Respondent City of Yorba Lindas Opposition Brief Related To Roa208OppositionCal. Super. - 4th Dist.October 16, 2015AN Un Bs W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Rutan & Tucker, LLP attorneys at law RUTAN & TUCKER, LLP Todd O. Litfin (State Bar No. 181152) tlitfin @rutan.com 611 Anton Boulevard, Suite 1400 Costa Mesa, California 92626-1931 Telephone: 714-641-5100 Facsimile: 714-546-9035 Attorneys for Respondent and Defendant CITY OF YORBA LINDA EXEMPT FROM FEE PER GOV'T CODE SEC 6103 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF ORANGE, CENTRAL JUSTICE CENTER TOM BEYL and CINDY BEYL individuals, Case No. 30-2015-00815529 V. Petitioners and Plaintiffs, Assigned for all purposes to: Judge Nathan Scott, Dept. C15 RESPONDENT CITY OF YORBA LINDA’S CITY OF YORBA LINDA, and DOES 1 OPPOSITION BRIEF through 10, (RELATED TO ROA #208) Respondents and Defendants . Date Action Filed: October 16, 2015 Trial Date: February 19, 2020 Hearing Information: Date: February 19, 2020 Time: 2:00 p.m. Location: Department C15 [Filed concurrently with City of Yorba Linda’s Request for Judicial Notice, and Compendium of Declarations and Evidence in support of Opposition Brief] 539/009410-1042 14575071.4 a01/13/20 1- RESPONDENT CITY OF YORBA LINDA’S OPPOSITION BRIEF AN Un Bs W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Rutan & Tucker, LLP attorneys at law TABLE OF CONTENTS LL. WNT BCT TIC TOMI esos eS ES ESR EE EE 9 IL. FACTUAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND .....cccuioiiiiiiinieeieceentee seers seeeeeeee 9 A. The City Establishes The City of Yorba Linda Street Lighting and Landscaping MaitieNance DIASTIICE swum. amssuss snus sass snssnss cxsss sass sssssss ovens sms ssmass ssnssass 9 B. Consistent With Prior Years, The City Approved The Fiscal Year 2013/16 BAI MEET"S BOOTIE ussressmmssmsneos ems sense ssmssiom sions messes esas mss wie Saas 10 C. The Areas Maintained By The City On “Private Property” Are Either Areas Over Which The City Has A Recorded Easement Or A 2 aicTor uh 6 bre Ss KT 1c) SU --- 13 II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ......coooitiiiiienie cece eects sees cece 13 LEP CC EH, 1 S O 14 A. Courts Defer To City Determinations As To Whether An Expenditure Is For A Public Purpose And Not A Gift Of Public TPPULINELS cmos soso 5A D348 SA AA EHR RE RAAB 14 B. An Expenditure Is Not A Gift Of Public Funds If It Is For A Public PUIPOSE ceeeee cesta eee sate essen ee eas 15 C: A City Has Broad Powers Under The State Constitution To Expend Funds For Public PUIPOSES.......ccccoiriiiriiiiiciineeeie cece 16 D. Where An Expenditure Is For A Public Purpose, The Expenditure Is Not A Gift Of Public Funds If Private Parties Also Benefit ..........ccccoceeniienenee. 18 E. In Addition To The Broad Rights Under The Police Power, The City Has Rights To Maintain Landscaping On Property Pursuant To BASIE RIGIES 5 5x.co cumumsn owns sn on sows sss 06.5555 55555 55.08 4553598 $5555 55045 545555 SH55595 08 S455 A95 S558 55.3 22 F. The City’s Gift Of Public Funds Is Not Barred By The Law of the CEE D0 T SHE A RE IE 23 G. Petitioners Are Limited To Litigating The Third Cause Of Action For Injunctive Relief And The Court Should Not Issue An TE RTE vests sss SHE SB REE IE 27 V. CONCLUSION Lc. sees sae sae sees ea 28 539/009410-1042 14575071.4 a01/13/20 A. RESPONDENT CITY OF YORBA LINDA’S OPPOSITION BRIEF 1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 2 | FEDERAL CASES Page(s) 3 | Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego (1981) 4 453 U.S. 490, 69 L.Ed.2d 800, 101 S.Ct. 2882......uiiieiiecieie eee e eee eee etree eevee eerie esses essa 17 5 CALIFORNIA CASES 6 |Abroms v. New York Life Ins. Co. (1944) 04 CaALADPP-2A 449 cco sabes b eshte sabe e ete ehte sabe ene e eran 26 7 Amezcua v. City of Pomona (1985) 8 170 Cal.APP-3A 305 eee eee eee sate sabe atest ee eb be eebe anne eet ee este esse ene esnreens 17 9 | Associated Home Builders etc, Inc. v. City of Livermore (1976) 18 CA, FE SBE mms sono vosessooso e s EA TRA SSEOME HAAS 23 10 11 Associated Home Builders etc., Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek (1971) 4 CAL3A 633 cece eee eee eee eee ete eae este ee eae eee aae ee eabe ee eabe ee erae ee aabeeeataeeenraeans 23 12 Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles (1949) 13 B4 CAL 2A 31 e eee ete beatae teehee abe ene e ete e sate este e nee ebee sateen 23 14 | Bergman v. Drum (2005) 5 129 CalLAPP.ALh 11 coer sb ee sabe e test ee shite esse anne esee sateen 26 16 Beutz v. County of Riverside (2010) 184 CalLAPP.Ath 1516 o.oo tee sbeebs estes sabe eebeenneas 11,20 17 Beyl v. City of Yorba Linda (2018) 18 2018 WL VOBOIT TZ sss minivans os ssi ssi is os A 8 HS 5355 FAS E555 5 14, 26, 27 19 | Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley (1976) 17 Cal.3d 129 eee eta eerste esta e era a ee aat ae erate eee ee eare ee eaae ee erae ee eareeeanas 17 20 71 Board of Supervisors v. Dolan (1975) AS CLAPP. 237 eee eee eee eerste sateen t teehee ete t ae sate enbeeneas 19, 22 22 Building Industry Assn. of Central California v. County of Stanislaus (2010) 5 190 CALPE, 5B soos cesemonenssossisnsosoonessesnsssonsssons s ms 5004 A ER A BTS 23 24 || Burch v. Gombos (2000) 82 CaAlLAPP.Ath 352 eects eee ee she sabe eee t ee sate sete ennes 24 25 California Building Industry Assn. v. City of San Jose (2015) 26 1 61 CALAN 435 ooo eee 17 2 California Redevelopment Assn. v. Matosantos (2013) 28 212 CalLAPPAL TAS57T eee ee ete rt ee sate sabe ates bee sbae sateen sees beens 16 Rutan & Tucker, LLP attorneys at law 539/009410-1042 i EA TIERED RESPONDENT CITY OF YORBA LINDA’S OPPOSITION BRIEF AN Un Bs W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Rutan & Tucker, LLP attorneys at law Page(s) CALIFORNIA CASES (CONT.) Candid Enterprises, Inc. v. Grossmont Union High School Dist. (1985) BO CAl.3A B78 ieee eee eee ee eee shee eae eee bee eh teen be ante e tee ehte sabe anne ebeeehae eens 16 Cane v. City and County of San Francisco (1978) TB CaALLAPP.3A O54... eee eee este st teeta e teeta eshte sateen teste esate sabe ene ee reens 19 Carlin v. City of Palm Springs (1971) 12 CAL APPA TU: soreness vosssesssoososs oem sss 8000568000000 A TRA SHEE HAA 17 Central Basin Municipal Water Dist. v. Fossette (1965) 235 CalLAPP-2A 089 cnet eee eee sates atest ee ea te eee eneas 14, 15 City of Los Angeles v. Jameson (1958) 165 CalAPP.2A 3571 eect eee eee sate eee e teeta hte este e eee bee ehte sabe ene aera ns 23 City of Marina v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2006) 39 CAlAth 341 co c eee shee sabe atest eshte sabe ene estes sate enbe anes 15, 16 City of Saratoga v. Hinz (2004) T15 CalLAPP.Ath 1202 o.oo eee eee esrb ee eb te eebe eres tee ebae esse enna sseens 10 Concerned Dog Owners of California v. City of Los Angeles (2011) 194 CAL APPA, 11D 1x0 cn. wm ssn. mss 2550575.59 559555.5550555 56 5755555 £5555. 50 555.458 SSR S55 550 SHG S855 17 Coshow v. City of Escondido (2005) 132 CalLAPP.ALh O87 eee eee ete eters ee ete e teeta sate sateen ates bee eaae anne 27 County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) SCALA 730 niece ee eet eh teste atest ee eh te ee beatae bee sate eebe antes tae saae eens 19 County of Alameda v. Janssen (1940) 16 CAL FTG seusssensinsssomsavessiossoesnssronss soso s ss 300500 0 SO SB 14, 15, 19, 21, 22, 24 County of Riverside v. Whitlock (1972) 22 CalLAPP.3A BO3 ee eee eee ete sate sabe eee bee shite sete e eee aee ns 19, 22 County of San Diego v. Carlstrom (1961) 196 Cal. APD. 2 ABD sus swsssn.ssssmmss cov is 555558 5505055.50 55555508 5555557538 SATRERS S555 00 SHH 58 SARET A559 SHE5 A SASHA 17 County of Ventura v. State Bar (1995) 35 Cal APP-Ah TOSS eee eee eee eet st te eee e ete es bbe sabe e sees t ee sbbe sabe ene ee neens 27 Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of America (1998) 17 CALA G70 cen t eee ete ee ete eee steer b ee ebbe sabe e ate e bee es teense ante e bee eaae anne 26 Dahms v. Downtown Pomona Property & Business Improvement Dist. (2009) 1 74 Cl ADEA, TUB cums somos sso sss ois mmemss os es sss 10, 12 4- en RESPONDENT CITY OF YORBA LINDA'S OPPOSITION BRIEF AN Un Bs W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Rutan & Tucker, LLP attorneys at law Page(s) CALIFORNIA CASES (CONT.) Di Genova v. State Bd. of Education (1962) ST CAL2A 1607 eee eee eee eee etter tae staat ae esas ee eaba ee esae ae ssbe ae eabe ee ssbe se ssaeeessaeennnes 25 Dunn v. PG&E (1954) 43 Cal.2d 205... eee e eae e ete e estat ease eee abe ae eabe ee etae ee arbeeeasaeeenraeans 23 Estate of Horman (1971) BD (CTAB U5 muses venoms rs ossessoensres E 0 ETRA SHSHE HAAS 25 Golden Gate Bridge & Highway Dist. v. Luehring (1970) 4 CalLAPP.3A 204 cee eee ee eee eet eae sees sabe sabe t ae eabe sateen 20, 21 Golden West Baseball Co. v. City of Anaheim (1994) 25 Cal APPA TT c sas sb ae eee etree b ee sate seb e nee nees 23,25 Guinnane v. San Francisco City Planning Com. (1989) 200 CalLAPP.3A 732 eee eee eee este ee eee atest ee sh teehee eee tee shae sabe ante ebaen 17 Investors Equity Life Holding Co. v. Schmidt (2015) 233 Cal.APP-Ath 1303 ...oeiiiee ee eesti testes sabe estes sate sabe e teeta esate eas 25 Irwin v. City of Manahattan Beach (1966) OF CCALZH. IF su muss sso mnsinsiniososos oss 55055085 555 S505 ls ASST AHS SA 55 RASH SRA 5 St 14, 15 Leider v. Lewis (2017) 2 Cal.Sth 1121, 1130 cies eee cette ete e steers eas aeeaaaae essa ae esas ae essaee sane ee esseeessnes 25 Mannheim v. Superior Court (1970) BCAL3A O78 eee eee eee eee eee eet esate eee t ee eh tee abe eat eeb ee ehte sabe ante eneas 14, 15 Miller v. Board of Public Works (1925) 1 98 CL ATT sommsosossooss coves io A RE A BT 17 Morehart v. Santa Barbara County (1994) T CALAN T25 c os eres eta e sees ete e eas ae esas ee eaas ae ea ab ae erar ae eras ae eerie ae eaae ae erbe ee eraeaens 17 Morgan v. Imperial Irrigation Dist. (2014) 273 Cal APD ANN. BUD. covsnis ummm sows onsmwssss 25555500 5405555 550055 55-45 5555558 SR55545.50 5455550 S455 55045 SHEA 45.00 HANS 5 15 Nally v. Grace Community Church (1988) AT Cal.B3A 278 eee eee eee cette eet este e reeset ae eab ae eae ae eats ae este ae erar ae eaat ae etre ae erae ae erae ee nraeaens 26 Novi v. City of Pacifica (1985) 169 CalLAPP.3A O78 eee eee ete ee t eshte sabe e teeta eshte esse anne estes saae ees 17 Oakland v. Garrison (1924) 1 928 A. DIB mmossossooss venoms os oso ee SE A ER A BT 16 5. en RESPONDENT CITY OF YORBA LINDA'S OPPOSITION BRIEF AN Un Bs W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Rutan & Tucker, LLP attorneys at law Page(s) CALIFORNIA CASES (CONT.) Otay Water Dist. v. Beckwith (1991) LT CalLAPP.Ath TOAL ooo eee esate eee e estes bbe setae eee b ee sbae enna ese esnseens 24 People v. Greene (1968) 2604 CAlLAPP.2A TTA oot eee sates este sbeebs ene e ete e sabe enbeaneaenseens 17 Pratt v. Adams (1964) 229 Col A520] UI wsermonnonssi os sossssesssoesnssnrssmsnons sss 8000 50 0 TRA SMS ME HAA 17 Redevelopment Agency v. Shepard (1977) TS Cal. APDP.3A 453 ee ee eee eet eae etter teenth been be ete e nt eeehbe sabe antes beens 16 Reinsch v. City of Los Angeles (1966) 243 CAlLAPP-2A 737 eee eee eee eet este sabes t ee sate sabe ates bee ebte sabe e nee eran 23 Richeson v. Helal (2007) 158 CalLAPP.Ath 2608 ......ooniiiiieeiie cece eects sees e eee st ees bae sabe a ne estes ebbe esse anaes reeas 16 San Vicente Nursery School v. County of Los Angeles (1956) T47 CalLAPP-2A TO cece eee eee teste eee teste shee sabe e eee b ee sb be enbe ane eebee sateen 20 Schettler v. County of Santa Clara (1977) TA CAL ATI, FIO cis cumsnn.on summon ssmnnsn sows 555055518 5555858 55555 5055551458 £55555:08 S455 SH 5048 FHSS 45.30 SHAN 3 19 Silicon Valley Taxpayers’ Assn. v. Santa Clara County Open Space Authority (2008), A4 Call Athi 431 coerce steer e setae sree era e erates erae ae errr ae eaae ae eabe ee eane aan 12, 15 Steelduct Co. v. Henger-Seltzer Co. (1945) 260 Cal. 2A 634... eee eee ete ete t ete e shee sabe e eee tee ehte sete e nee e bee eaae ens 25 Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles (2008) 167 Cal ADEA, G30 ur50.05 5550 svnsnms msm e5555,58 5455558 855555 0 555558 54555 45-50 455550 S45 58 FATE 14,15, 16 Sullivan v. City of Los Angeles (1953) L18 CalLAPP.2A BOT ens eee ete ste eee atest ee she sabe e eee b ee ebbe esse ane es nseesaae eas 17 Sundance v. Municipal Court (1986) 42 Cal.3A TT0T eerie eee eee ete eee ete e eras eae ae eaas ae esasae esas ae esss se ssseaessseaesssesessseaenns 27 Thain v. City of Palo Alto (1962) 207 Coal A521 | FB wsssoessosasrssmmansn oss ovanmonssonsssmsins somes ss sms ss sss eS si A as 17 Trent Meredith, Inc. v. City of Oxnard (1981) T14 CalLAPP.3A 317 eee eee eters eee teste she sabe e sees b ee sb be esbe anne e esas sateen 23 6- en RESPONDENT CITY OF YORBA LINDA'S OPPOSITION BRIEF AN Un Bs W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Rutan & Tucker, LLP attorneys at law Page(s) CALIFORNIA CASES (CONT.) Weightman v. Hadley (1956) 138 CalLAPP.2A 831 «eect eee eee ete ea teeta t ee ebb seb eats tee ebte sabe anne eran 25 Winkelman v. City of Tiburon (1973) 32 Cal. APP.3A 834 «eects sabe e ete eh te ents eee ete e hae enbe ante ereens 19 CALIFORNIA STATUTES Civil Code SECTION. BA ..eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee eee e teat ee sas testa sse esse seas anes e eas sens s essesessasnnnnenas 23 SECHION 887.010. c.ccciiiiiiiiiiiiiieeeee eee 23,25 SECTION TOO... eee ieee eee eee ee eee teeter eee este tetera eases este testa es sees se ssasannesessesesensnnansenes 13 Seetien: 1009; sbi: [d) sesso mms ams oss ammo soo 24 Code of Civil Procedure SECON S20 ......euieieiiiiieeeeieieieeeee eee ee e e eee eee ee ae teases esas esas esas esas a sesese sess sesesssss sensnsssnenssen nsnnns 13,27 Government Code SECTION 37350). cee eee eee eee eee e ease eet e ates ee esate ase ee se ee serena ee se eesestannnnnenes 22 SECTION 65302(A)(2) +eeeeeurreieeiirieieeeeitie ee eette ee eertre tees staeae ee eabae ee essae ee eassseae es ssssaeasansaeeeansssaeansssses 17 SECTION BOATS eee eee eee eee eee ee eee eee eee eee eee ee ee ae ee ee eee eee eee ae ae ee ae ae ee aeae ee aeae ee aennanns 22 Landscaping and Lighting Act of 1972. cxmmmom mamma momma amass 10, 13,17, 26 Revenue and Taxation Code SECHION S096 ©F SEQ. +veeevreerurieiiieeeitie arti eet teeta estes estes sates ete ee sabe ee sabe ee sube ee sabe ee sabe ee sabeeensseennnee 13 Streets & Highway Code SECTION 225000. ..uu eee ieee eee eee eee eset teeter ee ease eet eat eres eee te asa ee se ee sess an esse eesertarnn anes 10 SECTION 22525(Q) cuvvveeeeiiiieeeeeirie ee eiitte ee eeitte esas settee ee ebae ee easbeae ae sssssaeaeensseaeaasssaeasesssaeseennsseaesnssnes 17 SECTION 22525(F) uurriieeiee ieee eee eee eee ee eee ee eee eee eater eee ae esas eettr bere ae sees ee natarbraeaeaes 26 SECHIONS 22500, 22022... esate e esas eet e ater sees ess te ata es sess ee sestat esas sesertar aes 11 SECTION 225607 eee eee eee esas este eet e sees sees e at esas ese ae asses sees sess aaanessesesesensnnnnanes 11 SECTION 22020)... eee ieee eee eee eee eee eee ee teat ee ee ee estate ater ee see te ssa esse sete ss anaes se eesessannnneeas 10 SECHONS 22024-22031, 22046.....cueueeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee e e ee eee aae t ats sae ssssnnnmnnnn 13 SECTION 83000... ue ieeeiiiieiee eect etter eres ee etter ee esas teats esse ee ee se ssaaaa esse sesessanrn esse eesessananneneseese 23 SECTION 8324... cee ee eee ee eee eee eee eee ee ee ee eee eee eee eee eae ae eee e ana e ee ee an aa ee een aaa een a ee eennaa ee aeanaaaeeennn 23 OTHER AUTHORITIES 80 Cal. Atty.Gen.Ops. 56 (1990) ....cooiiiiiiie eee ee e aan 24,25 £7. 539/009410-1042 AEG 4 OTA RESPONDENT CITY OF YORBA LINDA’S OPPOSITION BRIEF 1 Page(s) 2 | California Constitution ATHICIE XI, SECTION 7 .ovvvveveiiiieiieiieeieieaeteeeeeteaeeaeaeaeaeasaeseseaeasaesssssesesesesssesssssessssssssssnsnsnensnnns 9,16, 18 30 Articles XII C ANA D covers esses sees eee esses ee esos sess sess ee sees esse eeee see eess see eesee eee 10 4 ATHICIE XIII DD cee eee ae eae se seas sess sssssssssssssssssssssssnsnsssssnssensnsnssensnens 15 Article XIII D, SECtiONS 2(1), 42) .eeeeuvreeeeiiiieeeeiiiee ee eitie ee sir e eee esstaeae as s rae ee nsseeeessseaesnssnnes 10, 12 5 Article XIII D, SECON 4A) ..uvurvrrreeieeeiieiiiiieee ieee ee ei irr re esse eset eierarae ee ee sees eestasaearae sees esanrasr eeseseens 10 Article XIII D, SECtioN 4a), (D)...uieeeciieeeeiiieie eects eects ee errie essere ee seetae ae essae ee ssssasae ee ssssaeaesnnns 11 6 Article XIII D, SECON 4(D) ..cvviiriiiiieiieeiie eect eeetee ete eats eeeeeae ee eta setae eve eens ee esee esse ease enseeseens 11 - ATHICIE XVI SECION 6 «eevee eee eee eee ee ee eee e teases ee vasa sees ease vsannnes 9,13, 14, 15 8 PrODOSTUON. ZLB cxumonsnsamasnssss ss suninsuas avs55008 5555550050064 5885465 A MEER AHR RSH V5 SHBRG TB RHA 10, 12, 13, 21 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Rutan & Tucker, LLP RETR 539/009410-1042 ii 14575071.4 a01/13/20 RESPONDENT CITY OF YORBA LINDA’S OPPOSITION BRIEF AN Un Bs W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Rutan & Tucker, LLP attorneys at law MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES I. INTRODUCTION Consistent with its motto, “The Land of Gracious Living,” the City of Yorba Linda has maintained certain landscaping, street lights, and traffic signals in the City since the early 1980s. As the City grew and areas of the City were developed, the City required certain developments to annex into the City’s Street Lighting and Landscaping Maintenance District and dedicate easements to the City for the City’s future maintenance of the landscaped areas. Consistent with applicable law, every year the City holds a public hearing, hears debate, and approves an Engineer’s Report that outlines the improvements maintained by the City and identifies the: 1) “special benefits” from such improvements that are paid for by special assessments on the local properties that receive the special benefit; and 2) the “general benefits” from such improvements such as fire prevention and public safety that accrue to the general public that are paid for by general fund dollars. Petitioners allege that the City’s maintenance of the improvements on alleged “private property” is a “gift of public funds” under California Constitution, Article XVI, section 6. The law holds otherwise. The actions of the City clearly are for a public purpose within the scope of the City’s power pursuant to California Constitution, Article XI, section 7. The law is also clear that the City’s maintenance of improvements for a public purpose that also benefit private property does not convert the expenditure into a gift of public funds. This is especially true where the City holds an easement on the property to specifically perform such maintenance. For the reasons articulated herein, the City requests that the Court deny Petitioners’ request to overrule the City Council’s determination that City expenditures to maintain improvements serve a public purpose and provide aesthetic, public safety and other benefits to the properties and residents of the City. II. FACTUAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND. A. The City Establishes The City of Yorba Linda Street Lighting and Landscaping Maintenance District. Beginning approximately forty years ago, as neighborhoods throughout the City of Yorba Linda (“City”) were being developed and built with regularity, the City formed multiple 9. en RESPONDENT CITY OF YORBA LINDA'S OPPOSITION BRIEF AN Un Bs W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Rutan & Tucker, LLP attorneys at law assessment districts pursuant to the Landscaping and Lighting Act of 1972 (the “Act”) to provide landscape, street light, and traffic signal maintenance. (Sts. & Hwy. Code, §§ 22500 et seq.; Ex. 1, [FY 2015/16 Engineer’s Report], p. 4 [reference to exhibit page number].) An “assessment district” is a geographic area within a city that operates as a financing mechanism to fund certain public improvements. (See Dahms v. Downtown Pomona Property & Business Improvement Dist. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 708, 712; Sts. & Hwy. Code, 22620 et seq.) The City assessment districts were eventually consolidated into a citywide district with various zones called the City of Yorba Linda Street Lighting and Landscaping Maintenance District (“District” or “LMAD”). (Ex. 1, pp. 4-5.) As properties were developed in the City, the City sometimes conditioned the developers to install landscaped areas and often dedicate such areas usually in the form of an easement to the City that would then be maintained by the LMAD. (Brantley Dec., { 3.) In 1996, voters approved Proposition 218, which added Articles XIII C and D to the California Constitution. Pursuant thereto, cities may assess property owners within the zone for the reasonable cost of the proportional “special benefit” conferred on their respective parcels from the improvements within the zone. (Cal. Const., Art. XIII D, §§ 2(i), 4(a).) Special assessments can only be used within the specific zone for which they are levied. (Cal. Const., Art. XIII D, § 4(a).) Any “general benefits” flowing from the improvements must be paid for by the assessing agency out of non-assessment funds. (/d., Art. XIII D, § 4(a); City of Saratoga v. Hinz (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1202, 1223.) In 1997 the City held a ballot proceeding to authorize the continuation of the District’s assessments. (Ex. 1, pp. 4-5.) The City’s parcel owners authorized the LMAD assessments with 83% approval. (/d.) The LMAD currently maintains approximately 502.57 acres of landscape, 6033 street lights, 4954 local street lights and 69 traffic signals in the City. (Ex. 12.) B. Consistent With Prior Years, The City Approved The Fiscal Year 2015/16 Engineer’s Report. To levy LMAD special assessments each year, the City undertakes a multi-step process as required by the Act and Proposition 218. First, as it does every year, the City Council ordered its -10- en RESPONDENT CITY OF YORBA LINDA'S OPPOSITION BRIEF AN Un Bs W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Rutan & Tucker, LLP attorneys at law assessment engineer to prepare the Fiscal Year 2015/16 Engineer’s Report (“Engineer’s Report”). (Ex. 2; Sts. & Hwy. Code, §§ 22566, 22622; Cal. Const., Art. XIII D, § 4(b).) An Engineer’s Report includes a description of the improvements in the District, maps detailing the property to be maintained, and a budget that identifies: (i) the special assessment dollar amount to be levied on each particular parcel based upon the special benefits identified in the report to parcels in the zone, and (ii) the general benefits and respective general funds contributed by the City. (See Sts. & Hwy. Code, § 22567; Cal. Const., Art. XIII D, § 4(a), (b); Beutz v. County of Riverside (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1516, 1532.) The Yorba Linda City Council considered and approved the 2015/16 Engineer’s Report at its regularly-noticed meeting of June 4, 2015, after reviewing the report and taking evidence from the public. (Ex. 3; Ex. 1.) The Engineer’s Report delineates the boundaries of each zone, as well as their respective budgets. (Ex. 1, pp. 71-118 [maps of zones and subzones], pp. 57-69 [budgets].) All told, the Engineer’s Report details one (1) Local Street Lighting Zone, thirty-two (32) Local Landscaping Subzones, one (1) Arterial Street Lighting Zone, nine (9) Arterial Landscaping Subzones, and three (3) Traffic Signal Zones, for a total of forty-six (46) different Zones. (Ex. 1,p. 12.) In the Engineer’s Report, the City specifically identifies and approves both the special benefits to properties within the zone and general benefits to the general public from landscaping improvements. As for the special benefits from landscaping to the properties within the zone, the Engineer’s Report found in part as follows: The ongoing maintenance of landscaped areas within the District provide aesthetic benefits to the properties within each respective Zone and a more pleasant environment to walk, drive, live, and work. The primary function of these landscape improvements and related amenities is to serve as an aesthetically pleasing enhancement and green space for the benefit of the immediately surrounding properties and developments for which the improvements were constructed and installed and/or were facilitated by the development or potential development of properties within the Zones. These improvements are an integral part of the physical environment associated with the parcels in each Zone and while some of these improvements may in part be visible to properties outside the Zone, collectively if these Zone improvements are not properly maintained, it is the parcels within the Zone that would be aesthetically burdened. (Ex. 1, p. 32, emph. added.) "The City cites to the fiscal year 15/16 Engineer’s Report because it was the engineer’s report referenced in Petitioner’s complaint. 11- en RESPONDENT CITY OF YORBA LINDA'S OPPOSITION BRIEF AN Un Bs W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Rutan & Tucker, LLP attorneys at law As to the general benefits to the general public from the landscaping improvements, the City determined: In the absence of a special funding Zone, the City would typically provide only limited free management, weed abatement, rodent control, and erosion control services for the various landscape easement areas. This baseline level of service would typically provide for periodic servicing of the improvement areas (generally twice annually) or on an as needed basis. This baseline level of service provides for public safety and essential property protection to avoid negative impacts on adjacent roadways and vehicle traveling on those roadways and potential property damage resulting from slope failures or fire hazards ... This baseline servicing, unlike the enhanced aesthetic services funded through the District assessments, would provide benefits to the general public and to the properties both within and outside of the specific benefit zones. (Ex. 1, p. 33. emph. added.) Furthermore, the City determined additional general benefits as follows: In addition to the general benefit identified above, it is recognized that there are indirect or incidental general benefits to properties within the District as well as the general public that are associated with regular landscape maintenance services, including: - Minimization of dust and debris; and - Decreased potential water runoff from both properties and the landscaped areas. (Ex. 1, p. 34.) In so doing, the City identified and approved the budgeted assessment amounts and general fund dollars it would expend to operate the LMAD, as well as the location of the improvements to be maintained. (Ex. 1, pp. 54-68 [budgets], 71-118 [maps detailing improvement location].) The City Council’s decision to approve the Engineer’s Report determined both the special assessments to be assessed for the “special benefits” from the improvements and the City’s general fund contribution to the District for the “general benefits” on a zone-by-zone basis for the improvements. In the budget, the amount of the general fund expenses for the general benefit costs is identified on the line item “General Benefit Expenses (City Funded)”. (Ex. 1, pp. 58-69.) Indeed, Proposition 218 legally obligates the City to use non-assessment funds to support the District. As the City can only assess local properties for “special benefits,” the City itself is responsible for paying the costs of all “general benefits” out of non-assessment dollars. (Cal. Const. Art. XIII D, §§ 2(i), 4(a) [“Only special benefits are assessable....”’]; see also Dahms, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at 723; Silicon Valley Taxpayers’ Assn. v. Santa Clara County Open Space Authority (2008), 44 Cal.4th 431, 443 [city must secure other funds to pay for general benefits].) -12- en RESPONDENT CITY OF YORBA LINDA'S OPPOSITION BRIEF AN Un Bs W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Rutan & Tucker, LLP attorneys at law Following approval of the Engineer’s Report, the Act requires the City Council to hold a subsequent meeting at which it must: (1) overrule all protests relating to the levy, (2) levy the assessments consistent with the Engineer’s Report, and (3) direct the County to collect the assessments on the County’s property tax roll. (Sts. & Hwy. Code, §§ 22624-22631, 22646; Ex. 4.) Atits July 21, 2015 meeting, the City Council followed the required procedures and approved Resolution No. 2015-5321. (Ex. 5.) C. The Areas Maintained By The City On “Private Property” Are Either Areas Over Which The City Has A Recorded Easement Or A Prescriptive Easement. The areas that the City maintains that are on private property often are areas that that are easements dedicated and accepted by the City on a tract map or covered by a separate easement document. (Gutierrez Dec., 4.) As properties were developed in the City, the City sometimes conditioned the developers to install landscaped areas and often dedicate such areas usually in the form of an easement to the City that would then be maintained by the LMAD. (Brantley Dec., 93.) There are a certain limited number of areas where the City has not located a recorded easement, but documents indicate that the City has maintained such areas for at least five years and the City is unaware of any express permission or opposition by a private property owner to such maintenance. (Gutierrez Dec.,{ 5; Brown Dec., | 3, Ex. 8.) Therefore, on these limited number of properties the City has a vested right to continue landscape maintenance pursuant to Civil Code section 1009 on these areas. III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Petitioners filed this action on October 16, 2015. The majority of the complaint primarily consisted of a challenge to the City’s LMAD assessment based on Proposition 218 and the Act, with the third cause of action stating a claim for injunctive relief pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 526a that the City violated the “gift of public funds” doctrine in California Constitution, Article XVI, section 6. After multiple demurrers, the trial court sustained the City’s demurrer to the Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s decision as to the first two causes of action for failing to comply with the mandatory claims requirement in Revenue and Taxation Code 13- en RESPONDENT CITY OF YORBA LINDA'S OPPOSITION BRIEF AN Un Bs W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Rutan & Tucker, LLP attorneys at law section 5096 et seq. However, the Court overturned the trial court’s decision as to the third cause of action for injunctive relief and stated, “The judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The trial court erred in sustaining the city’s demurrer to the Beyls’ third cause of action, and the case is remanded to the court for further proceedings on that cause of action.” (Beyl v. City of Yorba Linda (2018) 2018 WL 1980712, *14 (“Court of Appeal Opinion™).) Therefore, the Court of Appeal has already ruled against Petitioner’s challenge as to the legality of the City’s determination as to the amount or nature of the special benefits or general benefits determined by the City in the Engineer’s Report. The only issue remaining in the case is whether the City’s maintenance of landscaping on alleged “private property” is a gift of public funds in violation of the Article XVI, section 6, of the California Constitution. IV. ARGUMENT A. Courts Defer To City Determinations As To Whether An Expenditure Is For A Public Purpose And Not A Gift Of Public Funds. When determining whether a city has violated the “gift of public funds” doctrine, the courts defer to legislative determinations pertaining to expenditures and liberally construe the concept of a public purpose. (County of Alameda v. Janssen (1940) 16 Cal.2d 276, 281-282; Irwin v. City of Manahattan Beach (1966) 65 Cal.2d 13, 22; Mannheim v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 678, 691 [“The concept of public purpose has been liberally construed by the courts, and the Legislature’s determination will be upheld unless it is totally arbitary.”]; Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 630, 637-638; Central Basin Municipal Water Dist. v. Fossette (1965) 235 Cal. App.2d 689, 702 [“Furthermorez, the Legislature is vested with a large discretion in determining what is for the public good and what are public purposes for which public moneys can be rightfully expended and that discretion cannot be controlled by the courts, except when its action is clearly evasive.”] The California Supreme Court in County of Alameda stated: The determination of what constitutes a public purpose is primarily a matter for legislative discretion [citations], which is not disturbed by the courts so long as it has a reasonable basis. [Citations.] This court has frequently upheld the expenditure of funds by the state or its subdivision for the benefit of individuals as for a “public purpose” and hence not within section 31 of article IV. [Citations.] (County of Alameda, supra, 16 Cal.2d at 281-282.)> 2 Article IV, section 31 is the previous version numbering for Article XVI, section 6. 14- en RESPONDENT CITY OF YORBA LINDA'S OPPOSITION BRIEF AN Un Bs W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Rutan & Tucker, LLP attorneys at law For example, in Irwin v. City of Manhattan Beach (1966) 65 Cal.2d 13, 24, the court addressed the issue of whether it was a gift of public funds for a city to allow a pedestrian overpass to be constructed by private parties over a public street. As stated by the court: It is plaintiff’s contention, however, that the instant exercise of this power constitutes a gift of public property in violation of article IV, section 31 of the state Constitution because the benefit of the agreement accrues to private parties. The difficulty with this position is that the agreement set forth in her complaint shows that the city council has expressly found that the structure in question is in the public interest in that it removes a substantial segment of foot traffic from a congested street. Such a finding is reviewable by a court only where it is alleged that fraud, oppression, or manifest abuse of discretion accompanied the determination of public benefit [citation omitted], and plaintiff has alleged none of these. The mere allegation of private benefit cannot be considered an allegation of fraud in the proceedings. [Citations.] Petitioners argue that the court reviews the gift of public funds issue under an “independent judgment” standard. Petitioners cite Silicon Valley Taxpayers’ Assn., Inc, supra, 44 Cal.4th 431 and Morgan v. Imperial Irrigation Dist. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 892, 912. Neither case even remotely applies to, nor even mentions, the standard of review for a gift of public Junds claim. Silicon Valley pertains to a challenge to the amount of an assessment pursuant to California Constitution, Article XIII D. (Id. at 448-450.) Morgan pertains to the constitutionality of a water rate increase pursuant to Article XIII D, section 6. (Id. at 912-913.) After the Court of Appeal decision, the legality of any assessment is not at issue in this case. The only issue is whether the City’s expenditures for landscaping are somehow a gift of public funds pursuant to California Constitution, Article XVI, section 6. Pursuant to County of Alameda, Irwin, Mannheim and Central Basin, in reviewing an allegation of a gift of public funds, courts defer to legislative determinations pertaining to expenditures and liberally construe the concept of a public purpose. B. An Expenditure Is Not A Gift Of Public Funds If It Is For A Public Purpose. The gift of public funds doctrine does not apply to an expenditure when the gift is for a public purpose. (City of Marina v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2006) 39 Cal.4th 341, 363 [the primary question is whether the funds are to be used for a ‘public’ or a ‘private’ purpose]; Sturgeon, supra, 167 Cal. App.4th at 637 [“It is well settled that the primary question to be considered in determining whether an appropriation of public funds is to be considered a gift is whether the funds are to be used for a public or private purpose. If they are to 15- en RESPONDENT CITY OF YORBA LINDA'S OPPOSITION BRIEF AN Un Bs W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Rutan & Tucker, LLP attorneys at law be used for a public purpose, they are not a gift within the meaning of the constitutional violation.”]; Redevelopment Agency v. Shepard (1977) 75 Cal. App.3d 453, 457.) As stated in Oakland v. Garrison (1924) 194 Cal. 298, 302: [Where the question arises as to whether or not a proposed application of public funds is to be deemed a gift within the meaning of that term as used in the constitution, the primary and fundamental subject of inquiry is as to whether the money is to be used for a public or a private purpose. If it is for a public purpose within the jurisdiction of the appropriating board or body, it is not, generally speaking, to be regarded as a gift. In California Redevelopment Assn. v. Matosantos (2013) 212 Cal. App.4th 1457, 1499- 1500, the court analyzed a claim that the reallocation of general tax funds from one use to another use violated the gift of public funds doctrine. The court rejected the claim and stated: In the present matter, the funds in question were not raised by the redevelopment agencies for a specific purpose. They came from general property taxes that were allocated to the agencies. This is not a transfer of funds from the redevelopment agencies to other local agencies, as in Golden Gate Bridge, but a reallocation of funds by the Legislature from one public purpose to another. And the same general group of individuals that contributed the funds, county property taxpayers, will benefit from the use of those funds elsewhere. Under these circumstances, there has been no gift of public funds within the meaning of article XVI, section 6. Hence, pursuant to City of Marina, Sturgeon, and Oakland, if an expenditure is for a public purpose, it is not a gift of public funds. Furthermore, pursuant to Matosantos, general purpose funds can be used for the general purposes of the city. C. A City Has Broad Powers Under The State Constitution To Expend Funds For Public Purposes. The scope of permissible public purposes of a California city is extremely broad. Pursuant to California Constitution, Article XI, section 7, a city has broad powers to act to make within its limits all such “local, police, sanitary and other ordinances and regulations as are not in conflict with general laws.” Under this “police power” granted by the Constitution, “cities have plenary authority to govern, subject only to the limitation that they exercise this power within their territorial limits and subordinate to state law.” (Candid Enterprises, Inc. v. Grossmont Union High School Dist. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 878, 885.) The police power is the exercise of sovereign right to protect the lives, health, morals, comfort, and general welfare of the people. (Richeson v. Helal _16- en RESPONDENT CITY OF YORBA LINDA'S OPPOSITION BRIEF [@ ) wn E a Ww No 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Rutan & Tucker, LLP attorneys at law (2007) 158 Cal. App.4th 268, 277.) The power delegated to municipalities is as broad as that of the Legislature itself. (Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley (1976) 17 Cal.3d 129, 140.) In the exercise of its police powers, “the city has broad discretion in determining what is reasonable in endeavoring to protect the public health, safety, morals, and general welfare.” (Carlin v. City of Palm Springs (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d 706, 711.) As stated in Miller v. Board of Public Works (1925) 195 Cal. 477, 490, when analyzing the police power of the City of the Los Angeles, “Every intendment is to be indulged by the courts in favor of the validity of its exercise, and unless the measure is clearly oppressive it will be deemed to be within the purview of that power.” When a city’s actions are alleged to be outside of its police powers, “all presumptions favor its validity and it will be upheld unless its unconstitutionality clearly and unmistably appears.” (Concerned Dog Owners of California v. City of Los Angeles (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1234, citing Community Memorial Hospital v. County of Ventura (1996) 50 Cal. App.4th 199, 206.) It is fundamental that a city has the authority under its police power to regulate the development and use of private property to promote the general welfare. (California Building Industry Assn. v. City of San Jose (2015) 61 Cal.4th 435, 455.) Permissible areas of municipal authority over private property include but are not limited to regulating and controlling the design and improvement of land (Morehart v. Santa Barbara County (1994) 7 Cal.4th 725; Pratt v. Adams (1964) 229 Cal. App.2d 602), preserving the safety of public streets and sidewalks (Amezcua v. City of Pomona (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 305, 311; People v. Greene (1968) 264 Cal. App.2d 774, 777-780), weed control (Thain v. City of Palo Alto (1962) 207 Cal. App.2d 173, 187), fire safety (County of San Diego v. Carlstrom (1961) 196 Cal.App.2d 485, 491; Sullivan v. City of Los Angeles (1953) 118 Cal.App.2d 807, 810-811), erosion control (Gov. Code § 65302(d)(2)), and aesthetics. (Guinnane v. San Francisco City Planning Com. (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 732, 741; Novi v. City of Pacifica (1985) 169 Cal. App.3d 678, 682; Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego (1981) 453 U.S. 490, 502, 69 L.Ed.2d 800, 811, 101 S.Ct. 2882.) Indeed, the installation and maintenance of landscaping, street lights and traffic signals within the City is specifically authorized by the Act. (Sts. & Hwy. Code, §§ 22525(a) [landscaping], (c) [street lights/traffic signals], (f) [the maintenance or servicing of landscaping/lights].) -17- en RESPONDENT CITY OF YORBA LINDA'S OPPOSITION BRIEF AN Un Bs W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Rutan & Tucker, LLP attorneys at law In the current case, as noted above, the special benefits from the enhanced landscaping provided aesthetic benefits to the properties with the zone. (Ex. 1. p. 29.) As to the general benefits to the general public from the landscaping improvements, the City determined: In the absence of a special funding Zone, the City would typically provide only limited free management, weed abatement, rodent control, and erosion control services for the various landscape easement areas. This baseline level of service would typically provide for periodic servicing of the improvement areas (generally twice annually) or on an as needed basis. This baseline level of service provides for public safety and essential property protection to avoid negative impacts on adjacent roadways and vehicles traveling on those roadways and potential property damage resulting from slope failures or fire hazards ... This baseline servicing, unlike the enhanced aesthetic services funded through the District assessments, would provide benefits to the general public and to the properties both within and outside of the specific benefit zones. (Ex. 1, p. 33, emph. added.) In addition to the general benefit identified above, the City recognized additional general benefits including minimization of dust and debris and decreased potential water runoff from both properties and the landscaped areas. (Ex. 1, p. 34; see also Gutierrez Dec., {{ 2-3.) These benefits were paid for by general funds because the City determined that they were general benefits to the overall community. (Ex. 1, pp. 33-35 [calculation of general benefit costs], pp. 58-69 [budget line item for “General Benefit Expenses (City Funded)”].) Although not raised by Petitioners, the Engineer’s Report also outlines the special benefits from street lighting and traffic signals including property security benefit, pedestrian safety benefit, and parkway/roadway egress benefit. (Ex. 1, p. 32.) The Engineer’s Report also outlines the general benefits from such improvements of enhanced general nighttime traffic safety and circulation for other properties outside the zone and the general public. (Ex. 1, pp. 35-36.) Therefore, it is clear pursuant to California Constitution, Article XI, section 7, and the multitude of cases derived therefrom that the City has the authority and is legally authorized under its police power to install and maintain landscaping, street lights and traffic signals on private property when for a public purpose such as public safety and fire protection and hence not a gift of public funds. D. Where An Expenditure Is For A Public Purpose, The Expenditure Is Not A Gift Of Public Funds If Private Parties Also Benefit. The fact that a private party receives a benefit from an expenditure for a public purpose _18- en RESPONDENT CITY OF YORBA LINDA'S OPPOSITION BRIEF AN Un Bs W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Rutan & Tucker, LLP attorneys at law does not make the expenditure a gift of public funds. The law is replete with examples that where the underlying purpose is public, incidental benefits to private property owners does not convert the expenditure into a gift of public funds. (Board of Supervisors v. Dolan (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 237, 243; County of Riverside v. Whitlock (1972) 22 Cal.App.3d 863, 877 [public purpose determined by nature of use, not who owns or operates the improvement]; Schettler v. County of Santa Clara (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 990, 1003.) “The benefit to the state from an expenditure for a public purpose is in the nature of consideration and the funds expended are therefore not a gift even though private persons are benefited therefrom.” (County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 730, 745-746.) For example in County of Alameda, supra, 16 Cal.2d at 280, the issue was whether the county could release public liens on property of indigent property owners or whether it was a gift of public funds to do so. The release of the lien would be a direct personal benefit to the property owner, but the California Supreme Court held that since the government had determined there was a public benefit in assisting the indigent, there was no gift of public funds despite the benefit received by the property owner. (Id. at 281, 282; see also Cane v. City and County of San Francisco (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 654, 660 [evidence indicated payment of lessee taxes by lessor city on leased city property was for public purpose]; Winkelman v. City of Tiburon (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 834, 845 [sale of public property at reduced market rate for construction of moderate and low incomes housing is not a gift of public funds].) In Board of Supervisors v. Dolan (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 237, 243, the court considered whether a city’s making of long term low interest loans for residential rehabilitation and issuance of bonds for such purposes was a gift of public funds even though there was a benefit to private persons. (Id. at 243.) The benefit to private parties in Dolan was obvious and direct - a property owner could get a below market loan to improve its private residential property. (Id. at 239-242.) However, the court held that since there was a public purpose of residential community rehabilitation, it was not a gift of public funds. (Id. at 243.) The fact that the actual improvement for which the city expends public funds is owned by a private party is irrelevant. (County of Riverside v. Whitlock (1972) 22 Cal.App.3d 863, 877.) In 19- en RESPONDENT CITY OF YORBA LINDA'S OPPOSITION BRIEF AN Un Bs W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Rutan & Tucker, LLP attorneys at law County of Riverside, the county raised and expended funds for the construction of a gas line to provide utility service, and upon completion of the project determined that the system would be owned and operated by a privately owned utility. Plaintiffs raised the issue that the arrangment consituted a gift of public funds. The court disagreed: The fact title to the improvements vest in the utility upon completion of the work does not invalidate the arrangment. Public funds may be expended for a public purpose even though there may be incidental benefits to private persons. ... The fact that the improvements will be owned and operated by a public utility does not detract from the public character of the improvements. The gas company is a regulated public utility obligated by law to manage and operate its system to provide service to the inhabitants of the lands within the district. “The test of the public character of an improvement is the use to which it is to be put, not the person by whom it is to be operated.” (Milhelm v. Moffat Tunnel Improvment Dist. 262 U.S. 710.719 [67 L.Ed 1194, 1200, 43 S.Ct. 694].) (Emph. added.) Therefore, pursuant to the multitude of authorities above, if a city expenditure is for a public purpose, it is not a gift of public funds although a private party may benefit therefrom. Petitioners cite two cases for the proposition that the City’s maintenance of landscaping is a gift of public funds, neither of which is remotely analogous. In San Vicente Nursery School v. County of Los Angeles (1956) 147 Cal.App.2d 79, the county gave exclusive use of a building in a county park to a private school to the exclusion of the public. As noted by the court, “The use of the park by the school did not contribute to the enjoyment of the park by the general public but contributed only to the enjoyment of the park by the few children and their parents.” Indeed, in San Vicente the County itself determined that the school unreasonably excluded the public from the use of the facility and that the law prohibited the county from interfering with the public’s use of the park. (Id. at 85.) Likewise Golden Gate Bridge & Highway Dist. v. Luehring (1970) 4 Cal. App.3d 204, is inapposite. In Golden Gate, the district at issue was formed pursuant to laws specifically authorizing the acquisition and construction of highways and bridges. (Id. at 209.) As such, its revenues were limited to the special purpose of “bridging the Golden Gate”. (Id. at 215.) The issue in the case was whether the district could transfer excess revenues of the district to the general funds of local counties. The court held that the transfer violated the gift of public funds doctrine because government funds assessed for a specific purpose by a limited purpose agency 20- en RESPONDENT CITY OF YORBA LINDA'S OPPOSITION BRIEF AN Un Bs W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Rutan & Tucker, LLP attorneys at law such as the district could not be transferred to the general fund of another agency and be used for general purposes. (Id. at 215.) Obviously, Golden Gate is irrelevant to the case at bar where the City uses special assessment funds to pay for the special benefits from the improvements to the properties in the assessment zone. (See Ex. 1, pp. 58-69 [Assessment Rate per EBU].) Indeed, the General Benefit Expenses (City Funded) is subtracted from the total annual expenses to determine the total eligible special benefit expenses. (See Ex. 1, pp. 58-69 [General Benefit Expenses (City Funded)].) Indeed, in Golden Gate the court noted that in contrast to the district in Golden Gate, general purpose entities (like a city such as the City of Yorba Linda) have much broader authority to expend public resources to serve the general interests of the people. (Id. at 209 [“Such entities have extremely broad “purposes,” affecting in many ways the welfare of their citizens; they are therefore empowered to undertake many kinds of activity in furtherance of the general welfare of their citizens.”]) Petitioners also argue that where the alleged expenditure does not serve a “meaningful” public purpose and confers alleged “significant direct benefits” to private property owners, the expenditure is a gift of public funds - but Petitioners cite no authority for such proposition. (Opening Brief, pp. 13-14.) In contravention of County of Alameda, 16 Cal.2d at 281-282, Petitioners’ argument simply seeks to improperly have the Court substitute its viewpoint on policy matters for that of the City Council. Petitioners also attempt to distort the City’s findings in the Engineer’s Report as to the public benefits, both special and general, from the maintenance of landscaping. (Opening Brief, pp- 14-16.) As noted above, the City specifically determined in the Engineer’s Report that there was a special benefit to properties within each zone to create “an aesthetically pleasing enhancement and green space for the benefit of the immediately surrounding properties ... within the Zones.” (Ex. 1, p. 32.) Completely separate from these special benefit of aesthetics (and as required by Proposition 218), the City determined that there was general benefit from the landscape improvements as follows: In the absence of a special funding Zone, the City would typically provide only limited tree management, weed abatement, rodent control, and erosion control services for the various landscape easement areas. ... This baseline level of service provides for public safety and essential property protection to avoid negative 21- en RESPONDENT CITY OF YORBA LINDA'S OPPOSITION BRIEF AN Un Bs W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Rutan & Tucker, LLP attorneys at law impacts on adjacent roadways and vehicles traveling on those roadways and potential property damage resulting from slope failures or fire hazards ... This baseline servicing, unlike the enhanced aesthetic services funded through the District assessments, would provide benefits to the general public and to the properties both within and outside of the specific benefit zones. (Ex. 1, p. 33; emph. added.) These general benefits, as required by law, are paid for by general fund dollars because the City has determined that it is the general public that received such benefits. (Ex. 1, pp. 33-35.) Petitioners also misleadingly argue that the City determined in the Engineers Report that the landscaping improvements have “no quantifiable benefit to the public at large or properties outside each respective zone” and hence there is no “public benefit” and it is a gift of public funds. (Opening Brief, p. 15.) However, Petitioners left out the language immediately before the quoted sentence which states that the reference to “no quantifiable benefit to the public” is refering to “such maintenance beyond that which is required to ensure the safety and protection of the general public and property in general.” (Ex. 1, p. 33.) In otherwords, the benefits identified other than to ensure the safety and protection of the general public and property in general. However, the City separately determines the separate general benefits to ensure the safety and protection of the overall general public that is paid for by general fund dollars. In sum, pursuant to Dolan, Whitlock, and County of Alameda, the case law is clear that if an expenditure is for a public purpose, the fact that private party benefits or even owns the improved property does not transform the action into a gift of public funds. E. In Addition To The Broad Rights Under The Police Power, The City Has Rights To Maintain Landscaping On Property Pursuant To Easement Rights. Additionally, the City has the right and obligation to maintain certain areas of properties because it has easements on such property. Pursuant to Government Code section 37350, “A city may purchase, lease, receive, hold, and enjoy real and personal property, and control and dispose of it for the common benefit.” Furthermore, pursuant to Government Code section 66475 states in part, “There may be imposed by local ordinance a requirement of dedication or irrevocable offer of dedication of real property within the subdivision for streets, alleys, including access rights and abutter’s rights, drainage, public utility easements and other public easements.” It is clear that a 99. en RESPONDENT CITY OF YORBA LINDA'S OPPOSITION BRIEF AN Un Bs W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Rutan & Tucker, LLP attorneys at law city can require dedication of easements in connection with the development of property within the city. (Associated Home Builders etc, Inc. v. City of Livermore (1976) 18 Cal.3d 582, 600; Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles (1949) 34 Cal.2d 31, 42; Trent Meredith, Inc. v. City of Oxnard (1981) 114 Cal.App.3d 317, 328; Building Industry Assn. of Central California v. County of Stanislaus (2010) 190 Cal. App.4th 582, 589-598 [conservation easement]; Associated Home Builders etc., Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek (1971) 4 Cal.3d 633, 638 [city authority to accept open space easement].) An easement provides the right to the easement holder to use the property consistent with the easement. (Civ. Code, § 887.010, Golden West Baseball Co. v. City of Anaheim (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 11, 35.) An entity that owns an easement also has a duty to maintain the area of the easement and the improvements therein so that it remains in a safe condition. (Civ. Code, § 845; Dunn v. PG&E (1954) 43 Cal.2d 265, 273 [easement holder must maintain the facilities installed in easement area in safe condition and prevent injury to third parties]; Reinsch v. City of Los Angeles (1966) 243 Cal. App.2d 737, 747 [city’s right to use drainpipe gave rise to duty to maintain it].) Furthermore, the fee owner is prohibited from unreasonable interference with the easement holder’s use of the easement. (City of Los Angeles v. Jameson (1958) 165 Cal.App.2d 351 [fee owner had to remove fences that interfered with maintenance of easement owner’s power lines].) In order to cease having duties under an easement, a city may vacate its rights in the easement in accordance with the Public Streets, Highways, and Service Easements Vacation Law (Sts. & Hy. Code, §§ 8300 et seq.) upon a noticed hearing and a city council finding that the easement is unnecessary for present or prospective public use. (Sts. & Hy. Code, § 8324.) A number of areas maintained by the City are on areas on which the City has either accepted the dedication of an easement on a tract map or has a separately recorded easement. (Gutierrez Dec., 4; see examples at Exs. 16 and 17.) As noted above, when developments were developed in the City they were often conditioned to dedicate an easement to the City for landscaping purposes. (Brantley Dec., 3.) Therefore, pursuant to its easement rights, in addition to the ability to maintain landscaping under its police power, under the law the City has the right 073. en RESPONDENT CITY OF YORBA LINDA'S OPPOSITION BRIEF AN Un Bs W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Rutan & Tucker, LLP attorneys at law and indeed the duty to maintain the areas subject to the easements for the public benefit and such maintenance cannot be a gift of public funds. Not surprisingly, given the sheer amount of acreage maintained and the 40 year existence of the District, there are also a limited number of areas where the City has not located a recorded easement. (Gutierrez Dec., 5.) However, for those areas on private property that the City is aware of without a recorded easement, the City has satisfied the requirements for a prescriptive easement. Pursuant to Civil Code section 1009, subdivision (d): Where a governmental entity is using private lands by an expenditure of public funds on visible improvements on or across such lands or on the cleaning or maintenance related to the public use of such lands in such a manner so that the owner knows or should know that the public is making such use of his land, such use, including any public use reasonably related to the purposes of such improvement, in the absence of either express permission by the owner to continue such use or the taking by the owner of reasonable steps to enjoin, remove or prohibit such use, shall after five years ripen to confer upon the governmental entity a vested right to continue such use. (See also Burch v. Gombos (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 352, 361; Otay Water Dist. v. Beckwith (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1045.) The use of a prescriptive easement is the same as the use by which it is acquired. (Otay, supra, 1 Cal. App.4th at 1047.) Like a recorded easement, a prescriptive easement is also an interest in the property. (See Burch, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at 362.) The City’s maintenance of landscaping on such areas is obviously open and notorious. From a review of City documents, the maintenance with City funds has occured for a minimum of five years. (Ex. 8; Gutierrez Dec., {5.) The City has reviewed its records and is not aware of any express permission by the owner of private property to continue such use or the taking by the owner of reasonable steps to enjoin, remove or prohibit such use. (Brown Dec., {3.) Therefore, the City contends that it has prescriptive easement rights over the areas of alleged private property it maintains without a recorded easement. Maintenance of private property pursuant to an easement is not a gift of public funds. (80 Cal. Atty.Gen.Ops. 56, 59-60 (1990).) In this opinion, the Attorney General analyzed whether a county’s maintenance of a road that the public had acquired as a prescriptive easement (or implied dedication) was a gift of public funds. The Attorney General noted that County of Alameda, supra, 16 Cal.2d at 281, held that expenditures for a public purpose were not a gift of public 24- en RESPONDENT CITY OF YORBA LINDA'S OPPOSITION BRIEF AN Un Bs W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Rutan & Tucker, LLP attorneys at law funds. (Id. at 59.) Because the public and the private property owners could use the road, the Attorney General held, “We conclude that public funds may be used to repair and maintain an unpaved road located on private property if the general public has a “prescriptive use easment” to travel on the road. (/d. at 60.) The same rationale applies to any improvement of private property pursuant to an easement either recorded or prescriptive. Therefore, in addition to its police power authority, as the holder of an easement, or in limited cases a prescriptive easement, pursuant to Civil Code section 887.010, Golden West and the other cited authorities, the City clearly has the right to maintain landscaping on property within its easement consistent with the public purposes of the expenditures for such maintenance. F. The City’s Gift Of Public Funds Is Not Barred By The Law of the Case Doctrine. The law of the case doctrine does not bar the City’s arguments that its maintenance of landscaping is not a gift of public funds. “The doctrine of the law of the case (in this state) does not extend to the facts or the points of law which might have been but were not presented and determined on a prior appeal.” (Steelduct Co. v. Henger-Seltzer Co. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 634, 644 [no indication in prior opinion that defense of abandonment of contract was raised]; Di Genova v. State Bd. of Education (1962) 57 Cal.2d 167, 179 [doctrine does not extend to “points of law which might have been, but were not presented and determined on a prior appeal’].) For example, in Leider v. Lewis (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1121, 1130, the supreme court held that animal abuse claims against a zoo were jusiticable under a taxpayer statute; however, on remand defendants asserted a statutory defense that was not resolved in the prior appeal so not barred. Similarly in Estate of Horman (1971) 5 Cal.3d 62, the state asserted for the first time the statute of limitations barred the claims and the law of the case doctrine did not apply because the new defense was not “essential to the decision” in the prior appeal. (Id. at 74.) The law of the case doctrine does not apply to new and additional evidence, nor does it apply when explanation of previous evidence appears in later trial. (Weightman v. Hadley (1956) 138 Cal.App.2d 831, 841; Investors Equity Life Holding Co. v. Schmidt (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1377 [doctrine does not limit additional evidence that party may introduce that was not presented at first trial].) 05. en RESPONDENT CITY OF YORBA LINDA'S OPPOSITION BRIEF AN Un Bs W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Rutan & Tucker, LLP attorneys at law In its opinion on the trial court’s ruling on the City’s demurrer, the Court of Appeal merely stated that the City cited the Act and that there was no citation to any authority authorizing the City to maintain these types of improvements on private property. (Court of Appeal Opinion, *13.) However, because the case was merely at the demurrer state, the City did not raise (and obviously the Court did not consider) the issue of the easements that it has on the so-called private property (both recorded and prescriptive) to specifically perform the landscaping at issue. Furthermore, the City did not raise (and the court did not consider) the plethora of authority under the police power authorizing the public purposes inherent in its landscaping, nor did the City raise the issue nor the Court mention the issue of the ability to maintain landscaping pursuant to Streets and Highway Code section 22525(f) [the maintenance or servicing of landscaping/lights]. As such, the City is clearly not barred from raising such arguments now. Furthermore, the law of the case doctrine is not applicable in the current situation because the only issue at the demurrer state was whether Petitioners had alleged a valid claim. As noted in Bergman v. Drum (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 11, 21, a court’s procedural conclusion that plaintiff presented a prima facie case will have no impact on the trial of the matter and, “Upon the commencement of the trial, the impact of the law of the case doctrine will simply disappear.” Similarly in Abroms v. New York Life Ins. Co. (1944) 64 Cal.App.2d 449, 456, the court held that the decision of a reviewing court in ruling on a demurrer did not bind the trial court as law of case in ruling on sufficiency of evidence to support allegations in pleadings because in ruling on demurrer courts must assume truth of facts in plaintiff's complaint. (See also Nally v. Grace Community Church (1988) 47 Cal.3d 278, 301 [law of case doctrine did not bar review of evidence not considered in prior appeal because court only found plaintiff has raised triable issue of fact to defeat summary judgment motions]; Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of America (1998) 17 Cal.4th 670, 685 [prior ruling on demurrer that complaint stated cause of action not borne out by evidence and not binding as law of the case].) In short, the law of the case doctrine does not govern where the City is raising different law and evidence for the pending trial on this matter than it raised or could raise at the demurrer state in its challenge to the pleadings. 26- en RESPONDENT CITY OF YORBA LINDA'S OPPOSITION BRIEF AN Un Bs W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Rutan & Tucker, LLP attorneys at law G. Petitioners Are Limited To Litigating The Third Cause Of Action For Injunctive Relief And The Court Should Not Issue An Injunction. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of the trial court sustaining the City’s demurrer to the first and second causes of action for a writ of mandate and declaratory relief respectively. “The judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The trial court erred in sustaining the city’s demurrer to the Beyls’ third cause of action, and the case is remanded to the court for further proceedings on that cause of action.” (Court of Appeal Opinion, *14.) Therefore, Petitioners’ request for a writ of mandate and declaratory relief have already been dismissed and are barred. The remaining third cause of action seeks an injuction pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 526a. A public expenditure is a potential waste of public funds subject to Code of Civil Procedure section 526a only if it is “totally unnecessary”, “useless” or “provides no public benefit.” (County of Ventura v. State Bar (1995) 35 Cal. App.4th 1055, 1059; Sundance v. Municipal Court (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1101, 1138-39.) “Waste” is more than a disagreement with the manner in which the government acts or a mistake by a public official in matters of the exercise of discretion, or else every disagreement is subject to litigation. (Coshow v. City of Escondido (2005) 132 Cal. App.4th 687, 714; Sundance, supra, 42 Cal.3d at 1138-1139.) For the reasons outlined above, the City’s expenditures for the landscaping, street lighting and traffic signal improvements clearly provided a public benefit and do not amount to waste or authorize an injunction pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 526a. 111 111 111 111 111 111 111 111 97. en RESPONDENT CITY OF YORBA LINDA'S OPPOSITION BRIEF AN Un Bs W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Rutan & Tucker, LLP attorneys at law LP CONCLUSION For the reasons articulated herein, the Court should deny Petitioners’ arguments that the City’s expenditures on alleged private property for landscaping maintenance constitute a gift of public funds. The City Council goes through a detailed public process to determine the special and general benefits within each zone within the LMAD to improve the aesthetics of the zones and improve the public safety and fire safety for the overall community. The City’s determination regarding the public purposes of such expenditures is not only clearly justified, but is of vital importance to the community and its citizens. Dated: January 13, 2020 RUTAN & TUCKER, LLP TODD O. LITFIN By: /s/ Todd Litfin Todd O. Litfin Attorneys for Respondent and Defendant CITY OF YORBA LINDA 08. en RESPONDENT CITY OF YORBA LINDA'S OPPOSITION BRIEF
