Mohammad Farha vs. Michelson Marketplace Venture, LLC

Opposition

Cal. Super. - 4th Dist.September 23, 2015

95 1. 84 8. 94 30 -F AX C A N Y O N LA KE , CA 92 58 7 TE LE PH ON E: 95 1. 66 7. 57 92 W A L K E R TR IA L L A W Y E R S 31 50 4- 2 RA IL RO AD C A N Y O N RO AD OW 0 NN aA EA W N N N O N O N N N O N DN N N p m em em p m p m e d mb e d pe d e d 0 NN AA EA W N = S Y N N N Ww yy = O Barry M. Walker (SBN 195947) Larissa A. Branes (SBN 245875) ELECTRONICALLY FILED WALKER TRIAL LAWYERS, LLP Superior Court of California, 31504 Railroad Canyon Road, Suite 2 County of Orange Canyon Lake, CA 92587 02/05/2016 at 08:48:00 A pew amg! ermallawyers.com Clerk of the Superior Court 951.821.7150 fax By e Clerk Deputy Clerk Attorneys for Plaintiff MOHAMMAD FARHA SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ORANGE MOHAMMAD FARHA, an individual, CASE NO.: 30-2015-00811246-CU-BC-CJC Plaintiff, Assigned for All Purposes to vs. The Honorable Martha K. Gooding MICHELSON MARKETPLACE PLAINTIFF MOHAMMAD FARHA’S VENTURE LLC, a Delaware limited OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION liability company; and DOES 1 through 25, TO STRIKE inclusive, DATE: February 22, 2016 Defendants. TIME: 8:30 a.m. DEPT: C34 Complaint Filed: September 23, 2015 TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD: Plaintiff, Mohammad Farha ("Plaintiff"), hereby opposes Defendant, Michelson Marketplace Venture's ("Defendant"), Motion to Strike, as follows: L INTRODUCTION Defendant’s Motion to Strike improperly attempts to accomplish things that a motion to strike cannot do. Defendant seeks to strike from Plaintiff’s Complaint all references to damages, on the purported grounds that monetary damages are precluded by an exculpatory provision in the lease agreement and based on alleged “judicial admissions” in the Complaint. Interestingly, the Motion conveniently ignores Plaintiff’s reformation cause of action. PLAINTIFFS OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE eo 0 N N SN nh A W N p d pm ed WwW N N = o 95 1. 84 8. 94 30 -F AX pd a C A N Y O N LA KE , CA 92 58 7 Te LE PH ON E: 95 1. 66 7. 57 92 pd th W A L K E R TR IA L L A W Y E R S 31 50 4- 2 RA IL RO AD C A N Y O N RO AD NN O N N N N N N N N p e 0 NN a Un A W N O E Vw W N a Defendant’s Motion is in large part an effort to have the Court evaluate evidence in light of applicable legal standards and to determine the legal sufficiency of the allegations in the Complaint. The first is the function of a motion for summary adjudication. The second is the function of a demurrer. Neither is the function of a motion to strike. Furthermore, although the Motion relies heavily on the case of Fritelli, Inc. v. 350 North Canon Drive, LP (2011) 202, Cal.Ap.4th 35, such reliance is misplaced, as Fritelli was decided on a motion for summary judgment and the facts are distinguishable. As a motion to strike may not be used to weigh evidence, resolve disputed legal issues or simply eliminate essential allegations of a cause of action with which a party disagrees, Defendant’s Motion to Strike is improper and should be denied in its entirety. IL STATEMENT OF FACTS As alleged in the Complaint, on or about May 1, 2013, Plaintiff, as lessee, entered into a written Standard Retail/Multi-Tenant Lease - Net (the “Lease”) with Wilks Land Company, a California limited partnership, as lessor, which was subsequently assigned to Defendant, for certain retail real property in the City of Irvine, County of Orange, commonly known as 2222 Michelson Drive, Suite 208 (the “Premises”). The Premises consists of approximately 545 square feet and is a part of a larger retail center known as Michelson Marketplace (the "Shopping Center"). Plaintiff entered into the Lease in order to operate a business known as Gourmet Burgers, which prepared and sold specialty hamburgers and related food items. Plaintiff specifically entered into the Lease with the intent to lease space located in the food court area of the Shopping Center, which provided high visibility, was a high traffic area and is generally a location in which hungry shoppers will commence their search for dining options. Additionally, as the Premises are only 545 square feet, the food court provided ample seating for customers of Gourmet Burgers. After expending considerable time, resources and funds in making Gourmet Burgers a successful restaurant in the food court of the Shopping Center, Plaintiff received written correspondence from Lincoln Property Company, the authorized agent of Defendant, dated July 15, 2015, advising Plaintiff that Defendant was exercising its election under Section 42 of the Lease to 2 PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE W A L K E R T R I A L L A W Y E R S 31 50 4- 2 R A I L R O A D C A N Y O N R O A D C A N Y O N LA KE , CA 92 58 7 TE LE PH ON E: 95 1. 66 7. 57 92 95 1. 84 8. 94 30 -F AX ov 0 Na N n Aa W N N O N O N O N O N N N N O N mm p d em wk e d md e d pm b p d 0 NN O A 0 HE W N = Oe vw NN N E W N = e relocate Plaintiff to another space in the Shopping Center ("Relocation Notice"). The proposed relocation space, although allegedly greater in square footage, is not located anywhere near the food court area of the Shopping Center and does not provide any visibility in the food court ("Relocation Space"). Up until receipt of the Relocation Notice, Plaintiff was unaware of the provisions of Section 42 of the Lease, which provides, in part that: "Lessor shall have the right at any time or times, upon giving Lessee not less than 60 days prior written notice, to provide and furnish Lessee with space of comparable visibility located elsewhere within any of the buildings within the Shopping Center and to move Lessee into such new space, provided that the useable area of such new space is not less than the usable area of the Premises. . . ." English is a second language to Plaintiff and, unlike Wilks Land Company, Plaintiff is not a sophisticated business entity that owns, leases and manages real properties, but an individual who creates and sells specialty food items. Plaintiff was not familiar with the fifteen (15) page, small print, AIR Commercial Real Estate Association Net Lease form, and was unaware of Section 42 of the Lease, buried at the bottom of page thirteen (13) of the Lease and misleadingly entitled "Building Planning," and any effect thereof. Additionally, Plaintiff was unaware of Section 8.8 of the Lease, entitled "Exemption of Lessor and its Agents from Liability," which is concealed in provision 8 of the Lease, entitled "Insurance; Indemnity," and is an exculpatory provision in favor of the lessor. Section 8.8 provides, in part," [n]otwithstanding the negligence or breach of this Lease by Lessor or its agents, neither Lessor nor its agents shall be liable under any circumstances for. . . (3) injury to Lessee's business or for any loss of income or profit therefrom." The relocation provision of the Lease, Section 42, and the exculpatory provision of the Lease, Section 8.8, do not reflect the true intent of the parties, in that Plaintiff would lease space in the food court, which would provide high visibility to shoppers looking for dining options, heavy foot traffic and would provide ample, common area sitting. As Defendant is attempting to relocate Plaintiff to a space that is not of comparable visibility, and based on the failure of the Lease to reflect the true intent of the parties, Plaintiff had no choice 3 PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE TE LE PH ON E: 95 1. 66 7. 57 92 95 1. 84 8. 94 30 -F AX W A L K E R TR IA L L A W Y E R S 31 50 4- 2 RA IL RO AD C A N Y O N RO AD C A N Y O N LA KE , CA 92 58 7 eo 0 NN N D A W N N O O N O N O N NB NBN NBN NN NN m o m o m mm j h pw mk mk es 00 ~N AA dA W O N mE ® 8 N N a n A W N y = D but to file a Complaint against Defendant for: (1) Breach of Contract - Lease; (2) Breach of Contract - Quiet Possession; (3) Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; (4) Declaratory Relief; (5) Injunctive Relief; and (6) Reformation. IIL. THE MOTION TO STRIKE IS IMPROPER Motions to strike are disfavored since pleadings are to be “liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice between the parties.” Code of Civil Procedure § 452; CLD Const., Inc. v. City of San Ramon (2004) 120 Cal. App.4th 1141, 1149 (“complaints are to be liberally construed (§ 452) and disputes should be resolved on their merits”). “In passing on the correctness of a ruling on a motion to strike, judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth.” Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal. App.4th 1253, 1255. In essence, Defendant asks the Court to weigh evidence, resolve factual disputes and finally determine the viability of certain material allegations and legal defenses at the pleading stage. Defendant does not point to any circumstance in which the courts have authorized a motion to strike for this purpose. The approach is completely contrary to the requirement that the court accept allegations as true and gives those allegations a liberal construction. See Velez v. Smith (2006) 142 Cal. App. 4th 1154, 1163. It would also circumvent the procedural protections provided to a party under Code of Civil Procedure §§ 430.10 and 437c. Although Defendant cites the definitions of “immaterial allegation” in the Motion and the grounds in which a motion to strike may be used to strike an immaterial allegation, Defendant fails to mention the definition of a material allegation. (Motion, 6:2-3). “A material allegation in a pleading is one essential to the claim or defense and which could not be stricken from the pleading without leaving it insufficient as to that claim or defense.” C.C.P. § 431.10(a). Moreover, “it is improper for a court to strike a whole cause of action of a pleading under Code of Civil Procedure section 436 . . . . While under section 436, a court at any time may, in its discretion, strike portions of a complaint that are irrelevant, improper, or not drawn in conformity 4 PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE oo 00 N N a Wn A W N E E < = WwW N N = o 95 1. 84 8. 94 30 -F AX - = C A N Y O N LA KE , CA 92 58 7 TE LE PH ON E: 95 1. 66 7. 57 92 pt th W A L K E R TR IA L L A W Y E R S 31 50 4- 2 RA IL RO AD C A N Y O N RO AD NN N N N N N N N N E m pe 0 NN aA Vn AE W N = SS vO 0 NN with the law, matter that is essential to a cause of action should not be struck and it is error to do $0.” Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Ctr. (2006) 140 CA4th 1256, 1281. Plaintiff’s allegations of damages are essential to his three breach of contract causes of action. “A statement of a cause of action for breach of contract requires a pleading of . . . (4) damages to plaintiff therefrom.” Acoustics, Inc. v. Trepte Construction Co. (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d 887, 913. As damages are an essential element to Plaintiffs breach of contract, striking them would be improper. Moreover, by asking the Court to strike the damages, Defendant is improperly asking the Court to make a determination of the facts at the pleading stage. Plaintiff's Complaint has merely alleged that he has suffered damages, which is an essential allegation of the breach of contracts causes of action. In order for the Court to strike the damage allegations, it would have to make a determination as to whether Plaintiff is entitled to recover damages. Moreover, if the Court strikes the damages, then the Court is essentially ruling on the reformation claim, which was is glaringly ignored by the Motion. Although Defendant asserts in its Motion that “[a] motion to strike may target improper damage allegations in a breach of lease case,” the case of Saberi v. Bakhtiari cited by Defendant do not support this contention. (Motion, 5: 24-25.) The case of Saberi v. Bakhtiari (1985) 169 CA3d 509 was an unlawful detainer action based on a 30-day notice to quit. The court found that rent cannot be recovered unless the unlawful detainer is based on nonpayment of rent. Saberi, 169 CA3d at 516. The court found that “[h]aving determined that pre-termination rent may not be recovered in an unlawful detainer proceeding which is based upon a 30-notice to quit, and not upon default in the payment of rent,” such allegations requesting rent were subject to a motion to strike. Id. Plaintiff’s Complaint is not an unlawful detainer action in which the court’s strictly construe the unlawful detainer statutes. (See Saberi, 169 CA3d at 514). As such, the holding of Saberi is inapplicable. 111 111] 5 PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE TE LE PH ON E: 95 1. 66 7. 57 92 95 1. 84 8. 94 30 -F AX W A L K E R TR IA L L A W Y E R S 31 50 4- 2 RA IL RO AD C A N Y O N RO AD C A N Y O N LA KE , CA 92 58 7 8 00 NN a Un A W N N O O N O N O N NB O N NN N N N N p m o m pm p m p d pe d p d p m e d ed 0 NN A bE WwW N = ve NN N W A W Ny = e As Defendant’s Motion seeks to strike material allegations of Plaintiff’s Complaint essential to his breach of contract causes of action and reformation cause of action, Defendant’s Motion is improper and should be denied it its entirety. See Quiroz 140 Cal.App.4th at 1281. IV. PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT IS PROPERLY PLED A. Plaintiffs Exhibits do not Undermine his Allegations and his Allegations Do Not Bar his Damage Allegations. Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s monetary claims should be struck “because they are barred by the Lease that Tenant attaches as an exhibit to, and incorporates into, its complaint.” (Motion, 6: 14-16). The authority cited in the Motion in support of this assertion is misplaced. Both cases cited in the Motion, Barnett v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. (2001) 90 Cal. App.4th 500 and George v. Automobile Club of Southern Calif. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1112, involved a demurrer, not a motion to strike. Nonetheless, the terms of the Lease do not “undermine” Plaintiff's allegations and Plaintiff has not alleged “contrary allegations.” (Motion, 6:11-13). In fact, as asserted in the Motion, Plaintiff alleges that “based on the exculpatory provision in the Lease, monetary damages are not available and that Section 8.8 of the Lease precludes a monetary recovery.” (Motion, 6:18-20). As to whether these allegations are “binding” “judicial admissions,” is irrelevant and erroneous, as the Complaint was not verified. (Motion, 6:21-22, citing Reichert v. General Ins. Co. (1968) 68 Cal.2d 822 (wherein the court found that defective allegations of a verified complaint infect the subsequent pleading so as to render it vulnerable to a demurrer.) Moreover, although Plaintiff has alleged in the Complaint that the exculpatory provision of the Lease does preclude recovery of monetary damages, this allegation is part of Plaintiff's reformation cause of action, wherein Plaintiff has alleged that the exculpatory provision does not reflect the true intent of the parties when they entered into the Lease. (Complaint, § 52). Plaintiff has sufficiently and properly alleged each cause of action of the Complaint. Defendant’s Motion is essentially asking the Court to weigh the evidence and determine that the Lease cannot be reformed and that Plaintiff is precluded from recovering damages. A motion to strike is not the proper vehicle for such a request. Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that he has 6 PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE ow 0 NN e n n A W NN = p d p k pe d pe d WwW N N = o 95 1. 84 8. 94 30 -F AX pt - C A N Y O N LA KE , CA 92 58 7 TE LE PH ON E: 95 1. 66 7. 57 92 pt th W A L K E R TR IA L L A W Y E R S 31 50 4- 2 RA IL RO AD C A N Y O N RO AD BN O N N N N N N N N N N pm em em ee 0 NN A U A W N = OS VO 8 N S suffered damages. Whether Plaintiff can recover those damages is an issue that must be resolved at a later time, but not at the pleading stage. B. The Lease Does Not Bar Plaintiffs Damage Allegations. Notably, the Motion is devoid of any reference to Plaintiff's reformation cause of action. Plaintiff alleges in the Complaint that Section 8.8 of the Lease, the exculpatory provision, and Section 42 of the Lease, the relocation provision, do not reflect the true intent of the parties when entering into the Lease and that there was a mutual mistake of fact at the time of execution of the Lease. (Complaint, 9] 50-53). Based thereon, Plaintiff has requested that the Lease be reformed to reflect the true intent of the parties. (Complaint, { 50-53). Defendant’s reliance on Frittelli, Inc. v. 350 North Canon Drive, LP is misplaced. Frittelli, Inc. was decided on a motion for summary judgment, not a motion to strike. Furthermore, Defendant is asking the Court to weigh the evidence and determine if Plaintiff should be precluded from recovering on its claims. Essentially, Defendant is asking for judgment entered in its favor. This is improper. A motion to strike does not evaluate the facts alleged in light of other circumstances. The very nature of Defendant’s request falls beyond the purview of a motion to strike. Defendant’s argument that Frittelli is “based on the exact same lease provisions at issue in this case,” is just that - an argument. (Motion, 8:1-2.) Whether the facts of Frittelli are identical to the facts of this case, and whether Frittelli is dispositive, is an issue to be determined by trial or a motion for summary judgment. As such, a motion to strike is the not the proper vehicle for requesting such a determination. The entire Section VI of the Motion is asking the Court to act as a fact finder at the pleading stage. Whether the Lease cannot be reformed and, therefore, Plaintiff cannot recover damages, is a decision that awaits proof after the pleading stage. C. Defendant’s Reliance on the Case of Frittelli is Misplaced. The Motion seeks to have the Court inquire into the facts of Plaintiff’s Complaint in light of the holding in Frittelli, Inc. This is not the function of a motion to strike. At the pleading stage, the law is clear that all factual allegations of the complaint as well as any inferences to be drawn from 7 PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE 95 1. 84 8. 94 30 -F AX TE LE PH ON E: 95 1. 66 7. 57 92 W A L K E R TR IA L L A W Y E R S 31 50 4- 2 RA IL RO AD C A N Y O N RO AD C A N Y O N LA KE , CA 92 58 7 8 00 N N hh A W N N O O N N N N N N N N E m je m mk pe d mk p m e k ee ed 0 ~N A WU Ea W N = Se 8 N N N n A W N = those allegations are to be accepted as true. Plaintiff has requested reformation of the Lease and has alleged that he has suffered damages, a requisite element of his breach of contract causes of action. Whether Plaintiff may not ultimately prevail on his reformation cause of action and whether Plaintiff is ultimately precluded from recovering damages is irrelevant and improper on a motion to strike. As noted above, whether the facts of Frittelli are identical to the facts of this case, and whether Frittelli is dispositive, is not an issue to be determine on a motion to strike. Moreover, Defendant’s reliance on Frittelli is misplaced, as the case was decided on a motion for summary judgment, not a motion to strike. Furthermore, although irrelevant at this stage, Frittelli is distinguishable. Frittelli involved a lessor that exercised its right to remodel a shopping center. Frittelli, Inc. v. 350 North Canon Drive, LP (2011) 202 Cal. App.4th 35, 39 The tenants in the Frittelli case alleged that the remodel destroyed their business and that the lessor failed to exercise reasonable care in the remodel and breached the covenant of quiet enjoyment. Frittelli, Inc. 202 Cal.Ap. 4th at 39. Frittelli did not involve a landlord’s exercise of a relocation provision of the lease and attempt to relocate the tenant to a space that was not of comparable visibility as the leased space, and which was in violation of the scope and spirit of the lease and the intent of the parties in executing the lease. Moreover, Frittelli did not involve a cause of action for reformation. Although the tenants in Frittelli brought a claim for rescission and alleged that the “respondents” breach was so material and complete that [tenants were] entitled to rescind the lease and recover its lease payments and all damages . . .,” the Court found that the rescission claim was barred, as it was “predicated on the lessor’s liability for injury and damages from a breach of lease.” /d. at 42. In the exercise of its equity power, the court in proper cases may reform leases. Baines v. Zuieback (1948) 84 Cal. App.2d 483, 488. If the essential elements for reformation of a contract are present, it is immaterial whether the contract is executed or executory. Merkle v. Merkle (1927) 85 Cal. App. 87, 110. “Code section 3399 allows reformation of a contract when, through mistake, it fails to express the true agreement of the parties. ‘[The] mistake may be the mutual error of both parties to the contract, or the oversight of one party which the other knew or suspected at the time of entering the agreement.’” Appalachian Ins. Co. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. (1989) 214 8 PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE TE LE PH ON E: 95 1. 66 7. 57 92 95 1. 84 8. 94 30 -F AX W A L K E R TR IA L L A W Y E R S 31 50 4- 2 RA IL RO AD C A N Y O N RO AD C A N Y O N LA KE , CA 92 58 7 OW 0 N N a n A W N N O N RN RN N N N N N N N N N N o e o m op m p m md p m p m e m pe d p d 00 NN A Wn A W N = Se Ww N N N A E W N = e Cal.App.3d 1, 8 (citing American Home Ins. Co. v. Travelers Indemnity Co. (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 951. Here, Plaintiff is seeking reformation of the Lease to reflect the true intent of the parties. The reformation cause is not “predicated on the lessor’s liability for injury and damages,” but on mutual mistake and failure of the Lease to accurately reflect the intentions of the parties. If Plaintiff prevails on the reformation cause of action, then the Lease should be reformed to reflect the true intent of the Parties, to wit: Plaintiff may only be relocated to a space of comparable visibility located in the food court area and for Plaintiff to have an adequate remedy against Defendant. Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s allegations as to his knowledge of the exculpatory provision and the font and location of the exculpatory provision in the Lease were addressed by the court in Frittelli and “Frittelli makes it clear that Tenant’s allegations do not render the Lease provisions unenforceable.” (Motion, 10:1-2). However, such argument is erroneous and misplaced as Frittelli did not inquire into such allegations based on a reformation cause of action. As set forth hereinabove, a court may reform a lease to reflect the true intent of the parties. Moreover, when construing an exculpatory provision, the circumstances surrounding the contract and the parties’ intentions must be considered. Frittelli, Inc., 202 Cal. App.4th at 44. In this case, the circumstances surrounding Plaintiff's execution of the Lease and the parties’ intent in executing the Lease must be examined. Accordingly, this requires a factual investigation, which is not appropriate on a motion to strike. V. LEAVE TO AMEND SHOULD BE GRANTED In the event that the Court decides to grant any portion of Defendant’s motion to strike, Plaintiff must be granted leave to amend. As long as the defect is curable, courts usually allow the amendment of the pleading. See Grieves v. Sup.Ct. (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 168. Indeed, failure to grant such leave would constitute an abuse of discretion. See C.C.P. § 472a(d); Vaccaro v. Kaiman (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 761, 768-769. I I! 9 PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS MOTION TO STRIKE TE LE PH ON E: 95 1. 66 7. 57 92 95 1. 84 8. 94 30 -F AX W A L K E R TR IA L L A W Y E R S 31 50 4- 2 RA IL RO AD C A N Y O N R O A D C A N Y O N LA KE , CA 92 58 7 oe 00 N N A n hs e W N = N O N N O N N N N N N RE o m em em e d em e k p d p d p d 00 ~N A N hs W N O E SO Vv N S N A W N = Oo VL CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court deny the Motion in its entirety. To the extent that the Court does grant any portion of the Motion to Strike, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court grant leave to amend the Complaint. DATED: February 4, 2016 WALKER TRIAL LAWYERS, LLP oorBn Barry M. Walker Larissa A. Branes Attorneys for Plaintiff, MOHAMMAD FARHA 10 PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE W A L K E R T R I A L L A W Y E R S 31 50 4- 2 R A I L R O A D C A N Y O N R O A D C A N Y O N LA KE , CA 92 58 7 TE LE PH ON E: 95 1. 66 7. 57 92 95 1. 84 8. 94 30 -F AX oO 0 N n A W y = N O N O N O N R R RN N N N N mE op m pm em em e k e d ee 0 NN A Wh As W N = e 8 N N N n A W N = D PROOF OF SERVICE - CCP §§ 1013a STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE ) SS I am employed in the County of Riverside, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party 4 the within action; my business address is 31618-1 Railroad Canyon Road, Canyon e, Ta On February 5, 2016, I served the foregoing document(s): PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF ERRATA TO DECLARATION OF DAVID VERED IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT as follows: Michael D. Stewart, Esq. (SBN 161909) Attorneys for Defendant MICHELSON SHEPPARD, MULLIN, RICHTER & MARKETPLACE VENTURE, LLC HAMPTON LLP 714.513.5100 (telephone) 650 Town Center Drive, 4" Floor 714.513.5130 (facsimile) Costa Mesa, CA 92626-1993 mstewart@sheppadmullin.com [ 1 BYMAIL: I placed such envelopes with postage thereon prepaid in the United States Ima. a Samon Lake, California. (ALL BUT DEPONENT AND/OR DEPONENT’S [ ] BYPERSONAL SERVICE: I caused such documents to be delivered by hand to the parties or their representatives as listed on the attached service list. (DEPONENT AND/OR DEPONENT’S COUNSEL ONLY.) [ 1] BYFACSIMILE: The above-referenced document (together with all exhibits and attachments thereto) was transmitted via facsimile transmission from 951.848.9430 to the addressee(s) as indicated on the attached mailing list on said date and the transmission was reported as completed and without error. [ 1] BYELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION: The above-referenced document (was sent via electronic transmission to the addressee(s)’ email address as shown on attached service list. (COURTESY COPIES.) [X] BYFEDERAL EXPRESS: [am readily familiar with Walker Trial Lawyers’ business proctioes of collecting and processing items for pickup and next business day delivery by ederal Express. I placed such sealed envelope(s) for delivery by Federal Express to the offices of the addressee(s) as indicated on the attached mailing list on the date hereof following ordinary business practices. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. VICK] WARREN 11 PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE