Notice Entry of Order

Cal. Super. - 6th Dist.July 28, 2020

200V368776 Santa Clara - Civil CIVfiafleming ATTORNEY OR PARTY WITHOUT ATTORNEY (Name, State Bar number, and address): DURIE TANGRI LLP ’Ragesh K. Tangri (SBN 159477); Bethany D. Bengfort (SBN 3 12507) 217 Leidesdorff Street San Francisco, CA 941 11 TELEPHONE No.: 4 1 5_362_6666 FAx No. (Optionam 1 5_236_6300 E-MA'L ADDRESS (Optional): rtangri@durietangri.com; bbengfort@durietangri.com ATTORNEY FOR (Name): Defendants Momson & Foerster LLP & Paul L. L10n SUPERIOR COURT 0F CALIFORNIA, COUNTY 0F Santa Clara STREET ADDRESS 161 North First Street MAILING ADDRESS: 161 North First Street CITY AND ZIP CODE: San Jose, 951 13 BRANCH NAME: Old Courthouse PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER: ALLISON HUYNH DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT: MORRISON & FOERSTER, LLP, et a1. Electronically Filed by Superior Court of CA, County of Santa Clara, on 2/9/2022 2:20 PM Reviewed By: R. Fleming Case #20CV368776 Envelope: 8254985 FOR COURT USE ONLY NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT OR ORDER (Check one): UNLIMITED CASE E LIMITED CASE (Amount demanded (Amount demanded was exceeded $25,000) $25,000 or less) CASE NUMBER: 20CV368776 TO ALL PARTIES : 1. Ajudgment, decree, or orderwas entered in this action on (date): February 8, 2022 2, A copy of the judgment, decree, or order is attached to this notice. Date: February 9, 2022 Bethany D. Bengfort ’ (TYPE 0R PRINT NAME 0F ATTORNEY E PARTY WITHOUT ATTORNEY) (SIGNWESV fl/UV“ Page 1 of 2 Form Approved for Optional Use Judicial Council ofCalifomia NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT OR ORDER ClV-130 [New January 1, 2010] www.coun‘info. ca.gov CIV-1 30 PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER; ALLISON HUYNH CASE NUMBER: - 200v368776 DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT: MORRISON & FOERSTER, LLP, et al. PROOF OF SERVICE BY FIRST-CLASS MAIL NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT OR ORDER (NOTE: You cannot serve the Notice of Entry of Judgment or Order ifyou are a party in the action. The person who served the notice must complete this proof of service.) 1. | am at least 18 years old and not a party to this action. | am a resident of or employed in the county where the mailing took place, and my residence or business address is (specify): 2. | served a copy of the Notice of Entry of Judgment or Order by enclosing it in a sealed envelope with postage fully prepaid and (check one): a. E deposited the sealed envelope with the United States Postal Service. b_ E placed the sealed envelope for collection and processing for mailing, following this business's usual practices, with which | am readily familiar. On the same day correspondence is placed for collection and mailing, it is deposited in the ordinary course of business with the United States Postal Service. 3. The Notice of Entry of Judgment or Order was mailed: a. on (date): b. from (city and state): 4. The envelope was addressed and mailed as follows: a. Name of person served: c. Name of person served: Street address: Street address: City: City: State and zip code: State and zip code: b. Name of person served: d. Name of person served: Street address: Street address: City: City: State and zip code: State and zip code: E Names and addresses of additional persons served are attached. (You may use form POS-030(P).) 5. Number of pages attached | declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Date: (TYPE OR PRINT NAME OF DECLARANT) (SIGNATURE OF DECLARANT) Page 2 of 2 C'V'130 [NeWJanuaW 1' 201°] NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT OR ORDER \DOOMJONUI-PUJNH NNNMMNNNNr-au-au-nu-nr-sr-Ip-nn-r-nr-n OOHJQM¥U§NHOKOOOMJONLII$UJNHO jfELE FEB - 8 2022 Clerk of the Cour: Supnrior urf o Countv n arm Chara a mam SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY 0F SANTA CLARA ALLISON HYUNH, Case No. 200V368776 Plaintiff, ORDER RE: DEMURRER T0 FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT VS. MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP; PAUL L. LION III, and DOES 1-20, inclusive, Defendants. The Demurrer to the First Amended Complaint by Defendants Morrison & Foerster LLP and Paul Lion III came on for hearing before the Honorable Peter H. Kirwan on February 3, 2022, at 9:00 am. in Department 19. The matter having been submitted, the Court finds and orders as follows: This is an action for professional negligence brought by Plaintiff Allison Huynh (“Plaintiff") against Defendants Paul L. Lion III and Morrison & Foerster LLP (“Defendants”) based on Defendants’ former representation of Plaintiff, a company formed by Plaintiff, and companies formed by Plaintiff’s husband Scott Hassan (“Hassan”). Defendant Lion is an 1 ORDER RE: DEMURRER TO FAC \oooxqoxmLmNn-a NNNNNNNNNHHHr-ur-in-nr-nr-np-np-a mfimu-fimeoomqmm-PmNr-‘O attorney employed by Mom'son & Foerster. Plaintiff and Hassan are parties in a cunently ongoing marital dissolution action, In re Marriage ofAlh'son Huynh and Scott Hassan, 2015-6- FL-013853. The original Complaint in this action was filed on July 28, 2020 and stated three causes of action, each alleged against both Defendants: 1) Breach 0f Fiduciary Duty; 2) Intentional I Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage, and; 3) Negligent Interference with PrOSpective Economic Advantage. Defendants previously demurred to the original Complaint on various grounds and that demurrer was heard by the Court (Hon. Huber) on June 29, 202 1. In a written order issued 0n July 7, 2021, the Court rul'ed that the one-year limitations period in CCP §340.6 “clearly” applied to all three causes of action alleged in the Complaint. Defendants’ demurrer to all three causes of action was sustained with 10 days’ leave to amend. The Court’s written order included the following conclusions: “The Complaint (at 1]SS(a)) alleges that (among other things) Defendants’ representation ofHassan in the dissolution action was in and of itself a breach 0f fiduciary duty. “The elements of a cause 0f action for breach of fiduciary duty are the existence 0f a fiduciary relationship, its breach, and damage proximately caused by the breach.” (Knox v. Dean (2012) 205 Cal App 4th 417, 432.) The Complaint thus plainly alleges that Plaintiff was harmed by Defendants’ representation ofHassan in the dissolution action, otherwise there would be no basis for alleging that this action was a 2 ORDER RE: DEMURRER T0 FAC \DOO'MIONUI-PDJNP‘ NNNNNNNNNHHHp-np-np-Ir-ur-np-nr-a OO‘a-lmm-PUJI‘QP-‘OKDOON-Jmm-PUJNHO breach of fiduciary duty. As a party to the litigation, Plaintiff was necessarily aware of Defendant Morrison & Forester associating in as counsel for Hassan in the dissolution action as soon as it occurred on March 22, 2019. (See Complaint at 1132.) Both the Complaint itself (at 111152-57) and the judicially noticed material (Defendants’ exhibit 1 and Plaintiff’s exhibit A) establish that Plaintiff determined that this representation injured her, due to Defendant Paul Lion’s knowledge of her personal business and the community business, and based on this belief of injury filed her request for Morrison & Forester t0 be disqualified as counsel for Hassan on June 28, 2019, just over three months afier the representation 0f Hassan had begun. Accordingly, the one-year statute of limitation in CCP §340.6 began running by no later than June 28, 2019 and expired before the Complaint in this action was filed on July 28, 2020. “The words of the statute are quite broad, but they are not ambiguous: any time a plaintiffbrings an action against an attorney and alleges that attorney engaged in a wrongfill act 0r omission, other than fi'aud, in the attorney’s performance of his 0r her legal services, that action must be commenced within a year after the plaintiff discovers, or should have discovered, the facts that comprise the wrongful act or omission.” (Yee v. Cheung (2013) 220 Cal.AppAth 184, 194-195.) The argument by Plaintiff in opposition that the one and only damage she ever suffered from Defendants’ alleged actions or seeks to recover was the $1.1 million in attorney’s fees she incurred “in thwarting the sale” in the Delaware Action (Complaint at 1137) is not a reasonable interpretation of the Complaint and contradicts the Complaint’s 3 ORDER RE: DEMURRER TO FAC \DOOHJQUI-bUJNu-s NNNNMNNMMHHHHp-tr-AHHr-tp-t OOMJmM-bUJMHOWOOHONLhJLUJNn-to allegation that Defendants’ representation 0f Hassan in the dissolution action was a breach of fiduciary duty. The Complaint itself (at 1158) alleges that as a proximate result of Defendants’ breach of fiduciary duty Plaintiffhas suffered damages “in excess of $1,100,000 consisting generally 0f attorney and otherfees she has incurred and lost vaiue ofcommunity assets.” (Court’s emphasis.) The further argument in the opposition that the limitations pen’od does not start running until the tort is completed, and that no tort alleged in the Complaint was complete until Plaintiff incurred $1.1 million in attorneys’ fees “in thwarting the sale” in the Delaware action is not a basis for overruling the demurrer. The Complaint 0n its face asserts that a breach of fiduciary duties Defendants owed Plaintiff “by Virtue 0f” being attorneys occurred and was complete by March 22, 2019 when Morrison & Forester associated in as counsel for Hassan in the dissolution action. “While inconsistent theories of recovery are permitted, a pleader cannot blow hot and cold as to the facts positively stated.” (Mam‘z' v. Gunari (1970) 5 Ca1.App.3d 442, 449, internal citation omitted.) As the demurrer is sustained on statute of limitations grounds it is not necessary for the Court to consider Defendants’ other arguments in support 0f the demurrer at this time. Given that this is the first pleading challenge in this action and it is not apparent to the Court that leave to amend would be filtile, granting leave to amend at least once is appropriate. 4 ORDER RE: DEMURRER T0 PAC KOOO‘QONMLUJNH NNNNNNNNNb-‘r-Ip-Ir-up-ar-ab-np-tr-tp- DONONLh-b-WNHOKDOOKJmm-fimNP-‘O Plaintiff is reminded that if a demurrer is brought to an amended complaint, the Court “may consider the factual allegations ofprior complaints, which a plaintiffmay not discard or avoid by making contradictory averments, in a superseding, amended pleading.” (Berg & Berg Enterprises, LLC v. Bofle (2009) 178 Ca1.App.4th 1020, 1034, internal quotations omitted)” (July 7, 2021 Order at pp. 8: 17-1023.) The Court on its own motion takes judicial notice ofJudge Huber’s July 7, 2021 order pursuant to Evidence Code §452(c) and (d). As a court order, it may be noticed as to its contents and their legal effect. The Court 0n its own motion also takes judicial notice 0f those documents submitted by Defendants which Judge Huber previously granted notice of, to the extent that the prior order granted judicial notice of those documents. Plaintiffs operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) was filed on July 23, 2021, stating the same three causes of action as the original complaint. Currently before the Court are two matters. The first is Defendants’ demurrer t0 all three claims alleged in the FAC, opposed by Plaintiff. As stated in the July 7 Order, the Court will consider the allegations 0f the original complaint in evaluating this demurrer. The second matter is Defendant’s motion to seal certain documents attached to the declaration of Defense Counsel Ragesh Tangn'. The Court notes that Plaintiff filed a notice ofnon-opposition t0 this motion t0 seal on August 25, 2021. Accordingly the motion to seal is GRANTED and will not be fithher discussed. //// 5 ORDER RE: DEMURRER T0 FAC \Dm-QQUI-meh-d NNNNNMNMMHHHHr-nr-br-tb-I-IJ-I OOHJQM-PDJNI-‘ObOOHJQLh-b-UJNHO Request for Judicial Notice “Judicial notice may not be taken of any matter unless authorized or required by law.” (Evidence Code §450.) A precondition to judicial notice in either its permissive 0r mandatory form is that the matter to be noticed be relevant t0 the material issue before the Court. (Silverado Modjeska Recreation and Park Dist. v. County ofOrange (201 1) 197 Cal.App.4th 282, 307, citing People v. Shamrock Foods C0. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 422, fil. 2.) It is the Court that determines relevance, not the parties. As noted above the Court on its own motion has taken judicial notice of Judge Huber’s prior order pursuant to Evidence Code §§452(c) and (d). The Court also on its own motion takes judicial notice of those documents submitted for judicial fiotice by Defendants (as exhibits 1-8) with the prior demurrer 0n April 16, 2021 that Judge Huber granted judicial notice 0f in the prior order. Exhibit 1 is a copy of excerpts from Plaintiff’s request to disqualify Morrison & Foerster as counsel in the marital dissolution action filed on June 28, 201 9. Exhibit 2 is a copy 0f a brief excerpt fiom the transcript 0f a December 13, 2019 court hearing 0n a motion for preliminary injunction brought by Plaintiff in a related Delaware action, Huynh v. Hassan, C.A. No. 201 9- 0893-JTL (“Delaware Action”). The request for preliminary injunction was denied. Exhibit 3 is a COpy 0f excerpts from a bankruptcy petition filed in the federal bankruptcy court for the District of Delaware 0n February 26, 2020 in another related action, In re Suitabie Technoiogies, Ina, Case No. 20-10432 (MFW) (“Bankruptcy Action”). Exhibit 4 is a copy of excerpts from an April 20, 2020 order issued in the Bankruptcy Action. .Exhibit 5 is a copy of excerpts from a 6 ORDER RE: DEMURRER TO FAC \DOO-QQUl-p-UJNH NNNNNNNNNr-Ir-Ir-Ir-Ar-Ap-Ir-AHHH OOHJQLh-PWNHODOONJONLh-bUJNF-‘O Notice of Objection t0 Proof of Claim by the debtor in the Bankruptcy Action on September 30, 2020. The debtor objected to a claim made by Allison Huynh. Exhibit 6 is a copy of excerpts from an August 20, 2020 Order issued.in the Bankruptcy Action. Exhibit 7 consists of copies of further excerpts from the same order. Exhibit 8 is a copy of a Notice ofWithdrawal of Claim and Reservation of Rights filed by Allison Huynh in the Bankruptcy Action on October 13, 2020. As on the prior demurrer notice of exhibit 1 is GRANTED pursuant to Evidence Code §452(d) only, and only of the existence and filing date of the request t0 disqualify counsel. Notice cannot be and is not taken ofthe contents 0f the declarations fiom Plaintiff‘s Counsel Pierce O’Donnell and Plaintiff attached to the request, or arguments in the points and authorities dependent upon the contents ofthe attached declarations. Notice ofthe contents 0f these documents is DENIED as declarations cannot be judicially noticed as to the truth of their contents. (See 0h v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Assn. ofAmerica (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 71, 79-81 [truth of contents 0f court records cannot be judicially noticed]; Intengan v. BAC Home Loans Servicing LP (2013) 2 14 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1057 [court may take judicial notice of existence of declaration but not of facts asserted in it]; Bach v. McNeh’s (1989) 207 Ca1.App.3d 852, 86S [court may not notice the truth 0f declarations or affidavits filed in court proceedings); Garcia v. Sterling (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 17, 22 [“Although the existence of statements contained in a deposition transcript filed as part 0f the court record can be judicially noticed, their truth is not subject to judicial notice.”]) 7 ORDER RE: DEMURRER TO FAC \DOOHJONtJI-phUJNn-a NNNNNNNNNHHH-IH-nH-tHH OOQQM-bLIJNF-‘OKOOOHJONL’ILDJNHO Notice of exhibits 2, 4, 6 and 7 is GRANTED pursuant t0 Evidence Code §452(c) only. Notice of exhibits 3, 5 and 8 is GRANTED pursuant to Evidence Code §452(d) only. These documents can only be noticed as to their existence and filing date and not the truth of their contents. Plaintiff” s reguest With the opposition to this demurrer Plaintiff has submitted a request for judicial notice of two documents (attached as exhibits A & B to the request) identical to the one submitted in opposition t0 the prior demurrer 0n June 16, 2021. Once again, Evidence Code §452(g) and (h) have no application t0 this material. Notice 0f exhibit A (another excerpt from the same request t0 disqualify counsel filed by Plaintiff in the marital dissolution action 0n June 28, 2019, including declarations from Plaintiff and Counsel) is GRANTED solely pursuant t0 Evidence Code §452(d). Neither the contents of the declarations or any arguments based on the contents of those declarations have been considered. Notice of exhibit B (once again a brief excerpt fi'om the transcript 0f the August 16, 2019 court hearing in the marital dissolution action 0n the request t0 disqualify) is GRANTED solely pursuant t0 Evidence Code §452(c). Demurrer to the FAC The function 0f a demurrer is t0 test the legal sufficiency 0f a pleading. (Trs. OfCapz'tal Wholesale Elec. Etc. Fund v. Shearson Lehman Bros. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 617, 621.) Consequently, “[a] demurrer reaches only t0 the contents 0f the pleading and such matters as may be considered under the doctrine ofjudicial notice.” (South Shore Land Co. v. Peterseh (1964) 226 Ca1.App.2d 725, 732, internal citations and quotations omitted; see also CCP § 8 ORDER RE: DEMURRER TO FAC \DOOHJONUI-b-Lnbdw NNMMNMNMNr-an-An-An-nr-An-nr-nn-nu-nn-n OO‘QONLh-thHowm‘JQm-DBUJN-‘Q 430.30, subd. (a); Cansino v. Bank ofAmerica (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1474 [rejecting allegation contradicted by judicially noticed facts]. .) While “[a] demurrer admits all facts properly pleaded, [it does] not [admit] contentions, deductions or conclusions 0f law or fact.” (George v. Automobile Club ofSouthem California (201 1) 201 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1120.) A demurrer will lie where the allegations and matters subject t0 judicial notice clearly disclose a defense 0r bar to recovery. (Casterson v. Superior Court (2002) 101 Ca1.App.4th 177, 183.) As the prior Order stated where a demurrer is t0 an amended complaint, the Court “may consider the factual allegations ofpn'or complaints, which a plaintiffmay not discard or avoid by making contradictory averments, in a superseding, amended pleading.” ‘(Berg & Berg Enterprises, LLC v. Boyle (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1034 (internal quotations omitted.) “Under the sham pleading doctrine, plaintiffs are precluded fi'om amending complaints t0 omit harmful allegations, Without explanation, from previous complaints to avoid attacks raised in demurrers or motions for summary judgment.” (Deveny v. Entropin, Inc. (2006) 139 Ca1.App.4th 408, 425.) Generally, “a party may not allege inconsistent facts in his pleading in the same case.” (Kat: v. Feldman (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 500, 504.) Thus, the sham pleading doctrine applies where a party files an amended pleading with allegations inconsistent with those asserted in a prior pleading. When that occurs, the court may disregard the inconsistent allegation. (Vailejo Development C0. v. Beck Devel0pment Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 929, 946.) The Court cannot consider extrinsic evidence when ruling on a demurrer. Therefore, except to the extent the required meet and confer efforts are discussed, the Court has not 9 ORDER RE: DEMURRER TO PAC \OOOH-JQm-b-UJN-n NNNNNNNNNn-HHr-I-na-Ir-Aa-ar-tb-d OO‘JONM-h-WNHOWOOKJQLh-thF-‘O considered either declaration submitted by Defense Counsel Ragesh Tangri or the attached exhibits. Defendants demurrer to all three causes of action in the FAC on several grounds, including that they are all barred by the applicable statute of limitations. (See August 24, 2021 Notice 0f Demurrer and Demurrer.). Defendants’ demurrer t0 all three causes 0f action 0n the ground that they are time-barred by applicable statute 0f limitations-the one year statute of limitations in CCP §340.6-is SUSTAINED. As stated in the prior order, in evaluating this demurrer to an amended complaint the Court will continue to consider (and Plaintiff remains bound by) the allegations in the original complaint at 1H] 32 & 52-58 that establish (along with Plaintiff‘s own request for judicial notice ofher June 2019 request to disqualify) that Plaintiff was aware of Defendant Morrison & Forester associating in as counsel for Hassan in the dissolution action as soon as it occurred on March 22, 2019 and determined that this representation injured her, due t0 Defendant Paul Lion’s knowledge ofher personal business and the community business, and based 0n this belief of injury filed her request for Morrison & Forester to be disqualified as counsel for Hassan on June 28, 2019, thereby representing to the Court (see CCP §128.7(b)) that she had been and would continue to be injured by this representation), just over three months after the representation of Hassan had begun. 10 ORDER RE: DEMURRER TO FAC \DOOHJQLII-PUJNH NNMNMNNMMHwHHHHH-np-Ifl WQQMLWNHOWOONJQM-bWNHO As stated in the prior order, for purposes of the one-year statute of limitations in CCP §340.6, “[a]ctua1 injury” occurs “when the plaintiff suffers any Ioss 0r injury legally cognizable as damages in a legal malpractice action based on the asserted errors or omissions.” (Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison (1998) 18 Ca1.4th 739, 743. Court’s emphasis.) “An existing injury is not contingent or speculative simply because future events may affect its permanency or the amount ofmonetary damages eventually incurred.” (Id. at p. 754.) Therefore, it remains the case that the one-year statute of limitations began running by no later than June 28, 2019 and expired before the original complaint in this action was filed. The allegations in the FAC at 1136 that Plaintiff “suffered no monetary loss 0r other actual injury from Defendant entering an appearance 0n behalf 0f Hassan in the dissolution action,” and at 1156a) that “this representation, per se, did not cause Plaintiff any monetary damage or actual injury” are not a basis for overruling this demurrer. Both allegations are a) legal conclusions the Court would not be required to accept as true even if this were the first pleading challenge in this case, and b) clear examples of a sham pleading inconsistent with the allegations 0f the original complaint that attempt to evade the conclusions the prior order reached based 0n the Complaint’s factual allegations. Plaintiff’s argument in the opposition that the one-year limitations period should be considered tolledby a “continuing tort” is unpersuasive as a) tolling is not alleged in the FAC, and b) tolling ofCCP §340.6 is expressly limited t0 the circumstances enumerated in the statute. (See Laird v. Blacker (1992) 2 Ca1.4th 606, 618 (Laird) where the California Supreme Court 11 ORDER RE: DEMURRER TO PAC \OOO‘HIQU‘I-h-mmn-n NNNNMMNNNr-ar-np-tp-Ir-IHn-Iwhtp-I OOHJONU‘I-hUJNP-‘OWOOQONUI-b-UJMHO wrote: “Section 340.6, subdivision (a), states that ‘in no event’ shall the prescriptive period be tolled except under those circumstances specified in the statute. Thus, the Legislature expressly intended t0 disallow tolling under any circumstances not enumerated in the statute.”) Based 0n Laird, subsequent courts have refused t0 apply the doctrine 0f equitable tolling t0 claims against attorneys. (See Gordon v. Law Oflices onguirre & Meyer (1999) 7O Cal.App.4th 972.) Further leave to amend is DENIED as it is now apparent that Plaintiff cannot allege claims for Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage, and Negligent Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage against these Defendants that are not time-barred by the one-year statute of limitations in CCP §340.6. As the demurrer is sustained on the basis 0f the statute of limitations argument it is not necessary for the Court to consider Defendants’ other grounds for demurrer. \ “E ___ H..\c_..-......---.. Peter H. Kirwan Judge 0f the Superior Court Dated: 2.x ‘3 I 1-"??- 12 ORDER RE: DEMURRER TO FAC SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA DOWNTOWN COURTHOUSE 19 1 NORTH FIRST STREET SAN Jose, CALIFORNIA 95113 CIVIL DIVISION RE: Allison Huynh vs Paul Lion, Ill et al Case Number: ZOCV368776 PROOF OF SERVICE Order RE: Demurrer to First Amended Complaint was delivered to the parties listed below the above entitled case as set forth in the sworn declaration below. If you. a party represented by you. or a witness to be called on behalf of that party need an accommodation under the American with Disabilities Act. please contact the Court Administrator‘s office at (408) 882-2700. or use the Court’s TDD line (408) 882-2690 or the VoicerTDD CaIifomia Relay Service (800) 735-2922. DECLARATION 0F SERVICE BY MAIL: l declare that l served this notice by enclosing a true copy in a sealed envelope. addressed to each person whose name is shown below. and by depositing the envelope with postage fully prepaid. in the United States Mail at San Jose. CA on February 08. 2022. CLERK OF THE COURT. by Audrey Nakamoto. Deputy. cc: WalterJ Lack 10100 Santa Monica Blvd 16th Floor Los Angeles CA 900674107 David Floyd McGowan 217 Leidesdorfi St San Francisco CA 94111 CW-9027 REV 12108f16 PROOF OF SERVICE A VONUI 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 PROOF OF SERVICE I am employed in San Francisco County, State of California, in the office of a member of the bar of this Court, at Whose direction the service was made. I am over the age 0f eighteen years, and not a party to the Within action. My business address is 217 Leidesdorff Street, San Francisco, CA 941 1 1. On February 9, 2022, I served the following documents in the manner described below: NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT 0R ORDER m (BY ELECTRONIC SERVICE) By electronically mailing a true and correct copy through Durie Tangri’s electronic mail system from cortega@durietangri.com to the email addresses set forth below. On the following part(ies) in this action: Walter J. Lack Steven C. Shuman Engstrom, Lipscomb & Lack, P.C. 10100 Santa Monica Boulevard, Suite 1200 Los Angeles, CA 90067-41 13 Wlack@elllaw.com sshuman@elllaw.com mfletcher@elllaw.com Attorneysfor PlaintiffA llison Huynh I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on February 9, 2022, at San Francisco, California. UAW éhristinaCQ/{tega NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT OR ORDER / CASE NO. 20CV368776