Response ReplyCal. Super. - 6th Dist.February 16, 2021KOOOQQUI-bUJN 10 11 12 13 14 1 16 L11 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 Mary Arens McBride, Esq. (SBN 282459) Alexandria O. Pappas, Esq. (SBN 326149) ERSKINE LAW GROUP, PC 1576 N. Batavia Street, Suite A Orange, California 92867 Phone: (949) 777-6032 Fax: (714) 844-9035 Email: marensmcbride(a3erskinelaw.com Email: apappas@erskinelaw.com Attorneys for Defendant GENERAL MOTORS LLC Electronically Filed by Superior Court of CA, County of Santa Clara, on 3/3/2022 7:08 PM Reviewed By: J. Viramontes Case #21 CV377708 Envelope: 8428461 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA GERARDO VASQUEZ, Plaintiff, GENERAL MOTORS LLC; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendants. I. INTRODUCTION The opposition of Plaintiff Gerardo Vasquez further establishes that GM’s demurrer t0 his Sixth Cause 0fAction (for Fraud by Omission) in the First Amended Complaint should be sustained. Plaintiff fails t0 address the fatal flaws in his pleading, i.e., he has not and cannot sufficiently plead essential elements 0fa fraud cause 0f action 0r in support ofhis Economic Loss Rule, tolling and delayed discovery arguments. /// /// Case No.3 2 1CV377708 REPLY IN SUPPORT OF GENERAL MOTORS LLC’S DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT [Filed concurrently with GM’S Reply in Support ofits Motion t0 Strike Punitive Damagesfrom Plaintifi’iv First Amended Complaint] DATE: March 10, 2022 TIME: 9:00 a.m. DEPT: 7 Assignedfor allpurposes t0 the Hon. Christopher G. Rudy in Dept. 7 REPLY IN SUPPORT OF GM’S DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 0 \OOOflQUl-bww 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 II. LEGAL ARGUMENT A. GM Had N0 Duty t0 Disclose t0 Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s fraud by omission claim fails as a matter 0f law because GM did not have any duty t0 disclose. A duty t0 disclose arises in only four circumstances: “(1) when the defendant is in a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff, (2) when the defendant had exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to the plaintiff, (3) when the defendant actively conceals a material fact from the plaintiff; [or] (4) when the defendant makes partial representations but also suppresses some material facts.” (Heliotis v. Schuman (1986) 181 Ca1.App.3d 646, 651, quoting 4 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (8th ed. 1974) Torts, §§ 459-464, pp. 2724-2728.) There is n0 fiduciary relationship between GM and Plaintiff: “It is a general rule that a vendor not in a confidential relation t0 the buyer is not under a duty to make full disclosure concerning the object which he would sell.” (De Spirito v. Andrews (1957) 151 Ca1.App.2d 126, 130.) And, as the foregoing cases establish, absent a fiduciary relationship, the duty t0 disclose arises only when “the defendant makes representations but fails t0 disclose additional facts which materially qualify the facts disclosed, 0r which render the disclosure likely t0 mislead.” (Roddenberry v. Roddenberry (1996) 44 Ca1.App.4th 634, 666.) Plaintiff offers n0 support for his argument that the Court should find an exception t0 these requirements here, nor does he offer any explanation as t0 how GM made a partial disclosure, 0r any disclosure to him at all. B. Plaintiff’s Allegations Fail t0 Establish a Fraud by Omission Cause 0f Action. Fraud must be pleaded specifically; general, conclusory allegations are insufficient. (Stansfield v. Starkey (1990) 220 Ca1.App.3d 59, 74; Nagy v. Nagy (1989) 210 Ca1.App.3d 1262, 1268.) Unlike most causes 0f action that are governed by “the policy 0f liberal construction 0f the pleadings,” fraud requires particularity, that is, “pleading facts which show how, when, where, t0 whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.” (Stansfield, supra, at 73; Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645.) Every element of a fraud cause 0f action must be alleged both factually and specifically. (Hall v. Dept. ofAdoptions (1975) 47 Ca1.App.3d 898, 904; Cooper v. Equity Gen. Ins. (1990) 219 Ca1.App.3d 1252, 1262.) “The elements 0f common law fraud in California are (1) a misrepresentation 0f a material fact (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (2) knowledge 0f falsity; (3) intent t0 defraud; (4) justifiable reliance; and (5) resulting damage.” (Collins v. eMachines (201 1) 202 Cal.App.4th 249, 259.) REPLY IN SUPPORT OF GM’S DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 1 \OOOflQUl-bww 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 “The facts constituting the fraud, including every element of the cause 0f action, must be alleged 3” ‘factually and specifically in order t0 survive demurrer. (Apollo Capital Fund, LLC v. Roth Capital Partners, LLC (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 226, 240 [citing Committee 0n Children ’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 216-17].) The First Amended Complaint does not meet this high standard. It fails to allege these essential elements. It does not allege (1) any specific, measurable omission by GM, (2) that GM had knowledge of the alleged omission at the time of the sale, (3) that GM had any intent to defraud, or (4) that Plaintiff suffered any damages due t0 the alleged omission. First, Plaintiff does not allege any specific omission. Instead, he alleges in conclusory fashion that GM failed t0 disclose defects in the vehicle. He does not allege the information that GM should have disclosed. Second, the First Amended Complaint does not provide any allegations that GM knew about the defect that he says GM should have disclosed. Instead, Plaintiff merely provides a blanket conclusion that GM had knowledge 0f the alleged defect. He did not plead any specific facts as t0 how GM knew about the defect in the Subject Vehicle at the time Plaintiff bought it. Plaintiff concludes, Without providing any facts, that GM knew of a defect in his vehicle because 0f alleged problems in other vehicles. Third, Plaintiff has failed t0 plead specific facts as to how GM specifically intended t0 defraud him to induce him to purchase the Subj ect Vehicle. He offered only the bare conclusion thatGM intended to defraud. Plaintiff must plead facts that GM either intended to defraud by concealing material facts or that it intended to induce reliance Where reliance was reasonably expected t0 occur. (Lovejoy v. AT&T Corp. (2001) 92 Cal. App. 4th 85, 93). Instead, he offered the bare legal conclusion that, GM “committed fraud by allowing the Vehicle t0 be sold to Plaintiffwithout disclosing that the Vehicle and its fuel pump installed 0n the vehicle was defective...” (First Amended Complaint 1] 37). Given that fraud allegations “involve a serious attack 0n character,” Plaintiff cannot plead a cause 0f action for fraud without properly pleading actual knowledge and intent to defraud. (See Cansino, supra, at 1469.) Because the only “facts” supporting GM’S alleged intent t0 defraud are legal conclusions 0f other essential fact elements, Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts t0 show the intent to defraud element 0f the fraud claim. Fourth, Plaintiff has not pleaded any damages. Plaintiff makes a blanket assertion that the First REPLY IN SUPPORT OF GM’S DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 2 \OOOflQUl-bww 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 Amended Complaint has sufficiently pleaded damages because he would not have purchased the vehicle but for GM’S allegedly fraudulent omissions. (First Amended Complaint, 1] 40.) In Nelson v. Nissan, the plaintiff sufficiently pleaded damages supporting his allegations 0f fraud, but the plaintiff there provided far greater detail than the Plaintiffhere. ((D.N.J. 2012) 894 F.Supp.2d 558.) PlaintiffNelson alleged the mileage of his vehicle when he purchased it, the mileage of the vehicle and date when he first began t0 experience transmission-related concerns, the mileage 0f the vehicle and date When the vehicle suffered catastrophic transmission failure, and the resulting out-of-pocket costs he had when Nissan stated that the transmission failure was not covered under warranty. (Id. at 562.) Similarly, the plaintiff in Erlich v. BMW ofNorth America, LLC provided detailed damage allegations and alleged that BMW’s active concealment 0f the alleged defects “f0rc[ed] [p]laintiff and the class t0 pay for repair and replacement 0f cracked Windshields.” ((C.D. Cal. 2010) 801 F.Supp.2d 908, 912.) Plaintiff” s First Amended Complaint comes nowhere near the level 0f detail 0f damages that the plaintiffs in these two examples pleaded. Plaintiff does not allege What he paid for the Subject Vehicle, the dates he experienced any alleged defect, the dates 0r costs of any associated repairs, 0r Whether GM declined t0 cover the cost 0f a repair 0f an alleged defect. Plaintiff has only alleged that “[a]s a result 0f GM’S misconduct, Plaintiff has suffered and will continue t0 suffer actual damages.” (First Amended Complaint, 1] 111). Consequently, the First Amended Complaint fails to satisfy the requirement that every element be supported by specific and particular facts. (See Apollo Capital Fund, LLC, supra, at 240). C. The Economic Loss Rule Bars Plaintiff’s Fraud Claim. Fraudulent inducement constitutes an exception to the economic loss rule only if the affirmative misrepresentation at issue “expose[d] a plaintiff t0 liability for personal damages independent 0f the Plaintiff’s economic loss.” Robinson Helicopter Ca, Inc. v. Dana Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 979. Plaintiff’s “fraudulent omission” claim admittedly does not rest upon any affirmative misrepresentations by GM; this alone disqualifies the claim under Robinson Helicopter. (See also Nada Pac. Corp. v. Power Eng’g & Mfg, 73 F.Supp.3d 1206, 1224-1225 (ND. Cal. 2014) (holding in a products liability action that, because plaintiff did not allege any affirmative misrepresentations by defendant and did not allege that it was exposed t0 liability for personal damages independent 0f its REPLY IN SUPPORT OF GM’S DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 3 \OOOflQUl-bww 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 economic loss, the fraud claim could not fit within Robinson Helicopter’s “narrow and limited holding,” to avoid the economic loss rule). Despite Robinson’s holding that “the economic loss rule does not bar [a plaintiff’s] fraud and intentional misrepresentation claims [where they are] independent 0f breach 0f contract,” it expressly stated that its holding was “narrow in scope and limited t0 a defendant’s affirmative misrepresentations on Which a plaintiff relies and Which expose a plaintiff to liability for personal damages independent of the plaintiffs economic loss.” (Robinson Helicopter C0,, Inc. v. Dana Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 979, 993. See also Nada Pac. Corp. v. Power Eng’g and Mfg, Ltd. (N.D.Cal. 2014) 73 F.Supp.3d 1206, 1225 (“[Plaintiff] does not allege that [the defendant] made any affirmative misrepresentations 0n which it relied, nor does it allege that it was exposed to liability for personal damages independent of its economic loss. Without having done so, [Plaintiff] cannot fit Within Robinson’s narrow and limited holding.”).) The affirmative misrepresentation that exposed the Robinson plaintiff t0 liability for personal damages, independent 0f that plaintiff’s economic loss, is regularly referred t0 as the “Robinson exception.” While Plaintiff attempts t0 distinguish Robinson, he fails to address the long list 0f cases, in opinions that post-date Robinson, that have all concluded that the Robinson exception does not extend t0 fraud claims based upon alleged concealment, omissions, 0r non-disclosures: o In Zagarian, the plaintiff asserted fraud based upon allegations that BMW omitted information about an “oil consumption” defect in the subj ect vehicle. (Zagarian v. BMW 0f N. Am, LLC (C.D.Ca1. Oct. 23, 2019) No. CV 18-4857 RSWL (PLAX), 2019 WL 61 1 1731, at *2). The court there recognized that some courts have applied the economic loss rule t0 claims 0f fraudulent concealment, finding that its application is only barred Where a party has made affirmative representations that are fraudulent. (Id. at *3) Because the Zagarian plaintiff (i) had not alleged a single affirmative misrepresentation 0n the part 0fBMW and (ii) had not shown any exposure to personal damages independent 0f his economic loss, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s fraud claim as barred by the economic loss rule. (Id.) o In Hammond, the plaintiff only sought damages associated With defects in the subject vehicle, yet still asserted fraud claims (i) without alleging that BMW made any affirmative misrepresentations and (ii) without claiming damages beyond his economic loss associated With the vehicle itself. (Hammond v. BMW ofN. Am, LLC (C.D.Cal. Jun. 26, 2019) N0. CV 18-226 DSF (MRWX), 2019 WL 2912232, at *2). When the plaintiff argued that his fraud claim fell under the Robinson exception, the court rejected that argument, opining that the Robinson exception applied only t0 affirmative misrepresentations. (Id.) Because the plaintiff had not alleged any affirmative misrepresentations by BMW and did not seek damages other than his economic loss, the Hammond court ruled that the fraud claim based 0n “omissions” and “concealment” was barred by the economic loss rule. (Id. at *3.) o In Thompson, the plaintiff asserted a fraud claim based upon an allegation thatBMW omitted information about “defect” causing the vehicle t0 consume abnormally high amounts 0f oil. (Thompson v. BMWofN. Am., LLC (C.D.Cal. Jan. 10, 2019) N0. SA CV 17-1912 CJC (KSX), REPLY IN SUPPORT OF GM’S DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 4 \OOOflQUl-bww 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 2019 WL 988694, at *4). The court there held that, because plaintiff (i) had alleged fraud due to an alleged omission, (ii) had not alleged any personal injury 0r damages other than economic loss, and (iii) had not alleged a “single affirmative misrepresentation” by BMW, the fraud claim was barred by the economic loss rule. (Id. at *5.) o In Yi, the plaintiff asserted a fraud claim based upon allegations that BMW had omitted information about the subject vehicle burning through oil at an excessive rate. (Yi v. BMW ofN. Am. LLC (C.D.Cal. Mar. 5, 2018) N0. 2:17-cv-06467-SVW-SK, 2018 WL 11148443, at * 1). The Yi court ruled that, t0 avoid preclusion of a fraud claim under the economic loss rule, a plaintiff must show exposure to personal damages independent 0f the economic loss. (Id. at *2 (citing Robinson, 34 Cal.4th at 993)). A plaintiff cannot satisfy this condition (i.e., personal damages independent of the economic loss) merely by arguing that the alleged “fraud” would open the door t0 greater damages for the plaintiff. (Id.) The Yi court noted that, if a court were to interpret the Robinson exception that broadly, it would “eviscerate the guidelines set out by the Robinson court.” (Id.) Because the Yi plaintiff s Complaint did not claim additional, non-economic damages other than the alleged damages arising from the alleged defect (i.e., damages “above and beyond a broken contractual promise”), the “fraud” claim failed as a matter of law. (Id.) These four cases are not outliers. Last summer, in Kelsey v. Nissan North America (C.D.Ca1. Jul. 15, 2020) No. CV 20-4835 MRW, 2020 WL 4592744, at *1-2, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s fraud claim because the plaintiffdid not claim any affirmative misrepresentations by Nissan 0r economic damages other than economic loss due t0 alleged vehicle defects. The court noted that “[n]umerous California federal courts sitting in diversity have applied the economic loss rule t0 prohibit a follow-on fraudulent inducement claim in run-of-the-mill Song-Beverly Act warranty breach actions.” (Id. at *2.) The court then provided a “monstrously-long” string cite t0 support its conclusion: Mosqueda v. American Honda Motor C0., -F. Supp. 3d , N0. SA CV 19-839 MWF (MAAX), 2020 WL 1698710 at *13 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (“Because Plaintiffs concede that they seek only economic damages and premise their fraud claim 0n alleged omissions [,] Plaintiff’s fraudulent omission claim is barred by the economic loss rule.”); Hammond v. BMW ofNorth America, N0. CV 18-226 DSF (MRWX), 2019 WL 2912232 at *2 (C.D. Cal. 2019); Traba v. Ford Motor C0., No. CV 18-808 SVW (GJSX), 2018 WL 6038302 at *4 (C.D. Cal. 2018) (fraudulent concealment “resulted only in Plaintiff’s disappointed expectations”; plaintiffs “d0 not claim that the vehicle's alleged defects caused any personal injury 0r damage t0 property other than the vehicle”); Thompson v. BMWofNorth America, No. SA CV 17-1912 CJC (KSX), 2019 WL 988694 at *5 (C.D. Cal. 2019); Zagarian v. BMWofNorth America, No. CV 18-4857 RSWL (PLAX), 2019 WL 6111731 at *3 (C.D. Cal. 2019); Sloan v. General Motors, 2020 WL 1955643 at *24 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (“Robinson and the weight 0f authority within the Ninth Circuit suggest that the economic loss rule applies to fraudulent omission claims under California law”; “many courts within the Ninth Circuit have relied on Robinson in holding that affirmative representations are required for exceptions t0 the rule t0 apply”); Finney v. Ford Motor C0., 2019 WL 79033 at *5 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (under economic loss rule, car purchaser's “remedies are in contract and not in fraud”); Stewart v. Electrolux Home Prod, Ina, 304 F. Supp. 3d 894, 902 (E.D. Cal. 20 1 8) (“Plaintiff s damages are limited t0 economic loss, precluding their strict liability and fraudulent concealment claims.”); see also, In re Ford REPLY IN SUPPORT OF GM’S DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 5 \OOOflQUl-bww 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 Motor C0. DPS6 Powershz'ft Transmission Prod. Liab. Lit., N0. CV1706656ABFFMX, 2019 WL 3000646, at *6 (C.D. Cal. May 22, 2019) (finding “insufficient support in the California cases [defendant] cites for its distinction between fraudulent inducement by misrepresentation and fraudulent inducement by omission, and therefore declin[ing] t0 apply the economic loss rule t0 the omission claims at [the motion t0 dismiss] stage”). (Id.) In addition to Kelsey’s “monstrously-long” list 0f authority, courts have routinely barred omission- and concealment-based fraud claims under the economic loss rule. (See Macias v. Chrysler (C.D.Ca1. Aug. 13, 2020) N0. CV 17-1823, 2020 WL 4723976, at *2 (applying economic loss rule to preclude fraudulent omission claim); Leon v. Kia Motors Am, Inc. (Orange Cnty Cal. Super. 30-2019- 01093543-CU-BC-CJC) (Order 12/13/2019), RJN EX. G (applying economic loss rule t0 preclude fraudulent concealment/omission claim).) Most notably, in a decision issued last year - in a case that mirrors this case which Plaintifl“ does not address in his Opposition - a plaintiff filed a Complaint against Mercedes-Benz USA alleging a fraud claim based upon an alleged omission. (Hien Bui v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (S.D.Ca1. Jan. 25, 2021) No. 20-CV-1530-CAB-WVG, 2021 WL 242936, at *4). The court there barred plaintiff’s claim for fraudulent concealment because the First Amended Complaint did not allege any personal injury t0 the plaintiff 0r any damage t0 physical property independent of the subject vehicle. (1d,) The First Amended Complaint there did not allege any facts that supported a “plausible inference” that Mercedes had any “general duty t0 disclose the alleged [] defect regardless 0f whether [p]laintiff purchased a vehicle,” so “any omissions were not independent 0fany warranties related t0 the actual purchase.” (Bui, 2021 WL 242936, at * 4.) Naturally, the court there held that the economic loss rule barred plaintiffs fraudulent concealment claim. (Id.) But the court did not stop there. It went on to say that, because plaintiff’s alleged “damages were strictly economic” and arose out 0f the “same conduct as the breach 0f warranty claims, no amendment t0 the First Amended Complaint would be able t0 avoid this outcome.” (Id. (citing Hsieh v. FCA US LLC (S.D.Cal. 2020) 440 F.Supp.3d 1157, 1162 (dismissing fraud claim without leave t0 amend because the fact that the lawsuit involved “alleged omissions, not affirmative misrepresentations [precluded] [p]laintiff”s ability t0 avoid the economic loss rule”).) The Bui court also dismissed plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages predicated on the alleged concealment, because there REPLY IN SUPPORT OF GM’S DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 6 \OOOflQUl-bww 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 was n0 argument to suggest that her punitive damages claim could survive Without her fraudulent concealment claim. (Id.) This case is indistinguishable from all the cases in Kelsey’s “monstrously-long” list and nearly identical to the facts presented in Bui. Here, Plaintiff alleges that GM “committed fraud by allowing the Vehicle t0 be sold to Plaintiff without disclosing that the Vehicle and fuel pump installed on the vehicle was defective...” (First Amended Complaint 1] 37). Plaintiff has not alleged personal injuries or damages to property other than economic loss for the vehicle itself. (Id.) In fact, the only allegation of harm that Plaintiff alleged in the First Amended Complaint is that, if GM had disclosed the “fuel pump” then Plaintiffwould not have bought the subject vehicle. (Id. at 1] 1 10.) This allegation is exactly What the Bui court rej ected. (2021 WL 242936, at *4.) Without an affirmative misrepresentation by GM, and Without damages independent 0f the alleged economic loss related t0 his vehicle, Plaintiff s fraud claim is barred and should be dismissed without leave t0 amend. Significantly, unlike in Erlich v. Menezes (1999) 21 Cal.4th 543, 55, Plaintiff has not stated how he suffered any damages resulting from GM’S allegedly fraudulent conduct that are independent of his breach 0f warranty damages. Because Plaintiff does not plead tort duty and damage separate and apart from the breach 0f warranty claims, the Economic Loss Rule applies. Further, NuCal Foods, Inc. v. Quality Egg LLC (2013) 918 F.Supp.2d 1023, is easily distinguishable as that case involved alleged concealment ofdefective eggs in sales to third parties, Which exposed NuCal t0 liability above and beyond the performance 0f the contract. That is exactly the type of damage described in Robinson, but it is nothing like the allegations in this case. /// /// /// /// /// /// /// /// REPLY IN SUPPORT OF GM’S DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 7 \OOONQUI-bUJNr-t NNNNNNNNNNF-‘Hr-‘b-‘r-‘b-lr-tr-tr-tr-t \OOOQONUI-bUJNr-KO©OONO\UIJ>WNr-to III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, GM respectfully requests the Court sustain its demurrer and dismiss Plaintiff’s Sixth Cause 0f Action, without leave t0 amend. Dated: March 3, 2022 ERSKINE LAW GROUP, PC ALEXANDRIA O. PAPPAS Attorney for Defendant GENERAL MOTORS LLC REPLY IN SUPPORT OF GM’S DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 8 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 PROOF OF SERVICE I am employed in the County 0f Orange and my business address is 1576 N. Batavia Street, Suite A, Orange, California 92867. I am over the age of 18 years and I am not a party to this action. I am readily familiar with the practices 0f ERSKINE LAW GROUP, PC for the collection and processing 0f correspondence for mailing With the United States Postal Service. Such correspondence is deposited with the United States Postal Service the same day in the ordinary course of business. On March 3, 2022, I served the foregoing document bearing the title: REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT GENERAL MOTORS LLC’S DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 0n the interested parties in the action as follows: [X] by placing [] the original [X] a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope addressed as follows: STRATEGIC LEGAL PRACTICES, APC 1840 Century Park, East, Suite 430 Los Angeles, CA 90067 emailservices@slpattorney.com [] (BY MAIL SERVICE) I placed such envelopes for collection and t0 be mailed 0n this date following ordinary business practices. [] (BY PERSONAL SERVICE) I caused to be delivered such envelope by hand t0 the office 0f the addressee. [] (BY FACSIMILE) The document stated herein was transmitted by facsimile transmission and the transmission was reported as complete and Without error. A transmission report was properly issued by the transmitting facsimile machine and a copy of said transmission report is attached t0 the original proof of service indicating the time 0f transmission. (BY NEXT DAY DELIVERY) I caused to be delivered such envelope by hand t0 the office 0f the addressee. [X] (BY E-MAIL) I served the above-mentioned document Via electronic transmission per agreement 0f the parties. [X] (State) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. [] (Federal) I declare under penalty of perjury that I am employed by a member of the Bar 0f this Court, at Whose direction this service is made. Executed on March 3, 2022, at Orange, CA. Signed: James Gimeno 1 PROOF OF SERVICE - REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT GM’S DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT