Laurence Harper vs. Raul Najera Lopez

Motion in Limine

Cal. Super. - 4th Dist.April 13, 2016

A I T K E N 4 A I T K E N 4+ C O H N 3 M A C A R T H U R P L A C E , SU IT E 80 0 S S OO 0 N N N nn B R E W ND = -_- e d e d e a A N Wn R A W ND = 71 4- 43 4- 14 24 71 4- 43 4- 36 00 F A C S I M I L E S A N T A A N A , C A 92 70 7 Do NO No No No NS ) No -_ -_ -_ aN Wn E S Ww No - = O 0 J No ~ 28 £2 PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER ELECTRONICALLY FILED ATTICUS N. WEGMAN, ESQ. (SBN 273496) Superior Court of California, AITKEN 4 AITKEN 4 COHN County of Orange 3 MACARTHUR PLACE, SUITE 800 06ME 2018 at 02:00:00 A P.O. BOX 2555 . Clerk of the Superior Court (714) 434-1424/(714) 434-3600 FAX Attorneys for Plaintiffs LAURENCE HARPER and MICHAELYN MILOSEVICH-HARPER SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF ORANGE, CENTRAL JUSTICE CENTER LAURENCE HARPER, an individual; CASE NO: 30-2016-00846007 MICHAELYN MILOSEVICH-HARPER, an [Hon. Theodore Howard, Dept. C18] individual; Co Patni, PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION IN LIMINE VS. NO. 8 RE MEDICARE AND THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE; RAUL NAJERA LOPEZ, an individual; [PROPOSED|[ ORDER CAPISTRANO FORD, a business organization, form unknown; DOES 1 to 10, inclusive; Trial Date: May 7, 2018 Time: 9:00 a.m. Dept.: C18 Defendants. Complaint Filed: 4/13/16 AND RELATED CROSS-ACTIONS. N r ’ N r ’ N r ’ N r ’ N e ” N a e N e ” N e ” N e N e N e N e N e N e N e N e N e TO THE HONORABLE COURT, ALL PARTIES AND TO THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD: PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Plaintiffs will move the Court for issuance of the following order relating to Motion in Limine No. 8: An order precluding Defendants’ counsel and its witnesses from introducing improper collateral source evidence including future Medicare health insurance coverage; An order requiring the attorneys for all parties to instruct their witnesses of the court's 1 PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 8 RE MEDICARE AND THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE; [PROPOSED] ORDER A I T K E N 4 A I T K E N + C O H N 3 M A C A R T H U R P L A C E , S U I T E 80 0 OS OO 0 N N N n n RE W N a a (© ) 71 4- 43 4- 14 24 71 4- 43 4- 36 00 F A C S I M I L E S A N T A A N A , C A 92 70 7 D O NO no No NO No ND - - -_ ©) Wn H wo No - = Oo 0 J No J 28 £2 PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER exclusionary order on this motion; and An order requiring the attorney for Defendants, prior to making any references, comments, or assertions concerning such matters, to approach the bench and make an offer of proof to the court so that the court, prior to any presentation of the above-referenced evidence to the jury, can make a preliminary determination of the relevancy and admissibility thereof. This motion is based on this Notice, the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the Declaration of Atticus N. Wegman, the complete file maintained by the Court in this action, and all such other oral and documentary evidence as may be presented at the time of hearing on this motion. Dated: June 15,2018 AITKEN4AITKEN4 COHN ATTICUSQL WEGMAN, ESQ. Attorneys for Plaintiffs 2 PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 8 RE MEDICARE AND THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE; [PROPOSED| ORDER A I T K E N 4 A I T K E N + C O H N 3 M A C A R T H U R P L A C E , SU IT E 80 0 S O 0 NN O N n n B A L I N = -_ = = = e m e a A A WL» Br W N = 71 4- 43 4- 14 24 71 4- 43 4- 36 00 F A C S I M I L E S A N T A A N A , C A 92 70 7 No [N S] N o NS ) N o No No - -_- -_ - aN wh 55 . wD No - c= ] \O c o a No ~ 28 £2 PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES I. INTRODUCTION On December 7, 2015, around 2:00 p.m., Plaintiff Mr. Laurence Harper was traveling alone in his four-door sedan on his way to his house on Camino Capistrano Boulevard in San Juan Capistrano, Ca. There are four lanes of travel on Camino Capistrano Boulevard, two Northbound lanes and two Southbound lanes, separated by an open median. Plaintiff Mr. Harper was traveling Southbound in the slow lane. Without any warning or ability to take evasive action, Defendant Raul Lopez, working for his employer Defendant Tuttle Click Capistrano Ford, Inc., entered into Plaintiff Mr. Harper’s lane of travel as he negotiated a left turn onto Camino Capistrano Boulevard from the Tuttle Click Capistrano Ford, Inc. car dealership. Both vehicles collided, and Plaintiff Mr. Harper sustained major injuries to his neck (requiring fusion surgery), back (requiring fusion surgery), left shoulder (requiring surgery), right shoulder (requiring surgery), and minor injuries to his right wrist and right foot. Defendant Mr. Lopez and Defendant Tuttle Click Capistrano Ford, admit they were partially negligent, but dispute the nature and extent of Plaintiffs’ harms and losses. 3 PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 8 RE MEDICARE AND THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE; [PROPOSED| ORDER -_ - 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 : 13 EE, 55g $a (fag EmdxE “x%33 16 +2427 LEER 2g5 3 U7 Ea “2 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 €2 PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER Defendants Mr. Lopez and Tuttle Click Capistrano Ford and Plaintiffs Mr. Harper and Mrs. Harper (who maintains a claim for loss of consortium) allege that Defendant Cervando Salgado, working for his employer Defendant URS Midwest, Inc., is at least partly responsible for parking its car hauler and trailer with cars loaded on an adjacent red curb, thus impeding the ability for motorists to see each other. Defendant Mr. Salgado and Defendant URS Midwest, Inc., admit they were parked illegally, but do not admit they were negligent or that Mr. Harper and Mrs. Harper were harmed. II. MEDICARE IS A CLEAR COLLATERAL SOURCE AND ITS IMPROPER INCLUSION IN THIS CASE WILL SEVERELY PREJUDICE PLAINTIFF The only claim for future medical care in this case that the Plaintiffs will ask the jury to award relates to a 3-level anterior cervical discectomy and fusion. Plaintiffs believe that Defendants will attempt to use inadmissible collateral source evidence including Medicare treatment rates to reduce the costs of this future surgery, which is already scheduled to take place in August 2018 without any Medicare coverage. Further, Plaintiffs believe the Defendants will try to introduce inadmissible evidence of Medicare payments for treatment that has already been provided. Not only would the mention of Medicare in this case violate the collateral source rule, but Defendants’ own medical billing expert admits that her opinions are not based on Medicare. The collateral source rule provides that if an injured party receives compensation for his or her injuries from a source that is wholly independent of the tortfeasor, such compensation is not deducted from the amount of damages that the plaintiff would otherwise collect from the tortfeasor. Helfend v. S. Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 1, 6. The rule functions not only as a rule of damages, but also a rule of evidence prohibiting introduction of any evidence of a collateral payment for the purpose of reducing damages. See Hrjak v. Graymar. Inc. (1971) 4 Cal.3d 725, 729. 4 PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 8 RE MEDICARE AND THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE; [PROPOSED| ORDER 2 3 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 2 13 EE. w 558 £ +5 LE 52338 15 Ed ZxZz718 16 += Te 4E7 T 17 ESS = 44 13 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 £2 PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER The collateral source rule is most clearly applicable when those benefits received by an injured party come from a source to which the party has contributed by way of premium or otherwise. See Brown v. Stewart (1928) 129 Cap. App. 3d 331, 335. The collateral source rule embodies the concept that a person who has invested years of insurance premiums to assure that his or her medical care will be provided for should receive the benefits of his or her thrift and that the tortfeasor should not garner the benefits of the victim’s providence. If tortfeasors were permitted to reduce the plaintiff's damages in such a way, the plaintiff would be in an inferior position to those without insurance. Helfend, supra, at 9-10. Plaintiff in this case is entitled to Medicare as he is over the age of 65. Medicare, like other private insurance, is a collateral source and evidence of such is prohibited. See Hrjak v. Graymar. Inc. (1971) 4 Cal.3d 725, 729. Plaintiff intends to argue that, to a degree of medical certainty, he will need future care. Plaintiff will also argue the reasonable cost of the future care supported by relevant experts in the field including with the same expert treating physician Dr. Jason Liauw that performed Plaintiff’s prior lumbar surgery as a result of this crash. It must be noted that Plaintiff is already scheduled to go forward with the recommended future cervical surgery in August 2018 after this trial with Dr. Jason Liauw. Dr. Jason Liauw does not accept Medicare and therefore if the Defendants introduce evidence of Medicare payment rates and the jury awards future medical care expenses based on those rates, Plaintiff Mr. Harper will not be awarded enough money to pay for the surgery that he needs, which was caused by the Defendants. Medicare is a secondary payor and therefore it is illegal (a crime) to bill Medicare for any care for which the jury awards money. 42 U.S.C. 1395y(b)(2)(A). Medicare and Medicaid are federal programs that provide medical insurance to various classes of individuals. Medicare is for qualified elderly and disabled persons, 42 U.S.C., §§1395 et. seq. Medicare is a secondary payer as to medical expenses for which some other entity (e.g., a tortfeasor) bears responsibility. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2). Traditional Medicare reimbursement has always been premised on the Medicare Secondary Payer statute which provides that Medicare pays only after everyone else has paid, including typical automobile insurance companies. The Medicare Secondary Payer 5 PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 8 RE MEDICARE AND THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE; [PROPOSED| ORDER A I T K E N 4 A I T K E N 4 C O H N 3 M A C A R T H U R P L A C E , S U I T E 80 0 BA L N S S OO 0 NN O Y Wn 1 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 71 4- 43 4- 14 24 71 4- 43 4- 36 00 FA CS IM IL E S A N T A A N A , C A 92 70 7 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 £2 PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER ("MSP") statute "assigns primary responsibility for medical bills of Medicare recipients to private health plans when a Medicare recipient is also covered by private insurance. These private plans are therefore considered ‘primary’ under the MSP and Medicare acts as the ‘secondary’ payer responsible only for paying amounts not covered by the primary plan." Fanning v. United States, 346 F.3d 386, 389 (3d Cir.2003). Thus, the MSP bars Medicare payments where "payment has already been made or can reasonably be expected to be made" by a primary plan. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(A) (parenthetical in original). The MSP defines a "primary plan" as "a workmen's compensation law or plan, an automobile or liability insurance policy or plan (including a self-insured plan) or no- fault insurance." 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(A)(ii) (parenthetical in original). This provision "is intended to keep the government from paying a medical bill where it is clear an insurance company will pay instead." Fanning, supra 346 F.3d at 389 (quotation omitted)." Sipler v. Trans Am Trucking, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 2d 635, 637 (D.N.J. 2012). A. Howell and Corenbaum Do Not Limit the Recovery of Future Care to What “May” Be Accepted as Payment in Full The rulings in Howell and Corenbaum as they pertain to this case are clear. In Howell v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions, Inc. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 541, 555, the court held that the amount a plaintiff can recover for past medical expenses is the amount actually paid by the plaintiff's health insurance, not the amount billed by the provider. Howell also noted that evidence that an amount was paid by a health insurer is generally inadmissible under the collateral source rule. Howell at 567. As such, the jury cannot hear about insurance and they cannot award more than was actually paid by health insurance to plaintiff for past medical treatment. In Corenbaum v. Lampkin (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1308, the Court held that "that evidence of the full amounts billed for plaintiffs’ medical care is not relevant to the amount of damages for past medical services, damages for their future medical care or noneconomic damages. Because plaintiffs have not shown that the evidence of the full amounts of their medical bills was relevant to any other issue, the admission of such evidence was error." Id. To 6 PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 8 RE MEDICARE AND THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE; [PROPOSED] ORDER A I T K E N 4 A I T K E N 4 C O H N 3 M A C A R T H U R P L A C E , SU IT E 80 0 SOS OO RX 9 O N n n B A L ND -_ = = e m e d e d pe SA A Wn B A W N D = 71 4- 43 4- 14 24 71 4- 43 4- 36 00 F A C S I M I L E S A N T A AN A, CA 92 70 7 Ne ) No No No No \) No == - - aN Wn EE N w NS ) - = oO [= <] J No ~ 28 £2 PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER be clear, Plaintiff does not dispute Defendants’ argument that the billed amount of plaintiff’s past medical care is irrelevant and inadmissible to prove future expenses. The real issue is Defendants are seeking to use Medicare costs as a basis for plaintiff's future care needs, which is improper. The standard by which a plaintiff can recover for future medical expenses can be found in CACI 3903(A). CACI instruction 3903(A) regarding future medical expenses states "[ To recover damages for future medical expenses, [name of plaintiff] must prove the reasonable cost of reasonably necessary medical care that [he/she] is reasonably certain to need in the future." Defendants cannot be allowed to offer inadmissible evidence that the costs of plaintiff’s future treatment is as set forth by Medicare and such costs are therefore “reasonable.” This would be a clear violation of the collateral source rule. If Defendants, however, want to argue that the reasonable value of the costs of the future care plaintiff will need is less than Plaintiff asserts through its experts, Defendants have a number of options. Defendants can offer their own expert testimony to rebut plaintiff’s expert’s testimony. Or, Defendants can simply cross examine plaintiff’s expert on how he/she came to their opinion as to the reasonable costs for future treatment. Defendants cannot, however, tell the jury that the costs for such treatment are as laid forth in Medicare guidelines. Such testimony would confuse the jury and suggest, at a minimum, that the plaintiff will use Medicare insurance to pay for her future treatment costs. Defendants may try to argue that the medical malpractice case of Cuevas v. Contra Costa County (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 163 is somehow applicable. It is not. Cuevas allowed the defense life care planner to testify as to “insurance rates.” However, the Cuevas court specifically found that this is because it has a medical malpractice case, and therefore, Civil Code section 3333.1 applied which eliminates the collateral source rule. The present case is clearly not a medical malpractice case which means that Civil Code section 3333.1 (commonly referred to as “MICRA”) does not apply. Rather, the present case is an auto negligence personal injury case wherein the collateral source rule is alive and well. As such, it would be prejudicial error to allow “insurance rates” into the present case. 7 PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 8 RE MEDICARE AND THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE; [PROPOSED| ORDER A I T K E N 4 A I T K E N 4+ C O H N 3 M A C A R T H U R P L A C E , S U I T E 80 0 OS OO cL N N n n R A W ND = - = e m e m e m a SA N WL» B A L D = 71 4- 43 4- 14 24 71 4- 43 4- 36 00 F A C S I M I L E S A N T A A N A , C A 92 70 7 \o ) No No No No NS ) NO - - - aN 19 ,1 E N Ww No - OS Oo 0 J No ~~ 28 >» PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER B. Tying Future Medical Expenses to Medicare is Speculative and Would Set Dangerous Precedent Medicare is an entitlement program that is funded by taxpayers. Allowing Defendants to argue that plaintiffs future medical expenses should not exceed Medicare costs forces the plaintiff to utilize Medicare to pay for a tortfeasor’s wrongs. If plaintiffis only awarded the Medicare costs for her future medical expenses she will be left with no option but to utilize Medicare for her future care. Medicare, of course, is funded by taxpayers and taxpayers should not have to pay for the Defendants” wrongs. As cited above, Medicare is supposed to act as a secondary payer after other health insurance or other recovery from tortfeasors. Even more, Medicare recommends that plaintiffs that receive funds from personal injury lawsuits set aside funds after settlement or judgment to account for future medical expenses so as to avoid having Medicare pay'. Allowing the defendants to make this argument would thus violate public policy. Further, Defendants’ argument is soaked with speculation and would unduly prejudice the jury pursuant to Evidence Code section 352. Defendants are speculating that Medicare will be in place when plaintiff goes forward with her future treatment needs. Defendants would also be speculating that plaintiff does not have any other primary health insurance or even a Medicare Advantage Plan. Finally, Defendants are speculating that plaintiff will utilize a doctor she finds acceptable that will also agree to bill Medicare for the care provided. This Court should not be involved with playing a game of chance with plaintiff’s future medical needs. Tn 2011, the Center for Medicare Services (CMS), which often enforces Medicare reimbursement, released a memorandum which raised the specter of MSAs for the first time. CMS’s memorandum articulated that, under the MSP, “[a]ll parties do have significant responsibilities under the MSP to protect Medicare's interests when resolving cases that includes [sic ] future medical expenses. A recommended method to protect Medicare's interest is a set- aside arrangement, which allocates a portion of the settlement for future medical expenses. The amount of the set-aside is determined on a case-by-case basis.” Sipler v. Trans Am Trucking, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 2d 635, 637 (D.N.J. 2012) 8 PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 8 RE MEDICARE AND THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE; [PROPOSED] ORDER A I T K E N 4 A I T K E N 4+ C O H N O O 0 uN O N nu BA L N = -_ = e m e e e m e e ee A N hn BA WLW ND = OO 71 4- 43 4- 14 24 71 4- 43 4- 36 00 F A C S I M I L E it ~ S A N T A AN A, CA 92 70 7 3 M A C A R T H U R P L A C E , S U I T E 80 0 D N D N ND N N N -_ = aA Wn ES N 2 NS ) - oO Oo 0 No 3 28 £2 PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER III. EVIDENCE RELATING TO MEDICARE IS IRRELEVANT AND UNDULY PREJUDICIAL Evidence Code Section 350 provides that only relevant evidence is admissible. Relevant evidence is defined as “having any tendency to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.” (Evidence Code § 210; People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 523; People v. Haston (1968) 69 Cal.2d 233, 245 [stating that a court should consider severing relevant from irrelevant portions of evidence to protect against undue prejudice]). Evidence Code Section 352 states, “[t]he court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.” Plaintiff Mr. Harper, the faultless party, is not required - nor should he be required - to limit his treatment to speculative future Medicare coverage rates. Further, no expert in this case has provided any opinions relating to Medicare rates for future care and treatment that Plaintiff Mr. Harper is reasonably certain to need. Defendants’ billing expert Nancy Michalski testified in her deposition that her opinions as they relate to the reasonable value of the past medical treatment are not in any way based on Medicare. 0. Do any of your opinions relating to the reasonable value of the past care take into account Medicare repayment rates? A. No. I do not use any third party commercial or governmental payers in rendering my opinions. --Deposition of Nancy Michalski, pgs. 33-34, lines 22-1 Ms. Michalski admits that Medicare did not pay any of Mr. Harper’s past medical care. 0. You know he didn't have-- you know Medicare didn't pay for any of his past health treatment, is that correct? A. Correct. It was-- I don't recall the name as I sit here who the carrier was, but it was a Medicare related third party. --Deposition of Nancy Michalski, pgs. 35, lines 21-25 9 PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 8 RE MEDICARE AND THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE; [PROPOSED| ORDER A I T K E N 4 A I T K E N 4 C O H N 3 M A C A R T H U R P L A C E , SU IT E 80 0 SS OO 0 uN O N n n Bs W N = -_ em e m e e a a A N Wn B A L D = 71 4- 43 4- 14 24 71 4- 43 4- 36 00 F A C S I M I L E S A N T A A N A , C A 92 70 7 NO NO NS ) NO No No No = = = aN Wn E N Ww No - = Oo 0 J No ~ 28 £2 PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER Interestingly however, Ms. Michalski’s report includes a column that lists what she believes is the past value of medical treatment based on Medicare. Ms. Michalski admits this column, titled “Medicare value” has no weight relating to her opinions as to the reasonable value of past medical treatment. 0. But you understand that your column for Medicare value is not relevant to your opinions related to past reasonable value medical care, correct? A. The Medicare value is not related to my opinions on reasonable value. As I've explained, I don't use Medicare rates in determining my reasonable value. I was asked separate and apart to provide that information. As I understand it, it was a source available, and 1 did so. Other than that, I don't have any opinions on it. --Deposition of Nancy Michalski, pgs. 36, lines 3-12 0. Okay. The Medicare value has no weight as it relates to the reasonable value of the past medical expenses that Mr. Harper has incurred in this case, correct? A. That's correct. --Deposition of Nancy Michalski, pgs. 98, lines 8-11 Ms. Michalski also noted that she will not be offering any opinions as it relates to the reasonable cost for future medical care and treatment. You don't have any opinions related to the reasonable necessity of the future care for Mr. Harper, do you? No. That's outside my scope. You don't have any opinions related to the reasonable cost of the future care for Mr. Harper, do you? No, I do not. = O R 1 0 --Deposition of Nancy Michalski, pgs. 25, linesl1-13 The only other expert hired by the Defendants that could conceivably provide an opinion as to the reasonable costs of the future medical treatment that Plaintiff Mr. Harper is reasonably certain to need is Dr. Michael Weinstein. Dr. Weinstein, however, testified that he does not believe this crash caused the need for any future cervical treatment as a result of this crash. 0. Do you believe had this crash not happened, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that Mr. Harper would have needed a cervical surgery? 10 PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 8 RE MEDICARE AND THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE; [PROPOSED| ORDER = L N S S OO 0 NN O N Wn 1 12 13 14 15 16 17 71 4- 43 4- 14 24 71 4- 43 4- 36 00 F A C S I M I L E A I T K E N 4 A I T K E N 4 C O H N S A N T A AN A, CA 92 70 7 3 M A C A R T H U R P L A C E , SU IT E 80 0 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 £2 PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER A. I don't believe he needs a cervical surgery. --Deposition of Dr. Michael Weinstein, pgs. 51, lines 14-18 As such, Ms. Michalski’s report must be precluded from this trial as well as any testimony relating to Medicare. Dr. Weinstein must similarly be precluded from testifying that Medicare is involved in this case in any way. IV. CONCLUSION Plaintiffs respectfully requests that the Court grant this motion in its entirety. Dated: June 15, 2018 AITKEN4+AITKEN 4+ COHN ATTICUS N. WEGMAN, ESQ. Attorneys for Plaintiffs 11 PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 8 RE MEDICARE AND THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE; |[PROPOSED| ORDER 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 g 13 ig F gg ) 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 €9 PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER PROOF OF SERVICE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF ORANGE I am employed in the County of Orange, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action; my business address is 3 MacArthur Place, Suite 800, Santa Ana, California, 92707. On June 15, 2018 1 served the foregoing documents described as PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 8 RE MEDICARE AND THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE on the parties herein in this action by placing ( ) the original (x) a true copy thereof in 4 sealed envelope addressed as indicated on the attached service list. (X) BY MAIL (X) As follows: Iam "readily familiar" with the firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with U.S. postal service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid at Santa Ana, California in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date SL praise meter date is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing an affidavit. ( ) By Personal Service: I caused the above-referenced the document(s) to be delivered by hand to the attached addressees. ( ) By Overnight Courier: I caused the above-referenced document(s) to be delivered to an overnight courier service for delivery to the above address(es). ( ) By Facsimile Machine: I caused the above-referenced document(s) to be transmitted to the above-named persons at the following telephone number(s) see attached Proof of Service list. () By Email Transmission: I caused the above-referenced document(s) to be transmitted to the persons listed in the attached Proof of Service lists. Executed on June 15, 2018 at Santa Ana, California. (X) (State) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct. risgin McCarthy 1 PROOF OF SERVICE A I T K E N 4 A I T K E N 4 C O H N 3 M A C A R T H U R P L A C E , SU IT E 80 0 SS O O 0 NN O N n n B R A W N -_- = = e m e d p d pe A N Ln A L N = 71 4- 43 4- 14 24 71 4- 43 4- 36 00 FA CS IM IL E SA NT A AN A, CA 92 70 7 N O N N N N N N m e m e NO O00 L R L W O N D m S WO o N [N S] oo €9 PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER HARPER v. LOPEZ, et al. SERVICE LIST Debra L. Braasch BROWN, BONN & FRIEDMAN, LLP 4 Hutton Center, Suite 350 Santa Ana, CA 92707 714-427-3900 714-427-5449-fax and Scott L. MacDonald MACDONALD & CODY LLP 38 Executive Park, Suite 280 Irvine, CA 92614 (714) 831-1713 (714) 823-3229-fax Attorneys for Defendants/ Cross- Complainants/Cross-Defendants TUTTLE CLICK'S CAPISTRANO FORD, INC. (erroneously sued and served as "Capistrano Ford") and RAUL NAJERA LOPEZ Richard C. Moreno, Esq. Steven J. McEvoy , Esq. MURCHISON g CUMMING LLP 801 South Grand Ave., 9th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90017 (213) 623-7400 (213) 623-6336-fax Attorneys for Defendants/Cross- Complainants /Cross-Defendants DNJ SERVICES LLC, DONALD PINKUS; Defendants/Cross-Defendants CERVANDO SALGADO, ROE 1 AND URS MIDWEST, INC., ROE 2 2 PROOF OF SERVICE