Sound View Innovations, LLC v. Hulu, LLC

REPLY IN SUPPORT NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Exclude IN-PART THE TESTIMONY OF DR. JEFFREY CHASE 245

C.D. Cal.March 25, 2019

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DAUBERT MOTION TO EXCLUDE IN-PART THE TESTIMONY OF DR. JEFFREY CHASE Case No. LACV17-04146 JAK (PLAx) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 RUSS AUGUST & KABAT Marc A. Fenster (SBN 181067) mfenster@raklaw.com Benjamin T. Wang (SBN 228712) bwang@raklaw.com Kent N. Shum (SBN 259189) kshum@raklaw.com 12424 Wilshire Boulevard, 12th Floor Los Angeles, California 90025 Tel: (310) 826-7474 Fax: (310) 826-6991 DESMARAIS LLP Alan S. Kellman (admitted pro hac vice) Richard M. Cowell (admitted pro hac vice) C. Austin Ginnings (admitted pro hac vice) Kerri-Ann Limbeek (admitted pro hac vice) Jennifer M. Przybylski (admitted pro hac vice) Steven M. Balcof (admitted pro hac vice) 230 Park Avenue New York, New York 10169 Tel: (212) 351-3400 Fax: (212) 351-3401 Peter C. Magic (SBN 278917) 101 California Street, Suite 3070 San Francisco, CA 94111 Tel: (415) 573-1900 Fax: (415) 573-1901 Attorneys for Plaintiff Sound View Innovations, LLC UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA WESTERN DIVISION SOUND VIEW INNOVATIONS, LLC, Plaintiff, v. HULU, LLC, Defendant. Case No. LACV17-04146 JAK (PLAx) REPLY IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF SOUND VIEW INNOVATIONS, LLC’S DAUBERT MOTION TO EXCLUDE IN-PART THE TESTIMONY OF DR. JEFFREY CHASE Date: April 15, 2019 Time: 8:30 a.m. Hon. Judge John A. Kronstadt Courtroom: 10B Case 2:17-cv-04146-JAK-PLA Document 356 Filed 03/25/19 Page 1 of 16 Page ID #:20356 REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DAUBERT MOTION TO EXCLUDE IN-PART THE TESTIMONY OF DR. JEFFREY CHASE i Case No. LACV17-04146 JAK (PLAx) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 TABLE OF CONTENTS Pages I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1 II. ARGUMENT................................................................................................... 1 A. Dr. Chase Engages In Claim Construction Under The Guise of Explaining The “Ordinary Meaning” Of Claim Terms. ....................... 1 1. Dr. Chase’s Opinions Regarding The “downloading said portion . . . while concurrently retrieving a remaining portion . . .” Element Amount To Arguing Prosecution History To The Jury. ................................................................... 2 2. Dr. Chase’s Opinions Regarding “adjusting a data transfer rate . . . ” Are Explicitly Based On Purported Limitations Of Claim Scope That The Court Already Considered And Rejected. ...................................................................................... 4 3. Hulu Provides No Grounds For Having The Court Engage In Additional Claim Construction. .................................................. 5 B. Dr. Chase’s Opinions That The Accused Products “Function In Ways Identical To The . . . Prior Art”-Which Hulu Admits Dr. Chase Offers “For Non-Infringement Purposes Only”-Is Impermissible Under Federal Circuit Law. .......................................... 6 C. Dr. Chase’s “Analysis” Regarding The Footprint CDN Is Legally Insufficient To Prove Invalidity And Should Be Excluded. ............... 10 III. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 10 Case 2:17-cv-04146-JAK-PLA Document 356 Filed 03/25/19 Page 2 of 16 Page ID #:20357 REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DAUBERT MOTION TO EXCLUDE IN-PART THE TESTIMONY OF DR. JEFFREY CHASE ii Case No. LACV17-04146 JAK (PLAx) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases ............................................................................................................... Page(s) 01 Communique Lab., Inc. v. Citrix Sys., Inc., 889 F.3d 735 (Fed. Cir. 2018) ..................................................................... 8, 9 Alloc, Inc. v. Norman D. Lifton Co., 653 F. Supp. 2d 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) ............................................................. 9 Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 12-cv-630, 2014 WL 660857 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2014) ......................... 3 Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 12-cv-00630-LHK, 2014 WL 252045 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2014) ............ 6 Core Wireless Lic. S.A.R.L. v. LG Elecs., Inc., No. 2:14-cv-911-JRG-RSP, 2016 WL 4718963 (E.D. Tex. July 12, 2016) ... 8 Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. Apple Inc., No. 15-CV-05008 NC, 2016 WL 8231157 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2016) .......... 9 EMC Corp. v. Pure Storage, Inc., No. 13-cv-1985, 2016 WL 775742 (D. Del. Feb. 25, 2016) ........................... 3 Ferring Pharm. Inc. v. PAR Pharm. Inc., No. 1:15-cv-173, 2016 WL 6471246 (D. Del. Oct. 28, 2016) ........................ 3 Fujifilm Corp. v. Motorola Mobility LLC, No. 12-cv-3587, 2015 WL 757575 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2015) ....................... 6 Huawei Techs. Co. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 340 F. Supp. 3d 934 (N.D. Cal. 2018) ........................................................ 2, 8 Icon-IP Pty Ltd. v. Specialized Bicycle Components, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 3d 928 (N.D. Cal. 2015)............................................................... 9 In re Nomiya, 509 F.2d 566 (C.C.P.A. 1975) ......................................................................... 7 Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Blue Sky Med. Grp., Inc., 554 F.3d 1010 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ....................................................................... 9 MediaTek Inc. v. Freescale Semiconductor, Inc., No. 11-cv-5341, 2014 WL 971765 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2014) ......................... 3 Netword LLC v Centraal Corp., 242 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ....................................................................... 1 Opticurrent, LLC v. Power Integrations, Inc., No. 17-CV-03597-WHO, 2018 WL 6727826 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2018)7, 8, 9 Parthenon Unified Memory Architecture LLC v. Apple Inc., No. 2:15-cv-621-JRG-RSP, 2016 WL 7743510 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 21, 2016) ................................................................................................................ 7 Case 2:17-cv-04146-JAK-PLA Document 356 Filed 03/25/19 Page 3 of 16 Page ID #:20358 REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DAUBERT MOTION TO EXCLUDE IN-PART THE TESTIMONY OF DR. JEFFREY CHASE iii Case No. LACV17-04146 JAK (PLAx) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 PerdiemCo, LLC v. Industrack LLC, No. 2:15-CV-00727-JRG-RSP, 2016 WL 8135383 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 25, 2016) ................................................................................................................ 9 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ................................................................... 1, 3 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Affymetrix, Inc., No. 17-cv-1394, 2018 WL 5617866 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2018) ...................... 6 Shumer v. Lab. Compt. Sys. Inc., 308 F.3d 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ....................................................................... 1 Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Res., Inc., 279 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ................................................................... 7, 8 YETI Coolers, LLC v. RTIC Coolers, LLC, No. 15-cv-597, 2017 WL 404519 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 27, 2017) .......................... 5 Ziilabs Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 2:14-cv-203-JRG, 2015 WL 13617214 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 2015) ................ 4 Case 2:17-cv-04146-JAK-PLA Document 356 Filed 03/25/19 Page 4 of 16 Page ID #:20359 REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DAUBERT MOTION TO EXCLUDE IN-PART THE TESTIMONY OF DR. JEFFREY CHASE 1 Case No. LACV17-04146 JAK (PLAx) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 I. INTRODUCTION Hulu’s opposition brief concedes that: (1) Dr. Chase intends to offer claim scope opinions (some of which Hulu already presented and lost in the Markman phase) under the guise of explaining “plain and ordinary meaning;” (2) Dr. Chase intends to compare the prior art to the accused products in an effort to convince the jury to find non- infringement; and (3) Dr. Chase’s opinion that the Footprint CDN anticipates the claims is based on a claim chart with citations to depositions and documents with no explanation from Dr. Chase as to what exact features meet the claims, and what exact claim scope Dr. Chase applied, other than a vague reference to Sound View’s expert’s “interpretation” of the claims. The case law cited in Sound View’s motion support excluding all of those opinions, and none of the cases cited by Hulu in its opposition brief demonstrates that Dr. Chase should be permitted to present such opinions to a jury. II. ARGUMENT A. Dr. Chase Engages In Claim Construction Under The Guise of Explaining The “Ordinary Meaning” Of Claim Terms. The key error in Hulu’s opposition is that it conflates the question of what analysis is appropriate at the claim construction stage with what is appropriate for an expert to opine to the jury. Hulu points to cases purportedly supporting its argument that its expert may opine on claim scope based on purported limitations in the prosecution history at any time (Dkt. No. 306 at 3-4), yet at most Hulu’s cited cases discuss reliance on the prosecution history or specification during claim construction. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1320-1324 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (discussing what weight a court should give intrinsic and extrinsic evidence during Markman proceedings); Netword LLC v Centraal Corp., 242 F.3d 1347, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (evaluating district court’s reliance on specification during Markman proceedings).1 1 Confusingly, Hulu also relies on Shumer v. Lab. Compt. Sys. Inc. (Dkt. No. 306 at 4) to argue “that an expert is expected to state his ‘interpretation of the claim element.’” While true, this statement relates to the sufficiency of an anticipation analysis and whether an expert opinion is conclusory; not the propriety of presenting claim scope opinions to a jury. See 308 F.3d 1304, 1315-1316 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Case 2:17-cv-04146-JAK-PLA Document 356 Filed 03/25/19 Page 5 of 16 Page ID #:20360 REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DAUBERT MOTION TO EXCLUDE IN-PART THE TESTIMONY OF DR. JEFFREY CHASE 2 Case No. LACV17-04146 JAK (PLAx) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Sound View does not dispute that the parties are permitted to discuss the plain and ordinary meaning of terms not construed by the Court. But that does not mean that Hulu can circumvent the Court’s claim construction order by arguing new or already- litigated constructions to the jury under the pretense of an expert opinion regarding plain and ordinary meaning. See Huawei Techs. Co. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 340 F. Supp. 3d 934, 949 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (“[E]xpert witnesses are not permitted to argue claim constructions to the jury.”). Nor can Hulu revisit claim construction to address issues it failed to raise earlier. See, e.g., id. at 947-948 (declining to reopen claim construction when the parties already had the opportunity to litigate the construction of 10 terms under the local rules). Here, Dr. Chase’s arguments regarding the two terms2 at issue in this motion cross the line because one argument is specifically premised on prosecution history disclaimer (for which Hulu cites no authority that such an opinion may be presented to the jury), and another argument is a repeat of an argument Hulu already made and lost during Markman. 1. Dr. Chase’s Opinions Regarding The “downloading said portion . . . while concurrently retrieving a remaining portion . . .” Element Amount To Arguing Prosecution History To The Jury. Hulu does not dispute that Dr. Chase construes the “downloading . . . while concurrently retrieving . . .” element to require concurrent retrieval into the “same buffer.” Dkt. No. 306 at 8-9. Nor does Hulu dispute that this purported limitation is based on “reference to the prosecution history.” Id.; see Przybylski Decl.3 Ex. 2 (Chase Rebuttal Rpt.) at ¶ 142. The law is clear that this type of opinion is not appropriate for an expert to present to a jury, and should be excluded. Hulu cites only to Phillips and Apple in support of its argument that it is 2 In its motion, Sound View also moved with regard to Dr. Chase’s “ring buffer” arguments. See Dkt. No. 245 at 19-20. As a result of the parties’ joint stipulation to dismiss claims, defenses, and counterclaims pertaining to ’213 Patent Claims 1, 7, and 8, Dr. Chase’s opinions regarding the “ring buffer” element are no longer at issue. 3 “Przybylski Decl.” refers to the Declaration of Jennifer M. Przybylski and exhibits thereto, filed as Dkt. No. 245-1. Case 2:17-cv-04146-JAK-PLA Document 356 Filed 03/25/19 Page 6 of 16 Page ID #:20361 REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DAUBERT MOTION TO EXCLUDE IN-PART THE TESTIMONY OF DR. JEFFREY CHASE 3 Case No. LACV17-04146 JAK (PLAx) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 appropriate for an expert to argue the “plain and ordinary meaning” of a term “in light of the prosecution history” to a jury. See Dkt. No. 306 at 8-9. Yet neither case supports Hulu’s argument. Phillips addressed arguments made at claim construction, not expert opinions provided to the jury. See 415 F.3d at 1320-1324. And, rather than support Hulu, Apple explicitly indicates that presenting prosecution history arguments to the jury is not appropriate. The Apple court noted that an expert cannot testify about prosecution history in support of a plain and ordinary meaning analysis “because it would confuse the jury . . . and such evidence is not relevant to how a person of ordinary skill in the art reading the specification would understand that term.” Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 12-cv-630, 2014 WL 660857, *5 n.3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2014); see EMC Corp. v. Pure Storage, Inc., No. 13-cv-1985, 2016 WL 775742, *4 n.5 (D. Del. Feb. 25, 2016) (“An expert’s testimony that a patent’s prosecution history supports his or her understanding of the plain and ordinary meaning of a claim term would likewise amount to arguing claim construction to the jury.”) (citing Apple, 2014 WL 660857, at *5 n.3). Hulu’s attempts to distinguish the cases cited in Sound View’s opening brief similarly fail. See Dkt. No. 306 at 6-7. Although each case permitted general reference to the prosecution history during trial, each case unequivocally stated that prosecution history could not be used to support the meaning of claim terms. See Ferring Pharm. Inc. v. PAR Pharm. Inc., No. 1:15-cv-173, 2016 WL 6471246, *1 (D. Del. Oct. 28, 2016) (“Both parties’ experts are, therefore, precluded from testifying that the specification and prosecution history support their views regarding the plain and ordinary meaning of the claim terms.”); MediaTek Inc. v. Freescale Semiconductor, Inc., No. 11-cv-5341, 2014 WL 971765, *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2014) (“[E]xpert testimony purporting to bring in intrinsic or extrinsic evidence to explain the meaning of a claim term will also be excluded.”). Because Dr. Chase’s opinions regarding the “downloading . . . while concurrently retrieving . . .” element import a limitation based on prosecution history, those opinions are inappropriate claim construction. See Ziilabs Case 2:17-cv-04146-JAK-PLA Document 356 Filed 03/25/19 Page 7 of 16 Page ID #:20362 REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DAUBERT MOTION TO EXCLUDE IN-PART THE TESTIMONY OF DR. JEFFREY CHASE 4 Case No. LACV17-04146 JAK (PLAx) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 2:14-cv-203-JRG, 2015 WL 13617214, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 2015) (precluding use of file history “to support [] inferences about the plain and ordinary meaning of a term” because a jury could give such evidence undue weight). 2. Dr. Chase’s Opinions Regarding “adjusting a data transfer rate . . . ” Are Explicitly Based On Purported Limitations Of Claim Scope That The Court Already Considered And Rejected. Hulu does not dispute that Dr. Chase construes the “adjusting” element to require “that the helper server must ‘control’ the adjusting” (Dkt. No. 306 at 9 n.3) and to mean that servicing a request “at the maximum network speed” cannot meet the claims (id. at 9).4 Hulu argues that because “the Court did not construe this claim term,” and instead agreed with Sound View that the “adjusting a data transfer rate” element did not require construction, Dr. Chase’s opinions could not contradict the court’s construction (since there is none). That argument is incorrect and ignores the reasoned analysis the Court provided on this term. As an initial matter, in declining to construe the “adjusting” element, the Court did not simply decline to analyze the parties’ arguments, but rather evaluated whether the two limitations presented by Hulu warranted construing the claim term to contain such limitations. See Dkt. No. 148 at 9-11. Having considered Hulu’s arguments, the Court declined to so limit the claims, finding “[t]here is insufficient reason to depart from [the ordinary] understanding or limit the term based on the specification’s disclosure.” Dkt. No. 148 at 11 (emphasis added). Dr. Chase cannot now opine to a jury that the same evidence limits the claims in the same way Hulu already argued. Hulu does not deny that Dr. Chase intends to opine “that the helper server must ‘control’ the ‘adjusting of a data transfer rate.’” See Dkt. No. 306 at 9 n.3 (emphasis added). Hulu’s assertion that such an opinion is “consistent” with the Court’s claim construction order simply because the Court did not construe the term is superficial. 4 Sound View in its opening brief also moved to exclude Dr. Chase’s opinions that the “adjusting” must be performed in response to the “receiving” step. See Dkt. No. 245 at 16. Hulu did not respond to that issue. See Dkt. No. 306 at 9-10. Case 2:17-cv-04146-JAK-PLA Document 356 Filed 03/25/19 Page 8 of 16 Page ID #:20363 REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DAUBERT MOTION TO EXCLUDE IN-PART THE TESTIMONY OF DR. JEFFREY CHASE 5 Case No. LACV17-04146 JAK (PLAx) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 See id.; Westin Decl.5 Ex. 18 (Chase Supp. Rpt.) at ¶ 131 (providing conclusory statement that the Court’s claim construction order “is not inconsistent” with Dr. Chase’s opinion). Specifically, as explained in Sound View’s opening brief, Dr. Chase’s opinions rely on the same arguments that Hulu raised during claim construction, and that the Court declined to adopt as limitations on the “adjusting” element. See Dkt. No. 245 at 18; Dkt. No. 148 at 10. Dr. Chase should not be permitted to simply rehash those same arguments to the jury, and his opinions that the helper server must “control” the “adjusting of a data transfer rate” should be excluded. See YETI Coolers, LLC v. RTIC Coolers, LLC, No. 15-cv-597, 2017 WL 404519, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 27, 2017) (excluding expert’s opinion that “is a blatant attempt to ‘back door’ [a] rejected claim construction into the trial”). Similarly, Dr. Chase opines that the “adjusting” element requires adjusting the data transfer rate to something other than “maximum network speed”; an argument presented by Hulu and rejected by the Court. See Dkt. No. 245 at 18-19. Hulu does not dispute that Dr. Chase intends to present that opinion. In his supplemental report, Dr. Chase asserted-despite acknowledging that “the Court cautioned against limiting the ‘adjusting’ term”-that “[t]he ’213 Patent’s only example . . . adjusts the data transfer rate from a higher data transfer rate to a lower data transfer rate.” Westin Decl. Ex. 18 (Chase Supp. Rpt.) at ¶ 130 (criticizing a purported lack of “support in the ’213 specification for any other type of data rate adjustment” in rejecting other types of data rate adjustment discussed by Dr. Richardson). Dr. Chase should not be permitted to opine or even imply to the jury that the ’213 Patent’s “only example” limits the claims, when the Court already concluded otherwise. See YETI, 2017 WL 404519 at *2. 3. Hulu Provides No Grounds For Having The Court Engage In Additional Claim Construction. Hulu’s request to reopen claim construction should be denied. See Dkt. No. 306 5 “Westin Decl.” refers to the Omnibus Declaration of Cameron W. Westin and exhibits thereto, filed as Dkt. No. 315. Case 2:17-cv-04146-JAK-PLA Document 356 Filed 03/25/19 Page 9 of 16 Page ID #:20364 REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DAUBERT MOTION TO EXCLUDE IN-PART THE TESTIMONY OF DR. JEFFREY CHASE 6 Case No. LACV17-04146 JAK (PLAx) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 at 11-12. Hulu already had its chance to (and did in fact) argue the scope and construction of the “adjusting a data transfer rate” element during the Markman phase and should not be permitted to relitigate those issues. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Affymetrix, Inc., No. 17-cv-1394, 2018 WL 5617866, *2 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2018) (rejecting motion for reconsideration of claim construction, finding the motion “should not merely present arguments previously raised in an attempt to reargue or relitigate the court’s claim constructions”). Moreover, Hulu chose to not pursue construction of the “downloading . . . while concurrently retrieving” element during claim construction. The Court need not now consider claim construction disputes that Hulu could have- and should have-raised during the Markman process. See, e.g., Fujifilm Corp. v. Motorola Mobility LLC, No. 12-cv-3587, 2015 WL 757575, *4-5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2015) (refusing to reopen claim construction at dispositive motions stage to address arguments “not raised during the claim construction process” where the court already “issued the claim construction order in this case construing each of the terms selected for construction by the parties”); Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 12-cv-00630- LHK, 2014 WL 252045, *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2014) (refusing to reopen claim construction to “constru[e] additional terms based on claim construction arguments raised for the first time” at dispositive motions stage where parties already identified and argued the ten “most significant” terms). B. Dr. Chase’s Opinions That The Accused Products “Function In Ways Identical To The . . . Prior Art”-Which Hulu Admits Dr. Chase Offers “For Non-Infringement Purposes Only”-Is Impermissible Under Federal Circuit Law. Hulu admits that Dr. Chase offers comparisons of the accused products to the prior art “for non-infringement purposes.” Dkt. No. 306 at 12, 18; see id at 12. (“None of the challenged paragraphs from Dr. Chase’s reports purport to relate to invalidity at all.”). But settled law precludes using such comparisons as proof of non-infringement. See Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Res., Inc., 279 F.3d 1357, 1365- Case 2:17-cv-04146-JAK-PLA Document 356 Filed 03/25/19 Page 10 of 16 Page ID #:20365 REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DAUBERT MOTION TO EXCLUDE IN-PART THE TESTIMONY OF DR. JEFFREY CHASE 7 Case No. LACV17-04146 JAK (PLAx) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 66 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Opticurrent, LLC v. Power Integrations, Inc., No. 17-CV-03597- WHO, 2018 WL 6727826, *14-16 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2018). Hulu argues that Dr. Chase’s comparisons between the accused products and prior art are permissible because: (1) “the prior art is discussed by the asserted patents themselves and thus serve as express disclaimers of claim scope” (Dkt. No. 306 at 12 (emphasis in original)); (2) the opinions “play only a limited role in explaining why certain claim limitations do not apply to the Accused Products” (id. at 15); and (3) “Dr. Chase’s opinions will also assist a jury in understanding portions of the Court’s construction of ‘SM object’” (id. at 14.). But Hulu’s attempts to justify Dr. Chase’s opinions comparing the accused products to the prior art are improper because all of them apply the purported comparison as a tool for arguing non-infringement and none are supported by any of the case law that Hulu cites. First, whether the prior art was mentioned in an asserted patent’s specification has no bearing on whether Hulu may rely on a “practicing the prior art” defense. The only case that Hulu cites in support of its argument is In re Nomiya, pointing to Nomiya’s footnote that cited prior art “is prior art for all purposes.” See 509 F.2d 566, 570-571 (C.C.P.A. 1975). But Nomiya pertained to prosecution of a patent-not infringement-and addressed whether a cited reference could be used for invalidity purposes under both 35 U.S.C. § 102 and § 103. See id. Nomiya in no way suggested that prior art could be used as part of a non-infringement analysis or to argue claim scope to a jury. Second, the “practicing the prior art” defense to infringement is disallowed regardless of whether it plays a “small role” in an expert’s analysis. See Opticurrent, 2018 WL 6727826 at *16 (“[Defendant’s expert] can testify regarding why accused products do not contain all elements of the claim without comparing them to prior art.” (emphasis added)); Parthenon Unified Memory Architecture LLC v. Apple Inc., No. 2:15-cv-621-JRG-RSP, 2016 WL 7743510 at *2 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 21, 2016) (prohibiting use of comparisons of prior art to accused products for affirmative non-infringement or Case 2:17-cv-04146-JAK-PLA Document 356 Filed 03/25/19 Page 11 of 16 Page ID #:20366 REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DAUBERT MOTION TO EXCLUDE IN-PART THE TESTIMONY OF DR. JEFFREY CHASE 8 Case No. LACV17-04146 JAK (PLAx) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 invalidity opinions, and allowing it only for purposes of cross examination or impeachment); Core Wireless Lic. S.A.R.L. v. LG Elecs., Inc., No. 2:14-cv-911-JRG- RSP, 2016 WL 4718963 at *3 (E.D. Tex. July 12, 2016) (same). Hulu’s attempt to distinguish Opticurrent because the expert there relied on the prior art for both invalidity and non-infringement purposes misreads the court’s holding. See Dkt. No. 306 at 17- 18. Opticurrent made clear that comparing the prior art to accused products is “irrelevant” to non-infringement and would confuse the jury-“implicit” in such comparison is the erroneous teaching that “in order to establish literal infringement, [plaintiff] must prove . . . [defendant's] accused devices embody all the limitations in the asserted claims, and . . . must not be an adoption of the combined teachings of the prior art.” Opticurrent, 2018 WL 6727826 at *15. The reason for such exclusion was plain in Opticurrent-“‘infringement is determined by construing the claims and comparing them to the accused device, not by comparing the accused device to the prior art.’” Id. at *16 (emphasis added) (quoting Tate, 279 F.3d at 1366). Third, Hulu’s statement that “Dr. Chase’s opinions will also assist a jury in understanding portions of the Court’s construction of ‘SM object’” is legally improper on multiple levels. Dkt. No. 306 at 14. For one, it confirms that Hulu intends to have Dr. Chase discuss whether prior art features are present in the accused products in an effort to convince the jury that if a specific feature that existed before the invention is present in an accused product, then an invention that incorporates that feature plus many other steps or elements cannot be infringed (or have within its claim scope a product that includes such a feature). That is the essence of the “practicing the prior art” defense, and is properly excluded. Furthermore, as discussed above, an expert cannot present claim construction opinions to the jury. See, e.g., Huawei, 340 F. Supp. 3d at 949. Hulu’s reliance on 01 Communique Lab., Inc. v. Citrix Sys., Inc., is inapt because that case did not hold that an accused infringer can argue as a defense to infringement that it is merely practicing the prior art. See 889 F.3d 735 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Instead, 01 Communique discussed the extent to which an accused infringer may support an Case 2:17-cv-04146-JAK-PLA Document 356 Filed 03/25/19 Page 12 of 16 Page ID #:20367 REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DAUBERT MOTION TO EXCLUDE IN-PART THE TESTIMONY OF DR. JEFFREY CHASE 9 Case No. LACV17-04146 JAK (PLAx) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 invalidity defense by asserting “that if a claim term must be broadly interpreted to read on an accused device, then this same broad construction will read on the prior art.” Id. at 742. According to Hulu, “[n]one of the challenged paragraphs from Dr. Chase’s reports purport to relate to invalidity at all.” Dkt. No. 306 at 12. Taking Hulu at its word, 01 Communique cannot support Hulu’s arguments, as the case pertains to use of prior art comparisons for invalidity purposes, not non-infringement purposes.6 Hulu’s analysis of Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Blue Sky Med. Grp., Inc., does not suggest any applicability to the present case. See Dkt. No. 306 at 16 (citing 554 F.3d 1010 (Fed. Cir. 2009)).7 In Kinetic, the court did not address the issue of whether comparing accused products to prior art could be used to prove non-infringement. Rather, the court found insufficient basis to reverse a denial of JMOL or reverse denial of the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial based on instances in which the defendant’s expert offered comparisons between the prior art and accused products to rebut “allegations of copying and willful infringement, to prove lack of intent to induce infringement, and to impeach [plaintiff’s] expert[].” Id. at 1024-25. Hulu argues that such a comparison “may be relevant” to this case without any allegation that Dr. Chase’s report contains such opinions. Id. That is unsurprising given that Hulu asserts that Dr. Chase compared the accused products and prior art “for non-infringement purposes only.” Id. at 18. Therefore, Dr. Chase’s opinions comparing the prior art to the accused 6 Because Hulu’s additional cited cases on this issue discuss how a comparison between accused products and the prior art is used for invalidity purposes, those cases fail to support Hulu’s arguments for the same reasons as 01 Communique. See Dkt. No. 306 at 15-16 (citing Icon-IP Pty Ltd. v. Specialized Bicycle Components, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 3d 928, 943 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (addressing challenged anticipation opinions); Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. Apple Inc., No. 15-CV-05008 NC, 2016 WL 8231157, *1-2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2016) (“Both experts opine on invalidity by comparing the claim with the prior art.”); PerdiemCo, LLC v. Industrack LLC, No. 2:15-CV-00727- JRG-RSP, 2016 WL 8135383, *2-3 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 25, 2016) (considering “Whether Mr. Williams’ Opinions Regarding Invalidity Should Be Struck as Untimely and Improper”)). 7 Hulu also cites Alloc, Inc. v. Norman D. Lifton Co., in support of its arguments. See Dkt. No. 306 at 16-17 (citing 653 F. Supp. 2d 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)). Another court recently considered that case and noted that it “provides only a cursory application of the prior art case law in a footnote” without “sufficient information on the expert testimony” for another court to “glean much value from the court’s application of the law.” Opticurrent, 2018 WL 6727826 at *15. Case 2:17-cv-04146-JAK-PLA Document 356 Filed 03/25/19 Page 13 of 16 Page ID #:20368 REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DAUBERT MOTION TO EXCLUDE IN-PART THE TESTIMONY OF DR. JEFFREY CHASE 10 Case No. LACV17-04146 JAK (PLAx) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 products should be excluded. C. Dr. Chase’s “Analysis” Regarding The Footprint CDN Is Legally Insufficient To Prove Invalidity And Should Be Excluded. Hulu argues that Dr. Chase’s report complies with Rule 26(a)(2) because Dr. Chase’s Footprint CDN opinions allegedly demonstrate a “limitation-by-limitation analysis of the Footprint CDN.” Dkt. No. 306 at 18-22. However, as discussed in detail in Sound View’s reply in support of its motion for summary judgment concerning the Footprint CDN, Dr. Chase’s report as it pertains to the Footprint CDN contains no discussion of the claim language or the Court’s claim constructions, and does not offer any explanation or analysis of the cited portions of the Footprint documents. See generally Przybylski Decl. Ex. 1 (Chase Opening Rpt.) at 297-358. Nor does Dr. Chase’s “analysis” of the Footprint CDN identify any theory under which Sound View’s expert (Dr. Richardson) supposedly “broadened” the claims, much less how the Footprint CDN discloses any claim limitations under any such allegedly “broadened” view. See generally id. Such an “analysis” does not comply with Rule 26(a)(2) and falls short of the minimum analysis required to demonstrate to (and thus be helpful to) a jury that the Footprint CDN anticipates any asserted claim. For at least those reasons (and those discussed in Sound View’s briefs concerning its motion for summary judgment concerning the Footprint CDN), Dr. Chase’s Footprint CDN theories are improper and should be excluded. III. CONCLUSION The Court should exclude Dr. Chase’s improper attempts to limit claim scope (paragraphs 102, 128-133, and 142 of Dr. Chase’s rebuttal report), his improper comparisons of the accused products to the prior art (paragraphs 44-48, 80, 81, 83, 90, and 105 of Dr. Chase’s rebuttal report and paragraphs 20, 41, 42, 44, 71, 75, 76, and 85 of his supplemental report), and his conclusory opinions related to the Footprint CDN (paragraphs 435-436 at pages 297-358 of Dr. Chase’s opening report). Case 2:17-cv-04146-JAK-PLA Document 356 Filed 03/25/19 Page 14 of 16 Page ID #:20369 REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DAUBERT MOTION TO EXCLUDE IN-PART THE TESTIMONY OF DR. JEFFREY CHASE 11 Case No. LACV17-04146 JAK (PLAx) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Dated: March 25, 2019 By: /s/ Kent N. Shum RUSS AUGUST & KABAT Marc A. Fenster Benjamin T. Wang Kent N. Shum 12424 Wilshire Boulevard, 12th Floor Los Angeles, California 90025 Tel: (310) 826-7474 Fax: (310) 826-6991 mfenster@raklaw.com bwang@raklaw.com kshum@raklaw.com Of Counsel: DESMARAIS LLP Alan S. Kellman (admitted pro hac vice) Richard M. Cowell (admitted pro hac vice) C. Austin Ginnings (admitted pro hac vice) Kerri-Ann Limbeek (admitted pro hac vice) Jennifer M. Przybylski (admitted pro hac vice) Steven M. Balcof (admitted pro hac vice) 230 Park Avenue New York, NY 10169 Tel: (212) 351-3400 Fax: (212) 351-3401 akellman@desmaraisllp.com rcowell@desmaraisllp.com aginnings@desmaraisllp.com klimbeek@desmaraisllp.com jprzybylski@desmaraisllp.com sbalcof@desmaraisllp.com Peter C. Magic (SBN 278917) 101 California Street, Suite 3070 San Francisco, CA 94111 Tel: (415) 573-1900 Fax: (415) 573-1901 pmagic@desmaraisllp.com Attorneys for Plaintiff Sound View Innovations, LLC Case 2:17-cv-04146-JAK-PLA Document 356 Filed 03/25/19 Page 15 of 16 Page ID #:20370 REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DAUBERT MOTION TO EXCLUDE IN-PART THE TESTIMONY OF DR. JEFFREY CHASE 1 Case No. LACV17-04146 JAK (PLAx) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was filed electronically in compliance with Local Rule 5-3.2. Therefore, this document was served on all counsel who are deemed to have consented to electronic service. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(d) and Local Rule 5-3.2, all other counsel of record not deemed to have consented to electronic service were served with a true and correct copy of the foregoing by email on March 25, 2019. /s/ Kent N. Shum Kent N. Shum Case 2:17-cv-04146-JAK-PLA Document 356 Filed 03/25/19 Page 16 of 16 Page ID #:20371