Plaintiffs Motion For ApprovalMotionCal. Super. - 4th Dist.December 6, 2016AEGIS LAW FIRM, PC SAMUEL A. WONG (State Bar No. 217104) KASHIF HAQUE (State Bar No. 218672) JESSICA L. CAMPBELL (State Bar No. 280626) ALI S. CARLSEN (State Bar No. 289964) 9811 Irvine Center Drive, Suite 100 Irvine, California 92618 Telephone: (949) 379-6250 Facsimile: (949) 379-6251 Attorneys for Plaintiff Ivan Mercado, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated ELECTRONICALLY FILED Superior Court of California, County of Orange 01/25/2018 at 03:48:00 PM Clerk of the Superior Court By Olga Lopez, Deputy Clerk SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ORANGE IVAN MERCADQ, individually and on Case No. 30-2016-00891448-CU-OE-CXC behalf of all others similarly situated, Assigned for all purposes to: Plaintiff, Hon. Kim G. Dunning Department CX104 V. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR FINAL SAMEDAY INSURANCE SERVICES, APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION INC.; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, SETTLEMENT Defendants. Date: February 21,2018 Time: 10:00 a.m. Dept: CX104 PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT wn Bs W N NO 0 N N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Zz] 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 II. IIL Iv. TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION ......oouimicmiinicitinestiienrescressesseee essere ssescsssssssssssss sesensese s snss essene senses THE SETTLEMENT MEETS THE REQUIREMENTS FOR FINAL APPROVAL €eer0040000usanaororueErTEesroenEnsatcandetsstoreretietEy Pree reraenratentsacasarreseratsettttettsenataatanttnrons A. The Court Found a Presumption of Fairness Exists at Preliminary APDEONA coonvrssssienercuessusmanmsessae sse AS Reem atts B. Other Factors Support Final Approval..........cceeveiecereieeereeeeeeeeseseesecsseeeseeeeenns 1. The Strength of Plaintiff’s Claims Weighed Against the Risks, Expense, Complexity, and Likely Duration of Further Litigation, Including the Risk of Maintaining Class Action Status through 3. The Extent of Discovery Completed and the Stage of the Proceedings ....cccovuveierieiciiiiccicees eerste resear nase nn 4, The Experience and Views of Counsel .......ocvvevvvvevecervcmrcercereveenerennnes 5. The Presence of a Governmental Participant ............cceeeverveverveeeneenneen. 6. The Reaction of Class Members to the Settlement ..........cccecvevenvennnne.. THE COURT-APPROVED NOTICE PROCEDURE SATISFIED DUE PROCESS Pe Tee Pree ae Een ea ae Pees eee eT Rea ARAN EAAAsEaa sa NRI tle tetesereertTIIereTeTIaeRAEe ITO IALIIteE Ney THE COURT SHOULD APPROVE THE REQUESTED ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS $8300 0 0000 as eraser erteriaesnaenasaeass teers assur svssusareeenreasaeaennassassnotstarensetstessetststsoracasranansss A. The Requested Fee Award is Fair and Reasonable Calculated as a Percentage of a Common Fund..........ccccoiveererinimnennienineeeeececseeeesene cesses B. A Lodestar Cross-Check Confirms the Reasonableness of the Requested 1. The Results Achieved on Behalf of the Settlement Class ................. 2. The Novelty and Difficulty of the Questions Involved and the Skill Displayed in Presenting Them ..........cccoceveveeeevcrienieeceisnrieneene. -1- PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT VL VIL VIII. 3. The Response of Class Members and Lack of Opt Outs and Objections to the Settlement and the Fee Award ..........oooevevecvveennnnnn... 14 | 4, Class Counsel’s Experience, Reputation, and Ability........cceeeeue......... 14 3. Class Counsel’s Preclusion From Other Work .........c.cccovevrirenrerererennnnnn.. 15 6. The Contingent Nature of the Fee Award.........o.ooeeeveiercecvceereeerennnn. 15 CLASS COUNSEL'S REQUESTED COST AWARD IS REASONABLE AND SHOULD RECEIVE FINAL APPROVAL .....ouviioeeeecereiteceeeeee er es eeeseeese ess s s ns 16 THE CLASS REPRESENTATIVE INCENTIVE AWARD IS REASONABLE............. 16 THE SETTLEMENT ADMINISTRATION COSTS ARE REASONABLE.........ooo...... 18 CONCLUSION ....ooutteteercereieeresterirerseesie tase eseressesstessestsseeseessasconasessesassensssses sssnssss ssnsssssn 18 -ii- PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT o e J S N wn B R A W N N O N N N N N N N N m m em em e m em e e em e m pe °K N N L R W N me O D N Y RE W N Rk, Oo TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES Augustus v. ABM Security Services, Inc., 233 Cal. App. 4th 1065 (2014) ...ccooveriecreeeieeeeen.. 4 Bell v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 115 Cal. App. 4th 715 (2004) ......ocoeriieeeveciereeeereeeesenereeenns 17 Cellphone Termination Fee Cases, 186 Cal. App. 4th 1380 (2010)......cccevvvreereveererrerererennnnn. 17 Chau v. Starbucks Corp., 174 Cal. App. 4th 688 (2009) ......cocvereererereverrsreeirerereeneeeseseereeseenesasanns 4 Chavez v. Netflix, Inc., 162 Cal. App. 4th 43 (2008) .......eoeeeieeeeeeeereeeerereeeeereresreresree res ssesaaens 10 City and County of San Francisco v. Sweet, 12 Cal. 4th 105 (1995)....cccevveererererenrecrresrerseenn. 10 Clark v. American Residential Services LLC, 175 Cal. App. 4th 785 (2009).....ccceeveveerevverennnn. 17 Dunk v. Ford Motor Co., 48 Cal. App. 4th 1794 (1996) .......cocceeeieeeeeeereenreesecreessesssnns 2,3,4 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) c...ucurrrevcceenrcrenrrcnicccnsessisesesnnnnsssssese nes 3 Fernandez v. Victoria Secret Stores LLC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123546 (2008)...................... 11 Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc., 144 Cal. App. 4th 140 (2006) ....cccocoeveeveecrerenrennn.. 15 Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 34 Cal. 4th 553 (2004) ......cooeveeeecerreereecresresreieeeneenens 15,16 Horsford v. Board of Trustees of Calif State Univ., 132 Cal. App. 4th 359 (2005) .............. 15,16 In re Cipro Cases I and II, 121 Cal. App. 4th 402 (2004) .......ocomeiecececrereeerenrererrereeeeseesses se 4 In re Consumer Privacy Cases, 175 Cal. App. 4th 545 (2014) cconveceeveiereeeereeecveeien eev e re ce 12 Ketchum v. Moses, 24 Cal. 4th 1122 (2001) eee eee eee eee 15 Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc., 168 Cal. App. 4th 116 (2008)......ccoeeerrereereenrirererireeerecereensans 4 Laffitte v. Robert Half, 1 Cal. 5th 480 (2016) ......cocvvveveverirerrirreerereereseeeereeeesessssaeaene. 9,10,11,12 Lealao v. Beneficial California, Inc., 82 Cal. App. 4th 19 (2000).....ovrvreesooeoooeoeooeeesoo 8,11 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) ...coceerereveeceveireeereesreenns 9 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985) ovooooemroooeoeoeooeeoeooeeooeoe os e e 9 PLCM Group v. Drexler, 22 Cal. 4th 1084 (2000) ......ccevrivereeereeeiricecreieeeinsireseeseeessee eee s ese sas 12 Rebney v. Wells Fargo Bank, 220 Cal. App. 3d 1117 (1991) weve sevens 13 Sav-on Drug Stores, Inc. v. Super. Ct. (Rocher), 34 Cal. 4th 319 (2004)......cccovvvrvvirmirerrenennn, 17 Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 30.25 (1977) cuussasssssisisiosisisssinivorsrsesarsverssvmsressssansnssssssssssenssprsasssas 10 Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc., 91 Cal. App. 4th 224 (2001) ...ceoreveeecereierieerereceee eee 13 -iii- PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc., 91 Cal. App. 4th 224 (2004) .....ccccemeerivirereererereeerrserennnnns 2.3 STATUTES Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 904.1 .......vouveieeereceeieeeeerere esters essevessss essa sssssesesse sas s sss ssesessesesese snes 4 Cal. Lab. Code § 2698..........veeeeirierinrerrenreireseseesesssetsarsssssssssssessssseseessessssesssssesssesassss sens 1,2,6,7 OTHER AUTHORITIES Alba Conte, Attorney Fee Awards § 2:08 at 50-51... cere ereae on 16 Eisenberg & Miller, Attorney Fees in Class Action Settlements: An Empirical Study, J. of Empirical Legal Studies, Vol. 1, Issue 1, 27-78, March 2004 .........c.ooveeereeeveverveernessseeeerns 10 Herr, David F., Manual for Complex Litigation, § 14.121 (1988) ....ccccceuerevererererieiveeieeerersresennns 11 Herr, Manual for Complex Litigation, § 14.122 (1984) ......c.ooeeieeerieriercirerereecereessee e n 12 Manual for Complex Litigation (4th ed. 2008) § 21.61, 462 .......coeeererericrerrneererieereesreserereseens 2 -iv- PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT NO 0 N d DN 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 IL INTRODUCTION This motion seeks final approval of a proposed non-reversionary Class Action Settlement, preliminarily approved by this Court on October 20, 2017. The Settlement will release claims that Defendant Sameday Insurance Services, Inc. (“Defendant”) failed to pay appropriate minimum and overtime wages, provide meal periods and rest breaks, provide accurate wage statements, and timely pay wages upon termination to Plaintiff Ivan Mercado (“Plaintiff”) and other employees who were employed by Defendant as a Marketing Representative, Customer Service Representative, Insurance Agent or in a functionally equivalent position in California at any time during the Class Period of December 6, 2012 through April 20, 2017, excluding any individuals who, as of October 20, 2017, have filed a pending, separate lawsuit as a named plaintiff, individually and/or as a putative class, collective or representative action, asserting the same or similar claims to those alleged in this Action and/or has released such claims, and the individuals Richard Berame, Jannedy Lingad, and Jony Tolentino (“Class Members”). Plaintiff and his counsel completed extensive informal discovery as part of their investigation into the class claims, and through numerous settlement discussions the parties agreed to settle the case for $170,000. The Settlement provides that this Gross Settlement Amount will be distributed as follows: (a) Net Settlement Amount of approximately $74,979.16 distributed to 107 Class Members who did not opt out of the Settlement (“Participating Class Members”) based on the amount of weeks worked during the class period; (b) attorneys’ fees not to exceed $56,666.66; (c) litigation costs of $2,370.27; (d) Plaintiff’s Incentive Award of $2,500.00; (e) Settlement Administration expenses of no more than $3,354.18; and (f) payment of $22,500.00 for the Labor and Workforce Development Agency’s (“LWDA”) share of penalties under the California Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”). -1- PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT ~ A N hh B A W DN 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 The proposed Settlement is a product of diligent efforts and extensive arms’ length negotiations by Class Counsel to obtain the best possible result for Class. By resolving this matter now, Class Members will receive a guaranteed recovery without risk of nonpayment, delay, or an adverse judgment at trial. In response to the Notice of Class Action Settlement (“Class Notice”), none of the 107 Class Members opted out or objected to the Settlement. Since the Settlement did not require the Class Members to submit a claim form, all Class Members who did not apt out (“Participating Class Members”) will receive their share of the Settlement. The Participating Class Members will receive an average settlement payment of approximately $700.74, with the highest payout reaching $3,216.22. In light of the Class’ favorable response, and the facts and law set forth below as well as in the motion for preliminary approval, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court now enter an order that (1) grants final approval of the proposed class action settlement; (2) enters final judgment; (3) orders distribution of the proportionate shares of the Settlement to Participating Class Members pursuant to the terms of the Settlement; and (4) approves payments for attorneys’ fees, litigation costs, Plaintiffs Incentive Award, Settlement Administration expenses, and payment to the LWDA, as requested herein. IL THE SETTLEMENT MEETS THE REQUIREMENTS FOR FINAL APPROVAL In deciding whether to grant final approval for a class action settlement, California courts consider whether the settlement is “fair, adequate and reasonable.” Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc., 91 Cal. App. 4th 224, 244-45 (2004); Dunk v. Ford Motor Co., 48 Cal. App. 4th 1794, 1801 (1996). A settlement is “fair, adequate and reasonable” and therefore merits final approval when “the interests of the class are better served by the settlement than by further litigation.” Manual for Complex Litigation (4th ed. 2008) § 21.61, 462. “1A] presumption of fairness exists where: (1) the settlement is reached through arm’s-length bargaining; (2) investigation and discovery are sufficient to allow counsel and the court to act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage of objectors is small. Dunk, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 1802. 2- PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT IN ~ oS Wn 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 A. The Court Found a Presumption of Fairness Exists at Preliminary Approval On October 20, 2017, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement, appointed ILYM Group, Inc. (“ILYM Group”) as the Settlement Administrator, appointed Plaintiff Ivan Mercado as the Class Representative, appointed Aegis Law Firm, PC as Class Counsel, approved the Class Notice (“Class Notice Packet”) and directed that the Class Notice Packet be mailed to the Class. See Declaration of Samuel A. Wong (“Wong Decl”), Exhibit 1 (Order Granting Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement dated October 20, 2017). At preliminary approval, Plaintiff presented evidence that the instant Settlement is entitled to a presumption of fairness because (1) the Settlement was reached through arms- length bargaining after a formal mediation, (2) Plaintiff conducted informal investigation and discovery, including analysis of Class Members’ time and payroll records, and (3) Plaintiff's counsel are sufficiently experienced to be appointed Class Counsel. See Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Approval (“MPA”) filed September 6, 2017. Since then, the final Dunk factor has been satisfied: no Class Members opted out of or objected to the settlement. See Dunk, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 1802. Accordingly, this Court can comfortably presume that the Settlement is worthy of final approval. B. Other Factors Support Final Approval In addition to the presumption above, a court’s inquiry at final approval can include several other factors, including: (1) the strength of the plaintiff's case weighed against the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation as well as the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, (2) the amount offered in settlement, (3) the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings when settlement was reached; (4) the experience and views of counsel, (5) the presence of a governmental participant, and (6) the reaction of class members. Wershba, 91 Cal. App. 4th at 244-45, Je PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT ~~ n h Bs W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1. The Strength of Plaintiff's Claims Weighed Against the Risks, Expense, Complexity, and Likely Duration of Further Litigation, Including the Risk of Maintaining Class Action Status through Trial As with most complex litigation, wage and hour class actions rarely end when the trial court enters a dispositive order or final judgment as to liability and/or damages. For instance, class action defendants ‘may seek a writ of mandate for interlocutory relief from an order | granting class certification. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 904.1; In re Cipro Cases I and 11,121 Cal. App. 4th 402, 409 (2004). Moreover, the losing party can appeal the final liability and/or damages issues. See, e.g., Chau v. Starbucks Corp., 174 Cal. App. 4th 688 (2009) (appellate court reversed $86 million restitution award to a certified class of hourly employees); Augustus v. ABM Security Services, Inc., 233 Cal. App. 4th 1065 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2014), (appellate court reversed $89 million judgment in favor of 14,788 class members). To assess the inherent risks, the Court must weigh the immediacy and certainty of substantial settlement proceeds against the risks inherent in continued litigation. Dunk, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 1801-02. The parties should provide “basic information about the nature and magnitude of the claims in question and the basis for concluding that the consideration being paid for the release of those claims represents a reasonable compromise.” Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc., 168 Cal. App. 4th 116, 133 (2008). Here, Plaintiff's Counsel calculated Defendant’s potential exposure assuming Plaintiff prevailed on all aspects of his claims at trial, but weighed that value against the chance of succeeding at class certification and trial. Wong Decl. q 10. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant failed to pay all minimum and overtime wages, and failed to provide meal periods and rest periods, based on Defendant’s alleged misclassification of Plaintiff and class members as independent contractors, and subsequently as exempt employees. Plaintiff also alleged that Defendant is liable for derivative penalties. Plaintiff evaluated the class claims in light of the risk that a jury might find otherwise and considering the expense and resources required for trial. Wong Decl. 9 9-18. | 4- PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT wn Ae WwW ND Oo o e ~ 1 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 While Plaintiff believed and continues to believe this is a strong case for certification, there were significant risks and expenses associated with class certification and liability proceedings, including the following: Defendant’s likely argument that common issues do not predominate, based on the wide variation in Class Members’ job duties and their option to voluntarily waive meal periods and rest breaks; Defendant’s likely arguments that the named plaintiffs claims are not typical of those of the Class and that he is an inadequate class representative, which Plaintiff expects would be based on the testimony of his supervisors and/or coworkers; The relative lack of written evidence for the Class Members’ missed meal and rest periods, other than their declarations; Even if the Court certified the class, the possibility that it would find that Defendant satisfied its duty to make breaks available. See Brinker v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 4th 1004, 1021 (2012); Defendant’s likely argument that, even if found liable for unpaid wages, meal period violations and/or failure to pay overtime compensation, the Class lacked sufficient evidence to legally establish their damages; Defendant’s likely argument that Plaintiff's estimate of the maximum damages available to the Class is vastly overstated and does not comport with the actual damages suffered by Class Members; The possibility that the Court will grant Defendant’s pending Motion to Compel Arbitration on September 20, 2017 and enforce Defendant’s purported arbitration agreement, which contains a class action waiver; The possibility that, as in any litigation, the Class could proceed all the way to trial and be victorious in this case and still find themselves unable to actually enforce their ultimate judgment owing to Defendant’s ultimate insolvency or other unforeseen intervening circumstances. Wong Decl. § 9. For settlement discussions, Plaintiff briefed the merits of the class claims and calculated maximum damages based on Class Members’ time records, payroll records, and data provided by Defendant. In response, Defendant argued that it properly classified Class Members as independent contractors and exempt employees and thus employees were paid all of their earned wages and Defendant did not illegally deprive them of meal periods and rest breaks. Defendant also argued that Plaintiff did not have standing to bring a class action, since he signed a valid arbitration agreement. Further, Defendant presented bank statements, tax returns, and profit and loss statements that -5- PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT OO 0 Nd ON Wn BR W O N ee BN N N N N N O N N O N m m m m em em e m em e m 0 N A A n n A W N O O N N DN W N =, indicated Defendant could not afford to pay a larger settlement without closing down operations and thereby putting all current employees out of work. Plaintiff and his counsel evaluated the settlement amount in light of these potential defenses and Defendant’s precarious financial condition, and found it was in the Class Members’ best interests to settle for a compromised amount rather than risk losing on one or all of the claims at trial. Wong Decl. § 18. Although the amount of the Class’ maximum potential damages - if proven - is substantial, the legitimate and serious risks above compelled a considerable discount for settlement. 2. The Amount Offered in Settlement The Settlement provides a $170,000 Gross Settlement Amount for 107 Class Members who did not opt out of the Settlement. The fund also pays Class Counsel for their fees and costs, Plaintiff for his contribution to the case, the Settlement Administrator for its oversight of the notice, and the LWDA for the PAGA claims, leaving a Net Settlement Amount of approximately $74,979.16. This Settlement is non-reversionary and the entire Net Settlement Amount will be paid to the Class Members. After approval by the Court, the Net Settlement Amount will be distributed to all Settlement Class Members. Settlement Class Members’ shares will be based on the Class Members’ number of weeks worked during the Class Period and the total number of weeks worked for all Class Members during the Class Period. As a result, the estimated average recovery is $700.74, the estimated highest payout for Settlement Class Members employed during the entire class period is $3,216.22, and the estimated lowest payout for Settlement Class Members who worked only one week is $1.97. (See Declaration of Nathalie Hernandez of ILYM Group, Inc. in Support of Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement (“Hernandez Decl.”), § 15.) Weighing the potential value of the class claims against the risk and expense of trial, Plaintiff and Class Counsel concluded that the value of the settlement was fair, adequate and reasonable. Thus, the amount offered in settlement provides sufficient relief in light of the potential risks associated with seeking a judgement for a larger amount. C3. The Extent of Discovery Completed and the Stage of the Proceedings -6- PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT Oo 8 ~~ O N na o n 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Class Counsel thoroughly investigated the proposed Class Members’ claims, applicable law, and potential defenses. In particular, Class Counsel assessed the value of the class claims using Defendant’s data and documents produced through informal discovery, including a sampling of time records, payroll records and other information for damages calculations, financial documents, such as bank statements and tax information, and responses to Plaintiffs counsel’s questions about the data to assess damages before mediation. The Parties engaged in numerous discussions and informal exchange of additional information for over two months, which ultimately led to this Settlement. Wong Decl. § 5. Thus, the extent of discovery and preparation for settlement discussions that were completed indicate the case was ripe for an adequate settlement. 4. The Experience and Views of Counsel Plaintiff is represented by Aegis Law Firm, PC (“Aegis” or “Class Counsel”). Class Counsel prosecute wage and hour cases, including class actions on behalf of employees and others who have had their rights violated. Class Counsel, cither on their own, or with co-counsel are currently serving as plaintiffs’ counsel of record in dozens of wage and hour and employment class action cases pending in both state and federal court. Class Counsel have litigated many wage and hour class action cases and have successfully resolved cases involving the - issue presented in this matter. In the instant case, Class Counsel negotiated a settlement that they considered fair, adequate and reasonable, based on their prior experience litigating these types of cases. Wong Decl. 147. 5. The Presence of a Governmental Participant The LWDA is arguably a governmental participant in this settlement. On October 27, 2016, Plaintiff notified the LWDA of his claims as part of his obligations under PAGA. The LWDA did not respond to Plaintiff’s notice. Wong Decl. § 19. The Settlement calls for the -- of $22,500.00 in PAGA penalties to the LWDA, which the Settlement Administrator will make after final approval of the Settlement. See Settlement Agreement, attached as Exhibit 2 to Wong Decl. The Settlement allocates a fair amount to the PAGA claims, given that there is sparse case law on what types of PAGA awards are reasonable, especially when courts have 3 PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 discretion to reduce PAGA awards. Plaintiff has provided notice to the LWDA of the Settlement as required by statute, and the LWDA has not objected to or commented on the proposed Settlement or allocation of the PAGA penalties. Wong Decl. § 20. 6. The Reaction of Class Members to the Settlement The 107 Participating Class Members will receive the benefits of the entire $74,979.16 Net Settlement Fund, since no funds will revert to Defendant. Wong Decl. § 23. In response to the Settlement Notice, no Class Members opted out or objected to the settlement. Hernandez Decl. 9 11-12. A court may properly infer that a class action settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable when few class members object to or opt out of it. Lealao v. Beneficial California, Inc., 82 Cal. App. 4th 19, 51 (2000). As such, the Class Members’ favorable reaction to the Settlement supports the conclusion that it is fair, adequate and reasonable. III. THE COURT-APPROVED NOTICE PROCEDURE SATISFIED DUE PROCESS When the Court granted preliminary approval, it also approved the method of providing notice to Class Members. Following a National Change of Address search of the U.S. Postal Service database, ILYM Group mailed the Class Notice and Exclusion Form (“Class Notice Packet”) to all Class Members on November 8, 2017. Hernandez Decl. § 7. The Notice advised Class Members of (1) the terms of the settlement, (2) their rights to participate in the settlement, object to the settlement, or request exclusion from the settlement, (3) the procedures and timing for doing any of these acts, (4) the date, time, and place scheduled for the Final Approval Hearing and instructions in the event a Class Member wished to be heard at that hearing; and (5) each Class Member’s individualized information upon which his or her share of the settlement would be calculated, i.e., the number of weeks he or she worked during the Class Period according to Defendant’s records, as well as the estimated amount of his or her respective settlement payment. Wong Decl. § 21; Hernandez Decl., Exhibit A. After sending the Class Notices, ILYM Group received 6 returned envelopes. ILYM Group performed a skip trace and found 5 updated addresses. Hernandez Decl, § 8. ILYM Group remailed the Notices, resulting in 1 undeliverable Notice total. Hernandez Decl., §q 9-10. -8- PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT oe 3 AN oO 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 This mailing provided the best practicable means of notice. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811-12 (1985); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 174-76 (1974) (individual notice must be sent to all class members who can be identified through reasonable efforts); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (best practicable notice is that which is “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections”). The Class Members were given 45 days to respond to the Class Notice. ILYM Group did not receive any requests for exclusion or objections in response to the Notice. Hernandez Decl. 99 11-12. The Class Members did not need to submit a claim form in order to receive their Settlement share. Accordingly, the Class has been given an adequate opportunity to participate in the Settlement. IV. THE COURT SHOULD APPROVE THE REQUESTED ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS California courts recognize two standard methods for calculating attorney fee awards in class action settlement approval. The far more prevalent “percentage of the fund” (also known as the “common fund” or “common benefit”) method calculates attorneys’ fees based on a percentage of the common benefit bestowed upon the class. The “lodestar-plus-multiplier” method uses class counsel's “lodestar” as a basis - determined by multiplying the hours counsel expended by their hourly rates -which the Court may then enhance by a multiplier. See Laffitte v. Robert Half, 1 Cal. 5th 480, 489 (2016) (recognizing both the “percentage of recovery” and “lodestar/multiplier” methods). Class Counsel seeks an award of attorneys’ fees in the amount of $56,666.66, or rather one-third of the proposed Settlement Fund. Class Counsel’s fee request is reasonable under either of these methods, as explained below. A. The Requested Fee Award is Fair and Reasonable Calculated as a Percentage of a Common Fund 9. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT © oe N N Wn BA W O N N N N N N D N N N N m m m m e m em a p e e m p m ww N A N L h B W L D E D O N Y RE W N ~= o o In Laffitte, the California Supreme Court held that it is not an abuse of discretion for a trial court to utilize the percentage method for calculating an attorneys’ fee award in a common fund case, which this case is. Laffitte, 1 Cal. 5th at 503; see also Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 35-40 (1977); City and County of San Francisco v. Sweet, 12 Cal. 4th 105, 110 (1995) (the common fund doctrine has been applied “consistently in California when an action brought by one party creates a fund in which other persons are entitled to share.”). In so doing, the Court rejected the appellant’s arguments against use of the percentage method, pointing out that the method has widespread acceptance in courts throughout the country. Id. The Court held “that when class action litigation establishes a monetary fund for the benefit of the class members, and the trial court in its equitable powers awards class counsel a fee out of that fund, the court may determine the amount of a reasonable fee by choosing an appropriate percentage of the fund created.” Id. Explaining that the percentage method “is a valuable tool” for trial courts to calculate attorneys’ fees, the Court extolled “[t]he recognized advantages” of the method, such as “ease of calculation, alignment of incentives between counsel and the class, a better approximation of market conditions in a contingency case, and the encouragement it provides counsel to seek an early settlement and avoid unnecessarily prolonging the litigation.” Id. (citations omitted). In applying the common fund doctrine, California courts routinely award attorneys’ fees equaling one-third of the common fund’s total potential value. See, e.g., See Laffitte v. Robert Half Int'l Inc., 231 Cal. App. 4th 860, 878 (2014) (“trial court’s use of a percentage of 33 1/3 percent of the common fund is consistent with [] awards in other class action lawsuits” and “studies show that ... fee awards in class actions average around one-third of the recovery”), aff'd by Laffitte, 1 Cal. 5th at 489; Chavez v. Netflix, Inc., 162 Cal. App.4th 43, 66, n.11 (2008) (“Empirical studies show that, regardless of whether the percentage method or the lodestar method is used, fee awards in class actions average around one-third of the recovery”); Eisenberg & Miller, Attorney Fees in Class Action Settlements: An Empirical Study, J. of Empirical Legal Studies, Vol. 1, Issue 1, 27-78, March 2004, at 35 (independent studies of class action litigation nationwide conclude that a one-third fee is consistent with market rates). -10- PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT NO 0 N Y n y A 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 One-third of the common fund is also reasonable because it best reflects the market rate for contingency fees. See Lealao, 82 Cal. App. 4th at 47 (“attorneys providing the essential enforcement services must be provided incentives roughly comparable to those negotiated in the private bargaining that takes place in the legal marketplace). Fees representing one-third of the recovery reflect the rate negotiated in “typical contingency fee agreements [which] provide that class counsel will recover 33% if the case is resolved before trial and 40% if the case is tried.” Fernandez v. Victoria Secret Stores LLC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123546, *55-57 (C.D. Cal. July 21, 2008) (citing an academic study collecting contingency fee agreements and finding that a fee award constituting 34% of the fund is reasonable on that basis). Because the negotiated fee structure mimics the marketplace, it is reasonable and should be approved. Here, Class Counsel efficiently litigated this matter, making the entire Net Settlement Fund available to Class Members with no reversion to Defendants. Class Members are receiving significant recovery, averaging $700.74 each, with the highest payout reaching $3,216.22. Wong Decl. at § 24. For employees who were paid either a set amount per pay period or straight commission, these amounts represent a fair recovery in a case where they did not have to take on the work or risk of filing their own lawsuits, but suffered wage loss. In short, the percentage of fees sought by Class Counsel is in line with awards in similar cases in California and is reasonable for the benefit obtained for Class Members in this case. B. A Lodestar Cross-Check Confirms the Reasonableness of the Requested Fee Despite the widely recognized limitations of the so-called lodestar method,! California and federal courts acknowledge the utility of a lodestar “cross-check” for common fund awards. Lealao, 82 Cal. App. 4th at 46-47. In Laffitte, the Court permitted use of a “lodestar cross check,” by which the trial court would first select a percentage of the common fund for the fee award, and then verify that the percentage chosen is fair and reasonable in light of the attorney 1 It has been recognized that, in practice, the lodestar method is difficult to apply, time- consuming to administer, inconsistent in result, and capable of manipulation. In addition the lodestar creates inherent incentive to prolong the litigation until sufficient hours have been expended. Herr, David F., Manual for Complex Litigation, § 14.121 (1988). -11- PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT NO 0 1 A N I B W N D DN N N N N RN N N N m e e m e m e m e a e m p a e m e m ® NN & UB A W N = © © 0 =m o r o o = = hours spent on the case. Id. at 504. While some “multiplier” would be expected, the multiplier should be “evaluated for reasonableness;” “rough parity” between the lodestar and the percentage based recovery would make sense. Id. at 496. Use of the lodestar cross-check, explained the Court, represents “a blending of the two fee calculation methods” (percentage and lodestar), where “one method is used to confirm or question the reasonableness of the other's result.” Id. at 497. The Court, however, did not require a lodestar cross check, explaining that courts “retain the discretion to forgo a lodestar cross-check and use other means to evaluate the reasonableness of a requested percentage fee.” Id. at 505. California’s lodestar/multiplier method is a two-step process of fee calculation under which the Court first determines a lodestar value for the fees by multiplying the time reasonably spent by the plaintiffs’ counsel on the case by a reasonable hourly rate. In re Consumer Privacy Cases, 175 Cal. App. 4th 545, 556-557 (2014). The starting point in determining the appropriate hourly fee is to discern the prevailing rate for similar work in the pertinent geographic region. PLCM Group v. Drexler, 22 Cal. 4th 1084, 1096-97 (2000) (using prevailing hourly rate in community for comparable legal services even though party used in-house counsel); see also Herr, Manual for Complex Litigation, § 14.122 (1984) (“reasonable fees . . . are to be calculated according to the prevailing market rates in the relevant community.”). Here, Class Counsel’s hourly rates are comparable to those charged by other class action plaintiff's counsel and the firms defending class actions. Wong Decl., § 45. Further, the total attorney hours expended on this action are reasonable and in line with comparable cases. Class Counsel billed a total of 120.1 hours prosecuting this case. Wong Decl., § 46. The firm dedicated significant resources to this case by dividing the tasks required according to skill level, and the professional hours generated by each attorney are neither unreasonable nor duplicative. Id. Multiplying the total hours billed by Class Counsel to the litigation by their reasonable hourly rates yields a lodestar of $58,405.00, which exceeds the requested fee amount of $56,666.66. This amount reflects the efficiencies achieved by a law firm experienced in this field. Wong Decl., q 46. | 1. The Results Achieved on Behalf of the Settlement Class -12- PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT Oo 0 J 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 As a result of Class Counsel’s efforts, Class Members will receive immediate and reasonable payment for their claims. A settlement does not have to provide 100% of the damages sought to be considered a fair and reasonable settlement. Rebney v. Wells Fargo Bank, 220 Cal. App. 3d 1117, 1139 (1991). Rather, compromise is expected: Compromise is inherent and necessary in the settlement process . . . even if “the relief afforded by the proposed settlement is substantially narrower than it would be if the suits were to be successfully litigated,” this is no bar to a class settlement because “the public interest may indeed be served by a voluntary settlement in which each side gives ground in the interest of avoiding litigation.” Wershba, 91 Cal. App. 4th at 250. Plaintiff’s Counsel estimated Defendant’s total potential exposure assuming Plaintiff prevailed on all aspects of his claims at trial, but weighed that value against the chance of succeeding at class certification and trial. As explained in the preliminary approval motion, Defendant could potentially defeat class certification by arguing that they properly classified Plaintiff and class members as independent contractors and exempt employees, and that individual issues predominated since there was a wide variation in job duties. Further, Plaintiff could have lost his ability to bring any of his class claims, if the Court had granted Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration of Plaintiff’s claims. - The payment to class members avoids the risk and expense of losing on some or all of the claims at trial. Class Counsel found it preferable here to reach a resolution at this stage of the case to save time and money that would otherwise go to litigation. For example, if this action had settled following additional litigation, the settlement amount would likely have taken into account the additional costs incurred, and there may have been less money, or no money at all available for Class Members, due to Defendants precarious financial condition. Moreover, if the putative Class had not been certified, the value of Plaintiff’s case would have been considerably reduced; indeed, Defendant would have likely offered no money to settle the class-wide claims. Even if Plaintiff prevailed at class certification, he would have faced arguably compelling defenses to the merits of the claims, including the recoverability of penalties. Wong Decl. 4 18. -13- PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT OO 0 N N Wn Bs W N N N N N N N N O N N D O N o m m m e m em e m em i e m 0 N A A B R A W N = O 0 0 N N N R W O N e m o Accordingly, the cumulative benefits achieved by Class Counsel favor approval of the requested fees. 2. The Novelty and Difficulty of the Questions Involved and the Skill Displayed in Presenting Them In negotiating the settlement, Class Counsel used their experience to negotiate an excellent settlement that avoided potential pitfalls for the class. The favorable terms included ending the settlement class period at a date prior to preliminary approval to avoid diluting the funds available to each class member, a pro rata increase of the Gross Settlement Amount if the number of class members or workweeks exceeded a certain threshold amount, relieving Class Members of the burden of filing claims to participate in the Settlement, convincing Defendant to pay the employers’ share of payroll taxes separate from the Settlement, and refusing to accept any reversion of funds to Defendant. Wong Decl. § 47. Although Class Counsel were optimistic about the chances of certifying the putative Class and prevailing at trial, they recognized continued litigation carried significant risks that could have prevented the Class from obtaining any recovery. Wong Decl. § 9. In summary, this result was far from certain and the efforts of Class Counsel should be recognized. 5. The Response of Class Members and Lack of Opt Outs and Objections to the Settlement and the Fee Award The response from Class Members was extremely positive. No Class Members opted out or objected to the settlement. Hernandez Decl. § 11-12. Such a positive response from Class Members supports approval of the fee award. 4. Class Counsel’s Experience, Reputation, and Ability Class Counsel submit that their skill contributed to the efficient resolution of this case. Class Counsel are experienced litigators who focus their practices on wage and hour class actions. They have extensive experience in litigating wage and hour class actions. They have been appointed as class counsel or co-class counsel in many cases, and have obtained substantial recoveries for thousands of employees through these cases. Class Counsel are currently counsel of record in dozens of class actions, most of which are wage and hour cases -14- PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT A No © © ~~ o n Wn 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 © 25 26 27 28 similar to the present case. See Wong Decl., § 25. They have the requisite skill and experience to justify the requested fee in this case. 3S. Class Counsel’s Preclusion From Other Work During the action’s pendency, Class Counsel thoroughly investigated and researched the claims in controversy, their defenses, and the developing body of law. Overall, Class Counsel performed extensive work and obtained a favorable result through aggressive and time-consuming litigation, numerous settlement discussions, and carefully negotiating the terms of the final Settlement Agreement. This time could have been spent on other potentially lucrative cases. Wong Decl. § 46. Accordingly, Class Counsel’s time should be compensated. 6. The Contingent Nature of the Fee Award The California Supreme Court has recognized that attorney fee awards should be enhanced to compensate attorneys for the risks of loss involved in contingency cases. See Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc., 144 Cal. App. 4th 140, 154 (2006). The main criterion for risk is the risk of complete loss, which would leave counsel unable to recover fees. See "Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 34 Cal. 4th 553, 583 (2004) (explaining that a multiplier corresponds to risk of loss, with the risk of not being the successful party ranking highest). In _ Ketchum, the California Supreme Court instructed courts to adjust fee compensation to ensure that the fees account for contingency risk: A lawyer who both bears the risk of not being paid and provides legal services is not receiving the fair market value of his work if he is paid only for the second of these functions. If he is paid no more, competent counsel will be reluctant to accept fee award cases. Ketchum, 24 Cal. 4th at 1132-33. A fee award that adjusts for contingency fee risk “constitutes earned compensation; unlike a windfall, it is neither unexpected nor fortuitous.” Id. at 1138. The contingent risk factor is the single most important enhancement factor under California law even for actions where statutory fees are available. See Horsford v. Board of Trustees of Calif. State Univ., 132 Cal. App. 4th 359, 399 (2005) (reversing a trial court order for failure to consider contingent risk for -15- PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT wn W N Oo o e J 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 statutory fees pursuant to the Fair Employment and Housing Act). The main criterion for risk is the risk of complete loss, which would leave counsel unable to recover fees. See Graham, 34 Cal. 4th at 583 (explaining that a multiplier corresponds to risk of loss, with the risk of not being the successful party ranking highest). This risk is particularly acute for contingency fee attorneys because they “must use savings or incur debt to keep their offices afloat and their families fed during the years-long litigation.” Horsford, 132 Cal. App. 4th at 400. Here, Class Counsel bore the entire risk of recovery. Class Counsel took this case on a pure contingency basis, with no guarantee of any payment. Class Counsel spent significant time on informal discovery and settlement discussions despite the risk of recovering nothing. Had the litigation continued, Defendant would undoubtedly have mounted an aggressive defense at the certification stage and at the merits stage. A defeat at one of these stages could have foreclosed the possibility of Class Counsel recovering full remuneration for their time and effort. Additionally, Defendant could have become insolvent while engaging in further litigation, resulting in no money for Class Counsel or the Class. Wong Decl. 48. Yet, in spite | of these considerable challenges that enhanced the already-high contingency risk, Class Counsel was able to obtain a settlement fund of $170,000. A fee award in the amount totaling one-third of the gross settlement fund is thus fair and reasonable. V. CLASS COUNSEL’S REQUESTED COST AWARD IS REASONABLE AND SHOULD RECEIVE FINAL APPROVAL The Settlement Agreement allows Class Counsel to seck reimbursement of litigation costs in an amount not to exceed $10,000. As Class Counsel’s actual litigation costs ultimately reached $2,370.27, they only seek reimbursement of this amount. Wong Decl. § 49, Exhibit 4; see Alba Conte, Attorney Fee Awards § 2:08 at 50-51 (“The prevailing view is that expenses are awarded in addition to the fee percentage.”). All of the costs were reasonable and necessary for the prosecution of this case. Wong Decl. { 49. VI. THE CLASS REPRESENTATIVE INCENTIVE AWARD IS REASONABLE Plaintiff seeks an incentive award for accepting the responsibilities of representing the interests of all Class Members and assuming the risks and potential costs that were not borne by -16- PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT O v e ~ 3 N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 any other Class Members. A named plaintiff is eligible for payment that reasonably compensates him or her for undertaking and fulfilling a fiduciary duty to represent absent class members. Cellphone Termination Fee Cases, 186 Cal. App. 4th 1380, 1393 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 2010); Bell v. Farmers Ins. Exch, 115 Cal. App. 4th 715, 726 (2004). “[T]he rationale for making enhancement or incentive awards to named plaintiffs is that they should be compensated for the expense or risk they have incurred in conferring a benefit on other members of the class.” Clark v. American Residential Services LLC, 175 Cal. App. 4th 785 (2009). By actively pursuing this action, Plaintiff has furthered the California public policy goal of enforcing the State’s wage and hour laws. See Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. 4th 319, 340 (2004). Here, the requested award is appropriate and reasonable in light of the initiation of the action, the work performed, risks for payment of costs in the event of an unsuccessful outcome, and for a release broader than that given by the Class. As Class Representative, Mr. Mercado assisted counsel in gathering the evidence necessary to prosecute the claims on behalf of the Class, responding to requests for information, gathering and reviewing documents, helping Class Counsel evaluate the claims for settlement discussions, and regularly seeking reports on the status of the case. Declaration of Ivan Mercado in Support of Final Approval (“Mercado Decl.”) 1 4-5. No action likely would have been taken by Class Members individually, and no compensation would have been recovered for them, but for Plaintiff’s services on behalf of the Class. Even though Plaintiff likely would have received an equal or larger payment for pursuing his wage claims on an individual basis, Plaintiff performed his responsibilities as Class Representative through nearly two years of litigation. Mercado Decl. § 7. Further, Plaintiff risked incurring the stigma often associated with those who bring such lawsuits. Mercado Decl. § 8. Thus, Plaintiff should be adequately compensated for his role in obtaining this class Settlement. Additionally, no Class Members objected to the amount of additional compensation sought by Plaintiff, which represents only 1.47% of the $170,000.00 Gross Settlement Amount. As such, the award is reasonable in light of the substantial benefits Plaintiff conferred upon the settlement class. -17- PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT ND G e NN O Y WV BR W N N O O N O N O N N N N N N = m em em em em em em em © N a WU RA W L W D N R O VW O e N N N RA W N Rm o o VII. THE SETTLEMENT ADMINISTRATION COSTS ARE REASONABLE The Parties agreed to hire ILYM Group as the Settlement Administrator, and the Court approved this choice at the time of the Preliminary Approval hearing. The Settlement Administrator was responsible for updating the mailing addresses of the Class Members, mailing the Class Notice Packet to each Class Member, responding to Class Member inquiries, providing weekly status reports, answering questions posed by Counsel for the Parties, and providing a declaration to document its duties and responsibilities under the Settlement. See generally Settlement Agreement. Following the granting of final stiovil, ILYM Group’s duties will continue in order to calculate and to mail the settlement payments to Class Members, disburse other payments as ordered by the Court, and perform such other duties as described in the Agreement. Id. The requested amount of $3,354.18 for services rendered and to be rendered is fair and reasonable and should be granted. VIII. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, Class Counsel respectfully request the Court grant fina] approval of the Class Action Settlement, award Class Counsel their attorneys’ fees of $56,666.66 and reimbursement of their litigation costs in the sum of $2,370.27, award the Class Representative Incentive Award to Plaintiff Ivan Mercado in the sum of $2,500, and award $3,354.18 to ILYM Group for its Settlement Administration expenses. Dated: January 25, 2018 AEGIS LAW FIRM, PC ~ ~~Ali S- Carlsen Attorneys for Plaintiff By: -18- PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT oo °° N N nn Ae W N N N N N N N O N O N NN Mm o e mm mm e m e m e m p e d e m pe 0 N N Wn EAE W N = D WwW N S N BRE W N e S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, the undersigned, am employed in the County of Orange, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action; am employed with Aegis Law Firm PC and my business address is 9811 Irvine Center Drive, Suite 100, Irvine, California 92618. On January 25, 2018, I served the foregoing document entitled: eo PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT on all the appearing and/or interested parties in this action by placing [_] the original [X] a true copy thereof enclosed in sealed envelope(s) addressed as follows: Uliana A. Kozeychuk LOBB & CLIFF, LLP 25240 Hancock Ave, Suite 315 Murrieta, CA 92562 ukozeychuk@lobbplewe.com Attorneys for Defendants: Sameday Insurance Services, Inc. Ol (BY MAIL) I am readily familiar with the firm’s practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with the U.S. Postal Service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid at Irvine, California in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postage cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing this affidavit. (Cal Code Civ. Proc. § 1013(a); Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 5(a); Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 5(c).) ] (BY OVERNIGHT MAIL) I am personally and readily familiar with the business practice of Aegis Law Firm PC for collection and processing correspondence for overnight delivery, and I caused such document(s) described herein to be deposited for delivery to a facility regularly maintained Federal Express for overnight delivery. (Cal Code Civ. Proc. § 1013(c); Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 5(c).) X (BY ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION) I caused said document(s) to be served via electronic transmission to the addressee(s) listed above on the date below. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1010.6(6); Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 5(b)(2)(E); Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 5(b)(3).) ] (BY PERSONAL SERVICE) I delivered the foregoing document by hand delivery to the addressed named above. (Cal Code Civ. Proc. § 1011; Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 3(0X2)(A).) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on January 25, 2018, at Irvine, California. Ad SL rethel Gonzalez CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
