OrderCal. Super. - 6th Dist.June 22, 2021KOOONONUl-hwwu-t NNNNNNNNNHHHHHHHHHH OONONM-PWNHOKOOONONm-PWNHO SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA JAVIER DIAZ, et al., Case N0.: 21CV383425 Plaintiffs, ORDER CONCERNING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY VS. APPROVAL OF CLASS/PAGA SETTLEMENT BGIS GLOBAL INTEGRATED SOLUTIONS US, LLC, et al., Defendants. This is a putative class and Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”) action. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant BGIS Global Integrated Solutions US, LLC failed t0 provide compliant meal and rest breaks, failed t0 pay employees for all hours worked due t0 rounding and on-call practices, failed t0 properly pay overtime under a valid Alternative Workweek Schedule (“AWS”), and committed other wage and hour Violations. Now before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary approval 0f a settlement, which is unopposed. The Court issued a tentative ruling 0n March 9, 2022, and n0 one challenged it at the hearing 0n March 10. The Court now issues its final order, which GRANTS preliminary approval. Electronically Filed by Superior Court of CA, County of Santa Clara, on 3/14/2022 11:09 AM Reviewed By: R. Walker Case #21CV383425 Envelope: 8499746 KOOONONUl-hwwu-t NNNNNNNNNHHHHHHHHHH OONONM-PWNHOKOOONONm-PWNHO I. BACKGROUND A. Factual Defendant operates and provides a global Data Center and IT Infrastructure Management software. (First Amended Complaint (FAC), 1] 2.) It employed Plaintiffs and others as non- exempt employees in California. (161., 1] 26.) Plaintiffs allege that Defendant failed t0 pay employees for all hours worked due t0 rounding practices, on-call time paid at less than minimum wage, and other practices. (FAC, 1] 29.) Defendant either failed t0 implement a proper alternative workweek 0r failed t0 properly pay overtime under a valid AWS, and thus owes Plaintiffs and putative class members unpaid overtime. (161., 1] 30.) Defendant did not provide compliant meal and rest periods 0r associated premiums. (1d,,w 3 1-32.) Plaintiffs and putative class members were not adequately reimbursed for necessary business expenses, including for cell phone and home internet use. (Id., 1] 33.) They were not provided with accurate itemized wage statements. (Id., 1] 34.) And separated employees did not receive timely payment 0f all wages, including vacation pay at the regular rate. (Id, 1] 35.) Based 0n these allegations, Plaintiffs assert claims for (1) failure t0 pay minimum wages, (2) failure t0 pay overtime wages, (3) failure t0 provide meal periods, (4) failure t0 permit rest breaks, (5) failure t0 provide accurate itemized wage statements, (6) failure t0 pay all wages due upon separation 0f employment, (7) failure t0 reimburse necessary business expenses, (8) Violation 0f Business & Professions Code section 17200, et seq., and (9) enforcement 0fPAGA. B. Procedural On February 16, 2021, Plaintiff Javier Diaz filed a putative class action 0n behalf 0f Defendant’s non-exempt employees in state court. It was then removed t0 federal court, and is currently pending in the United States District Court for the Northern District 0f California. (Diaz v. BGIS Global Integrated Solutions US, LLC (N.D. Cal., Case N0. 21-CV-02804-VKD) (the “Federal Action”).) Plaintiffs then filed this case as a representative action under PAGA in June 2021. KOOONONUl-hwwu-t NNNNNNNNNHHHHHHHHHH OONONM-PWNHOKOOONONm-PWNHO After the parties reached a global settlement in principle, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint in this action t0 include all the claims asserted in the Federal Action, and the parties stipulated t0 stay the Federal Action pending approval 0f the settlement. Plaintiffs now move for an order preliminarily approving the settlement 0f the class and PAGA claims, provisionally certifying the settlement class, approving the form and method for providing notice t0 the class, and scheduling a final fairness hearing. Upon final approval 0f the settlement, the parties will request dismissal with prejudice 0f all claims asserted in the Federal Action. II. LEGAL STANDARDS FOR SETTLEMENT APPROVAL A. Class Action Generally, “questions whether a [class action] settlement was fair and reasonable, whether notice t0 the class was adequate, whether certification 0f the class was proper, and whether the attorney fee award was proper are matters addressed t0 the trial court’s broad discretion.” (Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 234-235 (Wershba), disapproved 0f 0n other grounds by Hernandez v. Restoration Hardware, Inc. (201 8) 4 Cal.5th 260.) In determining whether a class settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable, the trial court should consider relevant factors, such as the strength 0f plaintiffs’ case, the risk, expense, complexity and likely duration of further litigation, the risk of maintaining class action status through trial, the amount offered in settlement, the extent 0f discovery completed and the stage 0f the proceedings, the experience and Views 0f counsel, the presence 0f a governmental participant, and the reaction 0f the class members t0 the proposed settlement. (Wershba, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at pp. 244-245, internal citations and quotations omitted.) In general, the most important factor is the strength 0f the plaintiffs’ case 0n the merits, balanced against the amount offered in settlement. (See Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 116, 130 (Kullar).) But the trial court is free t0 engage in a balancing and weighing 0f factors depending 0n the circumstances 0f each case. (Wershba, supra, 91 KOOONONUl-hwwu-t NNNNNNNNNHHHHHHHHHH OONONM-PWNHOKOOONONm-PWNHO Cal.App.4th at p. 245.) The trial court must examine the “proposed settlement agreement t0 the extent necessary t0 reach a reasoned judgment that the agreement is not the product 0f fraud 0r overreaching by, 0r collusion between, the negotiating parties, and that the settlement, taken as a whole, is fair, reasonable and adequate t0 all concerned.” (Ibid., citation and internal quotation marks omitted.) The burden is 0n the proponent 0f the settlement t0 show that it is fair and reasonable. However “a presumption 0f fairness exists where: (1) the settlement is reached through arm’s-length bargaining; (2) investigation and discovery are sufficient t0 allow counsel and the court t0 act intelligently; (3) counsel is experienced in similar litigation; and (4) the percentage 0f objectors is small.” (Wershba, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 245, citation omitted.) The presumption does not permit the Court t0 “give rubber-stamp approval” t0 a settlement; in all cases, it must “independently and objectively analyze the evidence and circumstances before it in order t0 determine whether the settlement is in the best interests 0f those whose claims will be extinguished,” based 0n a sufficiently developed factual record. (Kullar, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 130.) B. PAGA Labor Code section 2699, subdivision (l)(2) provides that “[t]he superior court shall review and approve any settlement 0f any civil action filed pursuant t0” PAGA. The court’s review “ensur[es] that any negotiated resolution is fair t0 those affected.” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 53 1, 549.) Seventy-five percent 0f any penalties recovered under PAGA g0 t0 the Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA), leaving the remaining twenty- five percent for the aggrieved employees. (Iskanian v. CLS Transportation L05 Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Ca1.4th 348, 380.) Similar t0 its review 0f class action settlements, the Court must “determine independently whether a PAGA settlement is fair and reasonable,” t0 protect “the interests 0f the public and the LWDA in the enforcement 0f state labor laws.” (Moniz v. Adecco USA, Inc. (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 56, 76-77.) It must make this assessment “in View 0fPAGA’S purposes t0 remediate present labor law Violations, deter future ones, and t0 maximize enforcement 0f state KOOONONUl-hwwu-t NNNNNNNNNHHHHHHHHHH OONONM-PWNHOKOOONONm-PWNHO labor laws.” (Id. at p. 77; see also Haralson v. U.S. Aviation Servs. Corp. (N.D. Cal. 2019) 383 F. Supp. 3d 959, 971 [“when a PAGA claim is settled, the relief provided for under the PAGA [should] be genuine and meaningful, consistent with the underlying purpose 0f the statute t0 benefit the public ....”], quoting LWDA guidance discussed in 0 ’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2016) 201 F.Supp.3d 1110 (0’C0nn0r).) The settlement must be reasonable in light 0f the potential verdict value. (See 0 ’Connor, supra, 201 F.Supp.3d at p. 1135 [rejecting settlement 0f less than one percent 0f the potential verdict].) But a permissible settlement may be substantially discounted, given that courts often exercise their discretion t0 award PAGA penalties below the statutory maximum even where a claim succeeds at trial. (See Viceral v. Mistras Group, Inc. (N.D. Cal., Oct. 11, 2016, N0. 15- CV-02198-EMC) 2016 WL 5907869, at *8-9.) III. SETTLEMENT PROCESS Plaintiffs submit that after the Federal Action was removed, they conducted formal discovery and received policy documents, time records, and wage statements from Defendant. After meet and confer about discovery and the merits 0f the claims at issue, the parties agreed t0 mediate. They attended a mediation session with Hon. Carl J. West (Ret) 0n September 13, 2021. The parties continued t0 negotiate the terms 0f the settlement after mediation, and finalized it in October 2021. IV. SETTLEMENT PROVISIONS The non-reversionary gross settlement amount is $1,275,000. Attorney fees 0f up t0 $425,000 (thirty-three percent 0f the gross settlement), litigation costs not t0 exceed $20,000, and administration costs 0f approximately $6,000 will be paid from the gross settlement. $50,000 will be allocated t0 PAGA penalties, 75 percent 0f which will be paid t0 the LWDA. The named plaintiffs will seek incentive award 0f $10,000 each. The net settlement, approximately $766,500, will be allocated t0 settlement class members proportionally based 0n their qualifying workweeks during the class period. A 2/3 weighted ratio factor will be applied t0 the workweeks 0f“AWS Subclass” members due t0 the greater value 0f their claims (as discussed below). The average payment will be $7,902.06 t0 KOOONONUl-hwwu-t NNNNNNNNNHHHHHHHHHH OONONM-PWNHOKOOONONm-PWNHO each 0f the 97 class members. Class members will not be required t0 submit a claim t0 receive their payments. For tax purposes, settlement payments will be allocated 1/3 t0 wages, 1/3 t0 penalties, and 1/3 t0 interest. The employer’s share 0f taxes will be paid separately from the gross settlement. Funds associated with checks uncashed after 180 days will be transmitted t0 the State Controller’s Office Unclaimed Property Fund, in the name 0f the class member for whom they are designated. In exchange for the settlement, class members who d0 not opt out will release “any and all claims alleged 0r which could have been in alleged based 0n facts pleaded in Named Plaintiffs’ operative complaints in the State Action and Federal Action, during the Class Period, including but not limited t0” specified relevant wage and hour claims. The scope 0f the release is appropriately tied t0 the factual allegations in the complaint. (See Amara v. Anaheim Arena Management, LLC (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 521, 538.) Consistent with the statute, PAGA employees will not be able t0 opt out 0f that portion 0f the settlement. V. FAIRNESS OF SETTLEMENT Plaintiffs’ minimum wage and overtime claims were premised 0n the theories that Defendant required putative class members t0 work invalid Alterative Workweek Schedules (AWS) and failed t0 pay them daily overtime compensation, illegally rounded time punches, and required employees t0 work 0n call shifts without adequate compensation. Plaintiffs estimated that the AWS overtime claim was worth $320,040, the rounding claim was worth approximately $6,247, and the on-call claim was worth approximately $2 million. Defendant argued it had adopted a valid AWS, exempting it from overtime requirements; its rounding policy was neutral; and employees were not 0n call for the length 0f time alleged. Plaintiffs believed the AWS claims were strong, but discounted the on-call claim due t0 the likelihood that it would raise individualized issues 0f employer control. Plaintiffs’ theory of liability for meal and rest break Violations was based 0n Defendant’s lack 0f meal and rest policies for the maj ority 0f the class period. Plaintiffs estimated the rest period damages were worth about $1 million and the meal period damages could total $294,75 1. But Defendant could use time records t0 argue that class members received their breaks, and KOOONONUl-hwwu-t NNNNNNNNNHHHHHHHHHH OONONM-PWNHOKOOONONm-PWNHO Plaintiffs would have t0 rely 0n employee testimony, which would raise risks at class certification. These claims accordingly were also discounted. Plaintiffs alleged class members were required t0 use their personal cell phones for work, and these claims could be worth about $30,078, but Defendant could argue that the cell phone usage was optional, raising challenges for class certification. As for penalties, the waiting time penalties were estimated at $560,280 and wage statement penalties were estimated at $156,000, with PAGA penalties totaling up t0 $501,300. Plaintiffs thus estimate that the maximum value 0f the case is $4,868,696, but much of that value depends 0n uncertain penalties 0r claims potentially raising individual issues that would complicate class certification. Based 0n this analysis, the Court agrees that the $1,275,000 settlement is fair and reasonable t0 the class, and the PAGA allocation is genuine, meaningful, and reasonable in light 0f the statute’s purposes. The Court retains an independent right and responsibility t0 review the requested attorney fees and award only so much as it determines t0 be reasonable. (See Garabedian v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone C0. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 123, 127-128.) While 1/3 0f the common fund for attorney fees is generally considered reasonable, counsel shall submit lodestar information prior to the final approval hearing in this matter so the Court can compare the lodestar information with the requested fees. (See Lafitte v. Robert HalfIntern. Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480, 504 [trial courts have discretion t0 double-check the reasonableness 0f a percentage fee through a lodestar calculation].) VI. PROPOSED SETTLEMENT CLASS Plaintiffs request that the following settlement class be provisionally certified: A11 current and former non-exempt employees who are 0r were employed by Defendant in California at any time from August 17, 2016, through November 12, 2021. The proposed class includes the “AWS Subclass” 0f class members who “worked a 4 days, 10-hours 0r a 3 days, 12-hours alternative workweek schedule, except for those non- KOOONONUl-hwwu-t NNNNNNNNNHHHHHHHHHH OONONM-PWNHOKOOONONm-PWNHO exempt employees who worked a 3 days, 12-hours alternative workweek schedule and who were paid daily overtime for all hours over eight (8) in a day.” A. Legal Standard for Certifying a Class for Settlement Purposes Rule 3.769(d) 0f the California Rules 0f Court states that “[t]he court may make an order approving 0r denying certification 0f a provisional settlement class after [a] preliminary settlement hearing.” California Code 0f Civil Procedure Section 382 authorizes certification 0f a class “when the question is one 0f a common 0r general interest, 0fmany persons, 0r when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable t0 bring them all before the court ....” Section 382 requires the plaintiff t0 demonstrate by a preponderance 0f the evidence: (1) an ascertainable class and (2) a well-defined community 0f interest among the class members. (Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 34 Cal.4th 319, 326, 332 (Sav-On Drug Stores).) “Other relevant considerations include the probability that each class member will come forward ultimately t0 prove his 0r her separate claim t0 a portion 0f the total recovery and whether the class approach would actually serve t0 deter and redress alleged wrongdoing.” (Linder v. Thrifty Oil C0. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 429, 435.) The plaintiff has the burden of establishing that class treatment will yield “substantial benefits” t0 both “the litigants and t0 the court.” (Blue Chip Stamps v. Superior Court (1976) 18 Cal.3d 381, 385.) In the settlement context, “the court’s evaluation 0f the certification issues is somewhat different from its consideration 0f certification issues when the class action has not yet settled.” (Luckey v. Superior Court (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 81, 93.) As n0 trial is anticipated in the settlement-only context, the case management issues inherent in the ascertainable class determination need not be confronted, and the court’s review is more lenient in this respect. (Id. at pp. 93-94.) But considerations designed t0 protect absentees by blocking unwarranted 0r overbroad class definitions require heightened scrutiny in the settlement-only class context, since the court will lack the usual opportunity t0 adjust the class as proceedings unfold. (Id. at p. 94.) B. Ascertainable Class A class is ascertainable “when it is defined in terms 0f objective characteristics and common transactional facts that make the ultimate identification 0f class members possible when KOOONONUl-hwwu-t NNNNNNNNNHHHHHHHHHH OONONM-PWNHOKOOONONm-PWNHO that identification becomes necessary.” (Noel v. Thrifty Payless, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 955, 980 (Noel).) A class definition satisfying these requirements puts members 0f the class 0n notice that their rights may be adjudicated in the proceeding, so they must decide whether t0 intervene, opt out, 0r d0 nothing and live with the consequences. This kind 0f class definition also advances due process by supplying a concrete basis for determining who will and will not be bound by (0r benefit from) any judgment. (Noel, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 980, citation omitted.) “As a rule, a representative plaintiff in a class action need not introduce evidence establishing how notice 0f the action will be communicated t0 individual class members in order t0 show an ascertainable class.” (Noel, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 984.) Still, it has long been held that “[c]lass members are ‘ascertainable’ where they may be readily identified by reference t0 official records.” (Rose v. City ofHayward (1981) 126 Cal. App. 3d 926, 932, disapproved 0f 0n another ground by Noel, supra, 7 Cal.5th 955; see also Cohen v. DIRECTV, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 966, 975-976 [“The defined class 0f all HD Package subscribers is precise, with objective characteristics and transactional parameters, and can be determined by DIRECTV’S own account records. N0 more is needed.”].) Here, the estimated 97 class members are readily identifiable based 0n Defendant’s records, and the settlement class and AWS Subclass are appropriately defined based 0n objective characteristics. The Court finds that the settlement class is numerous, ascertainable, and appropriately defined. C. Community 0f Interest The "community-of-interest” requirement encompasses three factors: (1) predominant questions 0f law 0r fact, (2) class representatives with claims 0r defenses typical 0f the class, and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class. (Sav-On Drug Stores, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 326, 332.) For the first community 0f interest factor, “[i]n order t0 determine whether common questions 0f fact predominate the trial court must examine the issues framed by the pleadings KOOONONUl-hwwu-t NNNNNNNNNHHHHHHHHHH OONONM-PWNHOKOOONONm-PWNHO and the law applicable t0 the causes 0f action alleged.” (Hicks v. Kaufman & Broad Home Corp. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 908, 916 (Hicks).) The court must also examine evidence 0f any conflict 0f interest among the proposed class members. (See J.P. Morgan & Ca, Inc. v. Superior Court (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 195, 215.) The ultimate question is whether the issues which may be jointly tried, when compared with those requiring separate adjudication, are so numerous 0r substantial that the maintenance 0f a class action would be good for the judicial process and t0 the litigants. (Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Superior Court (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1096, 1104-1 105 (Lockheed Martin).) “As a general rule if the defendant’s liability can be determined by facts common t0 all members 0f the class, a class will be certified even if the members must individually prove their damages.” (Hicks, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 916.) Here, common legal and factual issues predominate. Plaintiffs’ claims all arise from Defendant’s wage and hour practices applied t0 the similarly-situated class members. As t0 the second factor, The typicality requirement is meant t0 ensure that the class representative is able t0 adequately represent the class and focus 0n common issues. It is only when a defense unique t0 the class representative will be a major focus 0f the litigation, 0r when the class representative’s interests are antagonistic t0 0r in conflict with the objectives 0f those she purports t0 represent that denial 0f class certification is appropriate. But even then, the court should determine if it would be feasible t0 divide the class into subclasses t0 eliminate the conflict and allow the class action t0 be maintained. (Medrazo v. Honda OfNorth Hollywood (2008) 166 Cal. App. 4th 89, 99, internal Citations, brackets, and quotation marks omitted.) Like other members 0f the class, Plaintiffs were employed by Defendant as non-exempt employees and allege that they experienced the Violations at issue. The anticipated defenses are not unique t0 Plaintiffs, and there is n0 indication that Plaintiffs’ interests are otherwise in conflict with those 0f the class. 10 KOOONONUl-hwwu-t NNNNNNNNNHHHHHHHHHH OONONM-PWNHOKOOONONm-PWNHO Finally, adequacy 0f representation “depends 0n whether the plaintiff” s attorney is qualified t0 conduct the proposed litigation and the plaintiffs interests are not antagonistic t0 the interests 0f the class.” (McGhee v. Bank ofAmerica (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 442, 450.) The class representative does not necessarily have t0 incur all 0f the damages suffered by each different class member in order t0 provide adequate representation t0 the class. (Wershba, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 238.) “Differences in individual class members’ proof 0f damages [are] not fatal t0 class certification. Only a conflict that goes t0 the very subject matter 0f the litigation will defeat a party’s claim 0f representative status.” (Ibid., internal citations and quotation marks omitted.) Plaintiffs have the same interest in maintaining this action as any class member would have. Further, they have hired experienced counsel. Plaintiffs have sufficiently demonstrated adequacy 0f representation. D. Substantial Benefits 0f Class Certification “[A] class action should not be certified unless substantial benefits accrue both t0 litigants and the courts. . . .” (Basurco v. let Century Ins. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 110, 120, internal quotation marks omitted.) The question is whether a class action would be superior t0 individual lawsuits. (Ibid) “Thus, even if questions 0f law 0r fact predominate, the lack 0f superiority provides an alternative ground t0 deny class certification.” (Ibid) Generally, “a class action is proper where it provides small claimants with a method 0f obtaining redress and when numerous parties suffer injury 0f insufficient size t0 warrant individual action.” (Id. at pp. 120-1 2 1 , internal quotation marks omitted.) Here, there are an estimated 97 class members. It would be inefficient for the Court t0 hear and decide the same issues separately and repeatedly for each class member. Further, it would be cost prohibitive for each class member t0 file suit individually, as each member would have the potential for little t0 n0 monetary recovery. It is clear that a class action provides substantial benefits t0 both the litigants and the Court in this case. 11 KOOONONUl-hwwu-t NNNNNNNNNHHHHHHHHHH OONONM-PWNHOKOOONONm-PWNHO VII. NOTICE The content 0f a class notice is subject t0 court approval. (Cal. Rules 0f Court, rule 3.769(f).) “The notice must contain an explanation 0f the proposed settlement and procedures for class members t0 follow in filing written objections t0 it and in arranging t0 appear at the settlement hearing and state any objections t0 the proposed settlement.” (Ibid) In determining the manner 0f the notice, the court must consider: “(1) The interests 0f the class; (2) The type 0f relief requested; (3) The stake 0f the individual class members; (4) The cost 0f notifying class members; (5) The resources 0f the parties; (6) The possible prejudice t0 class members who d0 not receive notice; and (7) The res judicata effect 0n class members.” (Cal. Rules 0f Court, rule 3.766(6).) Here, the notice describes the lawsuit, explains the settlement, and instructs class members that they may opt out 0f the settlement 0r obj ect. The gross settlement amount and estimated deductions are provided. Class members are informed 0f their qualifying workweeks as reflected in Defendant’s records and whether they are a member 0f the AWS Subclass, and are instructed how t0 dispute this information. Class members are given 45 days t0 request exclusion from the class 0r submit a written objection t0 the settlement. The notice informs class members that they may appear at the final fairness hearing t0 make an oral objection without filing a written objection. The form 0f notice is generally adequate, but it must be updated t0 reflect the correct amount 0f administrative fees that will be requested, and the updated net settlement amount. The notice must also be modified so that class members’ estimated payments and workweek information is displayed in bold within a box set off from the rest 0f the text 0n the first page 0f the notice. And it must instruct class members that they may request t0 be excluded from the class by simply providing their name, without the need t0 provide their Social Security Number 0r other identifying information. Regarding appearances at the final fairness hearing, the notice shall be further modified t0 instruct class members as follows: 12 KOOONONUl-hwwu-t NNNNNNNNNHHHHHHHHHH OONONM-PWNHOKOOONONm-PWNHO Hearings before the judge overseeing this case are again being conducted in person. However, remote appearances are still permitted, and are offered with the assistance 0f a third-party service provider, CourtCall. If that remains the case at the time of the final fairness hearing, class members who wish t0 appear at the final fairness hearing remotely should contact class counsel t0 arrange an appearance through CourtCall, at least three days before the hearing if possible. Any CourtCall fees for an appearance by an objecting class member shall be paid by class counsel. Turning t0 the notice procedure, the parties have selected Phoenix Settlement Administrator as the settlement administrator. The administrator will mail the notice packet within 15 business days 0f preliminary approval, after updating class members’ addresses using the National Change 0f Address database. The administrator will skip-trace and re-mail all returned, undelivered mail within 5 days. Class members who receive a re-mailed notice will have at least 15 days from re-mailing t0 respond. These notice procedures are appropriate and are approved. VIII. CONCLUSION Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary approval is GRANTED. The final approval hearing shall take place 0n June 23, 2022 at 1:30 pm. in Dept. 1. The following class is preliminarily certified for settlement purposes: A11 current and former non-exempt employees who are 0r were employed by Defendant in California at any time from August 17, 2016, through November 12, 2021. The Court also preliminarily certifies the “AWS Subclass” 0f class members who “worked a 4 days, 10-hours 0r a 3 days, 12-hours alternative workweek schedule, except for those non-exempt employees who worked a 3 days, 12-hours alternative workweek schedule and who were paid daily overtime for all hours over eight (8) in a day.” 13 KOOONONUl-hwwu-t NNNNNNNNNHHHHHHHHHH OONONM-PWNHOKOOONONm-PWNHO Before final approval, Plaintiffs shall lodge any individual settlement agreements they may have executed with Defendant in connection with their employment for the Court’s review. Date: IT IS SO ORDERED. The Honorable Sunil R. Kulkarni Judge 0f the Superior Court 14 March 14, 2022
