Laura M. Knox vs. Bluffs Homeowners Community association

Reply to Opposition

Cal. Super. - 4th Dist.July 11, 2016

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 HORTON, OBERRECHT, KIRKPATRICK & MARTHA Cheryl A. Kirkpatrick, Esq. (SBN 149906) Fang Li, Esq. (SBN 250464) 2 Park Plaza, Suite 440 Irvine, CA 92614 PH: (949) 251-5100 FX: (949) 251-5104 ELECTROMICALLY FILED Superior Court of Califarnia, County of Orange 07/13/2018 at 05:32:00 PM Clerk of the Superior Court By & Clerk, Deputy Clerk Attorneys for Defendant, Bluffs Homeowners” Community Association SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF ORANGE — CENTRAL JUSTICE CENTER LAURA M. KNOX, Individually and as TRUSTEE OF THE LAURA M. KNOX REVOCABLE TRUST DATED DECEMBER 26, 2003, and SCOTT RAPHAEL, Plaintiffs, v. BLUFFS HOMEOWNERS’ COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION, A California Nonprofit Corporation Defendants. CASE NO. 30-2016-00862692 ASSIGNED FOR ALL PURPOSES TO: Judge: Hon. Deborah Servino Department: C21 DEFENDANT BLUFFS HOMEOWNERS’ COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION’S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF LAURA M. KNOX, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS TRUSTEE OF THE LAURA M. KNOX TRUST DATED DECEMBER 26, 2003’S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TAX COSTS Date: July 20, 2018 Time: 10:00 a.m. Dept.: C21 Reservation No.: 72820280 Complaint Filed: Trial Date: July 11, 2016 April 2, 2018 TO THE COURT, ALL PARTIES, AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD: Defendant Bluffs Homeowners’ Community Association (“Association”) hereby submits its Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Reply of Plaintiff Laura M. Knox, individually and as trustee of the Laura M. Knox Revocable Trust Dated December 26, 2003’s (“Knox”) Opposition to Motion to Strike Costs, or in the alternative, Motion to Tax Costs as follows: DEFENDANT’S REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TAX COSTS OF PLAINTIFF LAURA KNOX 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 1. PLAINTIFF CONCEDES THAT SHE FILED THE MEMORANDUM OF COSTS PREMATURELY BY FAILING TO ADDRESS IT IN HER OPPOSITION Knox does not dispute that she filed her May 9, 2018 memorandum of costs prematurely because it was filed before the judgment was entered on June 12, 2018. Therefore, the Court should strike her memorandum of costs in its entirety. See Boonyarit v. Payless Shoesource (2006) 145 Cal. App.4™ 1188, 1192 (defendant was not entitled to prejudgment costs since it filed its memorandum of costs before any judgment of dismissal had been entered). In addition, Knox’s memorandum of costs is premature because the Court has yet to rule on the Association’s motion for attorney’s fees currently scheduled on August 10, 2018. As the Court is aware, the Association contends that it was the prevailing party with respect to attorneys’ fees given that it prevailed on all of Knox’s breach and enforcement of CC&Rs claims. Should the Court find that the Association is the prevailing party under the attorney’s fees provision of Article XVIII Section 9, is will have a net judgment against Knox for purposes of the prevailing party determination with respect to costs (including Knox’s Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) §998 costs). See CCP §1717(c). Again, CCP § 1717(c) provides: “(c) In an action which seeks relief in addition to that based on a contract, if the party prevailing on the contract has damages awarded against it on causes of action not on the contract, the amounts awarded to the party prevailing on the contract under this section shall be deducted from any damages awarded in favor of the party who did not prevail on the contract. If the amount awarded under this section exceeds the amount of damages awarded the party not prevailing on the contract, the net amount shall be awarded the party prevailing on the contract and judgment may be entered in favor of the party prevailing on the contract for that net amount.” Civil Code § 1717(c)(emphasis added). Based on Civil Code § 1717(c), the Court must determine whether the Association is entitled to its attorney’s fees for prevailing on Knox’s contract claims before making a finding of prevailing party with respect to costs. As such, any resolution of Knox’s costs bill should be stayed until the Court determines whether the Association is the prevailing party with respect to attorney’s fees. However, if the Court is inclined to award Knox's her costs at this juncture, the Association believes that Knox’s costs bill should be stricken or taxed as discussed in more detail below. 2 DEFENDANT’S REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TAX COSTS OF PLAINTIFF LAURA KNOX 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 2 THE COURT SHOULD APPORTION THE COSTS RELATED TO KNOX AND RAPHAEL EVEN IF KNOX VOLUNTARILY PAID FOR RAPHAEL’S SHARE OF COSTS When a prevailing party has incurred costs jointly with one or more other parties who are not prevailing parties for purposes of an award of costs, the judge must apportion the costs between the parties based on the reason the costs were incurred and whether they were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation by the jointly represented party who prevailed. See Charton v. Harkey (2016) 247 Cal. App.4™ 730, 743-44; Ducoing Management, Inc. v. Superior Court (2015) 234 Cal. App.4" 306. Knox claims that she alone paid for the costs in her cost memorandum.' Therefore, she claims she is entitled to recover all of those costs. However, the costs in Knox’s cost memorandum reflect those of Knox and Raphael in the prosecution of their case against the Association. The fact that Knox elected to front the costs for both herself and Raphael does not support her claim that she should recover Raphael’s portion of the costs. Simply, Knox’s benevolent decision to pay for Raphael’s costs shows it was not reasonably necessary to the conduct of ker litigation pursuant to CCP §1033.5(c)(2). With respect to filing and motion fees, almost all filed papers were filed on behalf of both Knox and Raphael. Focusing on the larger cost items, the motions to compel written discovery, motion for protective order, motion for summary adjudication and motions in limine were filed on behalf of both Knox and Raphael. (See Li Decl. {[2). In addition, all of the jury fees, deposition costs, service of process, expert witness fees and court reporter fees were incurred by both Knox and Raphael. These costs were all common costs that were incurred by both Knox and Raphael in their prosecution of their claims. Knox has not presented any evidence that the “reason the costs were incurred” were based solely on her prosecution of her case against the Association. See Charton, 247 Cal. App.4" at 743-44. If Knox and Raphael were not husband and wife, she would not have solely incurred those costs. Indeed, Raphael should have paid his fair share of those costs and Knox’s voluntary payment of those entire costs is not dispositive of whether she should recover all of those costs. Had the case turned out differently in which Raphael prevailed whereas Knox did not, Raphael would have filed a memorandum ! While Knox represents that she alone paid all costs, she has not provided any invoices or other supporting documents showing that fact. Her continued refusal to provide those supporting documents suggests that she did not solely incur those costs. 3 DEFENDANT’S REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TAX COSTS OF PLAINTIFF LAURA KNOX 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 of costs regardless of whether he actually paid for those costs. See Charton, 247 Cal. App.4™ 730, 739 (holding that costs may be awarded to a prevailing party if the costs are incurred, whether or not paid). 3 THE COURT SHOULD APPORTION THE COSTS RELATED TO THE OTHER DEFENDANT FIRST SERVICE RESIDENTIAL CALIFORNIA, INC. WHO WAS DISMISSED FOR A WAIVER OF COSTS If items appearing in the cost bill appear to be proper charges, the burden is on the party seeking to tax costs to show that they were not reasonable or necessary; however, if items are properly objected to, they are put in issue and the burden of proof is on the party claiming them as costs. Sanford v. Rasnick (2016) 246 Cal. App.4™ 1121. The mere filing of a motion to tax costs may be a “proper objection” to an item. Nelson v. Anderson (1999) 72 Cal. App.4" 111, 131. In this case, the Association properly objected to Knox’s costs because the costs related to prosecuting the claim against First Service Residential California, Inc. (“First Service”) were not apportioned. Knox filed this action on July 11, 2016 against the Association and First Service. Knox did not dismiss First Service for a waiver of costs until shortly before the first trial date on January 2, 2018. Even though the Association objected to costs related to First Service (during the approximately 17 months that it was involved in this litigation), Knox never presented any evidence that the costs claimed were not related to her prosecution of claims against First Service. As such, Knox has not met her burden to show that her costs are appropriate (i.e., not costs related to First Service) and therefore the Court should strike all of her costs submitted in this case. Knox’s relies on Fundamental Inv. Etc. Realty Fund v. Gradow (1994) 28 Cal. App.4™ 966 to support her claim here; however, the case actually undermines her claim. In Fundamental, the plaintiff filed an action against several defendants. Id. at 969. At trial, plaintiff only prevailed against one of the defendants while the others prevailed on motions for nonsuit. Id. at 970. The prevailing defendants filed memorandums of costs against plaintiff which were stricken entirely by the trial court. Id. at 974. The appeals court in Fundamental affirmed because the prevailing defendants did not request any specific apportionment of costs in the trial court. Id. The prevailing defendants’ cost memorandum did not differentiate between costs incurred by the non-prevailing defendant and the prevailing defendants. 4 DEFENDANT’S REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TAX COSTS OF PLAINTIFF LAURA KNOX 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Id. Therefore, Fundamental found that the prevailing defendants were not entitled to their costs. Id. at 073, Similarly, in Fennessy v. Deleuw (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1192, plaintiff filed a wrongful termination action against six defendants who were all represented by the same law firm. Id. at 1194. One of those defendants prevailed on summary judgment and sought costs. Id. Plaintiff filed a motion to tax costs because the costs claimed had been incurred collectively by all defendants. Id. The trial court rejected this argument and awarded the costs of the one prevailing defendant. Id. at 1194-1195. The appeals court in Fennessy reversed the trial court and held that the plaintiff met his burden to dispute the validity of the claimed costs when he challenged all costs by arguing that they should be apportioned among all six defendants. Id. at 1195. Fennessey noted that costs should be apportioned and then remanded the case so the defendant can show that the costs should not be apportioned. Id. at 1196-1197. Similar to the prevailing defendants in Fundamental and Fennessey, Knox’s (the alleged prevailing party here) cost memorandum failed to differentiate her costs versus those of Raphael as a non-prevailing party. She also failed to differentiate costs incurred against the Association and First Service. Therefore, the Court should deny all of Knox's costs due to her failure to appropriately apportion her costs. 4. INDIVIDUAL ITEMS TO BE TAXED A. Filing and Motion Fees As discussed above, Knox fails to meet her burden to show her filing and motion fees are properly attributable to the Association. Specifically, she fails to meet her burden that these costs were not incurred by Raphael or incurred against First Service. Therefore, the Court should strike these costs in its entirety. At the very least, the Court should tax these costs based on a reasonable apportionment of] those costs to Raphael and First Service. In addition, Knox fails to meet her burden to apportion those costs related to her causes of action for which she did not prevail including the breach of CC&Rs cause of action. These costs should be apportioned because they were not necessary for the cause of action for which she did prevail (breach of fiduciary duty). 3 DEFENDANT’S REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TAX COSTS OF PLAINTIFF LAURA KNOX 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 B. Jury Fees As discussed above, jury fees should be apportioned as between Knox and Raphael. Knox has not met her burden to show that the jury fees are costs solely attributed to her. Indeed, Raphael’s claims for trespass, nuisance and negligence were all tried before the jury. Knox cannot dispute this fact. Therefore, the Court should tax these costs in its entirety. At the very least, the Court should tax these costs based on a reasonable apportionment of these costs to Raphael. C. Deposition Costs Knox's costs for taking the depositions of witnesses that were not necessary to her breach of fiduciary duty claim (i.e., regarding how the Association handled her property damages claims) should be taxed in its entirety. Knox does not even address this issue in her opposition. As the Court is aware, the bulk of Knox’s claims against the Association was based on a breach of CC&Rs cause of action. Specifically, Knox claimed that the Association breached the CC&Rs for its failure to properly maintain, repair and replace the common area sewer lateral that caused the July 11, 2014 toilet overflow event. However, the jury found that the Association did not breach any provisions of the CC&Rs. Therefore, all costs for deposing witnesses related to the breach of CC&Rs cause of action were not necessary and should be taxed. Knox does not dispute that the deposition costs related to Roy Helsing, Tom Unvert, Kimberly Nielsen, Mark Hopkins or Javier Ramirez were all related to Knox’s breach of CC&Rs claims. None of the above witnesses were necessary to prove how the Association handled Knox’s property damages claims in which the jury awarded damages. Unvert was not even a board member when Knox’s property damage claim was denied in June 2014. As a mere homeowner, Unvert had no control over whether to approve or deny Knox’s property damage claim. In addition, Nielsen was not even the Associations’ general manager at that time and therefore had no role in approving or denying Knox’s property damage claim. Hopkins did not even buy into the community until September 2015 which was after Knox’s property damage claim was denied. Finally, Ramirez was the on-site maintenance worker that would have only testified that he is not aware of any maintenance or repair of Knox’s sewer lateral prior to her July 11, 2014 sewer lateral event. As a maintenance person, he had no role in approving or denying Knox’s property damage claim. Clearly, this testimony only bears on the issue of whether the 6 DEFENDANT’S REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TAX COSTS OF PLAINTIFF LAURA KNOX 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Association breached its obligations under the CC&Rs to maintain and repair Knox’s sewer lateral. Because Knox has not shown how these depositions were necessary to her breach of fiduciary duty cause of action, the costs related to these depositions should be taxed in its entirety. D. Service of Process Even though the Association challenged Knox’s costs related to service of process based on necessity and reasonableness in amount, she nevertheless failed to produce any invoices related to the service of process costs. A prevailing party’s verified cost bill for service of deposition and trial subpoenas is insufficient to establish the necessity and reasonableness of the service costs, where the memorandum of costs did not state how the subpoenas were served. Nelson v. Anderson (1999) 72 Cal. App.4" 111, 132 (noting that whether and in what amount the expenses for service of process are allowed depends upon who served the process and what amount is allowed to a public officer in this state for such service). Here, Knox’s memorandum of costs does not show how the subpoenas were served. Therefore, her memorandum of costs was insufficient to establish necessity and reasonableness of the costs and the Court should strike the entire $1,105 in costs. E. Expert Witness Fees In the event that the Court finds that Knox is entitled to her expert fees from beating her CCP §998 offer, the Court should strike or tax costs related to those expert fees. Notably, Knox does not produce any invoices from her experts to support her entitlement to those costs. Knox refused to do so even though the Association had raised the reasonableness and necessity of the expert fees in its motion to tax costs. Initially, Knox’s mold expert Joe Spurgeon apparently billed 35.2 hours at $400 per hour for this case. The Association concedes that Spurgeon’s testimony was instrumental in Knox prevailing on her breach for fiduciary duty cause of action and the damages awarded to her. However, because Knox failed to produce Spurgeon’s invoices to show what services he actually performed in this case, neither the Association nor the Court can determine whether the fees are reasonable in amount or necessary in the conduct of this litigation. For this reason alone, the Court should strike Spurgeon’s fees in its entirety. 1" 7 DEFENDANT’S REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TAX COSTS OF PLAINTIFF LAURA KNOX 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 With respect Knox’s general contractor experts Mark DeVay and Brian Foster, the Association cannot deny that their bids/estimates impacted the jury’s award. The jury presumably issued its property damage award to Knox based on DeVay and Foster’s bids/estimates. However, it was simply not necessary for Knox to designate them as experts (and pay them as experts) in this case. Knox could have easily called them as percipient witnesses to authenticate their estimates/bids and achieved her goal to show that she had three legitimate and reasonable estimates/bids for repairs to her property damages. With respect to Knox's real estate expert Aaron Aftergood, there is simply no showing that his services were necessary in this case. Knox argues that Aftergood’s testimony that the homes within the Association are worth north of a million dollars was necessary to the punitive damages award and to impeach witness testimony that the Association simply did not have several millions of dollars to make repairs of all sewer laterals in the community. This argument has no merit. Indeed, the jury’s punitive damages award was based on the amount of money in the Association’s reserves and not the value of the individual homes in the community. Further, Knox only solicited testimony from Aftergood to show that the homeowners in million dollar homes could afford a special assessment to immediately repair all sewer laterals in the community to comply with the CC&Rs. Again, Knox did not prevail on her cause of action for breach of the CC&Rs. Therefore, Aftergood’s services were not necessary for the portion of the litigation in which she prevailed — namely, her breach of fiduciary duty cause of action on how the Association handled her property damage claim. Finally, with respect to Knox’s HOA standard of care expert Barry Ross, she again failed to provide any supporting documents regarding the description of services performed in this case. Ross apparently invoiced 54.7 hours at $400 per hour. However, because Knox failed to produce Ross’ invoices to show what services he actually performed in this case, neither the Association nor the Court can determine whether the fees are reasonable in amount or necessary in the conduct of this litigation. For this reason alone, the Court should strike Ross’ fees in its entirety. In addition, Knox admits that she never called Ross to testify at trial. Knox misrepresents that Ross was prevented from testifying due to the testimony of the Association’s general contractor Mike Brown. Knox intentionally chose not to call Ross to testify that day. Knox could have called Ross to 8 DEFENDANT’S REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TAX COSTS OF PLAINTIFF LAURA KNOX 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 testify before the Association opened their defense of the case but strategically held him back. (See Li Decl. 3). Contrary to Knox’s assertions, the Association provided Ross’ deposition testimony to show that he mostly relied on Raphael in support of his opinions. Yet, Knox argues that Ross’ services was instrumental in assisting Knox with reviewing exhibits, preparing jury instructions, and helping with cross examination of witnesses. These are merely attorney services provided to Knox. These are not expert services to proffer opinions regarding the standard of care of homeowners associations that Ross was retained and paid to provide. It is interesting that Knox will not provide any of Ross’ invoices to show that Ross in fact performed those services. Nevertheless, Knox cannot show that Ross’ services were necessary to the conduct of litigation and not merely convenient or beneficial to the litigation. See CCP §1033.5(c)(2). Finally, if the Court awards Knox’s costs for expert fees, the expert fees should be apportioned to take into account Raphael’s claims. Knox argues that all of the expert testimony related exclusively to the breach of CC&Rs and/or her property damage claims. Therefore, Knox argues that Raphael received no benefit from the expert testimony. This is incorrect. Raphael’s alleged three causes of action for negligence, trespass, and nuisance. All of these causes of action require a finding on the reasonableness of the Association’s conduct in causing the July 11, 2014 toilet overflow which resulted in Raphael’s damages. Indeed, Raphael attempted to prove that the Association breached the CC&Rs (and therefore breached a duty of reasonable care) in failing to properly maintain and repair Knox's sewer lateral. A close look at Raphael’s cause of action for nuisance is replete with allegations of breach of CC&Rs. (See Plaintiffs’ FAC at pages 16-23). The expert testimony of Helsing, Ross and Aftergood all related to the reasonableness of the Association’s actions in maintaining and repairing Knox's sewer laterals. In addition, the expert testimony of Knox’s general contractor experts DeVay, Foster and Bob Reed regarding their estimates/bids as well as Knox’s mold expert Spurgeon regarding the presence of mold showed the severity of the condition which impacted Raphael’s general damages claim. Therefore, Raphael benefited from the testimony of the experts and Knox’s expert costs should therefore be apportioned to reflect that. 1" 9 DEFENDANT’S REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TAX COSTS OF PLAINTIFF LAURA KNOX 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 F. Court Reporter Fees The Association concedes that the per diem cost for having a court reporter present at the trial is recoverable. See CCP §1033.5(a)(11); Government Code §68086(a); California Rules of Court, Rule 2.965(c)). However, the transcript fees themselves are a separate matter from fees for the court reporter’s presence at trial. Chaaban v. Wet Seal, Inc. (2012) 203 Cal. App.4" 49, 58. Transcription fees are not recoverable if the transcripts were not ordered by the Court. Id. Here, Knox fails to provide any of the invoices for the court reporter that could differentiate the court reporter fees to be present at trial and the court reporter fees for transcripts. Without the invoices, the Association cannot determine if the entire $16,335.47 is recoverable. Therefore, without this information, the Court should strike the entire court reporter fees because Knox has failed to sufficiently provide the backup for the court reporter fees. G. Models, Enlargements and Photocopies of Exhibits Knox is entitled to costs for models, enlargement of exhibits and photocopies of exhibits ... if they were reasonably helpful to aid the trier of fact. CCP § 1033.5(a)(13). It is within the discretion of the trial court to deny a prevailing plaintiff’s request to recover photocopying expenses even if the expenses were incurred to comply with a court order. See Gorman v. Tassaiara Development Corp. (2009) 178 Cal. App.4" 44. Here, Knox still does not provide any backup documents to support the $716.82 in claimed copy costs related to trial exhibits and binders. Knox seeks costs related to models, enlargements, and photocopies of exhibits in the amount of $716.82. However, Knox failed to provide any backup documentation to support these costs. Without the backup, the Association cannot determine whether this item of costs is reasonably necessary or reasonable in amount. 3. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, the Association respectfully request that the Court strike Knox’s costs in its entirety or, in the alternative, tax at a minimum $77.070.44 in costs. DATED: July 13, 2018 HORTON, OBERRECHT, KIRKPATRICK & MARTHA IAD Cheryl A. Kirkpatrick Fang Li Attorneys for Bluffs Homeowners Community Association By: 10 DEFENDANT’S REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TAX COSTS OF PLAINTIFF LAURA KNOX 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 DECLARATION OF FANG LI I, Fang Li, declare as follows: I. I am over the age of twenty-one (21) and am competent to make this declaration. I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth herein, except as to those stated on information and belief and, as to those, I am informed and believe them to be true. If called as a witness, I could and would competently testify to the matters stated herein. I make this declaration in support of the Defendant Bluffs Homeowners Community Association’s (“Association”) motion to tax costs submitted by Plaintiff Laura M. Knox, individually and as trustee of the Laura M. Knox Revocable Trust Dated December 26, 2003 (“Knox”). 2 I have reviewed the filing fees claimed by Knox in her costs bill including motions to compel written discovery, motion for protective order, motion for summary adjudication and motions in limine. Ihave confirmed that these motions were all filed on behalf of both Knox and Scott Raphael (“Raphael”) jointly. 3. On April 18, 2018, Knox’s expert Barry Ross was waiting all day to testify in this case. At approximately 3:50 p.m., Ross was ready to testify but Knox decided not to start his testimony given that he may not be back to finish his testimony. Knox could have called Ross as a witness before the Association called its expert Mike Brown (general contractor expert) at around 10:45 a.m. However, Knox allowed Brown to start the defense case even though Ross was waiting to testify. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed this 13th day of July, 2018, at Irvine, California. Fang Li 11 DEFENDANT’S REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TAX COSTS OF PLAINTIFF LAURA KNOX 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 PROOF OF SERVICE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF ORANGE I am employed in the County of Orange, State of California. Iam over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action. My business address is: HORTON, OBERRECHT, KIRKPATRICK & MARTHA, 2 Park Plaza, Suite 440, Irvine, California 92614. On July 13, 2018, I served the foregoing document described as: Defendant Bluffs Homeowners’ Community Association’s Reply to Plaintiff Laura M. Knox, Individually and as Trustee of the Laura M. Knox Trust Dated December 26, 2003s Opposition to Motion to Strike, or in the Alternative, Tax Costs; on all interested parties in this action by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in sealed envelopes addressed as stated on the attached service list: [] BY MAIL — I deposited such envelope in the mail at Irvine, California. The envelope was mailed with postage thereon fully prepaid. I am “readily familiar” with the firm’s practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with the U.S. Postal Service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid at Irvine, California in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than (1) day after the date of deposit for mailing in affidavit. [] BY PERSONAL SERVICE - I caused such envelope to be delivered by a process server employed by [name of process server]. [1] VIA FACSIMILE - I faxed said document, to the office(s) of the addressee(s) shown above, and the transmission was reported as complete and without error. [ X] BY ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION - I transmitted a PDF version of this document by electronic mail to the party(s) identified on the attached service list using the e-mail address(es) indicated. [] BY OVERNIGHT DELIVERY - I deposited such envelope for collection and delivery by Federal Express with delivery fees paid or provided for in accordance with ordinary business practices. Iam “readily familiar” with the firm’s practice of collection and processing packages for overnight delivery by Federal Express. They are deposited with a facility regularly maintained by Federal Express for receipt on the same day in the ordinary course of business. [ X] (State) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct. Executed on July 13, 2018, at Irvine, California. Metita Mireya Villanueva 12 DEFENDANT’S REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TAX COSTS OF PLAINTIFF LAURA KNOX 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Knox et al. v. The Bluffs HCA OCSC 30-2016-00862692 SERVICE LIST Laura M. Knox, Esq. THE KNOX-RAPHAEL LAW FIRM 9210 Irvine Center Dr Irvine, CA 92618-466 Tel: (949) 660-1609 Fax: (949) 660-1647 Email: lknox @knoxraphael-law.com Attorneys for Plaintiff LAURA M. KNOX, individually and as TRUSTEE OF THE LAURA M. KNOX REVOCABLE TRUST DATED DECEMBER 26, 2003 Jerry M. Gans, Esq. GANS & ROSENFIELD, LLP 155 N. Riverview Drive Anaheim, CA 92808 Tel: (714) 838-0654 Fax: (714) 838-1596 Email: jngesq @att.net Attorneys for Plaintiff LAURA M. KNOX, individually and as TRUSTEE OF THE LAURA M. KNOX REVOCABLE TRUST DATED DECEMBER 26, 2003 Scott D. Raphael 9210 Irvine Center Drive Irvine, CA 92618 Tel: 949-263-4923 Fax: 949-263-4925 Email: sraph94446 @msn.com Attorney for In Pro Per 13 DEFENDANT’S REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TAX COSTS OF PLAINTIFF LAURA KNOX