Minute OrderCal. Super. - 6th Dist.August 17, 2020SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA MINUTE ORDER Line 4 Hearing Start Time; 1:30 PM Schulze v. Apple, Inc. Hearing Type: Motion: Demurrer and 20CV369611 Motion t0 Strike Date 0f Hearing: 03/25/2021 Comments: Heard By: Kulkarni, Sunil R Location: Department 1 Courtroom Reporter: - N0 Court Reporter Courtroom Clerk: Ann Vizconde Court Interpreter: Court Investigator: Parties Present: Future Hearings: Exhibits: - [Reset from 2/4/21; due t0 transfer t0 the Complex Division] (1) Demurrer by Defendant Apple Inc. t0 the First Amended Complaint; (2) Motion by Defendant Apple Inc. t0 Strike the First Amended Complaint. No one called t0 contest the Tentative Ruling. No appearance. Tentative Ruling is not contested. THE COURT ADOPTS THE TENTATIVE RULING; see below: Plaintiff Anita Nariani Schulze brings employment discrimination and related claims against Apple, Inc. in her individual capacity. She also brings putative class and representative claims for violation of the California Equal Pay Act( EPA ) and related causes of action, on behalf of other female software engineers at Apple. Apple demurs to every cause of action in the operative First Amended Complaint ( FAC ) and moves to strike the class, representative, and punitive damages allegations. As discussed below, the Court SUSTAINS the demurrer in part and OVERRULES it in part; it also GRANTS IN PART the motion to strike, which is otherwise MOOT. Printed: 3/25/2021 03/25/2021 Motion: Demurrer and Motion t0 Strike 7 20CV369611 Page 1 of 10 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA MINUTE ORDER l. BACKGROUND Apple hired Ms. Schulze as a Technical Engineer in 2008. (FAC, 11.) Her Senior Manager was a Hindu Indian man and her Direct Manager was a Muslim Pakistani man (collectively, Managers ). (ld., 12.) Ms. Schulze is a Hindu Indian woman whose ancestry traces back to the Sindh region of modern-day Pakistan, one of numerous regions greatly impacted by the 1947 partition of what was then British India into what is now modern-day India and Pakistan. (lbid.) This partition created friction between the Hindu and Muslim communities in the Sindh region, often resulting in violence, and spurred a mass migration of people both in and out of the region. (|bid.) Plaintiff s Managers knew of and were familiar with her racial, national, and religious heritage. (|bid.) Their respective nationalities historically viewed women as subservient, and they treated Ms. Schulze as subservient. (|d., 13.) The fact that the Sindhi Hindu nationality is known for its technical acumen, encouraging men and women alike to pursue technical careers and women to rise above their historically subservient role, exacerbated the Managers discriminatory treatment. (|bid.) Plaintiff s Managers consistently excluded her from team meetings but included her male counterparts. (FAC, 14.) When Ms. Schulze discovered errors in the team s work and notified her Managers, they would respond in a condescending manner and dismiss her discoveries. (lbid.) If team projects involving Plaintiff were late, her Managers would exclusively blame her. (lbid.) The Managers would micromanage Ms. Schulze s work by monitoring the speed at which she performed assignments, something that did not happen to male employees. (lbid.) Finally, Ms. Schulze s Managers told herthat she needed to be more involved in her employment and that the reason she was not more involved was because she had children. (lbid.) Despite this treatment, Plaintiff received positive performance reviews. (FAC, 15.) For example, in 2017, she directed her own feature, or project, for Apple. (lbid.) This made her a Directly Responsible Individual or DRI, a coveted role at Apple because of its typical association with substantial bonus packages. (lbid.) At completion of the feature directed by Plaintiff, Apple gave her a performance review that stated, [Plaintiff] s innovation and methodical approach led to her being a key contributor to the Zero Shutter Lag effort. [Plaintiff] s drive to deliver a solution for this very complex feature really helped the team realize this vision, it was one of our top-level camera features this year. (lbid.) Despite these successes, Defendant did not give Ms. Schulze promised promotions, bonuses, annual salary increases, or restricted stock units. (lbid.) In November 2018, Plaintiff complained to Human Resources that she was not receiving promised compensation from Apple because she is a woman. (FAC, 16.) In response, Apple began to retaliate against her by issuing poor performance reviews, using these reviews as an excuse to implement a Performance Improvement Plan ( PIP ), and placing Ms. Schulze on an internal Do Not Hire List. (lbid.) Defendant s stated reason for implementing the PIP was as a response to Plaintiff missing required meetings. (lbid.) But Ms. Schulze only missed two meetings and her absences were due to illness and childcare. (lbid.) Plaintiff notified her supervisor that she disagreed with the underlying basis of the PIP and her supervisor verbally agreed with her. (lbid.) But the supervisortold Ms. Schulze that she would still need to sign the PIP, which Plaintiff refused to do. (lbid.) Because Apple ignored her complaints and her workplace became intolerable due to the retaliation she suffered, Ms. Schulze had no choice but to resign her employment on February 12, 2019. (lbid.) Printed: 3/25/2021 03/25/2021 Motion: Demurrer and Motion t0 Strike 7 20CV369611 Page 2 of 10 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA MINUTE ORDER Plaintiff seeks to represent a putative class of similarly situated female software engineers who worked for Defendant in California during the four years preceding the filing of [the FAC]. (FAC, 18.) She alleges that her claims are typical ofthe proposed class because Apple did not provide her equal compensation in line with male software engineers in the form of salary, bonuses, and stock options, complete payment of wages when they were due and at time of termination or quit, and complete and accurate wage statements. (|d., 19.) Based on these allegations, Ms. Schulze brings the following individual claims: (1) discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of Government Code section 12940, subdivision (a) (the Fair Employment & Housing Act or FEHA ); (2) discrimination on the basis of race in violation of FEHA; (3) discrimination on the basis of national origin in violation of FEHA; (4) discrimination on the basis of religion in violation of FEHA; (5) harassment on the basis of sex in violation of FEHA (Government Code section 12940, subdivision (j)); (6) failure to take reasonable steps to prevent discrimination and harassment in violation of FEHA (Government Code section 12940, subdivision (k)); (7) retaliation in Violation of FEHA (Government Code section 12940, subdivision (h)); and (8) constructive wrongful termination in violation of public policy under Article l, Section 8 ofthe California Constitution and FEHA. Plaintiff also brings putative class claims for: (9) failure to pay all wages pursuant to Labor Code sections 201 204; (10) wage statement violations under Labor Code section 226; (11) failure to pay equal compensation pursuant to Labor Code section 1197.5 (the EPA); and (12) unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business practices under Business & Professions Code section 17200, et seq. Finally, Plaintiff brings (13) a representative claim under the Private Attorneys General Act( PAGA ) derived from her putative class claims. 0n November 6, 2020, Apple filed (1) a demurrer to the FAC and (2) a motion to strike the class and punitive damages allegations. The action was subsequently deemed complex and reassigned to this Department. Plaintiff filed oppositions to both motions, which have now been fully briefed by both sides. |l. DEMURRER Apple demurs to the FAC on the ground that it fails to plead facts adequate to support any ofthe causes of action asserted therein, including both the individual and class/representative claims. (Code Civ. Proc., 430.10, subd. (e).) Ms. Schulze opposes the demurrer in all respects. A. Legal Standard The function of a demurrer is to test the legal sufficiency of a pleading. (Trs. of Capital Wholesale Elec. Etc. Fund V. Shearson Lehman Bros. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 617, 621.) Consequently, [a] demurrer reaches only to the contents of the pleading and such matters as may be considered under the doctrine ofjudicial notice. (South Shore Land Co. v. Petersen (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 725, 732, internal citations and quotations omitted; see also Code Civ. Proc., 430.30, subd. (a).) It is not the ordinary function of a demurrer to test the truth of the plaintiff s allegations or the accuracy with which he describes the defendant s conduct. Thus, the facts alleged in the pleading are deemed to be true, however improbable Printed: 3/25/2021 03/25/2021 Motion: Demurrer and Motion t0 Strike 7 20CV369611 Page 3 of 10 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA MINUTE ORDER they may be. (Align Technology, Inc. v. Tran (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 949, 958, internal citations and quotations omitted.) In ruling on a demurrer, the allegations of the complaint must be liberally construed, with a View to substantial justice between the parties. (Glennen v. Allergan, Inc. (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1, 6.) Nevertheless, while [a] demurrer admits all facts properly pleaded, [it does] not [admit] contentions, deductions or conclusions of law or fact. (George v. Automobile Club of Southern California (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1120.) A demurrer will succeed where the allegations and matters subject tojudicial notice unquestionably disclose a defense or bar to recovery. (Casterson v. Superior Court (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 177, 183.) B. Individual Claims 1. The First through Fourth Causes of Action for Discrimination and the Sixth Cause of Action for Failure to Prevent Discrimination and Harassment Generally to prove discrimination, the plaintiff must provide evidence that (1) she was a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for the position she sought or was performing competently in the position she held; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action, such as termination, demotion, or denial of an available job; and (4) some other circumstance suggests discriminatory motive. (Cucuzza v. City of Santa Clara (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1038, citing Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Ca|.4th 317, 355.) Plaintiff alleges all of these elements here, as well as some specific facts to support them. Apple essentially argues that Ms. Schulze s allegations are not specific enough and are themselves based on stereotypes. But contrary to Apple s argument, [t]o survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff s proof need not be alleged. (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872 [identities of allegedly negligent employees need not be provided to state a claim against school districtl.) With limited exceptions not applicable here, the rules of pleading require no more than general allegation[s] of ultimate fact. (Birke V. Oakwood Worldwide (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1540, 1548 [allegation that asserted nuisance affect[s] a substantial number of people at the same time suffices to state a claim although it mirrors the element of the claim].) The pleading is adequate so long as it apprises the defendant of the factual basis for the claim. (Id. at p. 1549.) Plaintiff correctly notes that Apple s authorities speak to the summary judgment context, where the plaintiff must present some evidence supporting a reasonable inference of a discriminatory motive. (Guthrey v. State of California (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1118 [ The mere fact Lucas is a female and plaintiff a male does not give rise to the inference that her alleged aggressive conduct was motivated by a desire to discriminate on the basis of gender. Without some evidence to make such an inference a reasonable one, it is mere speculation to suspect gender discrimination led to Lucas s allegedly hostile conduct. ].) Again, though, on the pleadings, allegations of ultimate fact suffice. Apple s demurrer to Ms. Schulze s claims for discrimination must accordingly fail. In addition, Apple contends that the sixth cause of action for failure to prevent discrimination and harassment fails to state a Printed: 3/25/2021 03/25/2021 Motion: Demurrer and Motion t0 Strike 7 20CV369611 Page 4 of 10 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA MINUTE ORDER claim because Plaintiff fails to state an underlying claim for discrimination. So Apple s demurrer to this claim will also be overruled. 2. The Fifth Cause of Action for Harassment The elements of a claim for sexual harassment under FEHA are: (1) plaintiff belongs to a protected group; (2) plaintiff was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the harassment complained of was based on sex; (4) the harassment complained of was sufficiently pervasive so as to alterthe conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment; and (5) respondeat superior. (Fisher V. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 590, 608 (Fisher); see also Lyle v. Warner Brothers Television Productions (2006) 38 Ca|.4th 264, 279 [endorsing standard stated in Fisher].) Here, Plaintiff does not allege the ultimate fact that the harassment she experienced was sufficiently pervasive to alterthe conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment, nor do her specific factual allegations support this conclusion. Fisher is illustrative. It held that a demurrer was properly sustained where the plaintiff s allegations did not address this element, explaining that [allthough the complaint describes in general terms what acts occurred and where they occurred, it only alleges in a most conclusionary manner that Ms. Fisher saw Dr. Tischler commit sexual harassment against three named nurses. What acts she observed are not detailed and are left to the imagination. Even though it is reasonable to assume that she observed Tischler commit all the alleged acts, the complaint is deficient as there is no indication of the frequency or intensity with which these acts occurred. (Fisher, supra, 214 Cal.App.3d at p. 613, italics added.) Similarly, here, Plaintiff alleges that her Managers told Plaintiff that she needed to be more involved in her employment and that the reason she was not more involved was because she had children. During Plaintiff s employment with Defendant, Plaintiff s Senior and Direct Managers also consistently excluded Plaintiff from team meetings but included Plaintiffs male counterparts. When Plaintiff discovered errors in the team s work and notified her Senior and Direct Managers, the Managers would respond in condescending ways and dismiss Plaintiffs discoveries. Additionally, Plaintiff s Senior and Direct Managers would micromanage Plaintiffs work, through the monitoring of the speed in which she performed assignments, something that did not happen to other male employees. (FAC, 54.) While such actions could potentially support a claim for harassment under some circumstances, Ms. Schulze does not allege that her Managers actions were so pervasive as to alter the conditions of her employment, or describe their frequency and intensity in a manner that would support this conclusion. The Court will accordingly sustain Apple s demurrer to this claim, but with leave to amend. Printed: 3/25/2021 03/25/2021 Motion: Demurrer and Motion t0 Strike 7 20CV369611 Page 5 of 10 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA MINUTE ORDER 3. The Seventh Cause of Action for Retaliation l]n order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the FEHA, a plaintiff must show (1) he or she engaged in a protected activity, (2) the employer subjected the employee to an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link existed between the protected activity and the employer s action. (Yanowitz V. L Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1042.) Apple argues that Plaintiff s claim for retaliation fails because while she claims she was retaliated against for complaining to HR through poor performance reviews and being placed on a PIP [citation], she alleges no facts identifying who placed her on a PIP or gave her poor reviews and whether the unidentified individual(s) knew of her HR complaint or providing a timeline of the events at issue. Apple contends that these details are essential to allege causation. But again, Plaintiff need only plead the ultimate fact of causation to state a claim, which she does. Fisher is helpful again, explaining that causation may be alleged without the details Apple points to: We note that Dr. Fisher did not plead the date when the FEHA complaint was filed or the date the lease was cancelled, that the lease was cancelled because he filed an FEHA complaint, or that SPPH knew that he filed the FEHA complaint. However, reading the complaint liberally, it is reasonable to infer that the reason SPPH refused to renew the lease was because of the FEHA complaint, especially since Dr. Fisher had occupied the office for many years, and it was still vacant when the second amended complaint was filed. (Fisher, supra, 214 Cal.App.3d at p. 617.) Here, as Apple acknowledges, Plaintiff does allege that her poor performance reviews and PIP resulted from her complaint to HR. The demurrer to the seventh cause of action will accordingly be overruled. 4. The Eighth Cause of Action for Constructive Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy Plaintiff s claim for wrongful termination is expressly based on constructive discharge as described in Turnerv. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1238 ( Turner ). (FAC, 73.) Turner held that [i]n order to establish a constructive discharge, an employee must plead and prove that the employer either intentionally created or knowingly permitted working conditions that were so intolerable or aggravated at the time of the employee s resignation that a reasonable employer would realize that a reasonable person in the employee s position would be compelled to resign. (Turner, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1251.) The opinion explained: In order to amount to a constructive discharge, adverse working conditions must be unusually aggravated or amount to a continuous pattern before the situation will be deemed intolerable. In general, [s]ingle, trivial, or isolated acts of [misconduct] are insufficient to support a constructive discharge claim. Moreover, a poor performance rating or a demotion, even when accompanied by reduction in pay, does not by itself trigger a constructive discharge. Printed: 3/25/2021 03/25/2021 Motion: Demurrer and Motion t0 Strike 7 20CV369611 Page 6 of 10 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA MINUTE ORDER (Turner, supra, 7 Ca|.4th at p. 1247, citations omitted.) As with her claim for harassment, Ms. Schulze does not plead conduct that rises to the level required, whether through specific factual allegations or by pleading the ultimate fact. She alleges: 0n February 12, 2019, given Defendant s discriminatory, harassing, and retaliatory conduct, Plaintiff s workplace became intolerable such that Plaintiff had no choice but to resign. During Plaintiffs employment, Plaintiff s Senior and Direct Managers consistently engaged in discriminatory and harassing conduct. In response to this discriminatory and harassing conduct, Plaintiff complained to Defendant s Human Resource Department. After Plaintiff s complaint, Defendant engaged in a course of conduct, specifically the implementation of a PIP and the use of an internal do-not-hire list, intentionally designed to retaliate against Plaintiff for reporting harassment and discrimination. Defendant s intentional conduct created an unreasonable and intolerable working environment for Plaintiff and resulted in Plaintiff having no other reasonable alternative but to resign. (FAC, 74.) Notably, the specific course of intentional conduct Plaintiff alleges, the implementation of a PIP and the use of an internal do-not-hire list, does not, standing alone, amount to constructive discharge as a matter of law. (See Turner, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1247 [a poor performance rating or a demotion, even when accompanied by reduction in pay, does not by itself trigger a constructive discharge ].) Similarly, gender discrimination does not necessarily constitute constructive discharge: The question [is] whether the discriminatory working conditions were so extreme as to coerce a reasonable employee to resign [u]nder the objective test set out in Turner. (Cloud v. Casey (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 895, 905 (Cloud).) Here, Ms. Schulze does not allege that this objective standard is satisfied, even in general terms. Rather, she alleges that Apple s actions created an unreasonable and intolerable working environment for Plaintiff. (Italics added.) This matters, because Turner specifically held an objective standard governs and that the conduct described by Ms. Schulze does not suffice. (See Cloud, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 905 [trial court correctly ruled that plaintiff s resignation was not a constructive discharge as a matter of law, although evidence would support a determination that she was barred from advancing due to gender discrimination].) The demurrer to the eighth cause of action will be sustained with leave to amend. C. Class and Representative Claims Apple demurs to (and moves to strike) the class allegations from the FAC on the stated basis that there is no reasonable possibility that the requirements for class certification will be satisfied. But Apple does not even address the requirements for class certification. Rather, it argues that the class and derivative representative claims fail to state a cause of action, even on an individual basis. So the Court will turn to that analysis. Plaintiff s class and representative claims all derive from her EPA claim under Labor Code section 1197.5. Printed: 3/25/2021 03/25/2021 Motion: Demurrer and Motion t0 Strike 7 20CV369611 Page 7 of 10 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA MINUTE ORDER Apple contends that Ms. Schulze fails to state a cause of action under that statute because she does not allege specific facts adequate to support her claim specifically, she does not identify any male comparators who were paid more for substantially similar work and she does not allege a required element of the claim even in general terms. 1. Pleading and Proving an EPA Claim The EPA provides in relevant part that [a]n employer shall not pay any of its employees at wage rates less than the rates paid to employees of the opposite sex for substantially similar work, when viewed as a composite of skill, effort, and responsibility, and performed under similar working conditions, except where the employer demonstrates that the wage differential is based upon one or more of the following factors: (A) A seniority system[;] (B) A merit system[;] (C) A system that measures earnings by quantity or quality of production[;] (D) A bona fide factor other than sex, such as education, training, or experience. (Lab. Code, 1197.5, subd. (a).) Since the statute originally mirrored the Federal Equal Pay Act of 1963 (see 29 U.S.C. 206, subd. (d)(1)), California courts rely on federal authorities construing the federal statute to interpret the EPA. (See Green v. Par Tools, Inc. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 620, 623 (Green).) Few California cases address the EPA: The apparent reason is that an aggrieved employee generally brings suit under both the California statute and the federal Equal Pay Act , or under the California [FEHA] or its federal counterpart. (|bid.) The elements of a prima facie case under the EPA are (1) the employer paid a male employee more than a female employee (2) for equal (or, since 2016, substantially similar) work considering the overall combination of skill, effort, and responsibility required, and (3) which is performed under similar working conditions. (Green, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 628, citing Corning Glass Works v. Brennan (1974) 417 U.S. 188, 195; CACI No. 2740 (2021).) To make this prima facie showing, a plaintiff must ultimately demonstrate that she is paid lower wages than an appropriate male comparator for equal work. (Hall V. County of Los Angeles (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 318, 324 325 (Hall).) The three-stage burden shifting analysis used to establish sex discrimination under the federal Equal Pay Act applies to a claim under the California EPA. (See Green, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at pp. 623 626 [analogizing to the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis applied in Title VII and FEHA cases].) Under this standard, once the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing in support of her claim, the employer then has the burden of showing that one of the exceptions listed in section 1197.5 is applicable. (lbid.) The employee may then show that the employer s stated reasons are pretextual. (|bid.) 2. Discussion While no California case has addressed this issue, some federal courts have held that a specific, appropriate comparator must be identified and described in some detail even at the pleading stage. In the Court s view, such a requirement would conflict with the principle that [t]he prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement. (Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A. (2002) 534 U.S. 506, 510 (Swierkiewicz) [applying former federal notice pleading standard in a Title VII employment discrimination case]; see also Alch v. Superior Court (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 339, 381 382 [citing Swierkiewicz and noting that [w]hile the pleading standard is stricter in California than the former federal standard, the plaintiff is required only to set forth the essential facts of his case with particularity Printed: 3/25/2021 03/25/2021 Motion: Demurrer and Motion t0 Strike 7 20CV369611 Page 3 of 10 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA MINUTE ORDER sufficient to acquaint a defendant with the nature, source and extent of his cause of action ], internal citations and quotations omitted.) Hall which was decided on summaryjudgment is not to the contrary. Even under this more forgiving standard, Plaintiff s allegations supporting her EPA and derivative claims are not enough. Ms. Schulze broadly and vaguely alleges that she was not provided with equal compensation in line with male software engineers (FAC, 19) and, even more generally, that Defendant failed to compensate Plaintiff and proposed class members in salaries, bonuses, stock options, and other employment benefits in a manner that was equal to male employees in similar positions (id., 77, 82, 99), doing similar work, and performed under similar working conditions (id., 88, 93). While the EPA was broadened from covering equal work to covering substantially similar work, it is not so broad as to require that all employees working in the same general field of software engineering or all employees in positions that are merely similar in some manner be paid the same. Plaintiff s allegations do not make it clear that she has a basis to allege an EPA violation applying the appropriate standard. In opposition to Apple s demurrer, Plaintiff does not acknowledge this issue or dispute that her representative and other class claims are wholly derived from her EPA claim. The Court will accordingly sustain Apple s demurrer to all of these claims with leave to amend. D. Conclusion For the reasons discussed above, Apple s demurrer to the fifth, eighth, and ninth through thirteenth causes of action is SUSTAINED WITH 30 DAYS LEAVE TO AMEND. The demurrer is otherwise OVERRULED. IV. MOTION TO STRIKE Specific pleading is required to support a request for punitive damages. (See Smith V. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1036, 1042 (Smith) [ conclusory allegations do not support a request for punitive damages; request must be stricken where complaint is devoid of any factual assertions supporting a conclusion [defendant] acted with oppression, fraud or malice ].) [W]rongfu| termination, without more, will not sustain a finding of malice or oppression. (Scott v. Phoenix Schools, Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 702, 717.) Apple correctly argues that Ms. Schulze fails to plead any specific facts in support of her claim for punitive damages. Her conclusory allegations are substantively indistinguishable from those rejected by Smith. (See Smith, supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1036, 1042.) In opposition to Apple s motion, Plaintiff continues this approach by merely stating her conclusion that [b]ecause Plaintiff alleges conduct that, if proved, would provide a basis for punitive damages, the Court should deny Defendant s motion . Apple s motion to strike is therefore GRANTED IN PART with regard to the punitive damages allegations. The following portions of the FAC are hereby struck with 30 days leave to amend: Plaintiff is thus entitled to recover punitive damages from Defendant, according to proof. (FAC, 31, 37, Printed: 3/25/2021 03/25/2021 Motion: Demurrer and Motion t0 Strike 7 20CV369611 Page 9 of 10 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA MINUTE ORDER 43, 49, 57, 65, 70.) Punitive damages according to proof; (Paragraph 4 of the Prayer for Relief.) In light ofthe Court s ruling on Apple s demurrer, Apple s alternative request to strike Ms. Schulze s class and representative allegations is MOOT. The Court will prepare the order. ***** COVID-19 LAW AND MOTION HEARING PROCEDURES Pursuant t0 the Judicial Council s Emergency Rule 3(a)(1) and (3), all law and motion hearings will be conducted remotely through CourtCall until further notice. Please see the General Order re: COVID-19 Emergency Order Regarding Complex Civil Actions, and in particular sections 7 and 10, available at http://www.scscourt.org/genera|_im‘o/news_media/ newspdfs/GEN ERALORDER_RECOV|D-19_EMERGENCY_ORDER_REGARDING_ COMPLEXCIVILACTIOdif. If a party gives notice that a tentative ruling will be contested, any party seeking t0 participate in the hearing should contact CourtCall. Public access t0 remote hearings is available 0n a listen-only line by calling 888-808-6929 (access code 2752612). State and local rules prohibit recording 0f court proceedings without a court order. These rules apply while in court and also while participating in a remote hearing or listening in on a public access line. N0 court order has been issued which would allow recording 0f any portion 0f this motion calendar. The court does not provide court reporters for proceedings in the complex civil litigation departments. Any party wishing t0 retain a court reporter t0 report a hearing may d0 so in compliance with this Court s October 19, 2020 Policy Regarding Privately Retained Court Reporters. The court reporter will participate remotely and will not be present in the courtroom. 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