Notice Entry of Order

Cal. Super. - 6th Dist.June 2, 2021

21 CV383442 Santa Clara - Civil DocuSign Envelope ID: E4593AF4-7OCD-44DC-A1 68-1 B7281 0A1 CCS R. Flenlling 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 JAMES R. WILLIAMS, County Counsel (SB. #271253) Electronically Filed MICHAEL C. SERVERIAN, Deputy County Counsel (SB. #lmflperior Court Of CA, CLAIRE T. CORMIER, Deputy County Counsel (SB. #15436Qounty of Santa Clara, OFFICE OF THE COUNTY COUNSEL 70 West Hedding Street, East Wing, Ninth Floor San José, California 95 1 10-1770 Telephone: (408) 299-5900 Facsimile: (408) 292-7240 michael.serverian@cco.sccgov.org claire.cormier@cco.sccgovorg Attorneys for Defendant COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA on 2/22/2022 12:38 PM Reviewed By: R. Fleming Case #21CV383442 Envelope: 8339602 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA DR. HEATHER COLBERT, M.D., Ph.D, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Defendants. No. 21CV383442 NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER RE: DEFENDANT’S DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT TO ALL PARTIES AND TO THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD: PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that an Order regarding Defendant’s Demurrer t0 Plaintiff s Complaint was entered by the Honorable Socrates Manoukian, Judge of the Superior Court of 20 California, on February 14, 2022. A true copy of the Order is attached hereto and served herewith. 21 Dated: February 22, 2022 Respectfully submitted, 22 JAMES R. WILLIAMS 23 County Counsel DocuSigned by: 24 By. (SWIMM,MM 25 MIEKE‘L‘WfiRVERIAN Deputy County Counsel 26 Attorneys for Defendant 27 COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA 2577820 28 Notice of Entry of Order 2 1CV3 83442 DocuSign Envelope ID: E4593AF4-7OCD-44DC-A1 68-1 B7281 0A1 CCS Order issued :m Submitted Matte .s‘_ m E [1 Em L3“ ‘5 SUPERIOR COURT, STATE OF CALIFORNIA ER} *3 L4 71 3 COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA ' DEPARTMENT 20 FEB Sq. 2322 161 North First Street, San Jose, CA 95113 I 408.882.2320 - 408.882.2296 (fax) C‘eyk ‘ smcmoukian@scscourt.org 3mm. cam m tbs (710w: Unnh.’ 0i 54:91.4: (1am httpyV/wwwscscourtorg By ' (For Clerk' seMDEPUTY CASE NO.: 21CV383442 Dr. Heather Colbert, M.D., Ph.D. v. County of Santa Clara, et a1. DATE: 13 January 2022 TIME: 9:00 am LINE NUMBER: 1 Order on Submitted Matter ---oooOooo--- Order on Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint. I. Statement of Facts. Plaintiff Dr. Heather Colbert, M.D., Ph.D's ("Dr. Colbert") 95 page complaint consists of 587 enumerated paragraphs directed against defendant County of Santa Clara (“County"). Plaintiff Dr. Colbert alleges generally that when other employees began to spread baseless damaging rumors against her in 2017, defendant County did nothing to stop them and allowed them to continue until at least the end of 2020. (Complaint. page 2, lines 10 - 13.) Defendant County punished plaintiff Dr. Colbert for complaining about other employees who failed to follow protocol, put patient lives at risk, and skipped scheduled shifts. (Complaint, page 2. lines 13 - 15.) Defendant County took no action when other employees openly disrespected, demeaned, and acted with hostility toward plaintiff Dr. Colbert despite multiple complaints. (Complaint, page 2, lines 15 - 17.) When plaintiff Dr. Colbert continued to complain, defendant County continued to escalate the retaliation against her until forcing plaintiff Dr. Colbert to resign from her employment. (Complaint. page 2, lines 17 - 20.) Plaintiff Dr. Colbert's complaint, filed 2 June 20211, asserts causes of action for: (1) Retaliation: Violation of Labor Code § 1102.5 (2) Retaliation: Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (h) 3) Discrimination: Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (a) 4) Harassment: Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (j) ) Violation of the California Family Rights Act: Gov. Code. § 12945.2, et seq. 6) Disability Discrimination: Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (a) ) Failure to Engage in Interactive Process: Gov. Code. § 12940. subd. (n) ) Failure to Accommodate: Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (m) (9) Failure to Prevent Harassment, Discrimination, and Retaliation: Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (k) (10) Patient Safety Whistleblower Retaliation: Health & Saf. Code, § 1278.5 (1 1) Retaliation: Violation of Labor Code §§ 6310 & 6311 1 This Department intends to comply with the time requirements of the Trial Court Delay Reduction Act (Government Code, §§ 68600-68620). The California Rules of Court state that the goal of each trial court should be to manage limited and unlimited civil cases from filing so that 100 percent are disposed of within 24 months. (Ca. St. Civil Rules of Court, Rule 3.714(b)(1)(C) and (b)(2)(C) 13 January 2022 Order on Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint. Page 1 ofJ7 DocuSign Envelope ID: E4593AF4-70CD-44DC-A1 68-1 B7281 0A1 CC5 On 13 September 2021, defendant County filed the motion now before the court, a demurrer to the fifth through eighth causes of action in plaintiff Dr. Colbert's complaint. II. Demurrers in General. A complaint must contain substantive factual allegations sufficiently apprising the defendant of the issues to be addressed. (See Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2.) A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. It is properly sustained where the compiaint or an individual cause of action fails to “state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action." (Code of Civil Procedure, § 430.10, subd. (e).) “[C]onclusionary allegations . . . without facts to support them” are insufficient on demurrer. (Ankeny v. Lockheed Missiles and Space Co. (1 979) 88 Cal.App.3d 531. 537.) “lt is fundamental that a demurrer is an attack against the complaint on its face, it should not be sustained unless the complaint shows that the action may not be pursued." (YoIo County Dept. of Social Services v. Municipal Court (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 842. 846- 847.) “It is not the ordinary function of a demurrer to test the truth of the plaintiff’s allegations or the accuracy with which he describes the defendant’s conduct. A demurrer tests only the legal sufficiency of the pleading.“ (Committee on Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Ca|.3d 197, 21 3.) “It ‘admits the truth of all material factual allegations in the complaint . . .; the question of plaintiff‘s ability to prove these allegations, or the possible difficulty in making such proof does not concern the reviewing court.‘ [Citation.]" (Id. at pp. 213-214; see Cook v. De La Guerra (1864) 24 Cal. 237, 239: "[|]t is not the office of a demurrer to state facts, but to raise an issue of law upon the facts stated in the pleading demurred to.") Ill. Analysis. Plaintiff asserts that the demurrers should be overruled on the following grounds: First, Plaintiff stated she took medical leave in the complaint. Second, P1aintiffs stress and stress-related severe headaches rose to the level of medical disability for which she took medical leave. Third, Defendant failed to engage in the interactive process with Plaintiff by moving her to an unsafe office after she returned to work from her leave, thus chilling her from seeking future accommodation, and by failing to inquire as to what form of accommodation she still needed. Finally. Defendant failed to accommodate Plaintiff by simultaneously demoting her and moving her to an unsafe office upon her return to work from her leave. A. Defendant County’s demurrer to the fifth cause of action (violation of the California Family Rights Act) in plaintiff Dr. Colbert’s complaint is OVERRULED. The California state counterpart to the federal Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) (29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.) is the Moore-Brown-Roberti Family Rights Act (“CFRA”) which is codified in Government Code, § 12945.2. “The CFRA, which is contained within the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), is intended to give employees an opportunity to take leave from work for certain personal or family medical reasons without jeopardizing job security." (Nelson v. United Technologies (1999) 74 Cal.App.4“‘ 597, 606.) Government Code, § 12945.2, subdivision (I) states, “It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to refuse to hire, or to discharge, fine, suspend, expeI, or discriminate against, any individual because of an individual’s exercise of the right to family care and medical leave provided by subdivision (a)." “A plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of retaliation in violation of the CFRA by showing the following: (1) the defendant was a covered employer; (2) the plaintiff was eligible for CFRA leave; (3) the plaintiff exercised his or her right to take a qualifying leave; and (4) the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action because he or she exercised the right to take CFRA leave." (Rogers v. County ofLos Angeles (2011) 198 Cal.App.4"‘ 480, 491; italics original; see also Dudley v. Dept. of Transportation (2001) 90 Cal.App.4"' 255, 261; see also CACI, No. 2620.) 13 January 2022 Order on Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint. Page 2 of 7 DocuSign Envelope ID: E4593AF4-7OCD-44DC-A1 68-1 B7281 0A1 CCS In demurring to the fifth cause of action, defendant County contends plaintiff Dr. Colbert has not sufficiently alleged that she exercised her right to take a qualifying leave because plaintiff Dr. Colbert did not identify the time as such. Defendant County acknowledges an allegation that Dr. Colben had a conversation with Dr. Meade (director) on 25 July 2019 stating she had severe headaches and "may seek a medical leave for them" and then later that evening emailed Dr. Meade stating she was taking time off work for the headaches and that she had scheduled a doctor's appointment five days later. (Complaint, 1111298 - 299.) With regard to the procedure for requesting CFRA leave, Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 11091, subd. (a)(1) states: ' Unless an emptoyer waives its employees' notice obligations described herein, an employee shall provide at least verbal notice sufficient to make the employer aware that the employee needs CFRA leave. and the anticipated timing and duration of the leave. The employee need not expressly assert rights under CFRA or FMLA or even mention CFRA or FMLA to meet the notice requirement, however, the employee must state the reason the leave is needed, such as, for example, the expected birth of a child or for medical treatment. The mere mention of vacation," other paid time off, or resignation does not render the notice insufficient, provided the underlying reason for the request is CFRA-qualifying, and the employee communicates that reason to the employer. The employer should inquire further of the employee ifnecessary to determine whether the employee is requesting CFRA leave and to obtain necessary information concerning the leave (i.e., commencement date, expected duration, and other permissible information). An employee has an obligation to respond to an employer's questions designed to determine whether an absence is potentially CFRA-qualifying. Failure to respond to permissible employer inquiries regarding the leave request may result in denial of CFRA protection if the employer is unable to determine whether the leave is CFRA-qualifying. (A) Under all circumstances, it is the employer’s responsibility to designate leave, paid or unpaid, as CFRA or CFRA/FMLA qualifying, based on information provided by the employee or the employee's spokesperson, and to give notice of the designation to the employee. (Emphasis added. See also Faust v. California Portland Cement Co. (2007) 150 Cat.App.4'h 864, 879.) The highlighted portion of the regulation makes clear that the employee need not expressly assert rights under CFRA or even mention CFRA and that it is the employer's obligation to inquire further to determine whether the employee is requesting CFRA leave. Defendant County cites no authority which requires plaintiff Dr. Colbert to expressly assen that she was taking medical leave pursuant to CFRA. Defendant County goes on to argue that even if plaintiff Dr. Colbert requested to take medical leave. plaintiff did not give sufficient notice that the leave was CFRA qualifying because Dr. Colben indicated she was merely seeking treatment for severe headaches. "Family care and medical leave“ includes "[|]eave because of an employee's own serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of the position of that employee . . . (Gov. Code, § 12945.2, subd. (c)(3)(C).) "Serious health condition" means "an illness, injury, impairment, or physical or mental condition that involves either of the following: [P] (A) Inpatient care in a hospital, hospice, or residential health care facility. [P] (B) Continuing treatment or continuing supervision by a health care provider." (Gov. Code, § 12945.2, subd. (c)(8).) (Gibbs v. Am. Airlines (1999) 74 Cal.App.4"1 1. 6 (Gibbs).) Defendant County relies on Gibbs where the court wrote: A cold or flu is not an incapacitating serious health condition under CFRA absent unusual circumstances. California regulations describe a "serious health condition" as an illness involving either inpatient care or "continuing treatment or continuing supervision by a health care provider as detailed in FMLA and its implementing regulations." (Cal. Code Regs, tit. 2, § 7297.0. subd. (0).) FMLA regulations specifically name "the common cold" and "the flu" as “examples of conditions that do not meet the definition of a sen'ous health condition and do not qualify for FMLA leave." (29 C.F.R. § 825.1 14(c) (1998).) 13 January 2022 Order on Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint: Page 3 of 7 DocuSign Envelope ID: E4593AF4-7OCD-44DC-A1 68-1 B7281 0A1 CCS (Gibbs, supra, 74 Cal.App.4lh at p. 8.) The Court does not find Gibbs to be determinative here since plaintiff Dr. Gilbert is not alleging that she took leave based upon a common cold or the flu nor are there any additional facts with regard to whether plaintiff Dr. Gilbert's condition required inpatient care, continuing treatment, or continuing supervision by a health care provider. More importantly, “[w]hether notice is sufficient under CFRA is a question of fact." (Avila v. Continental Airlines, Inc. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4lh 1237, 1255.) Accordingly, defendant County's demurrer to the fifth cause of action (violation of the California Family Rights Act) in plaintiff Dr. Colbert's complaint on the ground that the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action [Code of Civil Procedure, § 430.10, subd. (e)] is OVERRULED. B. Defendant County’s demurrer to the sixth cause of action (disability discrimination) in plaintiff Dr. Colbert’s complaint is SUSTAINED. The sixth cause of action alleges that the County unlawfully discriminated against her because of her disability that she defines as severe headaches. (Complaint, §§ 295, 298-300, 520.) The County contends that FEHA does not require an employer to accommodate minor conditions and the applicable regulations only identify “migraine headaches” as a qualifying medical condition. (Cal. Code Regs, tit. 2. § 11065. subd. (d)(9)(B).) In the context of disability discrimination, the plaintiff initially has the burden to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. The plaintiff can meet this burden by presenting evidence that demonstrates, even circumstantially or by inference, that he or she (1) suffered from a disability, or was regarded as suffering from a disability; (2) could perform the essential duties of the job with or without reasonable accommodations, and (3) was subjected to an adverse employment action because of the disability or perceived disability. (Jensen v. Wells Fargo Bank (2000) 85 Cal.App.4"‘ 245, 254 [102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 55].) (Sandal! v. Taylor-Listug, Inc. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4”‘ 297, 310; see also CACI, No. 2540.) In demurn'ng to the sixth cause of action, defendant County acknowledges plaintiff Dr. Colbert's altegations ~ that she suffered “stress" and "severe headaches," but contend those conditions do not qualify as disabilities. "'Mental disability' includes, but is not limited to, all of the following: Having any mental or psychological disorderor condition, such as intellectual disability, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness. or specific learning disabilities, that limits a major life activity." (Government Code, § 12926, subd. (j)(1).) A “physical disability" must also limit a major life activity." (Government Code, § 12926, subd. (m)(1)(B).) A mental or psychological disorder or condition or a physiological “disease, disorder, condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomica| loss limits a major life activity if it makes the achievement of the major life activity difficult." (Government Code, § 12926, subd. (i)(1)(B) and (m)(1)(B)(ii)-) "Disability" does not include conditions that are mild, which do not limit a major life activity, as determined on a" case-by-case basis. These excluded conditions have little or no residual effects, such as the common cold; seasonal or common influenza; minor cuts, sprains, muscle aches, soreness, bruises, or abrasions; non-migraine headaches, and minor and non-chronic gastrointestinal disorders. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 11065, subd. (d)(9)(B); emphasis added.) However, even under this particular regulation, exclusions are "determined on a case-by-case basis.“ Without taking judicial notice of its own knowledge, this Court believes that "severe headaches" not otherwise non-migraine headaches might be due to intracranial aneurysm, space-occupying lesion, cerebral venous thrombosis. spontaneous internal carotid artery dissection (probably unlikely in this case), colloid cysts, ventricular tumors, Chiari malformations or arteriovenous malformations. “Because recovery is based on a statutory cause of action, the plaintiff must set forth facts in his complaint sufficiently detailed and specific to support an inference that each of the statutory elements of liability is satisfied. General allegations are regarded as inadequate." (Mittenhuber v. City of Redondo Beach (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 1, 5.) 13 January 2022 Order on Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint. Page 4 of 7 DocuSign Envelope ID: E4593AF4-7OCD-44DC-A1 68-1 B7281 0A1 CCS The CFRA defines a “[slerious health condition" as “an illness, injury, impairment, or physical 0r mental condition that involves either 0f the following: [1|] (A) Inpatient care in a hospital, hospice, or residential health care facility. [or1|] (B) Continuing treatment or continuing supervision by a health care provider." (§ 12945.2(c)(8).) “Inpatient care” means “a stay in a hospital, hospice. or residential health care facility, any subsequent treatment in connection with such inpatient care, or any period of incapacity." (Cal. Code Regs, tit. 2, § 11087(q)(1).) “Continuing treatment" means “ongoing medical treatment or supervision by a health care provider ...." (Id. at (q)(3); (Soria v. Univision Radio Los Angeles, Inc. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5“‘ 570, 601 .) Although plaintiff alleges she suffered "severe headaches," there is nothing on the face of the pleading from which this Court can determine, as a matter of law, that such “severe" headaches were of the "non-migraine" variety. On reflection, plaintiff, especially given her medical background, should be able to allege what kind of symptoms she claims to have suffered. Accordingly, defendant County's demurrer to the sixth cause of action (disability discrimination) in plaintiff Dr. Colbert's complaint on the ground that the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action [Code of Civil Procedure, § 430.10, subd. (e)] is SUSTAINED with 10 days' leave to amend. C. Defendant County’s demurrer to the seventh and eighth causes of action (failure to engage in the interactive process] failure to accommodate) in plaintiff Dr. Colbert’s complaint is SUSTAINED. “Under FEHA, it is an unlawful practice for an employer to fail to engage in a good faith interactive process with the employee to determine an effective reasonable accommodation if an employee with a known physical disability requests one. (§ 12940. subd. (n); see § 12926.1, subd. (e); A.M. v. Albertsons, LLC (2009) 178 Cal.App.4“‘ 455, 463 [100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 449] (Albertsons).)" (Brown v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2021) 60 Cal.App.5"‘ 1092, 1109 (Brown).) An employer must provide a reasonable accommodation for an applicant or employee with a known mental or physical disability unless the accommodation would cause undue hardship. Failure to do so is an unlawful employment practice. (§ 12940, subd. (m)(1); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 11068 subd. (a).) To establish a failure to accommodate claim, [plaintiff] must show (1) she has a disability covered by FEHA; (2) she can perform the essential functions of the position; and (3) [defendant] failed reasonably to accommodate her disability. (Brown, supra, 60 Cal.App.5‘h at p. 1107.) Defendant County demurs to the seventh and eighth cause of action on the same ground it demurred to the sixth cause of action, i.e., plaintiff Dr. Colbert does not allege she suffered from a qualifying disability. For the reasons discussed above, the Court disagrees. Defendant County demurs further to the seventh cause of action on the ground that plaintiff Dr. Colbert makes no allegation that she even requested an accommodation. The “obligation [to engage in the interactive process] is triggered by an employee or an employee's representative giving notice of the employee's disability and the desire for accommodation." (Jensen v. Wells Fargo Bank (2000) 85 Cal.App.4“‘ 245, 261 .) In opposition. plaintiff Dr. Colben directs the Court's attention to a portion of the complaint where she alleges she informed Dr. Meade on 25 July 2019 of her “need to take time off," i.e., a request for accommodation, and was subsequently informed “she was off the schedule until October 25, 201 9" even though she “never requested a prolonged leave.“ (Complaint, 1m 299 - 300.) As plaintiff Dr. Colbert points out: Once the interactive process is initiated, the employer's obligation to engage in the process in good faith is continuous. “mhe employer's obligation to engage in the interactive process extends beyond the first attempt at accommodation and continues when the employee asks for a different accommodation or where the employer is aware that the initial accommodation is failing and further accommodation is needed. This rule fosters the framework of cooperative problem-solving contemplated by the ADA, by encouraging employers to seek to find accommodations that really work (Humphrey v. Memorial Hospitals Ass'n (9th Cir. 2001) 239 F.3d 1128, 1138.) 13 January 2022 Order on Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint. Page 5 of 7 DocuSign Envelope ID: E4593AF4-7OCD-44DC-A1 68-1 B7281 0A1 CCS (Scotch v. Art Institute of California (2009) 173 Cal.App.4lh 986, 1013 [93 Cal.Rptr.3d 338].) Plaintiff Dr. Colbert asserts that defendant County stopped engaging in the interactive process upon her return to work. However, plaintiff Dr. Colbert does not allege she asked for a different accommodation nor does she allege facts that defendant County was aware the initial accommodation failed or that further accommodation was needed. Accordingly, defendant County's demurrer to the seventh cause of action (failure to engage in the interactive process) in plaintiff Dr. Colbert's complaint on the ground that the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action [Code Civ. Proc., §430.10. subd. (e)] is SUSTAINED with 10 days' leave to amend. Similarly, with regard to the eighth cause of action, defendant County contends there are insufficient allegations that it failed to accommodate plaintiff Dr. Colbert. In opposition, plaintiff Dr. Colbert concedes defendant ‘finitially accommodated" her, but “stopped doing so the moment Plaintiff returned to work" and instead, demoted her and moved her to an unsafe office. (See Complaint, 1m 300, 340, and 343.) However, as with the seventh cause of action, plaintiff Dr. Colbert does not allege she asked for a different accommodation nor does she allege facts that defendant County was aware the initial accommodation failed or that further accommodation was needed. Accordingly, defendant County's demurrer to the eighth cause of action (failure to accommodate) in plaintiff Dr. Colbert's complaint on the ground that the pleading does not state facts‘sufficient to constitute a cause of action [Code of Civil Procedure, § 430.1 0, subd. (e)] is SUSTAINED with 10 days' leave to amend. IV. Tentative Ruling. The tentative ruling was duly posted. The defense duly challenged the tentative ruling. Ms. Ciarimboli appears for Plaintiff via Court Call. Messrs. Severian and Mr. Bussey appeared for Defendant in person. The defense argued that the medical conditions claimed by plaintiff have to be qualifying, such as requiring inpatient care. continuing treatment, continuing's supervision. The complaint does not currently allege that she had a qualifying medical condition or treatment. She alleges that she made one appointment but does not allege she kept the employment. Plaintiff argues that she alleged that stress was caused by work and thus qualifies, even if the cause of the headaches was temporary. This Court has reconsidered its ruling on the sixth cause of action for the reasons stated above. The demurrer to the sixth cause of action is SUSTAINED. V. Case Management. The current case management conference currently set for 12 July 2022 at 10:00 AM in this department will REMAIN AS SET. VI. Order. Defendant County's demurrerto the fifth cause of action (violation of the California Family Rights Act) in plaintiff Dr. Colbert's complaint on the ground that the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action [Code of Civil Procedure, § 430.10, subd. (e)] is OVERRULED. Defendant County's demurrer to the sixth cause of action (disability discrimination) in plaintiff Dr. Colbert's complaint on the ground that the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action [Code of Civil Procedure, §430.10, subd. (e)] is SUSTAINED with 10 days‘ leave to amend. Defendant County's demurrer to the seventh cause of action (failure to engage in the interactive process) in plaintiff Dr. Colbert's complaint on the ground that the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action [Code of Civil Procedure, §430.10, subd. (e)] is SUSTAINED with 10 days' leave to amend. 13 January 2022 Order on Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint. Page 6 of 7 DocuSign Envelope ID: E4593AF4-7OCD-44DC-A1 68-1 B7281 0A1 CCS Defendant County's demurrer to the eighth cause of action (failure to accommodate) in plaintiff Dr. Colbert's complaint on the ground that the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action [Code of Civil Procedure, § 430.10. subd. (e)] is SUSTAINED with 10 days' leave to amend. ETER MANOUK judge 0f the Superior Court County ofSanta Clara 13 January 2022 Order on Demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint. Page 7 of 7 DocuSign Envelope ID: E4593AF4-7OCD-44DC-A1 68-1 B7281 0A1 CCS SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA Michael C. Serverian Office of the County Counsel A WI.‘ .v ,. 70 West Hedding St East Wing 9th Floor i " " ' ' ’ ' ' .L, San Jose CA 95110-1770 "“ _ " COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA DOWNTOWN COURTHOUSE 191 NORTH FIRST STREET (:5; lg; :33"; g? VJ) SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA 95113 mm: E1 .3 :v §- CIVILDIVISION : J .J; .Lfl r ”T l EH 1 ’1 2022 --’~',:!:* RE: Heather Colbert, MD vs County of Santa Clara Case Number: 21CV383442 ' PROOF 0F SERVICE ORDER 0N DEMURRER T0 PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT was delivered to the parties listed below the above entitled case as set forth in the sworn declaration below. If you. a party represented by you, or a witness to be called on behalf of that party need an accommodation under the American with Disablllties Act, please contact the Court Administrator’s office at (408) 882-2700. or use the Court's TDD line (408) 882-2690 or the Voice/TDD California Relay Service (800) 735-2922. DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY MAIL: | declare that | served this notice by encioslng a true copy in a sealed envelope, addressed to each person whose name is shown below, and by depositing the envelope with postage fully prepaid. In the United States Mail at San Jose, CA on February 14, 2022. CLERK OF THE COURT, by Hientrang Tranthien. Deputy. cc: Kelsey K Ciarimboli Bohm Law Group Inc 4600 Northgate Blvd Suite 210 Sacramento CA 95834 cw-9027 REV 12/08/16 PROOF OF SERVICE DocuSign Envelope ID: E4593AF4-7OCD-44DC-A1 68-1 B7281 0A1 CCS 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA PROOF OF SERVICE BY ELECTRONIC MAIL Heather Colbert, MD, Ph.D., v. County ofSam‘a Clara, er a]. Case N0.: 21CV383442 I, Avril A. D’Souza, declare: I am now and at all times herein mentioned have been over the age of eighteen years, employed in Santa Clara County, California, and not a party to the within action 0r cause; that my business address is 70 West Hedding Street, East Wing, 9th Floor, San José, California 95 1 10-1770. My electronic service address is: avril.dsouza@cco.sccgov.0rg. On February 22, 2022, I electronically served copies 0f the following: NOTICE 0F ENTRY OF ORDER RE: DEFENDANT’S DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT to the people listed below at the following electronic service address: Bohm Law Group, Inc. Lawrance A. Bohm Kelsey K. Ciarimboli Email: lbohm@bohmlaw.com Email: kelsey@bohmlaw.com Email: BLG000800@b0hmlaw.com I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct, and that this declaration was executed 0n February 22, 2022. DocuSig ned by: flWiL D'Sowam 51 1 BG7F17E8041 9 , Avril A. D’Souza Proof Of Service by Electronic Mail 21CV383442