Notice of Hearing no fee

Cal. Super. - 6th Dist.February 3, 2021

©WQONUI£UJNH NNNNNNNNr-xr-xr-xr-xr-xr-xr-xu-xp-tu-x \Iaxu-hwnr-xcccoxlcxmthr-xc 28 COLLINS+ COLLINS u. 790 E. Colorado Boulevard Suite 600 Pasadena, CA 91101 Phone (626) 243-1100 Fax (626) 243-11 11 Robert H. Stellwagen, Jr., Esq., (State Bar N0. 150560) E'eCtronically Filed Nicholas R. Colletti, Esq. (State Bar No. 283947) by Superior Court of CA, COLLINS + COLLINS LLP County of Santa Clara, 790 E. Colorado Boulevard, Suite 600 0n 12/1 3/2021 4:37 PM Pasadena, CA 91101 Reviewed By: R. Tien (626) 243-1100 - FAX (626) 243-1111 Case #21 CV377043 rstellwagen@ccllp.law EnveIOpe: 785441 6 ncolletti@ccllp.law Attorneys for Marsha Edick and API Services SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA- DOWNTOWN SUPERIOR COURT RANDALL SHULER, CASE NO. 21CV377043 [Assigned t0 Hon. Drew C. Takaichi, Dept. 2] Plaintiffs, NOTICE OF MOTION AND SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF RANDALL SHULER’S COMPLAINT VS. MARSHA EDICK, API SERVICES, and DOES 1 through 10, [Filed concurrently with the Declarations ofNicholas R. Collettz'; Requestfor Judicial Notice, [Proposed] Order] Defendants. Complaint Filed: 02/03/2021 Trial Date: None VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD HEREIN: PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on _, 2022 at_ am. or as soon thereafter as this matter may be heard in the above 0f the entitled court, located at 191 N. lst Street, San Jose, California, 951 13, Defendants MARSHA EDICK and API SERVICES, (collectively, “‘Defendants”) will and hereby do specially move and order striking PlaintiffRANDALL SHULER’s (“Shuler”) Complaint in its entirety in accordance With California Code of Civil Procedure, section 425.16. /// 23490 1 DEFENDANTS’ ANTI-SLAPP MOTION Dept. 2 Time: 9:00am Date: 4-19-2022 ©WQONUI£UJNH NNNNNNNNr-xr-xr-xr-xr-xr-xr-xu-xp-tu-x \chu-hwwwcccoxlcxmthr-xc 28 COLLINS+ COLLINS u. 790 E. Colorado Boulevard Suite 600 Pasadena, CA 91101 Phone (626) 243-1100 Fax (626) 243-11 11 This Motion is brought on the basis that Plaintiff s allegations against Defendant arise out of protected activity as defined by Code of Civil Procedure, section 425.16(e). Furthermore, Plaintiff cannot show a probability 0f prevailing 0n the merits of his single libel cause 0f action as follows: Plaintiff‘s cause 0f action is time-barred; Plaintiff is a vexatious litigation and failed to both obtain the Court’s permission to file suit and t0 post the required $100,000.00 bond, and Defendant’s alleged defamatory statements were true and/or nonactionable opinion statements. This Motion is based 0n this Notice, the accompanying Memorandum 0f Points and Authorities, the declaration 0f counsel Nicholas R. Colletti, the Request for Judicial Notice and exhibits attached thereto, pleadings and papers 0n file in this action, all matters of Which the Court must 0r may take judicial notice, and such other evidence, authority, and argument as may be presented at the hearing of this Motion. Defendants further seek to recover their reasonable attorneys” fees pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, section 425. 1 6(c)( 1) in an amount of$ 1 8,690.00, as set forth in the declaration ofNicholas R. Colletti. DATED: December 3, 2021 COLLINS + COLLINS LLP By: ' NICHOLAS R. COLLETTI ROBERT H. STELLWAGEN, JR. Attorneys for Marsha Edick and API Services 23490 2 DEFENDANTS’ ANTI-SLAPP MOTION ©WQONUI£UJNH NNNNNNNNr-xr-xr-xr-xr-xr-xr-xu-xp-tu-x \chu-hwwwcccoxlcxmthr-xc 28 COLLINS+ COLLINS u. 790 E. Colorado Boulevard Suite 600 Pasadena, CA 91101 Phone (626) 243-1100 Fax (626) 243-11 11 II. III. IV. 23490 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 8 STATEMENT OF FACTS ............................................................................................. 9 A. The Active Temporary Restraining Order Against Plaintiff ................................... 9 B. Plaintiff Hires Defendant Concerning Challenging Temporary Restraining Order ..................................................................................................................... 9 C. PlaintiffAware of Defendant’s Allegedly Defamatory Statements in January 2020 ......................................................................................................... 9 D. Plaintiff s Restraining Order Becomes Permanent, and Plaintiff is deemed “Vexatious” ........................................................................................................... 9 PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT SHOULD BE STRICKEN UNDER CCP 425.16(b)(1) .................................................................................................................... 10 A. Defendant’s Alleged Defamatory Statements are Protected Under Section 426. 16(e)(2) Because they were Communications in Connection With an Issue Under Consideration by a Judicial Body ............................................................... 12 B. Defendant’s Alleged Defamatory Statements are Protected Under Section 426. 16(e)(3) Because they were Communications Made in a Public Forum and in Connection With an Issue 0f Public Interest ................................................ 14 1. Defendant’s Speech Occurred in a Public Forum ...................................... 14 2. Defendant’s Speech was Made in Connection With an Issue of Public Interest ...................................................................................................... 14 C. Defendant’s Alleged Defamatory Speech is Protected Under Section 426. 16(e)(4) Because they were Communications Arising from Defendant’s Exercise of her Constitutional Right to Free Speech in Connection with an Issue 0f Public Interest ......................................................................................... 17 D. Plaintiff is Unlikely t0 Demonstrate that He Would Prevail on His Claim ............. 18 1. Plaintiff’s Complaint is Time-Barred ....................................................... 19 2. Plaintiff is a Vexatious Litigant ................................................................. 20 3. Defendant’s Statements were True 0r Were Otherwise Nonactionable Opinion .................................................................................................... 20 DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO REASONABLE ATTORNEY’S FEES ................ 21 3 DEFENDANTS’ ANTI-SLAPP MOTION ©WQONUIBUJNH NNNNNNNNr-xr-xr-xr-xr-xr-xr-xu-xp-tu-x qcxm-nwwwcccoxlcxmthr-xc 28 COLLINS+ COLLINS u. 790 E. Colorado Boulevard Suite 600 Pasadena, CA 91101 Phone (626) 243-1100 Fax (626) 243-11 11 V. 23490 CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 22 4 DEFENDANTS’ ANTI-SLAPP MOTION ©WQONUI£UJNH NNNNNNNNr-xr-xr-xr-xr-xr-xr-xu-xp-tu-x \Iaxu-hwnr-xcccoqaxmthr-xc 28 COLLINS+ COLLINS u. 790 E. Colorado Boulevard Suite 600 Pasadena, CA 91101 Phone (626) 243-1100 Fax (626) 243-11 11 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) A Traditional Cat Ass’n, Inc. v. Gilbreath (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 392 ................................................................................................ 19 Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376 ............................................................................................................ 18 Barrett v. Rosenthal (2006) Cal.4th 33 ................................................................................................................. 14 Blackburn v. Brady (2004) 116 Ca1.App.4th 670 .......................................................................................... 13, 14 Briscoe v. Reader ’s Digest Association, Inc. (1971) 4 Cal.3d 529 ....................................................................................................... 16, 17 Chaker v. Mateo (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1138 ........................................................................................passim Christofi’v. Nestle USA, Inc. (2009) Cal.4th 468 ............................................................................................................... 19 City 0f Costa Mesa v. D ’Alessio Investments, LLC (2013) 214 Ca1.App.4th 358 ................................................................................................ 12 Contemporary Services Corp. v. StaffPro Inc. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1043 ......................................................................................... 13, 14 D.A.R.E. America v. Rolling Stone Magazine (2000) 101 F.Supp.2d 1270 (C.D.Cal.) ................................................................................ 21 Evans v. Unkow (1995) 38 Ca1.App.4th 1490 ................................................................................................ 19 Francis v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. (1992) 3 Ca1.App.4th 535 ....................................................................................................21 Fremont Reorganizing Corp. v. Faigin (201 1) 198 Ca1.App.4th 1153 ......................................................................................... 13, 14 Gantry Constr. C0. v. Am. Pipe & COnstr. C0. (1975) 49 Ca1.App.3d 186 ...................................................................................................21 Gilbert v. Sykes (2007) 147 Ca1.App.4th 12 ..................................................................................................21 Hailstone v. Martinez (2008) 169 Ca1.App.4th 728 ................................................................................................ 18 23490 5 DEFENDANTS’ ANTI-SLAPP MOTION ©WQONUI£UJNH NNNNNNNNr-xr-xr-xr-xr-xr-xr-xu-xp-tu-x \Iaxu-hwnr-xcccoqaxmthr-xc 28 COLLINS+ COLLINS u. 790 E. Colorado Boulevard Suite 600 Pasadena, CA 91101 Phone (626) 243-1100 Fax (626) 243-11 11 Hecimovich v. Encinal School Parent Teacher Organization (2012) 203 Ca1.Ap.4th 450, 467 ........................................................................................... 15 Maranatha Corrections, LLC v. Department ofCorrections & Rehab. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1075 ............................................................................................... 13 Navellier v. Sletz‘en (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82 ............................................................................................................ 11 Nygard, Inc. v. Uusi-Kerttula (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1027 ......................................................................................... 14, 15 Optional Capital, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss, Hauer & FeldLLP (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 95 .................................................................................................... 19 Paul v. Friedman (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 853 ............................................................................................ 13, 14 Rand Resources, LLC v. City ofCarson (2019) 6 Ca1.5th 610 ............................................................................................................ 12 Shively v. Bozam'ch (2003) 31 Ca.4th 1230 ......................................................................................................... 19 Tague v. Citizensfor Law and Order, Inc. (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d Supp. 16............................................................................................ 15 Terry v. Davis Community Church (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1534......................................................................................... 15, 17 Vergos v. McNeal (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1387 ......................................................................................... 13, 14 Wanland v. Law Offices ofMastagm', Holstedt & Chiurazzi (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 15 .................................................................................................. 11 Weinberg v. Feisel (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1122 ............................................................................................... 15 Wilbanks v. Walk (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 883 ................................................................................................ 15 Willbanks v. Walk (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1170 ................................................................................................ 14 Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871 ............................................................................................................ 11 Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester (2002) 28 Cal.4th 811 .......................................................................................................... 19 23490 6 DEFENDANTS’ ANTI-SLAPP MOTION Yeager v. Bowlin, 693 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2012) ........................................................................................ 19, 20 H Statutes Code CiV. Proc. § 340(0) ........................................................................................................... 19 Code CiV. Proc. § 425.16(b)(1) ...................................................................................... 11, 12, 18 Code. CiV. Proc. § 425.16(c)(1) .................................................................................................22 Code CiV. Proc. §425.16(e)(2) ...................................................................................... 12, 13, 14 Code CiV. Proc. §425.16(e)(3) .................................................................................. 9, 14, 15, 18 \OWQONUIhUJN NNNNNNNNr-xr-xr-xr-xr-xr-xr-xu-xp-tu-x qcxm-nwwwcccoxlcxmthr-xc 28 COLLINS+ COLLINS u. 23490 790 E. Colorado Boulevard 7Suite 600 Pasadena, CA 91 101 phone (626)243-1100 DEFENDANTS’ ANTI-SLAPP MOTION Fax (626) 243-1111 ©WQONUI£UJNH NNNNNNNNHHHHh-th-th-tt-th-tr-t \IQUI-thchOOQGNUI-BWNHG 28 COLLINS+ COLLINS u. 790 E. Colorado Boulevard Suite 600 Pasadena, CA 91101 Phone (626) 243-1100 Fax (626) 243-11 11 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES I. INTRODUCTION Defendant, Marsha Edick (“Defendant”) submits this special motion to strike Plaintiff Randall Shuler’s (“P1aintiff’) Complaint for a single libel cause 0f action against Defendant, under California’s anti-SLAPP statute. This Motion is made on the grounds that allegations contained in the Complaint arise out of Defendant’s exercise 0f her right t0 free speech concerning Defendant’s unsavory experiences With Plaintiff When engaged t0 perform private investigatory services for Plaintiff concerning an active restraining order against Plaintiff brought by Plaintiffs eX-lover. Defendant became uncomfortable With the nature of the work and was concerned the nature 0f the work also may cause her, any other private investigator, and Plaintiff t0 be in Violation 0f the active restraining order. Defendant thereafter ended her working relationship with Plaintiff. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant posted purportedly defamatory statements to an internet message board. Notwithstanding, such statements were nothing more than a casual warning to other private investigators, which contained true statements and Defendant’s opinion of her experiences With Plaintiff and the possible unlawful nature 0f the work Plaintiff was requesting be done. Notwithstanding, Defendant’s alleged defamatory statements duly fall under the protection of California’s anti-SLAPP statute, specifically as t0 the following subsections: Section 425.16(e)(2) - Defendant’s allegedly defamatory communications were in connection With matters under consideration 0r review by governmental body; Section 425.16(e)(3) - Defendant’s allegedly defamatory communications were made in a public forum about issues of public interest; and Subsection 425. 16(e)(4) - Defendant’s allegedly defamatory communications were in furtherance of Defendant’s exercise 0f her right t0 free speech in connection With an issue of public interest. Further, Plaintiff is unlikely to prevail on his claim: Plaintiff” s claim is time-barred; Plaintiff has been deemed a vexatious litigant by the California Superior Court, County of Santa Clara, and neither obtained permission t0 file suit, nor posted the required $100,000.00 bond; and Defendant’s alleged defamatory statements were true and/or were otherwise nonactionable opinion. As such, Defendant requests that this Court grant her special motion to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute, and thereafter dismiss Plaintiff s Complaint With prejudice. 23490 8 DEFENDANTS’ ANTI-SLAPP MOTION ©WQONUI£UJNH NNNNNNNNh-th-th-th-th-th-th-tt-th-tr-t \IQUI-thr-tcwcoqc‘xUI-BWNHG 28 COLLINS+ COLLINS u. 790 E. Colorado Boulevard Suite 600 Pasadena, CA 91101 Phone (626) 243-1100 Fax (626) 243-11 11 II. STATEMENT OF FACTS A. The Active Temporarv Restraining Order Against Plaintiff. In 0r around March 2016, nonparty petitioner Jennifer Nemac, filed a temporary restraining order against Plaintiff. (Complaint, 1] 6.) On May 13, 2016, in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Santa Clara, Case Number 16DV019635, before Hon. Judge Stuart J. Scott, a hearing was held, and Ms. Nemac’s temporary restraining order was granted. (Complaint, 1] 6; see also Request for Judicial Notice (“RFJN”), Exh. A.) Ms. Nemac is described in Plaintiff s Complaint as an individual who had some level of an intimate/sexual relationship history with Plaintiff, which concerned the restraining order. (Complaint, 1] 19, and generally.) Following the Court’s granting of the order, Plaintiff set out to appeal the restraining order. (Complaint, generally.) B. Plaintiff Hires Defendant Concerning Challenging Temporarv Restraining Order. In 0r around 2016, “Plaintiff retained the services 0f Defendants to conduct private investigation services pertaining t0 a fraudulent restraining order. .. against Plaintiff. .. (Complaint, 1] 6.) Plaintiff requested Defendant perform certain investigation techniques and conduct as part 0f Plaintiff s ongoing pursuit of appealing the temporary restraining order. (Complaint 1] 8, and generally.) Following performance of initial task assigned by Plaintiff t0 Defendant, Defendant, “declin[ed] [further] assignment stating that it was not the type 0f work that [Defendant] wished to perform” and that Defendant was, “uncomfortable With the personal nature of the information [Defendant] was being asked to obtain. . .” (Complaint, fl 12.) C. Plaintiff Aware of Defendant’s Allegedlv Defamatorv Statements in Januarv 2020. Plaintiff alleges that on October 31, 2016, Defendant posted purportedly defamatory statements on the intemet t0 a message board website at Yahoo.com, Which Plaintiff alleges was “accessible to anyone belonging to the group globally, requiring no specific credentials t0 join.” (Complaint, 1] 13.) Plaintiff alleges the following are the defamatory statements made by Defendant, and Which form the sole basis for Plaintiff s Complaint: /// /// /// 23490 9 DEFENDANTS’ ANTI-SLAPP MOTION ©WQONUIBUJNH NNNNNNNNr-xr-xr-xp-xp-xp-xp-xu-xp-tu-x \Iaxu-hwnr-xcccoqaxmthr-xc 28 COLLINS+ COLLINS u. 790 E. Colorado Boulevard Suite 600 Pasadena, CA 91101 Phone (626) 243-1100 Fax (626) 243-11 11 14. Defendant EDICK, negligently stated in the email/posting that she “assum(ed) it must be okay t0 send out messages such as this.” 15. Defendant EDICK wrote the following false, derogatory and defamatory statements: a) “Subj ect: [calimembers] Warning t0 Bay Area Investigators” b) “I worked 0n a case (briefly) and chose not to continue because the requests for additional service were clearly becoming borderline staking.” c) “This involves a DV and stalking matter (he is the accused)” d) “I know for certain that he has reached out to another female investigator in this area, and I left a message for her last week, but I haven’t received a return call.” e) “Just wanted t0 give everyone a ‘heads up’ that there is something very seriously wrong With this man and the work he is requesting to be done. There is a restraining order in place and the work his is requesting would Violate that order.” f) “If more information is needed (assuming you been contacted by ‘Randy’), and before agreeing to take on the assignment, you are welcome to contact me directly.” (Complaint, 1] 15.) Plaintiff alleges that such statements were “utilized later in continuing [Nemac/Nemac’s attorney’s] crimes and pursuit against Plaintiffto extend the first granted restraining order indefinitely When it was attached to a filed brief in January of 2020 and contributed to the false allegations and fraud of the petitioner.” (Complaint, 1] 22.) D. Plaintiff’s Restraining Order Becomes Permanent, and Plaintiff is deemed “Vexatious.” On November 4, 2020, a hearing was held concerning making the May 13, 2016, restraining order permanent. (RFJN re: EXh. C.) Hon. Judge Scott noted that Plaintiff was present in the Court When the November 4, 2020 hearing date was set, and that Plaintiff, for the November 4, 2020 hearing, “failed t0 appear. The hearing Will proceed.” (Id.) As a result 0f the hearing, Hon. Judge Scott issued an order as follows: (1) The restraining order is permanent; and (2) Plaintiff is deemed a vexatious litigant under 391(b), 391.7 With a $100,000.00 bond for filing. (Id) Plaintiff filed this instant Complaint on February 3, 202 1. (Declaration ofNicholas R. Colletti (“Colletti Decl.”), 1] 3; RFJN, EXh. G.) Plaintiff neither obtained permission from the Court, nor posted the required $ 1 00,000.00 bond needed to allow Plaintiff to file this instant Complaint. (Colletti Decl., 1] 9.) III. PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT SHOULD BE STRICKEN UNDER CCP 425.16(b)(1) California's anti-SLAPP statute “protects defendants from meritless lawsuits that might chill the exercise of their rights t0 speak and petition on matters 0fpublic concern.” (Wilson v. Cable News 23490 10 DEFENDANTS’ ANTI-SLAPP MOTION ©WQONUI£UJNH NNNNNNNNh-th-th-th-th-th-th-tt-th-tr-t \IQUI-thr-tcwcoqchI-BWNHG 28 COLLINS+ COLLINS u. 790 E. Colorado Boulevard Suite 600 Pasadena, CA 91101 Phone (626) 243-1100 Fax (626) 243-11 11 Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 883-84.) The statute authorizes a special motion to strike claims “arising from any act of that person in furtherance 0f the person's right of petition 0r free speech. .. in connection With a public issue.” (Code CiV. Proc. § 425. 1 6(b)(1).) The statute is “broadly construed t0 encourage continued participation in free speech and petition activities.” (Wanland v. Law Ofices ofMastagni, Holstedt & Chiurazzi (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 15, 22.) The defendant does not need t0 prove that her actions are constitutionally protected as a matter 0f law. (Navellz'er v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 94-95.) A court evaluates an anti-SLAPP motion in two steps. First, the defendant must show that the challenged causes of action “arise from any act of that person in furtherance 0f the person's right 0f. .. free speech. .. in connection With a public issue.” (Code CiV. Proc. § 425. 16(b)(1).) Once the defendant makes this showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiffto show a “probability that the plaintiff Will prevail 0n the claim[s].” (Id) (the latter discussed in further detail below under Section D.) As to the first prong, Section 425.16, subdivision (e), provides: “As used in this section, ‘acts in furtherance of a person's right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection With a public issue” includes: (1) any written or oral statement 0r writing made before a legislative, executive, 0r judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law; (2) any written 0r oral statement or writing made in connection With an issue under consideration 0r review by a legislative, executive, 0r judicial body, 0r any other official proceeding authorized by law; (3) any written or oral statement 0r writing made in a place open to the public 0r a public forum in connection with an issue 0f public interest; (4) or any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection With a public issue or an issue 0f public interest.” Defendant’s alleged defamatory speech is protected under Section 425. 16(e)(2), (3), and (4) respectively. 1 /// 1 As t0 Section 425. 16(e)(1) - statements made before a legislative/official proceeding, current information/knowledge does not suggest such statements were made 0r were alleged t0 have been made that would trigger this subsection, and therefore it will not be further discussed. However, Defendant reserves the right t0 raise such an argument and associated facts, should the same arise at some later time. 23490 1 1 DEFENDANTS’ ANTI-SLAPP MOTION ©WQONUI£UJNH NNNNNNNNh-th-th-th-th-th-th-tt-th-tr-t \IQUI-thr-tcwcoqchI-BWNHG 28 COLLINS+ COLLINS u. 790 E. Colorado Boulevard Suite 600 Pasadena, CA 91101 Phone (626) 243-1100 Fax (626) 243-11 11 A. Defendant’s Alleged Defamatorv Statements are Protected Under Section 426.16(e)(2) Because thev were Communications in Connection with an Issue Under Consideration bv a Judicial BodV. The anti-SLAPP statute protects communications “made in connection With an issue under consideration 0r review by a legislative, executive, 0r judicial body, 0r any other official proceeding authorized by law.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(e)(2); City 0f Costa Mesa v. D’Alessz'o Investments, LLC (2013) 2 14 Cal.App.4th 358, 372, 373.) T0 be considered an issue under consideration 0r review, the official proceeding must be “ongoing-or at the very least, immediately pending,” at the time of the communication. (Rand Resources, LLC v. City 0f Carson (2019) 6 Cal.5th 610, 627.) The same protection for statements and conduct made during an official proceeding extends t0 statements and conduct outside the proceedings if sufficiently related t0 matters under consideration by the official body. (Maranatha Corrections, LLC v. Department ofCorrecz‘ions & Rehab. (2008) 158 Ca1.App.4th 1075, 1085.) Under this subsection, communications need not concern a public issue, and are therefore protected, as long as statements or conduct are made “in connection With an issue under consideration” by a government body. (Vergos v. McNeal (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1395.) Additionally, a nexus between the statement/writing and the issue under consideration by the governmental body is required. (Paul v. Friedman (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 853, 866; Blackburn v. Brady (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 670, 677.) A statement is, therefore “in connection Wit ” litigation under Section 425.16(e)(2) if it relates t0 the substantive issues in the litigation and is directed to persons having some interest in the litigation (need not be parties or potential parties). (Contemporary Services Corp. v. StaffPro Inc. (2007) 152 Ca1.App.4th 1043, 1055; Fremont Reorganizing Corp. v. Faigin (201 1) 198 Ca1.App.4th 1153, 1168.) Here, and as stated above Plaintiff hired Defendant to conduct private investigation services in connection With an active restraining order against Plaintiff. (Complaint 1H] 6, 8.) At the time Defendant allegedly “broadcasted” the purportedly defamatory statements, Plaintiff was seeking t0 appeal the restraining order against him, and as well, concerned the further review by the Superior Court 0f California, County 0f Santa Clara for permanency and/or appeal. (Complaint, generally.) 23490 12 DEFENDANTS’ ANTI-SLAPP MOTION ©WQONUIBUJNH NNNNNNNNh-th-th-th-th-th-th-tt-th-tr-t \IQUI-thr-tcwcoqchI-BWNHc 28 COLLINS+ COLLINS u. 790 E. Colorado Boulevard Suite 600 Pasadena, CA 91101 Phone (626) 243-1100 Fax (626) 243-11 11 The nature of the restraining order against Plaintiff concerned allegations including but not limited to “harassment” and “stalking.” (Complaint, fl 24, see also, RFJN, Exhs. A, B, & C.) As it concerns Defendants alleged defamatory statements, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant stated the following on the intemet: 15. Defendant EDICK wrote the following false, derogatory and defamatory statements: a) “Subj ect: [calimembers] Warning to Bay Area Investigators” b) “I worked 0n a case (briefly) and chose not to continue because the requests for additional service were clearly becoming borderline staking.” c) “This involves a DV and stalking matter (he is the accused)” d) “I know for certain that he has reached out t0 another female investigator in this area, and I left a message for her last week, but I haven’t received a return call.” e) “Just wanted t0 give everyone a ‘heads up’ that there is something very seriously wrong With this man and the work he is requesting to be done. There is a restraining order in place and the work his is requesting would Violate that order.” f) “If more information is needed (assuming you been contacted by ‘Randy’), and before agreeing to take 0n the assignment, you are welcome t0 contact me directly.” (Complaint, 1] 15.) Here, it is plain that Defendant’s statements are “in connection With” the restraining order against Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s ongoing legal pursuit to appeal 0r otherwise dispose 0f the same, and further, Ms. Nemac’s pursuit ofpermanent restraining order. Accordingly, such statements 0r conduct are protected because they were made “in connection with an issue under consideration” by a court. (Vergos, supra, at p. 1395.) Further, Defendant’s statements purport to state that Defendant believes Plaintiff‘s conduct is in Violation 0f the restraining order, (Which is a crime), and further that she believed any private investigators further services would implicate “stalking,” which was part of the nature of the restraining order and its further consideration. Therefore, there is a clear and definable nexus between the communication and the matters under review/consideration. (Paul, supra, at p. 866; Blackburn, supra, at p. 677.) Moreover, the alleged statements were substantive issues in the litigation (harassment/stalking, Violating an active restraining order, and preparing Plaintiff s case for appeal) and was directed t0 persons having some interest in the litigation (other potential private investigators at large). (Contemporary Services Corp, supra, at p. 1055; Fremont Reorganizing Corp, supra, at p. 1168.) Thus, as it concerns Section 425.16(e)(2), Defendant has carried her burden in demonstrating prima facie protection under the anti-SLAPP statute. 23490 13 DEFENDANTS’ ANTI-SLAPP MOTION ©WQONUI£UJNH NNNNNNNNh-th-th-th-th-th-th-tt-th-tr-t \IQUI-thr-tcwcoqcxm-BWNHc 28 COLLINS+ COLLINS u. 790 E. Colorado Boulevard Suite 600 Pasadena, CA 91101 Phone (626) 243-1100 Fax (626) 243-11 11 B. Defendant’s Alleged Defamatorv Statements are Protected Under Section 426.16(e)(3) Because thev were Communications Made in a Public Forum and in Connection With an Issue of Public Interest. Protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute includes any “written or oral statement made in a place open t0 the public 0r a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(e)(3).) 1. Defendant’s Speech Occurred in a Public Forum. It is well-established that websites accessible t0 the public are “public forums” for the purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute. (Barrett v. Rosenthal (2006) Ca1.4th 33, 41 n. 4; Nygard, Inc. v. Uusi-Kerttula (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1039; Willbanks v. Walk (1996) 42 Ca1.App.4th 1170.) Specifically: In a sense, the Web, as a Whole, can be analogized to a public bulletin board. A public bulletin board does not lose its character as a public forum simply because each statement posted there expresses only the Views 0f the person writing that statement. It is public because it posts statements that can be read by anyone Who is interested, and because others who choose to do so, can post a message through the same medium that interested persons can read. .. Others can create their own Web sites or publish letters or articles through the same medium, making their information and beliefs accessible to anyone interested in the topics discussed. .. (Chaker v. Mateo (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1138, 1144.) Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant published false statements “of public record” and that they were “accessible t0 anyone. .. globally, requiring no specific credentials to join. . .” at Yahoo.com (Complaint, 1H] 13, 42.) Therefore, it is indisputable that Plaintiff’s cause 0f action for libel arises from Defendant’s speech in public forum or a place open to the public as required by Section 425.16(e)(3). 2. Defendant’s Speech was Made in Connection with an Issue 0f Public Interest. Additionally, Section 425.16(e)(3) requires the complained 0f speech also be made “in connection With an issue of public interest.” (Code. CiV. Proc. § 425.16(e)(3).) An “issue 0f public interest” within the meaning 0f Section 425.16(e)(3) is any issue in Which the public is interested. (Nygard, supra, at p. 1042.) The issue need not be “significant” to be protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. (Id.) /// 23490 14 DEFENDANTS’ ANTI-SLAPP MOTION ©WQONUI£UJNH NNNNNNNNr-xr-xr-xp-xp-xp-xp-xu-xp-tu-x \Iaxu-hwwwcccoxlcxmthr-xc 28 COLLINS+ COLLINS u. 790 E. Colorado Boulevard Suite 600 Pasadena, CA 91101 Phone (626) 243-1100 Fax (626) 243-11 11 In determining what is a matter of “public interest,” the courts look t0 various considerations, including whether the activity occurred in the context of an ongoing controversy, dispute, discussion, or affected community. (Wilbanks v. Wolk (2004) 121 Ca1.App.4th 883, 898.) Moreover, “public interest” is broadly construed, and includes private conduct that impacts a broad segment 0f society. (Terry v. Davis Community Church (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1534, 1546; Hecimovich v. Encinal School Parent Teacher Organization (2012) 203 Ca1.Ap.4th 450, 467.) Precise boundaries 0f “public interest” may be difficult to draw, however, discussion of crimes and/or possible Violations of the law have been held to be “an issue ofpublic interest.” (Tague v. Citizensfor Law and Order, Inc. (1977) 75 Ca1.App.3d Supp. 16, 24.) Still, case law suggests the assertion 0f criminal conduct alone does not automatically fall Within public interest. (Weinberg v. Feisel (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1135.) Notwithstanding, Where charges may be pending against the Plaintiff, or Where such speech identifies persons then-currently in the commission of a possible crimes, it may be legitimate t0 put others 0n notice 0f such potentially unlawful activity. (Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Association, Inc. (1971) 4 Cal.3d 529, 536-537.) Again, Plaintiff alleges that Plaintiffmade the following defamatory statements in public: 15. Defendant EDICK wrote the following false, derogatory and defamatory statements: a) “Subj ect: [calimembers] Warning t0 Bay Area Investigators” b) “I worked on a case (briefly) and chose not to continue because the requests for additional service were clearly becoming borderline staking.” c) “This involves a DV and stalking matter (he is the accused)” d) “I know for certain that he has reached out t0 another female investigator in this area, and I left a message for her last week, but I haven’t received a return call.” e) “Just wanted to give everyone a ‘heads up’ that there is something very seriously wrong with this man and the work he is requesting t0 be done. There is a restraining order in place and the work his is requesting would Violate that order.” f) “If more information is needed (assuming you been contacted by ‘Randy’), and before agreeing to take on the assignment, you are welcome to contact me directly.” (Complaint, 1] 15.) Here, it is clear that Defendant’s alleged speech is protected “as an issue of public interest.” First, as stated above, Plaintiff admits that at the time he hired Defendant, he was the subject of an active restraining order and that the work would directly concern the restraining order. (Complaint, 23490 15 DEFENDANTS’ ANTI-SLAPP MOTION ©WQONUI£UJNH NNNNNNNNh-th-th-th-th-th-th-tt-th-tr-t \IQUI-thr-tchOQGNUI-BWNHG 28 COLLINS+ COLLINS u. 790 E. Colorado Boulevard Suite 600 Pasadena, CA 91101 Phone (626) 243-1100 Fax (626) 243-11 11 W 6, 8.) The restraining order enjoined Plaintiff t0 not “harass. .. stalk. .. or contact” the protected persons, “directly 0r indirectly, by any means. . .” (RFJN, EXh. A.) As stated, Defendant” s alleged defamatory statements directly concern Defendant’s beliefthat Plaintiff may have been engaged in potential unlawful conduct-specifically, that Plaintiff was potentially using private investigators to Violate an active restraining order and possible stalking (crimes/unlawful conduct). (Complaint, 1] 15.) Notably, the determination 0f What constitutes a “public interest” was explained in Chaker v. Mateo (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1138. Chaker concerns similar facts to Plaintiff s case, in as much as, Chaker brought suit under a single cause 0f action for defamation concerning derogatory statements published 0n a message board website, statements that the Court ultimately concluded were protected by the anti-SLAPP statute, specifically as concerning issues of “public interest.” (See generally, Chaker, supra.) Specifically, the statements made included that Chaker was a “criminal,” to “be very careful” of Chaker, that Chaker was “into illegal activities,” the Chaker “picks up street walkers and homeless drug addicts,” and that he was a “deadbeat dad.” (Id. at p. 1142.) In determining the “public interest” portion 0f the statute, the Chaker Court began its analysis With the well-established principle that “public interest must be ‘construed broadly. ”’ (Id. at p. 1 145.) Additionally, the Chaker Court states that “a matter ofpublic interest should be something of concern t0 a substantial number ofpeople. .. There should be some degree of closeness between the challenged statements and assert public interest. .. and the focus of the speaker’s conduct should be the public interest. . .,” ultimately concluding that “we look to the principal thrust 0r gravamen 0f the plaintiff s cause of action” or said differently, “the ‘critical consideration’ is What the cause of action is ‘based on.’” (Id.) Ultimately, the Chaker Court concluded that the nature of the statements concerned Chaker’s “character” and “trustworthiness” in the community, and therefore were of public interest to the community. (Id. at p. 1146.) The Chaker Court also concluded that the statements generally were “nonactionable opinion.” (Id. at pp. 1149-1 150.) As it pertains to the case at bar, Plaintiff’s cause of action for libel is directly based upon Defendant’s alleged statements that Plaintiff was seeking private investigators generally to aid Plaintiff in Violation of the active restraining order against Plaintiff and to otherwise continue t0 stalk 23490 16 DEFENDANTS’ ANTI-SLAPP MOTION ©WQONUI£UJNH NNNNNNNNr-xr-xr-xp-xp-xp-xp-xu-xp-tu-x qam-nwnr-xcccoxlcxmthr-xc 28 COLLINS+ COLLINS u. 790 E. Colorado Boulevard Suite 600 Pasadena, CA 91101 Phone (626) 243-1100 Fax (626) 243-11 11 and harass Ms. Nemac. This meets the principle thrust 0r gravamen test under Chaker. Further, and as stated, Defendant’s alleged statements concerned possible criminality and putting others directly interested (i.e., other private investigators) 0n notice 0f such potentially unlawful activity, which is protected. (Briscoe, supra, at pp. 536-537.) Moreover, Plaintiff alleges that the purported defamatory statements were “broadcast” far and Wide, “accessible t0 anyone. .. globally.” (Complaint, 1] 13.) Such allegations of “global” reach tend t0 suggest concerning “a substantial number 0f people.” In any event, it remains that Where the issue is not of interest t0 the public at large, but rather to a “limited, but definable portion of the public (a private group, organization, 0r community),” the statements are protected where they, “at a minimum, occur in the context of an ongoing controversy, dispute, 0r discussion,” such that it warrants protection encouraging public participation. (Terry, supra, at p. 1549.) In other words, Defendant’s statements are further protected even as it would concern the limited and definable group of private investigators, as the statements directly concerned an ongoing and active contested restraining order and those person’s reasonable interest in not inadvertently involving themselves in potential unlawful conduct 0r stalking on behalf 0f Plaintiff. As such, Defendant has carried her burden to demonstrate that her alleged defamatory statements are protected under Section 425. 16(e)(3) as they were made in a public forum and concern an issue of public interest. C. Defendant’s Alleged Defamatorv Speech is Protected Under Section 426.16(e)(4) Because thev were Communications Arising from Defendant’s Exercise 0f her Constitutional Right t0 Free Speech in Connection with an Issue 0f Public Interest. Even if this Court were to find that Defendant had not posted the alleged defamatory speech t0 a “public forum 0r place open t0 the public,” as required by subsection (c)(3), the anti-SLAPP statute would still apply pursuant to subsection (e)(4), based on the fact that under subsection (e)(4), a public forum is not required. (See also, Hailstone v. Martinez (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 728, 736.) Similar to subsection (e)(3), and t0 the extent it would apply here, subsection (e)(4) also applies to private communications concerning issues of public interest. (Id.) For the sake of brevity, Defendant Will refrain from reiterating verbatim her legal and factual support and analysis demonstrating that Defendant’s alleged defamatory statements were in connection With an issue 0f public interest. 23490 17 DEFENDANTS’ ANTI-SLAPP MOTION ©WQONUI£UJNH NNNNNNNNh-th-th-th-th-th-th-tt-th-tr-t \IQUI-thr-tcwcoqchI-BWNHc 28 COLLINS+ COLLINS u. 790 E. Colorado Boulevard Suite 600 Pasadena, CA 91101 Phone (626) 243-1100 Fax (626) 243-11 11 Sufficed t0 say, Defendant’s alleged defamatory speech concerned Defendant’s belief that Plaintiff was potentially seeking any private investigators t0 potentially Violate an active restraining order against Plaintiff, and/or potential stalking on the part of Plaintiff. Such speech was in furtherance of Defendant’s exercise 0f free speech in connection With an issue 0f public interest. Thus, for this independent reason, Defendant has further carried her burden t0 demonstrate that her alleged defamatory statements are protected under Section 425.16(e)(4) as they were made in connection With and concerned an issue of public interest. D. Plaintiff is Unlikelv to Demonstrate that He Would Prevail on His Claim. As stated above, once the defendant makes a showing of protected activity under the statute, the burden shifts t0 Plaintiff t0 show a “probability that the plaintiff Will prevail 0n the claim.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(b)(1); Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384.) This includes both the “substantive merits of the plaintiff‘s complaint” and “all available defenses... including, but not limited to constitutional defenses.” (A Traditional Cat Ass'n, Inc. v. Gilbreath (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 392, 398.) T0 satisfy his burden, Plaintiff must “substantiate. .. a legally sufficient claim.” (Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidesz‘er (2002) 28 Cal.4th 81 1, 821.) Plaintiff must rely on admissible, affirmative evidence. (Evans v. Unkow (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1490, 1497.) Moreover, t0 overcome an affirmative defense, the evidence must be unequivocal. (Optional Capital, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss, Hauer & Feld LLP (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 95, 118-19 [inference does not suffice unless the inference is the “only plausible inference that may be drawn from undisputed facts”].) In addition t0 the speech complained ofbeing protected, as detailed above, there exist several additional independent reasons why, as a matter 0f law, Plaintiff Will not be able to demonstrate a probability 0f success as t0 his single cause of action for libel. First, Plaintiff’s Complaint is time- barred. Next, Plaintiff is a “vexatious litigant” and neither sought the Court’s permission to file suit, nor posted the required $100,000.00 bond. Further, Defendant’s alleged defamatory statements are true and/or nonactionable opinion. /// /// /// 23490 18 DEFENDANTS’ ANTI-SLAPP MOTION ©WQONUI£UJNH NNNNNNNNh-th-th-th-th-th-th-tt-th-tr-t \IQUI-thchOOQGNUI-BWNHG 28 COLLINS+ COLLINS u. 790 E. Colorado Boulevard Suite 600 Pasadena, CA 91101 Phone (626) 243-1100 Fax (626) 243-11 11 1. PlaintifPs Complaint is Time-Barred. It is well-established that a complaint must be filed Within the statutory deadline associated With the claim. Plaintiff s cause of action for libel carries a one-year statute of limitations. (Code CiV. Proc. § 340(0).) Further, California law follows the ‘single publication rule,’ Which governs the accrual dates for a plaintiff s cause of action, and restricts a plaintiff to only one claim for each mass publication and dissemination of a statement by a publisher, and may not bring multiple claims for each subsequent copy 0r publishing. Christofl v. Nestle USA, Inc. (2009) Cal.4th 468, 476-483; Shively v. Bozam'ch (2003) 31 Ca.4th 1230, 1242-1246). Notably, the rule applies Where the challenged statement is published 0n a website. (Traditional Cat Ass’n, Inc. v. Gilbreaz‘h (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 392, 402-404; Yeager v. Bowlin, 693 F.3d 1076, 1082 (9th Cir. 2012) [Internet “publication” occurs when a statement is first made available to the public online].) Moreover, a statement on a website is not “republished” merely because defendant continues to host the site. (Yeager, supra, at p. 1082.) Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint that Defendant “broadcast” the alleged defamatory statements on October 3 1 , 20 1 6. (Complaint, 1] 13 .) Plaintiffdid not file his lawsuit against Defendant until February 3, 2021, approximately five and a half years after Plaintiff alleges the first and only publication of Defendant’s purportedly defamatory statements. It is without dispute, Plaintiff’s cause of action for libel is well outside the one-year statute 0f limitations and is therefore time-barred. Assuming arguendo Plaintiffwere able to apply a theory 0f delayed discovery, and Defendant maintains Plaintiff cannot, Plaintiff s Complaint would still be time-barred. In his Complaint, Plaintiff admits he was aware 0f the Defendant’s publication 0f the alleged defamatory statements at least by “January 0f 2020.” (Complaint, 1] 22.) Again, Plaintiff’ s filed his Complaint 0n February 3, 2021. However slight, Plaintiff still failed to file his Complaint Within one year 0f actual knowledge and notice of facts that would give rise to his cause of action. Plaintiff s is not able to cure this defect and is unable t0 provide any evidence that would support an opposition to the fact that Plaintiff failed t0 timely file his Complaint. 23490 19 DEFENDANTS’ ANTI-SLAPP MOTION ©WQONUIBUJNH NNNNNNNNr-xr-xr-xp-xp-xp-xp-xu-xp-tu-x \Iaxu-hwnr-xcccoqaxmthr-xc 28 COLLINS+ COLLINS u. 790 E. Colorado Boulevard Suite 600 Pasadena, CA 91101 Phone (626) 243-1100 Fax (626) 243-11 11 Therefore, Plaintiff’s Complaint is time-barred. As such, Plaintiff necessarily will be unable to prevail 0n his libel cause of action. This alone should provide the Court ample reason t0 grant Defendant’s instant anti-SLAPP motion. 2. Plaintiff is a Vexatious Litigant. On November 4, 2020, Plaintiff was deemed by order of the Superior Court of California, County of Santa Clara, t0 be a vexatious litigant? (RFJN, Eth. C, D, E, & F.) As of the date 0f this Motion, Plaintiff remains named to the Judicial Counsel of California’s “Vexatious Litigant List.” (RFJN, Exh. F, p. 71.) By order of the Court, Plaintiff must have sought the Court’s permission to file his Complaint, and moreover must have posted $100,000.00 bond. (RFJN, Exhs. C, D, & E.) The records concerning this matter do not suggest 0r evidence that Plaintiff complied With the Court’s order. (Colletti Decl., 1] 9.) As such, Plaintiff’ s Complaint should not have even been filed 0r brought in the first place, and Plaintiff can provide no evidence to the contrary. Provided the Court maintains Plaintiff’s vexatious litigant status, and it does not provide ex post facto permission t0 file his Complaint, Plaintiff cannot prevail 0n his cause 0f action of libel because his case Will be dismissed. 3. Defendant’s Statements were True 0r Were Otherwise Nonactionable Opinion. Additionally, as it concerns Plaintiffs ability to prevail on the merits of his libel cause 0f action, it is well-established that truth is a complete defense. (Francis v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 535, 540.) Notably, California law overlooks minor inaccuracies and concentrates on substantial truth. (Gilbert v. Sykes (2007) 147 Ca1.App.4th 12, 28; Gantry Constr. C0. v. Am. Pipe & COnstr. C0. (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 186.) The issue 0f Whether a statement is true 0r substantially true is normally considered to be a factual one. (D.A.R.E. America v. Rolling Stone Magazine, (2000) 101 F.Supp.2d 1270, 1288 (C.D.Ca1.). Here, Defendant’s alleged defamatory statements are generally and substantively true (i.e., Defendant did briefly work 0n a case for Plaintiff and chose not to continue because she felt her services were borderline stalking, and Plaintiff was the accused and the subject of a restraining order filed in family court under domestic Violence, that included allegations of stalking). (Complaint, 2 Defendant has filed a Motion to Dismiss regarding Plaintiff’s status as a vexatious litigant and failing to adhere to orders. 23490 20 DEFENDANTS’ ANTI-SLAPP MOTION ©WQONUI£UJNH NNNNNNNNh-th-th-th-th-th-th-tt-th-tr-t \IQUI-thr-tcwcoqc‘xUI-BWNHG 28 COLLINS+ COLLINS u. 790 E. Colorado Boulevard Suite 600 Pasadena, CA 91101 Phone (626) 243-1100 Fax (626) 243-11 11 generally.) As such, Defendant’s statements were generally true, and truth is an absolute defense. (Francis, supra, at p. 540.) As such, Plaintiff is unlikely t0 prevail 0n his claim for libel. To the extent that portions of Defendant’s alleged defamatory statements would not fall under the absolute defense 0f truth, Defendant’s alleged statements should be considered nonactionable opinion. Again, this issue is analogous to and addressed in Chaker v. Mateo discussed above. The Chaker Court stated that, “the critical determination of Whether the allegedly defamatory statement constitutes fact 0r opinion is a question of law.” (Chaker, supra, at p. 1147.) The Court goes on to state that, “we must 100k t0 the totality 0f the circumstances Which gave rise t0 the statements and in particular the context in Which the statements were made.” (Id.) The Court ultimately concludes that “the overall thrust 0f the comments attributed is that Chaker is a dishonest and scary person. This overall appraisal 0f Chaker is on its face nothing more than a negative, but nonactionable opinion. (Id. at p. 1149.) Here, Defendant’s alleged statements, taken in the context in Which they were made, are clearly statements based 0n Defendant’s opinion of her experiences with Plaintiff. Defendant’s alleged statements that, “there’s something very seriously wrong with this man and the work he is requesting t0 be done,” and “the work he is requesting would Violate the restraining order” are clear statements of opinion, similar t0 Chaker (i.e., Chaker is a “dishonest” 0r “scary person”). As such, such statements should be similarly determined to be “negative, but nonactionable opinion.” IV. DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO REASONABLE ATTORNEY’S FEES “[A] prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike is entitled to recover his 0r her attorney’s fees and costs.” (Code. CiV. Proc. § 425.16(c)(1).) Should the Court grant this Motion, Defendant is entitled t0 recover attorney’s fees and costs in an amount of $18,690.00, as set forth in the declaration ofNicholas R. Colletti, attached herewith. /// /// /// /// 23490 21 DEFENDANTS’ ANTI-SLAPP MOTION ©WQONUI£UJNH NNNNNNNNr-xr-xr-xr-xr-xr-xr-xu-xp-tu-x qcxm-nwwwcccoxlcxmthr-xc 28 COLLINS+ COLLINS u. 790 E. Colorado Boulevard Suite 600 Pasadena, CA 91101 Phone (626) 243-1100 Fax (626) 243-11 11 V. W Given the foregoing, Defendant respectfully requests that this Court grant this Special Motion to Strike Plaintiff s Complaint, as it arises from constitutionally protected activity under California’s Anti-SLAPP statute and Plaintiff cannot demonstrate a probability of success of prevailing 0n the merits of his single libel cause of action. Additionally, Defendant further respectfully requests any relief this Court deems just and proper. DATED: December 3, 2021 23490 COLLINS + COLLINS LLP By: 'NICHOLAS R. COLLETTI ROBERT H. STELLWAGEN, JR. Attorneys for Marsha Edick and API Services 22 DEFENDANTS’ ANTI-SLAPP MOTION ©WQONUIBUJNH NNNNNNNNr-xr-xr-xr-xr-xr-xr-xu-xp-tu-x \chu-hwnr-xcccoxlcxmthr-xc 28 COLLINS+ COLLINS u. 790 E. Colorado Boulevard Suite 600 Pasadena, CA 91101 Phone (626) 243-1100 Fax (626) 243-11 11 PROOF OF SERVICE (CCP §§ 1013(a) and 2015.5; FRCP 5) State 0f California, ss. County of San Diego. vvvv I am employed in the County 0f San Diego, State 0f California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party t0 the within action; my business address is 2011 Palomar Airport Rd., Suite 207, Carlsbad, California 9201 1. On this date, I served the foregoing document described as NOTICE OF MOTION AND SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF RANDALL SHULER’S COMPLAINT on the interested parties in this action by placing same in a sealed envelope, addressed as follows: Randall Shuler, in Pro Per P.O. Box 5713 San Jose, CA 95150 (415) 500-5952 PLAINTIFF, IN PRO PER E gfiY MAIL} - I caused such envelope(s) with postage thereon fully prepaid t0 be placed in the United States mail in Carlsbad, California t0 be served 0n the parties as indicated 0n the attached service list. I am “readily familiar” with the film’s practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice, it would be deposited With the U.S. Postal Service 0n that same day with postage thereon fillly prepaid at Carlsbad, California in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion 0fthe patty served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after date 0f deposit for mailing in affidavit. D (BY CERTIFIED MAIL) - I caused such envelope(s) with postage thereon fully prepaid Via Certified Mail Return Receipt Requested to be placed in the United States Mail in Carlsbad, California. D FEDERAL EXPRESS - I caused the envelope to be delivered to an authorized courier 0r driver authorized to receive documents with delivery fees provided for. D (BY ELECTRONIC FILING AND/OR SERVICE) - I served a true copy, With all exhibits, electronically on designated recipients listed 0n the attached service list. D LECTRONIC SERVICE PER CODE CIV. PROC. 1010.6) - By prior consent or request 0r as required by rules 0f court (Code Civ. Proc., § 1010.6 (amended Jan. 1, 2021); Code Civ. Proc., § 1013(g); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.251(a)). (BY PERSONAL SERVICE) - I caused such envelope(s) to be delivered by hand to the office(s) of the addressee(s). Executed 0n December 3, 2021 at Carlsbad, California. g gSTATEl - I declare under penalty of peljury under the laws ofthe State 0f California that the above is true and correct. the bar 0f this court at whose direction the service wasD gEEDERAL! - I declare that I amemploWof a made. ‘ 'rAYLER ALHERS talfiers@ccllp.law 23490 23 DEFENDANTS’ ANTI-SLAPP MOTION