NoticeCal. Super. - 6th Dist.February 3, 2021©WQONUI£UJNH NNNNNNNNr-xr-xr-xr-xr-xr-xr-xu-xp-tu-x qam-nwnwcccoqcxmthr-xc 28 COLLINS+ COLLINS u. 790 E. Colorado Boulevard Suite 600 Pasadena, CA 91101 Phone (626) 243-1100 Fax (626) 243-11 11 Robert H. Stellwagen, Jr., Esq., (State Bar N0. 150560) E'eCtronically Filed Nicholas R. Colletti, Esq. (State Bar No. 283947) by Superior Court of CA, COLLINS + COLLINS LLP County of Santa Clara, 790 E. Colorado Boulevard, Suite 600 0n 12/1 3/2021 4:37 PM Pasadena, CA 91101 Reviewed By: R. Tien (626) 243-1100 - FAX (626) 243-1111 Case #21 CV377043 rstellwagen@ccllp.law EnveIOpe: 785441 6 ncolletti@ccllp.law Attorneys for DEFENDANTS MARSHA EDICK and API SERVICES SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA- DOWNTOWN SUPERIOR COURT RANDALL SHULER, CASE NO. 21CV377043 [Assigned t0 Hon. Drew C. Takaichi, Dept. 2] Plaintiffs, NOTICE THAT PLAINTIFF IS A VEXATIOUS LITIGANT SUBJECT TO A PREFILING ORDER; REQUEST TO DISMISS THE ACTION; DECLARATION OF NICHOLAS R. COLLETTI VS. MARSHA EDICK, API SERVICES, and DOES 1 through 10, Defendants. Complaint Filed: 02/03/2021 Trial Date: None vvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvv TO THE COURT, ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD HEREIN, AND TO PLAINTIFF ACTING IN PROPRIA PERSONA: Please take notice that pursuant to section 39 1 .7(c), 0fthe California Code 0f Civil Procedure, Defendants MARSHA EDICK and API SERVICES (“Defendants”), here provides written notice that Plaintiff RANDALL SHULER (“Plaintiff’) is a vexatious litigant subject t0 a prefiling order issued by the Placer Superior Court on or about December 3, 2020. 23490 1 NTC THAT PLTF IS A VEXATIOUS LITIGANT AND REQ FOR DISMISSAL ©WQONUI£UJNH NNNNNNNNr-xr-xr-xr-xr-xr-xr-xu-xp-tu-x \chu-hwwwcccoxlcxmthr-xc 28 COLLINS+ COLLINS u. 790 E. Colorado Boulevard Suite 600 Pasadena, CA 91101 Phone (626) 243-1100 Fax (626) 243-11 11 In accordance With the provisions 0f section 391.7(0), Defendants requests the imposition of an automatic stay, and the automatic dismissal of the litigation unless, Within 10 days of the filing of this notice, Plaintiff obtains an order from the presiding judge permitting the filing 0f this litigation as set forth in Code 0f Civil Procedure section 391.7(b). This Notice that Plaintiff is a Vexatious Litigant Subj ect t0 a Prefiling Order and Request for Dismissal is made and based upon this Notice, the attached Memorandum 0f Points and Authorities, the Request for Judicial Notice filed concurrently herewith, the Declaration Nicholas R. Colletti, the documents and pleadings on file herein with this Court, and any other matters that the Court may receive at the hearing on this matter. DATED: December 3, 2021 COLLINS + COLLINS LLP 23490 By= 'NICHOLAS R. COLLETTI ROBERT H. STELLWAGEN, JR. Attorneys for DEFENDANTS MARSHA EDICK and API SERVICES 2 NTC THAT PLTF IS A VEXATIOUS LITIGANT AND REQ FOR DISMISSAL ©WQONUIBUJNH NNNNNNNNh-th-th-th-th-th-th-tt-th-tr-t \IQUI-thr-tcwcoqc‘xUI-BWNHG 28 COLLINS+ COLLINS u. 790 E. Colorado Boulevard Suite 600 Pasadena, CA 91101 Phone (626) 243-1100 Fax (626) 243-11 11 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES I. INTRODUCTION: PLAINTIFF HAS ALREADY BEEN DECLARED A VEXATIOUS LITIGANT SUBJECT TO A PREFILING ORDER. Plaintiff RANDALL SHULER (“Plaintiff”) has already been declared a vexatious litigant subj ect t0 a prefiling order. Santa Clara Superior Court deemed him a vexatious litigant and subjected him to the statutory requirements provided by Code of Civil Procedure sections 391.3, 391.4, and 391.7. Pursuant t0 section 391.7(c), stating in pertinent part that Plaintiff is prohibited from filing a new litigation without first obtaining permission from the presiding judge 0f the court where the new litigation is proposed to be filed. Plaintiff was also ordered t0 post $100,000.00 bond as a condition of filing any new litigation. As such, Plaintiff is forbidden from filing a new litigation in the courts of the state of California without first obtaining leave from the proposed presiding judge and posting a bond. However, Plaintiff has failed to obey or otherwise comply With this Court order. Despite having notice 0fthe prefiling requirements, Plaintiff neglected to seek any leave from this Court prior t0 filing this action against Defendants MARSHA EDICK and API SERVICES (“Defendants”). Plaintiff also did not post the required conditional bond. Because Plaintiff has failed t0 obey and otherwise comply the prefiling order and cannot make the necessary showing that his action against Defendants has merit within 10 days 0f this notice, this action must be automatically dismissed. II. THE COURT MAY DISMISS THE ACTION FOR FAILURE TO OBEY THE PREFILING ORDER. Section 391 .7(c) provides that the clerk may not file any litigation presented by a vexatious litigant subject to a prefiling order unless the vexatious litigant first obtains an order from the presiding judge permitting the filing. (Code CiV. Proc. § 391.7(0)). If a clerk files such litigation Without the required order from the presiding judge, any party may file With the clerk and serve a notice stating that the plaintiff is a vexatious litigant subject to a prefiling order. (Code CiV. Proc. § 391.7(0)). The filing 0f this notice automatically stays the litigation. (Code CiV. Proc. § 391.7(0)). “The litigation shall be automatically dismissed unless the plaintiff within 10 days of the filing of 23490 3 NTC THAT PLTF IS A VEXATIOUS LITIGANT AND REQ FOR DISMISSAL ©WQONUI£UJNH NNNNNNNNh-th-th-th-th-th-th-tt-th-tr-t \IQUI-thr-tcwcoqchI-BWNHG 28 COLLINS+ COLLINS u. 790 E. Colorado Boulevard Suite 600 Pasadena, CA 91101 Phone (626) 243-1100 Fax (626) 243-11 11 that notice obtains an order from the presiding justice or presiding judge permitting the filing of the litigation” as set forth in section 391.7(b). (Code CiV. Proc. §391.7(c) (emphasis added)). Section 391.7(b) provides that the filing shall be permitted only if appears that the litigation has merit and has not been filed for the purposes of harassment 0r delay. (Code CiV. Proc. § 391.7(b)). III. PLAINTIFF DID NOT OBTAIN LEAVE FROM THE COURT TO FILE THIS ACTION NOR CAN HE SHOW THAT HIS CASE HAS MERIT. A. Plaintiff did Not Obtain Leave from the Court t0 File is Complaint. Plaintiff has already been declared a vexatious litigant subject to a prefiling order. “Where a plaintiff has already been declared vexatious, defendant moving under vexatious litigant statute need not again establish plaintiff’s status.” (Hupp v. Salem Oak Valley Greens Association (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1300, 131 1.) If Plaintiff does not obtain the court’s permission to proceed with this litigation within 10 days of this notice, it must be dismissed. In Kovacevic v. Avalon at Eagles’ Crossing Homeowners Association (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 667, the court properly dismissed a complaint filed by a vexatious litigant for failing t0 comply With the prefiling order. In Kovacevic, defendants filed a notice pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 391.7(0) stating that plaintiff was a vexatious litigant Who is subjected t0 a prefiling order. The defendants argued that the clerk had mistakenly filed plaintiff’s complaint and requested that the court dismiss the case pursuant t0 section 391.7(0). The court in Kovacevic held that Plaintiff was a vexatious litigant who was subject to a prefiling order that precluded her from filing a litigation in propria persona Without Obtaining permission from the presiding judgment. The court noted that plaintiff had not obtained the requisite permission, and properly entered judgment of dismissal in favor of the defendants. (Id. at 681). In Hupp v. Salem Oak Valley Greens Association (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1300, the plaintiff had also been declared a vexatious litigant subject t0 a prefiling order. The defendant filed a notice 0f vexatious litigant order, indicating that the court mistakenly filed the complaint in Violation of a prior order declaring the plaintiff a vexatious litigant. Because the plaintiff did not obtain an order of 23490 4 NTC THAT PLTF IS A VEXATIOUS LITIGANT AND REQ FOR DISMISSAL ©WQONUI£UJNH NNNNNNNNr-xr-xr-xp-xp-xp-xp-xu-xp-tu-x \Iaxu-hwnr-xcccoqaxmthr-xc 28 COLLINS+ COLLINS u. 790 E. Colorado Boulevard Suite 600 Pasadena, CA 91101 Phone (626) 243-1100 Fax (626) 243-11 11 permission to file his complaint, the court properly dismissed the action after the 10-day period had run. Like Kovacevic and Hupp, Plaintiff has already been declared a vexatious litigant subject to the 2017 prefiling order that precludes him from filing any new litigation, including the present action, in propria persona Without first obtaining an order permitting the filing. Similarly, Plaintiff did not, at any time, obtain such an order from this Court and the court clerk mistakenly filed Plaintiff s Complaint. (Declaration ofNicholas R. Colletti (“Colletti Decl.”), 1] 5.) Plaintiff must be required to make the necessary showing to proceed With this litigation and obtain an order from this Court permitting him to proceed With this litigation the statutory time period 0f 10 days. Pursuant to the plain language of section 391.7(0), if Plaintiff fails to d0 so, this case must be automatically dismissed. (Kovacevic, supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at 682 (‘We first examine the words themselves because the statutory language is generally the most reliable indicator 0f legislative intent. . .The words of the statute should be given their ordinary and usual meaning and should be construed in their statutory context. . .. If the statutory language is unambiguous, ‘we presume the Legislature meant What it said, and the plain meaning 0f the statute governs. ’)) The Legislature enacted section 391.7 t0 provide the courts With an additional means to counter misuse 0f the system by vexatious litigants. (Bravo v. Ismaj (2002) 99 Ca1.App.4th 211, 221.) “The prefiling order. . .is a powerful weapon t0 battle the vexatious litigant.” (Camerado Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Superior Court (1993) 12 Cal. App. 4th 838, 844.) Thus, “dismissing a lawsuit that the vexatious litigant had n0 right to file in the first p1ace...is fully consistent With the statute’s purpose of ‘counter[ing] misuse of the system by vexatious litigants. ’” (Bravo, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at 21 1.) 1 B. Plaintiff is Unlikelv t0 Demonstrate that He Would Prevail on His Claim. There exist several independent reasons why, as a matter of law, Plaintiff Will not be able t0 demonstrate a probability 0f success as t0 his single cause of action for libel. First, Plaintiff’s 1 Dismissal pursuant to section 391.7(0) does not require notice requirements under Code 0f Civil Procedure section 1005 either. “If a plaintiff is a vexatious litigant Who has been served a notice 0f vexatious litigant order under section 391.7(0), the section 1005 notice requirements are superseded by section 391.7(c).” (Hupp, supra, 12 Ca1.App.5th 1300, 1312.) 23490 5 NTC THAT PLTF IS A VEXATIOUS LITIGANT AND REQ FOR DISMISSAL ©WQONUIBUJNH NNNNNNNNh-th-th-th-th-th-th-tt-th-tr-t \IQUI-thr-tchOQGNUI-BWNHG 28 COLLINS+ COLLINS u. 790 E. Colorado Boulevard Suite 600 Pasadena, CA 91101 Phone (626) 243-1100 Fax (626) 243-11 11 Complaint is time-barred. Next, the basis of Plaintiff” s Complaint concerns activity/conduct which is protected under California Anti-SLAPP State, Code of Civil Procedure, section 425.16. Further, Defendant’s alleged defamatory statements are true and/or nonactionable opinion. 1. Plaintiff’s Complaint is Time-Barred. It is well-established that a complaint must be filed Within the statutory deadline associated with the claim. Plaintiff” s cause of action for libel carries a one-year statute of limitations. (Code Civ. Proc. § 340(0).) Further, California law follows the ‘single publication rule,’ Which governs the accrual dates for a plaintiff s cause of action, and restricts a plaintiff t0 only one claim for each mass publication and dissemination of a statement by a publisher, and may not bring multiple claims for each subsequent copy or publishing. Christofl v. Nestle USA, Inc. (2009) Ca1.4th 468, 476-483; Shively v. Bozam'ch (203) 31 Ca.4th 1230, 1242-1246). Notably, the rule applies Where the challenged statement is published on a website. (Traditional Cat Ass'n, Inc. v. Gilbreath (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 392, 402-404; Yeager v. Bowlin, 693 F.3d 1076, 1082 (9th Cir. 2012) [Internet “publication” occurs When a statement is first made available t0 the public online].) Moreover, a statement on a website is not “republished” merely because defendant continues t0 host the site. (Yeager, supra, at p. 1082.) Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint that Defendant “broadcast” the alleged defamatory statements on October 3 1 , 20 1 6. (Complaint, fl 13 .) Plaintiffdid not file his lawsuit against Defendant until February 3, 2021, approximately five and a half years after Plaintiff alleges the first and only publication of Defendant’s purportedly defamatory statements. It is Without dispute, Plaintiff’ s cause of action for libel is well outside the one-year statute 0f limitations and is therefore time-barred. Assuming arguendo Plaintiffwere able t0 apply a theory of delayed discovery, and Defendant maintains Plaintiff cannot, Plaintiff” s Complaint would still be time-barred. In his Complaint, Plaintiff admits he was aware of the Defendant’s publication 0f the alleged defamatory statements at least by “January 0f 2020.” (Complaint, 1] 22.) Again, Plaintiff’ s filed his Complaint 0n February 3, 2021. However slight, Plaintiff still failed to file his Complaint Within one-yar 0f actual knowledge and notice of facts that would give rise to his cause of action. Plaintiff’ s is not able t0 cure this defect and is unable to provide any evidence that would support an opposition to the fact that Plaintiff failed to timely file his Complaint. 23490 6 NTC THAT PLTF IS A VEXATIOUS LITIGANT AND REQ FOR DISMISSAL ©WQONUIBUJNH NNNNNNNNh-th-th-th-th-th-th-tt-th-tr-t \IQUI-thr-tchOQGNUI-BWNHG 28 COLLINS+ COLLINS u. 790 E. Colorado Boulevard Suite 600 Pasadena, CA 91101 Phone (626) 243-1100 Fax (626) 243-11 11 Therefore, Plaintiff’s Complaint is time-barred. As such, Plaintiff necessarily will be unable to prevail 0n his libel cause 0f action. 2. Plaintiff is a Vexatious Litigant. California's anti-SLAPP statute “protects defendants from meritless lawsuits that might chill the exercise 0f their rights to speak and petition 0n matters ofpublic concern.” (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 883-84.) The statute authorizes a special motion t0 strike claims “arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person's right 0f petition or free speech. .. in connection With a public issue.” (Code CiV. Proc. § 425. 16(b)(1).) The statute is “broadly construed to encourage continued participation in free speech and petition activities.” (Wanland v. Law Oflices ofMastagm', Holstedt & Chiurazzi (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 15, 22.) The defendant does not need to prove that her actions are constitutionally protected as a matter 0f law. (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 94-95.) Defendants’ Anti-SLAPP motion was filed simultaneously With this instant Motion, and fully details Defendants’ complete fact, legal argument and analysis. Notwithstanding, Section 425.16, subdivision (e), provides: “As used in this section, ‘acts in furtherance of a person's right of petition or free speech under the United States 0r California Constitution in connection With a public issue’ includes: (1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law; (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection With an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, 0r judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law; (3) any written or oral statement 0r writing made in a place open t0 the public or a public forum in connection With an issue of public interest; (4) 0r any other conduct in furtherance 0f the exercise 0f the constitutional right of petition 0r the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue 0r an issue of public interest.” Defendant’s alleged defamatory speech is protected under Section 425. 16(e)(2), (3), and (4) respectively? As such, Plaintiff is further unlikely to prevail on his claim. 2 As t0 Section 425. 16(e)(1) - statements made before a legislative/official proceeding, current information/knowledge does not suggest such statements were made 0r were alleged t0 have been made that would trigger this subsection, and 23490 7 NTC THAT PLTF IS A VEXATIOUS LITIGANT AND REQ FOR DISMISSAL ©WQONUI£UJNH NNNNNNNNh-th-th-th-th-th-th-tt-th-tr-t \IQUI-thchOOQGNUI-BWNHc 28 COLLINS+ COLLINS u. 790 E. Colorado Boulevard Suite 600 Pasadena, CA 91101 Phone (626) 243-1100 Fax (626) 243-11 11 3. Defendant’s Statements were True or Were Otherwise Nonactionable Opinion. Additionally, as it concerns Plaintiff’s ability to prevail on the merits of his libel cause 0f action, it is well-established that truth is a complete defense. (Francis v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 535, 540.) Notably, California law overlooks minor inaccuracies and concentrates on substantial truth. (Gilbert v. Sykes (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 12, 28; Gantry Constr. C0. v. Am. Pipe & COnstr. C0. (1975) 49 Ca1.App.3d 186.) The issue of Whether a statement is true or substantially true is normally considered t0 be a factual one. (D.A.R.E. America v. Rolling Stone Magazine, (2000) 101 F.Supp.2d 1270, 1288 (C.D.Cal.). Here, Defendant’s alleged defamatory statements are generally and substantively true (116., Defendant did briefly work on a case for Plaintiff and chose not t0 continue because she felt her services were borderline stalking, and Plaintiff was the accused and the subject of a restraining order filed in family court under domestic Violence, that included allegations of stalking). (Complaint, generally.) As such, Defendant’s statements were generally true, and truth is an absolute defense. (Francis, supra, at p. 540.) As such, Plaintiff is unlikely t0 prevail 0n his claim for libel. To the extent that portions of Defendant’s alleged defamatory statements would not fall under the absolute defense 0f truth, Defendant’s alleged statements should be considered nonactionable opinion. This issue is analogous to and addressed in Chaker v. Mateo (2012) 209 Ca1.App.4th 138. The Chaker Court stated that, “the critical determination of Whether the allegedly defamatory statement constitutes fact 0r opinion is a question of law.” (Chaker, supra, at p. 1147.) The Court goes on to state that, “we must 100k t0 the totality 0f the circumstances Which gave rise t0 the statements and in particular the context in which the statements were made.” (Id.) The Court ultimately concludes that “the overall thrust 0f the comments attributed is that Chaker is a dishonest and scary person. This overall appraisal of Chaker is 0n its face nothing more than a negative, but nonactionable opinion. (Id. at p. 1149.) therefore it will not be further discussed. However, Defendant reserves the right t0 raise such an argument and associated facts, should the same arise at some later time. 23490 8 NTC THAT PLTF IS A VEXATIOUS LITIGANT AND REQ FOR DISMISSAL ©WQONUI£UJNH NNNNNNNNr-xr-xr-xp-xp-xp-xp-xu-xp-tu-x \chu-hwnr-xcccoqaxmthr-xc 28 COLLINS+ COLLINS u. 790 E. Colorado Boulevard Suite 600 Pasadena, CA 91101 Phone (626) 243-1100 Fax (626) 243-11 11 Here, Defendant’s alleged statements, taken in the context in Which they were made, are clearly statements based 0n Defendant’s opinion of her experiences with Plaintiff. Defendant’s alleged statements that, “there’s something very seriously wrong With this man and the work he is requesting t0 be done,” and “the work he is requesting would Violate the restraining order” are clear statements of opinion, similar t0 Chaker (i.e., Chaker is a “dishonest” 0r “scary person”). As such, such statements should be similarly determined to be “negative, but nonactionable opinion.” IV. IF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT ENDURES, HE MUST POST $100,000.00 BOND. Section 391.7(b) further provides that if Plaintiff does make the necessary showing that his case has merit and was not brought for harassment, the presiding judge may condition the filing of litigation upon the furnishing of security for the benefit 0f the defendants. The term “defendants” is broadly defined t0 include a person (including a corporation, association; or partnership) against whom litigation is brought 0r maintained, or sought t0 be brought 0r maintained. (Code CiV. Proc. § 39 1 (6)). Certainly, Defendants fall under that definition in this litigation. Thus, ifPlaintiff is permitted to proceed With his litigation, Defendants asks that Plaintiff be required to post reasonable security based 0n What this Court deems is necessary under the circumstances, but not les that $100,000.00, as per the Court’s previous order. (RFJN, Exh. E.) V. CONCLUSION Plaintiff has already been declared a vexatious litigant subject to the 2020 prefiling order. Plaintiff failed t0 comply With the prefiling requirements set forth in Code 0f Civil Procedure section 391.7(0). If Plaintiff fails t0 obtain this Court’s permission to proceed With this litigation Within the 10-day period following the filing of this notice, then this case must be automatically dismissed. DATED: December 3. 2021 COLLINS + COLLINS LLP By: ' NICHOLAS R. COLLETTIV ROBERT H. STELLWAGEN, JR. Attorneys for DEFENDANTS MARSHA EDICK and API SERVICES 23490 9 NTC THAT PLTF IS A VEXATIOUS LITIGANT AND REQ FOR DISMISSAL ©WQONUI£UJNH NNNNNNNNr-xr-xr-xr-xr-xr-xr-xu-xp-tu-x \chu-hwwwcccoqaxmthr-xc 28 COLLINS+ COLLINS u. 790 E. Colorado Boulevard Suite 600 Pasadena, CA 91101 Phone (626) 243-1100 Fax (626) 243-11 11 DECLARATION OF NICHOLAS R. COLLETTI I, Nicholas R. Colletti, declare as follows: 1. I am an attorney licensed t0 practice before the court of the State 0f California. I am an associate with the law firm of Collins + Collins, counsel of record for Defendants MARSHA EDICK and API SERVICES (“Defendants”) in this matter. Unless otherwise stated, Ihave personal knowledge of the following facts, and if called upon, could and would competently testify thereto. 2. I make this declaration in support of Defendants Notice that Plaintiff RANDALL SHULER (“Plaintiff”) is a Vexatious Litigant Subject to a Prefiling Order and Request for Dismissal. 3. On November 4, 2020, the Court ordered that Plaintiff is a vexatious litigant. 4. Per the Court’s order, and pursuant to Plaintiff” s status as a vexatious litigant, Plaintiff was required t0 obtain the Court’s permission t0 file his Complaint, and post $100,00.00 bond. 5. As 0f the filing 0f this motion, I Viewed the docket for this case multiple times at the on the Santa Clara Court’s website. Based on my review of the docket, Plaintiff did not obtain this Court’s permission to file this new litigation or post a bond as required by Code 0f Civil Procedure sections 391.3, 391.4, and 391.7. 6. Plaintiff filed his Complaint against Defendant on February 3, 2021. 7. Accompanying this Motion and this Declaration, I have included Requests for Judicial Notice 0f the following documents regarding previous litigation and orders directly concerning Plaintiff’s status as a vexatious litigant in Superior Court 0f California, County of Santa Clara, Case Number 16DV019635 entitled Nemac v. Shuler: A. September 12, 2016 Form DV-13O Restraining Order After Hearing, Which concerns the initial restraining order granted and issued against Plaintiffby petitioner, Jennifer Nemac. B. November 4, 2020 Form DV-730 Order to Renew Domestic Violence Restraining Order, Which concerns the permanent restraining order against Plaintiff, and the Court’s determination that Plaintiff is a vexatious litigant. 23490 10 NTC THAT PLTF IS A VEXATIOUS LITIGANT AND REQ FOR DISMISSAL ©WQONUIBUJNH NNNNNNNNr-xr-xr-xr-xr-xr-xr-xu-xp-tu-x qcxm-nwwwcccoxlcxmthr-xc 28 COLLINS+ COLLINS u. 790 E. Colorado Boulevard Suite 600 Pasadena, CA 91101 Phone (626) 243-1100 Fax (626) 243-11 11 C. November 4, 2020 Minute Order, Which concerns the permanent restraining order against Plaintiff, and the Court’s determination that Plaintiff is a vexatious litigant. D. December 3, 2020 Findings and Order After Hearing, Which concerns the Court’s determination that Plaintiff was deemed a vexatious litigant, that he is not permitted to file any new litigation in any Court 0f the State in pro per without first obtaining leave form the presiding judge of the Court Where the litigation is proposed, and that absent permission from the presiding judge, Plaintiffmust post a bond 0f $100,000.00 in favor of the opposing party as a condition of filing any litigation. E. December 3, 2020 Prefiling Order-Vexatious Litigant, Which concerns the Court’s determination that Plaintiff is a vexatious litigant. F. Current Judicial Counsel 0f California Vexatious Litigant List, which names Plaintff. 8. I also have requested the Court take judicial notice of Plaintiff’s Complaint. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State 0f California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in Carlsbad, California on this 3rd day ofDecember 2021. ICHOLAS R. COLLET 23490 11 NTC THAT PLTF IS A VEXATIOUS LITIGANT AND REQ FOR DISMISSAL \OWQONUIBUJNH NNNNNNNNr-xr-xr-xr-xr-xr-xr-xu-xp-tu-x \chu-hwwwcccoxlcxmthr-xc 28 COLLINS+ COLLINS u. 790 E. Colorado Boulevard Suite 600 Pasadena, CA 91101 Phone (626) 243-1100 Fax (626) 243-11 11 PROOF OF SERVICE (CCP §§ 1013(3) and 2015.5; FRCP 5) State of California, ss. County of San Diego. VVVV I am employed in the County of San Diego, State of California. I am over the age 0f 18 and not a patty t0 the Within action; my business address is 2011 Palomar Airport Rd., Suite 207, Carlsbad, California 9201 1. On this date, I served the foregoing document described as NOTICE THAT PLAINTIFF IS A VEXATIOUS LITIGANT SUBJECT TO A PREFILING ORDER; REQUEST TO DISMISS THE ACTION; DECLARATION OF NICHOLAS R. COLLETTI on the interested parties in this action by placing same in a sealed envelope, addressed as follows: Randall Shuler, in Pro Per P.O. Box 5713 San Jose, CA 95150 (415) 500-5952 PLAINTIFF, IN PRO PER E {BY MAIL! - I caused such envelope(s) with postage thereon fiJlly prepaid to be placed in the United States mail in Carlsba¢ California to be served 0n the patties as indicated 0n the attached service list. I am “readily familiar” With the firm’s practice 0f collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice, it would be deposited with the U.S. Postal Service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid at Carlsbad, California in the ordinary course 0f business. I am aware that on motion ofthe party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date 0r postage meter date is more than one day after date 0f deposit for mailing in affidavit. D (BY CERTIFIED MAIL) - I caused such envelope(s) with postage thereon fully prepaid Via Cettified Mail Retum Receipt Requested to be placed in the United States Mail in Carlsbad, California. D FEDERAL EXPRESS - I caused the envelope t0 be delivered to an authorized courier 0r driver authorized t0 receive documents With delivery fees provided for. D (BY ELECTRONIC FILING AND/OR SERVICE) - I served a true copy, With all exhibits, electronically on designated recipients listed 0n the attached service list. D gELECTRONIC SERVICE PER CODE CIV. PROC., § 1010.6) - By prior consent or request or as required by rules of court (Code CiV. Proc., § 1010.6 (amended Jan. 1, 2021); Code Civ. Proc., § 1013(g); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.251(a)). D (BY PERSONAL SERVICE) - I caused such envelope(s) t0 be delivered by hand t0 the office(s) of the addressee(s). Executed 011 December 3, 2021 at Carlsbad, California. E gSTATEQ - I declare under penalty of peljury under the laws 0fthe State 0f California that the above is true and correct. D QEDERA 1- I declare that I am employed 1n lce of a mber the bar of this court at Whose direction the service was made. *rAYLER ALHERS talfiers ccll .law 23490 12 NTC THAT PLTF IS A VEXATIOUS LITIGANT AND REQ FOR DISMISSAL