Reply To Motion

Reply

Cal. Super. - 4th Dist.August 30, 2016

O O 0 3 O N w n b w N N = N N D N R N R N R N N N O N m m e m e e e m b m p m e k p e e ® 3 O N U n R R W N = O Y N N D W N Y = O o Stephen W. Moore, Esq., Bar No. 140207 Mark P. LaScola, Esq., Bar No. 223398 FORD, WALKER, HAGGERTY & BEHAR One World Trade Center Twenty-Seventh Floor Long Beach, California 90831-2700 (562) 983-2500 Attorneys for Defendants, DAVID ELLIS CROFTON AND SANDRA CROFTON SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ORANGE - CENTRAL JUSTICE CENTER BRYAN PEREZ, Case No. 30-2016-00872136-CU-PA-CJC JUDGE: HON. MELISSA R. MCCORMICK DEPT.: C-13 Plaintiff, VS. Reservation No.: 72824251 DAVID ELLIS CROFTON, SANDRA CROFTON, and DOES 1 TO 100, INCLUSIVE, DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE AND/OR TAX COSTS; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION OF MARK P. LASCOLA IN SUPPORT Defendants. Date: July 26, 2018 Time: 1:30 p.m. Dept. C-13 r r S a r t N a N e t N e t N w ? N w a t N a t g t a N a m N a e N a ’ N t N a s N a o r S a N o ” i i Il 1 DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE AND/OR TAX COSTS;MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION OF COUNSEL o e d N B W N Y e s B N N O N N N N N N m m e m m m e m e a e m o m e m ® N A A W D H O Y ® O N A W N m o o TO THE COURT, ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD: PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Defendants, DAVID ELLIS CROFTON and SANDRA CROFTON (collectively “Defendants™) hereby submit their Opposition to the Motion to Strike and/or Tax Costs,filed by Plaintiff, BRYAN PEREZ (“Plaintiff”). Defendants are respectfully requesting from the Court an award of costs totaling $37,850. Plaintiff’s Motion is set for hearing on July 26, 2018, at 1:30 p.m., in Department C-13 of the Orange County Superior Court, Central Justice Center, located at 700 Civic Center Drive West, Santa Ana, California 92701. Dated: July 13, 2018 FORD, WALKER, HAGGERTY & BEHAR BY; 7 STEPHEN W. MOORE MARK P. LASCOLA Attorneys for Defendants, DAVID ELLIS CROFTON AND SANDRA CROFTON 2 DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE AND/OR TAX COSTS;MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION OF COUNSEL v O o e 3 & W n h h Ww W N m B R D N R N N N N N N R N m e d e m e m ee d e m e m e m e m pe a © ~ ~ O N h h B h W N = O O E Y R E W N - - , e MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES L INTRODUCTION As the Court is well aware, this case arises out of a three-vehicle and one motorcycle rear- end accident on the west-bound 22 Freeway near the Magnolia Street off-ramp, on April 2, 2015. Plaintiff, BRYAN PEREZ (“Plaintiff”) claims to have sustained injuries arising from the subject accident, and sought recovery ofthese alleged damages from Defendants, DAVID ELLIS CROFTON and SANDRA CROFTON (collectively “Defendants™) at trial. On March 20, 2018, the jury returned a verdict that awarded Plaintiff $7,500 in damages. (See Declaration of Mark P. LaScola (“Decla. LaScola™), 4 3.) In summary, Plaintiff’s Motion to deny Defendants the right to recover their deserved costs is nominally based upon three grounds, all ofwhich can and should be rejected by the Court: 1. Plaintiffs Motion first makes the unsupported claim that Defendants are not entitled to their requested costs, under Code ofCivil Procedure § 998. This is in error, as Section 998 absolutely allows Defendants to seek costs that are both reasonable and recoverable. 2. Defendants have provided all the necessary evidence to the Court in support of their attempt to recover costs. No facts or law are provided to challenge Defendants’ request. 3. Defendants concede that Item no. 16 is not recoverable. However,there is no reason to deny Defendants’ the requested recovery for Item nos. 4 and 8, which is well over 90% ofthe requested amount sought by Defendants. Since this would reduce any award to $2,061, the “alternative” option of $1,000 is similarly deficient and should be denied. II. LEGAL AUTHORITY Except as otherwise provided by statute, a “prevailing party” is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs in any action or proceeding. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1032(b).) A “prevailing party” includes the party with a net monetary recovery, a defendant in whose favor a dismissal is entered, a defendant where neither the plaintiff nor defendant obtains any relief, and a defendant against those plaintiffs who do not recover any relief against the defendant. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1032(a)(4).) Code ofCivil Procedure § 1033.5(a) outlines the items of allowable costs, and Code ofCivil Procedure § 1033.5(b) outlines items which are not allowable as costs, except when expressly 3 DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE AND/OR TAX COSTS;MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION OF COUNSEL O O 0 1 N N n h W N = B N N N N N N N O R M e m e e e a e m e m e m p a a p m e m R X N n h h W N RE , O W O N Y A W N m o authorized by law. Code ofCivil Procedure § 1033.5(c) sets forth the conditions for any award of costs. The conditions relevant here include that the costs be incurred (even if not paid), that they be reasonably necessary to the conduct ofthe litigation rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation, and that they be reasonable in amount. III. LEGAL ARGUMENT A. Defendants’ Code of Civil Procedure § 998 Offer Was Valid Plaintiff’s Motion initially makes the unsupportable claim that the Code ofCivil Procedure § 998 offer was invalid. Notably, Plaintiff does not deny that he did not accept the offer, and does not claim that his failure to accept the offer was based on any misunderstanding. Further, there also is no dispute that Plaintiff’s counsel did not call Defendant’s counsel to express a willingness to accept, but for a claim that the offer was somehow “invalid” as written. The reason is that Plaintiff made a conscious decision to force all parties to incur costs to try this case in hopes of recovering more than the $50,001. Now that he has failed to do so, he is disingenuously trying to claim that the settlement offer was ambiguous,as he “was left to speculate to the exact release Plaintiff would besigned if he accepted Defendant’s purported C.C.P. § 998 offer.” (See, Motion, p. 6, In. 9-12.) (Decla. LaScola, 4.) California law holdsthat Section 998 offers, with releases, are valid. (Goodstein v. Bank of San Pedro (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 899.) In Goodstein, the defendant’s Section 998 offer had sought a “general release.” In concluding the offer was nonetheless valid, the Court of Appeal interpreted the offer’s reference to a “general release” to refer only to the litigation in which it was offered. (/d. at 907-908.) The Court affirmed over a dissent, which argued that a general release has no place in a Section 998 offer. (Id. at 911.) Here,the release clearly applies to the current litigation - “4. This offer to compromise is subject to defendant being provided with a Release of All Claim arising out of this incident executed by plaintiff ... .” [Emphasis added.] (See, Exhibit 1, Plaintiff's Motion.) Cases that have invalidated Section 998 offers were premised on facts not present here. In Valentino v. Elliott Sav-On Gas, Inc. (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 692, the Court ofAppeal explained that the offer was conditioned on the plaintiff releasing not just the defendant gas station, but also the gas station's attorney and insurance carrier from claims that were not related to the subject 4 DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE AND/OR TAX COSTS;MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION OF COUNSEL v O 0 ~ ~ O N W n A W N e e D N D N N N N N N N r m e m e m e m e m e m pe d e m p a @ R N N B W = O Y e N N E R W N = D matter of the lawsuit. (/d. at 694-695.) Obviously, such a scenario does not apply here. Turning to those cases relied upon by Plaintiff, in Ignacio v. Caracciolo (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 81, the release applied not just to all claims arising out of the subject accident, but to “any and all claims”the releasees may have against the releasors “whether now known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, that have existed or may have existed or which do exist, or which hereinafter can, shall or may exist ... .” (/d. at 88-90.) As noted in Ignacio, the plaintiff identified before the trial court a claim that would be encompassed by the release that was not accident-related and could not have been brought in the pending lawsuit - Plaintiff's claim against defendant, her attorney, and her investigator for violation of plaintiff’s privacy rights during the carrier’s investigation of her claim. The release specifically identified defendant and herattorney as released parties; whetherit also encompasses her investigator would depend on whether the investigator was defendant's agent or employee. The Court found that the release’s plain language necessarily encompassed, at the very least, plaintiff's privacy violation claim against defendant and defendant's attorney; thus, encompassing more than Section 998 permitted. Here, there are no other claims beyond Plaintiffs Complaint. Plaintiff also cites to Sanford v. Rasnick(2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1121, wherein a Section 998 offer required that Plaintiff agree to enter into a “settlement agreement and general release.” (Id. at 1130.) There was no request for a settlement agreementin this case, only the understandable release and request for dismissal. Thus,Plaintiff's request for costs is not available underthe circumstances. Plaintiff chose to proceed with this lawsuit. He gambled, failed to recover more than $50,001, and now must pay costs. “[T]he clear purpose of section 998 ... is to encourage the settlement of lawsuits priorto trial ... by penalizing the party who fails to accept a reasonable offer from the other party.” (Burch v. Children’s Hospital ofOrange County (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 537, 544.) B. The Memorandum Of Costs Is Reasonable And Should Be Awarded To Defendants In Full By The Court Overall, if items on their face appear to be proper charges,the verified Memorandum of Costs is prima facie evidence oftheir propriety, and the burden is on the party seeking to tax costs 5 DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE AND/OR TAX COSTS;MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION OF COUNSEL O O 0 ~ ~ O N w n B A W O N B N N N R N R N N D N N = m m m m e m e m e m be d e e e e © N N A A n t B W N = O W N N R W N = S to show they were not reasonable or necessary. (Ladas v. California State Auto. Ass'n (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 774-776; Jones v. Dumrichob (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1258, 1266, quoting Rappenecker v. Sea-Land Service, Inc. (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 256, 266 - mere statements in points and authorities and declaration of counsel are insufficient to rebut prima facie showing). Plaintiff is attempting to do just that, i.e., allege that Defendants’ Memorandum of Costs is excessive because he says so. Here, Defendant’s Memorandum of Costs is complete and provides the necessary information about all claimed costs. Plaintiff, in turn, has failed to meet his burden of showing that the claimed costs are not reasonable or necessary. C. The Particular Costs Cited By Plaintiff Are Recoverable By Defendants 1. Item No. 4 Costs Are Allowed And Reasonable Plaintiff provides zero basisto strike the costs in Item no. 4 except for the reason that they “are punitive as to this Plaintiff and his financial status.” (See, Motion, p. 9, In. 23-24.) Defendants were sued by Plaintiff for monetary damages, and by necessity this directly affects their right to due process. Plaintiff, not Defendants, initiated this lawsuit. Section 1033.5(a)(3) allows for recovery of costs for necessary depositions. Even Plaintiff acknowledges that the seven identified depositions were for “Plaintiff’s experts, treating physicians, and police officer from the scene of the incident ... .” (See, Motion, p. 10, In. 1-3.) Outside of Plaintiff himself there can be no more “necessary” category than those identified individuals. Finally, Defendants would note that these are limited in their scope, excluding (often, unnecessary) videotaping and travel-related fees. Simply sought are the costs for taking (only 2 of which are above $1,000) and transcribing (all of which are under $1,000). These are the very definition of “reasonable” under Code ofCivil Procedure § 1033.5(a)(3) In light of both the expired Section 998 offer and those who were individuals deposed, the $7,932 must be allowed by the Court. (Decla. LaScola, 5.) 2. Item No. 8 Costs Are Allowed And Reasonable Expert costs are available for Section 998 “in either or both preparation ortrial of the case.” (Santantonio v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., Inc. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 102, 123-124.) 6 DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE AND/OR TAX COSTS;MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION OF COUNSEL O 0 0 N N W r x W N B N N N N N R N N N R ) k e e m pe d e m m d pe d p t pe d p a p m W W N N N L L R A W = O Y N R W -= , o e Experts do not even need to testify. (/d. at 124); Michelson v. Camp (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 955, 975-976.) Defendants seeks to recover fees for Dr. David Karlin and Dr. Michael Weinstein that, understandably, are the most significant portion of the Memorandum of Costs. However, the arguments again consist of hyperbole and conjecture, e.g., the fees for Dr. Weinstein “are astronomical and unreasonable.” (See, Motion,p. 11, In. 24.) Defendants’ Section 998 Offer was served on August 11, 2017. As to Dr. Karlin, in the portions ofthe transcript attached to Plaintiff's Motion, he states that he was retained in September 2017, i.e., post-Offer. (See, Exhibit 4, Plaintiff’s Motion.) As for the “reasonableness” of his work, the $12,388 was definitely reasonable in light of the fact that a statutory settlement offer of $50,001 had just expired. (Decla. LaScola, 6.) Turning to Dr. Weinstein, nothing in Plaintiff's Motion qualifies beyond the fact that four- figure bills were incurred for record review; again, with the expiration of a statutory settlement offer of $50,001, Defendants and their counsel wanted to make certain that Dr. Weinstein was appropriately prepared to testify on the alleged injuries sustained by Plaintiff. A figure of $16,469 is quite reasonable under the circumstances. (Decla. LaScola, § 7.) 3. Defendants Concede Costs For Item No. 16 Defendants concede that the costs sought for Item no. 16 should be borne by them and not passed to Plaintiff. (Decla. LaScola, § 8.) D. Plaintiff’s Financial Condition May Not ConsideredIn Awarding Costs Towards The Prevailing Party Finally, Defendants wish to emphasize with a separate section the argument relied upon by Plaintiff throughout his Motion, including why (at most) an award of $1,000 is appropriate - that his financial condition should be considered when awarding costs against him. (See,e.g., Motion, p. 7, In. 20-26, p. 8, In. 1-5.) Code ofCivil Procedure § 998 clearly sets forth the potential consequences ofa plaintiff who rejects a defendant’s Section 998 offer and fails to obtain a more favorable judgment at trial. Those consequences include having to pay the costs of Defendants’ experts, no matter how minimal 7 DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE AND/OR TAX COSTS;MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION OF COUNSEL O O 0 0 3 O N W n A W N = N D N N N N N N N N m m e m e a e t pe es p b p d p e d A B A W N = O Y I N R W - , O o Plaintiff’s recovery is; nor is the cost shifting provision conditioned upon the losing party’s age. Plaintiff has cited no authority for the position that the financial disparities ofthe parties must be considered in determining the reasonableness of charges incurred and awardable to prevailing party. Most notably, it was Plaintiff, not Defendants, who rejected a very generous offer of $50,001 to settle the lawsuit, and instead insisted on bringing this matter to trial. As a result, Defendants were then forced to incur significant costs in defending their position at trial. Plaintiff should not now benefit in terms of having to pay reduced costs for pursuing this lawsuit and bringing this matter to trial. Accordingly, Plaintiff, not Defendants, should bear the consequences incurred for Defendants’ costs pursuant to Code ofCivil Procedure § 1033.5. (Decla. LaScola, 19.) IV. CONCLUSION Defendants realize that resolving a disputed Memorandum of Costs after any civiltrial is a painstaking and laborious task. The burden here, however,is on Plaintiff, and he has failed to present any sufficient evidence to challenge the Memorandum and the requested costs therein. Defendants are seeking from the Court an award of costs totaling $37,850. Based upon the foregoing, Defendants respectfully request that the Motion be denied,in its entirety, taking into account the concession as to Item no. 16. Dated: July 13, 2018 FORD, WALKER, HAGGERTY & BEHAR ~~ STEPHENW. MOORE MARK P. LASCOLA Attorneys for Defendants, DAVID ELLIS CROFTON AND SANDRA CROFTON 002\16\260\Trial Docs\Pltf Motion to Tax Costs.Opposition.docx 8 DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE AND/OR TAX COSTS;MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION OF COUNSEL O O 0 N a O N n t A W N = B N N D N N N N N N e m he m e m b m e m e m e m p m e e W W N N n n A W N = , O Y 0 N N Y R W N m o DECLARATION OF MARK P. LASCOLA I, Mark P. LaScola, do state and declare as follows: 1. I'am an attorney licensed to practice law before all courts of the State of California, and am a Senior Counsel with the law firm of Ford, Walker, Haggerty & Behar, counsel of record in the above-entitled matter for Defendants, DAVID ELLIS CROFTON and SANDRA CROFTON (collectively “Defendants™). 2. Thefacts set forth herein are true and correct and are within my personal knowledge, and if called as a witness, I could and would testify competently thereto. 3. Based upon information and belief, this case arises out of a three-vehicle and one motorcycle rear-end accident on the west-bound 22 Freeway near the Magnolia Street off-ramp, on April 2, 2015. Plaintiff, BRYAN PEREZ (“Plaintiff”) claims to have sustained injuries arising from the subject accident, and sought recovery ofthese alleged damages from Defendants at trial. On March 20, 2018, the jury returned a verdict that awarded Plaintiff $7,500 in damages. 4 Plaintiff’s Motion initially makes the unsupportable claim that the Code ofCivil Procedure § 998 offer was invalid. Notably, Plaintiff does not deny that he did not accept the offer, and does not claim that his failure to accept the offer was based on any misunderstanding. Further, there also is no dispute that Plaintiff's counsel did not call Defendant’s counsel to express a willingness to accept, but for a claim that the offer was somehow “invalid” as written. The reason is that Plaintiff made a conscious decision to force all parties to incur costs to try this case in hopes of recovering more than the $50,001. Now that he has failed to do so, he is disingenuously trying to claim that the settlement offer was ambiguous, as he “was left to speculate to the exact release Plaintiff would be signed if he accepted Defendant’s purported C.C.P. § 998 offer.” 5. Section 1033.5(a)(3) allows for recovery ofcosts for necessary depositions. Even Plaintiff acknowledgesthat the seven identified depositions were for “Plaintiff’s experts,treating physicians, and police officer from the scene of the incident ... .” (See, Motion, p. 10, In. 1-3 J) Outside of Plaintiff himself there can be no more “necessary” category than those identified individuals. On behalf of Defendants, we would note that these are limited in their scope, excluding (often, unnecessary) videotaping and travel-related fees. Simply sought are the costs for 9 DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE AND/OR TAX COSTS;MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION OF COUNSEL N O 0 0 1 O N n h B R O W N ) e a N D N N N N N N N N m r m h m e m b m ee t e m p a © N A b w R O Y N N N R A W O N - , o o taking (only 2 of which are above $1,000) and transcribing (all of which are under $1,000). These are the very definition of “reasonable” under Code ofCivil Procedure § 1033.5(a)(3). In light of both the expired Section 998 offer and those who were individuals deposed, the $7,932 must be allowed by the Court. 6. Defendants’ Section 998 Offer was served on August 11, 2017. In the portions of the transcript attached to Plaintiffs Motion, Dr. Karlin states that he wasretained in September 2017, i.e., post-Offer. As for the “reasonableness” of his work,the $12,388 was definitely reasonable in light of the fact that a statutory settlement offer of $50,001 had just expired. 7. Nothing in Plaintiff’s Motion qualifies beyond the fact that four-figure bills were incurred for record review by Dr. Weinstein; again, with the expiration ofa statutory settlement offer of $50,001, my firm and Defendants wanted to make certain that Dr. Weinstein was appropriately prepared to testify on the alleged injuries sustained by Plaintiff. A figure of $16,469 is quite reasonable under the circumstances. 8. Defendants concede that the costs sought for Item no. 16 should be borne by them and not passed to Plaintiff. 9. Code ofCivil Procedure § 998 clearly sets forth the potential consequences of a plaintiff who rejects a defendant’s Section 998 offer and fails to obtain a more favorable judgment at trial. Those consequences include having to pay the costs of Defendants’ experts, no matter how minimal Plaintiff’s recovery is; noris the cost shifting provision conditioned upon the losing party’s age. Plaintiff has cited no authority for the position that the financial disparities of the parties must be considered in determining the reasonableness of charges incurred and awardable to prevailing party. Most notably, it was Plaintiff and his counsel, not Defendants and their counsel, who rejected a very generous offer of $50,001 to settle the lawsuit, and instead insisted on bringing this matter to trial. As a result, my firm and Defendants were then forced to incur significant costs in defending our position at trial. Plaintiff should not now benefitin terms of having to pay reduced costs for pursuing this lawsuit and bringing this matter to trial. Accordingly, Plaintiff, not Defendants, should bear the consequences incurred for Defendants’ costs pursuant to Code ofCivil Procedure § 1033.5. 10 DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE AND/OR TAX COSTS;MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION OF COUNSEL WO W 0 2 3 O O W n H W R D e e B N N D O N N D O N N D N N m e e m oe m e m e m g e oe m a © N N R W N D = O W e R A W O N Rm , o o I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed this 13th day of July, 2018, at Long Beach, California. Mark P. LaScola- Declarant 11 DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE AND/OR TAX COSTS;MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION OF COUNSEL O o © 3 A N U 1 B A W N N N N N D N N N N m e m m m p s e a pe a e m e a e m p e PROOF OF SERVICE PEREZ VS. CROFTON 00216-260 STATE OF CALIFORNIA ) ) ss. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES ) I am employed in the aforesaid county; I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within entitled action; my business address is: One World Trade Center, Twenty-Seventh Floor, Long Beach, California 90831-2700 On July 13, 2018, I served the within: DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE AND/OR TAX COSTS; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION OF MARK P. LASCOLA IN SUPPORT on the interested parties in said action, SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST __ (BY MAIL) Iam readily familiar with the firm's practice of collecting and processing of documents and correspondence for mailing with the United States Postal Service. Under that practice, on the above date the envelope was sealed and placed for collection and mailing following the ordinary business practices of our office. This results in the envelope being delivered to the United States Postal Service in Long Beach, California, that same day, with postage thereon fully prepaid. -_ (BY FACSIMILE) Via facsimile from machine number (562) 590-35 I transmitted by facsimile machine true copies of the foregoing described document on the attorneys of record in this action at the facsimile machine telephone numbers shown, pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 2009(). _X__ (BY OVERNIGHT MAIL) I am readily familiar with the firm’s practice of collecting and processing of documents and correspondence for mailing with Federal Express. Underthat practice, on the above date, the Federal Express envelope was sealed and placed for collection and mailing following the ordinary business practices of our office. This results in the Federal Express envelope being delivered to the Federal Express box at the One World Trade Center, Long Beach, premises, with a Federal Express Airbill thereon. (BY ELECTRONIC SERVICE - EMAIL) I caused a true copy ofthe foregoing document(s) to be transmitted by email to each ofthe parties designated herein and as last given by that person on any document which he or she has filed in this action and served upon this office. Executed on July 13, 2018, at Long Beach, California. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct, (/Any DAMg AmyDeVore J 1 PROOF OF SERVICE O O 00 0 O N hh BA W R N N N N N N N N O N m m m e m pe t e m e m b d e m m a p e « 0 3 A W n B R W N = O N D N O N R W N D MAILING SERVICE LIST Gary L. Chambers, Esq. CHAMBERS & NORONHA 2070 N. Tustin Avenue Santa Ana, California 92705 (714) 558-1400; (714) 558-0885 Fax PEREZ VS. CROFTON 00216-260 2 PROOF OF SERVICE