Reply_to_oppositionReplyCal. Super. - 4th Dist.November 25, 2015Joel W. Baruch SBN 85903 Christopher Gaspard SBN 275763 Core . Hall N 295470 ELEC LAW OFFICES OF JOEL W. BARUCH barton COT of Caifotmia es va. Jeet, pulls 900 County of Orange rvine, California a Telephone (949) 864-9662 DANGI2018 = 02:30:00 Fd Facsimile (949) 851-3185 be Ce re Bar Attorneys for Defendants LAW OFFICES OF JOEL W. BARUCH, PC and JOEL W.BARUCH SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF ORANGE DEBBRA DEMARCO, CASE NO. 30-2015-00822319-CU-PN-CJC Co Assigned for All Purposes to the Honorable Plaintiff, Gregory H. Lewis, Department C26 VS. Date Filed: November 25, 2015 Trial Date: None Set LAW OFFICES OF JOEL W. BARUCH, PC, a California DEFENDANTS’ REPLY BRIEF TO Corporation; JOEL W. BARUCH, an PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO Individual, and DOES 1 through X, DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT inclusive. (Filed concurrently with Reply Brief to Defendants. pposition to Motion to Strike) Date: April 25,2016 Time: 10:30a.m. Dept: C26 Reservation number: 72302101 Defendants, LAW OFFICES OF JOEL W. BARUCH, PC and JOEL W. BARUCH, hereby respond to the Plaintiff's Opposition to the Demurrer to the Complaint as follows: 1. INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT: Plaintiff's lawsuit is clearly without merit on its face (even if all of the allegations are accepted as true for purposes of ruling on the motion to strike). Plaintiff claims damages for DEFENDANTS’ REPLY BRIEF TO PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT OVO 0 NN A N v i bh W N N O N O N O N N N = e m e m e m e e e e e s = items which have no monetary or tangible value, such as her hurt feelings and emotional distress which are not permitted in an action sounding in legal malpractice. For example, in this action, she seeks damages for the following: a) A July 14, 2014 letter confidentially addressed to Plaintiff by Defendant BARUCH in which he told her that her legal case was not valid and was critical of Plaintiffs acceptance of an offer to settle on which she changed her mind at the last minute (Complaint 123); b) She felt “forced” to sign a Substitution of Attorney form on or about July 14, 2014, in which she substituted herself “in pro per” in place of Defendants (Complaint, §23); c) After the substitution, Defendants did not return her case file quickly enough (Complaint, §24); and, d) Ultimately being “forced” to settle the action against the school district several months after hiring her current lawyer (Complaint, 928). Based on these claims of damage, Plaintiff prayed for emotional distress damages (“in excess of $5,000,000"). (Complaint- see prayer). As noted in the moving Demurrer and Motion to Strike papers, and as noted in the below reply argument, this action is clearly without merit even if all the allegations are taken as true for purposes of ruling on the motions. 2: THE ONE-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR LEGAL MALPRACTICE ACTIONS HAS RUN AS ALLEGED ON THE FACE OF THE COMPLAINT: A. Statement of Facts For This Argument: All claims for legal malpractice occurred and arose prior to Defendants’ last date of representation of Plaintiff— i.e. before July 14, 2014. Those claims of legal malpractice were alleged as follows: that Defendants “misinformed” Plaintiff regarding the Employer’s legal obligation towards her (Complaint, 415); that Defendants’ concluded that the Employer’s offer (to settle the case) was reasonable and should be accepted (Complaint, DEFENDANTS’ REPLY BRIEF TO PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT 2 Oo 0 N N A W N nN N O N O N N R e m e m e s e e e e e m e e 915); that, on April 1, 2013, Defendants’ identified an incorrect time period in Plaintiff’s Department of Fair Employment and Housing filing (Complaint, §17); that Defendants’ decision to claim that Plaintiff was discriminated/retaliated against based on her age was not supported by the facts (Complaint, 419); that Defendants “misrepresented” that Plaintiff was constructively discharged (Complaint, 419); that Defendants cited to the “incorrect” section of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (Complaint, 20); that Defendants’ changes for the First Amended Complaint was “unnecessary” and minimal (Complaint, §21); that Defendants wrote Plaintiff a letter, in which he degraded and belittled her (Complaint, 23); that upon substituting out of Plaintiff's case, Defendants refused to provide Plaintiff with the case file and instead claimed they had already provided the file to her, but did not provide her with outstanding discovery requests of the school district (Complaint, 24). Although Plaintiff claims she was sanctioned $500 for being late with her discovery (allegedly because Defendants did not provide her with the outstanding written discovery requests after substituting out of the case), the Complaint does not contain any allegation that Plaintiff suffered any economic damage by paying over these sanctions. (Complaint, 924). B. Summary Of Defendants’ Demurrer: This legal malpractice complaint by Plaintiff was filed on November 25, 2015. Defendants’ last representation of Plaintiff was on July 14, 2014, one year and four months before this legal malpractice action was filed. (Complaint, 423). Plaintiff hired her current lawyer to pursue both the underlying case against Plaintiff’s employer AND to pursue “malpractice” matters against Defendants on September 25. 2014, one year and two months before this legal malpractice action was filed. (Complaint, 425). In the Demurrer (at Argument III, 7:13-8:19), Defendants first pointed out that four of the five causes of action pled in the Complaint sound in legal malpractice no matter what these are called, and therefore all causes of action have the same one-year statute of limitation period of Code of Civil Procedure §340.6. The four of the five causes of action which sound in legal malpractice and, therefore, have a one-year statute of limitation period are the First Count for legal malpractice, the Second Count for misrepresentation, the Third DEFENDANTS’ REPLY BRIEF TO PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT 3 Oo ® N N N wn hr L N N O N O N O N N N m e s em e s e e e m e s e s e s Count for Breach of Fiduciary Duty, and the Fifth Count for Breach of Contract. (Citing Pompilio v. Kosmo, Cho & Brown (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1324 and Radovich v. Locke- Paddon (1995) 35 Cal. App.4th 946, 954 for the proposition that a count for breach of fiduciary duty in a malpractice action follows the one-year statute of limitation for malpractice under C.C.P. §340.6; also, Vafi v. McCloskey (2011) 193 Cal. App.4th 874, 881; Southland Mechanical Constructors Corp. v. Nixen (1981) 119 Cal. App.3d 417, 431; Quintilliani v. Mannerino (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 54, 69, all holding that the one year statute of limitation of §340.6 applies to breach of contract actions). Therefore, because of these judicial admissions as to the last date on which Defendants represented Plaintiff and the date on which Plaintiff hired another attorney to represent her in this malpractice action, both events of which occurred more than one year prior to the filing of the lawsuit, the Complaint can never appropriately be amended to state something different. Therefore, the Demurrer on these Counts 1, 2, 3, and 5 of the Complaint should be granted without leave to amend C. Plaintiff's Response to Statute Of Limitations Argument In Opposition: Plaintiff DEMARCO admits that “Baruch’s pleadings were defective on their face”, meaning that she admits this Complaint was filed outside the statute of limitations period for Counts 1, 2, 3, and 5 of the Complaint. (See Opposition, 10:7-8). Nevertheless, without citing a single case supporting her view, Plaintiff also claims that the statute of limitations was tolled because she was unable to ascertain the “type, nature, and amount of damages” she had sustained. Plaintiff contends that she had to wait until her attorney got a ruling on the “applicability of the relation back doctrine” or wait until Plaintiff settled the case to her satisfaction. (Opposition, 10:1-13:5). D. Defendants’ Reply To Plaintiff's Argument: Plaintiff's contention as to her alleged breach of the statute of limitations as to Counts 1,2, 3, and 5 of the Complaint can be reduced to a single sentence: “Yes, Judge, I violated the statute of limitations, and I knew I was damaged by Defendants’ conduct, however, I just didn’t know whether my damages were economic or general and I did not know the amount.” DEFENDANTS’ REPLY BRIEF TO PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT 4 OW 0 J O&O wn hp W N = N N N DN O N m m r m e t ee p b pe e d e d e e This is a ludicrous argument that does not accurately state the prevalent law on what is required to toll the running of the legal malpractice statute of limitations (Code of Civil Procedure §340.6). Code of Civil Procedure §340.6(a) provides, in pertinent part, that “an action against an attorney for a wrongful act or omission, other than for actual fraud, arising in the performance of professional services shall be commenced within one year after the plaintiff discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the facts constituting the wrongful act or omission, or four years from the date of the wrongful act or omission, whichever occurs first....” Further, under Section 340.6(a)(1), the statute is tolled if the plaintiff has not sustained actual injury, or, under Section 340.6(a)(3), the statute is tolled if the defendant attorney willfully conceals the facts constituting the wrongful act or omission when such facts are known to the attorney. In Plaintiff’s opposition, it is claimed that the new attorney (KD Hughes) filed a Third Amended Complaint (allegedly to correct Defendants’ errors); however, before the Third Amended Complaint was heard by the Court, the new attorney settled the underlying case with the school district on Plaintiffs behalf. The Complaint alleges the terms of the settlement to be satisfactory to the Plaintiff (i.e., she was reinstated into a full-time regular teaching position). Nevertheless, the school district apparently did not treat Plaintiff well and she has filed a new case against the school district arising out of its breach of the settlement agreement. (See Complaint 9 28-29). The allegations of the Complaint do not allege any viable damage claim and, in fact, indicate that she resolved the case for reinstatement to a full-time teaching position. The only injury alleged is emotional distress arising from the alleged legal malpractice. Plaintiff DEMARCO did not sustain any alleged and/or demonstrable economic damage. Emotional distress damages are not recoverable in a legal malpractice action. (See Merenda v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal. App.4th 1, 7-10; Crisci v. Security Ins. Co. (1967) 66 Cal.2d 425, 433; Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal. App4th 1033, 1038). Since there are not any demonstrable economic damages, there was no “actual injury” and, therefore, the DEFENDANTS’ REPLY BRIEF TO PLAINTIFE’S OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT 5 OO 0 NN O N wn Rh W N = N N MN DN r m p m e m e e m e e b e t e s one-year period of statute of limitations for Counts 1, 2, 3, and 5 has not tolled the operation and applicability of the statute to this case. The seminal case on the tolling of the statute of limitations of Code of Civil Procedure §340.6 is Jordache Enterprise, Inc. v. Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison (1998) 18 Cal.4th 739. In Jordache, the plaintiff client had learned of the attorney’s negligence in failing to timely claim liability insurance benefits covering a third party lawsuit against the plaintiff and also had incurred defense costs in that lawsuit. The plaintiff (Jordache Enterprises) contended that it did not sustain actual injury until it settled its action against its insurer for less than full benefits. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the law firm on the basis the action was barred by the operation of Code of Civil Procedure §340. After the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on the “actual injury” issue, finding there was no “actual injury” until the case settled, the California Supreme Court reversed that decision. The Supreme Court determined that the injurious consequences for Jordache of Brobeck’s alleged omissions occurred more than one year before Jordache sued and the statute was not tolled until the case settled— i.e., the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment on the statute of limitations issue. In the present case, as noted previously, the Complaint makes it clear that all of the alleged legal malpractice conduct occurred on or July 14, 2014, one year and four months before the Complaint in this case was filed. (See Argument 2A of this Reply Brief, 2:23- 3:15). Further, the consequences were admittedly all known to K.D Hughes, Esq., Plaintiff's new attorney who was hired to both represent Plaintiff in the underlying case and, also, to file this malpractice action against Defendants. Ms. Hughes, the new attorney, was hired by Plaintiff for these purposes on September 25, 2014, one year and two months before the Complaint in this case was filed on November 25, 2015. (Complaint, §] 23-25). Plaintiff DEMARCO, with Ms. Hughes advise and counsel, settled the case and was reinstated into a full-time teaching position. (Complaint, 28). After it became clear the settlement did not work out to Plaintiff's satisfaction, she filed this malpractice lawsuit against Defendants and filed another action for damages against the school district. (Complaint, § 29). DEFENDANTS’ REPLY BRIEF TO PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER TO COBMELAINT © 00 NN ON Wn bs W O N N O N N O N N N N rm em t e m e m e m e m mb p t pe ed pe B R E E R S P B E E ZT 3 a a R 0 0 = 3 On its face, the Complaint details a set of facts in which it would be virtually impossible to conclude that Plaintiff DEMARCO suffered an “actual injury” necessary to maintain this action. Defendants’ alleged malpractice arose from these alleged actions, none of which lead to an “actual injury” that is necessary to maintain a legal malpractice action. (1) Writing a letter criticizing the plaintiff which causes her only emotional distress is not an “actual injury”; (2) Not returning the underlying case file to Plaintiff quickly enough which causes her only emotional distress and no economic injury is not an “actual injury”; (3) Forcing the plaintiff to settle the case by not using the correct strategy in pursuing the cause is not an “actual injury”. The determination of “actual injury” does not necessarily require some form of adjudication, judgment or settlement. (Jordache at 755 citing Adams v.Paul 1995) 11 Cal.4th 583, 591). The test for “actual injury” under section 340.6...is whether the plaintiff has sustained any damages compensable in an action, other than one for actual fraud, against an attorney for a wrongful act or omission arising in the performance of professional services. (Jordache, at 757-58). The Jordache case is on all fours with this case— there was no tolling of the statute of limitations since having to settle the case for reinstatement to a teacher’s position at full salary and benefits is not an “actual injury”. From the four corners of the Complaint, any “actual injury” from the alleged malpractice conduct had already occurred as of July 14, 2014 when Plaintiff substituted Defendants out of the underlying case. One final point— the Complaint has not pled an “actual injury” for legal malpractice. No specific economic damage was cited. Plaintiff was seeking reinstatement as a remedy and obtained it. Plaintiff's alleged damages are for emotional distress, which she cannot obtain in an action based on legal malpractice. (See Merenda v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1, 7-10; Crisci v. Security Ins. Co. (1967) 66 Cal.2d 425, 433; Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal. App4th 1033, 1038). Plaintiff's counsel argues that the statute of limitations was tolled because the “amount of damage” could not be fully and finally ascertained. The inquiry necessary for “actual injury: is more qualitative than quantitative because the fact of damage, rather than the amount, is the critical factor. It is quite clear that DEFENDANTS’ REPLY BRIEF TO PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT 7 OW 60 ~~ O&O wn hb W N No N O N N N R m e e e e s e s e e e e s the amount of damages does not trigger a finding of “actual injury”. However, once the plaintiff suffers actual harm (which never occurred in this case because Plaintiff settled the underlying case to her satisfaction), neither difficulty in proving damages or uncertainty as to the amount tolls the limitations period. (Jordache, at 752). 3. THE DEMURRER TO THE SECOND AND FOURTH CAUSES OF ACTION FOR MISREPRESENTATION AND CONCEALMENT ON THE GROUNDS OF UNCERTAINTY SHOULD BE GRANTED: A. Statement of Facts For This Argument: The Second Cause of Action alleges that Defendants acted fraudulently because they held themselves out as “knowledgeable, careful and experienced” to handle Plaintiff's employment claims against her public employer. (Complaint, §f 38-39). The Fourth Cause of Action alleges that Defendants “fraudulently concealed” the fact that “they lacked the experience and/or skill necessary to handle an employment matter on behalf of a publically employed individual, such as Ms. DeMarco.” (Complaint, 55). Plaintiff then claims she was unaware of the above facts “until she retained counsel who was familiar with and experienced at handling legal matters arising from the employment of publically-employed individuals such as plaintiffs.” (Complaint, 57). Plaintiff further claims that her reliance was detrimental and reasonable because, has she known or been advised that defendants lacked the experience or skill necessary to handle an employment matter on behalf of a publically employed individual such as herself, she would not have retained them to handle her legal matter against her employer.” (Complaint, 957). Plaintiff also claims general damages for emotional distress and punitive damages on these two causes of action. (Complaint, 58-60). B. Summary Of Defendants’ Demurrer: The Demurrer challenged both the Second and Fourth Causes of Action of the Complaint on two grounds: (1) uncertainty; and, (2) failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Demurrer, 8:21-10:11). DEFENDANTS’ REPLY BRIEF TO PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT OO 0 NN O N Un bs W N N O N N N N O N m s e m e d p d m d pe d ee d e d e b Both the Second and Fourth Causes of Action are based on claims of fraud. In California, every element of a fraud cause of action must be pled with specificity. Service By Medallion, Inc. v. Clorox Co. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1807. This pleading requirement of specificity applies not only to the alleged misrepresentation, but also to the elements of causation and damage. Moncada v. West Coast Quartz Corp. (2013) 221 Cal. App.4th 768, 776. Generalized and conclusory allegations, such as a lawyer misrepresenting his knowledge, skills, and abilities to represent a client against her school district employer, are not sufficient for pleading purposes in a fraud-based cause of action. Plaintiff must plead facts which show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the allegedly false representations were tendered. Stansfield v. Starkey (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 59, 74; Nagy v. Nagy (1989) 210 Cal. App.3d 1262, 1268. As to the meat of the fraud-based allegations, there is only one claim addressed by Plaintiff— i.e. in the Second Cause of Action, the allegation that Defendants claimed they were “knowledgeable, careful and experienced” to handle Plaintiff's employment claims against her public employer. (Complaint, §Y 38-39). And, in the Fourth Cause of Action the allegation that Defendants “fraudulently concealed” the fact that “they lacked the experience and/or skill necessary to handle an employment matter on behalf of a publically employed individual, such as Ms. DeMarco.” (Complaint, §55). Any representations by Defendants that they were “knowledgeable, careful and experienced” and/or they possessed the experience and/or skill necessary to handle Plaintiff's employment matter against the school district were mere opinions. Opinions are not actionable fraud. Hauter v. Zogarts (1975) 14 Cal.3d 104, 112. Accordingly, the requisite elements of a fraud-based cause of action have not been particularly pled, nor is the one fraud-based allegation sufficient to constitute actionable misrepresentation and/or concealment. C. Plaintiff’s Response to Statute Of Limitations Argument In Opposition: In the Opposition to the Demurrer, Plaintiff DEMARCO contends that a former client can sue her attorney for fraud when it turns out that the attorney lacks the knowledge, skills, DEFENDANTS’ REPLY BRIEF TO PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT OO 00 N N O N nn aA W N —_— e t p m Ww N = OO 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 and experience either the client thought the attorney had or that the attorney indicated he had at one point before or during the representation in the underlying case. (Opposition, 13:2- 14:18). Plaintiff, in her Opposition, simply cites the elements of both the Second and Fourth Causes of Action, and then concludes that these elements were demonstrated in the Complaint. It is clear from the Opposition that Plaintiff's counsel stated the fraud-based claims in an attempt to survive the statute of limitations problem present on the face of the Complaint as to the other non-fraud-based counts. D. Defendants’ Reply to Plaintiff's Argument: As noted, it is clear that no actionable fraud or concealment could ever occur as a result of an attorney stating his opinion before or during the representation that he had the “knowledge, skills, and experience” to handle the dispute in the underlying case. A claim that an attorney, in fact, lacks the necessary “knowledge, skills, and experience” to handle the I matter is really nothing more than a statement that the particular attorney committed legal malpractice by doing something negligent or by omitting to do something he (the attorney) should have done. In the operative Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that she reasonably relied on Defendant BARUCH having the necessary “knowledge, skills, and experience” to represent her in the underlying employment action against the school district. She claims in her fraud count at 955 that: “[B]y virtue of the facts set forth in paragraphs 6 through 30, the defendants, as a legal corporation and attorney licensed under the state of California, sworn to uphold state and federal laws as well as the state and national rules of ethics, had a duty to disclose to the plaintiff that they lacked the experience and/or skill necessary to handle an employment matter on behalf of a publically employed individual such as the plaintiff, Mrs. Demarco.” (Emphasis in italics added). First of all, paragraphs 6 through 30 are incorporated statements for all of the causes DEFENDANTS’ REPLY BRIEF TO PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT 10 WO 0 NN O N Wn Bx W N N O N N N R em e s = e s e m e m es e e of action in the Complaint— in other words, paragraphs 6 through 30 allege the Defendants’ negligence in the malpractice action. Paragraphs 6 through 30 do not plead facts which show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the allegedly false representations were tendered. Stansfield v. Starkey, supra, 220 Cal.App.3d at 74; Nagy v. Nagy, supra, 210 Cal.App.3d at 1268. To this date, Defendants cannot ascertain when the alleged representations of having the necessary “knowledge, experience, and skills” were made, or where they were made, to whom they were made, how they were made, and by what means these representations were tendered (e.g., did Defendant BARUCH tell her something about his “knowledge, skills, and experience” that was false, or did she learn of the alleged “knowledge, skills, and experience” from someone or something else like, for example, from a website). Plaintiff has not alleged one particular fact about himself that Defendant BARUCH misrepresented to her. If she claims misrepresentation or concealment based on lack of “knowledge, skills, and experience”, Defendants need to know what it is. A conclusory statement does not meet the specific pleading requirements for a fraud-based cause of action. Further, in the absence of a specific misrepresented material fact, how can Plaintiff possibly allege detrimental reliance as one of the elements she is required to prove? Plaintiff's counsel apparently believes it is sufficient for pleading purposes to conclude that Plaintiff detrimentally relied by hiring Defendant BARUCH as her lawyer; and, if she had known the true facts about his “knowledge, skills, and experience” in handling public employment cases, she would have hired someone else. This is a completely circuitous and senseless argument. This is a claim which is behind every legal malpractice case— that the attorney’s so-called “knowledge, skills, and experience” were lacking. 4. CONCLUSION: Based on the foregoing, the Demurrer should be granted without leave to amend on at least the First, Second, Third and Fifth Causes of Action. As to the Fourth Cause of Action for concealment (which is really nothing more than a statement that Defendants DEFENDANTS’ REPLY BRIEF TO PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT 11 © 0 ~~ Oo wn » WwW Nh B O N O N N O R D O R O R O R E r e s e s ge p e l p d E y = e r R R N N & 8 0G BE O N ~~ © Vv ® N W UM Br W N = OD committed malpractice), the Demurrer should be granted on uncertainty grounds. Further, as to the Fourth Cause of Action, if the court determines that there is no basis for a fraud cause of action (either misrepresentation and concealment), then the Demurrer should also be granted without leave to amend. Defendants contend that, if the fraud-based counts are really nothing more than a malpractice claim disguised as “fraud,” then the statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure §340.6 would not be tolled at any time after the last representation on or about July 14, 2014. Finally, Plaintiff has made a judicial admission that she signed a substitution of attorney on or about July 14, 2014 and that her new attorney was hired to represent her because of Defendants’ malpractice in the underlying case on September 25, 2014. Those dates can never be changed in a subsequently amended pleading. The statute of limitations of one year under Section 340.6 would apply to all causes of action. There was no tolling. By filing this Complaint on November 25. 2015, Plaintiff “blew” the statute of limitations. (See Hobson v. Raychem Corp. (1999) 73 Cal. App.4th 614, 626; see also Thurman v. Bayshore Transit Management, Inc. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1158, wherein the court cited the general rule that the trial court’s discretion to permit amendment to avoid a judicial admission, such as the date when malpractice occurred or was discovered, is substantially limited. Accordingly, Defendants request that the Court grant the Demurrer without leave to amend. Dated: April 18,2016 LAW OFFICES OF JOEL W. BARUCH, PC oy 010823 J cel. Baruch, Attorney In Pro Per for Defendants DEFENDANTS’ REPLY BRIEF TO PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT 12 N = EE E r — O E N O N O R N R N N N N N N em e e e e ® uN AA WN ER W O R N = So vo 0 0 N N R W N = O PROOF OF SERVICE STATE OF CALIFORNIA ) ) SS: COUNTY OF ORANGE ) I am employed in the County of Orange, State of California, at the law firm of LAW OFFICES OF JOEL W. BARUCH, P.C. (2020 Main Street, Suite 900, Irvine, California 92614). 1am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action. On April 18, 2016, I served the documents described as DEFENDANTS’ REPLY BRIEF TO PLAINTIFE’S OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT in the manner indicated below, on the interested parties to this action as follows: K.D. Hughes HUGHES-CIONE, APLC 738 Santiago Street Santa Ana CA 92701 Tel: 714-834-1364 Fax: 714-834-1365 kdhughes@hughescione.com Attorney for Plaintiff DEBBRA DEMARCO XX (BY REGULAR MAIL) I caused such envelope(s) to be deposited in the United States mail at Irvine, California, with postage Berson fully prepaid. I am readily familiar with the firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. It is deposited with the United States Postal Service each day, and that practice was followed in the ordinary course of business for the service herein attested to. [C.C.P. Section 1013(a)(3)] (BY OVERNIGHT MAIL) I caused such envelope(s) to be delivered by Overnight Express to the office of the parties listed in the service list. (BY EMAIL) I caused the above document to be emailed to the offices of the parties listed above. XX (VIA ONE LEGAL, ELECTRONIC SERVICE) I caused the above document to be served via One Legal by serving the parties listed in the Service List by electronic service. (BY PERSONAL DELIVERY) I personally delivered the above document upon the parties listed in the Service List. (VIA FACSIMILE SERVICE) I caused the above document to be served via facsimile transmission by serving the parties listed in the Service List at the facsimile numbers listed with their names. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that all the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on April 18, 2016, at Irvine, California. Amy Land, Declarant
