Noreen Sottosanti vs. State of California Edd

Opposition

Cal. Super. - 4th Dist.January 23, 2014

Oo 00 ~J aN (9% ) [E N Ww No -_ 7 = p m p d pe pm ed p e 8 3 B 8 8 R B I R B B B 5 9 3 5&5 & 8 5 K = 5 KamMALA D. HARRIS Attorney General of California BRUCE W. REYNOLDS Acting Supervising Deputy Attorney General ERNESTO J. FONG Deputy Attorney General State Bar No. 192899 300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702 Los Angeles, CA 90013 Telephone: (213) 897-7936 Fax: (213) 897-1071 E-mail: Ernesto.Fong@doj.ca.gov Attorneys for Defendant State of California, Employment Development Department No filing fee pursuant to Government Code section 6103 ELECTRONICALLY FILED Superior Court of California, County of Orange 05/03/2016 at 01:36:00 Pi Clerk of the Superior Court By & Clerk, Deputy Clerk +SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ORANGE NOREEN SOTTOSANTI, Plaintiff, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, EMPLOYMENT DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT and DOES 1 through 20, Defendant. Case No. 30-2014-00700385-CU-OE-CJC DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFEF’S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL Filed concurrently with: 1. DEFENDANT’S COMPENDIUM OF EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITIONS TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL AND MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT; 2. DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFEF’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT Date: May 16, 2016 Time: 2:00 p.m. Dept: C-17 Judge: Hon. Craig Griffin Action Filed: January 23, 2014 OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL (30-2014-00700385-CU-OE-CJC) = m m a m m em pm em 8 3 8 8B RE V8 I R B L 53 53 58 G 5 6 8 = 6 © 0 J N A W N INTRODUCTION The jury rendered a swift and unanimous defense verdict on Plaintiff’s three causes of action in approximately two hours; yet, Plaintiff files a motion for a new trial. Plaintiff now belatedly complains of an alleged irregularity and claims there was insufficient evidence to. support the verdict. However, Plaintiff’s alleged irregularity either does not exist, or is trivial and not prejudicial. Further, Plaintiff provides no evidence of trial testimony or documentary evidence to support her new trial motion and she has not established that the verdict was a " “miscarriage of justice.” On the contrary, the evidence overwhelmingly supports the verdict. Accordingly, Defendant California Employment Development Department (“EDD”) respectfully requests that this Court deny Plaintiff’s motion. ) | FACTS Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint on April 25, 2014 against EDD alleging (1) disability discrimination, (2) failure to reasonably accommodate, and (3) failure to engage in the good faith interactive process. Trial began on November 5, 2015. On November 23,2015, after approximately two hours of deliberation, the jury returned a 12-0 defense verdict on all of Plaintiff’s three Eames of action. (See EDD’s Compendium of Evidence (“Compendium”)," Fong Decl., { 2, Exh. “1”.) This Court signed a Judgment on Special Verdict on January 4, 2016. (Compendium, Fong Decl., 15, Exh. “K”) A Notice of Entry of Judgment was served and filed on March 18, 2016. (Compendium, Fong Decl., q 5, Exh. “L”.) Plaintiff Noreen Sottosanti is a deaf employee who started work as an Office Assistant (“OA”) at EDD and is still working there. The trial showed that EDD provided Plaintiff with American Sign Language (“ASL”) interpreters for the vast majority of staff meetings, trainings, evaluations and one-on-one meetings to discuss work duties. (Compendium, Trial Transcripts (“TT”)* 11/16/15, J. Kimble, 160:20-162:6, Exhs. 40, 163:18-164:14, Exh. 3; TT 11/19/15, J. Kimble, 118:12-120:25, 123:5-127:25, Exhs. 40, 64.) EDD did not provide ASL interpreters for 1 EDD’s Compendium of Exhibits and Declarations will be referred to as “Compendium” from hereinafter. % The Trial Transcripts will be referred to as “TT” from hereinafter. 1 OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL (30-2014-00700385-CU-OE-CJC) Oo O N N N N R A WL H o m o m lm lm lm m m o m em 8 B B B R R B R E B L x 3 5 56a 2 6 K R B impromptu meetings due to the lack of availability for ASL interpreters, ios did it provide interpreters for social activities as these were not mandatory or required for Plaintiff's essential job duties. (Compendium, TT 11/09/15, N. Sottosanti, 43:4-12; TT 11/12/15, S. Elizalde, 180:4- 181:12; TT 11/19/15, J. Kimble, 133:11-134:25.) | The evidence at trial also demonstrated that EDD did not subject Plaintiff to an adverse employment action, a key element of a discrimination claim. (Compendium, TT 11/9/ 15, N. Sottosanti, 100:10-101:15.y Moreover, Plaintiff produced no evidence that EDD took any action toward her based on a discriminatory motive. (Compendium, TT 11/20/15, J. Kimble, 25:18- 26:16; TT 11/16/15, S. Elizalde, 20:12-21 8.) In addition, EDD properly denied Plaintiff’s request for a videophone because she had access to a teletype device (“TTY”) and her job duties only required minimal interaction with office staff and the public. (Compendium, TT 11/16/15, J. Kimble, 164:15-165:17, Exbs. 3, TT 11/19/15, C. Pouncy, 60:10-62:25.) Further, Plaintiff failed to prove that she suffered discrimination when she was not interviewed for an Office Tech (“OT”) position in 2012. In fact, the evidence demonstrated that she did not submit an application for the OT position, which made her ineligible for promotion. (Compendium, TT 11/19/15, J. Kimble, 160:7-161:18; TT, 11/9/15, N. Sottosanti, 77:23-79:8.) ARGUMENT I. PLAINTIFF HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED ANY “IRREGULARITY IN THE TRIAL PROCEEDINGS” A. Applicable Law The California Constitution provides that “[n]o judgment shall be set aside, or new trial granted, in any cause . . . for any error as to any matter of procedure, unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.” (Cassim v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2004) 33 Cal. 4th 780, 800, citing Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; see Code of Civ. Proc., § 475 J) A court may grant a new trial for an irregularity in the court proceedings. (Code Civ. Proc., § 657, sub. (1).) However, a motion for new trial on the ground of irregularity will only be granted where the “irregularity” was so prejudicial that it deprived the moving party of a 2 | OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL (30-2014-00700385-CU-OE-CJC) © 0 N N Ln B A L D N N N N N N R m m m em es E E a constitutionally guaranteed right to a fair trial. (Russell v. Dopp (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 765, 780.) Trivial or non-prejudicial errors will not warrant granting a motion for new trial. (8 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008), Attack on Judgment in the Trial Court, § 132, p. 723.) | ~B. Brief Deliberations From Jury Does Not Constitute an Irregularity Plaintiff claims that the approximate two hours the jury spent in deliberations was too short a time for the jury to have reached a meaningful decision. (Motion, p. 3.) However, the time a jury spends in deliberation is no indication whatsoever of any irregularity. Brief deliberations have never been a sufficient basis for granting a motion for a new trial. In Mendoza v. Club Car, Inc. (2000) 81 Cal. App.4th 287, the court properly denied a motion for new trial based on the fact that the jurors deliberated for less than one hour before returning a verdict. (Id. at p. 309-311) The court in Mendoza held that short deliberations do not necessarily show a jury’s failure to fully consider the case as “there is no minimum time a juror must deliberate ....7 (Id. at p. 309; see also, Perdue v. Hopper Truck Lines (1963) 221 Cal.App.2d 604, 609.) | Court of Civil Procedure section 613 states that “[w]hen the case is finally submitted to the jury, they may decide in Court or retire for deliberation.” (Code Civ. Pro., § 613, italics added.) The Mendoza court held that the “plain language of section 613 indicates a jury may decide a case immediately following the court’s instructions. (Mendoza, HT 81 Cal.App.4th at pp. 310-311, citing Vormaska v. City of San Diego (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 905,910.) “A party’s constitutional right to have his case decided by a jury [does not include] the right to compel jurors to discuss issues which they have chosen to decide without discussion. (Vormaska, supra, 55 Call. App.4th at p. 910 [jury decision on verdict 10 to 15 minutes after beginning deliberations upheld].) Based on the case law cited above, Plaintiff's claim that the jury’s short deliberations constituted an irregularity is unwarranted. Moreover, Plaintiff provided no authority in support of ber contention. | 1 I 3 OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL (30-2014-00700385-CU-OE-CJIC) -_ N O N R m m m em pm p m m e 8 ¥ B B R B I R B & 35 36 8 6 5 6 8 1B 5 © 00 N N L t B A W C. Plaintiff’s Alleged Irregularity is Not Prejudicial In order to justify a new trial, the party must demonstrate that any alleged irregularity was prejudicial. (Garcia v. ConMed Corp. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 144,149, citing Cassim v. Allstate Insurance Co. (2004) 33 Cal. 4th 780. 800.) Plaintiff s claims that the jury’s short deliberations were so prejudicial that it deprived Plaintiff of a fair trial is unfounded. As it stands, Plaintiff provided no evidence that any juror did not rely on the evidence presented at trial to make his/her decision. Mere speculation is not enough. Because Plaintiff has failed to show any indication of jury misconduct, she has not produced any indicia of prejudicial irregularity. II. TRIAL PRODUCED ABUNDANT EVIDENCE JUSTIFYING THE VERDICT ~ Contrary to Plaintiff’s allegations, her motion for a new trial should be denied because the evidence overwhelmingly supports the jury’s defense verdict. A judge may grant a new trial under Code of Civil Procedure section 657, subdivision (6), based on insufficiency of evidence only if the judge is convinced that from the entire record, including reams inferences, that the jury clearly should have reached a different verdict. (Lauren H. v. Kannappan (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 834, 839.) In making a decision, the judge must determine whether there is sufficient credible evidence to sustain the jury’s verdict. Further, a judge is to be guided by a presumption in favor of the correctness of a verdict, and may not arbitrarily reject a verdict that is supported by substantial evidence. (Dominguez v. Pantalone (1989) 212 Cal. App.3d 201, 216.) A motion for a new trial made on this ground must be made on the minutes of the court, i.e., on the records of the proceedings entered by the judge, which includes depositions and exhibits admitted into evidence and trial transcripts. (Id. at fn. 4; see also Gov. Code, § 69844.) Here, Plaintiff makes only conclusory statements that the trial evidence was insufficient for the jury to render a decision against her. She cites no actual testimony or evidence to support her contentions. Thus, this Court should reject Plaintiff's claims outright. As demonstrated during trial, substantial evidence supported the verdict. The verdict was premised on the - presented at trial and guided by the Special Jury Verdict agreed to by the parties. (Compendium, Fong Decl., 73, Exh. “J”.) Based on the Special Jury Verdict and] the evidence presented, the jury rejected Plaintiff’s three FEHA causes of action after concluding 4 OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL (30-2014-00700385-CU-OE-CJC) \O 0 ~ a N W h + Ww nN = ’ NN = = p e e R e d p d pe 8 3 8 8 R I B R B R E E L & 53 68 6G R G B B that: (1) EDD did not take adverse employment action against Plaintiff; 2) EDD did not fail to provide a reasonable accommodation to Plaintiff; and (4) EDD did not fail to engage Plaintiff ina good-faith interactive process. A. Plaintiff Did Not Show EDD Took Averse Action Against Her ‘In order to prove disability discrimination Plaintiff had to show EDD took adverse employment action against her. (see Scotch v. Art Institute of Cal. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 986, 1006; Green v. State of Cal. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 254, 263.) During trial, Plaintiff did not produce ‘evidence that EDD took adverse employment action against her. In fact, Plaintiff herself testified at the trial that EDD did not take any disciplinary or adverse employment action against her, which proved lethal to her disability discrimination claim. (Compendium, trial transcripts for Plaintiff.) During trial, Plaintiff did not produce evidence that EDD took adverse employment action -against her. In fact, Plaintiff herself testified at the trial that EDD did not take any disciplinary or adverse employment action against her. This proved lethal to her disability discrimination claim. (Compendium, TT 11/9/15, N. Sottosanti, 100:10-101:15) : Additionally, EDD’s testimony and documentary evidence clearly demonstrated that Plaintiff suffered no adverse employment action. Supervisors at the EDD Santa Ana office showed that they never executed any disciplinary action or an adverse employment action against Plaintiff during her employment at EDD. (Compendium, TT 11/19/15, J. Kimble, 161:19-162:12; TT 11/12/15, M. Rivas, 13:25-16:23, 18:1.20:23, Exh. 53, 21:1-23:15.) Therefore, the evidence at trial established that Plaintiff did not suffer an adverse employment action, and by extension, did not suffer disability discrimination Further, Plaintiff alleged that she suffered an adverse employment action when she was not allowed to interview for an Office Technician (“OT”) position in April 2012. However, in her testimony at trial, Plaintiff admitted she expressed interest for the OT position, but she never’ ~ submitted an application for it. (Compendium, TT 11/9/15, N. Sottosanti, 77:23-79:8; TT 11/19/15, J. Kimble, 160:7-161:18.) As a result, Plaintiff was ineligible for the OT position and she could not interview. (Compendium, TT 11/19/15, J. Kimble, 154:5-157:5, 160:7-161:18.) 5s OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL (30-2014-00700385-CU-OE-CIC) pi _ = pm = = = = Em = I 8 8 R B I R B G ©» 3 6&6 &a 6 KS RB & © 0 N A Un B W ON > B. EDD Provided Plaintiff With Reasonable Accommodations Another unfounded claim Plaintiff made at trial relates to EDD not providing her with reasonable accommodations. NsmETEs witnesses at trial actually showed that EDD did provide Plaintiff with reasonable accommodations in the form of American Sign Language (“ASL”) interpreters. Plaintiff 456 claimed that EDD did not provide her with a videophone; however, the evidence reflected that Plaintiff's duties as an Office Assistant (“OA”) did not warrant the need for a videophone. | | 1. EDD Accommodated Plaintiff With ASL Interpreters A reasonable accommodation is a modification or adjustment to the work environment that enables the employee to perform the essential job functions of the job. (Nadaf-Rahrov v. Neimus Marcus Group, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal. App.4th 952, 974.) If a request for reasonable accommodation does not relate to the performance of an essential job function, the employer is not obligated to provide such accommodations. (See Hanson v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 215, 228.) “The employer is not obligated to choose the best accommodation or the accommodation the employee seeks.” (Ibid.) Contrary to Plaintiff’s allegations, EDD’s manager Jill Kimble and Plaintiff's supervisor Sonya Elizalde testified that Plaintiff was provided with ASL interpreters for all one-on-one meetings discussing terms and conditions of employment and work performance. (Compendium, TT 11/16/15, J. Kimble, 160:20-162:6, Exhbs. 40; TT 11/19/15, J. Kimble, 118:12-120:25, 123:5- 127-25, Exhs. 40, 64; TT 11/20/15, J. Kimble, 12:9-13:23; TT 11/12/15, S. Elizalde, 135:9-137:5, 145:19-146:14, 149:4-151:26, Exhs. 40, 64, 171:21-172:14.) Kimble and Elizalde also fesefiffed. that Plaintiff was provided with ASL interpreters for staff meetings and trainings. (Ibid.) From December 2008 to 2014, EDD contracted ASL interpreters for Plaintiff on close to fifty 60) occasions in which EDD held essential meetings with Plaintiff.’ The dates were as follows: 12/3/08 through 12/5/08, 12/15/08, 1/12/09, 4/1/09, 4/6/09, 4/09, 6/9/09, 6/26/09, 9/15/09, ? Plaintiff was out on medical leave from October 25, 2010 through January 31, 2012. She was also out from October 3, 2013 through December 6, 2013 and March 24, 2015 through August 4, 2015. (Compendium, TT 11/ 12/15, S. Elizalde, 157:6- 26, Exh. 64; TT 11/ 16/15, S. Elizalde, 10:9- -24.) 6 OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL (30-2014-00700385-CU-OE-CJ 0 Oo 0 3 oo nh A W N F T eR p m pe e l p d pe l pe d ed pe 9 8 8 R B I R B S % 3 58 66 5 5 6 K B B 9/16/09, 2/25/10, 3/23/10, 5/12/10, 8/19/10, 9/29/10, 10/20/10, 2/1/12, 2/8/12, 3/7/12, 3/21/12, 4/19/12, 7/18/12, 8/14/12 through 8/20/12, 9/17/12, 10/26/12, 12/5/12, 2/13/13, 3/8/13, 4/25/13, 5/17/13, 5/22/13, 6/27/13, 7/29/13, 9/17/13, 1/23/14, 2/13/14, 2/28/14, 5/1/14, 7/15/14, 7/31/14, 9/11/14, 11/4/14, 1/2/15, 2/19/15, 2/14/15. (Compendium, TT 11/16/15, J. Kimble, 160:20-162:6, Exhs. 40; TT 11/19/15, J. Kimble, 118:12-120:25, 123:5-127:25, Exhs. 40, 64; TT 11/20/15, J. Kimble, 12:9-13:23; TT 11/12/15, S. Elizalde, 135:9-137:5, 145:19-146:14, 149:4-151:26, Exhs. 40, 64, 171:21-172:14; TT 11/12/15, C. Fanning, 82:16-91:15, Exh. 40.) All of these dates with interpreters were supported by invoices from the language companies contracted by EDD. (Ibid.) 2. Plaintiff’s Duties Did Not Warrant a Videophone In October 2012, Plaintiff requested a videophone as a reasonable accommodation to communicate even though she already had a TTY (device to assist deaf persons to communicate). (Compendium, TT 11/19/15, J. Kimble, 135:3-22, Exh. 41, TT 11/19/15, C. Pouncy, 60:10-62:25, | Exh. 55, 72:24-80:9, Exhs. 43-44.) Attrial, Connie Pouncy, Reasonable Accommodations | Director, and Kimble testified that EDD reviewed and researched Plaintiff’s request for a videophone and concluded that Plaintiff’s essential job duties did not warrant the use of a videophone. (Compendium, TT 11/19/15, C. Pouncy, 60:10-62:25, Exh. 55, 72:24-80:9, Exhs. 43-44.) Plaintiff’s job duties only required minimal interaction with office staff and the public. (Compendium, TT 11/19/15, J. Kimble, 136:8-137:9, 141:20-144:5, Exh. 41, 45; TT 11/16/15, J. Kimble, 163:18-165:17, Exhs. 3; TT 11/12/15, S. Elizalde, 122:17-126:2, Exh. 3, 126:3-134:17, Exh. 45, TT 11/16/15, S. Elizalde, 13:22-15:3; TT 11/19/15, C. Pouncy, 60:10-62:25, Exh. 55, 72:24-80:9, Exhs. 43-44.) Plaintiff confirmed at trial that in her request for a videophone, she wrote that the videophone was more of a “convenience” and it would make her job “easier,” but she did not state that she needed the videophone to perform her job duties. (Compendium, TT 11/9/15, N. Sottosanti, 87:3-91:3, Exh. 41; TT 11/19/15, C. Pouncy, 77:12-78:11, Exhs. 41, 44.) Moreover, Plaintiff had access to TTY and electronic mail in order to communicate with office staff and the public. (Compendium, TT 11/12/15, S. Elizalde, 134:18-135:5, TT 11/16/15, S. Elizalde, 13:22-15:3; TT 11/9/15, N. Sottosanti, 87:3-91:3, Exh. 41.) Consequently, the trial 7 + OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL (30-2014-00700385-CU-OE-CIC) OO Ww NN nh B A W NN P R R m pm e p e p EF 3 8 B R B E R R BEB LS & 53 5 46 5% 8 8 RB 5 testimony and documentary evidence showed that EDD’s denial of a videophone for Plaintiff was warranted because Plaintiff's use of a videophone did not relate to her essential job duties. C. EDD Engaged Plaintiff in the Good-Faith Interactive Process An employer’s duty to engage in an interactive process to identify a reasonable accommodation extends only to secomiodations that would enable the employee to perform the essential functions of the position. (Nadof-Rahrov, Supra, 166 Cal. App.4th at p. 974, fn. 9, p. 975.) Section 12940, subdivision (n) imposes liability only if a reasonable accommodation was possible. (Id. at pp. 980-983, emphasis added.) Also, it is plaintiff's burden to identify a reasonable accommodation that the interactive process should have produced. (Scotch, supra, 173 Cal. App.4th at pp. 1018-1019.) | | EDD introduced substantial testimonial and documentary evidence at trial proving that it engaged Plaintiff in the good-faith interactive process. First, the evidence showed that Jill Kimble and Julie Hays, Reasonable Accommodations Coordinator, maintained communications with Plaintiff regarding her request for a videophone as a reasonable accommodation. (Compendium, TT 11/19/15, J . Kimble, 144:6-145:22; TT 11/19/15, C. Pouncy, 60:10-62:25, Exh. 55, 72:24-80:9, Exhs. 43-44.) Plaintiff requested the videophone in April 2012. After "Plaintiff made her request, Kimble started researching the feasibility of a videophone with EDD’s office equipment. (Compendium, TT 11/19/15, J. Kimble, 139:9-144:5, Exhs. 41, 45, 144:6- 145:22; TT 11/9/15, N. Sottosanti, 91:4-95:13, Exh. 4.) Kimble communicated with Plaintiff on October 29, 2012, January 15, 2013 and April 12, 2013 to keep her informed shout the status of the videophone request. Kimble, and Plaintiff, also testified that other EDD staff, such as Ashley Lee, Luan Crawford and Beverly Chan, also communicated with Plaintiff about her request for a videophone. (Compendium, TT 11/9/15, N. Sottosanti, 91:4-95:13, Exh. 4; TT 11/19/15, J. Kimble, 145:23-150:24, Exh. 4.) Additionally, on June 7, 2013, Hays wrote a letter to Plaintiff denying the request for a videophone and explaining that Plaintiff did not need the videophone to perform her essential job duties. (Compendium, TT 11/19/15, J. Kimble, 150:25-152:22, Exh. 44; TT 11/19/15, C. Pouncy, 72:24-80:9, Exhs. 43-44.) 8 “OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL (30-2014-00700385-CU-OE-CIC) OO 00 NN Ny hh B A W N O R N N N N N N m m Rm | pm em e e E N B B R EB R B S T x 5 3 5 a 82 6 0 B B Second, EDD also maintained an interactive process with Plaintiff regarding the ASL interpreters. The trial evidence showed that starting in 2008, right after Plaintiff started working as an OA, EDD communicated with Plaintiff on providing ASL interpreters for the vast majority of essential job duties. (Compendium, TT 11/16/15, J. Kimble, 160:20-162:6, Exhs. 40; TT 11/19/15, J. Kimble, 118:12-120:25, 123:5-127:25, Exhs. 40, 64; TT 11/20/15, J. Kimble, 12:9- 13:23: TT 11/12/15, S. Elizalde, 135:9-137:5, 145:19-146:14, 149:4-151:26, Exhs. 40, 64, 171:21-172:14.) There were close to fifty (50) times from 2008 to 2014 in which EDD contracted interpreters for meetings with Plaintiff. (Ibid.) Each of those times, Plaintiff learned that EDD acted to provide her with sii interpreter for a specific meeting. ‘Also, as stated earlier, whenever EDD was not able to secure an interpreter for Plaintiff, it provided a supervisor or employee to assist Plaintiff understand the meetings subject by wifi to Plaintiff and helping her understand the material. (Compendium, TT 11/12/15, S. Elizalde, 171:21-172:14; TT 11/16/15, S. Elizalde, 7:19-8:16, 10:25-13:1; TT 11/19/15, J. Kimble, 116:5-118:11; TT Plaintiff.) CONCLUSION | Plaintiff’s motion for new trial is completely unsupported and she has not shown that “a manifest and unmistakable miscarriage of justice” occurred. To the contrary, substantial evidence supports the jury’s 12-0 verdict on all of Plaintiffs’ causes of action. Accordingly, EDD respectfully requests that the court deny the motion for new trial. Dated: May 3, 2016 Respectfully Submitted, KAMALA D. HARRIS Attorney General of California BRUCE W. REYNOLDS Acting Supervising Deputy Attorney 1 Attorneys for Defendant State of California Employment Dieveigpment Deporinen LA2014612143 Opposition to Motion for New Trial (Sottosanti) (FINAL) 61947113.doc 9 OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL (30-2014-00700385-CU-OE-CJC) DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY U.S. MAIL Case Name: Noreen Sottosanti v. State of California, EDD Case No. 30-2014-00700385-CU-OE-CJC I declare: I am employed in the Office of the Attorney General, which is the office of a member of the California State Bar, at which member's direction this service is made. Iam 18 years of age or. older and not a party to this matter. I am familiar with the business practice at the Office of the Attorney General for collection and processing of correspondence for mailing with the United States Postal Service. In accordance with that practice, correspondence placed in the internal mail collection system at the Office of the Attorney General is deposited with the United States Postal Service with postage thereon fully prepaid tha same day in the ordinary course of business. On May 3, 2016, I served the attached DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFE’S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope in - "the internal mail collection system at the Office of the Attorney General at 300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702, Los Angeles, CA 90013, addressed as follows: Matthew M. Pope Attorney at Law Matthew Pope Law Office 6787 Worsham Drive Whittier, CA 90602 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California the foregoing is-true and correct and that this declaration was executed on May 3, 2016, at Los Angeles, California. Letty Argumedo hdd hia de Declarant i Signature('\ LA2014612143 61967974.doc