krinitt V, Ashkenaze, Et Al. ORANGE COUNTY LAWRENCE D. WONG REBECCA J. HOGUE SHEILA ANNE ALEXANDER SIDNEY J. MARTIN® FREDRICK JAMES LISA M. AGRUSA MARGARET M. CAHILL MICHAEL C. TING DOUGLAS A. AMO STEPHANIE R. HANNING KHUONG T. DO SAN DIE ROBERT B. FESSINGER KYLE A. CRUSE CATHERINE Z. SCHROEDER ADMITTED TO PRACTICE IN OTHER STATES David M. Ashkenaze, M.D. and Advanced Orthopaedic Specialists of Orange County Our File No.: 57860 Dear Mr. Wohl: As you may know, Ms. Cahill is in trial. I am responding to your most recent letter on her behalf. Iam not privy to all the background of this case. Ihave seen enough of the file materials to know I agree with you that it is pointless to continue to quarrel with anyone's personal rendition of facts at this point. Thus, while we will of course continue to meet and confer, we do not intend to engage in further "tit-for-tat" exchanges. Those have done nothing to further the progress of case, and simply waste our client's resources. Suffice it to say that like you, we attempt to cooperate with counsel within the bounds of our professional duties, while remaining advocates of our clients. On that topic, we value our professional reputations. As such, we do feel obliged to respond to assertions about Mr. Do. You state that Mr. Do seemingly violated California Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 5-100 with a "threat of sever [sic] sanctions”. Mr. Do stated he would seek such sanctions if forced to oppose motions to compel discovery. Rule 5-100 has no potential applicability to a request for "severe sanctions" in connection with discovery motions in litigation. In fact, you partially quoted Rule 5-100 in your letter of 11/13/18, and omitted the word “criminal” from the LOS ANGELES 333 South Hope Street, 8th Floor Los Angeles, California 90071 SAN DIEGO 4250 Executive Square, Suite 430 La lola, California 92037 PALO ALTO 490 California Avenue, Suite 210 Palo Aho, California 94306 Tel.: (213) 473-8700 Fax: (213) 473-8777 Tel.: (858) 200-8440 Fax: (858) 200-8441 Tel.: (650) 543-2186 Fax: (650) 289-0298 Re: KRINITT v. ASHKENAZE, ET AL. November 28, 2018 Page 2 text of the rule.’ After partially quoting Rule 5-100, in the next paragraph of the same letter, you accused Mr. Do of committing a crime, i.e., a violation of Penal Code section 632. In our opinion that could be construed as a "seeming" violation of the very same Professional Conduct Rule of which you accused Mr. Do. Putting the above aside, regarding the order for reference, this is a simple, straightforward medical malpractice case, involving routine motions. While my 35 years in medical malpractice litigation do not equal your 53 years in practice, in my opinion, there are no grounds for such an order. We would oppose such a motion on the grounds an order of reference is not "necessary" - "[Thhere is no suggestion the Legislature intended these powers to be used over the parties’ objection in routine, pro forma. uncomplicated matters simply for expediency or a distaste for discovery resolution. Indeed, the statute gives the court this discretion when such a reference is necessary. (§ 639, subd. (e).)" (Taggares v. Superior Court (1998) 62 Cal. App.4th 94, 104, as modified (Mar. 26, 1998); court's italics; it also involves routine motions the Court is bound to hear: "It is one thing to refer out a particularly complex discovery dispute that appears to involve an extraordinary expenditure of judicial time. It is quite another to refer out all discovery, however simplistic, in a routine tort action" (Hood v. Sup.Ct. (Sears, Roebuck & Co.) (1 999) 72 Cal. App.4th 446, 449). At this point, perhaps we can all turn a page, and agree to disagree as to the past, and forgo further ad hominem comments. We want to cooperate with your office in expediting discovery and resolution of this case as much as possible while fully defending our client's rights, and discharging our ethical duties. We trust you will work with us to do the same. In the meantime, we assume you will do what you feel you need to regarding a reference order; and would urge you to reconsider a motion for the reasons above. Thank you for your professional courtesies. Very truly yours, SCHMID & VOILES £4 rd By REBECCA J. HOGUE ' Your letter omitted the bolded italicized word: "A member shall not threaten to present criminal, administrative, or disciplinary charges to obtain an advantage in a civil dispute." (CA ST RPC Rule 5-100; emphasis added.) Exhibit M JAMES P. WOML LAW OFFICES OF MEMBER OF CALIFORNIA, NEW YORK AND HAWAL SARS JAMES P. WOHL CHRISTINE M McCAIN . PARBUEOAL, 1928 CENTURY PARK EAST, SUITE 2140 LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA SOO&7 TEL (210) 557-2349 £AX (310) 657-2639 December 4, 2018 Schmid & Voiles Rebecca J. Hogue, Esq. 333 City Boulevard West, Suite 720 Orange, California 92868 Re: Krinitt v. Ashkenaze, et al. Orange County Superior Court Case No. 30-2017-00933355-CU-MM-CJC Your File No. 57860 Dear Rebecca. I 'want to thank you in advance for your kind letter in an initial attempt to get this case back to some semblance of reasonable discussions between counsel. Having said that, I need to inform you that: 1. I never threatened Mr. Do with anything. The reference to the Penal Code was just informational. never a threat to report. Thus, the advice back relating to a theat to report was unnecessary. I apologize if you misread the typo in the letter I had dictated which used the word “sever” instead of “severe” which is the word by which Mr. Do prefaced his warning about seeking severe sanctions. I have never received a response to the question that [ sent to Mr. Do which was a request for the legal authority for severe sanctions for anything that I have done. However, given the kind letter you sent, I will call that threat hyperbole. >) 3. Unfortunately. we have still not received dates from your office for the deposition for Dr. Ashkenaze. This is a serious matter, and the basis for the motion to secure a discovery referee which is in progress here. If you can please see to providing me with discovery dates for Dr. Ashkenaze in the reasonably near future, I can then proceed with our deposition plan in order to deal with the pending Motion for Summary Judgement. Naturally, if we cannot pin down Dr. Ashkenaze’s deposition date and the depositions of the other persons necessary for Mr. Krinitt’s opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgement, it will be necessary to go back to the Judge, yet a third time, for continuances and also for the discovery referee. Hopefully that will not be necessary. Rebecca J. Hogue, Esq. December 4, 2018 Page 2 of 2 In closing, I am going to say thank you again, and trust that we can make progress on item number 3. Please do not hesitate to write me immediately if there is any sign of a road block. By the way, I am sure it is just a coincidence, but I have only met a person named Hogue once in my life. That was John Hogue, who was my banker in Hilo, Hawaii. Does that ring any bells? Very 7 $ James JPW/cm P.S. Please feel free to email me at jpw1901 @pacbell.net to avoid any delay in responding to your letters and also please copy my paralegal at christine‘@wohl-law.com Exhibit N LOS ANGELES DENA J. HAYDEN LAMBIRTH DEBORAH S. TAGGART DENISE H. GREER MICHAEL V. LAMB KATHLEEN D. McCOLGAN RODNEY G. TOMLINSON BRADLEY C. CLARK PATRICK W. MAYER* JOHN S. CAYLEY JULIA E. MURRAY MYRNA L. D'INCOGNITO ADAM R. JAMES RONAN J. DUGGAN JENNIFER K. VILLEBRO¥* PALO ALTO MICHELE RALEY SCHMID & VOILES ATTORNEYS AT LAW 333 CITY BOULEVARD WEST SUITE 720 ORANGE, CALIFORNIA 92868 TELEPHONE (714) 940-5555 FAX (714) 940-5594 E-MAIL mcahill@schmidvoiles.com DIRECT DIAL (714) 940-5557 December 5, 2018 ORANGE COUNTY LAWRENCE D. WONG REBECCA J. HOGUE SHEILA ANNE ALEXANDER SIDNEY J. MARTIN* FREDRICK JAMES LISA M. AGRUSA MARGARET M. CAHILL MICHAEL C. TING DOUGLAS A. AMO STEPHANIE R. HANNING KHUONG T. DO SAN DIEGO ROBERT B. FESSINGER KYLE A. CRUSE CATHERINE Z. SCHROEDER “ADMITTED TO PRACTICE IN OTHER STATES Tel: (213) 473-8700 Fax: (213) 473-8777 Tel: (858) 200-8440 Fax: (858) 200-8441 Via Email and Mail James P. Wohl, Esq. LAW OFFICES OF JAMES P. WOHL 1925 Century Park East, Suite 2140 Los Angeles, CA 90067 Re: Case Name: Krinitt v. Ashkenaze, Et Al. Our Clients: David M. Ashkenaze, M.D. and Advanced Orthopaedic Specialists of Orange County Our File No.: 57860 Dear Mr. Wohl: I'am responding to your letter of this date noting I had not responded to your letter "sent yesterday". I didn't respond because yesterday's letter just came to my attention today. As you know, this is Ms. Cahill's file. She is still in trial. I wrote you 11/27 as a courtesy, in her absence, to set forth our position about the motion for reference you intended to file. I have not received emails from you ("Christine called our office to inquire). I did not get your voicemails either because [ am out ill and will remain so, with instructions from my ophthalmologist to rest my eyes. (More than you wanted to know.) I do understand you are anxious to depose our client; you stated your position clearly. Unfortunately I cannot assist with that, even were 1 in the office. I am in the "Law and Motion" Department. I am not a litigator on Ms. Cahill's team. Please make arrangements for Dr. Ashkenaze's deposition directly through Ms. Cahill and her assistant. As my involvement was limited to responding to one letter, please direct all further inquiries and concerns about the case directly to Mr. Do or to Ms. Cahill, to minimize any delays. PALO ALTO 490 California Avenue, Suite 210 Palo Alto, California 94306 Tel.: (650) 543-2186 Fax: (650) 289-0298 SAN DIEGO 4250 Executive Square, Suite 430 La Jolla, California 92037 LOS ANGELES 333 South Hope Street, 8th Floor Los Angeles, California 90071 Re: KRINITT v. ASHKENAZE, ET AL. December 5, 2018 Page 2 And to respond to your question, I do have a brother named John Hogue, a retired hospital administrator. As far as I know, [ don't believe he ever moonlighted as a banker in Hilo. Thank you for your professional courtesies. Very truly yours, SCHMID & VOILES By REBECCA J. HOGUE (dictated but not read) Exhibit O JAMES PL WOHL LAW OFFICES OF MEMBER OF CALIFORNIA, HE YONA tpn Sans JAMES P. WOHL 3 SHRISTINE M. McCAIN ID2S CENTURY PARK EAST, SUITE 2140 LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA BOOG7 TEL 1310} 557-2349 Fax (30) 557-2839 December 6, 2018 Schmid & Voiles Khuong Do, Esq. Margaret Cahill, Esq. Rebecca Hogue, Esq. 333 City Boulevard West, Suite 720 Orange, California 92868 Re: Krinitt v. Ashkenaze, et al. Orange County Superior Court Case No. 30-2017-00933355-CU-MM-CJC Your File No. 57860 Dear Khuong, Margaret and Rebecca: Thank you for your latest note. While we had been advised that Ms. Cahill was engaged in trial, we were not advised that she is the only person in your firm capable of responding to this problem of the refusal to produce Dr. Ashkenaze for his deposition, as well as the continuous dragging on of time in discovery. Thus, because we had received seemingly knowledgeable messages in the past from all of you, it seemed that out of the 20 or so lawyers in your firm we could get answers. Ms. Hoge was filling in for Ms, Cahill and failed to ever say she could not do anything on the matter until recently. Now that you have informed us that it is impossible for any of you to provide an answer for the failure to provide a date for the deposition of Dr. Ashkenaze as per our original schedule of depositions, we request either: 1. A continuance of the Motion for Summary Judgement and Trial to a date to be reasonably agreed between us, which would allow for the Plaintiff to complete the necessary discovery and prepare for the Motion for Summary Judgement, and concomitantly, to continue the Trial date accordingly by such agreement, or We must proceed to file our motion for appointment of a discovery referee so as to complete that which we believe is necessary in this case to secure the rights of Plaintiff. t o December 6, 2018 Page 2 of 2 By the way. your reference to the Orange County Rules of Civility, you will not be surprised to hear, together with the State Bar Rules of Civility, are cited references in our request for the appointment of a discovery referee. By the use of an excuse of blaming your client, Dr. Ashkenaze, for the refusal to grant our second request for a continuance, and the multitude of road blocks placed in denial of our client’s rights, those Rules of Civility and cooperation have been trampled. The fact that we put dates and times for responses is a direct result of the necessity required by the failure of civility from Defendants, in responses and responsibility (as exemplified by blaming Dr. Ashkenaze), which has pervaded this action, and will be brought to the attention of the Court. My suggestion to you is that Defendants commence taking the hi gh road, in step with Plaintiff; provide requested continuances; provide long past responses 10 written discovery; provide the staging of the depositions as noticed by Plaintiff; and, in all respects follow the Rules of Civility and candor which our rules of practice provide, We have told you the alternatives; you have had ample time to have decided with Ms. Cahill, even in trial. Otherwise, just choose item 1 or 2 above. Very truly yours, James JPW/cm P.S. Khuong, you have never responded to my meet and confer request for your legal authority for your use of the words “severe” sanctions. It was a simple request. If there is no legal authority to have entitled you to “severe” sanctions, please be kind enough to just state the truth. Exhibit P Saillant v. Gibson Dunn & Crutcher Inc | Trial Court Orders | Westlaw = , TLAW € ne Original image of 2017 WL 4434300 (POF) 2017 WL 4434800 (Cal.Super.) (Trial Order) Superior Court of California. Saiflant v. Gibson Dunn & Crutcher Inc Superior Count of California. March 20,2017 2017 WL 4434800 {Approx. 7 pages) Maria T SAILLANT et al, v. GIBSON DUNN & CRUTCHER INC et al. No. BC609319. March 20, 2017. Trial Order Frederick C. Shaller, Judge. NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: “1 1) DEFENDANT'S (GIBSON DUNN & CRUTCHER, LLP.) DEMURRERS TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT: 2) DEFENDANT'S (GIBSON DUNN & CRUTCHER, LLP.) MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT; 3) CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE; 4) MOTION OF PLAINTIFFS MARIA T. SAILLANT AND GISELLE SIMONIAN TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFFS' SPECIAL INTERROGATORY NO. 90, The Court posted its tentative ruling on the Court's website. Counsel! notified the Court by [electronic mail that all parties submit and waive notice. Therefore, the Court adopts its tentative as the final ruling. FINAL RULING: The demurrer to the 2nd Cause of Action for Age Discrimination - Disparate Impact - is sustained with 20 days leave to amend. Plaintiffs have not identified or alleged a facialiy age-neutral policy. The demurrer to the 3rd Cause of Action for violation of L.C. §232.5 is overruled. The demurrer to the 5th and 6th Causes of Action are sustained with 2 0 days leave to amend - Plaintiffs have not alleged a qualifying disability required for these causes of action. The demurrer to the 9th cause of action for {IED is sustained with 2 0 days leave to amend. Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to constitute an exception to the general rule that emotional injuries occurring in the workplace are pre-empted by the Worker's Compensation Act. The motion to strike is DENIED as it relates to the 3rd cause of action as to which the demurrer is overruled. Plaintiffs have stated a COA for violations of Lab. Code §232.5. Plaintiffs’ Request for Judicial Notice is granted pursuant to £.C. §452(d) as to the existence of such rulings and orders, but the court does not take judicial notice of the truth of any facts stated in the rulings of other courts. Sostnsky v. Grant (1962) 6 Cal. App. 4th 1548; Plaintiff's motion to compel! further response to Special Interrogatory 80 is DENIED without prejudice as the Separate Statement is not in compliance with CRC Rule 3.1345} (4) and https://1.next. westlaw.com/Document/Iccala6f0aa93 1 16 7b242b85... SELECTED TOPICS Civil Rights Employment Digan Secondary Sources Califomnia Fair Employment and Housing Acl (FEHA) Cal. Prac. Guide Employment Litigation Ch, 8-C -.1. {9:2075] Introduction: The California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) {Gov.C. § 12900 et seq.) prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of “physical disability, mental disability (and... Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Cal. Prac. Guide Employment Litigation Ch. 9-A ..1. {9:3} Introduction. The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA, 42 USC § 12101 et seq.) was enacted in 1990 to protect employment opportunities for qualified individuals with disabilities. Title | spe... s 2:45, Overview Cal. Civ. Prac. Employment Litigation §2.46 -..The FEHA prohibits employment discrimination because of an individual's physical disability, mental disability, or medical condition. {Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (a); for general discussion and forms re. Se More Secondary Scurces Briefs Appetiant's Reply Brief 2007 WL 1984786 Forough NADAF-RAHROV, Plaintiff and Appeilant, v. NEIMAN MARCUS GROUP and Kelly Butier, Defendants and Respondents. Court of Appeal, First District June 01, 2007 ...Note: Table of Authorities page numbers missing in original document FN1 Following the filing of her opening brief, Nadaf-Rahrov settied her Workers Compensation claim against Neiman Marcus. According... Respondent's Brief 2000 WI. 34409871 Linda Kaye HARTER, Plaintiff and Appeilant, v. CITY OF NATIONAL CITY, Defendant and Respondent. Court of Appeal, Fourth District Nov. 03, 2000 ...This action arises out of the termination of Appellant Linda Harter, then Senior Assistant City Attorney for Respondent City of National City. Appellant was terminated for dishonesty, after she lied ab. REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER 2001 WL 1167779 US Airways, Inc. v. Robert Barnett Supreme Court of the United States Oct. 01, 2001 ..FN* Admitted in California only The ADA prohibits discrimination against an individual in employment "because of [his] disability.” 42 12/28/2018, 9:16 AN Saillant v. Gibson Dunn & Crutcher Inc | Trial Court Orders [ Westlaw because of this the court has insufficient information to rule on the motion. Plaintiff may renew the motion by way of a re-noticed motion filed within 20 days curing the defects in the first. Case Management Conference is continued to 6/6/2017 at 8:30 a.m. As Plaintiff's discovery motion relating to the identity of employees who may qualify as PAGA class members was denied without prejudice, it is still premature to set the case for trial as class members (if any) are not yet known. The court proposes to bifurcate the case such the representative claims will be tried, if indicated, to a different jury after the completion of a successful trial on behalf of Plaintiffs. The parties are directed to brief this issue of bifurcation and necessity of a second phase trial in event the first phase is unsuccessful prior to the resumed CMC, Any party opposed to this proposal shall file and serve an opposition brief by 5/56/2017 and the other party may file and serve a reply brief by 5/22/2017. DISCUSSION Motion 1 - Demurrer to First Amended Complaint (FAC) 2nd Cause of Action ("COA"): Age Discrimination -Disparate Impact “2 The demurrer to the 2nd Cause of Action for Age Discrimination - Disparate Impact is sustained with 2 0 days leave to amend. "[A] prima facie casef } of age discrimination arises when the employee shows {1} at the time of the adverse action he or she was 4 0 years of age or older, (2) an adverse employment action was taken against the employee, (3) at the time of the adverse action the employee was satisfactorily performing his or her job and (4) the employee was replaced in his position by a significantly younger person.” Hersant v. Department of Social Services (1987) 57 C.A 4th 997 1003. “Disparate treatment” is intentional discrimination against one or more persons on prohibited grounds. (Guz v Bechtel National, inc. (2000) 24 Cal4th 317, 354. fn. 20, 100 Cal.Rptr2d 352, 8 P.3¢ 108% (Guz ).) A disparate treatment claim. i.e., a claim that an employer has treated a particular person less favorably than others because of the plaintiffs race, sex, or other protected category, “involve{s] ‘the most easily understood type of discrimination.” * {Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust {1988} 487 U.S. 977. 985-986, 108 S. Ct 2777. 101 L Ed. 2d 827 (Watson }.)." Rosenfeld v. Abraham Josua Heschel Day Scho! Inc. (2014) 226 C A. 4th 886, 893, “A claim of disparate impact differs from a claim of disparate treatment in that a plaintiff is not required to prove discriminatory motive when claiming disparate impact. Disparate impact exists where, “regardiess of motive, a facially neutral employer practice or policy, bearing na manifest relationship to job requirements, in fact had a disproportionate adverse effect on members of the protected class.” (Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 3 54, fn. 20, 100 Cat.Rptr.2d 352, 8 P.3d 1089, italics added, original italics omitted.) If the employee makes a showing that the employer's facially neutral policy has a disparate impact, “the employer must then demonstrate that "any given requirement {has) a manifest relationship to the employment in question,” in order to avoid a finding of discrimination. [Citation.] Even in such a case, however, the plaintiff may prevail, if he shows that the employer was using the practice as a mere pretext for discrimination.’ [Citations.]" (City and County of San Francisco v. Fair Empioyment & Housing Com. {1887) 191 Cal App.3d 976. 985. 236 Cal. Rptr. 718, quoting Connecticut v. Teal (1982) 457 U.S. 440. 446-447, 102 S.Ct 2525, 73 L.Ed.2d 130.)." Id. Defendant argues that Plaintiffs have not sufficiently pled a disparate impact claim because Plaintiffs have not identified or alleged a facially age-neutral policy. (Defendant does not argue, as Plaintiffs suggest, that Plaintiffs cannot allege aiternative theories of discrimination). Neither of the California cases relied on by the respective parties is on point. The disparate impact claim in Rosenfeld was first brought forward on the eve of trial, and the argument made by Rosenfeld's lawyer was that it was not necessary to expressly plead disparate impact. Id. at 892-893. Likewise, Life Technologies Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 197 C.A.4th 540, 649-650 arose on a motion to compel discovery, and both parties conceded that the plaintiff had pled disparate impact. Further, Plaintiffs’ interpretation of that case is simply not viable; as reflected by the portion of the case quoted in Plaintiffs’ Opposition, the Court of Appeal held, not that plaintiff need not identify a specific policy, but that plaintiff clearly had identified a specific policy. (Id.; Opposition p. 2:1-6). https://1 .next.westlaw.com/Document/Iccal a6f0aa93 1 1e7b242b85.... U.S.C. § 12112(a). Respondent, like the Ninth Circuit below, subms... Sa2e Mere Briefs Trial Court Documents Martin v. Southern California Penmanente Group 2017 WL 2852724 Cheree MARTIN, v. SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA PERMANENTE GROUP, Superior Court of California May 26, 2017 -..MOVING PARTY: Defendant Southern California Permanente Medical Group RESPONDING PARTY(S): Plaintiff Cheree Martin STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS: Plaintiff alieges that after she had se... Mcbrian v. Kraft Foods 2015 WA. 12857872 MCBRIAN, v. KRAFT FOODS. Superior Court of California Apr. 22, 2015 DATE: 04/22/2015 TIME: 02:00.00 PM DEPT: 53 JUDICIAL OFFICER PRESIDING. David Brown CLERK: E. Brown REPORTER/ERM: BAILIFF/ICOURT ATTENDANT: CASE INIT.DATE: 05/14/2013 CASE CATEGORY: Civil - Unlimited Na... Udell v, Kenko intern, Inc. 2016 WL 8540030 Ron UDELL. an individual, Plaintiff, v. KENKO INTERNATIONAL. INC. Kenko Holdings Company, inc., Kenko Corporation, and Does 1 through 100, Inclusive, Defendants Superior Court of California Nov. 28, 2016 -Date: October 14, 2016 Time: 1:30 p.m. Dept: 14 Complaint Filed: June 2. 2014 FAC Filed August 27. 2014 Trial Date; November 21, 2016 The motion by Defendant KENKO INTERNATIONAL, INC. (‘Defendant"} f.. 12/28/2018, 9:16 AM Saillant v. Gibson Dunn & Crutcher Inc | Trial Court Orders | Westlaw Sof 7 “3 in the absence of procedurally on-point California authority, Gomez v. Quicken Loans. Inc. {Sth Cir. 2015) 629 Fed. Appx. 789. 802 is persuasive. See Guz v. Bechtel National, inc. {200G0) 24 C.4th 317. 354 (California courts look to pertinent federal precedent when applying employment discrimination statutes): Pacific Shore Funding v. Lozo (2006) 138 C.A4th 1242, 1352 in. (unpublished federal cases are citable as persuasive authority). Gomez held that a plaintiff had failed to state a disparate impact claim under FEHA where he had failed to allege how his identified policy could be facially neutral. Gomez, supra, 628 Fed Appx. at 802. A fortiori, Plaintiffs cannot state a disparate impact claim where they have not even identified what policy they challenge. Moreover, “the essence of a disparate impact claim is that a challenged policy, while facially neutral ... in practice and effect is discriminatory.” S:semore v. Master Financial, Inc. (2007) 151 C.A4th 1386. 1421. Plaintiffs cannot capture the essence of a disparate impact claim if there is no articulation of the challenged policy. Nor is Defendant on adequate notice when potentially any one of its (likely many) policies may be challenged. For the foregoing reasons, in order to state a cause of action for disparate impact, Plaintiffs must identify which policy or policies they challenge. The demurrer is therefore SUSTAINED with 20 days leave fo amend. The court will not prejudge whether or not the proposed amended pleading discussed in the opposition is sufficient until the FAC is filed and a demurrer thereto is made. 3rd COA: Lab. Code § 232.5 The demurrer to the 3rd Cause of Action for violation of L.C. §232.5 is overruled. Lab. Code § 232.5 reads as follows: “No employer may do any of the following: (a) Require, as a condition of employment, that an employee refrain from disclosing information about the employer's working conditions. (b) Require an employee to sign a waiver or other document that purports to deny the employee the right {o disclose information about the employer's working conditions. {c) Discharge, formaily discipline, or otherwise discriminate against an employee who discloses information about the employer's working conditions. {d) This section is not intended to permit an employee to disclose proprietary information, trade secret information, or information that is otherwise subject to a legal privilege without the consent of his or her employer.” Defendant correctly contends that “disclosure” under the statute requires that Plaintiffs tell someone who did not already know about their working conditions. [T] he report of information that was already known did not constitute a protected disclosure... In California cases holding that a public employee's report of wrongdoing to his or her own employer is not excluded from qualifying as a disclosure protected under the Labor Code, the superior to whom the report is made is not the person involved in the alleged wrongdoing.” See Mize- Kurzman v. Marin Community Ceilege Dist. (2 012) 202 CA 4th 832. 858-859 {citing cases) (emphasis in original). Plaintiffs’ attempts to distinguish Mize-Kurzman are without merit. Plaintiffs do not provide any reason to interpret “disclose” to have any meaning other than its ordinary one, which is presumably the same no matter what section number comes in front of it. See People v. Davis (2005) 125 CA 4th 14186, 1427. Further, Mize-Kurzman as quoted above inciudes a discussion of an analogous situation which could arise under the previous version of Lab Code § 1102.5: a governmental employee reporting to his own supervisor. However, Plaintiffs disclosure as alleged in the FAC was to a superior outside of their immediate workplace and not, up to that point, involved in the alleged wrongdoing: Stacy Glover in the Human Resources Department. (FAC 11% 30, 82, 88). There is no fact alleged to show that Stacy Glover was already aware of the information she was given. Defendant argues in its Reply that the information was disclosed after the retaliation campaign had already begun, and that retaliation cannot precede the act for which it is retaliation. This argument would be well taken had the retaliation reached its conclusion before it was reported. However, it is certainly within the scope of the allegations in the FAC that the https://1.next.westlaw.com/Document/Iccal a6f0aa93 1 1e 7b242b85... 12/28/2018, 9:16 AM Saillant v. Gibson Dunn & Crutcher Inc | Trial Court Orders | Westlaw https://1.next.westlaw.com/Document/icca 1 a6f0aa93 1 1e7b242b85... purported retaliation was for more than one act, such that the later events in a course of retaliation are directed both at the act that was the original spark, and subsequent attempts to put the fire out. *4 For the foregoing reasons, the demurrer is OVERRULED as to this COA. 5th-Bth COAs: Failure to Provide a Reasonable Accommodation, and Failure to Engage in the Interactive Process The demurrer to the 5th and 6th causes of action are sustained with 2 0 days leave to amend. “The essential elements of a claim of failure to accommodate are: (1) the plaintiff has a disability covered by FEHA; (2) the plaintiff is a qualified individual: and (3) the employer failed to reasonably accommodate the plaintiff's disability. (Jensen v. Wells Fargo Bank {200C) 85 C.A.4th 245, 255-256.) ‘The elements of a failure to accommodate claim are similar to the elements of a ... section 12940, subdivision (a) discrimination claim, but there are important differences. The plaintiff must, in both cases, establish that he or she suffers from a disability covered by FEHA and that he or she is a qualified individual. For purposes of [a failure to accommodate] claim, the plaintiff proves he or she is a qualified individual by establishing that he or she can perform the essential functions of the position to which reassignment is sought, rather than the essential functions of the existing position. [Citations.] More significantly, the third element [under a subdivision (a) claim] ... establishing that an "adverse employment action” was caused by the employee's disability-is irrelevant fo this type of claim. Under the express provisions of the FEHA, the employer's failure to reasonably accommodate a disabled individual is a violation of the statute in and of itself. [Citation.}' (Jensen, supra, at p. 256.)." Furtado v. State Personnel Board (2013) 212 C.A 4th 728. 744-745. “Under FEHA, ‘reasonable accommodation’ means ‘a modification or adjustment to the workplace that enables the employee to perform the essential functions of the job held or desired.’ (Nadaf-Rahrov v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc. (2008) 186 C.A 4th 952, G74, italics added.). “Reasonable accommodation” may include either of the following: (1) Making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to, and usable by, individuals with disabilities. (2) Job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities.” 163 12926, subd. (0); see Cai Code Regs, tit. 2. § 7262 9. subd. {a}; accord, 42 U S.C § 12111(9)).” 1d. at 745, "If the employee cannot be accommodated in his or her existing position and the requested accommodation is reassignment, an employer must make affirmative efforts to determine whether a position is available. [Citation.) A reassignment, however, is not required if “there is no vacant position for which the employee is qualified.” [Citations.] “The responsibitity to reassign a disabled empioyee who cannot otherwise be accommodated does ‘not require creating a new job, moving another employee, promoting the disabled employee or violating another employee's rights... * * [Citations.] “What is required is the ‘duty to reassign a disabled employee if an already funded, vacant position at the same level exists.’ {Citations |" [Citations.]' (Raine v. city of Burbank (2006) 135 C A 4th 1215. 1223; see § 12926, subd. {0).)." Id. *5 “The interactive process imposes burdens on both the employer and employee. The employee must initiate the process unless the disability and resulting timitations are obvious. ‘Where the disability, resulting limitations, and necessary reasonable accommodations, are not open, obvious, and apparent to the employer, ... the initial burden rests primarily upon the employee ... to specifically identify the disability and resulting limitations, and to suggest the reasonable accommodations.’ (Taylor v. Principal Financial Group. Inc. (5th Cir. 1986; 93 F.3d 155, 185)." Scotch v. Art Institute of California-Orange County. Inc. (2009) 173 C A 4th 358, 360-361. Defendant argues that Plaintiffs did not allege a qualifying disability, because their alleged disability is essentially an inability to work under certain supervisors. Plaintiffs do not dispute 4 of 7 12/28/2018, 9:16 AM Saillant v. Gibson Dunn & Crutcher Inc | Trial Court Orders | Westlaw https://1.next.westlaw.com/Document/Iccal a6f0a 93 11e76242b85. . this characterization of their disability, but argue that a disability which arises from non- standard oversight is a qualifying disability. Plaintiffs are incorrect. The most recent case on this issue is Higgins-Williams v. Sutter Medical Foundation {2015) 237 CA 4th 78. 84-86 "As we shall explain, the undisputed facts show plaintiff does not suffer from a FEHA-~ recognized mental disability; consequently, the trial coun properly granted summary adjudication of this cause of action because plaintiff cannot establish the element of a disability. An employee's inability to work under a particular supervisor because of anxiety and stress related to the supervisor's standard oversight of the employee's job performance does not constitute a disability under FEHA. (Hobson v. Raychem Corp (1999) 73 Cal. App 4th 614, 828. £6 Cal Rptr.2d 497 {Hobson ) [the inability to perform one particular job, or to work under a particular supervisor, does not constitute a qualified disability” under FEHA (italics added) |; see Weiler v. Household Finance Corp. (7th Cir. 1996) 101 F.3d 516, 522, 524-525 [both Hobson and Weiler apply the narrower federal test of disability of “substantially limits” a major life activity, rather than the broader California test of simply “limits”; Hobson was disapproved on this point in Coimenares v. Braemar Country Ciub, Inc. (2003) 28 Cal 41h 1019, 1031. fn. 6, 130 Cal Rotr.2d 662, 83 P.3¢ 220} (Colmenares ).) As set forth above in the undisputed facts of the Factual and Procedural Background, plaintiff and her treating physician, Dr. Chen, acknowledged on several occasions, both directly and through requests for a transfer from the Shared Services Department, that plaintiff was unable to work under her regional manager, Perry, or her supervisor, Prince, because of anxiety and stress related fo their standard oversight of piaintiffs job performance; Dr. Chen diagnosed plaintiff as having adjustment disorder with anxiety, and reported plaintiffs disabling condition as * ‘stress [ ] when dealing with her Human Resources and her manager.’ * [Fn.2: As for alleged nonstandard supervisorial oversight, ail plaintiff can muster is that regional manager Perry began singling plaintiff out for negative treatment on September 8, 2010, and that on the very next day, Perry grabbed plaintiffs arm and yelled at her, after which plaintiff suffered a panic attack, left work, and never returned. } This is precisely “the inability ... to work under a particular supervisor” that Hobson says does not rise to a FEHA-recognized disability. (Hobson, supra. 73 Cai App 4th at p. 628 86 Cal.Rpir.2d 497) Admittedly, plaintiff is correct that Hobson has been disapproved on one point and questioned on another. “6 First, as noted, the state Supreme Court has disapproved Hobson to the extent it held or suggested that “disabifity” under FEHA requires a “substantial limit" on a major life activity (as the parallel federal act, Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), requires); “disability” is defined more broadly under FEHA, requiring only a “limit” on a major fife activity. (See Colmenares, supra, 28 Cal 4th at p. 1031, fn. 6, 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 662. 83 P3¢ 220, § 12926.1, Subd. (c) [added to FEHA in 2000 as part of the Prudence Kay Poppink Act (Stats. 2000, ch. 1049, §§ 1. 6, pp. 7698, 7708), explicitly acknowledging that FEHA “disability” requires a “limitation™ upon a major life activity, not a “’substantial limitation’ * as the ADA requires].) And, second, Hobson's point that “the inability to perform one particular job ... does not constitute a [FEHA-] qualified disability,” has been questioned (by a 9th Cir. case). (Hobson, supra, 73 Cal App.4th at p. 628, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 497, italics added; see §12926.1, subd. (c) [stating, as relevant, “{UInder the law of this state, ‘working’ is a major life activity, regardless of whether the actual or perceived working limitation implicates a particular employment or a class or broad range of employments’ (italics added) |; see also EEQC v. United Parce Service, Inc. (9th Cir. 2005} 424 F.3d 1060, 1084, 1672-1073 (EEOC }[" ‘exclusion from a single job with a single employer’ “ possibly constitutes, under FEHA, a disability-satisfying * ‘limitation’ * in working; in EEOC, the exclusion from the particular type of job of driving the large trucks in the UPS fleet, because of monocular vision, constituted a FEHA physical disability (a disability, though, which could be subject to an employer's affirmative defense that safety requires such an exclusion) 1.) What no decision has disapproved or questioned, however, is the Hobson point directly on point here--i.e., that an employee's inability to work under a particular supervisor because of anxiety and stress related fo the supervisor's standard oversight of the employee's job performance does not constitute a mental disability under FEHA. (Hobson, supra, 73 50f7 12/28/2018, 9:16 AM Saillant v. Gibson Dunn & Crutcher Inc | Trial Court Orders | Westlaw https://1 .next.westlaw.com/Document/iccala6f0aa9311e7b242b85... A Cal App ath atp 628, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 497.) And plaintiff cannot equate EEQC's language that an “ ‘exclusion from a single job with a singie employer’ “ may constitute a FEHA disability (EEOC. supra, 424 P.3d at p. 1072), with “an employee's inability to work under a particular supervisor” (Hobson, at p. 825, 86 Cal Rplr 2d 467), because the context in EEOC was that of working in a * ‘single [type of} job’ * and not that of working under a particular supervisor (EEOC, at p. 1072, italics added).” As Defendant points out, the distinction between standard and non-standard oversight which appears in Higgins-Williams does not appear in Hobson. Hobson, supra. Moreover, as revealed by footnote 2, the Court of Appeal in Higgins-Williams did not entirely rely on that distinction, as it held that conduct which might constitute a battery did not preserve the plaintiff's case. The emphasis placed on the distinction in Higgins-Williams served to emphasize the point that the oversight was all work-related, not to open up an inquiry into whether the oversight was particularly onerous or beyond the pale. That inquiry is more properly conducted in the context of a harassment claim, which Plaintiffs have filed and which Defendant does not challenge on this demurrer. For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs have not alleged a qualifying disability and the demurrer to this cause of action is sustained. While the court cannot speculate as to what amendment Plaintiffs might make to this cause of action that can be made to address the qualifying disability requirement, the court will SUSTAIN this demurrer with 2 0 days leave to amend. 9th CCA: IIED *7 “The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is comprised of three elements: {1} extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; {2) the plaintiff suffered severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) the plaintiff's injuries were actually and proximately caused by the defendant's outrageous conduct.” KOVR-TV, Inc v. Superior Court (1985) 31 C.A 4th 1023, 1028. Moreover, “[ilt is not enough that the conduct be intentional and outrageous. Jt must be conduct directed at the plaintiff, or occur in the presence of a plaintiff of whom the defendant is aware.” Christensen v. Superior Court (1991) 54 C.3d 868, § 03 (Emphasis added). “There is fiability for conduct ‘exceeding all bounds usually tolerated by a decent society, of a nature which is especially calculated to cause, and does cause, mental distress. (See Prosser, Law of Torts (4th ed. 1971) p. 54.) Ordinarily mere insulting language, without more, does not constitute outrageous conduct. The Restatement view is that liability ‘does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other triviatities. ... There is no occasion for the law to intervene ... where some one's feelings are hurt.” (Rest.2d Torts, § 48, com. d.) Behavior may be considered outrageous if a defendant (1) abuses a relation or position which gives him power to damage the plaintiff's interest: (2) knows the plaintiff is susceptible to injuries through mental distress; or (3) acts intentionally or unreasonably with the recognition that the acts are likely to resuit in illness through mental distress.” Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Prot. Dist. (1987) 43 C. 3d 148, 155, fn. 7 (citations omitted). Defendant argues that a claim for [IED is pre-empted here by the Worker's Compensation Act. itis true that workers compensation is generally the exclusive remedy for emotional distress injuries that occur in the workplace, but there are exceptions. Two exceptions are noted in the case of Shoemaker v. Myers (1890; 52 Cal. 3d 1, 15: (1) the injury results from employer conduct that falls “outside the normal course of employment”; and (2) the employers conduct falls within an express or implied exception to the exclusivity provision. The allegations in the FAC are not sufficient to fit into the first exception. Claims for emotional distress caused by the employer's conduct involving termination, promotions, demotions, criticism of work practices, negotiations as to grievances, etc. are deemed a “part of the normal risk of employment” and are therefore subject to the exclusive remedy provides of workers compensation law. Charles J. Vacanti, M.D. Inc. v. State Compensation Ins. Fund (2001; 24 Cat. 4th 800, 814-815, Allegations that the employer acted “intentionally,” or “unfairly” or “outrageously” to cause emotional distress are not sufficient to permit an action outside the workers compensation system. Cole v. Fair Qaks Fire Protection Dist. (1987) 43 Cal. 3d 148, 160. The allegations merely compiain of a series of events that appear to the court to amount to more than the normal risk of employment. Regardiess of the allegations regarding her age and disability, the facts do not fit the second exception to the exclusivity of the workers compensation exclusive remedy doctrine either. 6 of 7 12/28/2018, 9:16 AM Saillant v. Gibson Dunn & Crutcher Inc | Trial Court Orders | Westlaw https://1.next.westlaw.com/Document/Iccala6f0aa93 1 1¢7b242b85... However, age discrimination contravenes fundamental pubic policy. Stevenson v Superior Court (1587) 18 Cal 4th 880, 894-909. So does harassment under FEHA. See, e.g. Id. at 882; Delaney v Superior Fast Freight (1983) 14 C A 4th 530. 593, 598-609. Plaintiff may be abie to aflege a viable cause of action based upon these exceptions to the exclusive remedy doctrine. *8 Therefore the demurrer to the HED cause of action is sustained with 2 © days leave to amend. Motion 2: Motion to Strike Portions of FAC The MTS involves striking allegations of the FAC which premise the 11th and 12th COA on violations of Lab. Code §232 5, on the ground that Plaintiffs have failed to state a COA for violations of that section is denied. Per the analysis above, Plaintiffs have stated a COA for violations of Lab. Code §232 5. Motion 3: Motion to Compe! Plaintiff moves this court, per CCP § 2030.300, for an order compeliing Defendant to provide further responses to Special Interrogatory No. 90 (hereinafter “Interrogatory”). On 8/2/18, the subject discovery was served. (Declaration of Allan A. Shenoi [hereinafter “Shenoi Dec." {| 3). Responses thereto were served on 9/20/16. (Id.). The deadline for filing a motion to compel was extended by agreement of the parties fo 1/31/17. (Id. {| 4). The parties met and conferred extensively on this issue, but were unable to reach a resolution. (Id. § 7). Plaintiffs’ Request for Judicial Notice is granted, but not as to the content of the rulings and orders. Plaintiffs" motion is DENIED without prejudice to a re-noticed motion filed within 20 days curing the defects in the first - the Separate Statement is not in compliance with CRC Rule 3.1345(c){4}, which requires the inclusion of definitions, instructions, and other matters necessary to understand each discovery request. The definitions of the terms “IDENTIFY” and "YOU" are not included, and those ferms are objected to as vague, ambiguous, and overbroad. (Separate Statement, p. 2}. it is further unclear what the request means when it refers to “non-exempt employees.” (1d.}. Also, the discovery requests and responses are not attached to any declaration. Notice is waived. End of © 2018 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. Document Westlaw. 2018 Thomson Reuters Privacy Statement Accessibility Supplher Tens Contact Us 1-800-REF-ATTY (1-800-733-2889) improve Westlaw tsa Kel 7of7 12/28/2018, 9:16 AM EXHIBIT Q LOS ANGELES DENA J. HAYDEN LAMBIRTH DEBORAH S. TAGGART DENISE H, GREER MICHAEL V, LAMB KATHLEEN D, McCOLGAN RODNEY G. TOMLINSON BRADLEY C. CLARK PATRICK W. MAYER* JOHN 8. CAYLEY JULIA E. MURRAY MYRNA L. D'INCOGNITO ADAM R. JAMES RONAN J, DUGGAN JENNIFER K. VILLEBRO* PALO ALTO MICHELE RALEY SCHMID & VOILES ATTORNEYS AT LAW 333 CITY BOULEVARD WEST SUITE 720 ORANGE, CALIFORNIA 92868 TELEPHONE (714) 940-5555 FAX (714) 940-5594 E-MAIL mcahiii@schmidvoiles.com DIRECT DIAL (714) 940-5557 December 27, 2018 Law Offices of James P. Wohl James P. Wohl, Esq. 1925 Century Park East, Suite 2140 Los Angeles, CA 90067 Re: Case Name: Our Clients: Our File No Dear Mr. Wohl: KRINITT v. ASHKENAZE, ET AL. ORANGE COU LAWRENCE D. WONG SIDNEY J. MARTIN* FREDRICK JAMES LISAM. AGRUSA MARGARET M. CAHILL MICHAEL C. TING DOUGLAS A. AMO STEPHANIE R, HANNING KHUONG T. DO SANDIEGO ROBERT B, FESSINGER KYLE A. CRUSE CATHERINE Z. SCHROEDER *ADMITTED TO PRACTICE IN OTHER STATES David M. Ashkenaze, M.D. and Advanced Orthopaedic Specialists of Orange County + 57860 We are serving to you today our further responses to plaintiff's form interrogatories and special interrogatories. The Verifications will follow as soon as we receive them from our client, David M. Ashkenaze, M.D. Thank you for your courtesy in this regard. MMC:cn Encl. LOS ANGELES 333 South Hope Street, 8th Floor Los Angeles, California 90071 Tel.: (213) 473-8700 Fax: (213) 473-8777 Very truly yours, SCHMID & VOILES SAN DIEGO 4250 Executive Square, Suite 430 La Jolla, California 92037 Tel.: (858) 200-8440 Fax: (858) 200-8441 PALO ALTO 490 California Avenue, Suite 210 Palo Alto, California 94306 Tel.: (650) 543-2186 Fax: (650) 289-0298 ee 0 3 a N Nn Ra W N N O N N O N N N N N N E ed em ja d e d ed 2 N B R E B E R E Z E D G E G D R E G E R E E MARGARET M. CAHILL, ESQ. (SBN 138231) mcahill@schmidvoiles.com KHUONG T. DO, ESQ. (SBN 189189) kdo@schmidvoiles.com SCHMID & VOILES 333 City Boulevard West, Suite 720 Orange, CA 92868 Tel: (714) 940-5555/Fax: (714) 940-5594 Attorneys for DEFENDANTS DAVID M. ASHKENAZE, M.D. and ADVANCED ORTHOPAEDIC SPECIALISTS OF ORANGE COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF ORANGE - CENTRAL JUSTICE CENTER PERRY KRINITT, CASE NO. 30-2017-00933355-CU-MM-CJC | Plaintiff, DEFENDANT DAVID ASHKENAZE, M.D.'S FURTHER RESPONSES TO SPECIAL \2 INTERROGATORIES (SET ONE) DR. DAVID ASHKENAZE, MD ADVANCED ORTHOPEDIC SPECIALISTS OF ORANGE COUNTY, Defendants. PROPOUNDING PARTY: Plaintiff PERRY KRINITT RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant DAVID M. ASHKENAZE, M.D. SET NO.: ONE (1) This responding party has not fully completed the investigation of the facts relating to this case and has not fully completed discovery in this action. All of the responses contained herein are based only upon such information and documents which are currently available to and specifically known to this responding party and disclose only those contentions which currently occur to such responding party. Tt is anticipated that further discovery, independent investigation, legal research and analysis will supply additional facts, add meaning to known facts, as well as establish entirely 1 DFT DAVID M. ASHKENAZE, MD'S FURTHER RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES Ne 90 A N BR W N N O N O N O N N N N N N m d je m Je m em t me md em ed new factual conclusions and legal contentions, all of which lead to substantial additions to, changes in, and variations from the contentions herein set forth, The following responses are given without prejudice to respondent's right to produce evidence of subsequently discovered fact or facts, which this responding party may later recall, Responding party, accordingly, reserves the right to change any and all responses herein as additional facts are ascertained, analyses are made, and legal research is completed. The responses contained herein are made in a good faith effort to supply as much factual information and as much specification of legal contentions as is currently known, but should in no way prejudice responding party in relation to further discovery, research, and analysis. SPECIAL INTERROGATORY RESPONSES RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 17: Objection. The definition of "YOU" renders this interrogatory overly broad, vague, ambiguous, and unintelligible and as such seeks information which is irrelevant to the subject matter of this litigation and/or is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible | evidence. This interrogatory seeks information which is irrelevant to the subject matter of this litigation and/or is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. FURTHER RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 17: Objection. The definition of "YOU" renders this interrogatory overly broad, vague, ambiguous, and unintelligible and as such seeks information which is irrelevant to the subject matter of this litigation and/or is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. This interrogatory seeks information which is irrelevant to the subject matter of this litigation and/or is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Without waiving said objections, defendant responds: Karim Abdollahi, MD and Michael Gillman, M.D. RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 18: Objection. This interrogatory seeks information which is irrelevant to the subject matter 2 DFT DAVID M. ASHKENAZE, MD'S FURTHER RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES a RN a9 a nh ER W N W O W O N O R O N O N I N O N O Re em ke e p R N R E R E R E R E B E E Z O a 0 a2 B R B of this litigation and/or is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. FURTHER RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 18: Objection. This interrogatory seeks information which is irrelevant to the subject matter of this litigation and/or is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Without waiving said objections, defendant responds: Karim Abdollahi, MD - since 2/1/04; and Michael Gillman, M.D. - since 8/1/99. RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 27: Objection. This interrogatory is compound, conjunctive, disjunctive or contains subparts in violation of Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.060(f). The definition of "YOU" renders this interrogatory overly broad, vague, ambiguous, and unintelligible and as such seeks information which is irrelevant to the subject matter of this Ii litigation and/or is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The interrogatory is overly broad, vague, ambiguous and speculative as to meaning, "medical care facilities". The phrasing leaves defendant to guess and speculate what this question may be meant to include, exclude, or mean in the context of this action and itis not required to so speculate; as phrased this question is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. (Hinson v. Clairemont Community Hospital (1990) 218 Cal. App.3d 1110, 1118-23) The interrogatory is, in essence, duplicative of interrogatory number 19 above. FURTHER RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 27: Objection. This interrogatory is compound, conjunctive, disjunctive or contains subparts in violation of Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.060(f). The definition of "YOU" renders this interrogatory overly broad, vague, ambiguous, and unintelligible and as such seeks information which is irrelevant to the subject matter of this litigation and/or is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The interrogatory is overly broad, vague, ambiguous and speculative as to meaning, 3 DET DAVID M. ASHKENAZE, MD'S FURTHER RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES CO 0 N F a N Wn Bs W N N O O N N N N N N N R e d w k md e d ee d ed R N R R E R B E R E E Z E R A O E R R = "medical care facilities". The phrasing leaves defendant to guess and speculate what this question may be meant to include, exclude, or mean in the context of this action and it is not required to so speculate; as phrased this question is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. (Hinson v. Clairemont Community Hospital (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1110, 1118-23) Without waiving said objections, defendant responds: none. RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 28: Objection. The definitions of "YOU" and "YOUR" render this interrogatory overly broad, vague, ambiguous, and unintelligible and as such seeks information which is irrelevant to the subject matter of this litigation and/or is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The interrogatory is overly broad and as such seeks information which is irrelevant to the subject matter of this litigation and/or is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. FURTHER RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 28: Objection. The definitions of "YOU" and "YOUR" render this interrogatory overly broad, vague, ambiguous, and unintelligible and as such seeks information which is irrelevant to the subject matter of this litigation and/or is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The interrogatory is overly broad and as such secks information which is irrelevant to the subject matter of this litigation and/or is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Without waiving said objections, defendant responds: Employees between 12/22/15 and 6/6/16: Kathleen Juhl-Vassilladis-(front office) Nakia Keeling (front office) Nathan Voss (surgery scheduler) Brittany Whitman (x-ray technician) 4 DET DAVID M, ASHKENAZE, MD'S FURTHER RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES Ce O e N S N un Ae W N N O N O N O N N O N N O R IN Ee ew kd B N R R E R E B N E N R E L E L a a R O G E R S Winter Burkart (surgery scheduler/front office) Jo-Ellen Collins (front office) Julie Daw (File Clerk) Deborah Elledge (biller) Jose Escalante (front office) Daniel Garcia (x-ray tech-per diem) Rebecca Hidalgo (x-ray tech) RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 29: Objection. As phrased, this interrogatory is unintelligible insofar as interrogatory number 28 did not require identifying any individual. FURTHER RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 29: Objection. The definitions of "YOU" and "YOUR" render this interrogatory overly broad, vague, ambiguous, and unintelligible and as such seeks information which is irrelevant to the subject matter of this litigation and/or is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The interrogatory is overly broad and as such seeks information which is irrelevant to the subject matter of this litigation and/or is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Without waiving said objections, defendant responds: Front office: answer phones, make appts, take messages, order supplies, fax documents Surgery scheduler: schedule surgeries, get insurance authorization, take messages, order supplies, fax documents X-ray tech: take x-rays, take messages, prepare and clean exam rooms, order supplies File clerk: put paper records into charts, pull requested charts, fax documents Biller: bills insurance companies Back office: room patients, take messages, prepare and clean exam rooms, order supplies N e o A Ww RESPONSE TQ INTERROGATORY NO. 30: Objection. The definition of "YOU" renders this interrogatory overly broad, vague, ambiguous, and unintelligible and as such seeks information which is irrelevant to the subject 5 DET DAVID M. ASHKENAZE, MD'S FURTHER RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES vo 0 0 3 SN Wh BE W N m s N O N O N N N R N N N N e k je m m d e l pm e d ed matter of this litigation and/or is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. As phrased, this interrogatory is unintelligible insofar as interrogatory number 28 did not require identifying any individual. FURTHER RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 30: Objection. The definition of "YOU" renders this interrogatory overly broad, vague, ambiguous, and unintelligible and as such seeks information which is irrelevant to the subject matter of this litigation and/or is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. This interrogatory is duplicative of interrogatory 28 ("IDENTIFY dates of employment...") above inasmuch as it requests "the period of their employment by YOU" as to individuals identified in response to number 28. See response to number 28. RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 31: Objection. As phrased, this interrogatory is unintelligible insofar as interrogatory number 28 did not require identifying any individual. FURTHER RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 31: Objection. The definition of "YOU" renders this interrogatory overly broad, vague, ambiguous, and unintelligible and as such seeks information which is irrelevant to the subject matter of this litigation and/or is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Without waiving said objections, defendant responds: Advanced Orthopaedic Specialists of Orange County, 31862 Coast Hwy, Laguna Beach, CA 92651. RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 32: Objection. As phrased, this interrogatory is unintelligible insofar as interrogatory number 28 did not require identifying any individual. FURTHER RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 32: Objection. The definition of "YOU" renders this interrogatory overly broad, vague, 6 DFT DAVID M. ASHKENAZE, MD'S FURTHER RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES w e N N hh RA W N N O N O W N N N N N N ee em m h he d ee d ed fe d E R R E R R P V B E N E B E Z E T O O E E E R ambiguous, and unintelligible and as such seeks information which is irrelevant to the subject matter of this litigation and/or is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Without waiving said objections, defendant responds: Not applicable as no employees employed between 12/22/15 and 6/2/16 were discharged. RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 33: Objection. The definition of "YOU" renders this interrogatory overly broad, vague, ambiguous, and unintelligible and as such seeks information which is irrelevant to the subject matter of this litigation and/or is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The request for any lawsuits involving defendant, without limitation to scope or subject matter is also overly broad, irrelevant and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Regardless, discovery directed to past lawsuits, if any, is not relevant and not calculated to lead to admissible evidence, because evidence of such information is inadmissible character evidence. (Hinson v. Claremont Community Hospital (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1110). Only the medical care and treatment provided by defendant to the plaintiff herein are relevant; those to any other persons and/or at any other time/place have no tendency in reason to prove a disputed fact of consequence to a determination of this action. It has long been settled that in addition to insurance coverage, mention of a professional's other lawsuits is strictly prohibited: "It is improper in argument to refer to judgments given in malpractice actions whether brought against doctors or lawyers or to refer to any protection either has against such actions." (Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Bd. of Trustees (1957) 154 Cal. App.2d 560, 579.) Finally, to the degree this information may be public record, it is equally available to the propounding party (Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.220(c).) FURTHER RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 33: Objection. The definition of "YOU" renders this interrogatory overly broad, vague, ambiguous, and unintelligible and as such seeks information which is irrelevant to the subject matter of this litigation and/or is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible 7 DFT DAVID M. ASHKENAZE, MD'S FURTHER RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES e 0 0 0 a N n d Ba W N N O N O N O N O N O N O N O N m e e d wd mk e d ee Eg 3 8&8 0 R U N R 8 8 =» 8 2 a u Rk R B evidence. The request for any lawsuits involving defendant, without limitation to scope or subject matter is also overly broad, irrelevant and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Regardless, discovery directed to past lawsuits, if any, is not relevant and not calculated to lead to admissible evidence, because evidence of such information is inadmissible character evidence. (Hinson v. Claremont Community Hospital (1990) 218 Cal. App.3d 1110). Only the medical care and treatment provided by defendant fo the plaintiff herein are relevant; those to any other persons and/or at any other time/place have no tendency in reason to prove a disputed fact of consequence to a determination of this action. It has long been settled that in addition to insurance coverage, mention of a professional's other lawsuits is strictly prohibited: "It is improper in argument to refer to judgments given in malpractice actions whether brought against doctors or lawyers or to refer to any protection either has against such actions." (Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Bd. of Trustees (1957) 154 Cal. App.2d 560, 579.) Finally, to the degree this information may be public record, it is equally available to the propounding party (Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.220(c).) | Without waiving said objections, defendant responds: Defendant does not recall the case number, court, judicial district, count of the following past California Jawsuits: Case #1: allegation was failure to diagnose arterial injury; and Case #2: allegation was failure to diagnose foot fracture. RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 34: Objection. The request for any lawsuits involving defendant, without limitation to scope or subject matter is also overly broad, irrelevant and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Regardless, discovery directed to past lawsuits, if any, is not relevant and not calculated to lead to admissible evidence, because evidence of such information is inadmissible character evidence. (Hinson v. Claremont Community Hospital (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1110). Only the medical care and treatment provided by defendant to the plaintiff herein are relevant; those to any other persons and/or at any other time/place have no tendency in 8 DFT DAVID M. ASBKENAZE, MD'S FURTHER RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES Ov 0 N N bs W N em O N N O R O N O N N N N mE ew o m ek wm mm e m em S N BRB mH BE U 9 B R B B TT 5 80 9 2 ad 52 8 8 = = reason to prove a disputed fact of consequence to a determination of this action. It has long been settled that in addition to insurance coverage, mention of a professional's other Jawsuits is strictly prohibited: "It is improper in argument to refer to judgments given in malpractice actions whether brought against doctors or lawyers or to refer to any protection either has against such actions." (Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Bd. of Trustees (1957) 154 Cal. App.2d 560, 579.) Finally, to the degree this information His be public record, it is equally available to the propounding party (Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.220(c).) FURTHER RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 34: Objection. The request for any lawsuits involving defendant, without limitation to scope - or subject matter is also overly broad, irrelevant and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Regardless, discovery directed to past lawsuits, if any, is not relevant and not calculated to lead to admissible evidence, because evidence of such information is inadmissible character evidence. (Hinson v. Claremont Community Hospital (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1110). Only the medical care and treatment provided by defendant to the plaintiff herein are relevant; those to any other persons and/or at any other time/place have no tendency in reason to prove a disputed fact of consequence to a determination of this action. It has long been settled that in addition to insurance coverage, mention of a professional's other lawsuits is strictly prohibited: "It is improper in argument to refer to judgments given in malpractice actions whether brought against doctors or lawyers or to refer to any protection either has against such actions." (Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Bd. of Trustees (1957) 154 Cal. App.2d 560, 579.) Finally, to the degree this information may be public record, it is equally available to the propounding party (Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.220(c).) Without waiving said objections, defendant responds: Case #1: allegation was failure to diagnose arterial injury; and Case #2: allegation was failure to diagnose foot fracture. RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 35: Objection. The request for any lawsuits involving defendant, without limitation to scope or subject matter is also overly broad, irrelevant and not reasonably calculated to lead to the 9 DFT DAVID M. ASHKENAZE, MD'S FURTHER RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES N e o e a3 ea n t B W 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 25 26 27 28 discovery of admissible evidence. Regardless, discovery directed to past lawsuits, if any, is not relevant and not calculated to lead to admissible evidence, because evidence of such information is inadmissible character evidence. (Hinson v. Claremont Community Hospital (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1110). Only the medical care and treatment provided by defendant to the plaintiff herein are relevant; those to any other persons and/or at any other time/place have no tendency in reason to prove a disputed fact of consequence to a determination of this action. It has long been settled that in addition to insurance coverage, mention of a professional's other lawsuits is strictly prohibited: "It is improper in argument to refer to judgments given in malpractice actions whether brought against doctors or lawyers or to refer to any protection either has against such actions.” (Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jv. University Bd. of Trustees (1957) 154 Cal.App.2d 560, 579.) Finally, to the degree this information may be public record, it is equally available to the propounding party (Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.220(c).) FURTHER RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 35: Objection. The request for any lawsuits involving defendant, without limitation to scope or subject matter is also overly broad, irrelevant and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Regardless, discovery directed to past lawsuits, if any, is not relevant and not calculated to lead to admissible evidence, because evidence of such information is inadmissible character evidence. (Hinson v. Claremont Community Hospital (1990) 218 Cal. App.3d 1110). Only the medical care and treatment provided by defendant to the plaintiff herein are relevant; those to any other persons and/or at any other time/place have no tendency in reason to prove a disputed fact of consequence to a determination of this action. It has long been settled that in addition to insurance coverage, mention of a professional's other lawsuits is strictly prohibited: “Tt is improper in argument to refer to judgments given in malpractice actions whether brought against doctors or lawyers or to refer to any protection either has against such actions." (Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Bd. of Trustees (1957) 154 Cal.App.2d 560, 579.) Finally, to the degree this information may be public record, it is equally available to the propounding party (Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.220(c).) Without waiving said objections, defendant responds: 10 DFT DAVID M. ASHKENAZE, MD'S FURTHER RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES N e 3 a Wn Ss W N e e N O N N O N N N N N N we m d ed pe Case #1: outcome was arbitration award for claimant. Case #2: outcome was verdict for plaintiff. RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 36: Objection. The definition of "YOUR" renders this interrogatory overly broad, vague, ambiguous, and unintelligible and as such seeks information which is irrelevant to the subject matter of this litigation and/or is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The request for any lawsuits involving defendant, without limitation to scope or subject matter is also overly broad, irrelevant and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Regardless, discovery directed to past lawsuits, if any, is not relevant and not calculated to lead to admissible evidence, because evidence of such information is inadmissible character evidence. (Hinson v. Claremont Community Hospital (1990) 218 Cal. App.3d 1110). Only the medical care and treatment provided by defendant to the plaintiff herein are relevant; those to any other persons and/or at any other time/place have no tendency in reason to prove a disputed fact of consequence to a determination of this action. It has long been settled that in addition to insurance coverage, mention of a professional's other lawsuits is strictly prohibited: "It is improper in argument to refer to judgments given in malpractice actions whether brought against doctors or lawyers or to refer to any protection either has against such actions." (Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Bd. of Trustees (1957) 154 Cal.App.2d 560, 579.) Finally, to the degree this information may be public record, it is equally available to the propounding party (Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.220(c).) FURTHER RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 36: Objection. The definition of "YOUR" renders this interrogatory overly broad, vague, ambiguous, and unintelligible and as such seeks information which is irrelevant to the subject matter of this litigation and/or is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The request for any lawsuits involving defendant, without limitation to scope or subject matter is also overly broad, irrelevant and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 11 DFT DAVID M. ASHKENAZE, MD'S FURTHER RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES \& ° 2 x th E o Ww ~ fd MN O N O N N N N N O N OW N ee em ed pe d Jt admissible evidence. Regardless, discovery directed to past lawsuits, if any, is not relevant and not calculated to lead to admissible evidence, because evidence of such information is inadmissible character evidence. (Hinson v. Claremont Community Hospital (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1110). Only the medical care and treatment provided by defendant to the plaintiff herein are relevant; those to any other persons and/or at any other time/place have no tendency in reason to prove a disputed fact of consequence to a determination of this action. It has long been settled that in addition to insurance coverage, mention of a professional's other lawsuits is strictly prohibited: "It is improper in argument to refer to judgments given in malpractice actions whether brought against doctors or lawyers or to refer to any protection either has against such actions." (Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Bd. of Trustees (1957) 154 Cal. App.2d 560, 579.) Finally, to the degree this information may be public record, it is equally available to the propounding party (Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.220(c).) Without waiving said objections, defendant responds: defendant does not recall one way or the other whether his deposition was taken in Case #1 and Case #2 identified above. | RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 41: Objection. The definition of "YOU" renders this interrogatory overly broad, vague, | ambiguous, and unintelligible and as such seeks information which is irrelevant to the subject matter of this litigation and/or is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. As phrased, the interrogatory invades the attorney client privilege and/or attorney work product and violates Evidence Code section 1157 and the disclosure requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 2034.010 ef seq. Without waiving said objections, the medical records from defendant's office pertaining to medical care and treatment defendant provided to plaintiff. FURTHER RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 41: Objection. The definition of "YOU" renders this interrogatory overly broad, vague, ambiguous, and unintelligible and as such seeks information which is irrelevant to the subject matter of this litigation and/or is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible 12 DFT DAVID M. ASHKENAZE, MD'S FURTHER RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES e e a a n n h A W N N O R O N O N N O N O N O N O N mm em ee em evidence. As phrased, the interrogatory invades the attorney client privilege and/or attorney work product and violates Evidence Code section 1157 and the disclosure requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 2034.010 ef seq. Without waiving said objections, the medical records and imaging studies from defendant's office pertaining to medical care and treatment defendant provided to plaintiff as well as the medical records and imaging studies of plaintiff from Mission Hospital, Community Orthopedic Medical Group and St. Joseph Heritage Medical Group. RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 55: Objection. The definition of "YOUR" renders this interrogatory overly broad, vague, ambiguous, and unintelligible and as such seeks information which is irrelevant to the subject matter of this litigation and/or is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. As phrased, the interrogatory invades the attorney client privilege and/or attorney work product and violates the disclosure requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 2034.010 et seq. | Without waiving said objections, defendant refers the propounding party to the medical records of plaintiff and the expert declaration of Lanchlan Chambers, M.D. filed in support of defendant's MSJ. | FURTHER RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. S55: Objection. The definition of "YOUR" renders this interrogatory overly broad, vague, ambiguous, and unintelligible and as such seeks information which is irrelevant to the subject matter of this litigation and/or is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. As phrased, the interrogatory invades the attorney client privilege and/or attorney work product and violates the disclosure requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 2034.010 et seq. This interrogatory is duplicative of Form Interrogatory number 15.1. i3 DFT DAVID M. ASHKENAZE, MD'S FURTHER RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES eo 0 a o e n te A W N N O O N N O N N N N N N ee e e Je d ed ee ed E N B R R R E N R B C Z S a G R O R = Without waiving said objections, defendant responds as follows: GENERAL DENIAL To the extent this interrogatory inquires about the standard of care, defendant objects on the grounds of the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work-product doctrine and that it seeks the premature and uncompensated disclosure of expert opinions in violation of Code of Civil Procedure section 2034.210. To that degree, it exceeds the permissible scope of discovery at this time, and is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Code of Civil Procedure section 2034.210, ef seq. is the exclusive means of obtaining expert opinions from a defendant and his experts. (County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court [Martinez] (1990) 224 Cal. App.3d 1446, 1457.) Expert medical opinion is required to determine issues of liability in this medical malpractice action, including but not limited to a determination of compliance with or deviation from the applicable standard of care. (Gami v. Mulliken Medical Center (1993) 18 Cal. App.4™ 870 at 877; Barton v. Owen (1977) 71 Cal. App.3d 488 at 506; Dumas v. Cooney (1991) 235 Cal. App.3d 1593, 1603 cf. Jones v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. (1985) 163 Cal. App.3d 396, 402-403; CACI 501.) The identities and opinion testimony of expert witnesses are not discoverable in general discovery. (Martinez, supra, at 1456-1457; City of Long Beach v. Sup.Ct. (1976) 64 Cal. App.3d. 65, 73, 80; In Re Jeanette H. (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 25, 36.) Plaintiff will have the opportunity to explore issues of the professional standard of care with defendant's experts, assuming his compliance with the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 2034.210, ef seq. Without waiving said objections, defendant exercises his right under Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.230 and refers to the declarations of Lauchlan Chambers, M.D. accompanying defendant's MSJ filed on 4/24/18 (MSJ#1) and MS] filed on 11/14/18 (MSI#2) and the medical records attached as exhibits to MSJ#1 and MSJ#2. FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE To the extent this interrogatory inquires about the standard of care, defendant objects on the grounds of the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work-product doctrine and that it seeks the premature and uncompensated disclosure of expert opinions in violation of Code of Civil 14 DFT DAVID M. ASHKENAZE, MD'S FURTHER RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES Le a ; nt BR W N p e B N N O N N N N M O R N DN r m ee ew em e k ee Procedure section 2034.210. To that degree, it exceeds the permissible scope of discovery at this time, and is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Code of Civil Procedure section 2034.210, ef seq. is the exclusive means of obtaining expert opinions from a defendant and his experts. (County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court [Martinez] (1990) 224 Cal. App.3d 1446, 1457.) Expert medical opinion is required to determine issues of liability in this medical malpractice action, including but not limited to a determination of compliance with or deviation from the applicable standard of care. (Gami v. Mulliken Medical Center (1993) 18 Cal. App.4™ 870 at 877; Barton v. Owen (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 488 at 506; Dumas v. Cooney (1991) 235 Cal. App.3d 1593, 1603 cf. Jones v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 396, 402-403; CACI 501.) The identities and opinion testimony of expert witnesses are not discoverable in general discovery. (Martinez, supra, at 1456-1457; City of Long Beach v. Sup.Ct. (1976) 64 Cal. App.3d. 65, 73, 80; In Re Jeanette H. (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 25, 36.) Plaintiff will have the opportunity to explore issues of the professional standard of care with defendant's experts, assuming his compliance with the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 2034.210, ef seq. Without waiving said objections, defendant exercises his right under Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.230 and refers to the declarations of Lauchlan Chambers, M.D. accompanying defendant's MS) filed on 4/24/18 (MSJ#1) and MS] filed on 11/14/18 (MSJ#2) and the medical records attached as exhibits to MSJ#1 and MSJ#2 and the medical records attached as exhibits to MSJ#1 and MSJ#2. SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE Plaintiff knew or should have known by 6/6/ 16 that the 4/26/16 performed by this defendant was the negligent cause of his injury within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5 and was required to commence his lawsuit within one year, to wit, no later than 6/6/17. Plaintiff untimely filed his lawsuit on 7/24/17, more than a month after the expiration of the limitations period. THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE Defendant presently lacks sufficient information to answer this interrogatory as to the 15 DFT DAVID M. ASHKENAZE, MD'S FURTHER RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES No 0 0 a3 a N WN RA W N em BN N O Y O N N N N N N e m e d jm ed t e d p m Third Affirmative Defense because plaintiff has not yet appeared for deposition despite being served with three notices of deposition since November, 2017. Defendant reserves his right to supplement his response with any responsive information obtained from completing the deposition of plaintiff. FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE This interrogatory improperly seeks the premature and uncompensated disclosure of expert opinions in violation of Code of Civil Procedure section 2034.210. To that degree, it exceeds the permissible scope of discovery at this time, and is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Code of Civil Procedure section 2034.210, et seq. is the exclusive means of obtaining expert opinions from a defendant and his experts. (County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court [Martinez] (1990) 224 Cal. App.3d 1446, 1457.) Expert medical opinion is required to determine issues of liability in this medical malpractice action, including but not limited to a determination of compliance with or deviation from the applicable standard of care. (Gami v. Mulliken Medical Center (1993) 18 Cal. App.4™ 870 at 877; Barton v. Owen (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 488 at 506; Dumas v. Cooney (1991) 235 Cal. App.3d 1593, 1603 cf. Jones v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 396, 402-403; CACI 501.) The identities and opinion testimony of expert witnesses are not discoverable in general discovery. (Martinez, supra, at 1456-1457; City of Long Beach v. Sup.Ct. (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d. 65, 73, 80; In Re Jeanette H. (1990) 225 Cal. App.3d 25, 36.) Plaintiff will have the opportunity to explore issues of the professional standard of care with defendant's experts, assuming his compliance with the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 2034.210, ef seq. Without waiving said objections, defendant exercises his right under Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.230 and refers to the declarations of Lauchlan Chambers, M.D. accompanying defendant's MS] filed on 4/24/18 (MSJ#1) and MSI filed on 11/14/18 (MSJ#2) and the medical records attached as exhibits to MSJ#1 and MSJ#2. FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE Defendant presently does not have any facts to support this Fifth Affirmative Defense. 16 DFT DAVID M. ASHKENAZE, MD'S FURTHER RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES O e a AN it Ae W N NN O N O N O N N N N N N e Ee ed ed S 3S 8B 3 RR 8 8S RR 3 8 8 3 8 xn 2 a 0 = 2 SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE Defendant presently does not have any facts to support this Fifth Affirmative Defense. SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE Defendant presently lacks sufficient information to answer this interrogatory as to the Seventh Affirmative Defense because plaintiff has not yet appeared for deposition despite being served with three notices of deposition since November, 2017. Defendant reserves his right to supplement his response with any responsive information obtained from completing the deposition of plaintiff. EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (a)-(c) Defendant presently lacks sufficient information to answer this interrogatory as to the Eighth Affirmative Defense because plaintiff has not yet appeared for deposition despite being served with three notices of deposition since November, 2017. Defendant reserves his right to supplement his response with any responsive information obtained from completing the deposition of plaintiff. NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE This interrogatory improperly seeks the premature and uncompensated disclosure of expert opinions in violation of Code of Civil Procedure section 2034.210. To that degree, it exceeds the permissible scope of discovery at this time, and is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Code of Civil Procedure section 2034.210, ef seq. is the exclusive means of obtaining expert opinions from a defendant and his experts. (County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court [Martinez] (1990) 224 Cal. App.3d 1446, 1457.) Expert medical opinion is required to determine issues of liability in this medical malpractice action, including but not limited to a determination of compliance with or deviation from the applicable standard of care. (Gami v. Mulliken Medical Center (1993) 18 Cal. App.4™ 870 at 877; Barton v. Owen (1977) 71 Cal. App.3d 488 at 506; Dumas v. Cooney (1991) 235 Cal. App.3d 1593, 1603 cf. Jones v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 396, 402-403; CACI 501.) The identities and opinion testimony of expert witnesses are not discoverable in general discovery. (Martinez, supra, at 1456-1457; City of Long 17 DFT DAVID M. ASHKENAZE, MD'S FURTHER RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES W O N N N N N N W Fe ed pe pd pe d 2 ND 8 8 R U N R E B C S O E G E L D E R B No e e x AN hh Ra W N Beach v. Sup.Ct. (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d. 65, 73, 80; In Re Jeanette H. (1990) 225 Cal. App.3d 25, 36.) Plaintiff will have the opportunity to explore issues of the professional standard of care with defendant's experts, assuming his compliance with the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 2034.210, ef seq. Without waiving said objections, defendant exercises his right under Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.230 and refers to the declarations of Lauchlan Chambers, M.D. accompanying defendant's MS] filed on 4/24/18 (MSJ#1) and MSJ filed on 11/14/18 (MSJ#2) and the medical records and imaging studies attached as exhibits to MSJ#1 and MSJ#2. TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE Defendant presently lacks sufficient information to answer this interrogatory as to the Tenth Affirmative Defense because plaintiff has not yet appeared for deposition despite being served with three notices of deposition since November, 2017. Defendant reserves his right to supplement his response with any responsive information obtained from completing the deposition of plaintiff. ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE California Civil Code section 3333.1 applies to medical malpractice actions such as the instant one and plaintiffs admit just as much as his Complaint alleges that defendants "negligently rendered medical services, including total left hip replacement surgery, to Perry Krinitt resulting in severe pain and functional limitation." (Complaint § 7.) TWELFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE California Code of Civil Procedure section 667.7 applies to medical malpractice actions such as the instant one and plaintiff admits just as much as his Complaint alleges that defendants "negligently rendered medical services, including total left hip replacement surgery, to Perry Krinitt resulting in severe pain and functional limitation." (Complaint § 7.) THIRTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE California Civil Code section 3333.2(b) applies to medical malpractice actions such as the instant one and plaintiff admits just as much as his Complaint alleges that defendants "negligently rendered medical services, including total left hip replacement surgery, to Perry 18 DFT DAVID M. ASHKENAZE, MD'S FURTHER RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES W O 2 a N n t RA W N N N N O N N N N N N N e e d em em e d eR Krinitt resulting in severe pain and functional limitation." (Complaint § 7.) FOURTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (a)-(c) California Civil Code sections 1431 and1431.2 operate as a matter of Jaw establishing joint and several liability for economic and non-economic damages. To that degree, defendant is unable to answer this interrogatory further as to the Fourteenth Affirmative Defense. FIFTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE Defendant presently lacks sufficient information to answer this interrogatory as to the Eighth Affirmative Defense because plaintiff has not yet appeared for deposition despite being served with three notices of deposition since November, 2017. Defendant reserves his right to supplement his response with any responsive information obtained from completing the deposition of plaintiff. RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 56: Objection. The definition of "YOUR" renders this interrogatory overly broad, vague, ambiguous, and unintelligible and as such seeks information which is irrelevant to the subject matter of this litigation and/or is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. As phrased, the interrogatory invades the attorney client privilege and/or attorney work product and violates the disclosure requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 2034.010 et seq. Without waiving said objections, defendant, Lauchlan Chambers, M.D., healthcare | providers identified in plaintiff's medical records and any retained and non-retained experts identified at the time of mutual designation of expert witnesses pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2034.010 ef seq. FURTHER RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 56: Objection. The definition of "YOUR" renders this interrogatory overly broad, vague, ambiguous, and unintelligible and as such seeks information which is irrelevant to the subject matter of this litigation and/or is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 19 DFT DAVID M. ASHKENAZE, MD'S FURTHER RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES vo ee a NN tt RA W N N O N O N O N O N N N O N RN we j e em e d ed e d As phrased, the interrogatory invades the attorney client privilege and/or attorney work product and violates the disclosure requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 2034.010 et seq. This interrogatory is duplicative of Form Interrogatory number 15.1. Without waiving said objections, defendant responds as follows: plaintiff, defendant, Lauchlan Chambers, M.D. and any non-retained and retained experts designated by defendants pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure 2034.010 et seq. RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 57: Objection. The definition of "YOU" renders this interrogatory overly broad, vague, ambiguous, and unintelligible and as such seeks information which is irrelevant to the subject matter of this litigation and/or is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. As phrased, the interrogatory invades the attorney client privilege and/or attorney work product and violates the disclosure requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 2034.010 ef seq. Without waiving said objections, Lauchlan Chambers, M.D. and any retained and non- retained experts identified at the time of mutual designation of expert witnesses pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2034.010 ef seq. will testify that defendant complied with the standard of care in his care and treatment of the plaintiff and that no act or omission on the part of defendant was a substantial factor in causing or contributing to the plaintiff's claimed injuries and damages. FURTHER RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 57: Objection. The definition of "YOU" renders this interrogatory overly broad, vague, ambiguous, and unintelligible and as such seeks information which is irrelevant to the subject matter of this litigation and/or is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. As phrased, the interrogatory invades the attorney client privilege and/or attorney work product and violates the disclosure requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 2034.010 et 20 DFT DAVID M. ASHKENAZE, MD'S FURTHER RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES oe ® g S n A W N W O N N N N N O N O N O N Em m m ed e d e w & 2 & 6 BR 8 nN =m 2 2 2 0 3 a n r S R O s seq. This interrogatory is duplicative of Special Interrogatory number 55 above inasmuch as | the witnesses are expected to testify as to the facts listed in the response to number 55 above. Without waiving said objections, defendants anticipate the witnesses will testify as to the facts set forth in the response to number 55 above. RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 58: Objection. The definitions of "YOU" and "YOUR" render this interrogatory overly broad, vague, ambiguous, and unintelligible and as such seeks information which is irrelevant to the subject matter of this litigation and/or is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Without waiving said objections, the affirmative defenses raised in the answer have all | been pled in accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure so as not to waive those affirmative defenses. To date, adequate discovery has not been completed so as to supply the names, addresses and telephone numbers of all persons who have knowledge of the facts supporting these defenses. However, it is anticipated that some or all of these affirmative defenses will be supported by documents in the patient's medical records that are available to all parties. Defendant also refers the propounding party to the expert declaration of Lauchlan Chambers, M.D. that was filed in support of defendant's MS. Discovery and investigation are continuing. FURTHER RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 58: Objection. The definitions of "YOU" and "YOUR" render this interrogatory overly broad, vague, ambiguous, and unintelligible and as such seeks information which is irrelevant to the subject matter of this litigation and/or is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. As phrased, the interrogatory invades the attorney client privilege and/or attorney work product and violates the disclosure requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 2034.010 et seq. | This interrogatory is duplicative of Form Interrogatory number 15.1. Without waiving said objections, defendants respond: (1) medical records and imaging 21 DFT DAVID M. ASHKENAZE, MD'S FURTHER RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES "© 9 a WM o a W O N me N O N N O N N O N O N O N OD N k d jm mk bm he d pe d pe ® 3 A U h o A BW N = SS © x a =a O h E L D R R E studies (as applicable) of plaintiff from Mission Hospital, Community Orthopedic Medical Group, St. Joseph Heritage Medical Group and David Ashkenaze, M.D.; and (2) the declarations of Lauchlan Chambers, M.D. filed with defendants’ MSJ#1 and MSJ#2. DATED: December 7 2018 SCHMID & VOILES By MARGARET M. CAHILL, ESQ. KHUONG T. DO, ESQ. Attorneys for Defendants, DAVID M. ASHKENAZE, M.D. and ADVANCED ORTHOPAEDIC SPECIALISTS OF ORANGE COUNTY 22 DFT DAVID M. ASHKENAZE, MD'S FURTHER RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES w w e 3 N n Ae W N N No Ny on d [N d |] ~ 3 ~N pt J d or - PROOF OF SERVICE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF ORANGE I am employed in the County of Orange, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action; my business address is Schmid & Voiles (“the firm"), 333 City Boulevard West, Suite 720, Orange, CA 92868. I am readily familiar with the business practice for collection and processing mail with the United States Postal Service. On December 2, 2018, 1 served the foregoing document described as: DEFENDANT DAVID ASHKENAZE, M.D.'S FURTHER RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES (SET ONE) on the interested parties in this action by placing a copy thereof addressed as follows: James P. Wohl, Esq. LAW OFFICES OF JAMES P. WOHL 1925 Century Park East, Suite 2140 Los Angeles, CA 90067 Telephone: (310) 557-2349 Facsimile: (310) 557-2839 ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF PERRY KRINITT By US Mail [CCP §§1013(a);1013a] I placed a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid for deposit with the United States Postal Service by placing it for collection and mailing at my business address on the date stated, following the firm's ordinary business practice. I am aware that on motion of party served, service is presumed invalid if the postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one (1) day after the date of deposit for mailing in the affidavit. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct. v Executed December J l at Orange, California. Crystal Nordenstam Type or Print Name Signature 24 DFT DAVID M, ASHKENAZE, MD'S FURTHER RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES Oo ®@ 3 1 a W N N O N D O N N N O N O N O N re em em be d ed pe d em ® N A M h W N m S P o a a n h @ m R B MARGARET M. CAHILL, ESQ. (SBN 138231) mcahill@schmidvoiles.com KHUONG T. DO, ESQ. (SBN 189189) kdo@schmidvoiles.com SCHMID & VOILES 333 City Boulevard West, Suite 720 Orange, CA 92868 Tel: (714) 940-5555/Fax: (714) 940-5594 Attorneys for Defendants DAVID M. ASHKENAZE, M.D. and ADVANCED ORTHOPAEDIC SPECIALISTS OF ORANGE COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF ORANGE - CENTRAL JUSTICE CENTER PERRY KRINITT, CASE NO. 30-2017-00933355-CU-MM-CJC Plaintiff, DEFENDANT DAVID ASHKENAZE, M.D.'S FURTHER RESPONSES TO FORM Vv. INTERROGATORIES (SET ONE) DR. DAVID ASHKENAZE, MD ADVANCED ORTHOPEDIC SPECIALISTS OF ORANGE COUNTY, Defendants. "RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant DAVID M. ASHKENAZE, M.D. PROPOUNDING PARTY: Plaintiff PERRY KRINITT SET NO.: ONE (1) This responding party has not fully completed the investigation of the facts relating to this case and has not fully completed discovery in this action. All of the responses contained herein are based only upon such information and documents which are currently available to and specifically known to this responding party and disclose only those contentions which currently occur to such responding party. It is anticipated that further discovery, independent investigation, legal research and analysis will supply additional facts, add meaning to known facts, as well as establish entirely 1 DFT DAVID M. ASHKENAZE, MD'S FURTHER RESPONSES TO FORM INTERROGATORIES No 90 3 N h be W N N N N N O N O N N N O N N O N w t ed k d ja d wd h m he d ® 9 RA Gh R D N o m e P m O a ER E L D E 2 E B E new factual conclusions and legal contentions, all of which lead to substantial additions to, changes in, and variations from the contentions herein set forth. The following responses are given without prejudice to respondent's right to produce evidence of subsequently discovered fact or facts, which this responding party may later recall. Responding party, accordingly, reserves the right to change any and all responses herein as additional facts are ascertained, analyses are made, and legal research is completed. The responses contained herein are made in a good faith effort to supply as much factual information and as much specification of legal contentions as is currently known, but should in no way prejudice responding party in relation to further discovery, research, and analysis. INTERROGATORY RESPONSES RESPONSE TO FORM INTERROGATORY NO. 2.2: 6/18/1958 FURTHER RESPONSE TO FORM INTERROGATORY NO. 2.2: 6/18/1958; Long Beach, CA. RESPONSE TO FORM INTERROGATORY NO. 15.1: (8) Respondent party denies any negligence on her part and maintains that the care and treatment he rendered to the plaintiff's was within the standard of practice within the community. Discovery is ongoing and expert testimony will be offered on these issues. (b) The affirmative defenses raised in the answer have all been pled in accordance - with the Code of Civil Procedure so as not to waive those affirmative defenses; {c) To date, adequate discovery has not been completed so as to supply the names, addresses and telephone numbers of all persons who have knowledge of the facts supporting these defenses. However, it is anticipated that some or all of these affirmative defenses will be supported by documents in the plaintiff's medical records that are available to all parties. FURTHER RESPONSE TO FORM INTERROGATORY NO. 15.1: GENERAL DENIAL (a)-(¢) To the extent this interrogatory inquires about the standard of care, defendant objects on the grounds of the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work-product doctrine and 2 DFT DAVID M. ASHKENAZE, MD'S FURTHER RESPONSES TO FORM INTERROGATORIES w e I aN R R A W N N O N O N O R N N N N N N e e pe ed pt that it seeks the premature and uncompensated disclosure of expert opinions in violation of Code of Civil Procedure section 2034.210. To that degree, it exceeds the permissible scope of discovery at this time, and is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Code of Civil Procedure section 2034.210, ef seq. is the exclusive means of obtaining expert opinions from a defendant and his experts. (County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court [Martinez] (1990) 224 Cal. App.3d 1446, 1457.) Expert medical opinion is required to determine issues of liability in this medical malpractice action, including but not limited to a determination of compliance with or deviation from the applicable standard of care. (Gami v. Mulliken Medical Center (1993) 18 Cal. App.4™ 870 at 877; Barton v. Owen (1977) 71 Cal. App.3d 488 at 506; Dumas v. Cooney (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1593, 1603 cf. Jones v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. (1985) 163 Cal. App.3d 396, 402-403; CACI 501.) The identities and opinion testimony of expert witnesses are not discoverable in general discovery. (Martinez, supra, at 1456-1457; City of Long Beach v. Sup.Ct, (1976) 64 Cal. App.3d. 65, 73, 80; In Re Jeanette H. (1990) 225 Cal. App.3d 25, 36.) Plaintiff will have the opportunity to explore issues of the professional standard of care with defendant's experts, assuming his compliance with the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 2034.210, et seq. Without waiving said objections, defendant exercises his right under Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.230 and refers to the declarations of Lauchlan Chambers, M.D. a -- defendant's MS] filed on 4/24/18 (MSJ#1) and MS] filed on 11/14/18 (MSJ#2) and the medical records and imaging studies attached as exhibits to MSJ#1 and MSJ#2. FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (a)-(c) To the extent this interrogatory inquires about the standard of care, defendant objects on the grounds of the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work-product doctrine and that it seeks the premature and uncompensated disclosure of expert opinions in violation of Code of Civil Procedure section 2034.210. To that degree, it exceeds the permissible scope of discovery at this time, and is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible { evidence. 3 DFT DAVID M. ASHKENAZE, MD'S FURTHER RESPONSES TO FORM INTERROGATORIES e e 3 & U n Aa W N N O N N O N N N N N NY p d ee em ee e l e s Code of Civil Procedure section 2034.210, et seq. is the exclusive means of obtaining expert opinions from a defendant and his experts. (County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court [Martinez] (1990) 224 Cal. App.3d 1446, 1457.) Expert medical opinion is required to determine issues of liability in this medical malpractice action, including but not limited to a determination of compliance with or deviation from the applicable standard of care. (Gami v. Mulliken Medical Center (1993) 18 Cal. App.4™ 870 at 877; Barton v. Owen (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 488 at 506; Dumas v. Cooney (1991) 235 Cal. App.3d 1593, 1603 cf. Jones v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 396, 402-403; CACI 501.) The identities and opinion testimony of expert witnesses are not discoverable in general discovery. (Martinez, supra, at 1456-1457; City of Long Beach v. Sup.Ct. (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d. 65, 73, 80; In Re Jeanette H. (1990) 225 Cal. App.3d 25, 36.) Plaintiff will have the opportunity to explore issues of the professional standard of care with defendant's experts, assuming his compliance with the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 2034.210, ef seq. Without waiving said objections, defendant exercises his right under Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.230 and refers to the declarations of Lauchlan Chambers, M.D. accompanying defendant's MSJ filed on 4/24/18 (MSJ#1) and MS] filed on 11/14/18 (MSJ#2) and the medical records and imaging studies attached as exhibits to MSJ#1 and MSJ#2. SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (a) Plaintiff knew or should have known by 6/6/16 that the 4/26/16 performed by this defendant was the alleged negligent cause of his injury within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5 and was required to commence his lawsuit within one year, to wit, no later than 6/6/17. Plaintiff untimely filed his lawsuit on 7/24/17, more than a month after the expiration of the limitations period. (b) Plaintiff. (c) Plaintiff's medical records and imaging studies (as applicable) of plaintiff from Mission Hospital, Community Orthopedic Medical Group, St. Joseph Heritage Medical Group and David Ashkenaze, M.D. 4 DFT DAVID M. ASHKENAZR, MD'S FURTHER RESPONSES TO FORM INTERROGATORIES e X a aN nt Aa W N ee N O N O N N N R N R NN e e em THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (a)-(c) Defendant presently lacks sufficient information to answer this interrogatory as to the Third Affirmative Defense because plaintiff has not yet appeared for deposition despite being served with three notices of deposition since November, 2017. Defendant reserves his right to supplement his response with any responsive information obtained from completing the | deposition of plaintiff. FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (a)-(c) This interrogatory improperly seeks the premature and uncompensated disclosure of expert opinions in violation of Code of Civil Procedure section 2034.210. To that degree, it exceeds the permissible scope of discovery at this time, and is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Code of Civil Procedure section 2034.210, et seq. is the exclusive means of obtaining expert opinions from a defendant and his experts. (County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court [Martinez] (1990) 224 Cal. App.3d 1446, 1457.) Expert medical opinion is required to determine issues of liability in this medical malpractice action, including but not limited to a determination || of compliance with or deviation from the applicable standard of care. (Gami v. Mulliken Medical Center (1993) 18 Cal. App 4% 870 at 877; Barton v. Owen (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 488 at 506; Dumas v. Cooney (1991) 235 Cal. App.3d 1593, 1603 cf. Jones v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. (1985) 163 Cal. App.3d 396, 402-403; CACI 501.) The identities and opinion testimony of expert witnesses are not discoverable in general discovery. (Martinez, supra, at 1456-1457; City of Long Beach v. Sup.Ct. (1976) 64 Cal. App.3d. 65, 73, 80; In Re Jeanette H. (1990) 225 Cal. App.3d 25, 36.) Plaintiff will have the opportunity to explore issues of the professional standard of care with defendant's experts, assuming his compliance with the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 2034.210, ef seq. Without waiving said objections, defendant exercises his right under Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.230 and refers to the declarations of Lauchlan Chambers, M.D. accompanying defendant's MSJ filed on 4/24/18 (MSJ#1) and MSJ filed on 11/14/18 (MSJ#2) and the medical records and imaging studies attached as exhibits to MSJ#1 and MSJ#2. 5 DFT DAVID M. ASHKENAZE, MD'S FURTHER RESPONSES TO FORM INTERROGATORIES N O N N N N N N N N e mk em em p t Be 0 9 ; Wn t Ase W N FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (a)-(c) Defendant presently does not have any facts to support this Fifth Affirmative Defense. Discovery ongoing. SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (2)-(c) Defendant presently does not have any facts to support this Fifth Affirmative Defense. Discovery ongoing. SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (a)-(c) Defendant presently lacks sufficient information to answer this interrogatory as to the Seventh Affirmative Defense because plaintiff has not yet appeared for deposition despite being served with three notices of deposition since November, 2017. Defendant reserves his right to supplement his response with any responsive information obtained from completing the deposition of plaintiff. EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (a)-(c) Defendant presently lacks sufficient information to answer this interrogatory as to the Eighth Affirmative Defense because plaintiff has not yet appeared for deposition despite being served with three notices of deposition since November, 2017. Defendant reserves his right to supplement his response with any responsive information obtained from completing the deposition of plaintiff. NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (a)-(c) This interrogatory improperly seeks the premature and uncompensated disclosure of expert opinions in violation of Code of Civil Procedure section 2034.210. To that degree, it exceeds the permissible scope of discovery at this time, and is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Code of Civil Procedure section 2034.210, et seq. is the exclusive means of obtaining expert opinions from a defendant and his experts. (County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court [Martinez] (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1446, 1457.) Expert medical opinion is required to determine issues of liability in this medical malpractice action, including but not limited to a determination of compliance with or deviation from the applicable standard of care. (Gami v. Mulliken Medical 6 DFT DAVID M. ASHKENAZE, MD'S FURTHER RESPONSES TO FORM INTERROGATORIES ww O w a O N i Aa W N N O R N O N N N N N N N em je ed ee pt R N R R B E R B E N R E B E E Z E E L D 2 B E G R E R B Center (1993) 18 Cal. App4™ 870 at 877; Barton v. Owen (1977) 71 Cal. App.3d 488 at 506; Dumas v. Cooney (1991) 235 Cal. App.3d 1593, 1603 cf. Jones v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 396, 402-403; CACI 501.) The identities and opinion testimony of expert witnesses are not discoverable in general discovery. (Martinez, supra, at 1456-1457; City of Long Beach v. Sup.Ct. (1976) 64 Cal. App.3d. 65, 73, 80; In Re Jeanette H. (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 25, 36.) Plaintiff will have the opportunity to explore issues of the professional standard of care with defendant's experts, assuming his compliance with the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 2034.210, ef seq. Without waiving said objections, defendant exercises his right under Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.230 and refers to the declarations of Lauchlan Chambers, M.D. accompanying defendant's MSJ filed on 4/24/18 (MSJ#1) and MS] filed on 11/14/18 (MSJ#2) and the medical records and imaging studies attached as exhibits to MSJ#1 and MSJ#2. TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (a)~(c) Defendant presently lacks sufficient information to answer this interrogatory as to the Tenth Affirmative Defense because plaintiff has not yet appeared for deposition despite being served with three notices of deposition since November, 2017. Defendant reserves his right to supplement his response with any responsive information obtained from completing the deposition of plaintiff. ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (a) California Civil Code section 3333.1 applies to medical malpractice actions such as the instant one and plaintiffs admit just as much as his Complaint alleges that defendants "negligently rendered medical services, including total left hip replacement surgery, to Perry Krinitt resulting in severe pain and functional limitation." (Complaint 7.) (b) Plaintiff and defendant. (¢) Plaintiff's Complaint and the medical records and imaging studies (as applicable) of plaintiff from Mission Hospitel, Community Orthopedic Medical Group, St. Joseph Heritage Medical Group and David Ashkenaze, M.D. 7 DFT DAVID M. ASHKENAZE, MD'S FURTHER RESPONSES TO FORM INTERROGATORIES Ne 00 Na SN Wn t BR W R nN [O ] No [3 d No ~N b o Ne B e Jd fd Je d Jo h ed TWELFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (a) California Code of Civil Procedure section 667.7 applies to medical malpractice actions such as the instant one and plaintiff admits just as much as his Complaint alleges that defendants "negligently rendered medical services, including total left hip replacement surgery, to Perry Krinitt resulting in severe pain and functional limitation." (Complaint §7.) (b) Plaintiff and defendant. (c) Plaintiff's Complaint and the medical records and imaging studies (as applicable) of plaintiff from Mission Hospital, Community Orthopedic Medical Group, St. Joseph Heritage Medical Group and David Ashkenaze, M.D. THIRTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (a) California Civil Code section 3333.2(b) applies to medical malpractice actions such as the instant one and plaintiff admits just as much as his Complaint alleges that defendants "negligently rendered medical services, including total left hip replacement surgery, to Perry Krinitt resulting in severe pain and functional limitation." (Complaint 7.) (b) Plaintiff and defendant. (¢) Plaintiff's Complaint and the medical records and imaging studies (as applicable) of plaintiff from Mission Hospital, Community Orthopedic Medical Group, St. Joseph Heritage Medical Group and David Ashkenaze, M.D. FOURTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (a)-{c) California Civil Code sections 1431 and1431.2 operate as a matter of law establishing joint and several liability for economic and non-economic damages. To that degree, defendant is unable to answer this interrogatory further as to the Fourteenth Affirmative Defense. FIFTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (a)-(¢) Defendant presently lacks sufficient information to answer this interrogatory as to the Eighth Affirmative Defense because plaintiff has not yet appeared for deposition despite being served with three notices of deposition since November, 2017. Defendant reserves his mn nn 8 DFT DAVID M., ASBKENAZE, MD'S FURTHER RESPONSES TO FORM INTERROGATORIES Ce 8 3 a Wm As W N BN N Y O N N N N Y N N p d je j l e d ee d 2 3 & HU R 8 8 B R 8 25 28 35 3 52 oa 5 0 8 B B = right to supplement his response with any responsive information obtained from completing the deposition of plaintiff. DATED: December Fors . SCHMID & VOILES KHUONG T. DO, ESQ. Attorneys for Defendants, DAVID M. ASHKENAZE, M.D. and ADVANCED ORTHOPAEDIC SPECIALISTS OF ORANGE COUNTY 9 DFT DAVID M. ASHKENAZE, MD'S FURTHER RESPONSES TO FORM INTERROGATORIES No 0 a a wn +o Ww t o Jk M O N NN N N O N O N O N NY EE em ed ed ed PROOF OF SERVICE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF ORANGE I am employed in the County of Orange, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action; my business address is Schmid & Voiles (“the firm"), 333 City Boulevard West, Suite 720, Orange, CA 92868. 1 am readily familiar with the business practice for collection and processing mail with the United States Postal Service. On December2 | , 2018, 1 served the foregoing document described as: DEFENDANT DAVID ASHKENAZE, M.D.'S FURTHER RESPONSES TO FORM INTERROGATORIES Sel ONE) on the interested parties in this action by placing a copy thereof addressed as follows: James P. Wohl, Esq. LAW OFFICES OF JAMES P. WOHL 1925 Century Park East, Suite 2140 Los Angeles, CA 90067 Telephone: (310) 557-2349 Facsimile: ~~ (310) 557-2839 ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF PERRY KRINITT By US Mail [CCP §§1013(a);1013a] I placed a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid for deposit with the United States Postal Service by placing it for collection and mailing at my business address on the date stated, following the firm's ordinary business practice. I am aware that on motion of party served, service is presumed invalid if the postal cancellation date or postage. meter date is more than one (1) day after the date of deposit for mailing in the affidavit. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct. Executed December <2} 2018, at Orange, California. Crystal Nordenstam (, 'g pr Type or Print Name Si re “ 11 DFT DAVID M. ASHKENAZE, MD'S FURTHER RESPONSES TO FORM INTERROGATORIES SS 0 0 J ON nn B A W N = N R N N N N N MN D N m em e m m a m d ed me p e ee d ee 0 ~ ~ ] N hs W Y = O N Y W N PROOF F SERVICE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES ) I am a resident of the county aforesaid; I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within entitled action; my business address is 1925 Century Park East, Suite 2140, Los Angeles, California 90067 SS On January 3, 2019, I served the foregoing document described as: REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSE TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET ONE, AND REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST DEFENDANT DR. DAVID ASHKENAZE, M.D. IN THE SUM OF $9,375 on all interested parties in said action: X_ by placing the original;_X a true and correct copy thereof enclosed in sealed envelopes addressed as follows: Schmid & Voiles Margaret M. Cahill, Esq. 333 City Boulevard West, Suite 720 Orange, California 92868 BY MAIL I deposited such envelopes, fully prepaid, in the United States mail at Los Angeles, California. Xx BY E-MAIL OR ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION: Based on a court order or an agreement of the parties to accept service by e-mail or electronic transmission, I caused the documents to be sent to the persons at the e-mail addresses listed above, on the attached service list or through the eFiling system of One Legal Attorney Service. I did not receive, within a reasonable time after the transmission, any electronic message or other indication that the transmission was unsuccessful. If the party’s attorney has used electronic filing for the Orange County Superior Court, he automatically consents to receiving electronic service. The parties hereto have agreed to accept service electronically and were served with the document(s) listed above by emailed pdf files on January 3, 2019. (CRC Rules 2.251(b)(1)(B) and 2.251(b)(B)(2), and 2.251(c).) Electronic service is complete at the time of transmission. My electronic notification address is 1925 Century Park East, Suite 2140, Los Angeles, California 90067; email: christine@wohl-law.com Executed on January 3, 2019, at Los Angeles, California. 0 o _X STATE Ideclare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that Ty true and correct. Christine McCain
