Order Submitted MatterCal. Super. - 6th Dist.April 5, 2021KOOONONUl-hwwu-t NNNNNNNNNHHHHHHHHHH OONONM-PWNHOKOOONONm-PWNHO SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA DEANGELO DANIELS, individually, and 0n Case N0. 2 1CV379 1 47 behalf 0f other members 0f the general public similarly situated, ORDER RE: MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION, STRIKE CLASS Plaintiff, ALLEGATIONS, AND STAY PROCEEDINGS VS. GARUDA LABS, INC. dba INSTAWORK, a unknown business entity; and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, Defendants. The above-entitled matter came 0n for hearing 0n Wednesday, October 27, 2021, at 1:30 pm. in Department 3, the Honorable Patricia M. Lucas presiding. Having reviewed and considered the written submissions filed by the parties, and having listened carefully t0 arguments 0f counsel, the court rules as follows: I. INTRODUCTION This is a putative class action arising out various alleged wage and hour Violations. Plaintiff Deangelo Daniels (“Plaintiff”) alleges that defendant Garuda Labs, Inc. dba Instawork (“Defendant”) hired him and other putative class members and misclassified them as independent contractors in Violation 0f California law; failed t0 compensate them for all hours 1 ORDER RE: MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION, STRIKE CLASS ALLEGATIONS, AND STAY PROCEEDINGS Electronically Filed by Superior Court of CA, County of Santa Clara, on 10/29/2021 9:47 AM Reviewed By: R. Walker Case #21CV379147 Envelope: 7564515 KOOONONUl-hwwu-t NNNNNNNNNHHHHHHHHHH OONONM-PWNHOKOOONONm-PWNHO worked and for missed meal periods and/or rest breaks; failed t0 keep complete and accurate payroll records; and failed t0 reimburse them for all necessary business expenses and costs. (Class Action Complaint (“Complaint”), W 13, 18-19, 27, 29, 38, 46, & 48.) The Complaint, filed on April 5, 2021, sets forth the following causes 0f action: (1) Violation 0f California Labor Code §§ 510 and 1198 (Unpaid Overtime); (2) Violation 0f California Labor Code §§ 226.7 and 5 12(a) (Unpaid Meal Period Premiums); (3) Violation 0f California Labor Code § 226.7 (Unpaid Rest Period Premiums); (4) Violation of California Labor Code §§ 1194, 1197, and 1197.1 (Unpaid Minimum Wages); (5) Violation 0f California Labor Code §§ 201 and 202 (Final Wages Not Timely Paid); (6) Violation 0f California Labor Code § 204 (Wages Not Timely Paid During Employment); (7) Violation of California Labor Code § 226(a) (Non-Compliant Wage Statements); (8) Violation 0f California Labor Code § 1174(d) (Failure t0 Keep Requisite Payroll Records); (9) Violation 0f California Labor Code §§ 2800 and 2802 (Unreimbursed Business Expenses); and (10) Violation California Business & Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq. Defendant now moves for an order: (1) compelling Plaintiff t0 arbitrate his claims against Defendant individually; (2) striking the class claims from the Complaint; and (3) staying further proceedings in this court pending the outcome 0f this motion and arbitration. Plaintiff opposes the motion. II. OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE Plaintiff submits several objections t0 evidence in connection with his opposition papers. Plaintiff obj ects t0 the declaration 0fAdam Stepinski in its entirety as lacking foundation, lacking personal knowledge, and conclusory. Plaintiff also object t0 paragraphs 5-7, 9, and 11- 12 as lacking foundation, improper opinion, speculation, Violating the secondary evidence rule, and conclusory. Plaintiff further obj ects t0 paragraph 12 as misleading and prejudicial. In addition, Plaintiff objects t0 Exhibits A-D t0 Mr. Stepinski’s declaration as lacking foundation, hearsay, conclusory, and incomplete. Plaintiff further obj ects t0 Exhibit D as irrelevant, misleading, and prejudicial. The evidentiary objections are OVERRULED. 2 ORDER RE: MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION, STRIKE CLASS ALLEGATIONS, AND STAY PROCEEDINGS KOOONONUl-hwwu-t NNNNNNNNNHHHHHHHHHH OONONM-PWNHOKOOONONm-PWNHO III. GOVERNING LAW Defendant contends, and Plaintiff does not dispute, that the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) applies here. “The FAA, which includes both procedural and substantive provisions, governs agreements involving interstate commerce.” (Avila v. Southern California Specially Care, Inc. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 835, 840.) However, “[t]he procedural aspects 0f the FAA d0 not apply in state court absent an express provision in the arbitration agreement.” (Ibid.; Cronus Investments, Inc. v. Concierge Services (2005) 35 Cal.4th 376, 394 [“Our opinion does not preclude parties t0 an arbitration agreement t0 expressly designate that any arbitration proceeding should move forward under the FAA’S procedural provisions rather than under state procedural law.”] .) Here, it is undisputed that the parties’ contract involves interstate commerce. Moreover, the parties expressly agreed the FAA’S procedures would apply t0 the arbitration provision. As is relevant here, Section 11.2 0f the parties’ agreement provides: Arbitration Governed by the FAA. Instawork and You expressly agree that this Mutual Arbitration Provision is a licensing agreement governed by the [FAA], evidences a transaction involving commerce, and is not a contract 0f employment involving any class 0f workers engaged in foreign 0r interstate commerce within the meaning of Section 1 0f the FAA. Instawork and You expressly agree that the FAA shall exclusively govern the interpretation and enforcement 0f this Mutual Arbitration Provision, and that the FAA shall apply t0 any and all disputes between the Parties, including by not limited t0 those arising out 0f 0r relating t0 this Agreement (Declaration 0fAdam Stepinski in Support 0f Defendant Garuda Labs, Inc. dba Instawork’s Motion t0 Compel Arbitration, Strike Class Allegations, and Stay Proceedings (“Stepinski Dec.”), 1] 7 & EX. C, 1] 11.2.) The parties’ agreement, therefore, requires the issue 0f enforcement t0 be governed by the FAA, which would include the FAA’S procedural provisions, rather than the state’s procedural law. (See Mount Diablo Medical Center v. Health Net 0f 3 ORDER RE: MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION, STRIKE CLASS ALLEGATIONS, AND STAY PROCEEDINGS KOOONONUl-hwwu-t NNNNNNNNNHHHHHHHHHH OONONM-PWNHOKOOONONm-PWNHO California, Inc. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 71 1, 722-724 [Which jurisdiction’s arbitration rules will apply depends 0n whether contract refers t0 “enforcement” under a particular jurisdiction’s rules]; see also Rodriguez v. American Technologies, Inc. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1121- 1122 (Rodriguez) [agreement required arbitration “pursuant t0” the FAA, which court 0f appeal interpreted t0 mean arbitration in “in conformance t0” and “agreement with” the FAA, and thus the parties “adopted the FAA-all 0f it-to govern their arbitration” and the arbitration proceeding should move forward under the FAA’S procedural provisions rather than under state procedural law] .) Consequently, the procedures 0f the FAA, rather than the procedures found in the California Arbitration Act, apply t0 the parties’ arbitration provision including enforceability 0f the arbitration provision. IV. LEGAL STANDARD A party seeking t0 compel arbitration under the FAA has the burden 0f showing “(1) the existence 0f a valid, written agreement t0 arbitrate; and, if it exists, (2) that the agreement t0 arbitrate encompasses the dispute at issue.” (Ashbey v. Archstone Prop. Mgmt., Inc. (9th Cir. 2015) 785 F.3d 1320, 1323 (internal quotation marks omitted). As t0 validity, Section 2 0f the FAA provides that arbitration agreements “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds that exist at law 0r in equity for the revocation 0f any contract.” (9 U.S.C. § 2.) Thus, when deciding whether a certain contract governed by the FAA is enforceable, courts apply ordinary state contract law principles. (See First Options 0fChi., Inc. v. Kaplan (1995) 514 U.S. 938, 944.) “[A]lthough ‘courts may not invalidate arbitration agreements under state laws applicable only t0 arbitration provisions,’ general contract defenses such as fraud, duress, 0r unconscionability, grounded in state contract law, may operate t0 invalidate arbitration agreements.” (Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams (201) 532 U.S. 105, 892.) V. DISCUSSION A. Existence 0f Agreement t0 Arbitrate Preliminarily, the court considers whether an agreement t0 arbitrate exists t0 bind Plaintiff. (See Fedor v. United Healthcare, Inc. (10th Cir. 2020) 976 F.3d 1100, 1104 [“[A] 4 ORDER RE: MOTION T0 COMPEL ARBITRATION, STRIKE CLASS ALLEGATIONS, AND STAY PROCEEDINGS KOOONONUl-hwwu-t NNNNNNNNNHHHHHHHHHH OONONM-PWNHOKOOONONm-PWNHO delegation clause cannot be severed from an agreement that does not exist. Courts must therefore first determine whether an arbitration agreement was indeed formed before enforcing a delegation clause therein.”]; see also Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson (2010) 561 U.S. 63,67 & 69.) Here, Defendant seeks t0 compel arbitration based 0n a Contractor Services Agreement, which it claims Plaintiff electronically signed 0n April 2, 2021. (Memorandum 0f Points and Authorities in Support 0f Defendant Garuda Labs, Inc. dba Instawork’s Motion t0 Compel Arbitration, Strike Class Allegations, and Stay Proceedings, p. 5, fn. 2; Stepinski Dec.,W 1-12 & Exs. A-D.) T0 establish the existence 0f the parties’ agreement t0 arbitration, Defendant submits the declaration 0f Mr. Stepinski, Defendant’s Director of Engineering. (Stepinski Dec., 1] 1.) Mr. Stepinski declares that he has personal knowledge 0f the matters contained in his declaration and/or have knowledge based 0n his personal review 0f business records kept in the course 0f regularly conducted business activity and were made as part 0f regular practice 0f that activity, at 0r near the time 0f the event by someone with knowledge. (Id. at 1] 2.) He states that Defendant is a technology company that develops software applications connecting businesses with professional contractors, referred t0 as “pros,” for short-term work called “gigs” 0r longer-term jobs. (Id. at 1] 3.) Pros can use Defendant’s app t0 access gigs and other opportunities. (Ibid.) Mr. Stepinski explains that t0 book a gig, a pro downloads the app and then creates a new account. (Stepinski Dec., 1] 4.) T0 d0 so, the pro provides a first and last name, telephone number, and email address. (Ibid) Once the pro creates a unique account, the pro must follow the onboarding process and complete all required documentation t0 claim a gig 0r other opportunity. (Id. at 1] 5.) Once that process is complete, the pro can book a first “gig.” (Ibid) T0 d0 so, the pro taps the “[b]00k your first gig” button. (Ibid) When the pro taps t0 book “gig,” the pro is prompted t0 tap t0 review the Contractor Services Agreement (“CSA”). (Ibid) T0 proceed, the pro must tap “Review Agreement.” (Ibid) The pro must then scroll down t0 review and read the entire CSA. (Ibid) At the end 0f the CSA, the pro must then tap “I accept” 5 ORDER RE: MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION, STRIKE CLASS ALLEGATIONS, AND STAY PROCEEDINGS KOOONONUl-hwwu-t NNNNNNNNNHHHHHHHHHH OONONM-PWNHOKOOONONm-PWNHO t0 agree t0 its terms t0 proceed. The pro cannot claim a gig 0r other opportunity without reviewing and accepting the CSA. (Id. atW 5 & 7.) Mr. Stepinski explains that, in the course and scope 0f his employment, he has access t0 company business records reflecting a pro’s use 0f the app, creation 0f an account, completion 0f the various steps required t0 claim a gig, and the gigs accepted and completed--all 0f which are kept electronically 0n a secure server and require the pro t0 provide the unique password t0 obtain. (Stepinski Dec., 1] 7.) In this capacity, he was able t0 access Plaintiff’s records kept 0n Defendant’s server. (Id. at 1] 8.) Based 0n his review 0f these records, Mr. Stepinski states that Plaintiff negotiated his first work opportunity as a pro 0n November 9, 2020. (Id. at 1] 9.) Before accepting that opportunity, Plaintiff had t0 enter into the CSA by the method as described above. (Ibid) Mr. Stepinski declares that Plaintiff tapped “I accept” t0 the terms 0f the CSA 0n November 9, 2020. (Id. at 1] 9 & EXS. B & D.) In addition, 0n April 2, 2021, Plaintiff again negotiated a work opportunity as a pro. (Id. at 1] 11.) Before accepting that opportunity, Plaintiff had t0 enter into an updated CSA by the method described above. (Ibid) Mr. Stepinski declares that Plaintiff tapped “I accept” t0 the terms 0f the CSA 0n April 2, 2021. (Ibid) Mr. Stepinski also provides a copy 0f the electronic record 0f the date and time that Plaintiff tapped “I accept” t0 the terms 0f the CSA. (Id. at 1] 12 & EX. D.) C“As is relevant here, courts have distinguished between two flavors’ ” 0f Internet “C“ contracts: clickwrap” (0r “click-through”) agreements, in which website users are required t0 click 0n an “I agree” box after being presented with a list 0f terms and conditions 0f use; and “browsewrap” agreements, where a website’s terms and conditions 0f use are generally posted 0n the website Via a hyperlink at the bottom 0f the screen.’ [Citation.]” (Long v. Provide Commerce, Inc. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 855, 862.) Because the setup process in Defendant’s app required Plaintiff t0 specifically agree t0 the CSA by clicking “I accept,” the CSA is a clickwrap agreement. (See Lee v. Ticketmaster L.L.C. (9th Cir. 2020) 817 F.App’x 393, 394 (Lee) [California courts have construed pure-form clickwrap agreements as “requir[ing] users t0 click a separate box indicating that they agree t0” the terms at issue].) Clickwrap agreements are generally enforceable. (See Disney Enters. v. 6 ORDER RE: MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION, STRIKE CLASS ALLEGATIONS, AND STAY PROCEEDINGS KOOONONUl-hwwu-t NNNNNNNNNHHHHHHHHHH OONONM-PWNHOKOOONONm-PWNHO Redbox Automated Retail, LLC (CD. Cal. 2018) 336 F. Supp. 3d 1146, 1153; In re Facebook Biometric Info. Privacy Litig. (N.D. Cal. 2016) 185 F. Supp. 3d 1155, 1165.) Thus, Defendant has presented evidence demonstrating that Plaintiff accepted the terms 0f the CSA. (See CiV. Code, § 1633.7, subd. (a) [“A signature may not be denied legal effect 0r enforceability solely because it is in electronic f0rm.”].) In opposition, Plaintiff contends that there is a critical gap in the evidence supporting Defendant’s motion because Defendant has not adequately authenticated Plaintiff” s purported electronic signature. Plaintiff asserts that under Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Group, Inc. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836 (Ruiz), Defendant was required t0 present “direct evidence” (Plaintiffs Opposition, at p. 4: 10) that Plaintiff submitted his signature electronically, show that the electronic signature could only have been placed 0n the document by him, and explain how one could conclude that the electronic signature was attributable t0 him. However, Ruiz does not, as Plaintiff claims, require “direct evidence” (as distinct from circumstantial evidence)-the word “direct” does not appear in the decision. As a practical matter, direct evidence 0f signing would almost always be impossible t0 provide. Moreover, Ruiz is distinguishable from this case. In Ruiz, the defendant provided a declaration from its business manager, who summarily asserted that the plaintiffwas the person who electronically signed the subject agreement, but she did not explain how she arrived at that conclusion 0r inferred that the plaintiffwas the person who electronically signed the agreement. (Ruiz, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 843.) In opposition t0 the motion, the plaintiff specifically averted that he did not recall electronically signing the subj ect agreement, and that if he had been presented with an agreement that limited his ability t0 sue the defendant, he would not have signed it. (Id. at pp. 840 & 844.) The court in Ruiz opined that, “[1711 theface 0f[the plaintfi’sjfailure t0 recall electronically signing the agreement, the fact the agreement had an electronic signature 0n it in the name 0f [the plaintiff], and a date and time stamp for the signature, was insufficient t0 support a finding that the electronic signature was, in fact, ‘the act 0f” [the plaintiff].” (Ruiz, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 844, italics added.) The court explained that “[t]h0ugh [the 7 ORDER RE: MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION, STRIKE CLASS ALLEGATIONS, AND STAY PROCEEDINGS KOOONONUl-hwwu-t NNNNNNNNNHHHHHHHHHH OONONM-PWNHOKOOONONm-PWNHO plaintiff] did not deny that the electronic signature 0n the agreement was his, he claimed he did not recall signing the ... agreement and would not have signed it had it been presented t0 him.” (Id. at p. 846.) The court held that “[i]n the face 0f [the plaintiff” s] failure to recall signing the agreement, [the defendant] had the burden 0f proving by a preponderance 0f the evidence that the electronic signature was authentic (EVid. Code, § 1401), that is, it was what [the defendant] claimed it was: ‘the act 0f” [the plaintiff] (CiV. Code, § 1633.9, subd. (a)).” (Ibid) Here, Plaintiff does not declare that he does not recall signing the CSA 0r that he would not have signed such a document. Instead, Plaintiff avers that he used his mobile phone 0n November 9, 2020, t0 create an account for himself 0n Defendant’s app. (Declaration 0f Deangelo Daniels in Support 0f Plaintiffs Opposition t0 Defendant Garuda Labs, Inc. dba Instawork’s Motion t0 Compel Arbitration, Strike Class Allegations, and Stay Proceedings, 1] 3.). He further declares that as part 0f this process he was required t0 scroll through a pop-up screen. (Ibid) Similarly, Plaintiff declares that he was again required t0 scroll through a pop-up screen when he attempted t0 post his availability for work in the app 0n April 2, 2021. (Id. at 1] 5.) Thus, Plaintiff” s declaration actually corroborates the statements in Mr. Stepinski’s declaration regarding Plaintiff’s creation 0f an account 0n the app and Plaintiff” s acceptance 0f the terms 0f the CSA. Finally, the operative CSA accepted by Plaintiff contains the following arbitration provision: Arbitration 0f Disputes. The Parties mutually agree t0 resolve any and all disputes between them 0r between You and Instawork 0r any 0f Instawork’s parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, successors, assigns, officers, directors, employees, and/or agents exclusively through final, binding, and individual arbitration instead 0f filing lawsuit in court (except as otherwise provided below). However, this Mutual Arbitration Provision does not cover disputes that, as matter 0f law, may not be subj ect t0 arbitration agreements. 8 ORDER RE: MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION, STRIKE CLASS ALLEGATIONS, AND STAY PROCEEDINGS KOOONONUl-hwwu-t NNNNNNNNNHHHHHHHHHH OONONM-PWNHOKOOONONm-PWNHO (Stepinski Dec., EX. C., 1] 11.1.) Based 0n the foregoing, the court concludes that an agreement t0 arbitrate exists between the parties. B. Delegation 0f Arbitrability Questions Next, Defendants contend that an arbitrator, rather than the court, should resolve arbitrability questions because the parties have clearly and unmistakably delegated gateway questions 0f arbitrability, including the validity and scope 0f the agreement itself, t0 an arbitrator. “ ‘ [C]0urts presume that the parties intend courts, not arbitrators, t0 decide disputes about “arbitrability,” such as “whether the parties are bound by a given arbitration clause,” 0r “whether an arbitration clause in a concededly binding contract applies t0 a particular type 0f ,9, controversy. [Citation] However, ‘parties can agree t0 arbitrate “gateway” questions 0f “arbitrability,” such as whether the parties have agreed t0 arbitrate 0r whether their agreement covers a particular controversy.’ [Citation.]”. (Aanderud v. Superior Court (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 880, 891 [221 Cal.Rptr.3d 225].) “Under California law, it is presumed the judge will decide arbitrability, unless there is clear and unmistakable evidence the parties intended the arbitrator t0 decide arbitrability. [Citation.]” (Dennison v. Rosland Capital LLC (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 204, 209.) In making a determination regarding whether the question 0f arbitrability should be decided by an arbitrator, the Court “must examine the parties’ agreements t0 determine what they say concerning the ‘who decides’ question.” (Sandquz'st v. Lebo Automotive, Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 233, 243 (Sandquist).) The arbitration clause here provides in pertinent part that: Delegation. Only an arbitrator, and not any federal, state, 0r local court 0r agency, shall have the exclusive authority t0 resolve any dispute relating t0 the interpretation, applicability, enforceability, 0r formation 0f this Mutual Arbitration Provision, including without limitation any dispute concerning arbitrability. (Stepinski Dec., EX. C, 1] 11.3.) Thus, the parties expressly and clearly evidenced their intention t0 accord the arbitrator the authority t0 determine issues 0f arbitrability. 9 ORDER RE: MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION, STRIKE CLASS ALLEGATIONS, AND STAY PROCEEDINGS KOOONONUl-hwwu-t NNNNNNNNNHHHHHHHHHH OONONM-PWNHOKOOONONm-PWNHO In a footnote in his opposition papers, Plaintiff suggests that the delegation clause does not apply because it also states that [T]he preceding clause shall not apply t0 any dispute relating t0 0r arising out 0f the Class Action Waiver and/or Representative PAGA Action Waiver (as defined below)-including, but not limited t0, any claim that all 0r part 0f the Class Action Waiver and/or Representative PAGA Action Waiver is unenforceable, unconscionable, illegal, void, 0r voidable, 0r that breach 0f either such Waiver has occurred, including all disputes relating t0 0r arising out 0f the payment 0f arbitration fees, and/or disputes relating t0 whether either party has satisfied the condition precedent 0f engaging in the pre-arbitration informal telephonic dispute resolution conference-which must proceed in court 0f competent jurisdiction and cannot be heard 0r arbitrated by an arbitrator. (Stepinski Dec., EX. C, 1] 11.3.) The fact that the delegation clause carves out issues 0f enforceability regarding the Class Action Waiver and PAGA Action Waiver does not somehow render the clause ambiguous 0r unenforceable. (See Mohamed v. Uber Techs, Inc. (9th Cir. 2016) 848 F.3d 1201, 1208, 1209 [enforcing a delegation clause that reserve the issue 0f enforceability 0f a class and representative action waiver t0 the court].) C. Class Action Waiver Defendant also correctly urges that the CSA provides for a waiver 0f class claims. (Stepinski Dec., EX C, 1] 11.6.) Multiple courts 0f appeal have held that arbitration provisions with language analogous t0 the operative language here d0 not permit class arbitration, and a trial court should dismiss such claims and compel individual arbitration upon motion by the defendant. (See Kinecta Alternative Financial Solutions, Inc. v. Superior Court (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 506, disapproved 0f 0n another ground by Sandquist, supra, 1 Cal.5th 233; Nelsen v. Legacy Partners Residential, Inc. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1115.) // // 1 0 ORDER RE: MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION, STRIKE CLASS ALLEGATIONS, AND STAY PROCEEDINGS KOOONONUl-hwwu-t NNNNNNNNNHHHHHHHHHH OONONM-PWNHOKOOONONm-PWNHO D. Discovery Plaintiff contends that if the court is not inclined t0 deny the motion, the court should order discovery with respect t0 the issue 0f unconscionability. However, such discovery would not alter the outcome 0f the motion as the issue 0f unconscionability is delegated t0 the arbitrator. Plaintiff’s request for arbitration-related discovery is DENIED. E. Conclusion For the reasons discussed above, Defendant has satisfied its burden t0 show the existence 0f an arbitration agreement between the parties and that gateway issues 0f arbitrability have been delegated t0 the arbitrator. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED. Plaintiffs claims shall be submitted t0 individual arbitration in accordance with the parties’ agreement, and are stayed pending completion 0f arbitration. The putative class claims are dismissed. Dated: October 28, 2021 Patricia M. Lucas Judge 0f the Superior Court 1 1 ORDER RE: MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION, STRIKE CLASS ALLEGATIONS, AND STAY PROCEEDINGS