Maria Figueroa vs. Elite Home Medical & Respiratory, Inc.

Reply to Motion

Cal. Super. - 4th Dist.March 29, 2011

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 David A. Robinson, Esq. (SBN 107613) Benjamin P. Pugh, Esq. (SBN 202025) Matthew W. Rosene, Esq. (SBN 294158) ENTERPRISE COUNSEL GROUP, ALC Three Park Plaza, Suite 1400 Irvine, California 92614 Telephone: (949) 833-8550 Facsimile: (949) 833-8540 Email: mrosene@enterprisecounsel.com Attorneys for Defendants ELITE HOME MEDICAL & RESPIRATORY, INC., STEVE WHITFORD and WHITFORD MEDICAL, INC. SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF ORANGE, CENTRAL JUSTICE CENTER MARIA FIGUEROA, an individual, Plaintiff, VS. ELITE HOME MEDICAL RESPIRATORY, INC., a California Corporation; STEVE WHITFORD, an individual; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, Defendants. ALL CONSOLIDATED ACTIONS. CASE NO.: 30-2011-00462139-CU-OE-CJC (Consolidated with Case Nos. 30-2011-00473653, 30-2011-00481012, 30-2011-00488386 and 30- 2011-00497220) Hon. Walter Schwarm Dept. C-19 DEFENDANT WHITFORD MEDICAL, INC.’S CONSOLIDATED REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO REQUESTS ) FOR ADMISSION, SET ONE, FROM ) PLAINTIFF MARIA FIGUEROA, ) PLAINTIFF YESENIA DUBYAK, AND ) PLAINTIFF TRACI GIBBS, AND FORM ) INTERROGATORIES, SET ONE, FROM ) PLAINTIFF DANA VELAZCO AND ) PLAINTIFF AAUNDERS BENFORD ) ) ) ) ) ) : ) Assigned for all purposes to the ) ) ) ) ) ) ) DATE: March 21, 2017 TIME: 1:30 p.m. DEPT: C-19 Action Filed: March 29, 2011 Trial Date: April 28, 2017 nr DEFENDANT WMI'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO RFAS AND FROGS FROM PLAINTIFFS 277007/1733-001 o e a 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 I. INTRODUCTION This Court should grant WMI’s motions to compel further responses to discovery because plaintiffs have denied defendant Whitford Medical, Inc.’s (“WMI”) statutory right to conduct discovery by inventing restrictions that this Court declined to apply. The five plaintiffs in the five separate actions consolidated under the above-captioned lead case named WMI as Doe Defendant 1 and the Court granted WMI “an opportunity to conduct discovery to prepare for trial.” (See Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Admission, Set One, from Maria Figueroa (“MTC Figueroa RFA”), Ex. 1 at 3:4-7.) Despite that the Court expressly stated that “Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that Whitford Medicalis an alter ego of Elite” and that WMI is “a newly named defendant,” plaintiffs have unilaterally restricted WMI’s discovery. (/d.) Plaintiffs attempt to justify their refusal to respond to discovery by claiming that even though plaintiffs failed to demonstrate alter ego and despite that plaintiffs alleged every single cause of action directly against WMI, WMI’s discovery is limited to a single theory of recovery,alter ego. The default under the Discovery Act is that discovery is allowed for all issues “relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending actions” and that “appear[] reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2017.010.) Discovery may, however, be “limited by order of the court in accordance with thistitle.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2017.010.) The Court here declined to limit WMI’s discovery. (MTC Figueroa RFA, Ex. 1 at 3:4-7; MTC Figueroa RFA, Ex. 2 at 2 (“The court notes that the motion to reopen discovery appears to be moot in light of the court’s ruling on 10-25-16 as to Defendants’ Motion to Continue the Trial.”) After obtaining a court order reopening discovery for WMI without any limitations, WMIserved discovery requests on the plaintiffs on November 8, 2016, that properly sought to “obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending actions . . . or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2017.010.) Nonetheless, plaintiffs refused to answer any question that was not overtly directed to the issue of alter ego liability. This consolidated reply address plaintiff Maria Figueroa’s Opposition to Motion to i 55 DEFENDANT WMI’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO RFAS AND FROGS FROM PLAINTIFFS 277007/1733-001 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Compel Further Responses to Requests for Admission, Set One (“Figueroa Opp. RFA”), plaintiff Traci Gibbs's Opposition to Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Admission, Set One (“Gibbs Opp. RFA”), plaintiff Yesenia Dubyak’s Opposition to Motion to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Admission, Set One (“Dubyak Opp. RFA”), plaintiff Aaunders Benford’s Opposition to Motion to Compel Further Responses to Form Interrogatories, Set One (“Benford Opp. FROGS”), and plaintiff Dana Velazco’s Opposition to Motion to Compel Further Responses to Form Interrogatories, Set One (“Velazco Opp. FROGS”). This reply does not address all objections made in the subject discovery responses nor does it address all issues raised in WMI’s motions to compel or plaintiffs’ oppositions to the motions to compel because lead trial counsel for the parties held an in-person meet and confer regarding the outstanding discovery disputes and resolved some ofthe discovery disputes. (See May 14, 2017 Joint Statement Regarding Outstanding Discovery Issues and Parties’ Meet and Confer filed with the Court.) Accordingly, this reply addresses the issues that the parties were unable to resolve. II. WMI WAS GRANTED THE RIGHT TO CONDUCT DISCOVERY AND PLAINTIFFS ATTEMPT TO USURP THE POWER OF THE COURT BY INVENTING LIMITATIONS TO WMI’S DISCOVERY Plaintiffs misapply the clear language of Code of Civil Procedure section 2017.010 in arguing that the “Court’s October 25, 2016 Minute Order did not authorize WMI to conduct discovery as to the underlying claims.” (E.g., Figueroa Opp. RFA at 9:24-27.) The default rule that a party may seek discovery of all issues “relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending actions”and that “appear[] reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2017.010.) Plaintiffs’ argumentis backwards. When the Court reopened WMTI’s discovery, there were no limitations other than those found in the Discovery Act, which certainly does not preclude a party from conducting discovery directly related to allegations in the complaint. The Court ordered that “Whitford Medical, as a newly named defendant, should be given "py DEFENDANT WMI’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO RFAS AND FROGS FROM PLAINTIFFS 277007/1733-001 10 1 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 an opportunity to conduct discovery to prepare for the trial. Accordingly, the motion to continue the trial is granted.” (MTC Figueroa RFA, Ex. 1 at 3:4-7.) Because WMI was identified as Doe Defendant 1 and all five plaintiffs alleged every single cause of action against Doe 1, WMI was entitled to conduct discovery as to every cause of action alleged by each of the plaintiffs. (June 21, 2016 Doe Amendment; Benford SAC at 6:6-7, 717-18, 8:8-9, 10:2-3, 11:5-6, 12:17-18, 13:17-18, 17:25-26, 22:11-12, 26:8-9, 27:10-12, 31:16, 33:2-3; Velazco FAC at 6:23-24, 8:3-4, 9:15-16, 10:15-16, 11:19-20, 12:9-10, 13:4-5, 14:12, 15:22-23, 16:22-23, 18:6; Gibbs SAC at 7:2- 3, 8:8-9,9:6-7, 11:12-13, 12:22-23, 13:10-11, 14:14-15, 15:4-5, 15:25-26, 17:5, 18:15-16, 20:15, 21:22-23; Dubyak SAC at 7:21-22, 9:4-5, 9:23-24, 11:13-14, 12:16-17, 14:2-3, 15:2, 15:17-18, 16:21-22, 18:3-4, 19:20-21, 20:20-22, 21:17-18, 23:2-3, 24:25-26; Figueroa SAC at 10:2-3, 11:12-13, 17:6, 18:18, 24:5-6, 25:4-5, 26:8-9, 27:2-3, 27:23-24, 29:3, 29:17, 30:12-13, 31:11-12, 32:22-23, 33:13.) WMI sought to exercise its statutory right to discovery when the Court reopened WMI’s discovery after WMI was named as a defendant in all five cases consolidated here. (MTC Figueroa RFA, Ex. 1; June 21, 2016 Doe Amendment; see also MTC Figueroa RFA, Ex. 2.) Plaintiffs should not be allowed to contribute to the “discovery abuse [that] is a spreading cancer” by inventing their own restrictions on WMI’s discovery that do not exist under the Discovery Act and that this Court did not apply. (Obregon v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424, 431.) If plaintiffs wanted to limit WMI’s discovery to alter ego, then plaintiffs should have limited the claims alleged against WMIto the alter ego theory. IILWMI’S MOTIONS TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES FROM PLAINTIFFS ARE SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE AND COMPLETE SEPARATE STATEMENTS WMIprovided sufficient information in the separate statements to satisfy Rule of Court 3.1345. The separate statements adequately describe the Doe Amendments plaintiffs filed. The Court is certainly familiar with what a Doe Amendment is and WMI summarized plaintiffs’ Doe Amendments by explaining that “Plaintiff’s Doe Amendment identifies WMI as Doe Defendant 1.” (WMI Separate Statement in Support ofMTC Figueroa RFA (“WMISep. Stmt. Figueroa -4- DEFENDANT WMI’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO RFASAND FROGS FROM PLAINTIFFS277007/1733-001 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 73 24 25 26 7 28 RFA”) at 2:26; WMI Sep. Stmt. Dubyak RFA at 2:25; WMI Sep. Stmt. Gibbs RFA at 2:25; WMI Sep. Stmt. Benford Form Interrogatories (“FROGS”) at 2:25 WMISep. Stmt. Velazco FROGS at 2:25.) The separate statements also refer to the Court’s October 25, 2017 Order and describe and quote the order. Additionally, the separate statements for each ofthe requests for admissions describe the allegations from the operative complaint for which each request seeks information. Specifically, WMI seeks Figueroa’s evidence regarding whether her employment with was terminated “for legal reasons. One of plaintiff’s claimsis that she suffered sexual harassment in the workplace and was terminated for complaining of the harassment. Plaintiff asserts a bad of paintballs that was left on her desk was an example of the purported sexual harassmentin the workplace.” (WMI Sep. Stmt. Figueroa RFA at 2:13-16.) The separate statements in support of the Requests for Admission do not provide the definitions, which are only required “if necessary.” (Rule of Court 3.1345.) Here,it is not necessary to provide the definitions because the defined terms are the all-caps “YOU”(or “YOUR”™), ELITE, WHITFORD, WMI, and DEFENDANTS,all ofwhich are identified on the first page of each separate statement. (WMI Sep. Stmt. Figueroa RFA at 1; WMI Sep. Stmt. Gibbs at 1; WMI Sep. Stmt. Dubyak at 1.) As for Form Interrogatories No. 17.1, WMI provided a separate statement for all Form Interrogatory No. 17.1 responses that plaintiffs provided. (See, e.g., WMI Sep. Stmt. Benford FROGS at 2:2-15.) A responding party must respond to Form Interrogatory No. 17.1 only if the response to the requests for admission is not an unqualified admission. (See MTC Benford FROGS, Ex. 3 at 7.) Instead of responding or objecting Form Interrogatory No. 17.1 for each request for admission, plaintiffs provided a single blanket objection. (See MTC Benford FROGS, Ex. 4 at 3:27-4:3; MTC Velazco FROGS, Ex. 4 at 3:27-4:3.) WMI does not know which, if any, of the requests for admission plaintiffs would have provided a Form Interrogatory 17.1 response to if the improper blanket objections were not asserted. Plaintiffs’ refusal to properly respond to the Form Interrogatories, Set One, are grounds for sanctions. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2023.010, 2030.300.) er DEFENDANT WMI’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO RFASAND FROGS FROM PLAINTIFFS277007/1733-001 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Additionally, WMTI’sseparate statements in support of the motions to compel requests for admissions were not required to include the Notice ofReliance because the notice informs the responding party of WMI’s reliance on the responses, but does not include any “definitions, instructions, and other matters required to understand each discovery request and the responses to it.” (Rule of Court 3.1345(c)(4).) The notice does not demand or instruct—or even request—that the responding party produce any evidence. Rather, the notice informs the responding party that WMI will rely on the completeness ofthe responses and would enforce its rights under the Discovery Act if plaintiffs attempt to “sandbag” defendantsat trial by attempting to introduce evidence that was responsive to the requests but was not provided during discovery. Moreover, WMI offered to withdraw the language from the requests for admissions, which did not alter the requests at all, in an effort to resolve the discovery dispute without court intervention. Despite repeated offers to extend plaintiffs’ deadline to respond to the discovery, plaintiffs stood on their objections. (See MTC Figueroa RFA, Exs. 5 at 16, 6 at 1-2,8 at 6, 10at 1, 11 at 2.) Plaintiffs also rely on Mills v. U.S. Bank (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 871 for the argument that WMI did not provide supporting evidence. There, the responding parties “acknowledge[d] that they did not set forth the full response to each ofthe discovery requests” in the separate statement and argued that attaching the responses to the separate statement was sufficient because the responses could be found in the attachments. (Mills, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at 893.) However, here, WMI included the full text of the requests and the responses in the separate statement and did not attach any documents to the separate statement for reference. Additionally, as mentioned above, WMI provided the necessary information regarding the relevant pleadings and documents. IV.WMI’S MOTIONS TO COMPEL WERE TIMELY SERVED AND INCLUDED SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORTING EVIDENCE. Relying on Quantum Cooking Concepts, Inc. v. LVAssociates, Inc. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 927, plaintiffs argue that WMI did not timely provide evidence supporting the motions to compel to this Court. There, the defendant’s -6- DEFENDANT WMI’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO RFASAND FROGS FROM PLAINTIFFS277007/1733-001 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 memoranda of points and authorities—each about one-half page of text— merely quote the [applicable] statutory [provisions] . . . . Apart from these cursory citations, they contain none of the elements that Rule 3.1113(b) requires to be included in supporting memoranda. (Quantum, supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at 933.) The moving party did not provide a statement of facts, did not identify supporting evidence, and did not present any legal argument. (/d.) Here, WMI’s motions to compel included statements offacts, provided, identified, and precisely cited supporting evidence, and presented legal argument. Plaintiffs appear to complain that WMI did not provide the Court with another copy of the Court’s own records.’ Gibbs also complains that “[i]t is unclear whether WMI is claiming that GIBBSis asserting thirteen or fifteen causes of action, or fourteen or sixteen theories ofliability against WMI.” (Gibbs Opp. RFA at 3:19-20.) Gibbsis correct,it is unclear how many theories she alleges against WMI. Gibbs’s operative Second Amended Complaint (supplemented with alter ego allegations) lists thirteen causes of action, each ofwhich is alleged directly against Doe Defendant 1. However, plaintiffs assert that they “set[] forth only a derivative theory of liability against WMI” (MTC Gibbs RFA, Ex. 7 at 5), but the operative complaints allege every cause of action directly against Doe Defendant 1 and WMI was identified as Doe 1 (June 21, 2016 Doe Amendment;see, ¢.g., Gibbs SAC at 7:2-3, 8:8-9, 9:6-7, 11:12-13, 12:22-23, 13:10-11, 14:14-15, 15:4-5, 15:25-26, 17:5, 18:15-16, 20:15, 21:22-23). V. WMI’S NOTICE OF RELIANCE IS NOT A PREFACE OR INSTRUCTION AND DOES NOT IMPOSE REQUIREMENTS ON PLAINTIFFS. The Notice of Reliance on WMI’s Requests for Admissions, Set One, to both Benford and Velazco does not impose any requirements on the responding parties nor is it a preface or instruction that the Discovery Act addresses. The notice informs the responding party that WMI will rely on the completeness ofthe responses provided and does not include any “definitions, instructions, and other matters required to understand each discovery request and the responses to it.” (Rule of Court 3.1345(c)(4).) In !' Based on plaintiffs’ argument,it appears plaintiffs believe the Court is unable to access its own records in this case and that a moving party is required to paper the Court with duplicate copies of the Court’s own records, which are already before the Court. -7- DEFENDANT WMI’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO RFAS AND FROGS FROM PLAINTIFFS 277007/1733-001 O o o o 3 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Clement v. Alegre (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1282, 1287 plaintiffs objected to special interrogatories based on the assertion the interrogatories “failed to comply with the statutory requirement that each be ‘full and complete in and ofitself”where some of defendants’ special interrogatories were follow-up questions to other interrogatories in that set (e.g., interrogatory No. 2 asked “Please state the amount of such damages as identified in interrogatory number 1.””) The discovery referee found plaintiff’s objection to be “unreasonable, evasive, lacking in legal merit and withoutjustification.” (Id. at 1284.) The court adopted the discovery referee’s findings and upheld recommended sanctions against the plaintiff. (/d. at 1285.) The court of appeal affirmed. (Id. at 1295.) WMI’s notice was not the “preface or instruction” the Discovery Act sought to prevent. As the court in Clement stated, “Section 2030.060 was designed to prevent precisely the type of attempt to avoid the presumptive limit of 35 that occurred” in Catanese, where the propounding party’s interrogatories required reference to deposition transcripts and essentially made 10,000 separate requests. (Clement v. Alegre (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1290, citing Catanese v. Superior Court (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1159.) Here, WMI’s requests for admissions do not require reference to any materials or documents outside of the discovery requests. Moreover,the notice does not demand or instruct—or even request—that the responding party produce any evidence. Rather, the notice informs the responding party that WMI will rely on the completeness of the responses and that WMI will enforce its rights under the Discovery Act if plaintiffs attempt to “sandbag” WMI at trial by attempting to introduce evidence that was responsive to the requests but was not provided during discovery. Moreover, because of plaintiffs’ professed confusion regarding the meaning of the notice, WMIrepeatedly offered to extend plaintiffs’ deadline to respond to discovery so that the matter could be resolved without having to come before the Court to resolve this discovery dispute, but plaintiffs declined. (See MTC Figueroa RFA, Exs. 8at 1,10 at 1, 11 at 2.) = Ris "DEFENDANT WMI’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS TO COMPEL FURTHERRESPONSES TO RFAS AND FROGS FROM PLAINTIFFS 277007/1733-001 o e 3 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 VI. WMI SEEKS TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES AND REQUESTS SANCTIONS UNDER THE APPROPRIATE AUTHORITY WMI sought to compel further responses to Requests for Admission “pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 2033.280, 2033.290 and 2023.010 et seq.” (e.g., MTC Figueroa RFA at 2:10-11) and to Form Interrogatories “pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 2030.290, 2030.300 and 2023.010 et seq.” (e.g., MTC Benford FROGS at 2:12-13). Plaintiffs attempt to show WMIfailed to cite proper authority by omitting several code sections explicitly referenced by WMI and by omitting “et seq.” (Compare Id. to Figueroa Opp. RFA at 13:10-12.) Additionally, WMI provides the facts, statutory authority, case law authority, and argument for sanctions against plaintiffs for their abuse of discovery. (See, e.g., MTC Figueroa RFA at 2:10-14, 4:23-6:5, 10:15-25.) Moreover, the Declaration ofMatthew W. Rosene filed in support of each ofthe motions to compel provides the hourly rate, number of hours, and statementthat the “amount of time expended by ECG in preparing this motion was reasonably and necessarily incurred.” (E.g., Rosene Decl. in support ofMTC Figueroa RFA at 7 2-3.) VII. PLAINTIFFS’ OTHER OBJECTIONS ARE MERITLESS Figueroa maintains a specific objection she made to requests for admission on the grounds that the term “sexual organ”is vague and ambiguous as used in Request for Admission No. 14. (Figueroa Opp. RFA at 10:10-11:21.) A propounding party is not required to define all terms that are not defined by statute. In SCC Acquisitions, Inc. v. The Superior Court ofOrange County (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 741, the court rejected the responding party’s objection on the grounds the terms “subsidiary” and “affiliate” are ambiguous and found that if the responding party “w[as] at all confused, it should have produced documents in accordance with the statutory definitions.” (SCC Acquisitions, supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at 757-758.) Moreover, where “the nature of the information soughtis apparent, the proper solution is to provide an appropriate response.” (Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783.) Here, Figueroa alleges he was subject to sexual battery under Civil Code section 1708.5. (Figueroa SAC 9 44-51.) WMI’s request asks her to admit that “WHITFORD never touched YOUR sexual organ,” which is one of the body parts that -9. DEFENDANT WMI’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO RFAS AND FROGS FROM PLAINTIFFS 277007/1733-001 10 1 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Civil Code section 1708.5 identifies as being protected by statute from unwanted touching. (MTC Figueroa RFA, Ex. 3 at 4:11.) Figueroa apparently understands that sexual organ is not “the ‘anus groin, or buttocks of any person, or the breast of a female,”but despite that she is married (Figueroa SAC 9 26, 61, 109) and that she identified a specific sexual position in her complaint (/d. § 23), Figueroa claims she does not know which part of her body is a sexual organ. (Figueroa Opp. RFA at 10:25-27.) This feigned confusion should not be tolerated. Figueroa should have provided “an appropriate response” and should be compelled to do so now. (Deyo, supra, 84 Cal.App.3d at 783.) Plaintiffs also inform the Court ofthe number of pages of discovery responses plaintiffs purportedly previously produced. (See, e.g., Benford Opp. MTC FROGS at 2:8-9; Velazco Opp. MTC FROGS at 2:7-8.) However,there is no magic number of pages of discovery that once produced relieves a party oftheir obligations under the Discovery Act. Regardless of the number of pages previously exchanged, plaintiffs are required to respond to WMI’s discovery pursuant to the Discovery Act. VIII. PLAINTIFFS HAVE IMPROPERLY REFUSED TO COMPLY WITH THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE DISCOVERY ACT AND ARE NOT ENTITLED TO SANCTIONS Plaintiffs’ request for sanctions where plaintiffs have improperly invented and unilaterally applied a limitation on WMI’s discovery is unsupportable. In an attempt to distract from plaintiffs’ attempt to deprive WMI ofits statutory right to conduct discovery, plaintiffs claim WMI’s attempt to do exactly what this Court expressly allowed WMIto do (i.e., “to conduct discovery to prepare for trial” (MTC Figueroa RFA, Ex. 1 at 3:4-7)) somehow violates the Discovery Act. Plaintiffs are wrong. IX. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant defendant WMI’s Motions to Compel Further Responses to Requests for Admission, Set One, from plaintiffs Maria Figueroa, Traci Gibbs, and Yesenia Dubyak, and to Form Interrogatories, Set One, from plaintiffs Aaunders -10 - DEFENDANT WMI’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO RFAS AND FROGS FROM PLAINTIFFS 277007/1733-001 o o 0 1 D Y 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Benford and Dana Velazco, and for sanctions pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 2023.010, 2033.290, and 2030.300. DATED March 14,2017 ENTERPRISE COUNSEL GROUP A Law Corporation By: tr ) Matthew W. Rosene Attorneys for Defendants ELITE HOME MEDICAL & RESPIRATORY, INC., STEVE WHITFORD and WHITFORD MEDICAL, INC “11 - DEFENDANT WMT'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO RFAS AND FROGS FROM PLAINTIFFS 277007/1733-001 PROOF OF SERVICE Figueroa v. Elite Home Medical, et al. Orange County Superior Court - Case No. 30-2011-00462139 (Consolidated) I declare that I am over the age of 18 years, employed in the County of Orange, and not a party to the within action; my business address is Three Park Plaza, Suite 1400, Irvine, CA 92614. On March 14, 2017, I served the following DEFENDANT’S CONSOLIDATED REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION, SET ONE, FROM PLAINTIFF MARIA FIGUEROA, PLAINTIFF YESENIA DUBYAK, AND PLAINTIFF TRACI GIBBS, AND FORM INTERROGATORIES, SET ONE, FROM PLAINTIFF DANA VELAZCO AND PLAINTIFF AAUNDERS BENFORD on the interested parties in this action by placing [J the original true copies thereof, as follows: SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST O By E-SERVICE. Pursuant to California Rules of Court Rule 2.251(c), adopted effective July 1, 2013, I am e-Serving the above-listed document(s) to the electronic service address(es) on the attached Service List and e-Filing the document(s) using one of the court’s approved electronic service providers. A true and correct copy of the e-Service transmittal will be attached to the above-listed document(s) and produced if requested by any interested party. O By MAIL. Iam readily familiar with this law firm's practice for collection and processing of documents for mailing with the U. S. Postal Service. The above-listed document(s) will be deposited with the U. S. Postal Service on the same day shown on this affidavit, to the addressee(s) on the attached Service List in the ordinary course of business. I am the person who sealed and placed for collection and mailing the above- listed document(s) on this date at Irvine, California, following ordinary business practices. [0 By E-MAIL. I e-mailed above-listed document(s) to the e-mail address(es) of the addressee(s) on the attached Service List. A true and correct copy of the e-mail transmittal will be attached to the above-listed document(s) and produced if requested by any interested party. By OVERNIGHT DELIVERY. The above-listed document(s) will be deposited with an Overnight Delivery Service on the same day shown on this affidavit, in the ordinary course of business. I am the person who sealed and placed for collection and overnight delivery the above-listed document(s) on this date at Irvine, California,to the addressee(s) on the attached Service List following ordinary business practices. A true and correct copy of the overnight delivery service transmittal will be attached to the above-listed document(s) and produced if requested by any interested party. [J By PERSONAL SERVICE. I caused to have hand delivered, via Legal Solution Attorney Services, the above-listed document(s) to the addressee(s) on the attached Service List. (STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on March 14, 2017, at Irvine, California. TERRIEJ. HANSEN 263300 - 1724-001 PROOF OF SERVICE I ~ N N D 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 SERVICE LIST Figueroa v. Elite Home Medical, et al. Orange County Superior Court - Case No. 30-2011-00462139 (Consolidated) Laurie D. Rau, Esq. Anthony G Chavos, Esq. CHAVOS & RAU, APLC 4921 Birch Street, Suite 110 Newport Beach, CA 92660 Tel.: (949) 679-9504 Fax: (949) 679-9709 Counsel for Plaintiffs MARIA FIGUEROA, AAUNDERS BENFORD, TRACI GIBBS, YESENIA DUBYAK, DANA VELAZCO Irau@chavosandrau.com achavos(@chavosandrau.com 263300 — 1724-001 PROOF OF SERVICE