Strohmeyer vs. Santos Electronics, Inc.

Reply to Opposition

Cal. Super. - 4th Dist.July 24, 2015

NO RX N N N Wn R W N o N o N D N o N o N o N o N o NN - p - p t Pt . J fo - - P t P a oo ~ AN Wh Ey wo [N S p- S Oo =] ~ aN wn + Ww 38 ] - oO o Rodney W. Bell (SBN 125314) Audrey L. Khoo (SBN 234007) CHANG & COTE, LLP 19138 E. Walnut Drive North, Suite 100 Rowland Heights, California 91748 Telephone: (626) 854-2112 Facsimile: (626) 854-2120 ELECTRONICALLY FILED = Superior Court of California, County of Orange OTAT20MT at 04:12:00 PM Clerk of the Superior Court By & Clerk, Deputy Clerk Attorneys for Defendant (Main Case) and Plaintiff (Consolidated Case)SANTOS ELECTRONICS, INC. SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ORANGE JENNIFER STROHMEYER, Plaintiff, vs. SANTOS ELECTRONICS, INC., dba OSD AUDIO, a California corporation; and DOES, I through 25, inclusive, Defendants. SANTOS ELECTRONICS, INC., dba OSD AUDIO, Plaintiff, Vs. JENNIFER STROHMEYER, an individual, and DOES 1 through 5, inclusive, Defendants. Case No. 30-2015-00800613-CU-WT-CJC (Consolidated with Case No. 30-2016- 00828282-CU-1P-CJC) Assigned For All Purposes To: Judge CRAIG GRIFFIN Department C17 SANTOS ELECTRONICS, INC.’S REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO TAX COSTS DATE: July 24,2017 TIME: 2:00 p.m. DEPT: C17 Reservation ID: 72607238 Main Action Complaint Filed: 07/24/2015 Related Action Complaint Filed: 01/05/2016 NO 0 NN S N W N 10 1 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 2 23 24 25 26 27 28 L THE PARTIES AGREE AT L AST $7,034.44 SHOULD BE TAXED FROM ~~ PLAINTIFF'S COST BILL. Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Tax Costs (“Opposition”) concedes that her Cost Bill is inflated and a minimum of $7,034.44 should be taxed, comprising of the following: Cost Description Amount Item 11, Exhibits ($7,987.49 claimed v. $7,935.09 incurred) $52.40 Item 13, Travel ($3,934.08 claimed v. $3,197.06 incurred) $737.02 Item 13, Other - Investigation expenses $2,618.28 Item 13, Other - Telephone, postage, and fax charges $452.00 Item 13, Other - Attorney meals and lodging $1,415.74 Item 13, Other - Bates stamping and electronic images $1,393.35 Item 13, Other - CDs $80.00 Item 13, Other - Runners $285.65 Total $7,034.44 With respect to Plaintiff's Item 11 costs, Plaintiff concedes a mathematical error caused claimed amount to be overstated and voluntarily reduces the amount of her request: “Plaintiff concedes the reduction of $52.40 as it was the result of an inadvertent mathematical error, reducing the amount requested to $7,935.09.” (Opposition at 5:1-2) Similarly, Plaintiff’s Item 13 “travel related costs” are overstated, presumably due to another inadvertent mathematical error on Plaintiff's part. The Cost Backup indicates only $3,197.00 was incurred whereas $3,934.08 is claimed on the Cost Bill, and the Opposition provides no argument or evidence to support the extra $737.02 in claimed travel related costs. Therefore, the Cost Bill should be further reduced by $789.42 for these mathematical errors. With respect to Plaintiff's claimed “Other” costs within Item 13, Plaintiff agreed to reduce the amount sought to $4,475.62: “Plaintiff concede[s] that costs associated with investigation expenses, telephone, postage and fax charge are not allowable under Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5. Thus, Plaintiff reduces the requested cost contained in line item No. 13 to $4,475.62.” (Opposition at 8:25-27.) OVO 0 N N nn R W N O N R D N N N N N R em e e e e e m e m e m e e e s e e 00 ~N A N Wn Bs L N = O DO 0 N N N R W NY = O ~~ With respect to “Other” Item 13 costs for attorney meals and lodging ¢ 1,41 5.74), Bates stamping and electronic images ($1,393.35), runners (5285.65), and CDs ($80.00), over in the Opposition does Plaintiff oppose (or even address) the taxing of these categories of costs. Therefore, the Cost Bill should be reduced further by another $3,174.74. Given the foregoing, there is no dispute that at least $7,034.44 should be taxed from Plaintiff's Cost Bill. IL DISPUTED COST ITEMS. The Opposition confuses a firm’s cost of doing business (which Plaintiff's counsel shifts to its client to the fullest extent) with costs recoverable under the cost statute. As a result, the Cost Bill improperly seeks reimbursement of multiple items of “pass through costs from vendors. ..advanced for Plaintiff...on contingency...per the engagement agreement between Ms. Strohmeyer and Klinedinst PC.” (Declaration of Floyd A. Brown in Support of Plaintiff Jennifer Strohmeyer’s Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Tax Costs (“Brown Decl.”), 16.) Though recoverable by Plaintiff's counsel from Plaintiff by contract, those same overhead expenses are not automatically recoverable by Plaintiff from Defendant by statute. “It is axiomatic that the right to recover costs is purely statutory, and, in the absence of an authorizing statute, no costs can be recovered by either party.” (Garcia v. Hyster Co. (1994) 28 Cal. App. 4th 724, 732, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 283, 287; Ladas v. Cal. State Auto. Ass'n (1993)19 Cal. App. 4th 761, 774,23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 810, 817 (“Because the right to costs is governed strictly by statute [citation] a court has no discretion to award costs not statutorily authorized.”).) A. Item No. 11: Plaintiffs Costs for Photocopies of Trial Exhibits is Inflated and/or Wholly Unsupported by Evidence. Plaintiff does not contest that Item 11 of her Cost Bill consists of (1) $5,394.90 in In House Copies, and (2) $2,539.75 in miscellaneous copies, exhibit tabs, and velo binding. !' This is calculated as the $690.65 in “runners and trial setup assistance” expenses (Motion at 7), less the $405.00 “cost advanced to Aptus Court Reporting for Trial Equipment Setup Assistance” (Bell Decl., Exhibit A at 205). N e I « E Y 0 N S N Ln B A R W O N = OC N 0 0 N N N Y E W - Oo 1L Plaintiff’s In House Copies Expense of $5,394.90 is Unreasonable in Amount. Plaintiff's counsel offers the following explanation for the In House Copies expense of $5,394.90: “The costs associated with in house copies that are on the bills were for the voluminous trial exhibits, to included color copy trial exhibits. There were many notebooks of trial exhibits, with copies made for the court, the witness, and each counsel.” (Brown Decl., § 13.) Even the roughest calculations demonstrate Plaintiff's In House Copies cost is inflated. Assuming Plaintiff made five copies? of its exhibits 1-346 (which exhibits collectively contain 2,000 pages), that amounts to 10,000 pages in the aggregate. Having purportedly incurred $5,394.90 in copying costs, Plaintiff's photocopies amounts to $0.54 per page for exhibits which are predominantly black and white. Plaintiff’s photocopy rate of $0.54 per page is well over the going rate for standard copy services. By way of example, Staples offers black and white copies at a rate of $0.038 for the quantity of copies Plaintiff purportedly made. (Declaration of Audrey L. Khoo In Support of Reply to Opposition to Motion to Tax Costs (“Khoo Decl.”), Exhibit A.) To copy 10,000 pages of trial exhibits, Plaintiff's costs would have totaled $380.00 at Staples. To further illustrate, even at an inflated rate of $0.10-$0.15 per copy, Plaintiff would have incurred $1,000.00 to $1,500.00 at most in photocopying costs. Defendant should not be penalized for Plaintiff's counsel’s election to make photocopies at a grossly inflated and unreasonable rate. Defendant posits that $380.00 represents a reasonable amount for photocopying expenses for trial exhibits in this litigation, and that the excess of $5,014.90 claimed by Plaintiff should be taxed from Item 11 of the Cost Bill. 2 This includes a set of exhibits for the court, the witness, Plaintiff’s counsel, Defendant’s counsel, and Defendant’s former co-counsel. 3 The Opposition fails to show that all of the copies were exclusively for exhibits actually used at trial (i.e. omits those included in exhibit binders and unused at trial), which is the only allowable cost for copies under Cal. Code of Civ. Pro. sec. 1033.5. Be SANTOS ELECTRONICS, INC. DO 0 N N O N nn A W N 10 1 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 2. Plaintiff’s Opposition Offers No Support Jor he Remaining 5% 539. 75 i in Claimed Item 11 Costs. The Opposition addresses only the In House Copies expense of $5,394.90. No support is provided for the remaining Item 11 costs claimed in the Cost Bill, which total $2,539.75 and comprise of the following: Cost Description Amount Exhibit Tabs $24.75 Velo Binding $108.00 Cost for obtaining copies, exhibit tabs, $2,139.44 prints and color prints Color Copies $268.00 Total $2,539.75 There is no indication of what “copies, exhibit tabs, prints and color prints” were obtained and no evidence provided in the Opposition as to why the above expenses were reasonably necessary to the litigation and not just merely convenient. Without this showing, there can be no awarding of discretionary costs under Cal. Code of Civ. Pro. sec. 1033.5. Plaintiff’s Opposition explains only that In House Copies expense accounted for Plaintiff's costs to photocopy trial exhibits, including any color copies utilized at trial. (See, Section II(A)(1) above.) The additional copy expenses sought can only be for copies of items other than trial exhibits. As only photocopies of trial exhibits are recoverable per Cal. Code of Civ. Pro. sec. 1033.5, subd. (a)(13) and photocopies of other document expressly disallowed per Cal. Code of Civ. Pro. sec. 1033.5, subd. (b)(3), the sum of $2,539.75 should be taxed from the Cost Bill. B. Item No. 13 “Travel Related Costs” Are Neither Allowable By Statute Nor Reasonably Necessary to this Litigation. 1. Travel Related Expenses are Not Recoverable Under the Cost Statute. Travel is simply not an allowable cost per Cal. Code of Civ. Pro. sec. 1033.5. The statute is clear - the only type of travel that may be reimbursed are “travel expenses to attend depositions.” (Cal. Code of Civ. Pro. sec. 1033.5, subd. (a)(3); Ladas v. Cal. State Auto. Assn. (1993) 19 Cal. App. 4th 761, 775, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 810, 818 (“The only travel expenses authorized by section 1033.5 are those to attend depositions.”).) NO 0 0 ~~ ] O N Wn BR A W N N o tN N y N o N o N o N D N y No - P t o i - - - s t - - - 0 ~ aN Ww of OJ No - oS \ O © ~ ND wn + Ww No - o To skirt the statute’s express language, Plaintiff first attempts to create a distinction between local and non-local travel. Plaintiff does not dispute that local travel is not recoverable, but argues non-local travel should be recoverable. This distinction is incongruous with cost statutes and case authority. Plaintiff offers no support for the proposition that non-local travel is recoverable as a cost item. Plaintiff also offers no authority for what constitutes non-local travel under his rubric - travel from San Diego to Santa Ana can be considered local travel without regard to travel time. For instance, local travel from Los Angeles to Santa Ana can take between 90-120 minutes depending on traffic conditions, as could travel from San Diego to Santa Ana (at approximately 80-90 miles) again depending on traffic conditions. Moreover, it is not uncommon for Orange County residents to commute to work in San Diego and vice versa. That Plaintiff's counsel must commute between neighboring Orange and San Diego counties is incidental to, and typifies, living in Southern California and such local travel is expressly disallowed per Ladas. 2 Travel Related Expenses are Not Reasonably Necessary, Particularly Where Plaintiff’s Counsel Maintains a Local Santa Ana Office But Elects to Operate Out of Its Farther San Diego Office and Staff This Case With San Diego Attorneys. Finding no caselaw that allows recovery for travel, Plaintiff next appeals to the court’s discretion to allow the same on the grounds that “Plaintiff is allowed to use counsel of her choice.” (Opposition at 6:8-9.) Plaintiff is certainly free to select Klinedinst as her counsel. However, Defendant should not be penalized for and be required to reimburse travel expenses arising from Klinedinst’s decision to staff the case inefficiently. Plaintiff’s counsel has a Santa Ana office local to Plaintiff, Defendant, the court, and witnesses. (Exhibit B to Khoo Decl.) Instead, Plaintiff's counsel elected to staff this litigation exclusively with San Diego-based attorneys* and chose to use its farther San 4 See, Brown Decl. 1 3 (“[Brown] currently reside[s] in San Diego, California, San Diego County [and] has never lived in Orange County, California.”), 4 (“Initially, there was another attorney, Tom Daughtery, working on the case.... Mr. Daugherty is also located in our San Diego office. When Mr. Garbacz was initially retained to represent Ms. Strohmeyer on this case, he resided in San Diego.”) and 5 (Mr. Garbacz resided in San Diego for the most of this litigation -5- OO 0 N N S N wn A W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 25 26 27 28 Diego office as its “home base.” To ask that Defendant now pick up the tab for costs associated with this poor and inefficient case management is unreasonable. These costs were entirely avoidable and incurred only as a result of Klinedinst’s preference to assign caseloads in this fashion. Klinedinst’s website boasts that its Santa Ana office “houses a full complement of associates and staff to serve our clients.” (Id.) The Cost Bill, Cost Backup, and Opposition offer no inkling as to why it was reasonably necessary for Klinedinst to assign three attorneys nearly 100 miles away in its San Diego office when its Santa Ana office stands at the ready with “a full complement” of counsel and staff capable of representing Plaintiff. Klinedinst’s website also boasts of the prime locale of its Santa Ana office, “within minutes of federal and state courthouses.” (/d.) Klinedinst’s Santa Ana office is also by far the most practical choice when considering access and convenience of Plaintiff, who resides in La Habra.” Again, the Cost Bill, Cost Backup, and Opposition are silent as to why it was reasonably necessary for the San Diego office to serve as “home base” in this matter, particularly in light of the proximity of Klinedinst’s Santa Ana office to the courthouse where the case would be tried and Plaintiff's residence. Finally, Plaintiff makes much ado about Defendant’s choice of counsel, which is irrelevant. Defendant’s cost bill is not at issue; Defendant has not solicited reimbursement of its litigation costs from Plaintiff. Plaintiff's Travel Related Expenses of $3,934.08 should be taxed. until “August 2016, lead counsel Greg Garbacz relocated his residence from San Diego County to Orange County.”).) > See, Opposition at 5:20-21 (“When this litigation began lead counsel Greg Garbacz and associate Floyd Brown both resided in San Diego and used the San Diego office as their “home base.”); see also, Brown Decl. § 6 (“...pretrial meeting that we held in San Diego because that is where the litigation files, trial documents and notebooks were located pretrial.”). 6 Klinedinst’s Santa Ana office is located just 4.3 miles from the Central Justice Center; by contrast, Klinedinst’s San Diego office is located nearly 90 miles from the Central Justice Center. (Khoo Decl., Exhibits B and C.) 7 See Trial Exhibit 128, J. Strohmeyer Severance Pay in the amount of $7,980.01, dated 1/12/15). -6- i NO 00 N N B R W N N N N N N N N N NN m m m m e m e m em s m m me e s e m e s WwW N A E W N = O V X N N Ee W N -- Oo 3. The Opposition Makes No Showing that Her $1,415.74 in Costs for Attorney Meals and Lodging Were Reasonably Necessary. Only juror meals and lodging are specifically allowable under the cost statute, not attorney meals and lodging. (Cal. Code of Civ. Pro. sec 1033.5, subd. (a)(2).) Attorney meals and lodging may only be recoverable within the court’s discretion if the court deems them reasonably necessary the conduct of litigation. (Cal. Code of Civ. Pro. sec 1033.5, subd. (c)(2).) The Opposition does not give any indication that attorney meals and lodging, whether related to travel expenses or otherwise, were reasonably necessary to this litigation. Nor can the Opposition refute established case law which definitively determined that attorney meals and lodging are not reasonably necessary to litigation: “Since attorneys have to eat, whether they are conducting litigation or not[, a]t best, these expenses are ‘merely convenient or beneficial’ to preparation for litigation, the recovery of which is proscribed under section 1033.5, subdivision (c) [and] should have been stricken.” (Ladas v. Cal. State Auto. Assn. (1993) 19 Cal. App. 4th 761, 774-775, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 810, 818.) Plaintiffs $1,415.74 in attorney meals and lodging costs should be taxed. C. Item No. 13 “Courtcall Fees” are Costs Incurred for the Mere Convenience of Plaintiff’s Counsel. Courtcall is a third party vendor that provides telephonic services that allow an attorney to make court appearances by phone in lieu of attending in person. The service is clearly designed for the convenience of counsel and thus proscribed under the cost statute. (Cal. Code of Civ. Pro. sec 1033.5, subd. (c)(2).) Courtcall is touted as “provid[ing] time and cost efficiencies for the legal community” and the conveniences offered by Courtcall’s services are certainly not a “necessary” expense to litigation. The Opposition argues that Courtcall appearances “reduce travel expense and attorney’s fees.” However, travel expenses are not recoverable as a cost, except in connection with a deposition travel. (Cal. Code of Civ. Pro. sec 1033.5, subd. (a)(3)(C); see also, Section II(B), supra.) Moreover, it is apparent that it was “convenient” for Plaintiff's counsel to appear by phone and avoid travel time and the fact that the party purportedly saved money is ancillary. Litigation § See, Courtcall website at https://courtcall.com/what-is-courtcall/appear-in-court-by-phone/. Oo 0 N N Wn BR W N N N N N R N N N N N e e m m m m e m m m m m p d e t b a s ee s CL ~N O N th BE W D = © O R N N N E w N = Oo strategy done to help a party save money is not “reasonably necessary” for a case, it is simply a cost objective that is particular to the client and irrelevant to the merits of the case. Plaintiffs $636.00 in Courtcall fees should be taxed.’ D. Item No. 13 “Settlement Conference Expenses” Are Unrelated to Plaintiff's Attendance At MSC and Are Not Allowable Costs. Plaintiff's Cost Bill seeks $392.85 for “cost advanced to Ace Attorney Service, Inc. for processing mandatory settlement conference to” three witnesses - Lillian K. Lin, Tom Gandula, and Ken Reingold. (Bell Decl. in Support of Motion to Tax Costs, Exhibit A Cost Backup at 185.) Confusingly, Plaintiff argues these expenses should be allowed on the grounds that “Plaintiff's and her counsel’s attendance at a Mandatory Settlement Conferences [sic] was reasonable and necessary to litigation.” (Opposition at 7:20-21.) It is unclear why an attorney service would be necessary with respect to witness participation at an MSC in the first instance. Nonetheless, these expenses have no apparent relation to Plaintiff's or her counsel's attendance at a MSC. Plaintiff and her counsel would attend the MSC irrespective of the participation of witnesses Lin, Gandula, and Reingold, who are neither counsel nor parties in this action. Moreover, Plaintiff's Cost Bill already seeks reimbursement of every conceivable and recoverable cost with respect to witnesses Lin, Gandula, and Reingold, which Defendant’s Motion did not seek to tax. These costs are itemized in the Cost Bill as witness fees and mileage (see Items 8al, 2, and 3), deposition costs (see Items 4d, f, and g), and service of process costs (see Items 5i, j, and k). Further recovery of costs with respect to witnesses Lin, Gandula, and Reingold would surely be duplicative. The Court should tax the amount of $392.85 from Item 13 of the Cost Bill. E. Item No. 13 “Other” Costs for Cancelled Process Server and Reporting Fees Should be Taxed. The Opposition confuses the $1,227.00 in fees for cancelled process servers and court reporters with those for process servers and court reporters whose services were not cancelled. 9 To the extent Courtcall fees are recoverable under Cal. Code of Civ. Pro. sec. 367.6 as Plaintiff argues, the costs must still be reasonably necessary and not merely convenient. © © N N Un A W N N O N O N N N RN O N N D e m e m e m e m p e s e m e m b m e m e e 0 N Y Es W N = O O RR NN Y N R W ND = Oo (Opposition at 8:15-16.) Plaintiff's Cost Bill requested recovery of $13,354.41 in court reporter fees (Item 4) and $1,699.75 in process server fees (Item 5), which Defendant did not move to tax. The $1,227.00 in process server and court reporter cancellation fees are independent of the costs Plaintiff claims to have incurred in Items 4 and 5. The Opposition fails to make any attempt to argue cancelled court reporter fees were reasonably necessary. With respect to cancelled process server fees, Plaintiff explains, “Several attempts to serve additional witnesses were unsuccessful and later canceled.” (Brown Decl., § 15.) Cancellation fees imposed by a third party vendor against Plaintiff cannot be reasonably necessary. Plaintiff’s decision to cancel service of process on certain witnesses indicates that such clearly were not reasonably necessary to the conduct of litigation and the witnesses never served with trial subpoenas. There was no benefit derived by these purported costs - in fact, incurring these costs had no effect on the end result of the litigation. The overriding principle in any cost award is that costs recovered be reasonably necessary to the conduct of litigation (as opposed to merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation) and reasonable in amount. (Cal. Civ. Pro. sec. 1033.5(c)(2), (3).) Plaintiff has failed to make this showing and the amount of $1,227.00 should be taxed. Dated: July 17,2017 CHANG & COTE A Limited Liability Partnership By: Audrey L. Khoo Attorneys for Defendant and Plaintiff, SANTOS ELECTRONICS, INC. - OO 0 0 ON Wn Ra W N N O R B N R N O N O N N N m m o e m e m m t o e p t e m t e d m d e s GW 3 O N Un KH W N = O O O R N N N R W N = Oo PROOF OF SERVICE I'am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action. My business address is 19138 East Walnut Drive North, Suite 100 Rowland Heights, CA 91748. On July 17,2017, 1 served the foregoing document(s) described! titled as: SANTOS ELECTRONICS, INC.’S REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO TAX COSTS on the following interested parties by the method described: a 0 & See Attached Service List BY MAIL: I placed the original of the foregoing document in a sealed envelope addressed to each interested party as set forth. I am “readily familiar” with the firm’s practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice, it would be deposited with the U.S. Postal Service on the same day with postage thereon fully prepaid at Rowland Heights, California in the ordinary course of business. | am aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one (1) day after date of deposit for mailing an affidavit. BY OVERNIGHT CARRIER: I placed the original of the foregoing document in a sealed envelope, box, or other facility maintained by FedEx or other express carrier service, or delivered to a courier or driver authorized by said express carrier service to receive documents with delivery fees paid for or provided for. VIA HAND DELIVERY BY FACSIMILE: [ sent by facsimile transmission such document(s) to the numbers indicated and confirmed successful transmission of all pages. A transmission report was properly issued by the sending facsimile machine for each interested party served. BY ELECTRONIC MAIL: (BY EMAIL OR ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION) Based on a court order or an agreement of the parties to accept service by email or electronic transmission, I sent by email or electronic transmission such document(s) to the emails indicated. I did not receive, within a reasonable time after the transmission, any electronic message or other indication that the transmission was unsuccessful. (STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury that the above is true and correct. (FEDERAL) I declare that I am employed in the office of a member of the bar of this court at whose direction the service was made. Executed on July 17,2017 at Rowland Heights, California. /) AW) () \ \ Yeffrey Cara PROOF OF SERVICE LO 0 N N N nn s w NY -- 0 NN AN Wn hs W N = O O WO 0 0 N O N WM Es WwW ND o - o o (CASE NO.: 30-2015-00800613-CU-WT-CJC) a) Greg A Garbacz Thomas E. Daugherty Floyd A. Brown Karla M. Hamilton Randy A. Baker Catherine Bond Sean Higgins KLINEDINST PC 501 West Broadway, Suite 600 San Diego, CA 92101 Email: ggarbacz@klinedinstlaw.com Email: tdaugherty@klinedinstlaw.com Email: fborown@klinedinstlaw.com Email: khamilton@klinedinstlaw.com Email: rbaker@klinedinstlaw.com Email: cbond@klinedinstlaw.com Email: shiggins@klinedinstlaw.com SERVICE LIST Attorneys for Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant JENNIFER STROHMEYER 2 PRCOF OF SERVICE