Contact Chiropractic, P.C., as Assignee of Girtha Butler, Respondent,v.New York City Transit Authority, Appellant.BriefN.Y.March 21, 2018APL-2016-00111 Queens County Clerk’s Index No. 03291/07 Appellate Division – Second Department Docket No. 2014-05446 Court of Appeals of the State of New York CONTACT CHIROPRACTIC, P.C. As assignee of GIRTHA BUTLER Plaintiff-Respondent, against NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Defendant-Appellant. BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF CONTACT CHRIPRACTIC, P.C. Of Counsel: Gary Tsirelman GARY TSIRELMAN, P.C. Attorneys for Amicus Curiae 129 Livingston Street, 3rd Floor Brooklyn, New York 11201 (718)-438-1200 gtsirelman@gtmdjd.com Dated: December 18, 2017 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................... ii INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ........................................ 1 ARGUMENT ..................................................................... …2 I. This Court Should Reject Amicus Curiae ATIC’s Invitation to Shorten the Limitations Period Applicable to Insurance Contracts and Statutory Interest, Which Is Well-Established and Not at Issue in this Appeal ....................................................... 2 II. The Lower Courts’ Finding that the Six-Year Contractual Statute of Limitations Applies to Both Insured and Self-Insured Parties in No-Fault Is Well-Supported By Law ................................................ 5 A. The lower courts correctly found that six- year limitations period applies to these claims because self-insured’s no-fault obligations are “essentially contractual.” ............ 6 B. Imposing the same limitations period best comports with the Legislature’s intent to treat accident victims the same whether the payer is insured or self-insured. ........................ 11 CONCLUSION .................................................................... 17 i TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. World Wide Rent-A-Car, Inc., 28 A.D.2d (1st Dep’t 1967) ..................................................... 9 Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v. Nelson, 67 N.Y.2d 169, 175 (1986) ............................................... 17, 18 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Shaw 52 N.Y.2d 818, 820 (1980) .................................... 14, 16, 17, 18 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Stein, 1 N.Y.3d 416, 422, 807 N.E.2d 268, 272 (2004) ................. 5, 18 Benson v. Boston Old Colony Ins. Co., 134 A.D.2d 214, 215, 521 N.Y.S.2d 14 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t. 1987) ................................................... 3 Childs v. Armour Food Co., 333 S.E.2d 377, 377 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985) ......................... 12, 13 Danner v. Hertz Corp., 584 F. Supp. 293 (D. Del. 1984) ............................................ 10 Entzion v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., 675 N.W.2d 925, 927 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) ......................... 11 Guercio v. Hertz Corp., 40 N.Y.2d 680, 358 N.E.2d 261 (1976), ................................. 10 ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (Continued) Gurnee v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 55 N.Y.2d 184, 193, 433 N.E.2d 128, cert denied, 459 US 837 (1982) ......................................................................... 3 Koerner v. State, 62 N.Y.2d 442 (1984) ...................................................... 15, 16 In re Gee (State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.), 107 A.D.3d 1559, 1559, 967 N.Y.S.2d 566, 567 (App. Div. 4th Dep’t. 2013) .. .................................................. 3 Loven v. City of Minneapolis, 639 N.W.2d 869, 873 (Minn. 2002) .. ….……………………..12 Mandarino v. Travelers Prop. Cas Ins. Co. 37 A.D.3d 775, 776, 831 N.Y.S.2d (App. Div 2 452 ............ 3,4 McClain v. Begley, 465 N.W.2d 680, 682 (Minn. 1991) ....................................... 12 Micha v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 94 A.D.2d 835, 463 N.Y.S.2d 110 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t. 1983) ..................................................... 4 MVAIC v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 89 N.Y.2d 214 (1996) ............................................................ 18 New York City Transit Auth. v. Thom, 70 A.D.2d 158, 171 (1979), aff’d, 52 N.Y.2d 1032 (1981) ..... 15 Shave v. Allstate Ins. Co., 549 F. Supp. 1006, 1009 n.1 (S.D. Ga. 1982) ......................... 11 iii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (Continued) Walker v. Stein, 305 A.D.2d 972, 976 (App. Div. 4th Dep’t 2003), aff’d sub nom. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Stein, 1 N.Y.3d 416 (2004). ....... 18 Whirl v. Safeco Ins. Co., 527 S.E.2d 262, 265 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) .. ............................ 12 STATUTES: C.P.L.R. § 213 (2) .............................................................. 3, 4, 11 C.P.L.R. § 214 (2) .................................................................... 3, 4 Vehicle and Traffic Law § 316 ..................................................... 7 Vehicle and Traffic Law § 370(3) ......................................... 7, 8, 9 Insurance Law § 167(2) .............................................................. 10 Insurance Law § 167(2-a) ........................................................... 10 Insurance Law § 3420(f)(1) ........................................................ 16 Insurance Law § 5102 (g) ........................................................... 14 Insurance Law § 5103 .............................................................. 8, 9 Insurance Law § 5103 (b) ............................................................. 5 iv INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE Amicus curiae Gary Tsirelman, P.C., is a law firm specializing in representing medical goods and services providers seeking payment for no-fault claims assigned to them by automobile accident victims. Gary Tsirelman, P.C., has represented hundreds of different no- fault medical providers and has resolved over 150,000 no fault claims in arbitration and in the courts. As such, the firm is uniquely situated to represent the interests of a wide variety of no-fault providers, who are the parties actually affected by changes to the no-fault benefits since practically all no-fault claims are assumed by providers at the time of service. The amicus curiae law firm and its provider clients have a substantial interest in ensuring that the rights and benefits of no-fault beneficiaries are protected to the full extent intended by the Legislature. This action directly implicates this interest, for the Appellant seeks to cut in half the time period for no-fault claimants to bring claims against self-insured entities. Moreover, amicus curiae American Transit Insurance Company (“ATIC”) urges this Court to apply this curtailment of benefits to all no-fault claims, including those pursuant to a written insurance contract. Amicus curiae Gary 1 Tsirelman, P.C., can assist the Court by providing the perspective of a wide variety of no-fault providers and their counsel, to supplement the arguments of the Appellee, a sole no-fault provider.1 ARGUMENT I. This Court Should Reject Amicus Curiae ATIC’s Invitation to Shorten the Limitations Period Applicable to Insurance Contracts and Statutory Interest, Which Is Well- Established and Not at Issue in this Appeal As an initial matter, this Court should decline the request of amicus curiae ATIC to unsettle established law on the correct limitations periods for no-fault claims against insured parties and interest and legal fees. As even Appellants agree, these issues are not before the Court and should not be considered in this litigation. See Appellant’s Br. in Response to Amicus Br. at 2. Moreover, the application of the six-year contractual statute of limitations to no-fault 1 No party or counsel for a party to this action authored this Brief in whole or in part, and no party or counsel for a party made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this Brief. No person other than amicus curiae or its counsel made a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of this Brief. 2 insurance contracts is quite settled, and unsettling it would open a Pandora’s box of unintended consequences across all areas of law. This Court and each of the four Appellate Division Departments have consistently and unanimously applied the six-year contractual limitations period to no-fault claims covered by an insurance policy. Indeed, ATIC cannot point to a single decision from any court applying its wished-for three-year statute of limitations. The reason for this unanimity is straightforward: “Although the relevant terms of such contracts are mandated by various provisions of the Insurance Law,” “as a matter of strict statutory interpretation . . . the longer, six-year statute of limitations, as provided in C.P.L.R. § 213 (2), is applied to the exclusion of the three-year statute of limitations provided in C.P.L.R. § 214 (2).” Mandarino v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., 37 A.D.3d 775, 776, 831 N.Y.S.2d 452 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t. 2007); accord Gurnee v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 55 N.Y.2d 184, 193, 433 N.E.2d 128, cert denied, 459 US 837 (1982) (applying the six- year contractual statute of limitations contained in C.P.L.R. § 213); In re Gee (State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.), 107 A.D.3d 1559, 1559, 967 N.Y.S.2d 566, 567 (App. Div. 4th Dep’t. 2013) (same); Benson v. Boston Old Colony Ins. Co., 134 A.D.2d 214, 215, 521 N.Y.S.2d 14 3 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t. 1987) (same); Micha v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 94 A.D.2d 835, 463 N.Y.S.2d 110 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t. 1983) (same). Importantly, courts have not just mechanistically applied the six-year limitations period, but instead specifically rejected the argument offered by ATIC. For example, the Second Department in Mandarino examined the text of the relevant limitations provisions, noting that not only did the six-year period from C.P.L.R. § 213 (2) directly apply to contractual actions, but also the three-year statutory provision from C.P.L.R. § 214 (2) applies to liabilities “imposed by statute except as provided in sections 213 and 215.” 37 A.D.3d at 776 (emphasis in Mandarino). So even in cases where both provisions could arguably apply, New York law is clear that the six-year contractual period trumps the shorter statutory period. See id. Unsettling this settled law would also open a Pandora’s box of unintended consequences across many areas of law – courts would be forced to determine just how much regulation is too much to transform a private contract into a statutory obligation. All private contracts are undertaken in the shadow of government regulation, whether it be licensing regimes, consumer protections, or minimum 4 coverage requirements. ATIC’s conception would throw into disarray the applicable limitations period for all manner of private contract disputes, forcing courts to determine the precise degree of government regulation required to transform a contract dispute into one where a party’s obligations stem from statute. Indeed, even no-fault insurance contracts are not entirely mandatory, see Ins. Law § 5103 (b) (outlining optional exclusions insurers may choose to add to no-fault policies); cf. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Stein, 1 N.Y.3d 416, 422, 807 N.E.2d 268, 272 (2004) (applying six year contractual limitations period where regulation “merely prescribes the form of a clause that declares Allstate's pre-existing right.”). In this context, would such optional exclusions be subject to a six-year limitations period while claims regarding the remainder of the contract expire after just three years? Needless to say, such a radical ruling would undermine the very purpose of statutes of limitation, which is to establish a date certain by which parties can rest assured that they are free from the prospect of legal action. This Court should reject ATIC’s invitation to unsettle the clearly-established law – unanimously upheld by every court – that the six-year contractual statute of limitations governs no-fault claims under an insurance contract. 5 II. The Lower Courts’ Finding that the Six-Year Contractual Statute of Limitations Applies to Both Insured and Self- Insured Parties in No-Fault Is Well-Supported By Law The Supreme Court and Appellate Division correctly found that no-fault claims against self-insured parties should be treated identically to those against insureds, for multiple, independent reasons. First, the agreement between the government and self- insurers, including the promises made by self-insurers as consideration for permission to forgo otherwise mandatory insurance coverage, forms the “essentially contractual” basis for applying the six-year limitation period. Second, the courts of other similarly- situated states agree that even no-fault claims against self-insured entities should be governed by the contractual, not statutory, statute of limitations. Thus, imposition of the three-year statutory limitations period is inappropriate. Finally, consistent application of the six-year contractual statute of limitations to no-fault claims involving both insureds and self-insureds best comports with the legislative intent to treat no-fault claims the same regardless of the self-insured status of the payer. 6 A. The lower courts correctly found that six-year limitations period applies to these claims because self- insured’s no-fault obligations are “essentially contractual.” i. The agreement between the self-insurer and the government provides a sufficient basis for the “essentially contractual” nature of the self-insurer’s no-fault liability. The entire basis of Appellants’ challenge to the lower courts’ conclusions is that self-insurers, unlike insureds, do not have a literal contract of insurance and are thus exempt from the six-year limitations period to which insureds are subject. But a self-insured party’s no-fault obligations do in fact stem from an agreement between it and the government – the Motor Vehicles Commissioner’s discretionary grant of the self-insurer’s application for self-insurance under V.T.L. § 370(3). See also V.T.L. § 316 (repeating, verbatim, the self-insurance provisions of V.T.L. § 370(3)). As such, the lower courts correctly found that the obligations stemming from the self- insured’s application for a certificate of self-insurance are “essentially contractual.” 7 Pursuant to V.T.L. § 370(3), a party may request permission to avoid obtaining insurance coverage required by Ins. Law § 5103 by submitting an application to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles. V.T.L. § 370(3). Importantly, the Commissioner is specifically vested with the discretion to grant or deny such application. Id. Should the Commissioner decide to grant such an application and issue a certificate of self-insurance, as consideration for the benefit of forgoing insurance, the applicant must pay various fees. Id. Appellants seek to evade the essentially contractual nature of this agreement between the Commissioner and a self-insurer by misleadingly arguing that the certificate of self-insurance itself is not an “agreement” and wrongly asserting that “[b]y self-insuring, an individual or corporation does not promise or agree to do anything . . . .” Appellant’s Reply Br. at 2. First, the essentially contractual nature of self-insurers’ obligations stems from its application for self- insurance and the Commissioner’s discretionary decision to grant such an application, not (solely) from the certificate of self-insurance’s issuance. The certificate is merely the result of the agreement struck between the applicant and the Commissioner. Second, Appellants are simply incorrect to claim that a self-insurer “does not promise or 8 agree to do anything” in consideration for a grant of a certificate of self-insurance. Appellant’s Reply Br. at 2. Rather, V.T.L. § 370(3) specifically requires that a prospective self-insurer agree to the payment of multiple fees as necessary conditions for obtaining the Commissioner’s approval for a certificate of self-insurance. Appellant’s citation of Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. World Wide Rent-A-Car, Inc., 28 A.D.2d 286 (1st Dep’t 1967) to support its position is wholly without merit. Most importantly, World Wide did not concern in any respect whether the coverage obligations of a self- insurer are essentially contractual nor any question of statutes of limitations. Further, this fifty-year-old decision predated New York’s enactment of the no-fault insurance regime, so it is nonsensical to find it probative of Appellant’s no-fault obligations. That Court’s out-of- context statement that a “certificate of self-insurance can in nowise be equated with an insurance contract” simply meant, in context, that the leasing agency defendant had no obligation to cover a lessee’s costs despite that lessee’s violation of the lease. World Wide, 28 A.D.2d at 289-90. In contrast, there is no dispute that Appellant was obligated under no-fault to pay first-party benefits of timely-submitted claims. Ins. Law. § 5103. 9 Likewise, this Court’s opinion in Guercio v. Hertz Corp., 40 N.Y.2d 680, 358 N.E.2d 261 (1976) predated New York’s no-fault system and dealt simply with whether the lessor had agreed to compensate the lessor for his damages. Guercio, like World Wide, had nothing to do with the issue here – statutes of limitations. Moreover, these cases were rendered obsolete by New York’s adoption of the no- fault system, which defined the obligations of all motor vehicle operators (whether insured or self-insured) to include payment of first-party benefits to those injured in automobile accidents. Finally, the Delaware case of Danner v. Hertz Corp., 584 F. Supp. 293 (D. Del. 1984), similarly did not involve the no-fault law, but instead interpreted a different law, Ins. Law § 167(2) and 167(2- a), which does not require self-insurers to undertake the same obligations as insureds, in contrast to the no-fault law. Unsurprisingly, the Delaware district court found that self-insuring rental car companies were not required to offer additional coverage beyond what the law required. See 584 F. Supp. at 301. Danner sheds no light on the question at issue here: the appropriate statute of limitations governing no-fault claims. 10 ii. Similarly-situated states whose no-fault statutes contain no specific statute of limitations also apply the contracts limitations period to claims against self- insureds. While most states’ no-fault regimes specify a limitations period for no-fault claims, states like New York with analogous statutes of limitations categories also apply the limitations period applicable to contracts. For example, in Minnesota, the state Supreme Court found that the six-year limitations period for suits “upon a contract or other obligation, express or implied, as to which no other limitation is expressly prescribed” applies to no-fault claims. Entzion v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., 675 N.W.2d 925, 927 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (quoting Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(1) (2002)); compare C.P.L.R. § 213 (2) (applying six-year limitations period to “an action upon a contractual obligation or liability, express or implied”); see also Shave v. Allstate Ins. Co., 549 F. Supp. 1006, 1009 n.1 (S.D. Ga. 1982) (applying six-year limitations period governing contracts to no-fault action). Importantly, those state courts to have considered the issue found that self-insured entities could not use that status as a shield to 11 be treated more favorably than insureds. See Loven v. City of Minneapolis, 639 N.W.2d 869, 873 (Minn. 2002) (rejecting self- insured city’s attempt to cap its no-fault liability based on statutory municipal tort liability cap). This is consistent with Minnesota’s policy that, like New York, in the context of no-fault auto insurance, “[s]elf-insurance is the functional equivalent of a commercial insurance policy.” McClain v. Begley, 465 N.W.2d 680, 682 (Minn. 1991). Georgia courts have rejected the very argument offered by NYCTA. See Childs v. Armour Food Co., 333 S.E.2d 377, 377 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that six-year limitation period governing actions upon contract governs self-insured entities in no-fault because “plaintiff’s cause of action lies in contract” due to the “approved plan of self-insurance.”). As in New York, the Georgia limitations statute requires that “rights must arise under a legislative enactment and must not have existed but for the act.” Whirl v. Safeco Ins. Co., 527 S.E.2d 262, 265 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). Applying substantially the same residual limitations statute, Georgia courts have reached the same results as the 12 lower courts here: that self-insurance is essentially contractual. See Childs, 333 S.E.2d at 377. B. Imposing the same limitations period best comports with the Legislature’s intent to treat accident victims the same whether the payer is insured or self-insured. The Legislature made clear when it created the self-insurance exception to the requirement to obtain insurance that the victims of automobile accidents should be no worse off where the payer was a self-insurer. Casting aside as irrelevant the legislature’s declaration and the extensive caselaw relied upon by the courts below, Appellants assert that an impenetrable wall divides the benefits guaranteed by the substantive law from the expiration of those benefits under the statute of limitations. But of course the two are inextricably linked, and accepting Appellants’ argument would necessarily diminish the benefit of the no-fault protections to accident victims by cutting in half the limitations period for bringing a no-fault claim, contrary to the will of the Legislature and this Court’s previous pronouncements. 13 i. The “Legislature refused to countenance” any reduction in the protection for accident victims when it permitted self-insurance. In Allstate Ins. Co. v. Shaw, this Court reviewed the history of the law allowing self-insurance. 52 N.Y.2d 818 (1980); see also Ins. Law § 5102 (g) (defining “insurer” in the no-fault law to include self- insurers “who provide[] the financial security required” under specified articles of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, including the section analyzed by this Court in Shaw). This Court found that the self- insurance provision was “in no way intended to decrease the insurance protection presently available” based in part on the legislative history on the law, with a declaration on the bill jacket that “permitting self- insurance rather than requiring insurance, [would not] result in any diminution of the protection now afforded to users of (rental) vehicles or to other persons.” Id. at 820. Importantly, the Court cautioned against “be[ing] caught up in narrow and technical analysis” or engaging in “overprecious and perhaps overliteral reading” when analyzing the requirements of self-insurance, but instead “interpret[ing the statutory scheme] as a whole, giving the words a meaning which serves rather than defeats the over-all legislative 14 goals” of the law. Id. at 819-21. Ultimately, despite a literal reading of the statute that would relieve self-insurers of the uninsured motorist requirement faced by insureds, see id. at 822-24 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting), the Court read into the statute an implied requirement that self-insurers carry uninsured motorist coverage to prevent “the precise diminution of protection of highway users which the Legislature refused to countenance.” Id. at 820; see also New York City Transit Auth. v. Thom, 70 A.D.2d 158, 171 (1979), aff’d, 52 N.Y.2d 1032 (1981). Similarly, to adhere to the Legislative intent that accident victims’ protections not be diminished by self-insurance, this Court should read into the law an implied requirement that self-insurers face the same statute of limitations as insureds. In an analogous situation, this Court has previously relied on the law’s intent to treat similarly- situated victims the same regardless of the status of the defendant. In Koerner v. State, 62 N.Y.2d 442 (1984), this Court rejected a governmental entity’s attempt to seek a shorter limitations period, finding dispositive the fact that “[w]e cannot discern any intent on the part of the Legislature to subject the injured person to a shorter limitations period when the wrong was committed by the State.” 62 15 N.Y.2d at 448. In Koerner, this Court reversed the lower courts’ determination that a shorter limitations period applied by relying on “the predominant purpose” of the relevant law – in that case, eliminating employment discrimination. Id. Similarly, here, the Legislature has made plain its intent that victims be treated the same where self-insurers are liable, and that the predominant purpose of the law was to permit entities the benefit of self-insurance without diminishing victims’ protections in any respect. See Shaw, 52 N.Y.2d at 820. Employing the approach taken by this Court in Shaw and Koerner—looking to the purpose of the law—would permit the Court to read an implied limitation for self-insureds that matches the well- established six-year limitations period for contractual insurance claims. Indeed, even Appellants appear to agree with this understanding of the Court’s approach in Shaw. See Appellant’s Reply Br. at 20-21 (“the clear legislative intent that Insurance Law § 3420(f)(1) appl[ies] to both insurers and self-insurers” required the Court “to fill the loophole” created when the law, literally read, would exempt self-insurers from providing uninsured motorist coverage). Appellants can make no serious argument that the Legislature 16 intended to cut off the ability of accident victims to bring claims against them three years earlier on account of being self-insured when all the evidence indicates that the self-insurance provision was only enacted with the specific guarantee that it would not “result in any diminution of the protection” to those victims. Shaw, 52 N.Y.2d at 820. Why then, Appellants will no doubt ask, did this Court permit a three-year limitations period in Aetna v. Nelson and the MVAIC cases? The answer is simple: neither of those cases implicated the accident victim’s right to receive the same benefit from a self-insurer as a contractual insurance carrier. First, in Aetna v. Nelson, this Court applied the three-year statute of limitations solely to an insurer seeking to recoup double-benefits already paid out. See Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v. Nelson, 67 N.Y.2d 169, 175 (1986). There was no issue of the limitations period governing the accident victims’ right to seek no- fault compensation (indeed, they were compensated twice over); the question was what limitations period governed the entirely distinct claim of an insurer to bring suit to recover excessive payment. That evil which the Legislature “refused to countenance” – the reduction in 17 benefits to victims seeking payments from the self-insured – was simply not implicated in Aetna v. Nelson. Similarly, the MVAIC cases do not involve the right of accident victims to be treated the same by insureds and self-insureds. Instead, the only case decided by this Court concerns the recoupment of already-made payments between insurance companies and analogous no-fault payers. In MVAIC v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 89 N.Y.2d 214 (1996), this Court straightforwardly applied Aetna v. Nelson to find that MVAIC had three years to recover a duplicate payment from an insurance company. 89 N.Y.2d at 221. Even those lower court cases that have applied a three-year limitations period to no-fault claims made directly to MVAIC do not alter this analysis. First, claims involving MVAIC do not implicate the legislative mandate discussed in Shaw that victims’ rights be undiminished by a payer’s agreement to self-insure. Shaw, 52 N.Y.2d at 820. Second, MVAIC is “purely a creation of statute, and its rights and obligations are likewise derived entirely from statute and regulations.” Walker v. Stein, 305 A.D.2d 972, 976 (App. Div. 4th Dep’t 2003), aff’d sub nom. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Stein, 1 N.Y.3d 416 (2004). As a statutory creation, MVAIC does not have an analogous 18 process to self-insurers that is essentially contractual. MVAIC need not seek permission from the Motor Vehicle Commissioner to operate; it does not receive any benefit from the Commissioner, nor does it agree to pay fees for the benefit of self-insuring. In short, none of the factors that support a six-year limitations period for self- insurers apply to MVAIC. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the decision and order appealed from. Dated: December 18, 2017 Brooklyn, New York Respectfully submitted, Gary Tsirelman, Esq. GARY TSIRELMAN, P.C. 129 Livingston Street, 3rd Floor Brooklyn, New York 11201 (718)-438-1200 On the Brief: Gary Tsirelman 19 NEW YORK STATE COURT OF APPEALS CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE I hereby certify pursuant to 22 NYCRR 500.l(j) that the foregoing brief was prepared on a computer using Microsoft Word. Type. A Monospaced typeface was used as follows: Name of typeface: Times New Roman Point size: Line spacing: 14 Double Word Count. The total number of words in this brief, inclusive of point headings and footnotes and exclusive of pages containing the table of contents, table of citations, proof of service, certificate of compliance, corporate, disclosure statement, questions presented, statement of related cases, or any authorized addendum containing statutes, rules, regulations, etc., is 3,523 words. Dated: December 18, 2017 Brooklyn, New York GARY TSIRELMAN, P.C. 129 Livingston Street, 3rd Floor Brooklyn, New York 11201 By: Gary Tsirelman, Esq. STATEMENT PURSUANT TO COURT OF APPEALS RULE 500.1(f) 1 . Gary Tsirelman is a professional corporation without corporate parents, subsidiaries, or affiliates within the meaning of the rule. Dated: January 4, 2018 Brooklyn, NY