Mid-Wilshire Property, L.P. vs. Dr. Leevil, LLC

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Cal. Super. - 4th Dist.July 28, 2015

A N n n W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 TERI T. PHAM (SBN 193383) Email: tpham@enensteinlaw.com TONY J. CHENG (SBN 235009) Email: tcheng @enensteinlaw.com ENENSTEIN RIBAKOFF LAVINA & PHAM 650 Town Center Dr., Suite 840 Costa Mesa, CA 92627 Phone: (714) 292-0262 Fax: (714) 464-4770 Attorneys for Plaintiffs SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ORANGE, CENTRAL JUSTICE CENTER MID-WILSHIRE PROPERTY, L.P., a Case No. 30-2015-00801555-CU-OR-CJC California Limited Partnership; MID- WILSHIRE HEALTH CARE CENTER, a ppAINTIFFS MID-WILSHIRE California Corporation, PROPERTY, L.P. AND MID-WILSHIRE Plaintiff. HEALTH CARE CENTER’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR v. JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADING AS TO PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AGAINST DEFENDANT DR. DR. LEEVIL, LLC, a California Limited LEEVIL. LLC , . Liability Company; LIDO HOLDING COMPANY, LLC, a Nevada Limited Liability Company; and DOES 1 through 50, Date: May 8, 2017 inclusive Time: 9:00 a.m. Dept.: CX-103 Defendants. Reservation No.: No Reservation Required Complaintfiled: July 28, 2015 MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AS TO DEFENDANT DR. LEEVIL, LLC A N n n W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 TO ALL COUNSEL AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD: PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on May 8, 2017 at 9:00 a.m., or as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard in Department CX-103 the above-entitled court, located at 751 West Santa Ana Blvd., Santa Ana, California 92701, plaintiffs Mid-Wilshire Property, L.P. (“Mid-Wilshire LP”) and Mid-Wilshire Health Care Center (“Mid-Wilshire Corp.”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs’) hereby bring this Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings against defendant Dr. Leevil, LLC (“Leevil”) with respect to the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) and Plaintiffs’ causes of action for 1) Wrongful Foreclosure, 2) To Set Aside Trustee’s Sale, 3) To Cancel Trustee’s Deed, 4) Quiet Title, and 5) Accounting. This Motion is based upon the grounds that the FAC states facts sufficient to constitute causes of action against Leevil and Leevil’s Answer does not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense of such claims. This Motion is based upon this Notice, the Memorandum of Points and Authorities attached hereto, the concurrently filed Request for Judicial Notice, all the records and pleadings on file in this action, such matters upon which this Court does, and may, take judicial notice as requested, and such other and further documentary evidence and argument as may be properly presented to the Court at or before the time of the hearing on the Motion. DATED: April 14, 2017 ENENSTEIN RIBAKOFF LAVINA & PHAM fasiici ai By: eal ioe TERI T. PHAM TONY J. CHENG Attorneys for Plaintiffs I \ 1 MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AS TO DEFENDANT DR. LEEVIL, LLC A N n n W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES I. INTRODUCTION The undisputed facts set forth in the pleadings and judicially-noticeable documents clearly and unambiguously establish one conclusion: Defendant Dr. Leevil, LLC (“Leevil”) did not have any legal interest on which to base its July 2015 foreclosure of a commercial property owned by Plaintiff Mid-Wilshire Property, L.P. and occupied by plaintiff Mid-Wilshire Healthcare (collectively hereafter as “Plaintiffs”). In fact, Leevil had expressly transferred all interest it had in the subject property to a third party, D-Day Capital, LLC, in February 2015, yet nonetheless proceeded wrongfully to foreclose on the property five months later. As a result, the July 2015 foreclosure sale is void as a matter of law and all transfer oftitle and ownership resulting from the sale are similarly void. The Court should therefore grant judgment in favor of Plaintiffs on all claims as a matter of law. II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND A. The Property at Issue and the Underlying Promissory Notes and Liens. Plaintiff Mid-Wilshire Property L.P. (“Mid-Wilshire LP”) is now, and at all times relevant hereto was, the owner of real property commonly known as 1051 Bryan Avenue, Tustin, County of Orange, California, APN 500-131-08 (the “Tustin Property”). (FAC, { 6.) Plaintiff Mid-Wilshire Health Care Center (“Mid-Wilshire Corp.”) was and is the tenant of the Tustin Property pursuant to a Commercial Lease Agreement with Mid-Wilshire LP dated January 4, 2004. (FAC, { 7) On January 7, 2008, Mid-Wilshire LP entered into a loan agreement with Tomatobank, N. A. (“Tomatobank™) for a real estate loan in the principal sum of $4,322,500 (the “Mid-Wilshire Loan”). (FAC, { 8). In connection with the loan agreement, Mid-Wilshire LP executed a Promissory Note in favor of Tomatobank in the principal amount of $4,322,500 (the “Mid- Wilshire Note”). (Id.) The Mid-Wilshire Note and loan agreement were secured by a deed oftrust on the Tustin Property (the “Mid-Wilshire DOT”). (Id.) On July 10, 2008, Tomatobank entered into a second loan agreement with an entity related to Mid-Wilshire LP, Westlake Village Property, L.P. (“Westlake LP”) (the “Westlake Loan”). (FAC, 10). In connection with the Westlake Loan agreement, Westlake LP executed a 1 MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AS TO DEFENDANT DR. LEEVIL, LLC A N n n W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Promissory Note in favor of Tomatobank in the principal amount of $9,204,000 (the “Westlake Note). (Id.) The Westlake Note and loan agreement were secured by a deed of trust (theFirst Westlake DOT”) on a commercial property owned by Westlake LP, located at 250 Fairview Road in Thousand Oaks, California (the “Westlake Property”). (I/d.) Tomatobank thereafter entered into separate extension agreements with Mid-Wilshire, LP and Westlake LP which, among other things, extended the maturity date of the Mid-Wilshire and Westlake Note to December 15, 2013. (FAC { 12). In connection with the Westlake Extension Agreement, Westlake LP also agreed to allow a second deed oftrust (the “Second Westlake DOT”) on the Westlake Property to secure the obligations under the Mid-Wilshire Note. (FAC q 13). On December 15, 2013, Tomatobank placed the Westlake and Mid-Wilshire Loans in default. (FACT 14). B. The Ventura Court Action and Satisfaction of the Mid-Wilshire Note. On April 1, 2014, Tomatobank filed an action against Mid-Wilshire LP and others in the Ventura County Superior Court (“the Ventura Court Action”) for, among other things, judicial foreclosure and breach of the Mid-Wilshire Note, Westlake Note, and related agreements and deeds of trust. (FAC | 15) On July 30, 2014, while the Ventura Court Action was pending, Tomatobank assigned and transferred all ofits rights, title, interest, and remedies in the Mid- Wilshire and Westlake Note and related agreements to Leevil. (FAC ] 16) On or about February 12, 2015, Leevil executed an Assignment of Deed of Trust for the Second Westlake DOT (the “Assignment”) to non-party D-Day Capital, LLC (“D-Day”). (Request for Judicial Notice, Exh. 1.) It was then recorded with the Orange County Register of Records on February 17, 2015. The Assignment, expressly states, in relevant parts: FOR VALUE RECEIVED, [LEEVIL] hereby grants, assigns and transfers to D- Day Capital, LLC all beneficiary interest under that certain Deed of Trust dated as of September 16, 2013, executed by WESTLAKE VILLAGE PROPERTY, L.P., A CALIFORNIA LIMITED PARTNERSHIP as Trustor(s), to TOMATO BANK, N.A. as Trustee and recorded on September 27, 2013 as instrument no. 20130927- 0016474-0 [Second Westlake Deed of Trust] ... All rights accrued or to accrue under said Deed of Trust including the right to 2 MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AS TO DEFENDANT DR. LEEVIL, LLC A N n n W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 have reconveyed, in whole or in part, the real property commonly known as 250 FAIRVIEW ROAD, THOUSAND OAKS, CA 91361 and more fully described in said Deed of Trust. See Exhibit 2 to RFJN (emphasis added). The rights under the Second Westlake DOT assigned to D-Day included, among other things, all amounts owed under the Mid-Wilshire Note. Specifically, pursuant to the Second Westlake DOT: Payment and Performance. Except as otherwise provided in this Deed of Trust, Borrower shall pay to Lender all Indebtedness secured by this Deed of Trust as it becomes due, and Borrower and Trustor shall perform all their respective obligations under the Note, this Deed of Trust, and the Related Documents. skeksk Indebtedness. The word “Indebtedness” means all principal, interest, and other amounts, costs and expenses payable under the Note or Related Documents, together with all renewals of, extensions of, modifications of, consolidations of and substitutions for the Note or Related Documents and any amounts expended or advanced by Lender to discharge Trustor’s obligations or expenses incurred by Trustee or Lender to enforce Trustor’s obligations under this Deed of Trust, together with interest on such amount as provided in this Deed of Trust. skeksk Note. The word “Note” means The Collateral Surety Agreement dated September 16, 2013 making Grantor a surety on a Promissory Note dated January 7, 2008, in the original principal amount of $4,322,000.00 given by Mid-Wilshire Property, LP [Mid-Wilshire Note], together with all renewals of, extensions of, modifications of, refinancings of, consolidations of, and substitutions therefor. See Exhibit 1 to RFJN at pgs. 2 and 14. Thus, by its terms, Leevil’s Assignment of the Second Westlake DOT to D-Day also assigned all of it rights and interests under the Mid-Wilshire Note to D-Day. On February 19, 2015, while the Ventura Court Action was still pending, Leevil foreclosed on the Westlake Property through a nonjudicial foreclosure sale. (FAC { 27). At the auction, Leevil purchased the Westlake Property for $15,600,000, with a credit bid of $10,240,275.69. (FAC Yq 27). As aresult of Leevil’s credit bid, the debt on the Westlake Note was satisfied in full. Id.) On or about April 1, 2015, the balance of the proceeds from the foreclosure of the Westlake 3 MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AS TO DEFENDANT DR. LEEVIL, LLC A N n n W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Property was paid to D-Day to satisfy all amounts owed under the Mid-Wilshire Note pursuant to the second deed of trust on the Westlake Property and Assignment. (FAC q 28). Thus, as of April 1, 2015, all amounts owed under the Westlake and Mid-Wilshire Notes were paid in full. (FAC 29). Despite the satisfaction of the Mid-Wilshire Note and the Assignment ofall interests in the Mid-Wilshire Note to D-Day, on July 22, 2017, Leevil then proceeded to foreclose on the Tustin Property to satisfy a purported debt of approximately $226,000 it claimed was still owed.! Defendant Lido, a company owned by the actual foreclosure trustee, then purchased the Tustin Property at the foreclosure sale for the amount of $1,010,000. C. The Current Wrongful Foreclosure Action. On July 27, 2015, Plaintiffs commenced the instant action for Wrongful Foreclosure, to Set Aside Trustees Sale, to Cancel Sale, Quiet Title and Accounting. Among other things, Plaintiffs allege that the foreclosure sale was improper and should be set aside. Because it is clear from the judicially noticeable documents that Leevil had no right or standing to foreclose on the Tustin Property as a result of the Assignment of the Second Westlake DOT and all rights under the Mid- Wilshire Note, the sale was improper and must be set aside. III. LEGAL ARGUMENT A. Legal Standard for a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. A plaintiff may prevail on a motion for judgment on the pleadings “if his complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and the answer neither raises a material issue nor states a defense.” Barasch v. Epstein (1957) 147 Cal.App.2d 439, 440. “It is well established in California that either prior to trial or at the trial the plaintiff or the defendant may move for judgment on the pleadings, and that the appropriate ground for such a motion is the same as that [arguable] by general demurrer, namely, the failure to state a cause of action or defense.” Dobbins ' Leevil claimed that it wasstill owed amounts for taxes, attorneys’ fees and other costs based on an apparent improper calculation of interest. Specifically, Leevil compounded interest in violation of the loan documents and California law, and also claimed attorneys’ fees without basis. Despite a Superior Court in the County of Ventura rejecting Leevil’s claim that there was no dispute thatit was owed the amount, Leevil proceeded to unilaterally foreclose on the Tustin Property to satisfy the purported debt. 4 MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AS TO DEFENDANT DR. LEEVIL, LLC A N n n W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 v. Hardister (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 787, 791; see also Stoops v. Abbassi (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 644, 650, as modified (Aug. 7, 2002). A trial court has the discretion to grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings when the claims at issue are materially based upon the interpretation of a contract. See, e.g., George v. Automobile Club ofSouthern California (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1127-28 [*“the trial court must provisionally consider parol evidence allegations, but unless those allegations would support an interpretation to which the contract is reasonably susceptible, a demurrer is properly sustained]; Hervey v. Mercury Cas. Co. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 954, 962-63 [“When the facts are undisputed, as they are deemed to be on a ruling on a demurrer, the interpretation of a contract...is a question of law]; Falkenstein v. Popper (1947) 81 Cal.App.2d 131, 137 [holding that since the “question of interpretation was one of law, and that the trial court properly interpreted the contract on the motion for judgment on the pleadings”). As discussed below, there is no ambiguity in the language of the Assignment of the Second Westlake DOT. The Assignment expressly and conclusively transferred all interest Leevil had in the Second Westlake DOT, which byits terms included the Mid-Wilshire Note, to D-Day five months prior to the Tustin Sale. As such, Leevil had no debt interest for which to foreclose on the Mid-Wilshire Property and the Tustin Sale is void as a matter of law. B. Plaintiffs are Entitled to Judgment as Against Defendant Leevil as to the First Cause of Action for Wrongful Foreclosure as Leevil Could Not Foreclose on the Tustin Property as It Had Previously Assigned All Interests in the Mid-Wilshire Note to D-Day. It is well-established that only the actual beneficiary under a deed of trust has standing to proceed with a foreclosure sale. While a “deed of trust may thus be assigned one or multiple times overthe life of the loan it secures. ..only the current beneficiary may direct the trustee to undertake the nonjudicial foreclosure process.” Yvanova v. New Century Mortg. Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 919, 927-928. In other words, “only the entity currently entitled to enforce a debt may foreclose on the mortgage or deed oftrust securing that debt.” Id at 928. Moreover, “[a] beneficiary or trustee under a deed of trust who conducts an illegal, fraudulent or willfully oppressive sale of property may be liable to the borrower for wrongful 5 MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AS TO DEFENDANT DR. LEEVIL, LLC A N n n W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 foreclosure. A foreclosure initiated by one with no authority to do so is wrongful for purposes of such an action.” Yvanova, supra, 62 Cal.4th at 929. “A void contract is without legal effect. ‘It binds no one and is a mere nullity.” Id. [quoting Little v. CFS Service Corp. (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1354, 1362]. In this case, it is judicially noticeable and undisputed that Leevil assigned the Second Westlake DOT to D-Day prior to both the Westlake Sale and the Tustin Sale. RIN, Exhs. 1 and 2. More specifically, as conceded by Leevil in its judicially noticeable filings, Leevil made an assignment “of the Mid-Wilshire Note up to the amount that was secured by the Second Westlake Deed of Trust”, which was the entire indebtedness under the Mid-Wilshire Note. (Leevil’s January 24, 2017 Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 2:16-18 [Docket No. 219].) There were no limitations set forth in the language of the Assignment to D-Day or the Second Westlake DOT asto the transfer of the underlying Indebtedness and Mid-Wilshire Note. Further, to the extent there was any modification of the Mid-Wilshire Note, the modification was also a part of the total Indebtedness assigned to D-Day under the Second Westlake DOT. See Exhibit 2 to RFJN at pgs. 2 and 14. Accordingly, Leevil lacked capacity or standing to enforce any part of the Mid-Wilshire Note and the foreclosure of the Tustin Property was wrongful as a matter of law. Although Leevil now claims that it only orally assigned a portion of the Mid-Wilshire Note, such an allegation fails factually and legally. First, Leevil’s contention that an oral transfer of a promissory note is enforceable against the debtor is contrary to California law. Civil Code § 2932.5, states “[w]here a powerto sell real property is given to a mortgagee, or other encumbrancer, in an instrument intended to secure the payment of money...[t]he power of sale may be exercised by the assignee if the assignmentis duly acknowledged and recorded.” Thus, an oral assignment of a promissory note would not be enforceable against a third party without the proper indorsement. Comm. Code §§ 955.1, 1201 et seq., and 3301 et seq.; Pribus v. Bush (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 1003, 1006 [affirming the trial court’s holding that plaintiff was not a “holder” of the promissory note because he lacked the proper indorsement]. 6 MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AS TO DEFENDANT DR. LEEVIL, LLC A N n n W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Second, Leevil’s convenient claim that he “partially orally assigned” the Mid-Wilshire Note to D-Dayis directly contrary to the expressed language of the Assignment and how California courts interpret such language. “It is well settled that two or more written instruments relating to the same subject matter and executed as parts of substantially one transaction are to be construed together as one contract. The above rule is applicable not only where the writings are executed contemporaneously (but also where they are executed by the parties at different times,if the subsequent documents are part of the same transaction.” Meier v. Paul X. Smith Corp. (1962) 205 Cal.App.2d 207, 217; see also Civ. Code § 1642. More specifically, “[a] note and a deed oftrust, although two instruments, form parts of one transaction and must be read and construed together.” Kerivan v. Title Ins. & Trust Co. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 225, 230. Read together as a whole, the Mid-Wilshire Note, the Second Westlake DOT, and the Assignment clearly and unambiguously memorialize the complete and total transfer of Leevil’s interests in the Mid-Wilshire Note to D-Day via way of the Second Westlake DOT and the Assignment. RIN, Exhs. 1 and 2. Such an interpretation of the Second Westlake DOT and the Assignment is supported by the findings and ruling found in Lopez v. Puzina (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d 708. In Lopez, the holders of a promissory note sought to establish that defendants were endorsers of such a note and thus obligated to compensate plaintiffs when the debtors failed to pay. “No endorsement or assignment was endorsed upon or physically affixed to the note. At the time the note was delivered to plaintiffs the [defendants] executed an ‘Assignment of Deed of Trust,” which recited that the [defendants], as present beneficiaries of the deed of trust dated July 15, 1958, which was executed by the [debtors] and given to secure the payment of a promissory note...by ‘mesne assignment’ ‘have endorsed, assigned and transferred and do hereby assign, transfer and set over unto [plaintiffs] the said Deed of Trust and all right title, and interest in and to the real property thereby conveyed, together with the promissory note therein mentioned and all monies due or that may hereafter become due thereunder...”” Id at 710. Based upon such facts,the trial court granted a motion for nonsuit in favor of the defendants. Id at 709-710. Plaintiffs appealed. The Lopez appellate court affirmed the trial court’s finding that defendants were not 7 MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AS TO DEFENDANT DR. LEEVIL, LLC A N n n W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 endorsers for the note since California law requires that “an endorsement must be written on the instrument itself or on a paper attached or annexed thereto in order to effectively charge one with the liability of an endorser, or to give rights of an endorsee.” Id at 712; Civ. Code § 3112. Furthermore and of key relevance to this litigation, the Lopez court expressly found that while “defendants did not effectively endorse the subject note...they are, by the terms ofthe ‘Assignment ofDeed of Trust,’...assignors ofthe note.” Id at 714 [emphasis added]. As applied to this case, the language in the Second Westlake DOT and Assignment clearly and unambiguously states that Leevil assigned all ofits interests to “all principal, interest, and other amounts, costs and expenses payable under” the Mid-Wilshire Note to D-Day on February 12,2015. RIN, Exh. 1 and 2. Leevil further memorialized such a transfer by recording the Assignment and, as a result, legally established D-Day as the holder of the Mid-Wilshire Note under the terms of the Assignment and California law. The execution and recording of the Assignment conclusively establish that 1) Leevil had no interests in the Mid-Wilshire Note after the execution of the Assignment in February 2015 and 2) could not legally foreclose on the Tustin Property. As such, the Tustin Sale is void as a matter of law and Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a matter of against Leevil as to the causes of action set forth in the FAC. C. The Court Should Grant Judgment on Plaintiffs’ Other Four Causes of Action as they are Directly Derived from and/or Related to Plaintiffs’ Wrongful Foreclosure Cause of Action. “A beneficiary or trustee under a deed of trust who conducts an illegal, fraudulent or willfully oppressive sale of property may be liable to the borrower for wrongful foreclosure. A foreclosure initiated by one with no authority to do so is wrongful for purposes of such an action.” Yvanova, supra, 62 Cal.4th at 929 [internalcitations omitted]. Furthermore, if “a purported assignment necessary to the chain by which the foreclosing entity claims that power is absolutely void, meaning of no legal force or effect whatsoever, the foreclosing entity has acted without legal authority by pursuing a trustee's sale, and such an unauthorized sale constitutes a wrongful foreclosure.” Id at 935 [internal citations omitted]; see also Sciarratta v. U.S. Bank National Association (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 552, 555 [a “void assignmentis the proximate cause of actual 8 MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AS TO DEFENDANT DR. LEEVIL, LLC A N n n W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 injury and all that is required to be alleged to satisfy the element of prejudice or harm in a wrongful foreclosure cause of action]. “A void deed passes no title, and cannot be made the foundation of a good title even under the equitable doctrine of bona fide purchase.” Schiavon v. Arnaudo Brothers (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 374, 379 [quoting Erickson v. Bohne (1955) 130 Cal.App.2d 553, 556]. Plaintiffs’ second cause of action to Set Aside Trustee’s Sale, third cause of action for Cancellation of Trustee’s Deed, fourth cause of action for Quiet Title, and fifth cause of action for Accounting (the “Related Causes of Action”) are legally and factually dependent upon and/or related to Plaintiffs’ first cause of action for Wrongful Foreclosure. More specifically, as set forth in the FAC, Plaintiffs’ wrongful foreclosure cause of action alleges a number of improper conduct by Leevil and Lido in connection with the foreclosure of the Tustin Property. (FAC, |] 27-41.) Those allegations,if proven, allow Plaintiffs to set aside the July 2015 foreclosure sale, clearing the clouds on thetitle of the Tustin Property, and recover damages from Defendants. (FAC, {{ 37-41.) Thus, should it grant judgment in Plaintiffs’ favor and against Leevil as to Plaintiffs’ wrongful foreclosure claim, the Court should similarly grant judgment in Plaintiffs’ favors as to the Related Causes of Action. IV. CONCLUSION For the above stated reasons, Plaintiffs request that the Court grant their Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as against defendant Leevil and as to the causes of action set forth in the First Amended Complaint. DATED: April 14, 2017 ENENSTEIN RIBAKOFF LAVINA & PHAM By: = SINeer TERI T. PHAM TONY J. CHENG Attorneys for Plaintiffs 9 MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AS TO DEFENDANT DR. LEEVIL, LLC A N n n W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 PROOF OF SERVICE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF ORANGE I am employed in the County of Orange, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action. My business address is 650 Town Center Drive, Suite 840, Costa Mesa, CA 92626. On April 14, 2017 I caused the following documents described as: PLAINTIFFS MID-WILSHIRE PROPERTY, L.P. AND MID-WILSHIRE HEALTH CARE CENTER’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADING AS TO PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AGAINST DEFENDANT DR. LEEVIL, LLC. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ MID-WILSHIRE PROPERTY, L.P. AND MID-WILSHIRE HEALTH CARE CENTER’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADING AS TO PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AGAINST DEFENDANT DR. LEEVIL, LLC. to be served on the interested parties in this action as stated below: Geoffrey Long Attorneys for LAW OFFICES OF GEOFFREY LONG, A.P.C. Dr. Leevil, LLC 1601 N. Sepulveda Blvd., No. 729 Manhattan Beach, CA 90266 Mark J. Mulkerin Attorneys for BURKE, WILLIAMS & SORENSEN, LLP Lido Holding Company 1851 East First Street, Suite 1550 Santa Ana, CA 92705-4067 [X] BY HAND DELIVERY [X] (STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct. Executed on April 14, 2017 in Orange County, California. ) So Sclomte Jennifer Schamberger 1 PROOF OF SERVICE A N n n W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 PROOF OF SERVICE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF ORANGE I am employed in the County of Orange, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action. My business address is 650 Town Center Drive, Suite 840, Costa Mesa, CA 92626. On April 14, 2017 I served the foregoing documents described as: PLAINTIFFS MID-WILSHIRE PROPERTY, L.P. AND MID-WILSHIRE HEALTH CARE CENTER’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADING AS TO PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AGAINST DEFENDANT DR. LEEVIL, LLC. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ MID-WILSHIRE PROPERTY, L.P. AND MID-WILSHIRE HEALTH CARE CENTER’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADING AS TO PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AGAINST DEFENDANT DR. LEEVIL, LLC. on the interested parties in this action as stated below: Ronald N. Richards Attorneys for LAW OFFICES OF RONALD RICHARDS & ASSOCIATES Dr. Leevil, LLC 9255 Doheny Rd #1604 West Hollywood, CA 90069 [X] BY FEDERAL EXPRESS OVERNIGHT: I placed true copies of the document in sealed envelopes addressed to the individual(s) included above. I am "readily familiar" with the firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. It is deposited with Federal Express on that same day in the ordinary course of business. [X] (STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct. Executed on April 14, 2017 in Orange County, California. ) So Selomite Jennifer Schamberger 2 PROOF OF SERVICE