Kelly S. Johnson vs. William G. Joiner

Opposition

Cal. Super. - 4th Dist.June 8, 2015

T R O U T M A N S A N D E R S L L P 5 P A R K P L A Z A SU IT E 14 00 Ir vI NE , C A 9 2 6 1 4 - 2 5 4 5 O O 3 nn BM 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP Penelope Parmes, Bar No. 104774 penelope.parmes@troutmansanders.com Meghan Canty Sherrill, Bar No. 259487 meghan.sherrill@troutmansanders.com 5 Park Plaza, Suite 1400 Irvine, CA 92614-2545 Telephone: 949.622.2700 Facsimile: 949.622.2739 Attorneys for Cross-Complainant, THE WILLIAM G. JOINER TRUST DATED 2-6-02, William G. Joiner as Trustee ELECTRONICALLY FILED Superior Court of California, County of Orange 0405/2016 at 01:16:00 Ph Clerk of the Superior Court By & Clerk, Deputy Clerk SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ORANGE, CENTRAL JUSTICE CENTER KELLY S. JOHNSON, individually and as Trustee of Johnson Family Trust dated September 24, 1999, Plaintiff, V. WILLIAM G. JOINER, et al. Defendants. THE WILLIAM G. JOINER TRUST DATED 2-6-02, William G. Joiner as Trustee, Cross-Complainant, V. KELLY S. JOHNSON, an individual and as Trustee of the Johnson Family Trust dated September 24, 1999, et al. Cross-Defendants. 28170165v2 Case No. 30-2015-00791778-CU-OR-CJC [Hon. Gregory H. Lewis] CROSS-COMPLAINANT’S OPPOSITION TO CROSS-DEFENDANTS’ DEMURRER TO CROSS-COMPLAINT Date: April 18,2016 Time: 10:30 a.m. Dept: C26 Complaint Filed: June 8, 2015 Trial Date: None Set OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER T R O U T M A N S A N D E R S LL P 3 P A R K P L A Z A SU IT E 14 00 IR VI NE , C A 9 2 6 1 4 - 2 5 4 5 H N OO 0 ~~ O N wh 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 97 28 Cross-Complainant The William G. Joiner Trust Dated 2-6-02, William G. Joiner as Trustee (“Cross-Complainant™), hereby submits the following Opposition to the Demurrer of Cross-Defendant Kelly S. Johnson (“Johnson™) filed on December 23, 2015 (the “Demurrer”), and joined by Cross-Defendant Shannon M. Johnson (““S. Johnson” and collectively “Cross- Defendants”) on January 19, 2016. LL INTRODUCTION Cross-Defendants’ Demurrer not only lacks merit, but fails to make even a comprehensible argument. The Demurrer consists almost entirely of Cross-Defendants’ recitation of the law relating to demurrers, littered with conclusory statements that are not supported by anything found in the Cross-Complaint. The obvious purpose of the pleading is to cause delay and unnecessary expense for Cross-Complainant, wasting the Court’s time and resources in the process. Indeed, the baseless Demurrer is representative of Johnson’s utterly frivolous claims in this action and is the latest in a long line of vexatious filings against Cross-Complainant. Because the facts and causes of action in the Cross-Complaint are clearly pled, and because Cross-Defendants have not pointed (and cannot point) to any deficiency in the pleading, the Demurrer should be overruled in its entirety. II. SUMMARY OF CROSS-COMPLAINANT’S ALLEGATIONS Through the Cross-Complaint, Cross-Complainant asserts claims for Breach of Settlement Agreement, Statutory Damages pursuant to Civil Code section 1951.2 and California Code of Civil Procedure sections 1174 and 1174.5, Express Indemnity, Trespass, Waste and Fraud. (Cross-Complaint (“CC”), 99 32-83.) The Cross-Complaint alleges that, on or about March 7, 2007, Cross-Complainant made a loan to Johnson in the principal amount of $150,000.00 (“Loan”), evidenced by an Adjustable Rate Note (“Note”) and secured by an Adjustable Rate Deed of Trust (“Deed of Trust”) recorded against the real property located at 26262 Glen Canyon Drive, Laguna Hills, CA 92653 (the “Property™). (CC, {9 6-7.) Johnson defaulted on the Loan beginning in 2011 by, among other things, failing to make payments due under the Note. As a result, Cross-Complainant commenced foreclosure 28170165v2 -1- OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER T R O U T M A N S A N D E R S LL P 5 P A R K P L A Z A SU IT E 14 00 IR VI NE , C A 9 2 6 1 4 - 2 5 4 5 No OO «0 3 O N un Ww 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 proceedings pursuant to the Deed of Trust. (Id., 8.) After several attempts to accommodate Johnson with forbearance agreements that he ultimately breached, and in response to Johnson’s further request for a postponement of the foreclosure, Cross-Complainant and Cross-Defendants agreed to enter into a written settlement and release of claims on the terms set forth in that certain Settlement and Release Agreement effective March 18, 2015 (“Agreement”). (Id., § 15.) Pursuant to the Agreement, Cross-Complainant agreed to forbear from conducting a foreclosure sale of the Property until June 9, 2015, absent any default under the Agreement. In exchange, Cross-Defendants waived and released any and all claims against Cross-Complainant in connection with the Loan and the pending foreclosure sale and agreed to indemnify Cross- Complainant against any claims arising out of the Loan. (Id., { 16, 52.) The Cross-Complaint alleges that, after entering into the Agreement, Johnson: (i) failed to repay the Loan in full; (ii) failed to reinstate the Loan on or before June 8, 2015; (iii) failed to make any payments on the senior mortgage to reinstate it during the subject time period; and (iv) failed to provide any proof to Cross-Complainant that the senior mortgage was no longer in default. (Id., 21.) As a result, Johnson was in material default under the terms of the Agreement, and a trustee’s sale was conducted on June 9, 2015, at which Cross-Complainant was the highest bidder. (Id.) A Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale (“Trustee’s Deed”), vesting title to the Property in the Cross-Complainant, was recorded on June 10, 2015. (Id., §22.) Cross-Defendants, however, remained in possession of the Property after the sale and refused to vacate, despite being served with a Notice to Quit. (Id., §23.) Cross-Complainant filed an Unlawful Detainer action against Cross-Defendants on June 25, 2015, in the Superior Court of California, County of Orange, Case No. 30-2015-00795549 (the “UD Action”). (Id., § 27.) A judgment of possession was entered in favor of Cross-Complainant in the UD Action on or around September 22, 2015 (the “UD Judgment”). (Id.) To this date, Cross-Defendants continue in their unlawful possession and occupancy of the Property. (Id., 130.) Cross-Defendants appealed the UD Judgment but have been dilatory in 28170165v2 -2- OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER T R O U T M A N S A N D E R S L L P 5 P A R K P L A Z A SU IT E 14 00 IR VI NE , C A 9 2 6 1 4 - 2 5 4 5 OO 0 NN YN n n BA W N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 proceeding, failing to file an opening appellate brief by the required deadlines. No opening brief has been filed to date. Finally, as alleged in the Cross-Complaint, Cross-Defendants have failed and are failing to preserve and protect the Property physically and financially, by among other things, failing to care for and maintain the Property, failing to make repairs, failing to pay applicable taxes related to the Property, failing to maintain insurance for the Property, and failing to make payments on increasing debts secured by the Property. (Id., 31.) III. LEGAL STANDARD “A complaint is sufficient if it sets forth the essential facts with reasonable precision and with particularity sufficient to acquaint a defendant with the nature, source, and extent of the cause of action.” Doe v. City of Los Angeles, 42 Cal. 4th 531, 550 (2007) (internal citations omitted). For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the cause of action, the demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pleaded and does not go beyond the four corners of the complaint. Aubry v. Tri-City Hosp. Dist., 2 Cal. 4th 962, 966-967 (1992); Adelman v. Associated Int’l Ins. Co., 90 Cal.App.4th 352, 359 (2001); Saunders v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. App.4th 832, 837-838 (1994). Courts will not sustain a demurrer unless the objection is clearly well taken; the complaint will be construed “liberally ... with a view to substantial justice between the parties.” Code Civ. Proc. § 452; see Stevens v. Sup.Ct. (API Auto Ins. Services), 75 Cal. App. 4th 594, 601 (1999). In ruling on a demurrer, Courts “give the complaint a reasonable interpretation and [ ] read it in context.” Cansino v. Bank of Am., 224 Cal. App. 4th 1462, 1468 (2014). “[1]t is error for a trial court to sustain a demurrer when the [complaining party] has stated a cause of action under any possible legal theory.” Aubry, supra, 2 Cal. 4th at 967. Further, “it is an abuse of discretion to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if the plaintiff shows there is a reasonable possibility any defect identified by the defendant can be cured by amendment.” Id; Ambers v. Beverages & More, Inc., 236 Cal. App. 4th 508, 511-12 (2015). 28170165v2 -3- OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER T R O U T M A N S A N D E R S LL P 5 P A R K P L A Z A Sw iT E 14 00 IR VI NE , CA 92 61 4- 25 45 OO 0 Nd AN 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 IV. DEFENDANTS HAVE NOT ARTICULATED ANY GROUNDS FOR THE DEMURRER Cross-Defendants’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of their Demurrer is incomprehensible and baseless. The first three pages recite the potential grounds and applicable standard for demurrer under California law, interrupted only by generic, conclusory assertions that the Cross-Complaint is “improperly pled,” “contrary to law,” “fatally defective,” and “fails to state a valid cause of action.” Cross-Defendants fail to set forth any reasoning to support these legal conclusions. The final two pages contain the same conclusory characterizations of the Cross- Complaint, purportedly based on a claim that the Agreement is unenforceable and that the Cross- Complaint is contrary to the language of the Trustee’s Deed. Cross-Defendants fail to identify how or why the Agreement is unenforceable, or how or why the Cross-Complaint contradicts the Trustee’s Deed. Cross-Defendants further claim that the UD Judgment is invalid and that Cross- Complainant has committed fraud, yet Cross-Defendants fail to provide any insight as to the basis for these bald assertions. In sum, the Demurrer cites to no allegations of the Cross-Complaint, is illogical and frivolous, and is clearly meant only to delay. V. THE CROSS-COMPLAINT IS CERTAIN AND SETS FORTH THE ESSENTIAL FACTS TO SUPPORT THE CAUSES OF ACTION ALLEGED THEREIN Cross-Defendants’ argument that all six causes of action in the Cross-Complaint are subject to demurrer as uncertain under California Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10(f) is false and unsupported. As described above and set forth further below, the factual allegations of the Cross-Complaint are straightforward, detailed and clear. Cross-Defendants’ Demurrer pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10(f) should be denied. Lickiss v. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, 208 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1135 (2012) (“demurrers for uncertainty are disfavored, and are granted only if the pleading is so incomprehensible that a defendant cannot reasonably respond”), citing Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc., 14 Cal. App. 4th 612, 61 (1993). Additionally, as Cross-Complainant has set forth the essential facts to support all of the 28170165v2 -4 - OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER T R O U T M A N S A N D E R S LL P 3 P A R K P L A Z A SU IT E 14 00 IR VI NE , C A 9 2 6 1 4 - 2 5 4 5 B O W OO 0 ~~ O v W n 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 claims asserted in the Cross-Complaint, Cross-Defendants’ Demurrer pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10(e) should be denied as well. A. The Cross-Complaint Properly Alleges Cross-Defendants’ Breach of Settlement Agreement The allegations of the Cross-Complaint sufficiently set forth facts to support a claim for breach of settlement agreement. A claim for breach of settlement agreement is analyzed as a breach of contract claim. See Department of Industrial Relations v. UI Video Stores, Inc., 55 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1090 (1997). “To prevail on a breach of contract cause of action, cross- complainants must establish (1) a contract; (2) its performance or excuse for nonperformance; (3) breach; and (4) damages.” Stockton Mortgage, Inc. v. Tope, 233 Cal.App.4th 437, 447 (2014), citing Acoustics, Inc. v. Trepte Const. Co., 14 Cal.App.3d 887, 913 (1971). Here, Cross-Complainant clearly pled all such required elements. The Cross-Complaint alleges that Cross-Complainant and Cross-Defendants knowingly and voluntarily entered into an enforceable settlement contract, pursuant to which Johnson was required to repay the Loan in full by 5:00 p.m. on June 8, 2015, or, alternatively, reinstate the Loan before that time as well as provide to Cross-Complainant proof that the loan secured by a first priority lien on the Property had been fully reinstated, paid in full, or was no longer in default. (CC, qf 15, 33-34.) By the June 8, 2015 deadline, however, Johnson: (a) failed to repay the Loan in full; (b) failed to reinstate the Loan; (c) failed to make any payments on the senior loan to reinstate it; and also, (d) failed to provide assurances to Cross-Complainant that the senior loan was no longer in default. (Id., § 35.) Further, pursuant to the Agreement, Cross-Complainant was entitled to conduct a foreclosure sale on June 9, 2015, and Cross-Defendants agreed to vacate the Property within five business days of any such sale without necessity of further court intervention. (Id., 4 36-37.) Yet, Cross-Defendants breached the Agreement, refused to vacate the Property after the foreclosure sale, and remain in possession of the Property to date. (Id., 38.) The Cross-Complainant alleges both that: (i) Cross-Complainant performed all terms, conditions, and covenants on his part to be performed under the Agreement; and that, (ii) as a 28170165v2 -5- OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER T R O U T M A N S A N D E R S LL P 5 P A R K P L A Z A SU IT E 14 00 IR VI NE , C A 9 2 6 1 4 - 2 5 4 5 A W N Ow 0 3 S N Wn 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 direct and foreseeable result of Cross-Defendants’ breaches of the Agreement, Cross- Complainant suffered damages, including but not limited to the reasonable rental value of the Property from June 18, 2015 through September 22, 2015, and Cross-Complainants’ legal fees associated with the UD Action and instant proceedings. Given the foregoing allegations that address all necessary elements of Cross-Defendants’ claim, Cross-Defendants’ Demurrer to the First Cause of Action should be denied. B. The Cross-Complaint Properly Alleges a Right to Statutory Damages Pursuant to Applicable California Civil Code And Code Of Civil Procedure Sections As alleged in the Cross-Complaint, pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 1174, Cross-Complainant is entitled to damages in the amount of the fair or reasonable rental value of the Property for the period of time from the expiration of the notice terminating Cross- Defendants’ purported right of possession to the date of the UD Judgment. (Id., 46.) Further, pursuant to California Civil Code section 1951.2 and California Code of Civil Procedure section 1174.5, Cross-Complainant is entitled to damages in the amount of the fair or reasonable rental value of the Property for the period of time from the entry of the UD Judgment to the date on which Cross-Complainant obtains possession of the Property (which has yet to occur). (Id., § 47); see also 7 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (4th ed. 2015) §§ 34:190 (damages for future rent after unlawful detainer judgment must be recovered by separate action). Cross-Defendant does not challenge these legal propositions in the Demurrer but rather states that Cross-Complainant has failed to allege facts sufficient to sustain its cause of action. To the contrary, the Cross-Complaint alleges that: Cross-Complainant is the rightful owner of the Property and is entitled to possession; that Cross-Defendants have failed to vacate the Property throughout all of the aforementioned time periods; and that, as a result, Cross-Complainant has suffered and continues to suffer damages, including the fair or reasonable rental value of the Property between June 18, 2015, and the present. (Id., §] 48-50, 60-64.) Accordingly, Cross- Defendants’ Demurrer to the Second Cause of Action should be denied. C. The Cross-Complaint Properly Alleges a Claim for Express Indemnity Cross-Complainant is entitled to express indemnity against Cross-Defendants by reason of 28170165v2 -6- OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER T R O U T M A N S A N D E R S LL P 5 P A R K P L A Z A SU IT E 14 00 IR VI NE , C A 9 2 6 1 4 - 2 5 4 5 \] Oo 0 N N a Wn B A W 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 the indemnity provision contained in the Agreement. An indemnitee seeking to recover on an agreement for indemnification must allege the parties’ contractual relationship, the indemnitee’s performance of that portion of the contract which gives rise to the indemnification claim, the facts showing a loss within the meaning of the parties’ indemnification agreement, and damages. Four Star Electric, Inc. v. F & H Construction, 7 Cal. App. 4th 1375, 1380 (1992). Cross-Complainant has clearly pled facts to support all of these elements, as Cross- Complainant properly alleged the contractual relationship, and that the Agreement contained an indemnity provision requiring Cross-Defendants to “indemnify and hold [Cross-Complainant] harmless of and from any and all claims, action and causes of action that may be brought by them or any third party for any alleged acts or omissions arising out of or relating to the Loan and the Property, without limitation.” (CC., 52.) Further, as Cross-Complainant has incurred and continues to incur damages based on frivolous legal actions brought by Johnson related to the foreclosure sale of the Property, Cross-Complainant has sustained a loss within the indemnity provision for which damages are recoverable. (Id., 58.) As the Cross-Complaint sets forth facts sufficient to support the express indemnity claim, Cross-Defendants’ Demurrer to the Third Cause of Action should be denied. D. The Cross-Complaint Properly Alleges Claims for Trespass and Waste The Cross-Complaint states valid claims for trespass and waste against Cross-Defendants, alleging facts sufficient to sustain both claims. A trespass action may be maintained “by one whose right to possession has been violated. ..[T]he inquiry in a case involving unlawful intrusion on property rights should focus upon the nature of the injury and the damages sought: If the right to possession has been abridged and possessory rights damaged, the possessor may complain by way of an action for trespass; if, on the other hand, an intruder harms real property in a manner which damages the ownership interest, the property owner may seek recovery whether the cause of action be technically labeled trespass or some other form of action, such as waste.” Hassoldt v. Patrick Media Group, Inc., 84 Cal. App. 4th 153, 171 (2000), disapproved of on unrelated grounds by People v. Rogers, 57 Cal. 4th 296, 330-331 (2013). “Trespass may be ‘by personal intrusion of the wrongdoer or by his failure to leave[.]’” Martin Marietta Corp. v. Insurance Co. 28170165v2 -7 - OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER T R O U T M A N S A N D E R S LL P 5 P A R K P L A Z A SU IT E 14 00 IR VI NE , C A 9 2 6 1 4 - 2 5 4 5 S w OO © ~ 1 O N Lh 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 23 26 27 28 of North America, 40 Cal. App. 4th 1113, 1132 (1995). Meanwhile, waste is conduct on the part of the person in possession (both acts of commission and omission) of property which results in a permanent injury to the property and its owner. Avalon Pacific-Santa Ana, L.P. v. HD Supply Repair & Remodel, LLC, 192 Cal. App. 4th 1183, 1211-1212 (2011). “In order to state a cause of action for waste, a plaintiff must plead and prove that the defendant was under a duty to preserve and protect the property involved.” Id. Here, the Cross-Complaint alleges that: (i) Cross-Complainant is the owner of all right, title and interest to the Property; (ii) Cross-Defendants have a duty to surrender possession of the Property and to vacate immediately; (iii) Cross-Defendants have intentionally and deliberately entered and/or otherwise remained on the Property without Cross-Complainant’s permission or consent; and that (iv) Cross-Defendants continue to deprive Cross-Complainant of the ability to make beneficial use of the Property. (CC, 1 60-64.) The Cross-Complaint further alleges that: (i) Cross-Defendants have a duty to preserve and protect the Property physically and financially given their inferior ownership rights to those of Cross-Complainant; (ii) Cross-Defendants have failed to maintain and care for the Property, such that the value of the Property is depreciating; and that (iii) Cross-Defendants have failed to make repairs, pay applicable taxes related to the Property, maintain insurance for the Property, and failed make payments on increasing debts secured by the Property. Accordingly, as Cross-Complainant’s trespass and waste claims are properly pled, Cross- Defendants’ Demurrer to the Fourth and Fifth Causes of Action should be denied. E. The Cross-Complaint Properly Alleges a Fraud Claim against Johnson Finally, the facts set forth in the Cross-Complaint sufficiently support Cross- Complainant’s fraud claim against Johnson. “The elements of fraud are (a) a misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) scienter or knowledge of its falsity; (c) intent to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage. Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center, 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294 (2005). The Cross-Complaint sets forth specific fraudulent representations made by Johnson in order to induce Cross-Complainant to enter the Agreement. Namely, at and immediately before 28170165v2 -8 - OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER T R O U T M A N S A N D E R S LL P 5 P A R K P L a z a SU IT E 14 00 IR VI NE , C A 9 2 6 1 4 - 2 5 4 5 0 3 ON \O 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 the time the parties entered into the Agreement, Johnson made false representations to Cross- Complainant and his counsel that Johnson’s brother-in-law, as well as at least one other person, were ready and willing to put up the money to cure the defaults on both the Loan and on the senior loan, and that all J ohnson needed was time to be able to finalize that financing. (CC, § 76.) As alleged in the Cross-Complaint, Johnson never had such potential sources of financing, or at a minimum, he misrepresented the stage of such financing and grossly exaggerated the likelihood that such financing would materialize, all in order to induce Cross-Complainant to postpone the foreclosure sale and enter into the Agreement. (Id.) The Cross-Complaint goes on to allege that Johnson knew the subject representations were false, that he intended to induce and in fact induced reliance, and that Cross-Complainant has been damaged as result thereof. (Id., qf 79-82.) Given the foregoing allegations that address all necessary elements of Cross-Defendants’ fraud claim, Cross-Defendants’ Demurrer to the Sixth Cause of Action should be denied. VI. CONCLUSION For all the foregoing reasons, Cross-Complainant respectfully requests that the Court overrule the Demurrer in its entirety. TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP py. 7Y Legh o Flop ec 0 Penelope Parmes Meghan C. Sherrill Attorneys for Cross-Complainant, THE WILLIAM G. JOINER TRUST DATED 2-6-02, William G. Joiner as Trustee Dated: April 5, 2016 28170165v2 -9 - OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER Oo © 0 3 O y nn Bx W N = N N N N N N N O N m m e s m m e m e a e a e p N Y L n P W N = O V e N N W N = o 23 TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP 5 PARK PLAZA, SUITE 1400 IRVINE, CA 92614-2545 PROOF OF SERVICE Kelly S. Johnson, etc. v. William G. Joiner, etc., et al. Case No. 30.2015-00791778-CU-OR-CIC STATE OF CA, COUNTY OF ORANGE I am employed in the County of Orange, State of CA. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action; my business address is 5 Park Plaza, Suite 1400, Irvine, CA 92614- 2545. On April 5, 2016, I served the following document(s) described as: CROSS-COMPLAINANT’S OPPOSITION TO CROSS-DEFENDANTS?’ DEMURRER TO CROSS-COMPLAINT To the following person(s): Kelly S. Johnson Shannon S. Johnson* 27068 La Paz Road, Suite 510 26262 Glen Canyon Drive, Aliso Viejo, CA 92656 Laguna Hills, CA 92653 KSJEsq@aol.com As indicated below: (By E-Service) On April 5, 2016, I checked the case information system via OneLegal, LLC Court Services, and confirmed that the following recipients are listed as person(s) that receives/ accepts service by e-filing system (Per California Rule of Court 2.251 (a)(1) and C.C.P. Section 1010.6 (a)(2), if a document can be served by mail, express mail, overnight delivery, or fax transmission, electronic service is permitted.) O (By Mail) On April 5, 2016, I placed a true and correct copy thereof in a sealed envelope with postage thereon, fully prepaid to be placed in the United States mail. (By Federal Express/Overnight Mail) On April 5, 2016, I caused such envelope to be delivered by Federal Express (or Express Mail), next business day delivery. O (By Personal Delivery Service) On N/A, I caused said document to be personally delivered. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct, Annette P. Siu gi Executed on April 5, 2016, at Irvine, CA * This person is being served via Federal Express only. PROOF OF SERVICE 28190132V1