DeclarationCal. Super. - 6th Dist.February 11, 2021GCA LAW PARTNERS LLP Mountaln Vlew Callfornla \OOONQ 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 21 CH009861 Santa Clara - Civil JAMES L. JACOBS (SBN 158277) KATHRYN C. CURRY (SBN 157099) GCA LAW PARTNERS LLP 2570 W. E1 Camino Real, Suite 400 Mountain View, CA 94040 Telephone: (650) 428-3900 Facsimile: (650) 428-3901 Email: jjacobs@gcalaw.com kcurry@gcalaw.c0m Attorneys for Respondent MICHAEL HAN M. Sq Electronically Filed by Superior Court of CA, County of Santa Clara, on 10/1/2021 3:34 PM Reviewed By: M. Sorum Case #21 CH009861 Envelope: 7385455 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA IN AND FORTHE COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA UNLIMITED JURISDICTION BRIAN TRAN, Petitioner, V. MICHAEL HAN, Respondent. CASE NO. 21CH009861 DECLARATION OF KATHRYN C. CURRY IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT MICHAEL HAN’S MOTION FORATTORNEYS’ FEES Date: kg 12/21/21 Time: T 2:00 PM Dept: 4 rum DECLARATION OF KATHRYN C. CURRY ISO MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES- CASE NO. 2 1CH009861 GCA LAW PARTNERS LLP Mountain View Califorma .p QQUI 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 I, Kathryn C. Curry, , declare as follows: 1. I have personal knowledge ofthe facts contained in this declaration and if sworn as a Witness I could competently testify thereto. 2. I am an attorney at law duly licensed to practice before the courts of the State of California. I am a partner at GCA Law Partners LLP, attorneys of record for Respondent Michael Han. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated herein and if sworn as a Witness could and would competently testify thereto. 3. I have been an equity partner at GCA Law Partners since June 2008. I have been a litigation, benefits, and employment partner at GCA for the past twelve years. My practice covers a broad spectrum 0f litigation and appeals. 4. Prior to joining GCA, I was an equity partner at Ropers, Majeski, Kohn & Bentley, Where I began practicing law in 1991. At Ropers, Majeski, I also handled civil litigations and appeals. 5. I am a graduate of the University 0f California, Berkeley (B.S. Business Administration) and the Santa Clara University School of Law (J.D., summa cum laude). I was admitted to the California Bar in 1991 and have been practicing for more almost 30 years. I am AV Rated by Martindale-Hubbell. I have served as a guest lecturer for the Trial Advocacy Program at Stanford Law School. 6. Mr. Han is a client ofGCA Law Partners. James L. Jacobs, another partner here at GCA, was the attorney Who was hired by Mr. Han (and Zocial) for this matter and a prior matter. Mr. Jacobs was the client contact person, the lead supervising attorney, and responsible for deciding the litigation strategies. I was brought in to make the court appearances for Mr. Han because ofmy significant court trial experience. Because I would be making the court appearances, we agreed that I would also handle motions and the preparation work in order to be as efficient as possible. 7. Mr. Jacobs and I did not bill for duplicate tasks or projects. Because Mr. Jacobs was the contact person for the client and was in charge of strategy, he billed for his time communicating with the client and providing direction to me. When Mr. Jacobs -1 _ DECLARATION 0F KATHRYN C. CURRY ISO MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS” FEES - CASE No. 21CH009861 GCA LAW PARTNERS LLP Mountam Vlew California \OOOQON 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 billed his time for discussions or meeting With me, I did not charge or bill Mr. Han for those same discuSsions. Similarly, although I would attend meetings With the clients and Mr. Jacobs, only Mr. Jacobs time was billed. 8. Although Mr. Jacobs was copied on all email and reviewed all documents, he did not bill the client for these activities. 9. Mr. Jacobs joined GCA Law Partners in February 1997. Previously, he practiced in the litigation departments ofWilson Sonsini Goodrich 8: Rosati in Palo Alto, California and Winthrop, Stimson, Putnam 8: Roberts in New York City. His litigation practice covers a broad spectrum of complex and commercial matters. In addition, Mr. Jacobs also counsels clients on litigation prevention and alternative dispute resolution options and advises both executives and corporations With respect to employment and severance agreements. Mr. Jacobs also provides employment law counseling and works with the firm’s corporate and securities lawyers on transactional matters such as initial business formation, venture capital financings, and mergers and acquisitions. Mr. Jacobs graduated With honors With an A.B. in Law and Society from Brown University in Providence, Rhode Island and received his J.D. from the University of Virginia in Charlottesville, Virginia. 10. For this matter, GCA charged $550 an hour for Mr. Jacobs’ and me. 11. I am familiar with the hourly rates charged by similar attorneys with Mr. Jacobs and my background and experience in the San Francisco Bay Area. The $55o/hour is within the prevailing market rates. I have been awarded $650/hr. by the federal court for my ERISAI litigation work. (See Order attached hereto as Exhibit A.) 12. This Court has previously approved the $550 hourly rate for me and Mr. Jacobs in this type of case. (See, Order Attached hereto as Exhibit B.) 13. GCA maintains a computerized time keeping and billing system for its attorneys, paralegals, and clerks. Time worked 0n a matter is input into the timekeeping system by the attorneys and paralegals When the work is performed. The attorneys and paralegals input their activities and time on our computerized billing system in the same _ 2 _ DECLARATION OF KATHRYN C. CURRY ISO MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES - CASE NO. 2 1CH009861 GCA LAW PARTNERS LLP Mountam Vlew California 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 manner. 14. It is our firm’s policy for attorneys and paralegals to enter time in our computerized billing system regardless of Whether the work is performed 0n an hourly or contingent-fee basis. Thus, our computerized billing system contains a record of the work performed on the present case. The computerized billing system shows for each time entry the date the services were performed, the individual performing the services, the nature 0f the services, and the time spent performing the services. Costs are entered onto spreadsheets and are itemized. I recorded my hours worked on this case in the firm’s time keeping system. 15. My time as well as the time spent by James L. Jacobs and Tina Ernst (paralegal) is accurately reflected in our computer billing system. 16. Attached as Exhibit C are true and correct copies of the detailed billing entries for the legal charges incurred to represent Mr. Han in this matter. The time relating to the motion for attorneys has not yet been billed to the client, but will be after the motion is filed. A11 entries on Exhibit C come from the firm’s computer billing system and sets forth (1) the charges that have already billed and (2) the charges for work in progress that will be billed to Mr. Han and Zocial for this matter. 17. The total fees incurred t0 date on this matter are $35,180. Additional fees Will be incurred preparing a reply and attending the hearing on the motion. 18. The hours set forth in the Exhibit C were reasonably necessary to the successful defense of Mr. Han. Mr. Jacobs and I reviewed the entries (Which are being submitted to the Court) and the hours set forth therein are accurate and reasonable. 19. Prior to filing this motion, I met and conferred with Dmitry Stadlin, counsel for Mr. Tran, to try and reach an agreement as to an award of attorneys’ fees. We were unable to reach an agreement. Executed this lst day of October, 2021, in Mountain View, California. I declare / / // -3- DECLARATION OF KATHRYN C. CURRY ISO MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES - CASE NO. 2 1 CH009861 GCA LAW PARTNERS LLP Mountaln Vlew Callforma 10 11 ‘12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 under penalty of perjury ofthe laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true Kathryn C. Curry and correct. -4- DECLARATION 0F KATHRYN C. CURRY ISO MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES - CASE NO. 2 1CH009861 EXHIBIT A HI I United States District Court Northern District of California OOQON \O 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Case 5:18-cv-O6628-BLF Document 99 Filed 01/25/21 Page 1 of 19 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA SAN JOSE DIVISION ALFREDO VILLASENOR, Plaintiff, Case No. 18-cv-06628-BLF ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND V- DENYING IN PART MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COMMUNITY CHILD CARE COUNCIL DETERMINATION 0F PAST DUE 0F SANTA CLARA COUNTY, INC, ct AND FUTURE BENEFITS, INTEREST, a1» AND PENALTIES Defendants. Before the Court is Plaintiff Alfredo Villasenor’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Determination of Past Due Benefits, Future Benefits, Interest, and Penalties. Mot, ECF 78.1 Based on the reasoning stated 0n the record at the January 7, 2020 motion hearing and explained below, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the motion. I. BACKGROUND Plaintiff Alfredo Villasenor filed this action to recover benefits under two retirement plans sponsored by his former employer, Defendant Community Child Care Council of Santa Clara County, Inc. (“4C3”). ECF 1. On July 6, 2020, the Court granted summary judgment in favor 0f Villasenor for Villasenor’s first cause of action for benefits under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). MSJ Order, ECF 77 at 15. This Court determined that (1) Villasenor was 1 This motion functions as a second motion for summary judgment in violation of the Court’s standing order; the Court, nonetheless, opts to rule on the motion as it is fully briefed and there are no material disputes of fact. United States District Court Northern District of California A \DOO‘JQUI 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Case 5:18-cv-06628-BLF Document 99 Filed 01/25/21 Page 2 of 19 entitled to benefits under the 4C5 Employee Profit Sharing Plan (“Qualified Plan”) and the 4C3 Non-Qualified Pension Plan (“Non-Qualified Plan”), (2) Defendants were required to pay Villasenor’s claim under both retirement plans, and (3) Villasenor was entitled to all past benefits due and owing, plus interest and reimbursements of any penalties assessed as a result of Villasenor’s inability to obtain distributions from the retirement plans. Id. The Court did not, however, determine the amount due to Villasenor, as that question was beyond the scope of the motion. Id.; see also ECF 58. The Court later granted the parties’ stipulation dismissing Villasenor’s remaining causes of action. ECF 83. Villasenor now seeks a determination that he is owed a monthly benefit 0f $1 1,307.42 under his Non-Qualified Plan. He also seeks an order and judgment in the following amounts: (1) $452,296.80 in past due benefits owed under the Non-Qualified Plan, plus $1 1,307.42. for every month of benefits that remain unpaid; (2) $50,5 19.99 in prejudgment interest, plus interest at 5% for every month that benefits remain unpaid; (3) $55,346 in IRS penalties Villasenor owes because he was unable to take his minimum required distributions in 2017, 201 8, and 2019; and (4) $128,868 in legal fees and costs. See Mot. II. DISCUSSION A. Benefits Due under the Non-Qualified Plan The Court first considers Villasenor’s request for a Determination of Past Due Benefits. Mot. at 2-3. Villasenor seeks a determination that he is owed a monthly benefit of $1 1,307.42 under his Non-Qualified Plan. Id. As a threshold issue, 4Cs raises that “Villasenor did not present a proper claim for benefits from the Non-Qualified Plan. Rather, until he filed this Motion last month, he had not shown 4Cs that he had obtained a 20-year monthly pension with his Qualified Plan benefits -- a prerequisite for obtaining benefits under the Non~Qualified Plan.” Opp. at 3, ECF 90. The Court rejects this argument. It has already determined just the opposite in its MSJ Order. MSJ Order at 6-9, 15. As 2 United States District Court Northern District 0f California UI-PUJN \OOO\]O\ 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Case 5:18~cv~06628-BLF Document 99 Filed 01/25/21 Page 3 of 19 the Court concluded then, “Plaintiff has provided evidence that he applied for his [Non-Qualified Plan] retirement benefits in August, October, and November 2017 . . . And Defendants have failed to present any evidence to the contrary to create a factual dispute.” Id. at 8-9. The Court thus turns to the merits 0f Villasenor’s request. The relevant section of the 4C’s Non-Qualified Pension Plan Document states: 3.1 Plan Benefits. The Company shall pay to each Participant a supplemental retirement benefit each month for twenty (20) years commencing with the month following the month in which the Participant first made a claim under the Qualified Plan (the “Supplemental Benefit”). The amount of each monthly installment plan shall be determined by: First, determine the amount ofthe monthly pension benefit the Participant would be entitled to if the Participant had been covered by the California State Teachers Retirement System (CaISTRS) during the period of their employment With the Company, taking into account their actual salary, age, actual retirement date and assuming they elected a twenty (20) year payout from CalSTRS. This is the "Measuring Benefit." A determination made by use 0f CaISTRS "retirement Calculator" at http://www.calstrs.com/Calculators/index.aspx, shall be binding on the Participant and the Plan. Second, subtract from the Measuring Benefit the actual pension benefit the Participant shall receive from the Qualified Plan. If the Participant elects a payout in excess of twenty (20) years from the Qualified Plan then the Measuring Benefit shall be subtracted from a sum equal to the amount the participant would receive if the Participant had elected a twenty (20) year benefit payout. The result of this calculation is the monthly payment of the Supplemental Benefit. Plan Document, ECF 78-2. Under the Plan Document, the monthly payment from the Non-Qualified Pension Plan is determined by subtracting the monthly benefit amount from the Qualified Plan (placed in an annuity) from the Measuring Benefit, which is the monthly benefit that the participant would have been entitled to under CaISTRS. In mathematical terms: Measuring Benefit - Qualified Plan = 3 United States District Court Northern District of California #w KOOOQO‘x 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Case 5:18-cv-O6628-BLF Document 99 Filed 01/25/21 Page 4 of 19 Non-Qualified Monthly Plan Benefits. The Court starts by calculating the Measuring Benefit. The CaISTRs monthly pension benefit is based on the following formula: Service Credit x Age Factor x Final Compensation = Measuring Benefit. Retirement Benefits, CaISTRs, https://Www.calstrs.com/retirement-benefits, accessed December 16, 2020; ECF 97, Exh. A (screenshot of retirement calculator). The parties do not dispute this formula. Nor d0 they dispute the age factor-~.024--or Villasenor’s final monthly compensation-$15,125.00-under this formula; instead, they argue about the amount 0f years of service credit to which Villasenor is entitled. Compare Mot. at 2-3 with Opp. at 4. Villasenor contends he is entitled to 45 years as he was employed by 4Cs between October 1, 1972 and August 4, 2017. Mot. at 3 (citing Villasenor Decl. 1] 2). To support this interpretation, Villasenor argues that under the Plan Document, “benefits are calculated based on ‘the period of employment With the Company’ and not on a ‘period of employment with the Company since the Plan was established’ as Defendants argue.” Reply at 3, ECF 92. 4C3, for its part, argues Villasenor is only entitled to 15.75 years of service credit, Which represents the amount of time between the establishment of the Non-Qualified Plan on November 19, 2001 and Villasenor’s retirement date. Id. 4Cs supports this argument with the declaration ofBen Menor that “[s]ince the inception of the Non-Qualified Plan, 4C3 has determined the employee’s ‘years of service’ under the Plan by calculating the employee’s years of service following the Plan’s creation date.” Opp. at 3 (citing Menor 11 Decl. 12). The Court agrees with Villasenor. The Plan Document defines years as “all periods 0f employment regardless of whether such periods are not consecutive,” which supports Villasenor’s conclusion that his retirement benefit should be calculated based on Villasenor’s total years of service, not Villasenor’s years of service during Which the Non-Qualified Plan existed. The only argument 4Cs offers to the contrary is the declaration 0f Menor, Which is made without any foundation. Menor’s declaration does not set forth any facts to establish his knowledge about the 4 United States District Court Northern District of California #UJN \DOOQO’XU’I 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Case 5:18-cv-O6628~BLF Document 99 Filed 01/25/21 Page 5 of 19 administration of the Non-Qualified Plan. Indeed, prior declarations by Menor suggest just the opposite. See, e.g., ECF 70 1} 5 (“I am not and was not the Plan Administrator for the 4C5 Non- Qualified Plan.”); see Bank Mellz' Iran v. Pahlavi, 58 F.3d 1406, 1412 (9th Cir. 1995) (declarations made without personal knowledge are “entitled to no weight”). The Court concludes that, under the Plan Document, Villasenor’s Service Credit factor is 45. Applying the CaISTRs formula of Service Credit x Age Factor x Final Compensation = Retirement Benefit, 45 X .024 x $15,125.00 = $16,335. See Mot. at 3. Villasenor’s monthly Measuring Benefit is $16,335. Villasenor contends that on top of this Measuring Benefit, he is owed $400 each month as a longevity bonus under CalSTRS. Mot. at 3. In support, he offers a copy of the CaISTRS Retirement Calculator webpage. The image indicates that, upon inserting Villasenor’s relevant information and clicking the “calculate” button, a pop-up appears asking “Did the member earn 30 years of credited service prior to 1/1/201 1? YES/NO.” ECF 97, Exh. C. Upon clicking “yes,” the CaISTRS calculator indicates Villasenor is owed $16,755, which includes a $400 longevity bonus. See ECF 97, Exh. D; ECF 98 (errata to ECF 97). 4Cs objects that there is “no mention of the CaISTRS longevity bonus in the Non-Qualified Plan” Opp. at 4. Maybe so. But the Non-Qualified Plan Document explicitly incorporates the CaISTRS Retirement Calculator, which includes a longevity bonus. See Plan Document § 3.1 (“A determination made by use of CaISTRS "retirement Calculator" at http://www.calstrs.com/Calculators/index.aspx, shall be binding on the Participant and the Plan.” (emphasis added)). As such, the Court concludes Villasenor’s Measuring Benefit under the Non-Qualified Plan is $16,735. According to the Plan Document, the next step is to “subtract from the Measuring Benefit the actual pension benefit the Participant shall receive from the Qualified Plan.” Plan Document § 3. 1. In mathematical terms: Measuring Benefit - Qualified Plan = Non-Qualified Monthly Plan Benefits. The parties do not dispute that Villasenor is scheduled to receive a monthly Qualified Plan benefit amount of $5,427.58. Mot. at 4; Opp. at 4. When the Qualified Plan benefit of 5 United States District Court Northern District of California \OOOQO‘N 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Case 5:18-cv-06628-BLF Document 99 Filed 01/25/21 Page 6 of 19 $5,427.58 is subtracted from the Measuring Benefit 0f $16,735, Villasenor’s Non-Qualified Plan monthly benefit amounts t0 is $1 1,307.42. The Court determines that Villasenor is entitled to a Non-Qualified Plan monthly benefit amount of $1 1,307.42. B. Past Due Benefits Villasenor seeks $407,067.12 in past due benefits, which he calculated by multiplying a monthly benefit of $1 1,307.42 by 36 months. Mot. at 4. Villasenor contends he is due 36 months of past due benefits as he should have started receiving benefits on November 1, 2017. Id. 4Cs responds that “Villasenor is not owed past due benefits because now that he has submitted a claim for benefits and submitted proof of his 20-year annuity with benefits from the Qualified Plan, he will obtain a Non-Qualified benefit each month for 20 years.” Opp. at 5. It alternatively argues that Villasenor’s past due benefit should be calculated by multiplying $289.67 by 36 months, resulting in a total amount 0f $10,428. 12. It also requests that Villasenor’s subsequent monthly benefit payments be limited to seventeen years, or 204 months. Opp. at 5. The Court, again, rejects 4Cs first argument as contrary to this Court’s MSJ Order. In that ' Order, the Court made clear that Villasenor applied for benefits in November 2017. MSJ Order at 8. As the Court determined in the prior section, Villasenor is owed a monthly Non-Qualified Plan benefit of $1 1,307.42. And, having rejected 4Cs first argument, there is no dispute that Villasenor has been owed benefits since November 1, 2017. Thirty-ninth months have passed since November 1, 2017. Accordingly, Villasenor is owed past-due benefits 0f $1 1,307.42 for 39 months, which amounts to $440,989.38. The Court AWARDS Villasenor $440,989.38 in past due benefits. The Court further determines Villasenor is limited to 201 subsequent months of benefits payments from the Non-Qualified Plan. C. Prejudgment Interest Villasenor argues he is entitled to 5% prejudgment interest 0n his withheld benefit payments. Mot. at 4-5. Villasenor calculates he is owed $27,930.50 in interest, plus $565.60 a 6 United States District Court Northern District of California \oooxxoxmgmw... N NNNNNv-dp-nwt-twr-Ar-ao-AHl-t Case 5:18~cv-06628-BLF Document 99 Filed 01/25/21 Page 7 of 19 month for every future month that benefits remain unpaid. Id. at 4. This request is based on a 5% interest rate. Id. 4Cs argues that prejudgment interest is an element of compensation, and that Villasenor has failed to provide evidence of loss Opp. at 5. “A district court may award prejudgment interest on an award ofERISA benefits at its discretion.” Blankenship v. Liberty Life Assurance C0. ofBoston, 486 F.3d 620, 627 (9th Cir.2007). “The exercise of that discretion is to be guided by fairness and balancing the equities.” Perez v. Cozen & O'Connor Group Long Term Disability Coverage, N0. 07cv0837 DMS(AJB), 2008 WL 6693714, at *1 (S.D.Cal. Aug. 19, 2008) (citing Shaw v. Int’l Ass'n ofMachinz'sts and Aerospace Workers Pension Plan, 750 F.2d 1458, 1465 (9th Cir.1985)). “[M]oney has a time value, and prejudgment interest is therefore necessary in the ordinary case to compensate a plaintiff fully for a loss suffered at time t and not compensated until t + 1.” Hopi Tribe v. Navajo Tribe, 46 F.3d 908, 922 (9th Cir.1995) (internal citations omitted). An award of prejudgment interest serves as an element of compensation rather than a penalty. Dishman v. UNUM Life Ins. C0. 0fAm., 269 F.3d 974, 988 (9th Cir.2001). “Whether t0 award prejudgment interest to an ERISA plaintiff is a question of fairness, lying within the court's sound discretion, to be answered by balancing the equities.” Smyrm‘ v. US. Investigations Servs. LLP, No. C 08-4360-PJH, 2010 WL 807445, at *2 (ND. Cal. Mar. 5, 2010) (citing Landwehr v. DuPree, 72 F.3d 726, 739 (9th Cir.1995) (internal citations omitted). Among the factors to be considered in determining whether prejudgment interest should be awarded is the presence of bad faith or ill Will and whether the award of prejudgment interest would put a financial strain on the defendant. Smyrm‘, 2010 WL 807445, at *2 (citing Landwehr, 72 F.3d at 739 and Shaw v. Int’l Ass'n ofMachinists andAerospace Workers Pension Plan, 750 F.2d 1458, 1465 (9th Cir.1985)). On this record, and in the exercise of the Court's discretion, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs request for prejudgment interest. The Court finds that there was ample bad faith on the part of 4Cs 7 United States District Court Northern District of California KOOOQONLJI-PUJN 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Case 5:18-cv-06628-BLF Document 99 Filed 01/25/21 Page 8 of 19 to support this award. The Court’s order granting summary judgment highlights the bad faith present here. In rej ecting 4Cs’ argument that Villasenor’s motion was moot because 4Cs’ authorized distribution of Villasenor’s Qualified Plan benefits, the Court explained: Defendants delayed the authorization of Plaintiff’s claim for benefits under the Qualified Plan for over two years - without providing him With any written explanation. More than 15 months after Plaintiff sued for benefits and shortly before filing their tardy opposition to Plaintiff’ s motion for summary judgment, Defendants finally authorized the processing of Plaintiff’s benefits under the Qualified Plan. Defendants cannot ignore an ERISA plan participant’s claim for years and escape the consequences of their actions (or inactions) by simply “mooting” Plaintiffs claim at this stage of litigation. MSJ Order at 13. And, although Villasenor attempted to resolve this issue with 4C3 multiple times, his outreach was met With silence. Id. at 2-3; see Stone v. Bayer Corp. Long Term Disability Plan, No. 08-CV-356-BR, 2010 WL 2595675, at *4 (D. Or. June 21, 2010) (awarding prejudgment interest in an ERISA action where the Defendant denied Plaintiff benefits for five years, requiring Plaintiff t0 file two federal court actions). 4C3 argues that it was simply following legal counsel’s advice to not issue Villasenor’s plan benefits. Opp. at 7. This narrative paints an incomplete picture of the facts here. The Court acknowledges that the payment of prejudgment interest may impose a financial strain on 4Cs, but this factor cannot overcome the considerable bad faith that permeated this action. The Court, however, declines to accept Villasenor’s suggested interest rate. The Ninth Circuit has held that “the interest rate prescribed for post-judgment interest under 28 U.S.C. § 1961 is appropriate for fixing the rate ofpre-judgment interest unless the trial judge finds, on substantial evidence, that the equities of that particular case réquire a different rate.” Grosz- Salomon v. Paul Revere Life Ins. C0., 237 F.3d 1154, 1164 (9th Cir.2001). The interest rate for post-judgment interest under § 1961 is the rate applicable to one-year United States Treasury Constant Maturities (T-Bills). See, e.g., W. Pac. Fisheries, Inc. v. SS President Grant, 730 F.2d United States District Court Northern District 0f California #UJN KOOOQQM 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Case 5:18-cv-06628-BLF Document 99 Filed 01/25/21 Page 9 of 19 1280, 1289 (9th Cir. 1984). In his opening brief, Villasenor failed to produce evidence to establish that he suffered the loss of an ability to invest money in funds at a rate of return higher than that earned on TmBills or that he had to borrow money at a higher rate to compensate for lost benefits. See Mot. at 4-5. Instead, Villasenor requested that “the court, in its discretion, award prejudgment interest at a higher rate than the formula prescribed for post-judgment interest under 28 U.S.C. § 1961” and cited to numerous district court cases from the early 20103. Mot. at 4. As part of his reply brief, however, Villasenor offered a supplemental declaration that he has taken out “loans on his life insurance at a rate of 8% in order to pay his daily living expenses” that would otherwise have been paid out of his monthly pension benefits. See Reply at 6. Although the Court is not persuaded by caselaw that deals in financial figures from nearly a decade ago, it finds that the one-year T-Bill rate is insufficient here in light of 4Cs’ bad faith and evidence that Villasenor took out loans to pay for his living expenses. The Court AWARDS Villasenor prejudgment interest at the average prime rate. Villasenor provides documentation that the average primate rate between November 2017 and July 2020 was 4.76%. See Supp. Curry Decl., ECF 94. The Court DIRECTS Villasenor to recalculate the prejudgment interest at 4.76%, compounded annually, and to submit a declaration showing this calculation with the proposed judgment. D. IRS Penalties Related to the Qualified Plan Villasenor alleges he owes the IRS $55,346.38 in penalties for the failure to take the required minimum distributions from his Qualified Plan in 2017, 2018, and 2019. Mot. at 5 (citing Tierney Dec]. 11 22; Villasenor Decl. 1[ 13, 14 and Exh. F.). 4Cs responds that Villasenor has failed t0 submit evidence that he in fact incurred penalties associated with the Qualified Plan. Opp. at 5. The parties do not dispute that the IRS has not yet assigned Villasenor any penalties because he has not been able to take distributions from his Qualified Plan. The Court Will not award tax 9 United States District Court Northern District of California pooh.) KOOO\10\LII 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Case 5:18-cv-06628-BLF Document 99 Filed 01/25/21 Page 10 of 19 penalties that have not yet been assessed. Should Villasenor in fact incur any penalties from the IRS, he may move for an amended judgment. E. Attorneys’ Fees Villasenor requests an award of $128,868 in attorneys' fees and costs pursuant t0 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g) because he achieved success on his claim for benefits under both retirement plans. He argues that the factors set forth by the Ninth Circuit in Hummell v. S. E. Rykoff& Co., 634 F.2d 446, 453 (9th Cir. 1980), support a fee award. Mot. at 6-12. 4C3 argues that the first and second Hummell factors warrants denial of the request. Opp. at 6-7. Section 502(g)(1) ofERISA gives the Court discretion to award attorneys’ fees. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1). The Supreme Court has held that a-fee claimant may be entitled to attorneys' fees if the claimant shows "some degree of success on the merits." Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. C0,, 560 U.S. 242, 255 (201 0). In addition, the Ninth Circuit has held that a prevailing plan participant such as Plaintiff "should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust." Smith v. CMTA-lAMPension Tr., 746 F.2d 587, 589 (9th Cir. 1984) (internal quotations and citation omitted). As the Ninth Circuit has explained, ERISA "is remedial legislation which should be liberally construed in favor of protecting participants in employee benefit plans" and, specifically, "to afford them effective access to federal courts." Id. Once a court determines that an ERISA fee claimant has achieved some degree 0f success on the merits, the court "must consider" the factors set forth in Hummell, 634 F.2d 446, to guide its discretion under § 1132(g). See Simom'a v. Glendale Nissan/Infinitz' Disability Plan, 608 F.3d 1118, 1119, 1121 (9th Cir. 2010). In exercising this discretion, district courts should consider the following factors: (1) the degree of the opposing parties' culpability or bad faith; (2) the ability of the opposing parties to satisfy an award of fees; (3) whether an award of fees against the opposing parties would deter others from acting under similar circumstances; (4) whether the parties 1 0 United States District Court Northern District of California OOQQUI§UJN \O 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Case 5:18-cv-06628-BLF Document 99 Filed 01/25/21 Page 11 of 19 requesting fees sought to benefit all participants and beneficiaries of an ERISA plan or to resolve a significant legal question regarding ERISA; and (5) the relative merits of the parties‘ positions. Hummel, 634 F.2d at 453. “No one 0f the Hummell factors . . .is necessarily decisive, and some may not be pertinent in a given case.” Carpenters Southern Californian Admin. Corp. v. Russell, 726 F.2d 1410, 1416 (9th Cir. 1984). The Ninth Circuit generally construes the Hummell factors in favor of participants in employee benefit plans. See McElwaine v. U.S. West, Ina, 176 F.3d 1167, 1172 (9th Cir. 1999) (“When we apply the Hummell factors, we must keep at the forefront ERISA’S purposes that ‘should be liberally construed in favor of protecting participants in employee benefit plans”); Oster v. Std. Ins. C0., 768 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1032 (ND. Cal. 201 1). 1. Hummel Factors The first Hummell factor, the “degree of opposing parties’ culpability or bad faith,” supports a fee award because the Court found that Villasenor was entitled to benefits under both plans. A losing defendant in an ERISA case is generally regarded as culpable for their conduct because a “losing defendant must have violated ERISA, thereby depriving plaintiffs of rights under a [benefit] plan and Violating a Congressional mandate.” Salovaara v. Eckerr, 222 F.3d 19, 28 (2d Cir. 2000). “[F]rom a legal perspective, Defendants are ‘culpable’ in that they were found to owe Plaintiff a legal duty that they were not fulfilling.” King v. Cigna Corp, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94644, *5 (N.D. Cal. 2007); see also, Caplan v. CAN Financial Corp, 573 F .Supp.2d 1244, 1248 (ND. Cal. 2008) (same). 4Cs is “culpable” in that it owed Villasenor a legal duty t0 pay him benefits under the Qualified and Non-Qualified Plans that it was not fulfilling. See MSJ Order. And, as the Court explained above, 4Cs acted in bad faith in withholding this legal duty. The second Hummell factor, ability to pay, is in dispute. Villasenor states without evidence that this factor is satisfied as the “4C3 is insured for the claim and had sufficient assets to pay an award of attorneys’ fees.” Mot. at 7 . 4Cs rebuts this argument, contending that it is not insured for 11 United States District Court Northern District of California AWN \OOO\JO\UI 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 l7 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Case 5:18-cv-06628-BLF Document 99 Filed 01/25/21 Page 12 of 19 attorneys’ fees arising out of claims for retirement benefits. Opp. at 7 (citing Menor Decl., fl 13). It also highlights, in its opposition brief and at the motion hearing, that it is currently filing for dissolution “because the State of California has ceased providing funding to 4Cs as of June 30, 2020.” Id. As such, it argues that it does not have the ability to satisfy an attorney fee award. The evidence is on the side of 4Cs. The Court finds that this factor weighs against awarding attorneys’ fees. The third factor, deterrence, favors an award 0f fees. Unlike traditional tort claims under state law, ERISA does not provide any type of exemplary or punitive damages remedy to deter bad faith insurance conduct. See Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. C0. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 147 (1985) (holding compensatory and punitive damages not available remedies for ERISA benefit claims). Attorney fee awards pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g) are, therefore, regarded as essential for deterring future Violations of ERISA. See Caplan, 573 F.Supp.2d at 1248 (an “award 0f attorneys' fees could serve to deter other plan administrators from denying meritorious disability claims” which “could indirectly benefit other individuals”); Carpenters Southern Californian Admin. Corp, 726 F.2d at 1416 (an attorney’s fees award to a prevailing plaintiff provides “added incentive to comply with ERISA”). Here, a fee award will deter providers 0f pension plan benefits from failing to comply with ERISA’s claims regulation procedures. The fourth factor, whether the relief sought would benefit other participants or resolve a significant legal question regarding ERISA, is neutral at best. Although Villasenor argues that “Defendants argued they were exempt from having to comply With ERISA’S claims handling procedures because of challenges t0 the plan from third parties” and a finding that they are not “will benefit other pension plan participants in other plans,” this case focused on the factual particularities of Villasenor’s situation. Mot at 7-8. “To the extent that the court's decision may help other plan participants, any such benefit is already captured in the previous factor . . . ” Gurasich v. IBMRet. Plan, Case No. 14-cv-0291 l-DMR, ECF 82 at 7 (ND. Cal. Jul. 12, 2016). 12 United States District Court Northern District 0f California \OOOQONUIAUJNF‘ MN NNNNNHpr-twb-Ay-ta-AHy-n g“0\&hkflN’-‘O\OOO~JO\M-PUJNHO Case 5:18-cv-06628-BLF Document 99 Filed 01/25/21 Page 13 of 19 The fifth Hummell factor, the relative merits of the parties’ positions, also supports a fee award. A participant is entitled t0 fees under this factor if she “succeeds on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some 0f the benefit sought in bringing suit and if no special circumstances make an award unjust.” McClure v. Life Ins. C0. ofN. Am., 84 F.3d 1129, 1136 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation omitted) (emphasis added). Even when a plaintiff does not prevail 0n some claims for relief, any success on some significant aspect of the case supports a fee award under this factor. See Caplan, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 1248. Here, Villasenor prevailed on his claim for benefits under both Plans. See MSJ Order. In sum, the Court finds that three Hummell factors weigh in favor of awarding attorneys’ fees while only one factor clearly weighs against awarding attorneys’ fees. The Court concludes that Villasenor is entitled to an award 0f attorneys’ fees. The Court now turns to the reasonableness 0f Villasenor’s request for fees. 2. Reasonableness 0f Requested Fees District courts in the Ninth Circuit typically employ the "lodestar analysis" in calculating fee awards. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983); Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin, Ina, 523 F.3d 973, 978 (9th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). "The lodestar figure is calculated by multiplying the number of hours the prevailing party reasonably expended on the litigation (as supported by adequate documentation) by a reasonable hourly rate for the region and for the experience ofthe lawyer." Yamada v. Nobele'ocare HoldingAG, No. 14-55263, 2016 WL 1579705, at *6 (9th Cir. Apr. 20, 2016) (internal citation omitted). The party seeking fees bears the initial burden of establishing the hours expended litigating the case and must provide detailed time records documenting the tasks completed and the amount 0f time spent. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434; Welch v. Metro. Life Ins. C0,, 480 F.3d 942, 945-46 (9th Cir. 2007). The requesting party also has the burden to demonstrate that the rates requested are "in line with the prevailing market rate of the relevant community." Carson v. Billings Police Dep't, 1 3 United States District Court Northern District of California N \OOOQONUIu-PUJ 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Case 5:18-cv-O6628-BLF Document 99 Filed 01/25/21 Page 14 of 19 470 F.3d 889, 891 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Generally, "the relevant community is the forum in which the district court sits." Camacho, 523 F.3d at 979 (citations omitted). Typically, "affidavits of the plaintiffs' attorney and other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community and rate determinations in other cases . . . are satisfactory evidence ofthe prevailing market rate." United Steelworkers ofAm. v. Phelps Dodge C0rp., 896 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 1990). Fee awards calculated under the lodestar method generally are presumed to be reasonable. Gonzalez v. City ofMaywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1208-09 (9th Cir. 2013). At the same time, the court may adjust this figure "if circumstances warrant" in order "to account for other factors Which are not subsumed within it." Ferland v. Conrad Credit C0rp., 244 F.3d 1145, 1149 n.4 (9th Cir. 2001). "Where the documentation of hours is inadequate, the district court may reduce the award accordingly." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. The district court may also exclude any hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary. McCown v. City ofFontana, 565 F.3d 1097, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434). In addition, the Ninth Circuit has stated that a district court may "impose a small reduction, no greater than 10 percent-a 'haircut'w-based on its exercise 0f discretion and Without a more specific explanation." Moreno v. City ofSacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2008). After the party presents its evidence supporting its fee request, the party opposing the fees has a "burden of rebuttal that requires submission of evidence t0 the district court challenging the accuracy and reasonableness 0f the hours charged or the facts asserted by the prevailing party in its submitted affidavits." Gates v. Deukmejz'an, 987 F.2d 1392, 1397-98 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). The party opposing fees must specifically identify defects or deficiencies in the hours requested; conclusory and unsubstantiated objections are insufficient to warrant a reduction in fees. De Amara] v. Goldsmith & Hull, N0. 12-CV-03580-WHO, 2014 WL 1309954, at *3 (ND. Cal. Apr. 1, 2014) (citing Cancio v. Fin. Credit Network, Ina, 04-cv-03755 TEH, 2005 WL 14 United States District Court Northern District of California \OOO‘QONLIl-PUJNw-n NNNNh-An-tb-HHHHHr-AH Case 5:18-cv-06628-BLF Document 99 Filed 01/25/21 Page 15 of 19 1629809, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 6, 2005)). Courts have reduced fee awards where prevailing counsel engaged in inefficient or unreasonably duplicative billing, or Where counsel's billing records contain insufficiently descriptive entries, show evidence of block billing, 0r billing in large time increments. See e.g., Welch, 480 F.3d at 948-50. Even if the opposing party has not objected t0 the time billed, the district court may not uncritically accept a fee request, but is obligated to review the time billed and assess Whether it is reasonable. Sealy, Inc. v. Easy Living, Ina, 743 F.2d 1378, 1385 (9th Cir. 1984). The Court finds that the requested rates are within the prevailing market rates in the community for ERISA attorneys with similar experience and qualifications. The Court also finds that the hours expended by Villasenor’s attorneys in this litigation were reasonable. a. Reasonableness of Hourly Rates The rates charged by Villasenor’s counsel are reasonable. The "reasonable hourly rate" is calculated "according to the prevailing market rates in the relevant community . . . ." Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984). "To inform and assist the court in the exercise of its discretion, the burden is on the fee applicant to produce satisfactory evidence-in addition to the attorney's own affidavits-that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation." Id. at 896, n. 11. Affidavits of the plaintiffs attorney and other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community as well as rate determinations in other cases can provide evidence of the prevailing market rate. Welch, 480 F.3d at 947 (citing Phelps Dodge Corp, 896 F.2d at 407). In the absence 0f opposing evidence, the proposed rates are presumed reasonable. Phelps Dodge Corp, 896 F.2d at 407. Villasenor seeks the following hourly rates: $650 for Kathryn Curry and Tracy Tierney, both ofWhom are partners at GCA Law Partners with over 20 years of experience, and $190 for Tina Ernst and Jennifer Johnson, both ofwhom are senior litigation paralegals at GCA Law 1 5 United States District Court Northern District of California .hUJN \OOO\J0\U1 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Case 5:18-cv-06628-BLF Document 99 Filed 01/25/21 Page 16 of 19 Partners with over 20 years of experience. Mot. at. 9-10. Villasenor submits the following information in support of these requested rates: (1) the Curry declaration, ECF 78-2; (2) the Tierney declaration, ECF 78-3; (3) citations to rates awarded t0 ERISA attorneys; and (4) a Request for Judicial Notice} ECF 79, of declarations filed by Rebecca Grey and Terence Coleman in support of the fee motion in Echague v. Metro. Life Ins. C0., Case No. 3:12-cv-00640-WHO (ND. Cal. Aug. 20, 2014), as well as Judge Orrick's Order on that motion, Echague v. Metro. Life Ins. C0., 69 F. Supp. 3d 990, 997 (N.D. Cal. 2014), and Judge Ryu’s Order on a separate attorneys” fee motion in Gurasz'ch v. IBM Ref. Plan. 4C3 does not attempt to rebut the evidence of the reasonableness of the rates sought by Villasenor in this case. Based upon the declarations submitted by Villasenor, as well as the absence of any contrary evidence submitted by 4C3, the Court finds that the hourly rates requested are reasonable and consistent with the prevailing market rates. See Gurasz’ch, ECF 82 at 11 (approving rate of $650 for a partner with over 20 years of experience and $1 80 for senior paralegals); Zoom Elec., Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. ofElec. Workers, Local 595, No. C 11-1699 CW, 2013 WL 2297037, at *4 (ND. Cal. May 24, 2013) (approving hourly rates between $180 and $225 per hour for law clerks and paralegals). b. Reasonableness of Hours Expended In granting a fee award, the Court must explain how it arrived at the amount. Moreno, 534 F.3d at 1111. The explanation does not need to be elaborate; rather, it "must be concise but clear." Id. (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437). "Where the difference between the lawyer's request and the 2 The Court GRANTS Villasenor’s request for judicial notice. Courts may properly take judicial notice of other court filings and matters of public record. Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena AirportAuth. v. City ofBurbank, 136 F.3d 1360, 1364 (9th Cir. 1998)). The Court also takes notice of the fact that the Grey and Coleman declarations were filed in that matter. 16 United States District Court Northern District of California m-bboN KOOOQQ 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Case 5:18-cv-06628~BLF Document 99 Filed 01/25/21 Page 17 of 19 court's award is relatively small, a somewhat cursory explanation Will suffice. But Where the disparity is larger, a more specific articulation of the court's reasoning is expected." Id. The party seeking the award of fees bears the burden 0f submitting time records detailing the hours spent; courts may reduce the award where the records d0 not justify the hours spent. Chalmers v. City 0f Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir. 1986). Courts also have discretion to reduce the amount of hours billed in the event that entries are block-billed, as a court Will be unable to determine whether all time in the entry was reasonably expended, and for duplicative or unnecessary work. Mendez v. Cty. ofSan Bernadino, 540 F.3d 1109, 1128-29 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Day v. AT & TDisabz'lity Income Plan, 608 F. App'x 454, 457 (9th Cir. 2015). Villasenor’s attorneys contend that they have spent the following time on this case: 157.8 hours by Kathryn Curry; 36.6 hours by Tracy Tierney; and 13.2 hours by the two paralegals. Mot. at 11-12. These hours, if granted in their totality, amount to $128,868 in attorneys’ fees. Id. Villasenor submits the declarations of his two attorneys along With computerized billing system entries to support this request. Curry Decl., ECF 78-2; Tierney Decl., ECF 78-3; ECF 78-2, Exh. 6-7 (billing entries). The computerized billing system entries indicate the date the services were performed, the individual performing the services, the nature of the services, and the time spent performing the services. Villasenor also provided a summary of the amount oftime spent by each timekeeper on each key task (complaint, settlement, motions for summary judgment, etc.). Supp. Curry Decl., ECF 94. 4Cs’ sole objection to the reasonableness of these hours is that Villasenor included 27 hours attributable to a third-party’s motion to intervene. Opp. at 7. 4Cs contends that it did not initiate that filing or cause Villasenor to incur any fees associated With that filing. Id. Villasenor responds that his attorneys spent only 21.8 hours on the motion to intervene, and that this time is recoverable because he was “forced to oppose the Motion to Intervene, which if granted, would have substantially impacted the cost, expense, and time spent on this case and would have turned 1 7 United States District Court Northern District of California KOOOQONUI-«PUJNH NNNHp-lwn-AHI-tr-Ip-twt-n Case 5:18-cv-06628-BLF Document 99 Filed 01/25/21 Page 18 of 19 his simple claims for benefits into a class action.” Reply at 9~10; see also ECF 78-2, Exh. 6-7 at 2~ 3 (detailing hours spent 0n the motion t0 intervene); Supp. Curry Decl. (providing hourly summaries by key task). The Court agrees With Villasenor and finds it both reasonable- and, indeed, even necessary- that his attorneys expended time on this motion. The Court also finds that 21 .8 hours was a reasonable amount oftime to expend based on the nature of the motion. The Court’s analysis is not yet complete. See Sealy, 743 F.2d at 1385 (holding that the district court may not uncritically accept a fee request). In light of the Court's responsibility to determine fees for the hours reasonably expended, the Court has analyzed the individualized billing entries. The Court finds that the time spent by counsel to litigate this case to its successful completion was reasonable. District courts Within California have acknowledged that “[p]laintiffs in ERISA matters generally must spend a great amount of time preparing for conferences and other proceedings because ERISA cases tend to be factually intensive.” Oster, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 1036 (quoting Mogck v. Unum Life Ins. C0. 0fAm.,289 F.Supp.2d 1181, 1192 (S.D.Cal.2003)). This case was no different. The parties engaged in significant litigation activities, including motions to intervene, to dismiss the complaint, to compel arbitration, to stay the case, and for summary judgment, along With a settlement conference. See ECF 13, 31, 55, 58. The Court GRANTS the motion for attorneys’ fees in full and AWARDS Villasenor $128,868 in attorneys’ fees. III. ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 1. Alfredo Villasenor is owed a Non-Qualified Plan monthly benefit amount of $1 1,307.42. 2. Alfredo Villasenor is AWARDED $440,989.38 in past due benefits. Villasenor is limited t0 201 subsequent monthly benefits payments from the Non-Qualified Plan. 3. Alfredo Villasenor is AWARDED prejudgment interest at 4.76%, compounded annually. 18 United States District Court Northern District of California \OOOQONUI-PUJNH N NNNNNHHHa-ty-np-ap-IHy-ap-n Case 5:18-cv-06628-BLF Document 99 Filed 01/25/21 Page 19 of 19 4. Alfredo Villasenor’s request for payment of IRS penalties is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Villasenor may move for an amended judgment should any penalties be assessed against him in the future. 5. Alfredo Villasenor’s motion for attorneys’ fees is GRANTED. Villasenor is AWARDED $128,868 in attorneys’ fees. 6. The Court DIRECTS the parties to submit a proposed judgment consistent with this Order, including a calculation of the amount of prejudgment interest due, by February 1, 2021. Villasenor SHALL also submit a supporting declaration showing this calculation. Dated:January 25,2021 Wmgvlgw BETH LABSON FREEMAN United States District Judge 19 EXHIBIT B HI I 10 ll 12 13 l4 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 28 L E JUN 25 64,3021 ftr{e Court BSuperio Cou t0 lfiy of Santa Clara DEPUTY FARMS BRYANT SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA . v 0“ S (“fled Mafiefi Demsm“ CASE NO.: 20CH009649 VANECHAY PHOMMOCHACK, , ‘ DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING IN Pctltlonel'a PART RESPONDENT’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES vs. MICHAEL HAN, Respondent. This matter came on for hearing on May l 1, 2021 , in Department 4 of the Superior Court. At the hearing, counsel for both Petitioner and Respondent appeared, arguments were made and the matter was taken under submission for written decision. Having considered the moving papers, opposition, attached declarations and arguments of counsel and the file herein, and for the reasons noted below, the court GRANTS, in part, Respondent’s request for attorney fees. I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On October 22, 2021, Petitioner filed an ex parte application for civil harassment restraining orders, alleging that Respondent, among other things, engaged in a course of conduct that put Petitioner in a state of fear or emotional distress. Specifically, she alleged that Respondent burglarized a home of her friend, and Respondent’s former business partner Brian Tran, and that Respondent repeatedly followed if not shadowed Petitioner and her friends. On October 26, 2020 the Court granted a temporary restraining order protecting Petitioner and set a hearing for December 15, 2020. On December 3, 2020, Respondent, in pro per, filed his opposition to the request for restraining orders denying any wrongdoing and further denying the specific allegations made in 10 ll 12 l3 l4 15 l6 l7 18 19 20 21 22 23 the request for orders. Respondent stated in his declaration that the matter arose from a business dispute between himself and Mr. Tran, who co-owned a business in which Petitioner and her husband were investors. Respondent denied the burglary and the other harassing conduct. Counsel for Respondent appeared in court on December 15, 2020 and filed a notice of appearance on January 5, 2021. The matter was reset for hearing on Monday January 1 l, 2021. The parties appeared with their respective counsel and Petitioner dismissed the action. Respondent did not object, but expressly reserved his right to bring a motion for attorney fees. On March 18, 2021, Respondent filed his motion for attorney fees with supporting declarations and exhibits. Petitioner filed an opposition on April 28, 2021 and a hearing was held on May 11, 2021. Petitioner made two arguments in opposition: 1) Respondent was the not prevailing party and 2) in the alternative, the requested attorney fees were unreasonable for various but specific reasons discussed below. At the hearing, the Court heard argument and concluded that Respondent was in fact the prevailing party as defined in Section 1032 ofthe Code of Civil Procedure. However, and as to the reasonableness 0f the requested attorney fees, the Court took the matter under submission for further consideration. The court thanks counsel for their very capable representation. II. LEGAL STANDARD The prevailing party in an action brought under Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) §527.6 may be awarded reasonable attorney fees and/ or court costs. CCP § 527.6(5); Leydon v. Alexander (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d l, 5. III. LEGAL ANALYSIS This action was brought under CCP § 527.6 and ultimately dismissed at time of trial. The court previously ruled that Respondent was the prevailing party and now turns its attention to the - only remaining issue of reasonableness. The determination of a “reasonable amount” of attorney fees is within the sound discretion of the trial court. PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095;Ak1'ns v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. (2000) 79 Cal. App. 4th 1127, 1134. There are many factors that the court looks to when making such an evaluation. “In determining what constitutes a reasonable attorney fee when a contract or statute provides for such an award, 10 ll 12 13 l4 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23' courts should consider the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, and the skill required and success of the attorney's efforts, his or her learning, age and experience in the particular type of work demanded, the intricacies and importance of the litigation, the labor and necessity for skilled legal training and ability in trying the cause, and the time consumed.” Contractors Labor Pool, Inc. v. Westway Contractors, Inc. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th i52, 168. But the analysis does not stop there. The basis for the trial court's calculation should be the actual hours counsel has devoted to her case, less those that result from “inefficient or duplicative use 0f time.” Horsford v. Board ofTrusz‘eeS ofCalifornia State (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 395. In other words, “padding in the form of inefficient or duplicative efforts is not subject to compensation.” Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Insurance Guarantee Association (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 556. The court has discretion to reduce or deny a request for attorney fees where such request appears to be inflated. Id.; see also Chavez v. City 0fL.A. (2010) 47 Cal. 4th 970, 990-91 [finding that attorney fees in the amount of $807,935.50 for 1,851 hours 0f work was “grossly inflated,” when considered in light of the single cause of action 0n which plaintiff prevailed] Loadstar Method The determination of what constitutes a reasonable fee generally begins with the “lodestar method,” i.e., the number 0f hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 154.The lodestar method of calculation applies to a statutory award 0f attorney fees unless the statute provides for another method. Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1135. Lodestar is the basic fee for “comparable legal services in the community [and] it may be adjusted by the court based on factors including, as relevant herein, (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature ofthe litigation preciuded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc, supra at 154-155. Lastly, but not to understate the point, trial courts properly may use equitable considerations to reduce the lodestar amount of 10 11 12 l3 14 15 l6 1'7 18 19 20 21 22 24 25 26 27 28 attorney fees, including on the basis that certain fees were unnecessary. EnPaZm, LLC v. The Tez'z‘ler Family Trust (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 770, 778. Respondent’s Request for Fees In this civfil harassment action, Respondent requests $27,175.99 in attorney fees, which reflects the actual amount of fees incurred by him. In support of this request, Respondent has submitted his attorneys’ invoices and billing records and a declaration from his attorney Kathyrn Curry. In her declaration, Ms. Curry states that she and her law partner James Jacobs charged their client $550 per hour, which is reasonable for attorneys of their experience, skill and record. She further states that this is the prevailing market rate for attorneys with 30 years of experience. The court agrees that the hourly rate charged in this matter was reasonable for an attorney of similar education, experience and skill. Both attorneys are entitled to an houriy rate commensurate with their experience and the prevailing market rates. However, the next - and more crucial question ~ is whether the amount of time expended on this matter was commensurate with the complexity, difficulty or novelty of the litigation, In support 0f an attorney fees motion, “there is n0 required level of detail that counsel must achieve.” Syers Properties III, Inc. v. Rankin (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 691, 699. Attorney billing records are not required, but there must be some evidence in support of the fees. Weber v. Langholz (1995) 39 Cal. App. 4th 1578, 158. Nevertheless, a party’s verified billing invoices may be prima facie evidence that the fees were necessarily incurred; however, the trial court is entitled to look at the totality 0f the circumstances and is not bound by the itemization claimed by the moving party. Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 682. Petitioner takes the position that the fees requested are simply not reasonable in what was a rather uncomplicated civil harassment petition. She argues that Respondent is not automatically entitled to all of the hours claimed; rather Respondent must prove such time spent was reasonable and necessary. (Pet. Opp. pg. 5). On the other hand, Respondent argues that his attorney’s verified billing invoices are prima facie evidence that the fees, as invoiced, were necessarily incurred. (Res. Reply, pg. 4). I‘J 10 11 13 14 15 16 1'7 18 19 20 21 22 24 25 26 28 Before moving forward with an analysis as to the reasonableness of the fees, the court has considered Petitioner’s additional arguments and flatly rejects them: 1)Notice of Request for Attorney Fees. There is no authority for the proposition that Respondent should have included a request for attorney fees in his original responsive pleadings. Reasonable attorney fees are allowed by statute and does not require a prayer in the initial pleadings. See CCP § 527.6(3). 2) Post-Hearing Fees, Petitioner cites no authority in support of her argument that Respondent is precluded from requesting fees for work performed after the dismissal. Fees paid for post~trial attorney work, including preparation of a motion for attorney fees are recoverable: “[W]hen attorney fees are recoverable by statute, the reasonable attorney fees incurred in preparing the motion are also recoverable.” Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 1002. 3) Third Party Invoicing. There is no authority cited that states the prevailing party is precluded from an award of attorney fees where the fees were invoiced to a third party. The prevailing party is entitled t0 an award of attorney fees, irrespective ofwho paid the fees. The question is merely whether the rates and time spent were reasonable. Ketchum v. Moses, supra, at 1133. 4) Consultation with Criminal Attorney. Lastly, and again without citing to any authority, Petitioner claims that it was improper to include fees used for consulting with Respondent’s criminal attorney. This Work was entirelyjustified. The overiap between the civil harassment application and a criminal investigation is manifest and any lack of cooperation between the attorneys could have been to Respondent’s detriment. Thus, the only question here is whether all of the time expended by counsel on this particular case was reasonable. Based on a totality of the circumstances and review of the matter and the facts presented, the court concludes that the time spent and billed to the Respondent was not entirely reasonable. [‘J 10 11 13 l4 15 16 l7 18 19 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 As noted previously, a determination of what constitutes a reasonable fee generally begins with the lodestar method, but does not end there. Trial courts may properly use equitable considerations t0 reduce the Iodestar amount of attorney fees, including 0n the basis that certain fees were unnecessary. EnPalm, LLC v. The Teitler Family Trust, supra, at 778. Under the lodestar adjustmefit methodology, the trial court must initially determine the actual time spent and then ascertain whether under all the circumstances of the case the amount of actual time spent and the monetary charge being made for the time spent are reasonable. Mkhaeilpoor v. BMWofNorth America, LLC (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 240, 247. The prevailing party must show that the fees incurred were "reasonably necessary to the conduct of the iitigation," and were "reasonable in amount." Id. It follows that if the prevailing party fails to meet this burden, and the court finds the time expended or amount charged is not reasonable under the circumstances, “then the court must take this into account and award attorney fees in a lesser amount” Id. In the case at bar, the matter was not presented as a complex action, not even by lower civil harassment standards. There were no novel issues of law or complicated facts requiring exhaustive litigation measures. In fact, other than the standard civil harassment filings, there were n0 motions filed and debated, no discovery required, no sleuthing for facts beyond the typical harassment case and no special circumstances requiring extensive préparation. This was a fairly straight forward civil harassment matter. It should also not go unnoticed, that the trial never went forward, the case having been dismissed. And yet, Respondent was billed for approximately 50 hours of attorney-work. The hourly rate of $550 was reasonable and there is no doubt that those hours were actually billed. However, the sheer number of hours expended on a straight forward civil harassment case is staggering by any comparable standards. As previously noted, the matter was uncomplicated, not requiring any discovery or pretrial motions. Further, the matter proceeded over a short period of time and did not, in the end proceed to trial. Thus the court concludes that the amount of time spent, and the fees incurred 0n an otherwisé straight forward civil harassment case, were not reasonable. 10 ll 12 13 l4 15 16 l7 18 19 20 21 22 23 Based on the uncomplicated nature ofthe case, the lack of or need for preutrial investigation, motions pleading and any wide-ranging pre-trial preparation, and in light of the considerations of the Iodestar method, the court concludes that a reasonable amount of time worked is 25 hours. At the reasonable hourly rate 0f $550, the reasonable amount 0f attorney fees in this matter is $13,750.00. IV. CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS AND ORDER For the reasons set forth above and good cause appearing, and after a review of the moving papers, opposition and attached declarations, the court makes the following findings and order: 1. The court finds that Respondeht, as the prevailing party, is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees under CCP § 527.6(5); 2. The court finds that reasonable attorney fees in this matter, for the reasons noted above, are $13,750.00; r 3. Respondent’s request for reasonable attorney fees is GRANTED, in part, and Respondent shall be awarded attorney fees in the sum 0f $13,750.00 IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: June 25, 2021 SUPERIOR COURT COMMISSIONER SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA DOWNTOWN COURTHOUSE 191 NORTH FIRST STREET SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA 95 1 13 CIVIL DIVISION I ‘l> c s;.,,.“=="w. ~‘ 4t. n“. “\qu'gxfix‘wfi" RE: Vanechay Phommachack vs Michael Han Case Number: 20CH009649 PROOF OF SERVICE DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART RESPONDENT‘S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES was delivered to the parties Hsted below the above entitled case as set forth in the sworn declaration beiow. If you, a party represented by you. or a witness to be called on behalf of that party need an accommodation under the American with Disabilities Act, please contact the Court Administrator’s office at (408) 882-2700, or use the Court's TDD line (408) 882-2690 or the Voice/TDD California Reiay Service (800) 735-2922. DECLARATION 0F SERVICE BY MAIL: | declare that | served this notice by enclosing a true copy in a sealed envelope, addressed to each person whose name is shown below, and by depositing the envelope with postage fully prepaid, In the United States Mail at San Jose, CA on June 25, 2021‘ CLERK OF THE COURT. by Farris Bryant. Deputy. cc: Dmitry Stadkin Stadiln Marinho LLP 111 N Market Street Suite 300 SAN JOSE CA 95113 Kathryn Ceciiia Curry 2570W El Camino Real Ste 400 Mountain View CA 94040 CW-9027 REV 12/08/16 PROOF 0F SERV'CE EXHIBIT C HI I GCA Law Partners LLP Page 1 Run: 10/1/2021 2:03:26 PM Matter Ledger Report File: MLDGR 1/1/1 970 to 12/31/2059 Unbilied Timem Code Name Date Code Hours $ Value Task Ref# Text KCC Kathryn C. Curry, Partner 08/19/21 B 0.20 110.00 31 L4690 Prepare email to Mr. Stadlin regarding attorneys fees request KCC Kathryn C. Curry, Partner 08/25/21 B 0.20 110.00 31L4689 Emails with Mr. Stadlin regarding request for attorneys fees KCC Kathryn C. Curry, Partner 08/30/21 B 0.50 275.00 31L4692 Conferwith Mr. Han regarding petitioner's counter-offer and recommended response thereto KCC Kathryn C. Curry, Partner 09/01/21 B 0.50 275.00 31L4691 Detailed response to Mr. Stadlin's email regarding attorneys' fees; review his response; provide update to Mr. Han regarding same KCC Kathryn C. Curry, Partner 09/28/21 B 1.10 605.00 31L4686 Begin preparation of motion for attorneys' fees KCC Kathryn C. Curry, Partner 09/30/21 B 1.40 770.00 31L4687 Continue preparation of motion for attorneys fees, including notice, legal memorandum, deciaration, and request for judicial notice KCC Kathryn C. Curry, Partner 10/01/21 B 1.60 880.00 31 L4688 Finalize motion for attorneys fees, including ali supporting documents Billable 5.50 3,025.00 Non-Billable 0.00 0.00 Matter Suppressable 0.00 0.00 ”HoursValue Total Unbilled Time 5.50 3,025.00 Total 5.50 3,025.00 Billed Time Code Name Date Code Hours $ Value Task Ref# Text JLJ James L. Jacobs, Partner 03/25/21 B 1.70 935.00 31H8774 Review all ofthe pleadings in Tran case; review of declaration used in prior case for potential use in Tran matter; telephone cali with K. Curry; zoom conference call with clients and K. Curry KCC Kathryn C. Curry, Partner 03/25/21 B 0.50 275.00 3115298 Review new Tran filings against Mr. Han (.5); zoom- conference cal! with clients regarding same (no charge) JLJ James L. Jacobs, Partner 03/26/21 B 0.40 220.00 31H8862 Telephone call with K. Curry regarding strategy and opposition declaration; teiephone call with A. Castro regarding strategy KCC Kathryn C. Curry, Partner 03/27/21 B 2.80 1,540.00 31 l5299 Begin preparation of response to B. Tran Civil Harassment Restraining Order (CHRO) application; begin preparation of declaration of Michael Han; telephone calls with Mr. Han regarding same; review additiona! documents provided by Mr. Han and supplement declaration JLJ James L. Jacobs, Partner 03/27/21 B 0.20 110.00 31l5312 Email update to client group JLJ James L. Jacobs, Partner 03/28/21 B 1.20 660.00 31H8856 Email from K. Curry with questions and draft declaration; prepared redline of declaration; further emails with K. Curry regarding strategy; review of next iteration of declaration; email to K. Curry regarding further suggestions/edits KCC Kathryn C. Curry, Partner 03/28/21 B 1.90 1,045.00 3115300 Calls with Mr. Han regarding same; revise Mr. Han‘s supporting declaration; finalize response to B‘ Tran's CHRO application TE Tina Ernst, Paralegal 03/29/21 B 0.40 80.00 31H9326 File and serve Response to TRO JLJ James L. Jacobs, Partner 03/29/21 B 0.40 220.00 31H9352 Review of various emails and next iteration of declaration; provided comments to same; telephone call with K. Curry JLJ James L. Jacobs, Partner 03/30/21 B 0.50 275.00 31H9487 Email exchange with A. Castro; teiephone call with K. Curry; review of deposition notice TE Tina Ernst, Paralegal 04/01/21 B 0.20 40.00 31 |0277 Serve and calendar deposition notice of Brian Tran KCC Kathryn C. Curry, Partner 04/01/21 B 0.20 110.00 3111887 Review and revise deposition notice to Mr. Tran JLJ James L. Jacobs, Partner 04/01/21 B 0.80 440.00 31J1425 Email with Mike and Rick regarding subpoena of Vanechay; voicemail to Mike and Armando regarding Vanechay question; telephone call with M, Han; added inserts into deposition notice regarding document requests; client communication regarding same KCC Kathryn C. Curry, Partner 04/02/21 B 2.10 1,155.00 31|1886 Confer with Mr. Han; review exhibits and additional documents provided by Mr. Han JLJ James L. Jacobs, Partner 04/02l21 B 0.80 440.00 31 15118 Telephone caHs with K. Curry; telephone call with A. Castro; email from Rick B regarding Brian in area; email response to Rick B with suggestions; email from A. Castro GCA Law Partners LLP Run: 10/1/2021 2:03:26 PM Page 2 Matter Ladger Report File: MLDGR 1/1 l1 970 to 12/31 [2059 Billed Time Continued Code Name Date Code Hours $ Value Task Ref # Text KCC Kathryn C. Curry, Partner 04/05/21 B 4.70 2,585.00 31 l1885 Prepare for hearing, including prepare evidence/exhibits; prepare direct examinations of Mr. Han, Thao and Rick; confer with Mr. Han regarding same; prepare hearing subpoena for Ms. Phommachack JLJ James L. Jacobs, Partner 04/06/21 B 0.30 165.00 31 l1566 Debrief telephone call with K. Curry following hearing KCC Kathryn C. Curry, Partner 04/06/21 B 2.40 1,320.00 31|1884 Attend civil harassment hearing at court TE Tina Ernst, Paralegal 04/08/21 B 0.20 40.00 31 i1 918 Prepare case correspondence; schedule court reporter for deposition JLJ James L. Jacobs, Partner 04/08/21 B 0.50 275.00 31 [1982 Review of emai! from opposing counsel; review court web site for recent additions; prepared ciient update emaii; email to T. Ernst and K. Curry TE Tina Ernst, Paraiegal 04/09/21 S 0.10 20.00 31 11991 Calendar continued hearing date JLJ James L. Jacobs, Partner 04/09/21 B 0.20 110.00 31J1459 Email to ciients regarding response to arguments in Tran's papers; revised email to opposing counsel TE Tina Ernst, Paralegal 04/1 3/21 S 0.20 40.00 31 |2848 Update electronic pleading file re motion to quash deposition; calendar JLJ James L. Jacobs, Partner 04/1 3121 B 0.50 275.00 31.31476 Review of Tran papers, analysis and email update to client group; email with K. Curry JLJ James L. Jacobs, Partner 04/14/21 B 0.10 55.00 31.11478 Emails with M. Han and K. Curry regarding strategy and next steps JLJ James L. Jacobs, Partner 04/1 6/21 B 0.30 165.00 31 |3329 Telephone calt with K. Curry regarding ex parte application; opposition to motion to quash and strategy KCC Kathryn C. Curry, Partner 04/19/21 B 0.20 110.00 31 l4325 Prepare email to Mr. Stadlin regarding ex parte request to advance the hearing date on the motion to quash KCC Kathryn C. Curry, Partner 04/20/21 B 2.10 1,155.00 3114326 Review email from Mr. Stadlin regarding his non-opposition to our ex parte appiication; begin preparation of ex parte application to advance the gearing on the motion to quash TE Tina Ernst, Paraiegal 04/21/21 B 1.30 260.00 31 I416? Revise, file and serve ex parte application KCC Kathryn C. Curry, Partner 04/21/21 B 1.20 660.00 31 14328 Continue prepare ex parte application and proposed order KCC Kathryn C. Curry, Partner 04l22/21 S 0.80 440.00 31 [4330 Revise and supplement ex parte application KCC Kathryn C. Curry, Partner (34/23/21 B 1.00 550.00 31 E4329 Attend ex parte hearing; review order and email Mr. Stadlin regarding same JLJ James L. Jacobs, Partner 04/23/21 B 0.10 55.00 31J1483 Emaii update to clients regarding ex parte application JLJ James L. Jacobs, Partner 04126/21 B 0.10 55.00 31.11490 Emails with K. Curry regarding deposition and scheduling issues and drafted email to opposing counsel JLJ James L. Jacobs, Partner 04/28/21 B 0.50 275.00 31 15132 Review of draft opposition TE Tina Ernst, Paralegal 04/28/21 B 1.10 220.00 31 l5151 Prepare pteadings and fiie and serve Opposition to Motion to Quash JLJ James L. Jacobs, Partner 04/29/21 B 0.10 55.00 31J1489 Email update to clients regarding motion to quash KCC Kathryn C. Curry, Partner 05/04/21 B 0.60 330.00 31 [7496 Review and analysis of Mr. Tran's reply brief in support of his motion to quash the deposition notice KCC Kathryn C. Curry, Partner 05/10/21 B 0.80 440.00 31 |8726 Prepare for hearing on motion to quash KCC Kathryn C. Curry, Partner 05/1 1/21 B 0.90 495.00 31 E8724 Attend hearing on motion to quash JLJ James L. Jacobs. Partner 05/1 2/21 B 0.30 165.00 31 I8521 Email from D. Stadlin; telephone cali and emails with K. Curry regarding response KCC Kathryn C. Curry, Partner 05/12121 B 0.20 110.00 31 |8727 Prepare status report to clients KCC Kathryn C. Curry, Partner 05/14/21 B 0.20 110.00 31 18728 Forward emai! from Mr. Stadlin to clients regarding motion for monetary sanctions and our anaiysis and recommendations KCC Kathryn C. Curry, Partner 05/20/21 B 6.10 3,355.00 31J3074 Prepare for the hearing, including exhibits, and cross examination (3.1 hrs); travel to and attend hearing (3.0) KCC Kathryn C. Curry, Partner 05/27/21 B 3.70 2,035.00 31K4169 Prepare opposition to motion to quash deposition subpoena KCC Kathryn C. Curry, Partner 06/01/21 B 2.20 1,210.00 31K4227 Confer with Mr. Tran regarding hearing; conferwith witnesses regarding same; prepare additional exhibits, including video and pictures KCC Kathryn C. Curry, Partner 06/02/21 B 4.40 2,420.00 31 K4232 Attend CHRO hearing; confer with clients after hearing TE Tina Ernst, Paralegal 06/03/21 S 0.10 20.00 31J3003 Calendar continued TRO hearing date KCC Kathryn C. Curry, Partner 06/13I21 B 1.90 1,045.00 31 K4233 Prepare for continued hearing, including prepare additional documents/exhibits for cross-examination and defense; supplement and revise cross-examination of Mr. Tran KCC Kathryn C. Curry, Partner 06/14/21 B 7.10 3,905.00 31 K4234 Attend CHRO hearing GCA Law Partners LLP Page 3 Run: 10/1/2021 2:03:26 PM Matter Ledger Report File: MLDGR 1/111 970 to 12/31/2059 C 2156 Billed Time Continued Code Name Date Code Hours $ Value Task Ref# Text KCC Kathryn C. Curry, Partner 08/03/21 B 0.90 495.00 31K4167 Appear in court for ruling (.7); conferwith clients after hearing (.2) KCC Kathryn C. Curry, Partner 08/09/21 B 0.20 110.00 31 K4610 Email to clients regarding status and recommendations Billable 60.50 32,155.00 Non-Billable 0.00 0.00 Suppressable 1.20 520.00 Total Billed Time 61 .70 32,675.00 Matter Ledger Summary Matter Value of Total Current 31-60 61-90 Over 90 Trust Balance Prepaid Balance WiP Carried Forward WIP: 3,076.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3,076.00 0.00 0.00 Fees 3,025.00 Costs 51 .OO NR: 32,223.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 32,223.47 ----------- Total 3,076.0
