Memorandum Points and Authorities

Cal. Super. - 6th Dist.March 2, 2021

21 CV378991 Santa Clara - Civil D Harris Clifford R. Homer, Esq., State Bar No. 154353 1 Paymon Hifai, Esq., State Bar N0. 306133 Electronicany Filed 2 HORNER LAW GROUP, P.C. by Superior Court of CA, 800 S, Broadway, Sulte 200 count of Santa ClaraWalnut Creek, California 94596 y _ ’ 3 Telephone: (925) 943-6570 0" 8/13/2021 4-24 PM_ Facsimile: (925) 943-6888 REVIGWGd By: D Harrls 4 Case #21 CV378991 5 Attorneys for Plaintiff Frederick Hart, Jr. Envelope: 7091 044 6 7 8 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 9 COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA 10 UNLIMITED JURISDICTION 11 FREDERICK HART, JR, an individual No. 21CV378991 12 Plaintiff, FREDERICK HART, JR.’S 13 vs. MEMORANDUM 0F POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 1N SUPPORT 0F HIS 14 MICHAEL HART, an individual, FRANCES MOTION FOR ENTRY 0F DEFAULT 0F 1 5 HART, an individual, TRACY HART- DEFENDANTS AND FOR COURT DEGREGORIO, an individual, GAIL A. gfiggfigfigNchlgEUNSEL 16 HART, an individual, and DOES 1-50 Date: 17 Defendants. Time: Department: 1 8 19 20 PlaintiffFREDERICK HART, JR. (“Plaintiff”) alleges: 21 I. INTRODUCTION 22 Defendants Michael Hart, Frances Hart, Tracy Hart-Degregorio, and Gail Hart’s 23 (collectively the “Harts”) last day t0 file a response t0 Plaintiff” s Complaint in this Action was June 24 14, 2021. The Harts failed t0 file a responsive pleading t0 the Complaint by June 14, 2021. 25 On June 8th, six days before the responsive pleading deadline, Plaintiff’s counsel warned 26 the Harts’ counsel that the Harts needed to file their response by June 14th. Plaintiff’s counsel 27 again warned the Harts’ counsel on June 16th that since n0 responsive pleading had been filed 28 within the last two days, that if a responsive pleading wasn’t filed that day, then Plaintiff s would ggmlgaigxzzggl‘ovfil’c FREDERICK HART, JRRS MOTION FOR ENTRY 0F DEFAULT 0F DEFENDANTS AND FOR COURT W”““‘Cr“"’M““ ORDER STRIKING THE DECLARATION 0F COUNSEL 1 request the Court’s entry 0f their default as Plaintiff is required t0 do under CRC 3.1 10, Which 2 provides, “If a responsive pleading is not served within the time limits specified in this rule and no 3 extension 0f time has been granted, the plaintiffM file a request for entry of default Within 10 4 days after the time for service has elapsed. The court may issue an order to show cause Why 5 sanctions should not be imposed if the plaintiff fails to timely file the request for the entry of 6 default.” (Emphasis Added). CRC 3 .1 10 makes it a compulsory requirement that a Plaintiffrequest 7 a defaulting Defendant’s entry of default or face sanctions. 8 Despite Plaintiff’s multiple warnings and reminders to the Harts’ attorney to file a 9 responsive pleading, he never responded t0 Plaintiff’s counsel - even after being warned after his 10 response was already two days’ late. 11 Instead, the Harts’ counsel filed a sham declaration purporting to seek relief under C.C.P. 12 § 430.41(a)(2) which provides for an extension to respond to a Complaint i_f, “the parties are n_0t 13 m t0 meet and confer at least five days prior t0 the date the responsive pleading is due, ...”, 14 subject t0 the moving party, “filing and serving, 0n 0r before the date 0n which a demurrer would 15 be due, a declaration stating under penalty ofperjury that a 200d faith attempt t0 meet and confer 16 was made and explaining the reasons whv the parties could not meet and confer.” (Emphasis 17 Added). 18 Here, the Harts are not afforded fly relief under C.C.P. § 430.41(a)(2) because the Harts’ 19 counsel did not timely “make a good-faith attempt to meet and confer” and couldn’t meet and 20 confer at least five days before June 14th. As such, the Harts’ response t0 the Complaint was due 21 by June 14th. While Plaintiff requested that the Court enter the Harts’ default, that Request was 22 denied by the Clerk of the Court because 0f the Harts’ counsel’s filed sham Declaration for an 23 Extension under C.C.P. § 430.41(a)(2). The Harts’ default should be entered. 24 The Harts’ counsel’s declaration confirms that he does not and cannot satisfy the 25 requirements to obtain an extension under C.C.P. S 430.41(a)(2). The Hart’s counsel, in his 26 declaration, talks out 0f both sides 0f his mouth - but in any instance, he is not afforded any 27 extension under the controlling statute. Nor did he request such an extension. On the one hand 28 the Harts’ Counsel declares that he met and conferred after being served With the Complaint - i.e., -2- EORNERLAWGROUPPC FREDERICK HART, JRRS MOTION FOR ENTRY 0F DEFAULT 0F DEFENDANTS AND FOR COURT ’ ORDER STRIKING THE DECLARATION 0F COUNSEL 1 satisfying the meet and confer requirements which obligate a response to be filed by June 14th - 2 and on the other hand, he fails t0 declare: 1) whether any good faith attempt to meet and confer 3 was made, and 2) explaining the reasons Why the parties could not meet and confer. The reason 4 that Counsel is unable provide this required declaration is that it is not true that that the Parties 5 “couldn’t meet and confer.” Because, as counsel admits, he did infact meet and confer but simply 6 wanted t0 “further in-depth meet and confer.” In any event, either the Parties met and 7 conferred, and the Harts should have filed a response 0n or before June 14th (Which is the actual 8 factual case by Counsel’s own admission) - 0r the Harts’ counsel never called and thereby “never 9 made a good faith attempt” t0 meet and confer, and as such is not afforded protections under C.C.P. 10 § 430.41(a)(2). In either event, the Harts are not afforded protections under C.C.P. § 430.41(a)(2). 11 As such, this Court should enter the defaults of the Harts. 12 II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 13 A. The Harts Failed t0 File a Responsive BV June 14, 2021 14 The Harts admit that their response to the Complaint was due on June 14, 2021 and that n0 15 response was filed by that date. See Declaration 0f Paymon Hifai (“Hifai Decl.,”) In Support 0f 16 Motion to Strike, EX. C. at p. 2: 8 - 9. “Plaintiffs’ counsel granted extensions t0 respond t0 the 17 Verified Complaint through today, Monday June 14, 2021.” 18 On June 8th, six days before the responsive pleading deadline, Plaintiff’s counsel warned 19 the Harts’ counsel that the Harts needed t0 file a response by June 14th. See Hifai Decl., EX. A. 20 Plaintiff’s counsel again warned the Harts’ counsel 0n June 16th that since n0 responsive pleading 21 was filed by June 14th, that if a responsive pleading wasn’t filed that day, then Plaintiff would 22 request the entry 0f the Harts’ default. Id at EX B. 23 T0 date, the Harts counsel has failed t0 substantively respond as t0 the legitimacy 0f his 24 declaration, the Harts’ failure to file a responsive pleading, and how or why the Harts would ever 25 be afforded relief under C.C.P. § 430.41(a)(2) given the contents 0f counsel’s declaration. Id. at 26 EX. G. 27 /// 28 /// -3- EORNERLAWGROUPPC FREDERICK HART, JRRS MOTION FOR ENTRY 0F DEFAULT 0F DEFENDANTS AND FOR COURT ’ ORDER STRIKING THE DECLARATION 0F COUNSEL B. The Harts’ Counsel Admits That He Met and Conferred Prior t0 June 14th But Did Not File a Responsive Pleading BV the Filing Deadline 2 The Harts’ counsel admits in tw_0 declarations signed under penalty 0f perjury that he 3 already met and conferred prior to June 14th. Tellingly, nowhere in his declaration seeking an 4 extension of time to respond does the Harts’ counsel ever declare as required under the Code 0f 5 Civil Procedure that, “the parties [were] not able to meet and confer at least five days prior to the date the responsive pleading [was] due,” 0r “stat[e] under penalty 0f perjury that a good faith 7 attempt to meet and confer was made”, “and explain [. . .] the reasons why the parties could not 8 meet and confer”. In fact, the Hart counsel’s declarations says quite the opposite - the Harts’ 9 counsel admits that he Q1 meet and confer but wanted t0 “further meet and confer” and “needed 10 more time” given his workload and the complexity of the case - none of which reasons for a 11 delayed response fall under C.C.P. § 430.41(a)(2). 12 Specifically, the Harts’ counsel admits the following in his two declarations signed under 13 penalty of perjury: 14 o “I initially contacted counsel for the plaintiff and gave him some general 15 information concerning the defects in the complaint upon which I plan t0 16 w.” (Emphasis Added) See Hifai Decl., EX. C at p. 2: 3 - 4. 17 o “At the time 0f my first offer, I explained that I believed that the Complaint 18 could not Withstand demurrer, and I gave Plaintiff’s attornev several specific 19 reasons with explanations and indicated that the defects could not be cured bv 20 amendment due t0 the nature 0f the defects. While I expected a substantive 21 response t0 my demurrer issues. . .”(Emphasis Added) See Hifai Decl., EX. D at p. 22 2; 1 - 6. 23 o “Pursuant t0 Code 0f Civil Procedure §430.41, I am required t0 provide the Plaintiff 24 with legal support for the basis of the deficiencies which I alreadv disclosed t0 the 25 Plaintiff.” Hifai Dec1., Ex. C atp. 2: 10-11. 26 o Moreover, due t0 other professional obligations and the complexitv 0f the 27 issues that Will be presented 0n demurrer, I have not had sufficient time 28 available to delineate a_ll 0f the specific legal authority for each of those -4- :“NERLAWGROUPPC FREDERICK HART, JRRS MOTION FOR ENTRY 0F DEFAULT 0F DEFENDANTS AND FOR COURT ”’ ”"1” ORDER STRIKING THE DECLARATION 0F COUNSEL 1 deficiencies that will be the basis of the demurrer. Thus, I have not yet had time 2 to prepare for the follow-up in-depth meet and confer With Plaintiffs’ counsel 3 on the proposed demurrer, as required by Code of Civil Procedure §430.4l(a)(1).” 4 Id. atp.2: 20-25. 5 There is no “follow-up in-depth meet and confer” requirement under C.C.P. § 430.41(a)(2) 6 Which warrants an extension 0f time t0 respond t0 the Complaint. In fact, if the Harts’ counsel felt 7 that Plaintiff’s counsel failed t0 “further” “follow-up” 0n his meet confer efforts, then he should 8 have filed a Demurrer 0n June 14th. C.C.P. § 430.41(a)(2) provides that if a Demurring Party 9 attempts t0 meet and confer and the other side fails t0 respond, the Demurring Party should then 10 timely file its demurrer so long the as the demurring Party declares,” That the partv Who filed the 11 pleading subiect t0 demurrer failed t0 respond t0 the meet and confer request of the 12 demurring partv or otherwise failed t0 meet and confer in 200d faith.” 13 The Harts’ counsel’s own declarations signed under penalty 0f perjury confirm that he met 14 and conferred and then didn’t file a response - Which is not a ground for an extension of time to 15 respond under C.C.P. § 430.41(a)(2). His Declaration does state that he tried and couldn’t meet 16 and confer - and as such, the Harts are still not afforded any relief under C.C.P. § 430.41(a)(2). 17 III. LEGAL ARGUMENT 18 A. The Harts Did Not File a Response t0 the Complaint By June 14th and, as such, the 19 Court Should Enter Their Defaults 20 In the usual case, a defendant has 30 days after service is complete Within Which to respond 21 to the complaint. C.C.P. § 412.20(a)(3). 22 “If the defendant has been served, other than by publication, and n0 answer, demurrer, 23 notice 0f motion to strike of the character specified in subdivision (f), notice of motion to transfer 24 pursuant t0 Section 396b, notice 0f motion t0 dismiss pursuant to Article 2 (commencing with 25 Section 583.210) 0f Chapter 1.5 0f Title 8, notice 0fmotion t0 quash service of summons 0r t0 stay 26 0r dismiss the action pursuant t0 Section 418.10 0r notice 0f the filing 0f a petition for writ 0f 27 mandate as provided in Section 41 8.10 has been filed with the clerk 0f the court Within the time 28 /// -5- :“NERLAWGROUPPC FREDERICK HART, JRRS MOTION FOR ENTRY 0F DEFAULT 0F DEFENDANTS AND FOR COURT ”’ ”"1” ORDER STRIKING THE DECLARATION 0F COUNSEL 1 specified in the summons, or Within further time as may be allowed, the clerk, upon written 2 application of the plaintiff, shall enter the default 0f the defendant.” Code CiV. Proc., § 585. 3 Plaintiff is entitled t0 entry of default 0n the date he requests it if there is then n0 responsive 4 pleading by defendant on file, and plaintiffcannot be deprived ofhis right to entry of default merely 5 because a clerk erroneously fails t0 perform his ministerial duty and does not enter it when 6 requested. Goddard v. Pollock (App. 1 Dist. 1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 137. 7 The court clerk in this case had and has no authority to determine the legal sufficiency of 8 the pleading or motion filed by the defendant. Thus, as long as it appears to be one 0f the 9 permissible responses (answer, demurrer, etc), the clerk must refuse a request by a Plaintiff to 10 enter an Defendant’s default; and any default actually entered by the clerk would be void. Stevens 11 v. Torregcmo (1961) 192 CA2d 105, 112-1 13. Entry of default judgment by clerk is ministerial act 12 which may be compelled by mandamus. W. A. Rose C0. v. Municipal Court for Oakland- 13 Piedmont Judicial Dist., Alameda County (App. 1 Dist. 1959) 176 Cal.App.2d 67. “If the 14 document filed bears a title that would preclude entry of default, although insufficient, plaintiff‘s 15 remedy is a motion t0 strike concurrently With a motion t0 enter default.” B. Entry 0f Default, Cal. 16 Prac. Guide CiV. Pro. Before Trial Ch. 5-B 17 The Clerk 0f the Court may and should be compelled by this Court however t0 enter the 18 Defaults of the Harts. The Harts failed to file a timely responsive pleading, and as such entry of 19 default by the Clerk 0f this Court is mandatory. However, because the Clerk 0f the Court cannot 20 determine the sufficiency of the sham declaration filed under C.C.P. § 430.41(a)(2), this Court may 21 and can easily determine that, as set forth herein, by the Harts’ counsel’s own admissions that he 22 is not afforded protection under C.C.P. § 430.41(a)(2). Here, the Clerk of the Court denied the 23 entry 0f default requested by Plaintiff on the basis of the defective declaration filed by the Harts’ 24 counsel. (See Hifai Dec1., Exs.E - F). As such, this Court should strike the Harts’ counsel’s 25 declaration and enter the defaults of the Harts. 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// -6- EORNERLAWGROUPPC FREDERICK HART, JRRS MOTION FOR ENTRY 0F DEFAULT 0F DEFENDANTS AND FOR COURT ’ ORDER STRIKING THE DECLARATION 0F COUNSEL A. Counsel’s Declaration Admits That He Is Not Afforded Relief Under C.C.P. § 430.41(a)(2) Because He Met and Conferred Prior t0 June 14th But Didn’t File a 2 Proper Responsive Pleading BV That Time C.C.P. § 430.41(a)(2) provides that:3 4 Ifthe parties are not able t0 meet and confer at least five days prior t0 the date the responsive pleading is due, the demurring party shall 5 be granted an automatic 30-day extension 0f time Within Which t0 file a responsive pleading, by filing and serving, 0n 0r before the date 6 on Which a demurrer would be due, a declaration stating under 7 penalty 0f perjury that a good faith attempt t0 meet and confer was made and explaining the reasons why the parties could not 8 meet and confer.” (Emphasis Added) C.C.P. § 430.41(a)(2). 9 As such, the conditions for an extension under C.C.P. § 430.41(a)(2) are the following - 10 none 0f which are at-issue here, and which are in fact contradicted by Mr. Maynard’s declaration: 11 1) an inability t0 meet and confer; 2) a declaration stating that a good faith attempt t0 meet and 1 2 confer took place but did not happen; and 3) the reasons Why the parties could not meet and confer. 1 3 First, the declaration 0f Scott Maynard contains n0 such factual showing and so 0n its face 1 4 it must be stricken and the defaults entered. A standard judicial council form exists with statutory 15 language required t0 obtain such an extension. N0 such language is included in Mr. Maynard’s 16 declaration and n0 such judicial council form was signed and filed by the Harts’ attorney. 17 Moreover, the declaration 0f Scott Maynard directly confirms that the Harts are n_0t allowed 18 to be afforded any relief because Mr. Maynard admits he met and conferred and thus was never 19 “unable t0 meet and confer” - a condition precedent to being afforded any relief. 20 The Harts’ counsel admits in his two declarations signed under penalty of perjury that he 21 already met and conferred. Specifically, the Hart’s counsel admits the following: 22 o “I initially contacted counsel for the plaintiff and gave him some general 23 information concerning the defects in the complaint upon which I plan t0 demur.” 24 See Hifai Decl., EX C. at p. 2: 3 - 4. 25 o “At the time ofmy first offer, I explained that I believed that the Complaint could 26 not withstand demurrer, and I gave Plaintiff’s attornev several specific reasons 27 with explanations and indicated that the defects could not be cured bV 28 /// -7- :“NERLAWGROUPPC FREDERICK HART, JRRS MOTION FOR ENTRY 0F DEFAULT 0F DEFENDANTS AND FOR COURT ”’ ”"1” ORDER STRIKING THE DECLARATION 0F COUNSEL 1 amendment due to the nature of the defects. While I expected a substantive 2 response t0 my demurrer issues. . .” Hifai Decl., EX D at p. 2: 2 - 6. 3 o “Pursuant to Code 0f Civil Procedure §430.41, I am required to provide the Plaintiff 4 with legal support for the basis ofthe deficiencies which I alreadv disclosed t0 the 5 Plaintiff.” Hifai Decl., EX. C at p. 2: 10 - 11. 6 o Moreover, due t0 other professional obligations and the complexity of the issues 7 that will be presented on demurrer, I have not had sufficient time available t0 8 delineate all 0f the specific legal authority for each 0f those deficiencies that will 9 be the basis 0f the demurrer. Thus, I have not yet had time t0 prepare for the 10 follow-up in-depth meet and confer With Plaintiffs’ counsel on the proposed 11 demurrer, as required by Code 0f Civil Procedure §430.41(a)(1).” Id. at p. 2: 20 - 12 25. 13 There is no “follow-up in-depth meet and confer” requirement under C.C.P. § 430.41(a)(2) 14 which warrants an extension t0 respond to the Complaint. In fact, once the Hart’s counsel 15 determined that Plaintiff’s counsel did not respond t0 his first meet and confer efforts, then he 16 should have filed a Demurrer on June 14th. C.C.P. § 430.41(a)(2) provides that if the opposing 17 party does not respond t0 the meet and confer efforts, the demurring party must timely file a 18 demurrer so long the as the demurring Party declares,” That the partv who filed the pleading 19 subiect to demurrer failed t0 respond t0 the meet and confer request 0f the demurring partv 20 0r otherwise failed t0 meet and confer in 200d faith.” (Emphasis Added). There is n0 21 requirement for any “further” and “follow-up” meet and confer efforts - nor is it grounds for an 22 automatic extension under C.C.P. § 430.41(a)(2) for the want 0f a “further in-depth meet and 23 confer” after one has already taken place. 24 The Harts’ counsel’s own declarations signed under penalty ofperjury confirms that he met 25 and conferred but then did not timely file a response - Which is n_ot a statutory ground for an 26 extension under C.C.P. § 430.41(a)(2). His Declaration does not (because he cannot truthfully) 27 state that he tried and couldn’t meet and confer - and as such, the Harts are not afforded any 28 relief under C.C.P. § 430.41(a)(2). This is plain and simple. -8- EORNERLAWGROUPPC FREDERICK HART, JRRS MOTION FOR ENTRY 0F DEFAULT 0F DEFENDANTS AND FOR COURT ’ ORDER STRIKING THE DECLARATION 0F COUNSEL 1 While the Clerk of the Court is not afforded any authority to determine the legitimacy or 2 the merits oer. Maynard’s declaration, this Court is. The Declaration speaks for itself. A “further 3 in-depth follow up” meet and confer session by its own admission, means, a meet and confer 4 session has alreadv taken place. Therefore, the Harts’ counsel never “attempted t0 meet and 5 confer” but could not. Tellingly, his declaration 0f course does not ever contain such a statement, 6 but in fact, states the opposite. The facts as sworn by Mr. Maynard are clear - as is the law. There 7 can be no automatic extension given the facts presented to the Court here under penalty ofperjury. 8 The Court should strike the declaration and enter the Harts’ defaults. T0 the extent grounds to set 9 aside a default exist, them can seek same. 10 IV. CONCLUSION 11 The Harts are not afforded any relief under C.C.P. § 430.41(a)(2), their response to the 12 Complaint was due by June 14th, and as such the Court’s entry 0f the Harts’ default should be 13 entered. The Hart’s Counsel declares that he met and conferred after being served With the 14 Complaint - i.e., satisfying the meet and confer requirements Which obligate a response t0 be filed 15 by June 14th. Therefore he cannot satisfy, and has not by his declaration, satisfied the statutory 16 requirements that 1) any good faith attempt to meet and confer was made, and 2) explaining the 17 reasons Why the parties could not meet and confer. 18 As such, this Court should enter the defaults of the Harts because the declaration filed does 19 not afford the Harts any protections under C.C.P. § 430.41(a)(2). 20 21 Date: August 18, 2021 HORNER LAW GROUP, P.C. 22 /¢/fl”' By: I 7- 23 Clifford R. Homer, Esq. 24 Paymon Hifai, Esq. Attorneys for Plaintiff, Plaintiff Frederick Hart, Jr. 25 26 27 28 -9- EORNERLAWGROUPPC FREDERICK HART, JRRS MOTION FOR ENTRY 0F DEFAULT 0F DEFENDANTS AND FOR COURT ’ ORDER STRIKING THE DECLARATION 0F COUNSEL HORNERLAW GROUP sun s. Emndway. Sun: zoo Walnm Creek, Califumia 94596 \OOOQQ 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 PROOF OF SERVICE Case Name: Frederick Hart, Jr. v. Michael Hart, et. a1. Case N0: Santa Clara County Superior Court Case No. 21CV378991 I am employed in the County of Contra Costa, State 0f California. My business address is 800 S. Broadway, Suite 200, Walnut Creek, California 94596. I am over the age of eighteen years, and not a party t0 the within action. On August 18, 2021, I caused t0 be served the within: FREDERICK HART, JR.’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR ENTRY 0F DEFAULT OF DEFENDANTS AND FOR A COURT ORDER STRIKING THE MEET AND CONFER DECLARATION RE DEMURRER TO VERIFIED COMPLAINT FILED BY DEFENDANTS’ COUNSEL FREDERICK HART, JR.’S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT OF DEFENDANTS AND FOR A COURT ORDER STRIKING THE MEET AND CONFER DECLARATION RE DEMURRER TO VERIFIED COMPLAINT FILED BY DEFENDANTS’ COUNSEL DECLARATION OF PAYMON HIFAI IN SUPPORT OF FREDERICK HART, JR.’S MOTION FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT OF DEFENDANTS AND FOR A COURT ORDER STRIKING THE MEET AND CONFER DECLARATION RE DEMURRER TO VERIFIED COMPLAINT FILED BY DEFENDANTS’ COUNSEL PROPOSED ORDER on the party(ies) listed below, addressed as follows: Douglas Scott Maynard, Esq. 1 151 Minnesota Avenue San Jose, CA 95125 Attorney for Defendants BV Mail/Ordinarv Business Practices [C.C.P. SS 1013, 1013a]. By causing a true copy thereof to be enclosed in a sealed envelope 0r package, addressed t0 the party[ies] as stated on the attached service list. I am readily familiar With the firm's business practice for collection and processing of envelopes and packages for mailing with the United States Postal Service. Under the firm's practice, mail is deposited in the ordinary course of business with the United States Postal Service at Walnut Creek, California, that same day, With postage thereon fully prepaid. I am aware that upon motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid ifpostal cancellation date 0r postage meter date on the envelope or package is more than one day after the date of deposit for mailing. Executed August 18, 2021 at Walnut Creek, California. By: %W 62mm Sharon Piserchio PROOF OF SERVICE