36 Cited authorities

Jackson v. Virginia
443 U.S. 307 (1979) Cited 77,625 times 16 Legal Analyses
Holding that courts conducting review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction should view the "evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution"
People v. Contes
60 N.Y.2d 620 (N.Y. 1983) Cited 11,958 times 2 Legal Analyses
Stating the standard for review of the legal sufficiency of evidence in a criminal case is whether "after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt"
People v. Hawkins
2008 N.Y. Slip Op. 9254 (N.Y. 2008) Cited 1,877 times 1 Legal Analyses
Holding that to preserve for appellate review a challenge to the legal sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction, a defendant must move for a trial order of dismissal, and the argument must be "specifically directed" at the error being argued
People v. Gray
86 N.Y.2d 10 (N.Y. 1995) Cited 3,228 times 5 Legal Analyses
Holding that the issue of evidentiary sufficiency must be preserved for appellate review
Heflin v. United States
358 U.S. 415 (1959) Cited 469 times
Holding that the "only question" on a Rule 35 motion is "whether the sentence imposed was illegal on its face"
People v. Mahboubian
74 N.Y.2d 174 (N.Y. 1989) Cited 557 times 2 Legal Analyses
Finding prejudice where defendants's defenses "were not only antagonistic but also mutually exclusive and irreconcilable" and "[t]he jury could not have credited both defenses"
Prince v. United States
352 U.S. 322 (1957) Cited 414 times
In Prince, two counts of an indictment charging, respectively, entering a bank with intent to rob and robbery were submitted to the jury, which returned verdicts of guilty on both.
People v. Anderson
66 N.Y.2d 529 (N.Y. 1985) Cited 380 times
Stating that C.P.L. § 30.30, setting forth time limitations in which People must be ready for trial, addresses only problem of prosecutorial readiness, and is not a "Speedy Trial" statute in the constitutional sense
U.S. v. Gore
154 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 1998) Cited 156 times 1 Legal Analyses
Holding that the "stigma" associated with a second conviction along with an extra $50 special assessment constitutes prejudice sufficient to affect "substantial rights," even if the second conviction does not result in any additional time in prison
People v. Butts
72 N.Y.2d 746 (N.Y. 1988) Cited 173 times 1 Legal Analyses
Argued November 18, 1988 Decided December 20, 1988 Appeal from the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the First Judicial Department, Herman Cahn, J. Martha Krisel and Philip L. Weinstein for appellant. Robert M. Morgenthau, District Attorney (Paul Schectman and Mark Dwyer of counsel), for respondent. HANCOCK, JR., J. The dispositive question in this appeal is whether the evidence at trial reasonably supported defendant's request for a jury charge on the affirmative defense of entrapment.
Section 841 - Prohibited acts A
21 U.S.C. § 841 Cited 90,777 times 145 Legal Analyses
In § 841 prosecutions, then, it is the fact that the doctor issued an unauthorized prescription that renders his or her conduct wrongful, not the fact of the dispensation itself.
Section 70.25 - Concurrent and consecutive terms of imprisonment
N.Y. Penal Law § 70.25 Cited 1,659 times
Granting a sentencing court the power to specify that a term of imprisonment runs either concurrently or consecutively with respect to "any undischarged term of imprisonment imposed at a previous time"
Section 200.30 - Indictment; duplicitous counts prohibited
N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 200.30 Cited 254 times
1. Each count of an indictment may charge one offense only. 2. For purpose of this section, a statutory provision which defines the offense named in the title thereof by providing, in different subdivisions or paragraphs, different ways in which such named offense may be committed, defines a separate offense in each such subdivision or paragraph, and a count of an indictment charging such named offense which, without specifying or clearly indicating the particular subdivision or paragraph of the

The People, Respondent,v.Lionel McCray, Appellant.

36 Cited authorities

Holding that courts conducting review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction should view the "evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution"

Stating the standard for review of the legal sufficiency of evidence in a criminal case is whether "after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt"

Holding that to preserve for appellate review a challenge to the legal sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction, a defendant must move for a trial order of dismissal, and the argument must be "specifically directed" at the error being argued

Holding that the issue of evidentiary sufficiency must be preserved for appellate review

Holding that the "only question" on a Rule 35 motion is "whether the sentence imposed was illegal on its face"

Finding prejudice where defendants's defenses "were not only antagonistic but also mutually exclusive and irreconcilable" and "[t]he jury could not have credited both defenses"

In Prince, two counts of an indictment charging, respectively, entering a bank with intent to rob and robbery were submitted to the jury, which returned verdicts of guilty on both.

Stating that C.P.L. § 30.30, setting forth time limitations in which People must be ready for trial, addresses only problem of prosecutorial readiness, and is not a "Speedy Trial" statute in the constitutional sense

Holding that the "stigma" associated with a second conviction along with an extra $50 special assessment constitutes prejudice sufficient to affect "substantial rights," even if the second conviction does not result in any additional time in prison

In § 841 prosecutions, then, it is the fact that the doctor issued an unauthorized prescription that renders his or her conduct wrongful, not the fact of the dispensation itself.

Granting a sentencing court the power to specify that a term of imprisonment runs either concurrently or consecutively with respect to "any undischarged term of imprisonment imposed at a previous time"