Santiago vs. Miller Brewing CompanyReply to MotionCal. Super. - 4th Dist.September 22, 2015A M A R O | B A L D W I N L L P O 0 0 ~ ~ O h W n o h W N = D N N O N O N N O N O N D N m m e m e m e m h m e d e m e d e d 2 N N B O R U B R R 8 0 8 @ 3 a » » 0 = ~ o AMARO | BALDWIN LLP Michael L. Amaro, Esq. (Bar No. 109514) Rudie D. Baldwin, Esq. (Bar No. 245218) 180 E. Ocean Boulevard, Suite 850 Long Beach, California 90802 Telephone: (562) 912-4157 Facsimile: (562) 912-7919 mamaro@amarolawyers.com rbaldwin@amarolawyers.com SEDW0042 Attorneys for Defendant and Cross-Defendant, HARBOR DISTRIBUTING, LLC SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ORANGE, CENTRAL JUSTICE CENTER ANTONIA SANTIAGO, CASE NO. 30-2015-00811049-CU-PO-CIJC Plaintiff, (Case assigned to Judge Martha Gooding Dept. C34) \2 DEFENDANT, HARBOR DISTRIBUTING, MILLER BREWING COMPANY,a LLC'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S Milwaukee corporation; MILLERCOORS, OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT HARBOR LLC, a Delaware limited liability company; DISTRIBUTING, LLC'S JOINDER OF REYES HOLDINGS, L.L.C., an Illinois limited] MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, liability company; STATER BROS. IN THE ALTERNATIVE SUMMARY MARKETS,a California corporation; and ADJUDICATION DOES1 through 50, inclusive, DATE: January 17,2017 Defendants. TIME: 9:00 a.m. DEPT: C34 RESID: 72424409 STATER BROS. MARKETS, a California Co corporation, Complaint Filed: September 22, 2015 Trial Date: February 21, 2017 Cross-Complainant, v. MILLER BREWING COMPANY, a Milwaukee corporation; MILLERCOORS, LLC a Delaware limited liability company; REYES HOLDING, LLC, an Illinois limited liability company; and ROES 1 to 25,inclusive, Cross-Defendants. 1 DEFENDANT, HARBOR DISTRIBUTING, LLC'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT HARBOR DISTRIBUTING, LLC'S JOINDER OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE SUMMARY ADJUDICATION A M A R O | B A L D W I N L L P O O 0 2 O& O W n h~ h W W N D = N o N O N N N N O N N O N m m e m e m e m e m b e ee d e m e m e d 2 N N 8 B R B N 2 8 0 2 a x n 2 0 = o o TO ALL PARTIES HEREIN AND TO THEIR RESPECTIVE ATTORNEYS OF RECORD: PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Defendant and Cross-Defendant, HARBOR DISTRIBUTING, LLC, (hereinafter "Harbor") hereby files this Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant and Cross-Defendant, HARBOR DISTRIBUTING, LLC's Joinder to Motion for Summary Judgment or,in the alternative, Summary Adjudication: MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES I INTRODUCTION Plaintiffs Opposition and self-serving declaration grossly mischaracterize the evidence, and emphasize the merits of the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Stater Bros., and joined by Harbor Distributing, LLC and MillerCoors, LLC. Plaintiff desperately wants this Court to believe that the subject bottle spontaneously exploded, by disingenuously misrepresenting the timing and sequence of the complex events that occurred leading up to the incident. Nevertheless, even when such assertions are taken in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, the video lodged by Harbor and Plaintiff, show that Plaintiff had significant interactions with the bottle, before the alleged "explosion." Although Plaintiff requests this Court to blindly find that this is a case of an "exploding bottle," and that she did not do anything to cause the subject bottle to break (Plaintiff's Opposition, page 6, lines 20 to 23), the undisputed video clearly establishes that this incident arises from a complex set of facts and interactions, which takes the analysis of the alleged defective product well outside common knowledge of lay jurors (thus negating the application of the "consumer expectations test"), and simultaneously undermines the res ipsa loquitur cause of action. Plaintiff did not pick up the bottle, and it simply “exploded” in her hand for no reason. Rather,the video lodged with the Court shows that she selected the bottle, turned around, walked to her cart and interacted with the bottle: i 1 i 2 DEFENDANT, HARBOR DISTRIBUTING, LLC'S REPLY TQ PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT HARBOR DISTRIBUTING, LLC'S JOINDER OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE SUMMARY ADJUDICATION A M A R O | B A L D W I N L L P 0 0 0 ~ ~ O & O w n b h W N = N O N O N N N = e m e m m m e m m b e d e t e d iiumnDEFENDANT, HARBOR DISTRIBUTING, LLC'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT HARBORION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE 3 4SEN Fy \ore | a un 8 \dds . pry Te B® STETHL, , REPEL TRTHE)& Nd | DISTRIBUTING, LLC'S JOINDER OF MoT RN £00:13:90 STIHEb wv 3 UMMARY ADJUDICATION PUREST) § - \ {10:317128 EY : ~ MURTHY SURI)| A M A R O | B A L D W I N L L P O W 0 N y W n A W N N O N N O N N N N N N e e e e e m e m e m e w 0 0 ~ ~ O N h h A O W O N = O O O v 0 0 N y n r W w W w N N = O O II. HARBOR'S JOINDER WAS TIMELY Plaintiff counsel grossly misstates the case law cited in the Opposition. Plaintiff counsel asserts that the matter of Frazee v. Seely held that "a joinder to a motion for summary judgment / adjudication, like the moving papers it seeks to join, must be served at least 75 days before the hearing. Frazee v. Seely (2002) 95 Cal.App.4™ 627, 636-637.” Plaintiff's Opposition, page 3, lines 13-16. To the contrary, the relevant portion ofthat opinion states: "Section 437c, subdivision (a) requires that "[n]otice of the motion [for summary judgment] and supporting papers shall be served on all other parties to the action at least 28 days before the time appointed for hearing." When notice is served by mail within California, "the required 28-day period of notice shall be increased by five days . . . ." (§ 437c, subd. (a); see also St. Mary Medical Center v. Superior Court (1996) 50 Cal. App. 4th 1531, 1538 [58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 182].) Seely, Diehl, and S & R filed their motion for summary judgment/adjudication on May 26, 1999, and requested a hearing date of June 23. Hales, Etienne, and H, H & E did notfile their notice of the motion for joinder until June 1, 22 days before the hearing. Even under the more lenient 28-day notice requirement, the motion for joinder was untimely and should have been denied." Id. Indeed, Plaintiff's Opposition concedes that Harbor electronically filed its joinder on November 3, 2016, 75 days prior to the hearing, and also served the joinder by overnight courier. Plaintiff's Opposition, page 3, lines 17 — 19. Moreover, the Court in Frazee narrowly focused their analysis on when the joinder was filed. Assuming arguendo that Harbor was obligated to serve the joinder 75 days prior to the hearing, Plaintiff would have received notice of the electronic filing contemporaneously with the same. If Plaintiff contends that such is unsatisfactory, then the service of Plaintiff's Opposition is ES DEFENDANT, HARBOR DISTRIBUTING, LLC'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT HARBOR DISTRIBUTING, LLC'S JOINDER OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE SUMMARY ADJUDICATION A M A R O | B A L D W I N L L P O O 0 0 2 O& O W n H h W W N D = N O N O N N N D N N O N N = e e e m e t e t e m e m e e 0 0 ~1 J O N W h H h W O N = O 0 N N h l W N = O subject to the same criticism, as counsel for Harbor was not forwarded PDF copies of the filings until two days after Plaintiff's due date to serve the Opposition. See attached Declaration of Rudie D. Baldwin, Esq. III. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR STRICT PRODUCT LIABILITY AGAINST HARBOR HAS NO MERIT Plaintiff wants this Court to believe that this is a simple case of an exploding bottle; however, the undisputed evidence clearly establishes that this incident arises from a complex set of facts/interactions, which takes the analysis of the alleged defective product well outside common knowledge oflayjurors. A productliability case must be based on substantial evidence establishing both the defect and causation (as such, a plaintiff must establish a substantial probability that the design defect, and not something else, caused the injury). When an incident involves complex causation issues that are beyond common experience, expert testimony is required to establish causation. Diamond v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. (1976) 65 Cal. App. 3d 173, 177; McGee v. Cessna Aircraft Co. (1983) 139 Cal. App. 3d 179, 187-188; Campbell v. General Motors Corp. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 112, 124; General Motors Corp. v. Superior Court (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 580, 597; Whiteley v. Philip Morris, Inc. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 635, 694-696; Galanek v. Wismar (1999) 68 Cal.App.4th 1417, 1427; Leslie G. v. Perry & Associates, supra, 43 Cal.App.4th at p. 484. As such, Plaintiff in this case cannot prove her defect claims by merely relying on the "consumer expectation" test. Plaintiff's Opposition, page 5, lines 25 to 27, citing Soule v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 8 Cal. 4™ 548. The consumer expectation test does not apply here, where experts will have to opine on the complex circumstances of the bottle breakage, because the undisputed evidence clearly demonstrates that the bottle did not simply “explode.” Further, expert testimony can be expected regarding the balance ofthe benefits of design against the risk of danger. Barker v. Lull Engineering Co. (1978) 20 Cal.3d 413; Pritt v. General Motors Corp. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1480, 1483; Soule v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 548, 567-570 (the 5 DEFENDANT, HARBOR DISTRIBUTING, LLC'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT HARBOR DISTRIBUTING, LLC'S JOINDER OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE SUMMARY ADJUDICATION A M A R O | B A L D W I N L L P O O 0 0 ~ 1 A n n R A W N = N O N O N D N N O N N N N e e e s e m e m e m e t ee d e a 0 0 ~ 1 O N W w p h W N = O Y W 0 0 N N n n R h W N = O consumer expectations test does not apply to complex circumstances of an accident). As such, the fact that the fire department discarded the alleged "exploded" bottle is fatal to Plaintiff's products liability claim, as Plaintiff does not have the bottle, she cannot have an expert established that it “exploded.” In other words, Plaintiff cannot establish that the bottle broke due to "pressure from within the bottle" (over-pressurization or carbonation), or a weakness in the glass, or due to an impact (the bottle striking another object). As such, her declaration testimony regarding the “explosion” and causation of injuries, can and should be excluded. See the formal objections concurrently lodged with this Reply. The undisputed evidence demonstrates that the subject bottle is unavailable and no longer exists (and was not able to be inspected by the parties, by no fault of Harbor or any other Defendant). With the lack of such evidence, there is no way for Plaintiff to prove that the subject bottle did, indeed, contain a design or manufacturing defect at the time ofPlaintiff's incident, nor can she prove that an alleged defect caused her injuries. IV. PLAINTIFF IS UNABLE TO ESTABLISH THAT HARBOR EXERCISED EXCLUSIVE CONTROL OVER THE SUBJECT BOTTLE. THUS UNABLE TO PURSUE A CLAIM FOR RES IPSA LOQUITUR AS AGAINST HARBOR The undisputed video also undermines the res ipsa loquitur cause of action, because it clearly depicts that Plaintiff handled and manipulated the subject beer bottle for over four (4) seconds prior to the "explosion." The video depicts that she had exclusive control of the bottle and that she was the primary cause of the accident, or in the least, that her own voluntary actions contributed to the accident. The res ipsa doctrine may be relied upon to establish a prima facie case of negligence 'where a thing [which causes injury] is shown to be under the exclusive management or control of the defendant, and that the accident would not have happened if those who have the management use proper care. In such cases an inference arises that the accident resulted from a want of care on the part of the defendants. The doctrine does not apply unless the basic requisites of exclusive control 6 DEFENDANT, HARBOR DISTRIBUTING, LLC'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT HARBOR DISTRIBUTING, LLC'S JOINDER OF MOTION FOR SUMMARYJUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE SUMMARY ADJUDICATION A M A R O | B A L D W I N L L P OV O 0 0 ~ 1 O N W n b h W N = N O O N N N O N N O N D N D N e m e m e m e a e m e d e s 0 0 ~ ~ O& O W L h h W O N = O O Ww W 0 N N N R r W N = O O and probability of negligence are established by plaintiff. Selfridge v. Carnation Co. (1962) 200 Cal. App. 2d 245; Honea v. City Dairy. Inc., (1943) 22 Cal.2d 614, 616-617. In Honea, the plaintiff testified that she carried one bottle under her left arm and one in each hand, that the bottles were not touching at any time and that the bottle in her right hand "just broke," and the court held that the mere breaking of the bottle alone did not give rise to an inference that the defendant was negligentin failing to discover an alleged defect. Id. Further, the Honea court stated: “While it may often be a matter of common knowledge that certain articles or substances are not ordinarily rendered defective in the absence of negligence, we cannot say that this is true of glass containers. It has been held that because of the physical characteristics of glass an inference of negligence cannot be drawn from breaking alone.” Id. at 620-621. Similarly, the appellate court in Selfridge, 200 Cal. App. 2d at 248-249, found that the doctrine ofres ipsa loquitur did not apply because the trial court determined that the bottle did not explode, but rather, it broke by reason of a hard impact of the bottle in plaintiff's left hand against some object; that the sole proximate cause of the breaking of the bottle was the negligence and carelessness of plaintiff in striking the bottle against some hard object, causing it to break; and that there was no negligence on the part of defendants. In the subject case, if the bottle was a "ticking time bomb," it would have "exploded" at or immediately after Plaintiff grabbed it, and lifted it off the shelf. The undisputed video evidence clearly established that the bottle not instantaneously break when Plaintiff initially selected it. Rather, the video depicts a set of complex interactions and movements prior to the alleged explosion. The undisputed evidence clearly establishes that Plaintiff's voluntary actions caused, or in the least, contributed to the incident. Certainly, the undisputed evidence shows that the bottle did not spontaneously "explode" by itself. Such evidence renders the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur inapplicable to the subject incident, as a matter of law. 1 I" 7 DEFENDANT, HARBOR DISTRIBUTING, LLC'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT HARBOR DISTRIBUTING, LLC'S JOINDER OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE SUMMARY ADJUDICATION A M A R O | B A L D W I N L L P O O 0 N N n h R h W N N O N R N O N N N N N N e e e s e s e m e m e m e m p e e d 0 0 ~ I O O W h H h W N = © W W 0 0 N N N W n A r W N = O O V. CONCLUSION Simply stated, the undisputed video evidence establishes that the consumer expectation test cannot be applied to the complex facts/circumstancesofthis incident, and that as a result, expert testimony will have to be relied on by Plaintiff. Nevertheless, because the alleged defective product was discarded by no fault ofthe Defendants, Plaintiff cannot and will not be able to establish a defect by way of expert testimony, and hence, her strict products liability cause of action fails, as a matter of law. Further,the undisputed video evidence shows thatthis is not a set of circumstances where a bottle immediately exploded once Plaintiff picked it up. Rather,the alleged “explosion” occurred after and secondary to Plaintiff interacting with the same. Such evidence makes the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur inapplicable in this case. DATED: January [0, 2017 AMARO | BALDWIN LLP By: RUDIE D. BALDWIN Attorneys for Defendant and Cross-Defendant, HARBOR DISTRIBUTING, LLC 8 DEFENDANT, HARBOR DISTRIBUTING, LLC'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT HARBOR DISTRIBUTING, LLC'S JOINDER OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE SUMMARY ADJUDICATION A M A R O | B A L D W I N L L P O O 0 8 N N n n R r W N = N O R N O R N N N N N e e e e e e e m e e e s e d 0 0 ~ ~ O V W n b h W O N = O O O U 0 0 N O Y n n b h W N N = O O DECLARATION OF RUDIE D. BALDWIN I, RUDIE D. BALDWIN,declare: I am an attorney, duly licensed to practice law in all the courts of the State of California, and am a partner at the law firm of Amaro | Baldwin LLP, attorneys of record for Defendant, HARBOR DISTRIBUTING, LLC (hereinafter "Harbor" or “Defendant”). As such, I have personal knowledge of the files and pleadingsin this matter, as well as the facts stated below. If called upon as a witness, I could and would competently testify as follows: 1. Plaintiff would have received notice of the electronic filing of Harbor’s joinder contemporaneously with the same. 2. If Plaintiff contends that such is unsatisfactory, then the service of Plaintiff's Opposition is subject to the same criticism, as counsel for Harbor was not forwarded PDF copies of the filings until two days after Plaintiff's due date to serve the Opposition. Attached as Exhibit "BB" is a true and correct copy of a correspondence requesting Plaintiff’s counsel to send a PDF of the opposing papers, after receiving notification ofthe filing on January 3, 2017, and a subsequent correspondence acknowledging receipt of PDFs of the opposing papers two days later, on January 5, 2017. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct, and that this declaration is executed on January (0 , 2017 at Long Beach, TBS RUDIE D. BALDWIN, Declarant California. 9 DEFENDANT, HARBOR DISTRIBUTING, LLC'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT HARBOR DISTRIBUTING, LLC'S JOINDER OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE SUMMARY ADJUDICATION EXHIBIT "BB" eService Alert! Case No. 30-2015-00811049-CU-PO-CJC. Separate ... https://outlook.office.com/owa/projection.aspx lofl Reply all | Delete Junk] Fw: eService Alert! Case No. 30-2015-00811049-CU-PO-CJC. Separate Statement ISO Oppo to Stater Bros RB RUDIE BALDWIN Reply all | Mon 1/9/2017 2:27 PM To: RUDIE BALDWIN Inbox From: RUDIE BALDWIN Sent: Tuesday, January 3, 2017 3:34 PM To: David Lawrence Cc: Jessica Ball Subject: Fw: eService Alert! Case No. 30-2015-00811049-CU-PO-CIC. Separate Statement ISO Oppo to Stater Bros Hi David, Looks like youroffice e-filed it's opposition today, please PDF me a copy ofthe same, and the supporting docs, as well as a word version of the Separate Statement. Thanks, Rudie D. Baldwin, Esq. AMARO | BALDWIN 180 E. Ocean Blvd. Suite 850 Long Beach, CA 90802 (562) 912-4157 rbaldwin@amarolawyers.com amarolawyers.com CAUTION: Privileged and/or confidential information in this electronic mail message is intended solely for the use ofthe individual or entity to which itis addressed, an may contain information that is exempt from disclosure under applicable law. Ifthe reader ofthis electronic message is not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution, or copying ofthis communication is strictly prohibited. 1/9/2017 2:28 PM Fw: eService Alert! Case No. 30-2015-00811049-CU-PO-CJC.Sepa... https://outlook.office.com/owa/projection.aspx 1of5 Fw: eService Alert! Case No. 30-2015-00811049-CU-PO-CJC. Separate Statement ISO Oppo to Stater Bros RB RUDIE BALDWIN Reply all | Mon 1/9/2017 2:26 PM To: RUDIE BALDWIN Inbox From: RUDIE BALDWIN Sent: Thursday, January 5, 2017 12:38 PM To: David Lawrence Cc: Jessica Ball; Jaclyn Rodriguez Subject: Re: eService Alert! Case No. 30-2015-00811049-CU-PO-CIC. Separate Statement ISO Oppo to Stater Bros Hi David, I received the emails with the attached Oppositions documents from yourassistant, thank you. I asked for that two days ago when I received notice that the Opposition was filed, I'm not sure whyyou did not respect my first request, but I appreciate receiving the documents today. Best regards, Rudie D. Baldwin, Esq. BALDWIN 180 E. Ocean Blvd. Suite 850 Long Beach, CA 90802 (562) 912-4157 rbaldwin@amarolawyers.com amarolawyers.com CAUTION: Privileged and/or confidential information in this electronic mail message is intended solely for the use ofthe individual or entity to which it is addressed, an may contain information that is exempt from disclosure 1/9/2017 2:29 PM 0 ~ ~ O& O W n B h W N = O O O e D Y l s W N — = O O PROOF OF SERVICE Antonia Santiago v. Miller Brewing Company, et al. Case No. 30-201500811049-CU-PO-CJC STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18 years and am nota party to this action. My business address is 180 E. Ocean Blvd., Suite 850, Long Beach, California 90802. On January , 2017, I served the foregoing document described as DEFENDANT, HARBOR DISTRIBUTING, LLC'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT HARBOR DISTRIBUTING, LLC'S JOINDER OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE SUMMARY ADJUDICATION on interested parties in this action by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in sealed envelopes as follows: SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST (x (By U.S. Mail) I am readily familiar with my employer’s business practice for collection and processing of correspondence for mailing with the United States Postal Service. I am aware that on motion ofthe party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing in affidavit. I deposited such envelope(s) with postage thereon fully prepaid to be placed in the United States Mailat Long Beach, California. a (By Facsimile) [ served a true and correct copy by facsimile pursuant to C.C.P. 1013(e), calling for agreement and written confirmation of that agreement or court order,to the number(s) listed above or on attached sheet. Said transmission was reported complete and withouterror. O (By Personal Service) I caused to be delivered by hand by to the interested parties in this action by placing the above mentioned document(s) thereof in envelope addressed to the office of the addressee(s) listed above or on attached sheet. KN (By Overnight Courier) I served the above referenced document(s) enclosed in a sealed package, for collection and for delivery marked for next day delivery in the ordinary course of business, addressed to the office of the addressee(s) listed above or on attached sheet. & (By E-Mail) I transmitted a copy ofthe foregoing documents(s) via e-mail to the addressee(s). x (State) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. 0 (Federal) I declare that I am employed in the office of a member of the Bar ofthis Court, at whose direction the service was made. I declare under penalty ofperjury under the laws of the United States ofAmerica that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on January Jo 2017, at Long Beach, caitonis,——— SICA BALL r a O O 0 1 O N W n s e Ww W 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Antonia Santiago v. Miller Brewing Company, et al. Case No. 30-201500811049-CU-PO-CJC Michael J. FitzGerald, Esq. Guido I. Piotti, Esq. Fitzgerald Yap Kreditor LLP 16148 Sand Canyon Avenue Irvine, CA 92618 VIA OVERNIGHTONLY Gary A. Wolensky, ESq. Jamison E. Power, Esq. Anne Marie Ellis, Esq. Buchalter Nemer 18400 Von Karman Avenue, Suite 800 Irvine, CA 92612 David J. Porras, Esq. Varner & Brandt LLP 3750 University Avenue, Sixth Floor Riverside, CA 92501 SERVICE LIST Attorneysfor Plaintiff Telephone: (949) 788-8900 Fax: (949) 788-8980 Email: mfitzgerald@fyklaw.com gpiotti@fyklaw.com Attorneyfor Defendants, MillerCoors LLC and Miller Brewing Company Telephone: (949) 760-1121 Fax: (949) 720-0182 Email: Jamison.Power@arentfox.com Attorneyfor Defendant and Cross- Complainant, Stater Bros. Markets Telephone: (951) 274-777 Fax: (951)274-7770 Email: david.porras@varnerbrandt.com