Windy Bise vs. Quick Bridge Funding, LLCOppositionCal. Super. - 4th Dist.September 28, 2016- D o N O N N N O N N N RN Fm o m em mm mm mb e m e m e m 2 8 8 BR B R B B R E N B G S B S I a E B E R L E B& B Oo o e N N Wn b w AEGIS LAW FIRM, PC SAMUEL A. WONG, State Bar No. 217104 ALI S. CARLSEN, State Bar No. 289964 FAHEEM TUKH]I, State Bar No. 310249 9811 Irvine Center Drive, Suite 100 Irvine, California 92618 Telephone: (949) 379-6250 Facsimile: (949) 379-6251 swong@aegislawfirm.com ftukhi@aegislawfirm.com Attorneys for Plaintiff, WINDY BISE ELECTRONICALLY FILED Superior Court of California, County of Orange 02/09/2017 at 10:32:00 AM Clerk of the Superior Court By & Clerk, Deputy Clerk SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ORANGE-CENTRAL JUSTICE CENTER WINDY BISE, an individual, Plaintiff, Vs. QUICK BRIDGE FUNDING, LLC, formerly known as BLACKROCK LENDING GROUP, LLC, a California limited liability company; and DOES 1 through 20 inclusive, Defendants. CASE NO.: 30-2016-00877913-CU-OE-CJC [Assigned for all purposes to Hon. Theodore Howard, Dept. C18] ; PLAINTIFF WINDY BISE’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S NOTICE OF RELATED CASE - PURSUANT TO CRC 3.300(g); DECLARATION OF FAHEEM A. TUKHI Complaint Filed: September 28, 2016 Trial Date: None Set PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO NOTICE OF RELATED CASE eo 0 3 NN nn BR W N N O N N N e m e m m d e t e d e d e d md ja d p a TO THE COURT, ALL PARTIES, AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD: Pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.300(g), Plaintiff WINDY BISE (“Plaintiff”) hereby opposes the Notice of Related Case filed by Defendant QUICK BRIDGE FUNDING LLC formerly known as BLACKROCK LENDING GROUP, LLC’s (“Defendant”). MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IL INTRODUCTION Defendant’s Notice of Related Cases should be rejected outright for the simple reason that the two cases - one which is an individual case based on claims of wrongful termination and discrimination on the basis of sex and pregnancy, and the other which is a class action based solely on wage and hour claims - are not related in any way. Not only do the cases have completely different claims, the claims for each do not arise out of the same facts, and thus do not require the determination of the same questions of law or fact, as is required for related cases. In addition, the individual action is not a complex case, whereas the class action is. Thus, the complex nature of the class action and the fast track nature of the individual action are simply not amenable to relating the cases.” Accordingly, Defendants’ Notice of Related Cases should be rejected and this case should continue as is pursuant to CRC Rule 3.300(j). II. ARGUMENT A. THE CASES ARE NOT RELATED Pursuant to CRC Rule 3.300(a), “[a] pending civil case is related to another pending civil case, or to a civil case that was dismissed with or without prejudice, or to a civil case that was disposed of by judgment, if the cases: (1) Involve the same parties and are based on the same or similar claims; (2) Arise from the same or substantially identical transactions, incidents, or events requiring the determination of the same or substantially identical questions of law or fact; (3) Involve claims against, title to, possession of, or damages to the same property; or (4) Are likely for other reasons to require substantial duplication of judicial resources if heard by different judges.” Defendant claims that the matters should be deemed related because they involve the same parties and is based on the same or similar claims. Aside from this superficial assertion, Defendant w1= PLAINTIFFS OPPOSITION TO NOTICE OF RELATED CASE wm Ae W N NO 0 N a N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 does not provide any additional information to substantiate its claim that the cases should be related. Indeed, when comparing the operative complaints in each of these cases, it is clear that there is not a single similar claim. This case (hereinafter the “Individual Discrimination Case”) was filed as a result of Plaintiff’s wrongful termination after taking pregnancy leave-it asserts causes of] action arising under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”). See Declaration of Faheem A. Tukhi (“Tukhi Decl.”), § 3, Ex. A. However, the case Bise v. Quickbridge Funding, LLC, Case No. 30-2016-00878044 (hereinafter the “Class Action Case”) is a class and representative action that alleges causes of action for Defendant’s Labor Code violations. See Carlsen Decl., § 4, Ex. B. In other words, the Individual Discrimination Case pertains to the facts and circumstances surrounding Plaintiff's pregnancy leave and the retaliation and ultimate wrongful termination when she returned from leave, while the Class Action Case pertains to facts and circumstances as to wage and hour issues. Accordingly, this Court should reject Defendants’ Notice of Related Case pursuant to CRC Rule 3.300(). B. THERE IS GOOD CAUSE NOT TO DEEM THE CASES RELATED BECAUSE THE CLASS ACTION IS A COMPLEX MATTER Aside from the fact that the matters are not related, there is good cause not to deem the cases related because the Class Action Case is a complex matter pending before the Civil Complex Center of this Court. Where one or more of the listed cases has been designated as “complex” (here, the class action has been deemed “complex™) there can be no assignment made to a single judge or department even upon notice and determination that the cases are “related.” CRC Rule 3.300(h). Indeed, the reason behind this rule is clear: complex cases require more intense judicial management and are exempt from “fast track” deadlines (such as those applicable to the individual case) and judges presiding over complex cases must determine time limits for various phases of the litigation. CRC Standards of Jud. Admin., Standard 3.10. In contrast, the Individual Discrimination Case has no such issues which are unique to complex cases. As such, the two cases are not related and should not be deemed related as to do so would disrupt both cases. I 2- PLAINTIFEF’S OPPOSITION TO NOTICE OF RELATED CASE WO ® ~~ a Wn A W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 II. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court reject Defendants Notice of Related Cases. Dated: February 6, 2017 AEGIS LAW FIRM, PC Samuel A. Wong Faheem A. Tukhi Attorneys for Plaintiff WINDY BISE 3 PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO NOTICE OF RELATED CASE oO 0 N N in A W N = N N N N N N N N mE mm = em E e e m pe d e m ® I B B R U N R B S 39 3 3a 6 2 o p 2 3 DECLARATION OF FAHEEM TUKHI 1. I am an attorney at law duly licensed to practice in the state of California. I am a member of Aegis Law Firm PC, counsel of record for Plaintiff WINDY BISE (“Plaintiff”). The matters stated herein are within my personal knowledge, and if sworn, I could and would testify competently hereto. 2. This declaration is filed in support of Plaintiffs’ Response to (“Defendants”) QUICK BRIDGE FUNDING LLC formerly known as BLACKROCK LENDING GROUP, LI1.C’s Notice of Related Cases. 3. A true and correct copy of Plaintiff’s September 28, 2016 Complaint filed in the individual action (30-2016-00877913) is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 4, A true and correct copy of the operative Complaint filed in the class action (30- 2016-00878044) is attached hereto as Exhibit B. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the state of California that the foregoing is true and correct. PT - Executed this February 6, 2017 at Irvine, California. 1 Faheem A. Tukhi -1- DECLARATION EXHIBIT “Wp OC © 1 A Wn BA W O N = DN ) = mt me d e t e d Be d fe d fe l p d AEGIS LAW FIRM, PC SAMUEL A. WONG, State Bar No. 217104 ALIS. CARLSEN, State Bar No. 289964 9811 Irvine Center Drive, Suite 100 Irvine, California 92618 Telephone: (949) 379-6250 Facsimile: (949) 379-6251 swong@aegislawfirm.com acarlsen@aegislawfirm.com Attorneys for Plaintiff, WINDY BISE ELECTRONICALLY FILED Superiar Court of California, County of Orange 0928/2016 st 05:10:50 Phi Clerk af the Superior Court By Man Silva, Deputy Clerk SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ORANGE-CENTRAL JUSTICE CENTER WINDY BISE, an individual, Plaintiff, vs. QUICK BRIDGE FUNDING, LLC, a California limited liability company; and DOES 1 through 20 inclusive, " Defendants. CASE NO.:- 30-2016-00877913-CU-0E-CJC Judge Theodore Howard COMPLAINT FOR: 1. Sex and Pregnancy Discrimination in Violation of Government Code §§ 12940 et seq.; 2. Disability Discrimination in Violation of Government Code § 12940(a); 3. Retaliation in Violation of Government Code § 12945.2; 4, Failure to Prevent Discrimination and Retaliation; and 5. Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy. JURY TRIAL REQUESTED Plaintiff WINDY BISE (“Plaintiff”) hereby brings this Complaint against Defendant QUICK BRIDGE FUNDING, LLC (“Defendant” or “Quick Bridge”), and Does 1 through 20 (collectively “Defendants”) and alleges as follows: -1- COMPLAINT A w n NO G e Ng © 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 PARTIES, VENUE, AND GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 1. Plaintiff is, and at all relevant times herein has been, an individual residing in California. 2. Plaintiff is informed and believes that Quick Bridge is a California limited liability company, formerly known as BLACKROCK LENDING GROUP, LLC with its principal place of business located in Orange County, California. The acts herein complained of all occurred in Orange County California and Plaintiff is further informed and believes that Quick Bridge maintains records relevant to Plaintiff’s employment claims in Orange County, California. 3. Plaintiff is informed and believes that Defendants employed in excess of five (5) employees and were/are employers covered by the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), the California Government Code (“Government Code™), and the California Pregnancy Disability Leave (“PDL”) laws. 4, Plaintiff is further informed and believes that Quick Bridge was and continues to be a company that employs fifty (50) or more employees within a seventy-five mile radius of Plaintiff’s work location during the relevant period. 5. The true names and capacities, whether a corporation, agent, individual or otherwise, of defendant DOES 1 through 20, are unknown to Plaintiff, who therefore sues said Defendants by such fictitious names. Each defendant designated herein as a DOE is negligently or otherwise legally responsible in some manner for the events and happenings referred to herein and thereby proximately caused injuries and damages to Plaintiff as alleged herein. Plaintiff will seek leave of Court to amend this Complaint to show their true names and capacities when the same have been ascertained. | 6. At all times mentioned herein, DOES 1 through 20 were the agents, representatives, employees, successors and/or assigns of Quick Bridge and at all times pertinent hereto, were acting within the course and scope of their authority as such agents, representatives, employees, successors, and/or assigns. 7. Plaintiff is additionally informed and believes and thereon alleges that at all relevant times each defendant, whether named or fictitious, was an alter ego with respect to each 2- COMPLAINT nN No i - P d J k p d - - f - Jo t pt other, was a dual employer of Plaintiff’s and was the agent, representative, employee, successor and/or assign of the other Defendants and, in participating in the acts alleged in this Complaint, acted within the course and scope of such agency or employment or ratified the acts of the other. 8. Plaintiff is informed and believes that at all relevant times hereto, Defendants and their agents, employees, alter egos, and/or joint ventures were acting within the course and scope of such agency, employment, joint venture, or concerted activity. 9. Plaintiff is informed and believes that at all relevant times herein mentioned, Defendants and DOES 1 through 20 are and were corporations, business entities, individuals, and partnerships, licensed to do business and actually doing business in the State of California. As such, and based upon all the facts and circumstances incident to Defendants’ business in Los Angeles, California, Defendants and DOES 1 through 20 are subject to the FEHA and the California Labor and Government Codes. 10. Pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 395(a), venue is proper in the above-entitled Court, because all facts giving rie to the causes of action stated herein arose in Orange County, California. FACTS COMMON TO ALL CAUSES OF ACTION 11. Plaintiff began her employment with Quick Bridge in or about December 2012 as a Relationship Manager. In this role, Plaintiff was tasked with “selling” short-term, high-interest loans to her approximately 250 accounts at any given time. 12. During her first full year of employment in 2013, Plaintiff was one of the top, if not the top performer in her department. 13. In or about April 2014, Plaintiff learned that she was pregnant. In or about May 2014, Plaintiff informed her supervisor, Luke O’Dell (“Mr. O’Dell”) of her pregnancy. Mr. O’Dell’s response could be best described as displeasure. 14. In November 2014, Plaintiff was informed that when she goes out on maternity’ leave later in the month, all of her 250+ accounts would be re-distributed amongst the other Relationship Managers and only less than half of these accounts would be returned to her when she got back from maternity leave. Mr. O'Dell explained to Plaintiff that this discriminatory 3 COMPLAINT No 0 J NN L B D W N p d p t p k p k p k p d fe d fe d p m transfer of accounts, which would result is less commissions to Plaintiff upon her return from maternity leave, was the “fair thing to do” because these people would be covering for her while she was out on maternity leave. Despite protesting that she should be able to keep all of her accounts, Mr. O’Dell only allowed Plaintiff to keep about 100 accounts. 15. Pursuant to FMLA, Plaintiff began her maternity leave on or about November 28, 2014. Ultimately, Plaintiff was scheduled to return to work on April 15, 2015, 16. When Plaintiff returned to work in April 2015, Mr. O’Dell’s discriminatory treatment intensified. 17. When Plaintiff took lactation breaks, Mr. O’Dell constantly accused Plaintiff of ‘using the maternity room to “check out” or “goof off.” These comments made Plaintiff so uncomfortable that she ultimately stopped taking lactation breaks at work altogether and tried to endure the pain and discomfort until she could get home. 18. Additionally, upon her return to work in April 2015, Plaintiff was faced with a significantly reduced number of accounts and brand new accounts that typically did not generate sales right away. As a result, Plaintiffs call numbers were reduced in addition to the compensation she earned from commissions. Despite this, Mr. O'Dell immediately began nitpicking Plaintiff's performance. 19. In the weeks that followed her return, Mr. O'Dell continued to refuse to bring Plaintiff’s total accounts back to her pre-leave number until “she proved herself.” In reality, Quick Bridge was treating Plaintiff differently because she took a maternity leave and was a new mother. Indeed, Mr. O'Dell would make comments to Plaintiff like “Now that you're a mother, your head is probably not in it” and “I know you’d rather be with your son.” 20. Between April 2015 and September 2015, due to the discriminatory and retaliatory treatment towards Plaintiff, Plaintiff earned less commissions than she earned at the same time the previous year. As a result, in September 2015, Mr. O’Dell informed Plaintiff that unless she funded an additional $232,000, she would be put on a Performance Improvement Plan (“PIP”). However, because of the significant reduction in accounts and the addition of new accounts, which take time to develop, Plaintiff was practically guaranteed that she would not hit that number. Plaintiff is -4- COMPLAINT oO 0 3 S N wn B R A W N = N O N N O N N N ee m m a pe d e m em p m a p m informed and believes that other employees in her department were also not meeting their sales |. numbers but were not terminated. 21. On October 1, 2015, Mr. O’Dell called Plaintiff into a meeting and terminated her employment. Prior to her termination, Plaintiff had never been placed on a PIP or received any disciplinary action for her call time or tardiness. She was always one of the top performers prior to her pregnancy leave. After Plaintiffs termination, Mr. O’Dell had told other Quick Bridge employees that Plaintiff was terminated for “goofing around in the maternity room.” 22. Plaintiff is informed and believes that her sex, pregnancy, disability, request/nced for accommodation, leave of absence, and engagement in protected activities were substantial motivating factors in Quick Bridge's decision to terminate Plaintiff's employment. 23. Plaintiff is further informed and believes that Plaintiff was not the only individual not hitting her sales goals and that after Plaintiff’s termination, Quick Bridge reduced the sales goals for everyone in her department, 24, Within the time provided by law, Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the DFEH against Defendants. Plaintiff received a Right-to-Sue Notice authorizing this action. FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION | Sex and Pregnancy Discrimination in Violation of Government Code §§ 12940 ef seq. 25. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations in the above paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 26. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants wrongfully discriminated against her on the basis of sex and pregnancy. At all times herein mentioned, Government Code section 12940(a) was in full force and effect, and was binding upon Defendants. Said section required Defendants, and their employees and agents, not to discriminate against Plaintiff in the terms, conditions, and privileges of her employment on the basis of her sex and pregnancy. As used in Government Code section 12940(a) and defined in Government Code section 12926, the term “sex” includes “pregnancy, childbirth, or medical conditions related to pregnancy or childbirth.” 27. Plaintiff to this lawsuit is a woman and in her childbearing years. During her employment with Defendants, Plaintiff learned that she was pregnant and informed Defendants of -5- ‘COMPLAINT OO 0 3 O N Un BR W O N es her pregnancy in or about May 2014. Pursuant to FMLA, Plaintiff began her maternity leave on or about November 28, 2014. 28. Both prior to commencing her leave and at the conclusion of Plaintiffs leave, . Defendants discriminated against and retaliated against Plaintiff by, among other things, taking away accounts, drastically reducing Plaintiff's workload, and thereby drastically reducing her compensation, and ultimately wrongfully terminating Plaintiffs employment. 29. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that her sex, pregnancy, and/or pregnancy-related disability were motivating factors in Defendant’s decision to terminate Plaintiff's employment, in violation of Government Code §§ 12940 ef seq. 30. As a direct and proximate result of the wrongful conduct of Defendants, and each of them, Plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer substantial losses in earnings and other employment benefits in an amount according to proof at the time of trial. 31. Asa further direct and proximate result of the wrongful conduct of Defendants, and each of them, Plaintiff has suffered humiliation, emotional distress, and mental and physical pain and anguish, all to her damage in an amount according to proof at the time of trial. 32. In doing the acts herein alleged, Defendants, and each of them, acted with oppression, fraud, malice, and in conscious disregard of Plaintiff’s rights and Plaintiff is therefore entitled to punitive damages in an amount according to proof at the time of trial. 33 Plaintiff has also incurred and continues to incur attorneys’ fees and legal expenses in an amount according to proof at the time of trial. SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION Disability Discrimination in Violation of Government Code § 12940 (a) 34. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations in the above paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. 35. At all times relevant herein, Government Code § 12940(a) was in full force and effect, and was binding upon Defendants. Said section makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee on the basis of a disability. 36. Plaintiff to this lawsuit is a woman and in her childbearing years. During her -6- COMPLAINT Oo ® t B R O W N RN O N ee d md md p m e d fe d fe ed m d p d ® I 8 A R B I R B S 3 a a r o . 2 8 employment with Defendants, Plaintiff learned that she was pregnant and informed Defendants of her pregnancy in or about May 2014. Pursuant to FMLA, Plaintiff began her maternity leave on or about November 28, 2014. 37. Both prior to commencing her leave and at the conclusion of Plaintiff's leave, Defendants retaliated against Plaintiff by, among other things, treating her differently than other -employees, taking away accounts, drastically reducing Plaintiff's workload, and thereby drastically reducing her compensation, and ultimately wrongfully terminating her employment, 38. Plaintiff's disabilities limited her ability to perform major life activities, including, but not limited to her ability to work. Defendants knew and/or treated Plaintiff as if she had a disability that limited her ability to perform major life activities as set forth in this Complaint. 39. At all times mentioned herein, Plaintiff was willing and able to perform the essential job duties of her position or other available positions if such reasonable accommodation had been made by Defendants. At no time would the performance of the functions of the employment position(s), with a reasonable accommodation for Plaintiff's disability, have been a danger to Plaintiff's or any other person’s health or safety, nor would it have created an undue hardship to the operation of Defendants’ business. 40. Defendants engaged in unlawful employment practices in violation of the FEHA by terminating Plaintiff's employment on the basis of her disability, and by discriminating in terms, conditions and privileges of her employment. 41. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that her disability was a motivating factor in Defendants’ decision to terminate Plaintiff’s employment, and other discrimination against her, in violation of California Government Code § 12940(a). 42. As direct and proximate result of the wrongful conduct of Defendants, and each of them, Plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer substantial losses in earnings and other employment benefits in an amount according to proof at the time of trial. 43. Asa further direct and proximate result of the wrongful conduct of Defendants, and each of them, Plaintiff has suffered humiliation, emotional distress, and mental and physical pain and anguish, all to her damage in an amount according to proof at the time of trial. 7- COMPLAINT Do ee N N N A W N ~N N O N N O N m d m d p d e m em em em em e d 44. In doing the acts herein alleged, Defendants, and each of them, acted with oppression, fraud, malice, and in conscious disregard of Plaintiff's rights and Plaintiff is therefore entitled to punitive damages in an amount according to proof at the time of trial. 45. Plaintiff has also incurred and continues to incur attorneys’ fees and legal expenses in an amount according to proof at the time of trial. THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION Retaliation 46. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations in the paragraphs above as though fully set forth herein. 47. At all times relevant herein, Government Code section 12940(h) was in full force and effect, and was binding upon Defendants. Said section makes it unlawful for an employer to retaliate against an employee on the basis of a disability, sex, or pregnancy. 48. As set forth fully above, Plaintiff engaged in protected activity including but not limited to being a woman, pregnant, and disabled, requesting a leave .of absence and accommodation for her disabilities, and attempting to be reinstated to her job position pursuant to the FEHA and/or PDL. 49. As aresult of Plaintiff's sex, disabling medical conditions, exercise of her right to seek ceasanabla accommodation for her disability, and/or exercise of her right to take leave, Defendants retaliated against Plaintiff by subjecting her to adverse employment actions, including but not limited to, treating her differently than other employees, and terminating Plaintiff's employment. 50. Asa direct and proximate result of the wrongful conduct of Defendants, and each of them, Plaintiff has suffered and continues to sustain substantial losses in earnings and other employment benefits in an amount according to proof at the time of trial. 51. As a direct and proximate result of the wrongful conduct of Defendants, and each of them, Plaintiff has suffered humiliation, emotional distress, and mental pain and anguish, all to Plaintiff’s damage in an amount according to proof at the time of trial. 52. In doing the acts herein alleged, Defendants, and each of them, acted with COMPLAINT OC ee N N a nw A W O N = N O N N O N N N e d ml em t md p d b e t e d p d ee d B N B Y R R U I I R E B E L S « 3 2 & 3 2 6 0 = 3 oppression, fraud, malice, and in conscious disregard of the rights of Plaintiff, and Plaintiff is therefore entitled to punitive damages according to proof at the time of trial. 53. Plaintiff has also incurred and continues to incur attorney’s fees and legal expenses in an amount according to proof at the time of trial. FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION Failure to Prevent Discrimination and Retaliation 54. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations in the paragraphs above as though fully set forth herein. 55. Plaintiff was subjected to discrimination and retaliation because of her sex, pregnancy, disability, request for accommodation, and/or for exercising her rights to take a medical leave. 56. Defendants failed to take reasonable steps to prevent the discrimination and/or retaliation. Such conduct is in violation of California Government Code § 12900 ef seq. and has resulted in damage and injury to Plaintiff as alleged herein. 57. In doing the acts described herein, Defendants deprived Plaintiff of prospective career and employment opportunities, as well as other benefits, by failing to perform its duties to administer and apply all State and local laws, procedures, and regulations. 58. As a proximate result of Defendants’ willful, despicable, and intentional conduct towards Plaintiff, Plaintiff has sustained substantial losses in earings and other employment benefits. 59. As a proximate result of Defendants’ willful, despicable, and intentional conduct towards Plaintiff, Plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer personal injuries, humiliation, and emotional distress; the amount of such damages to be determined by proof at trial. 60. In doing the acts alleged herein, Defendants acted willfully, intentionally and maliciously, and in conscious disregard of the rights of Plaintiff, thereby entitling Plaintiff to an award of exemplary and punitive damages pursuant to Civil Code section 3294 in an amount to be determined at trial according to proof. COMPLAINT OO 8 8 N U A W N N O O N O N N O N O N N N N ee ek md p m f m e m p d e m e m e m QO ~~ O N t h A WwW N N = OO 0 0 3 hh bh W N = O FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy 61. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations in the paragraphs above as though fully set forth herein. 62. The discharge of Plaintiff by Defendants violates fundamental principles of public policy in that there is a substantial and fundamental policy against terminating employees for unlawful purposes, including on account of an employee’s sex, pregnancy, and disability, on account of an employee’s request for reasonable accommodations, on account of an employee’s exercise of her right to seek a leave of absence pursuant to the FEHA and/or PDL, and for exercising rights under the Constitution and laws of the State of California. 63. On or about October 1, 2015, Defendants wrongfully terminated Plaintiffs employment. Plaintiff is informed and believes that her employment was terminated because of her sex, pregnancy, disability, her request for accommodation, and/or her exercise of her right to seek a leave of absence pursuant to the FEHA and/or PDL. 64. Defendants effected Plaintiff’s termination with knowledge that Plaintiff had just given birth to her child, was on her requested and lawful leave, required reasonable accommodation due to disabilities and medical conditions, and was entitled to reinstatement at the end of her leave. Despite this knowledge, Defendants acted willfully and with conscious disregard for the rights of Plaintiff and terminated her employment. 65. Defendants acted with knowledge and awareness that they were consciously disregarding Plaintiff’s rights when they discriminated against, retaliated against, and terminated her employment. Defendants authorized and ratified Plaintiff's discrimination and termination through the conduct of its agents and/or employees. Plaintiff is informed, believes, and thereon alleges that at all relevant times, these agents and/or employees were acting within the scope of their employment and at the direction of Defendants when the decision to terminate Plaintiff was effected. Hn H -10- COMPLAINT OW 00 NN AN Wn BR W O N = md p d em pe md m l em t e d md pe e 2 I U R E V B N E R E Y E E S I I E T o r E a R = = 66. Defendants knew in advance that, as a consequence of Plaintiff's denial of leave, denial of reinstatement, denial of reasonable accommodation and interactive process, retaliation, and termination, her rights were being violated. 67. In doing the acts described herein, Defendants deprived Plaintiff of prospective career and employment opportunities, as well as other benefits, by failing to perform its duties to administer and apply all State and local laws, procedures, and regulations. 68. Asa proximate result of Defendants’ willful, despicable, and intentional conduct towards Plaintiff, Plaintiff has sustained substantial losses in earnings and other employment benefits. | | 69. As a proximate result of Defendants’ willful, despicable, and intentional conduct towards Plaintiff, Plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer personal injuries, humiliation, and emotions] distress; the amount of such damages to be determined by proof at trial. 70. In doing the acts alleged herein, Defendants acted willfully, intentionally and maliciously, and in conscious disregard of the rights of Plaintiff, thereby entitling Plaintiff to an award of exemplary and punitive damages pursuant to Civil Code section 3294 in an amount to be determined at trial according to proof. PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment as follows: 1. For general damages and special damages in an amount according to proof; Zz For compensatory damages according to proof, including past and future loss of earnings and other employment benefits, costs of seeking other employment and for damages for emotional distress, humiliation and mental anguish; 3. For interest at the legal rate from the date of injury or pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 3287; 4, For all damages available for violations of the FEHA, 5 For an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to Government Code § 12965(b) and any other applicable provisions of California statutory or common law; 6. For costs of suit incurred; -11- COMPLAINT O 0 0 N N Wn RA W N e w N O N O N O N O N RN O N mm oe m mm p d p d e m em 5 9 8 8 R B B R E E R O S S B E B E E = 7. For punitive and exemplary damages, according to proof; and 8. For any other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. Dated: September 28, 2016 AEGIS LAW ve WLU Samuel A. Wong Ali S. Carlsen Attorneys for Plaintiff WINDY BISE i -12- COMPLAINT NO 0 N h a B O W DN O N N O N N O N O N N O N e m mm mm mm h m he d mb em je m pe 0 ~ ~ OO W h A W N = O O e N Y t h R W = O DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL Plaintiff hereby demands trial of her claims by jury to the extent authorized by law, Dated: September 28, 2016 AEGIS LAW FIRM, PC By (Y A Samtel A. Wong Ali S. Carlsen Attorneys for Plaintiff WINDY BISE -13- COMPLAINT EXHIBIT “RB” oO 00 N Y N h lb W N N N O N O N N N N N N N NN O N O N m = m t pe d e h p e pe d p d p a 0 N N ah E W N = O YW 0 N N R W N = AEGIS LAW FIRM, PC SAMUEL A. WONG, State Bar No. 217104 KASHIF HAQUE, State Bar No. 218672 ALIS. CARLSEN, State Bar No. 289964 9811 Irvine Center Drive, Suite 100 Irvine, California 92618 Telephone: (949) 379-6250 Facsimile; (949) 379-6251 Attorneys for Plaintiff, ELECTRONICALLY FILED Superiar Court of California, County af Orange 0972872016 at 05:01:18 PM Clerk of the Superior Court By Sarah Lemese,leputy Clerk WINDY BISE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF ORANGE WINDY BISE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, Vs. QUICK BRIDGE FUNDING, LLC, formerly known as BLACKROCK LENDING GROUP, LLC, a California limited liability company; and DOES 1 through 20 inclusive, Defendants. 30-2016-00878044-CU-0E-CXC Case No. Judge Thierry Patrick Colaw © CX105 CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR: L. 2, £8 Failure to Pay Overtime Wages; Failure to Provide Meal Periods; Failure to Permit Rest Breaks; Failure to Provide Accurate Itemized Wage Statements; Failure to Pay All Wages Due Upon Separation of Employment; and Violation of Business and Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq. « DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT Oo 0 NN AN n s W O N N O N F e hm hm p d ed pe d pe d em Plaintiff Windy Bise, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, alleges as follows: NATURE OF ACTION AND INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 1. Plaintiff Windy Bise (“Plaintiff”) brings this putative class action against defendant Quick Bridge Funding, LLC (formerly known as Blackrock Lending Group, LLC) and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive (collectively, “Defendants”), on behalf of herself individually and a putative class of non-exempt employees employed by Defendants throughout California. 2, Defendants provide short-term, high-interest loans to various businesses. 3. Through this action, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have engaged in a systematic pattern of wage and hour violations under the California Labor Code and Industrial Welfare Commission (“IWC”) Wage Orders, all of which contribute to Defendants’ deliberate unfair competition. 4, Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendants have increased their profits by violating state wage and hour laws by, among other things: (@) Failing to pay overtime wages; (b) Failing to provide meal periods or compensation in lieu thereof; (c) Failing to authorize or permit rest breaks or provide compensation in lieu thereof; (d) Failing to provide accurate itemized wage statements; and (e) Failing to pay all wages due upon separation of employment. 5. Plaintiff brings this lawsuit seeking monetary relief against Defendants on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated in California to recover, among other things, unpaid wages and benefits, interest, attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses and penalties pursuant to Labor Code §§ 201-204, 226, 226.3, 226.7, 510, 512, 558, 1194, and 1198. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 6. Thisis a class action, pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 382. The monetary damages and restitution sought by Plaintiff exceeds the minimal jurisdictional limits of the Superior Court and will be established according to proof at trial. -1- CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT Lv 00 3 AN wn RA W O N - fe d pe d md a fe d em fe 8 9 8 R R B P R E T =x a r e pb 2 s 7. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to the California Constitution, Article VI, § 10, which grants the Superior Court original jurisdiction in all causes except those given by statutes to other courts. The statutes under which this action is brought do not specify any other basis for jurisdiction. 8. This Court has jurisdiction over all Defendants because, upon information and belief, they are citizens of California, have sufficient minimum contacts in California or otherwise intentionally avail themselves of the California market so as to render the exercise of jurisdiction over them by the California courts consistent with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. 9. Venue is proper in this Court because, upon information and belief, Defendants reside, transact business or have offices in this county and the acts and omissions alleged herein took place in this county. THE PARTIES 10. Plaintiff is a resident of California who worked for Defendants during the relevant time period. 11. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendants at all times hereinafter mentioned, were and are employers as defined in and subject to the Labor Code and IWC Wage Orders, whose employees were and are engaged throughout this county and the State of California. 12. Plaintiff is unaware of the true names or capacities of the defendants sued herein under the fictitious names DOES 1 through 20, but will seek leave of this Court to amend this Complaint and serve such fictitiously named defendants once their names and capacities become known. 13. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that each defendant acted in all respects pertinent to this action as the agent of the other defendant, carried out a joint scheme, business plan or policy in all respects pertinent hereto, and the acts of each defendant are legally attributable to the other defendant. Furthermore, defendants in all respects acted as the employer and/or joint employer of Plaintiff and the class members. 2. CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT © © NN O N wm BA W O N Tr nN nN N N S N D p t Yo ud fo nd - - - t - f t - - 14, Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that each and all of the acts and omissions alleged herein were performed by, or are attributable to, Defendants and/or DOES 1 through 20, acting as the agent or alter ego for the other, with legal authority to act on the other’s behalf. The acts of any and all Defendants were in accordance with, and represent, the official policy of Defendants. 15. Atall relevant times, Defendants, and each of them, acted within the scope of such agency or employment, or ratified each and every act or omission complained of herein. At all relevant times, Defendants, and each of them, aided and abetted the acts and omissions of each and all the other Defendants in proximately causing the damages herein alleged. 16. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that each of said Defendants is in some manner intentionally, negligently or otherwise responsible for the acts, omissions, occurrences and transactions alleged herein. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 17. Plaintiff brings this action under Code of Civil Procedure § 382 on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated who were affected by Defendants’ Labor Code, Business and Professions Code §§ 17200 and IWC Wage Order violations. 18. All claims alleged herein arise under California law for which Plaintiff seeks relief authorized by California law. | 19. Plaintiff's proposed Class consists of and is defined as follows: Class All current and former non-exempt employees employed by Defendants in the State of California within four years prior to the filing of this action to the present. 20. Plaintiff also seeks to certify the following Subclasses of employees: Waiting Time Subclass ~All Class members who separated their employment with Defendants at any time within three years prior to the filing of this action to the present. i Vi ; gs CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT Oo W N AN WM BA W O N - > 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Commissions and Non-Discretionary Bonus Subclass All Class members who received commissions, bonuses, and other non- discretionary incentive payments. 21. Plaintiff reserves the right to establish other or additional Subclasses, or modify any Class or Subclass definition, as appropriate. 22. Members of the Class and Subclasses described above will be collectively refetred to as “class members.” Plaintiff reserves the right to re-define the above Class and Subclasses and add additional Subclasses as appropriate based on investigation, discovery and specific theories of liability. 23. There are common questions of law and fact as to the Class and Subclasses that predominate over any questions affecting only individual members including, but not limited to: (a) (b) (c) ©) ® ® (b) Whether Defendants required Plaintiff and class members to work over 8 hours per day, over twelve (12) hours per day and/or over forty (40) hours per week and failed to pay them overtime compensation at the proper rate; Whether Defendants deprived Plaintiff and class members of timely meal periods or required Plaintiff and class members to work through meal periods without compensation; Whether Defendants deprived Plaintiff and class members of timely rest breaks or required Plaintiff and class members to work through rest breaks without compensation; Whether Defendants failed to provide accurate itemized wage statements to Plaintiff and class members; Whether Defendants failed to timely pay all wages due to Plaintiff and Subclass members upon termination or within seventy-two (72) hours of resignation; Whether Defendants’ conduct was willful or reckless; and Whether Defendants engaged in unfair business practices in violation of Business and Professions Code §§ 17200, ef seq. -4- CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT WO 0 N N wn A W N BN = = e m mt md e d ee f d pe t fe 2 3 R B R V R E B R E E B I S 593 a3 6 5 % 6 8 2 83 24, There is a well-defined community of interest in this litigation and the proposed Class and Subclasses are readily ascertainable: (@ Numerosity: The members of the Class and Subclasses are so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical. Although the members of the entire Class and Subclasses are unknown to Plaintiff at this time, on information and belief, the class is estimated to be greater than one hundred (100) individuals. The identities of the Class and Subclasses are readily ascertainable by inspection of Defendants’ employment and payroll records. (b) Typicality: The claims (or defenses, if any) of Plaintiff are typical of the claims (or defenses, if any) of the class because Defendants’ failure to comply with the provisions of California’s wage and hour laws entitled each class member to similar pay, benefits and other relief. The injuries sustained by Plaintiff are also typical of the injuries sustained by the Class and Subclass, because they arise out of and are caused by Defendants’ common course of conduct as alleged herein. (¢) Adequacy: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of all members of the Class and Subclasses because it is in her best interests to prosecute the claims alleged herein to obtain full compensation and penalties due them and the Class and Subclasses. Plaintiff's attorneys, as proposed class counsel, are competent and experienced in litigating large employment class actions and versed in the rules governing class action discovery, certification and settlement. Plaintiff has incurred and, throughout the duration of this action, will continue to incur attorneys’ fees and costs that have been and will be necessarily expended for the prosecution of this action for the substantial benefit of each class member. (d) Superiority: The nature of this action makes use of class action adjudication superior to other methods. A class action will achieve economies of time, effort and expense as compared with separate lawsuits, and will avoid inconsistent outcomes because the same issues can be adjudicated in the same manner and at the same time for the entire Class and Subclass. If appropriate this Court can, and is empowered to, fashion methods to efficiently manage this case as a class action. (e) Public Policy Considerations: Employers in the State of California violate -5- CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT © © N O hs W O N N O R O N N O N r m em md h d b m j m ml e d mk BB NN B R R B I R B S = I > a r r 6 0 2 3 ¢ employment and labor laws every day. Current employees are often afraid to assert their rights out of fear of direct or indirect retaliation. Former employees are fearful of bringing actions because they believe their former employers might damage their future endeavors through negative references and/or other means. Class actions provide the class members who are not named in the complaint with a type of anonymity that allows for the vindication of their rights at the same time as affording them privacy protections. : GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 25. At all relevant times mentioned herein, Defendants employed Plaintiff and other persons as non-exempt employees. 26. Plaintiff is or was employed in a non-exempt position at Defendants’ California’ business location(s). 27. Defendants continue to employ non-exempt employees within California. 28. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that at all times herein mentioned, Defendants were advised by skilled lawyers, employees and other professionals who were knowledgeable about California’s wage and hour laws, employment and personnel practices and the requirements of California law. 29. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendants knew or should have known that Plaintiff and class members _- entitled to receive the proper amount of overtime wages and that they were not receiving the proper amount of overtime wages. In violation of the Labor Code and IWC Wage Orders, Plaintiff and class members were not paid the proper amount of overtime wages when Defendants failed to incorporate non-discretionary bonuses into their overtime rate, among other things. 30. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendants knew or ahold have known that Plaintiff and class members were entitled to receive all required meal periods or payment of one (1) additional hour of pay at Plaintiff and class members’ regular rate of pay when they did not receive a timely, uninterrupted meal period. In violation of the Labor Code and IWC Wage Orders, Plaintiff and class members did not receive all meal periods or payment of one (1) additional hour of pay at Plaintiff and class members’ regular rate of pay -6- CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT oO 00 A N BR W O N N N N O N ON N O N KR mm or em e d em em e p when they did not receive a timely, uninterrupted meal period. 31. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendants knew or should have known that Plaintiff and class members were entitled to receive all rest breaks or payment of one (1) additional hour of pay at Plaintiff and class members’ regular rate of pay when a rest break was missed. In violation of the Labor Code and IWC Wage Orders, Plaintiff and class members did not receive all rest breaks or payment of one (1) additional hour of pay at Plaintiff and class members’ regular rate of pay when a rest break was missed. 32. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendants knew or should have known that Plaintiff and class members were entitled to receive itemized wage statements that accurately showed their gross and net wages earned, total hours worked and all applicable hourly rates in effect and the number of hours worked at each hourly rate in accordance with California law. In violation of the Labor Code, Plaintiff and class members were not provided with accurate itemized wage statements. 33. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendants knew or should have known that Plaintiff and other employees were entitled to timely payment of wages due upon separation of employment. Int violation of the Labor Code, Plaintiff and Waiting Time Subclass members did not receive payment of all wages within permissible time periods. 34. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendants knew or should have known they had a duty to compensate Plaintiff and class members, and Defendants had the financial ability to pay such compensation but willfully, knowingly and intentionally failed to do so all in order to increase Defendants’ profits. FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME (Violation of Labor Code §§ 510, 1194 and 1198; Violation of IWC Wage Order § 3) 35. Plaintiff hereby re-alleges and incorporates by reference all paragraphs above as though fully set forth herein. 36. Labor Code § 1198 and the applicable IWC Wage Order provide that it is unlawful to employ persons without compensating them at a rate of pay either one and one-half 5 CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT VO 0 ~~ A Wn A W O N N Y N NN BR m = e m e m t em e d p m e d e s d e ® I 8 X R U RN BR EE BE e = I a c ®R o BL = 3 or two times the person’s regular rate of pay, depending on the number of hours worked by the | person on a daily or weekly basis. 37. Pursuant to California Labor Code §§ 510 and 1194, during the relevant time period, Defendants were required to compensate Plaintiff and class members for all overtime hours worked, calculated at one and one-half (1%) times the regular rate of pay for hours worked in excess of eight (8) hours per day and/or forty (40) hours per week and for the first eight (8) hours of the seventh consecutive work day. 38. Plaintiff and class members were non-exempt employees entitled to the protections of California Labor Code §§ 510 and 1194. 39. During the relevant time period, Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and class members overtime wages for all overtime hours worked. | 40. In violation of state law, Defendants have knowingly and willfully refused to perform their obligations and compensate Plaintiff and class members for all wages earned and all hours worked, by failing to include in Plaintiff and class members’ overtime rate the amount that they earned in non-discretionary bonuses, among other things. 41. Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff and class members the unpaid balance of overtime compensation, as required by California law, violates the provisions of Labor Code §§ 510 and 1198, and is therefore unlawful. 42. Pursuant to Labor Code § 1194, Plaintiff and class members are entitled to recover their unpaid overtime compensation as well as interest, costs and attorneys’ fees. | SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION FAILURE TO P VIDE MEAL PERIODS (Violation of Labor Code §§ 226.7 and 512; Violation of IWC Wage Order § 11) 43. Plaintiff hereby re-alleges and incorporates by reference all paragraphs above as though fully set forth herein 44, Labor Code § 226.7 provides that no employer shall require an employee to work during any meal period mandated by the IWC Wage Orders. 45. Section 11 of the applicable IWC Wage Order states, “no employer shall employ -8- CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT Oo 8 NN AA W n RA W N BE RE BE R O N O K O M OB OB 5s Fs h e bE el je k eb fe b he ® = Oh L R A Y N = SO © 0 um RE ® N - oo any person for a work period of more than five (5) hours without a meal period of not less than 30 minutes, except that when a work period of not more than six (6) hours will complete the day’s work the meal period may be waived by mutual consent of the employer and the employee.” 46. Labor Code § 512(a) provides that an employer may not require, cause or permit an employee to work for a period of more than five (5) hours per day without providing the employee with an uninterrupted meal period of not less than thirty (30) minutes, except that if the total work period per day of the employee is not more than six (6) hours, the meal period may be waived by mutual consent of both the employer and the employee. 47. Labor Code § 512(a) also provides that an employer may not employ an employee for a work period of more than ten (10) hours per day without providing the employee with a second meal period of not less than thirty (30) minutes, except that if the total hours worked is no more than twelve (12) hours, the second meal period may be waived by mutual consent of the employer and the employee only if the first meal period was not waived. 48. During the relevant time period, Plaintiff and class members did not receive compliant ineal periods for working more than five (5) and/or ten (10) hours per day because their meal periods were short, missed, or late and/or they were not permitted to take a second meal period. 49. Labor Code § 226.7(b) and section 11 of the applicable IWC Wage Order require an employer to pay an employee one additional hour of pay at the employee’s regular rate of compensation for each work day that a meal period is not provided. 50. At all relevant times, Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and class members meal period premium for missed, late, and untimely meal periods pursuant to Labor Code § 226.7(b) and section 11 of the applicable IWC Wage Order. 51. Asaresult of Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff and class members an additional hour of pay for each day a meal period was not provided, Plaintiff and class members suffered and continue to suffer a loss of wages and compensation. i im 9. CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT 8 0 a y wn A W N BR DN = e m e m em e m e d e d f d e d 8 VF R E V R B R E E E & ® I a & E S E 2 3 . THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION FAILURE TO PERMIT REST BREAKS (Violation of Labor Code §§ 226.7; Violation of IWC Wage Order § 12) 52, Plaintiff hereby re-alleges and incorporates by reference all paragraphs above as though fully set forth herein. 53. Labor Code § 226.7(a) provides that no employer shall require an employee to work during any rest period mandated by the [IWC Wage Orders. 54. Section 12 of the applicable IWC Wage Order states “every employer shall authorize and permit all employees to take rest periods, which insofar as practicable shall be in the middle of each work period” and the “authorized rest period time shall be based on the total hours worked daily at the rate of ten (10) minutes net rest time per four (4) hours or major fraction - thereof” unless the total daily work time is less than three and one-half (32) hours. 55. During the relevant time period, Plaintiff and class members did not receive a ten (10) minute rest period for every four (4) hours or major fraction thereof worked because they were required to work through their daily rest periods and/or were not authorized to take their rest periods. 56. Labor Code § 226.7(b) and section 12 of the applicable IWC Wage Order requires an employer to pay an employee one additional hour of pay at the employees regular rate of compensation for each work day that the rest period is not provided. 57. At all relevant times, Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and class members rest period premium for missed or interrupted rest periods pursuant to Labor Code § 226.7(b) and section 12 of the applicable IWC Wage Order. 58. Asaresult of Defendants’ failure to pay Plaintiff and class members an additional hour of pay for each day a rest period was not provided, Plaintiff and class members suffered and continue to suffer a loss of wages and compensation. 1! i nm -10- CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT OW 8 Aq AA WL BN W O N : N a [\ &] - - - - p- - p- Je r j- Jo t FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION FAILURE TO PROVIDE ACCURATE ITEMIZED WAGE STATEMENTS (Violation of Labor Code § 226) 59. Plaintiffs hereby re-allege and incorporate by reference all paragraphs above as though fully set forth herein. 60. Labor Code § 226(a) requires Defendants to provide each employee with an accurate wage statement in writing showing nine pieces of information, including: (1) gross wages earned, (2) total hours worked by the employee, (3) the number of piece-rate units earned and any applicable piece rate if the employee is paid on a piece-rate basis, (4) all deductions, provided that all deductions made on written orders of the employee may be aggregated and shown as one item, (5) net wages earned, (6) the inclusive dates of the period for which the employee is pei, (7) the name of the employee and the last four digits of his or her social security number or an employee identification number other than a social security number, (8) the name and address of the legal entity that is the employer, and (9) all applicable hourly rates in effect during the pay period and the corresponding number of hours worked at each hourly rate by the employee. 61. During the relevant time period, Defendants have knowingly and intentionally failed to comply with Labor Code § 226(a) on wage statements that were provided to Plaintiff and class members. The deficiencies include, among other things, the failure to correctly state the gross and net wages earned, total hours worked and all applicable hourly rates in effect and the number of hours worked at each hourly rate by Plaintiff and class members. 62. As a result of Defendants’ knowing and intentional failure to comply with Labor Code § 226(a), Plaintiff and class members have suffered injury and damage to their statutorily- protected rights. Specifically, Plaintiff and class members are deemed to suffer an injury pursuant to Labor Code § 226(e) where, as here, Defendants intentionally violated Labor Code § 226(a). Plaintiff and class members were denied both their legal right to receive, and their protected interest in receiving, accurate itemized wage statements under Labor Code § 226(a). In addition, because Defendants failed to provide the accurate rates of pay on wage statements, Defendants have prevented Plaintiff and class members from determining if all hours worked were paid at the -11- CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT 0 3 AN th R W - = = e d e d mk m d je e appropriate rate and the extent of the underpayment. Plaintiff have had to file this lawsuit in order to analyze the extent of the underpayment, thereby causing Plaintiff to incur expenses and lost time. Plaintiff would not have had to engage in these efforts and incur these costs had Defendants provided the accurate hours worked, wages earned, and rates of pay. This has also delayed Plaintiffs ability to demand and recover the underpayment of wages from Defendants. 63. Plaintiff and class members are entitled to recover from Defendants the greater of all actual damages caused by Defendants’ failure to comply with Labor Code § 226(a), or fifty dollars ($5 0.00) for the initial pay period in which a violation occurred, and one hundred dollars ($100.00) per employee for each violation in subsequent pay periods, in an amount not exceeding four thousand dollars ($4,000.00) per employee, plus attorneys’ fees and costs. 64. Defendants’ violations of California Labor Code § 226(a) prevented Plaintiff and class members from knowing, understanding and disputing the wages paid to them, and resulted in an unjustified economic enrichment to Defendants. As a result of Defendants’ knowing and intentional failure to comply with California Labor Code § 226(a), Plaintiff and class members have suffered an injury, the exact amount of damages and/or penalties is all in an amount to be shown according to proof at trial. 65. Plaintiff and class members are also entitled to injunctive relief under California Labor Code § 226(h), compelling Defendants to comply with California Labor Code § 226, and seek the recovery of attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in obtaining this injunctive relief. FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION FAILURE TO PAY ALL WAGES DUE UPON SEPARATION OF EMPLOYMENT (Violation of Labor Code §§ 201, 202 and 203) 66. Plaintiff hereby re-alleges and incorporates by reference all paragraphs above as though fully set forth herein. 67. Labor Code §§ 201 and 202 provide that if an employer discharges an employee, the wages earned and unpaid at the time of discharge are due and payable immediately, and that if an employee voluntarily leaves his employment, his wages shall become due and payable not later than seventy-two (72) hours thereafter, unless the employee has given seventy-two (72) -12- CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT a O R N N N t h Ba W N Nd N No NN NY D N - - _- p- Ja ni p- - hours previous notice of his intention to quit, in which case the employee is entitled to his wages at the time of quitting. 68. During the relevant time period, Defendants willfully failed to pay Waiting Time Subclass members all their earned wages upon termination including, but not limited to, proper minimum wages and overtime compensation, either at the time of discharge or within seventy- two (72) hours of their leaving Defendants’ employ. 69. Defendants’ failure to pay Waiting Time Subclass members all their earned wages at the time of discharge or within seventy-two (72) hours of their leaving Defendants’ employ is in violation of Labor Code §§ 201 and 202. 70. Labor Code § 203 provides that if an employer willfully fails to pay wages owed immediately upon discharge or resignation in accordance with Labor Code §§ 201 and 202, then the wages of the employee shall continue as a penalty from the due date at the same rate until paid or until an action is commenced; but the wages shall not continue for more than thirty (30) days. 71. Waiting Time Subclass members are entitled to recover from Defendants the statutory penalty which is defined as Waiting Time Subclass members’ regular daily wages for each day they were not paid, at their regular hourly rate of pay, up to a thirty (30) day maximum pursuant to Labor Code § 203. SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION VIOLATION OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONS CODE §8§ 17200, ET SEQ. 72. Plaintiff hereby re-alleges and incorporates by reference all paragraphs above as though fully set forth herein. | 73. Defendants’ conduct, as alleged herein, has been and continues to be unfair, unlawful and harmful to Plaintiff and class members. Plaintiff seek to enforce important rights affecting the public interest within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5. 74. Defendants’ activities, as alleged herein, violate California law and constitute unlawful business acts or practices in violation of California Business and Professions Code §§ 17200, ef seq. 75. Aviolation of Business and Professions Code §§ 17200, ef seq. may be predicated -13- CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT OO ® NN AN Un Rs W N BN O N N N N N N N N Ee em mk e m p m e m ee ed be m < 0 ~J aN wn » Ww nN bl oO Oo ~J RN wh + Ww N - o on the violation of any state or federal law. 76. Defendants’ policies and practices have violated state law in at Jeest the following respects: (a) Failing to pay overtime wages to Plaintiff and class members in violation of Labor Code §§ 510, 1194, and 1198; (b) Failing to authorize or permit rest breaks without paying Plaintiff and class members premium wages for every day said rest breaks were not authorized or permitted in violation of Labor Code § 226.7; (¢) Failing to provide Plaintiff and class members with accurate itemized wage statements in violation of Labor Code § 226; and (f) Failing to timely pay all earned wages to Plaintiff and Waiting Time Subclass members upon separation of amply in violation of Labor Code §§ 201, 202 and 203. - 77. Defendants intentionally avoided paying Plaintiff and class members’ wages and monies, thereby creating for Defendants an artificially lower cost of doing business in order to undercut their competitors and establish and gain a greater foothold in the marketplace. 78. Pursuant to Business and Professions Code §§ 17200, ef seq. Plaintiff and class members are entitled to restitution of the wages unlawfully withheld and retained by Defendants during a period that commences four years prior to the filing of the Complaint; an award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5 and other applicable laws; and an award of costs. PRAYER FOR RELIEF Plaintiff, on her own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated, pray for relief and judgment against Defendants, jointly and severally, as follows: 1. For certification of this action as a class action, including certifying the Class and Subclasses alleged by Plaintiff; 2. For appointment of Windy Bise, as the class representative; 3. For appointment of Aegis Law Firm, PC as class counsel for all purposes; -14- CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT [ - B = ed p m md md p m e d ew md e k 2 I 8 8 R U B E EG E = I ax a R e p 2 3 vO 8 d N nM Bx W N 4, For compensatory damages in an amount according to proof with interest thereon; 5. For economic and/or special damages in an amount according to proof with interest thereon; 6. For reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs of suit and interest to the extent permitted by law, including pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5 Labor Code §§ 226(c), 1194; as For statutory penalties to the extent permitted by law, including those pursuant to the Labor Code and IWC Wage Orders; 8. For restitution as provided by Business and Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq; 9. For an order requiring Defendants to restore and disgorge all funds to each employee acquired by means of any act or practice declared by this Court to be unlawful, unfair or fraudulent and, therefore, constituting unfair competition under Business and Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq.; 10. For an award of damages in the amount of unpaid compensation including, but not limited to, unpaid wages, benefits and penalties, including interest thereon; 11. For pre-judgment interest; and | 12, For such other relief as the Court deems just and proper. Dated: September 12, 2016 AEGIS LAW FIRM, PC By: __\_ Samuel A. Wong Kashif Haque Ali 8. Carlsen Attorneys for Plaintiff - -15- CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT Oo 0 N n RA W N = N O N O N = mt em mt ed pee d b d ed e l b w E I B R U R E R B E S E S I a H E S B 2 3 DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL Plaintiff hereby demands a jury trial with respect to all issues triable of right by jury. Dated: September 12, 2016 AEGIS LAW FIRM, PC By: (i : Samuel A. Wong Kashif Haque Ali 8. Carlsen Attorneys for Plaintiff -16- CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT Oo 0 N N Wn BA W N es N O N N N N N N N N e m e e e e e m e m ed p e d me d e d co N N nn R W W N e O N R N Y R W N O CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, the undersigned, am employed in the County of Orange, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action; am employed with Aegis Law Firm PC and my business address is 9811 Irvine Center Drive, Suite 100, Irvine, California 92618. On February 9, 2017, I served the foregoing document entitled: ¢ PLAINTIFF WINDY BISE’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S NOTICE OF RELATED CASE PURSUANT TO CRC 3.300(g); DECLARATION OF FAHEEM A. TUKHI on all the appearing and/or interested parties in this action by placing {| the original [X] a true copy thereof enclosed in sealed envelope(s) addressed as follows: Marie Burke Kenny Annie Macaleer Procopio Cory Hargreaves & Savitch LLP 525 B Street, Suite 2200 San Diego, CA 92101 Attorneys for Defendant: Quick Bridge Funding, LLC X (BY MAIL) I am readily familiar with the firm’s practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with the U.S. Postal Service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid at Irvine, California in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postage cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing this affidavit. (Cal Code Civ. Proc. § 1013(a); Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 5(a); Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 5(c).) [] (BY OVERNIGHT MAIL) I am personally and readily familiar with the business practice of Aegis Law Firm PC for collection and processing correspondence for overnight delivery, and I caused such document(s) described herein to be deposited for delivery to a facility regularly maintained Federal Express for overnight delivery. (Cal Code Civ. Proc. § 1013(c); Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 5(c).) [] (BY ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION) I caused said document(s) to be served via electronic transmission to the addressee(s) listed above on the date below. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1010.6(6); Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 5(b)(2)(E); Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 5(b)(3).) [] (BY PERSONAL SERVICE) I delivered the foregoing document by hand delivery to . the addressed named above. (Cal Code Civ. Proc. § 1011; Fed R. Civ. Proc. 5(b)(2)(A).) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on February 9, 2017, at Irvine, California. -- Kafhyan Alvarez CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE