Technossus LLC vs. Venekatesh Sankaran

Motion to Strike

Cal. Super. - 4th Dist.December 16, 2016

© 0 9 O N nn BA W N = N O N N N N N N N N N mm e m e m e m e m e m p m p m co N N Ln BRA W N Y D = D O O 0 S N R E W I N D = O ELECTRONICALLY FILED Superior Court of California, County of Orange RICHARD E. QUINTILONE II (SBN 200995) 02/03/2017 at 11:08:00 PM ALVIN B. LINDSAY (SBN 220236) GEORGE A. ALOUPAS (SBN 313112) QUINTILONE & ASSOCIATES 22974 EL TORO ROAD SUITE 100 LAKE FOREST, CA 92630-4961 TELEPHONE NO. (949) 458-9675 FACSIMILE No. (949) 458-9679 Clerk of the Superior Court By Loc Nguyen, Deputy Clerk EMAIL REQ@QUINTLAW.COM; ABL@QUINTLAW.COM; GAA@QUINTLAW.COM SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ORANGE, CENTRAL JUSTICE CENTER TECHNOSSUS, LLC., a Delaware limited liability, Plaintiffs, Vs. VENKATESH SANKARAN, an individual; SAGUNA CONSULTING, LLC, a California limited liability company; SAGUNA CONSULTING SERVICES, LLC, a California limited liability company; HUMAN GENE EXPLORATION TECHNOLOGIES LLC, a California limited liability company; CHRISTIAN DAHLSTROM, an individual; SRIDHAR RAIDI, an individual; and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive, Defendants. Case No.: 30-2016-00893123-CU-BT-CJC Assigned for All Purposes To: Hon. Martha Gooding Dept.: C-34 DEFENDANT CHRISTIAN DAHLSTROM’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINT [Filed Concurrently with [Proposed] Order] Date: May 1, 2017 Time: 1:30 p.m. Dept.: C-34 Reservation ID#: 72527645 Complaint Filed: December 16, 2016 DEFENDANT CHRISTIAN DAHLSTROM’S MOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINT © 0 9 O N nn BA W N = N O N N N N N N N N N mm e m e m e m e m e m p m p m co N N Ln BRA W N Y D = D O O 0 S N R E W I N D = O TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD: PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on May 1, 2017 at 1:30 p.m., or as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard in Department C-34 of the above-entitled Court located at Orange County Superior Court, Central Justice Center, located at 700 Civic Center Drive West., Santa Ana, California 92701, CHRISTIAN DAHLSTROM (“Defendant”) will, and hereby does, move the Court for an order striking portions of the unverified Complaint filed in this action on December 15, 2016 by Plaintiff TECHNOSSUS, LLC. (“Technossus” or “Plaintiff’) as they specifically apply to Defendant. Allegations in the Complaint: 1. Plaintiff’s claims for punitive damages stated in a. Paragraph 60, Page 11, Lines 9-15 (Count II - Tortious Interference) b. Paragraph 66, Page 12, Lines 17-21 (Count III - Breach of Duty of Loyalty) EB Paragraph 97, Page 16, Lines 22-25 (Count VI - Conspiracy) 2. Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief as stated in: a. Paragraph 54, Page 10, Lines 11-13 (Count I - Unfair Business Practices) 3. Plaintiffs’ prayer for relief as stated in: a. Prayer, Paragraph 2, Page 17, Line 27 - Page 18, Line 2 (injunctive relief) b. Prayer, Paragraph 3, Page 18, Lines 3-4 (injunctive relief) C. Prayer, Paragraph 4, Page 18, Lines 5-6 (injunctive relief) d. Prayer, Paragraph 5, Page 18, Lines 7-8 (injunctive relief) € Prayer, Paragraph 7, Page 18, Line 10 (punitive damages) This motion will be based upon this notice, the attached memorandum of points and authorities and concurrently filed [Proposed] Order, all pleadings, records, and papers on file herein, and upon such further oral and documentary evidence that may be presented at the hearing of this motion. -1- DEFENDANT CHRISTIAN DAHLSTROM’S MOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINT © 0 9 O N nn BA W N = N O N N N N N N N N N mm e m e m e m e m e m p m p m co N N Ln BRA W N Y D = D O O 0 S N R E W I N D = O Dated: February 3, 2017 QUINTILONE & ASSOCIATES Pol E x RICHARD E. QUINTILONE II, ALVIN B. LINDSAY GEORGE A. ALOUPAS Attorneys for Defendant CHRISTIAN DAHLSTROM 2 DEFENDANT CHRISTIAN DAHLSTROM’S MOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINT © 0 9 O N nn BA W N = N O N N N N N N N N N mm e m e m e m e m e m p m p m co N N Ln BRA W N Y D = D O O 0 S N R E W I N D = O MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 1. INTRODUCTION The instant Complaint by Plaintiff TECHNOSSUS, LLC. (“Technossus” or “Plaintiff”) alleges unfair competition and tortious interference with contractual relations, and related causes of action, against CHRISTIAN DAHLSTROM (“Defendant”). Plaintiff claims Defendant used and disclosed its allegedly confidential and proprietary information to form a company while Defendant and co-Defendant Venkatesh Sankaran were still employed by Plaintiff. The allegations as to Defendant Dahlstrom are not specific, and broadly allege misappropriation and misuse of Confidential Information to compete against Plaintiff, work for the Seguna Defendant while working for Plaintiff, and solicitation of Plaintiff’s employees and customers to leave Plaintiff. As addressed in this Motion to Strike, many of Plaintiff’s allegations in the Complaint are irrelevant, false or improper and/or not drawn in conformity with the laws of this state. See Code of Civil Procedure § 436. The operative Complaint contains insufficient allegations to assert and have the Court impose equitable relief in the form of an injunction and/or punitive damages against the Defendants. As Plaintiff’s requested relief is not supported by the allegations of the Complaint, this Motion to Strike should be granted. 2, STATEMENT OF FACTS Plaintiffs December 16, 2016 Complaint alleges seven causes of action for (1) Unfair competition under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq.; (2) Tortious interference with contractual relations; (3) Breach of duty of loyalty; (4) Breach of contract; (5) Breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (6) Conspiracy; and (7) Aiding and abetting. The named Defendants also include two other individuals, Venkatesh Sankaran and Sridhar Raidi, and three entities, Saguna Consulting, LLC (“Seguna”), Saguna Consulting Services, LLC (“Seguna Services”), and Human Gene Exploration Technologies LLC (“HGET”) (collectively, “Seguna Entitites”) (all collectively referred to as “Defendants”). Count III for breach of the duty of loyalty, Count IV for breach of contract, Count V for breach of the implied covenant of -1- DEFENDANT CHRISTIAN DAHLSTROM’S MOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINT © 0 9 O N nn BA W N = N O N N N N N N N N N mm e m e m e m e m e m p m p m co N N Ln BRA W N Y D = D O O 0 S N R E W I N D = O good faith and fair dealing are alleged only against the Defendant and Mr. Sankaran, and the remaining Counts I, II, VI and VII are against all Defendants. Plaintiff describes its wide-ranging services as a consulting firm as focusing “on providing important technology solutions to business across a wide variety of industries” and states it has expertise “in the areas of software development and integration, architecture and modernization, enterprise mobile solutions as well as cloud strategy and transformation.” (Complaint, 99 17-18). Defendant Dahlstrom began working for Defendant on March 15, 2012 “as part of Technossus’ Project Management Team,” and alleges he signed Plaintiff’s Confidentiality Agreement that same day. (Complaint, 9 27-28). The Complaint then quotes the Confidentiality Agreement and its claimed definitions of “Confidential and Proprietary Information” and “Property,” and its prohibition on the use of this information by stating Defendant will “hold in confidence and not to directly or indirectly reveal, report, publish, disclose or transfer any of” the information for any purpose. (Complaint, § 28, citing Confidentiality Agreement, 4 1, 4, 5, 6). The Confidentiality Agreement also purports to restrict Defendant from engaging “in any other employment or business activity other than for the Company.” (Id.). The Complaint does not allege that Defendant had access to sensitive Technossus and client information or Confidential Information under the Confidentiality agreement until March 1, 2016, when it alleges he was promoted to Director of Project Management and thereafter “had access to sensitive Technossus and client information, including Confidential Information as described in the Confidentiality Agreement.” (Complaint, § 29). Plaintiff then alleges that Defendant and the other individual Defendants “conspired to misuse and steal, and did misuse and steal, Technossus’ Confidential Information in order to develop a competing company” (Complaint, § 32), but does not particularly identify what types of information were misused out of the broad definition of Confidential Information in the Confidentiality Agreement, at least as to Defendant Dahlstrom specifically. The Complaint includes several allegations regarding the alleged unauthorized conduct of Defendant Sankaran (Complaint, 99 35(a)-(e)), and asserts he formed Saguna on September 4, 2015 when still 2 DEFENDANT CHRISTIAN DAHLSTROM’S MOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINT © 0 9 O N nn BA W N = N O N N N N N N N N N mm e m e m e m e m e m p m p m co N N Ln BRA W N Y D = D O O 0 S N R E W I N D = O employed by Plaintiff. (Id. at § 35(a)). The Complaint alleges the individual Defendants solicited Plaintiff's “customers and recruited Technossus employees to leave Technossus” or to work for one of the Seguna Entitites, met on company time to leverage its confidential business and customer information, and solicited Technossus clients to leave and engage with the Segura entities while still employed by Plaintiff. (Complaint, qq] 35(b)-(d)). However, it does not provide any specifics as to who these individuals may be, the type of information that was allegedly leveraged, or the customers that were solicited. After making further allegations as to Defendant Sankaran (Complaint, 99] 36-41), the Complaint addresses alleged daily status calls Defendant conducted with another employee who left Plaintiff’s employment, Gauri Chhabra in India (Complaint, 99 43-45), but provides no allegations as to why it was improper for the Director of Project Management not to schedule such calls with Guari Chhabra. The Complaint then alleges, without any specifics, that Defendant was “covertly working for Saguna Consulting while still being employed at Technossus since at least June 23, 2016” and that Defendant was accordingly terminated on October 27, 2016. (Complaint, 99 46-47). Finally, after alleging that Defendant had a Saguna Consulting e-mail account since June 23, 2016, the Complaint jumps to the conclusion that Defendant has maintained misappropriated company information and “misused and disclosed Technossus Confidential Information to the benefit of a direct competitor causing great monetary harm to Technossus as well as causing great and irreparable harm to Technossus’ reputation and goodwill.” (Complaint, §9 48-50). These broad allegations are supported by conclusory statements and inferences that are insufficient to state a claim against Defendant Dahlstrom. Additionally, these allegations fail to establish any bases for Plaintiff’s claim that it is entitled to punitive damages and injunctive relief. Broad claims of alleged misappropriation of Confidential Information or of unlawful solicitation of employees to leave or of alleged work for a competitor neither rises to the level of justifying damages intended to punish Defendant nor presents ongoing or imminent harm justifying injunctive relief. Regardless of the materials and information Plaintiff claims are Confidential Information, Defendant did not take any documents or Confidential Information 3. DEFENDANT CHRISTIAN DAHLSTROM’S MOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINT © 0 9 O N nn BA W N = N O N N N N N N N N N mm e m e m e m e m e m p m p m co N N Ln BRA W N Y D = D O O 0 S N R E W I N D = O from Defendant nor did he disclose or use such information for any purpose before or after his employment was terminated in October of 2016. Plaintiff must allege the standard “who, what, when, where and why” supporting a claim that Defendant Dahlstrom misappropriated and misused Confidential Information, which also happens to be the foundation for all of the other claims. Defendant should not be forced to endure discovery, depositions, litigation and attendant costs on the wholly inadeqaute allegations. Therefore, Defendant respectfully requests that the Court grant this Motion to Strike the portions of the Complaint seeking injunctive relief and punitive damages, as listed in the accompanying Notice of Motion. 3. STATEMENT OF THE LAW California Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter “CCP”) § 435(b)(1), provides in pertinent part: “Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof.” In addition, CCP §436 provides in pertinent part: “The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to § 435: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; (b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” The allegations of Plaintiff’s Complaint satisfy both of these requirements. Also, an “immaterial allegation” in a pleading is as an allegation that is not essential to the statement of a claim or defense; an allegation that is neither pertinent nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or defense; or a demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint or cross- complaint. CCP § 431.10(b). Under CCP § 431.10(c), an “immaterial allegation” is defined as an “irrelevant matter” as that term is used in CCP §436. A motion to strike is considered a speaking motion and is treated as a motion for summary judgment. City and County of San Francisco v. Strahlendorf (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1911. The court has authority to strike sham pleadings, or those not filed in conformity with a prior ruling. Ricard v. Grobstein, Goldman, Stevenson, Siegel, LeVine & Mangel (1992) 6 Cal. App.4th 157, review denied. Additionally, under CCP § 437, the grounds for a motion to strike must appear on the face of the pleading under attack, or 4- DEFENDANT CHRISTIAN DAHLSTROM’S MOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINT © 0 9 O N nn BA W N = N O N N N N N N N N N mm e m e m e m e m e m p m p m co N N Ln BRA W N Y D = D O O 0 S N R E W I N D = O from matter which the court may judicially notice (e.g., the court’s own files or records). A motion to strike punitive damages allegations and prayer for punitive damages from an operative complaint is proper when the complaint is devoid of sufficient factual allegations to support a conclusion that defendant acted with malice, oppression, or fraud. Turmna v. Turning Point of Central Calif., Inc. (2010) 191 Cal. App.4th 53, 63; Smith III, et al v. Sup. Ct. (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1038-39. Given the heightened “clear and convincing” burden of proof of despicable conduct, Courts will often strike punitive damages where they are not clearly authorized. Woolstrum v. Mailloux (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 10. As demonstrated throughout these moving papers, portions of the Complaint lack any allegations rising to the level necessary to support injunctive relief or punitive damages. Accordingly, punitive damages must be stricken from the Second, Third and Sixth causes of action and injunctive relief stricken from the First cause of action, in addition to Plaintiff’s prayer for injunctive relief and punitive damages. 4. PLAINTIFF HAS NOT AND CANNOT SUFFICIENTLY PLEAD FACTS SUPPORTING A CLAIM FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES In the instant case, the allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint are a far cry from supporting its claim for an award of punitive damages. Before the trier of fact can determine punitive damages, a plaintiff must prove the statutory basis for a punitive damage award (Defendant’s oppression, fraud or malice) by clear and convincing evidence. Civil Code § 3294(a). This standard is much higher than the general preponderance of the evidence standard necessary to establish liability in a civil action. A plaintiff cannot successfully allege a claim for punitive damages without setting forth a definitive statement of actionable facts. Indefinite charges and unsupported conclusions fail to state an actionable claim for punitive damages. Lavine v. Jessup (1958) 16 Cal.App.2d 59, 70. The pre-1987 standard for punitive damages, for which the 1987 amendments to California Civil Code § 3294 were designed to “toughen,” was discussed by the court in -5- DEFENDANT CHRISTIAN DAHLSTROM’S MOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINT © 0 9 O N nn BA W N = N O N N N N N N N N N mm e m e m e m e m e m p m p m co N N Ln BRA W N Y D = D O O 0 S N R E W I N D = O Beck v. State Farm (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 347, 355. In that matter, despite a finding that the insurer had “no reasonable grounds” for refusing to settle the case, and despite the fact that the insurer based its defense on a “patently untenable defense,” the court of appeal reversed an award of punitive damages, stating that “punitive damages are unfavored” and should be granted “with the greatest caution.” An award of punitive damages was also reversed by the court in Flyer’s Body Shop Profit Sharing Plan v. Ticor Title Ins. Co. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1149, 1154-1155. In that matter, the court of appeal reversed the punitive damage award stating that punitive damages are only appropriate if defendants acts are “reprehensible, fraudulent or in blatant violation of law or policy.” The court stated that such damages should be awarded “only where the tortious conduct rises to levels of extreme indifference to the Plaintiffs’ rights, a level which decent citizens should not have to tolerate.” The court also noted that punitive damages were not proper where Defendants conduct was merely “negligent, grossly negligent, or even reckless.” Plaintiff clearly cannot meet its burden as it has only pled conclusory allegations without support of facts. (See, e.g., “In doing the things alleged herein, Defendants acted with the intent to cause injury to Technossus. Defendants’ conscious disregard for Technossus’ rights warrants an assessment of exemplary and punitive damages in an amount appropriate to punish them and deter others from engaging in similar conduct.” (Complaint § 97; see also Perkins v. Sup. Ct (General Tel. Directory Co.) (1981) 117 Cal.App.3rd 1, 6). The Court of Appeal has held that when a plaintiff is seeking leave to assert a punitive damage claim, the claim must be evaluated “with reference to the higher, clear- and-convincing evidentiary standard.” Basich v. Allstate (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1120. Similarly, the Basich court affirmed a holding that a motion for a non-suit on the issue of punitive damages must be determined in light of the applicable evidentiary standard. “Since January 1, 1988, a claim for punitive damages has required evidence which establishes by ‘clear and convincing evidence’ that the defendant has been ‘guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.” If a plaintiff is to recover on such a claim, it will be -6- DEFENDANT CHRISTIAN DAHLSTROM’S MOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINT © 0 9 O N nn BA W N = N O N N N N N N N N N mm e m e m e m e m e m p m p m co N N Ln BRA W N Y D = D O O 0 S N R E W I N D = O necessary that the evidence presented meet this higher evidentiary standard. . . . We see no reason why this standard should not apply here. . . .” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the Court here can properly view the evidence presented by Plaintiff with the higher burden in mind. For Plaintiff to properly have a claim for punitive damages considered, it must allege facts indicating that Defendant’s conduct was not merely wretched, miserable or loathsome, but also that Defendant’s conduct was so base, miserable, wretched, loathsome, etc., that it would cause “ordinary, decent people” to “look down upon it” and “despise it.” No actual facts have been pled to support the conclusion that Defendant acted with malice, oppression or fraud, as Plaintiff simply relies on its own conclusions. It has been recognized that this standard of “despicable” conduct requires a level of conduct that is nearly criminal before punitive damages may be awarded. Indeed, an examination of California cases using the term “despicable” in its common, ordinary sense reveals that the term is routinely employed to describe criminal behavior. See e.g., People v. McElrath (1975) 175 Cal.App.3d 178 [branding rape, oral copulation and sodomy as outrageous, shocking and despicable]; People v. Adams (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 346 [characterizing a racially motivated shooting as a “despicable deed.”] “As between oppression and malice, there must be some evidence of one or the other of those elements to justify the jury in making the award of [punitive damages]. It follows that tort committed by mistake, in the assertion of a supposed right, or without any wrong intention, and without such recklessness as evinces malice or a conscious disregard of the rights of others, does not warrant punitive damages.” (Citations Omitted). Roth v. Shell Oil Co. (1960) 185 Cal.App.2d 676, 682. Plaintiff asserts in 99 60, 66, and 97 of their Complaint that the assessment of punitive damages is warranted in this matter because Defendant Dahlstrom acted with oppression, fraud or malice and are appropriate to punish them and deter others from engaging in similar misconduct. However, there are no facts contained in Plaintiff's Complaint which even come close to describing the egregious conduct that allows for punitive damages. In fact, the charging allegations in the Complaint are mere conclusions -7- DEFENDANT CHRISTIAN DAHLSTROM’S MOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINT © 0 9 O N nn BA W N = N O N N N N N N N N N mm e m e m e m e m e m p m p m co N N Ln BRA W N Y D = D O O 0 S N R E W I N D = O without adequate supporting facts. In the second cause of action for tortious interference with business advantage, Plaintiff alleges Defendant deliberately misappropriated business opportunities belonging to Plaintiff to divert them to new companies which compete with Technossus. (Complaint 9 60). However, Plaintiff does not plead any details as to what opportunities were misappropriate or provide any details on how the Seguna Entities benefited from the alleged misappropriation. Defendant also never clearly alleges facts to establish that Defendant in fact worked for any Seguna Entities or how speaking with other Technossus employees in the course of his job duties amounts to soliciting them to leave Plaintiff’s employment. A similar deficiency plagues the punitive damages claimed in Paragraph 66 of the Complaint for the third cause of action for Breach of Duty of Loyalty, where Plaintiff merely alleges Defendant deliberately concealed his activities and intentions without alleging what they were. The allegations Plaintiff provides in support of its sixth cause of action for conspiracy are similarly conclusory and overbroad, as it merely alleges Defendant intended to cause injury to Plaintiff and acted in conscious disregard of its rights. (Complaint § 97). Plaintiff has pled nothing beyond unsupported conclusions that Defendants took confidential information and used it to his benefit. The industry in which Plaintiff is a part is one that is extremely open and competitive. Thus, if Plaintiff truly had supporting evidence for its claims, it would have been properly pled. Clearly, the conduct alleged here does not cause “ordinary, decent people” to “look down upon it” and “despise it,” especially in light of the fact that Plaintiffs has provided no allegations that Defendants even took their customer list (if one exists). Plaintiff does not even set forth enough facts to establish that they have a cause of action against Defendant, let alone that it is entitled to punitive damages. Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages must be stricken from the Complaint as a matter of law. -8- DEFENDANT CHRISTIAN DAHLSTROM’S MOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINT © 0 9 O N nn BA W N = N O N N N N N N N N N mm e m e m e m e m e m p m p m co N N Ln BRA W N Y D = D O O 0 S N R E W I N D = O 5. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF SHOULD BE STRICKEN In order to receive injunctive relief, Plaintiffs must show: (1) they are likely to suffer irreparable harm, (2) that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and (3) that an injunction is in the public interest. Winters v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (2008) 555 U.S. 7, 20. Plaintiff is seeking preliminary relief must demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an injunction. Id. at 22. To show irreparable injury, Plaintiff must demonstrate “immediate threatened harm.” Carribean Marine Services Co., Inc. v. Baldrige 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988); Koren Philadelphia Presbyterian Church v. California Presbytery (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1069, 1084. Establishing a risk of irreparable harm in the indefinite future is not enough. The harm must be shown to be imminent. Midgett v. Tri-County Metro. Transp. Dist. Of Oregon (9th Cir. 2001) 254 F.3d 846, 850-851. Delay in moving for an injunction may be considered in determining whether the claimed injury is irreparable. O’Connel v. Sup.Ct. (Venenzuela) (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1452, 1481 (finding that plaintiffs’ claim of imminent injury from not receiving high school diplomas, raised shortly before graduation, could have been made earlier in the school year thereby avoiding the urgency of their situation). Diligence of plaintiff is also a factor to consider when a court is deciding to grant or deny an injunction. Tustin Community Hosp. v. Santa Ana Community Hosp. Assocs. (1979) 89 Cal.3rd 889, 894. If Plaintiff truly believed an injunction was proper in this case, it should have and would have moved ex parte for a Temporary Restraining Order prohibiting Defendants from using the alleged misappropriated materials and information in July of 2016, when it first formed a belief that “Defendant Sankaran was attempting to harm Technossus.” (Complaint, § 42; see also CCP § 526 (a)(2); Civil Code § 34.26.2(a). However, no such action was taken by Plaintiff, and it waited five months before requesting injunctive relief after forming its belief of Defendant Sankaran’s alleged unlawful conduct. Additionally, Defendant Dahlstrom is no longer employed by Plaintiff, as he was terminated in October of 2016. (Complaint, § 47). Therefore, as Plaintiff must show it is likely to suffer irreparable harm from ongoing activities of a former employee that is no longer bound 9. DEFENDANT CHRISTIAN DAHLSTROM’S MOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINT © 0 9 O N nn BA W N = N O N N N N N N N N N mm e m e m e m e m e m p m p m co N N Ln BRA W N Y D = D O O 0 S N R E W I N D = O to Defendant by the alleged Confidentiality Agreement. As Plaintiff’s conduct and delay in seeking injunctive relief shows that the injuries it has alleged are not irreparable or immediate, the Court should strike Plaintiff’s prayer for injunctive relief. 6. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Dahlstrom respectfully requests that the Court grant this Motion to Strike as to all allegations of the Complaint pertaining to Plaintiff’s claims for punitive damages and equitable relief, as outlined in the Notice. Dated: February 3, 2017 QUINTILONE & ASSOCIATES Pl E z RICHARD E. QUINTILONE II, ALVIN B. LINDSAY GEORGE A. ALOUPAS Attorneys for Defendant CHRISTIAN DAHLSTROM -10- DEFENDANT CHRISTIAN DAHLSTROM’S MOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINT © 0 9 O N un BRA W N = N N N N N N N N N e m e m e m e m p m e m e m e e co NN O N nn kA W N = D O O N N N R E W I N D = O PROOF OF SERVICE I, the undersigned, declare as follows: I am a citizen of the United States, over the age of 18 years, and not a party to the within action. I am an employee of or agent for Quintilone & Associates, whose business address is 22974 El Toro Rd., Suite 100, Lake Forest, CA 92630-4961. On February 3, 2017, I served the foregoing document(s): DEFENDANT CHRISTIAN DAHLSTROM’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINT on the following parties in this action addressed as follows: X__ SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST (BY MAIL) 1 caused a true copy of each document, placed in a sealed envelope with postage fully paid, to be placed in the United States mail at Lake Forest, California. I am "readily familiar" with this firm's business practice for collection and processing of mail, that in the ordinary course of business said document(s) would be deposited with the U.S. Postal Service on that same day. I understand that the service shall be presumed invalid if the postal cancellation date or postage meter date on the envelope is more than one day after the date of deposit for mailing contained on this affidavit. (BY PERSONAL SERVICE) 1 delivered each such document by hand to each addressee above. (BY OVERNIGHT DELIVERY) 1 caused a true copy of each document, placed in a sealed envelope with delivery fees provided for, to be deposited in a box regularly maintained by Federal Express or Overnight Express. I am readily familiar with this firm's practice for collection and processing of documents for overnight delivery and know that in the ordinary course of Quintilone & Associates’ business practice the document(s) described above will be deposited in a box or other facility regularly maintained by Federal Express or Overnight Express or delivered to a courier or driver authorized by Federal Express or Overnight Express to receive documents on the same date it is placed at Quintilone & Associates for collection. (BY FACSIMILE) By use of facsimile machine number 949.458.9679, I served a copy of the within document(s) on the above interested parties at the facsimile numbers listed above. The transmission was reported as complete and without error. The transmission report was properly issued by the transmitting facsimile machine. (BY ELECTRONIC SERVICE) 1 delivered each such document by electronic means pursuant to California Civil Code, Code of Civil Procedure, the Local Rules and/or FRCP § 5(b)(2), et seq. Executed on February 3, 2017 at Lake Forest, California. XxX (FEDERAL) I declare that I am employed in the office of a member of the bar of this court at whose direction the service was made. (STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct. ALVIN B. LINDSAY -1- PROOF OF SERVICE © 0 J a nm BA W N = N N N N N N N N N e m e m e m e m p m e m e m e e co NN O N nn kA W N = D O O N N N R E W I N D = O Steven M. Hanle, Esq. Jared Veliz, Esq. STRADLING YOCCA CARLSON & RAUTH, P.C. 660 Newport Center Drive, Suite 1600 Newport Beach, CA 92660-6422 Telephone: (949) 725-4000 Facsimile: (949) 725-4100 sbanle@sycr.com jveliz@sycr.com Q&A Case No.: 17.01279 SERVICE LIST Attorneys for Plaintiff, Technossus, LLC 2- PROOF OF SERVICE