36 Cited authorities

  1. Jackson v. Virginia

    443 U.S. 307 (1979)   Cited 68,635 times   16 Legal Analyses
    Holding that court must presume trier of fact resolved all inferences in favor of the prosecution "even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record"
  2. People v. Contes

    60 N.Y.2d 620 (N.Y. 1983)   Cited 11,077 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Stating the standard for review of the legal sufficiency of evidence in a criminal case is whether "after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt"
  3. People v. Gray

    86 N.Y.2d 10 (N.Y. 1995)   Cited 2,920 times   5 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the issue of evidentiary sufficiency must be preserved for appellate review
  4. People v. Hawkins

    2008 N.Y. Slip Op. 9254 (N.Y. 2008)   Cited 1,621 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that to preserve for appellate review a challenge to the legal sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction, a defendant must move for a trial order of dismissal, and the argument must be "specifically directed" at the error being argued
  5. Heflin v. United States

    358 U.S. 415 (1959)   Cited 462 times
    Holding that the "only question" on a Rule 35 motion is "whether the sentence imposed was illegal on its face"
  6. Prince v. United States

    352 U.S. 322 (1957)   Cited 410 times
    In Prince, two counts of an indictment charging, respectively, entering a bank with intent to rob and robbery were submitted to the jury, which returned verdicts of guilty on both. The Court held that the sentences could not be cumulated and remanded the case to the District Court for resentencing, but made no reference to the fact that two counts were laid and found by the jury.
  7. People v. Mahboubian

    74 N.Y.2d 174 (N.Y. 1989)   Cited 485 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Finding prejudice where defendants's defenses "were not only antagonistic but also mutually exclusive and irreconcilable" and "[t]he jury could not have credited both defenses"
  8. People v. Anderson

    66 N.Y.2d 529 (N.Y. 1985)   Cited 355 times
    Stating that C.P.L. § 30.30, setting forth time limitations in which People must be ready for trial, addresses only problem of prosecutorial readiness, and is not a "Speedy Trial" statute in the constitutional sense
  9. U.S. v. Gore

    154 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 1998)   Cited 136 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the "stigma" associated with a second conviction along with an extra $50 special assessment constitutes prejudice sufficient to affect "substantial rights," even if the second conviction does not result in any additional time in prison
  10. People v. Butts

    72 N.Y.2d 746 (N.Y. 1988)   Cited 156 times   1 Legal Analyses

    Argued November 18, 1988 Decided December 20, 1988 Appeal from the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the First Judicial Department, Herman Cahn, J. Martha Krisel and Philip L. Weinstein for appellant. Robert M. Morgenthau, District Attorney (Paul Schectman and Mark Dwyer of counsel), for respondent. HANCOCK, JR., J. The dispositive question in this appeal is whether the evidence at trial reasonably supported defendant's request for a jury charge on the affirmative defense of entrapment.

  11. Section 841 - Prohibited acts A

    21 U.S.C. § 841   Cited 66,875 times   101 Legal Analyses
    Providing penalties for, among other things, possessing a "controlled substance" with intent to distribute it, which sentences vary dramatically depending upon the amount of the drug possessed, without requiring jury determination of the amount
  12. Section 70.25 - Concurrent and consecutive terms of imprisonment

    N.Y. Penal Law § 70.25   Cited 1,505 times
    Granting a sentencing court the power to specify that a term of imprisonment runs either concurrently or consecutively with respect to "any undischarged term of imprisonment imposed at a previous time"
  13. Section 200.30 - Indictment; duplicitous counts prohibited

    N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 200.30   Cited 222 times

    1. Each count of an indictment may charge one offense only. 2. For purpose of this section, a statutory provision which defines the offense named in the title thereof by providing, in different subdivisions or paragraphs, different ways in which such named offense may be committed, defines a separate offense in each such subdivision or paragraph, and a count of an indictment charging such named offense which, without specifying or clearly indicating the particular subdivision or paragraph of the