Response Reply

Cal. Super. - 6th Dist.May 11, 2020

Freeman Mathis a Gary, LLP Attorneys al Law #UJ VON 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ZOCV366495 Santa Clara - Civil Tunisia T FREEMAN MATHIS & GARY, LLP Electronically Filed DANIEL C. WALSH (SBN 266386) by Superior Court of CA, DWalSh fm law-Com County of Santa Clara, ISIS D. MIRANDA (SBN 313855) on 7/22/2021 2:32 PM IMirandangmglawcom . _ . . 550 South Hope Street, 22nd Floor Rev'ewed By' Tums'a Turner Los Angeles, California 90071-2627 Case #20CV366495 (213) 615-7000; FAX (213) 615-7100 Envelope: 6905849 Attorneys for Petitioner GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA - DOWNTOWN COURTHOUSE GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE CASE NO.: 20CV366495 COMPANY, [Assigned t0 Hon. Maureen A. Folan, Dept. 6] Petitioner, REPLY IN SUPPORT OF GEICO’S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION vs. Date: July 29, 2021 ANNA M. PRENARES, Time: 9:00 am. Dept: 2 Respondent. Complaint Filed: May 11, 2020 Trial Date: None Yet Petitioner GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY (“GEICO”) submits this Reply in support of its Motion to Compel Arbitration. The Court should decline the invitation ofRespondent ANNA M. PRENARES to decide issues that fall outside the Court’s jurisdiction. (See Respondent’s Opposition to GEICO’s Motion to Compel Arbitration (“Opposition”).)1 Pursuant to the arbitration provision in Respondent’s auto insurance policy (the “Policy”), Which incorporates the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) rules (“AAA Rules”), the arbitrator has jurisdiction to decide issues of enforceability. Respondent makes no argument that the delegation clause is unenforceable. Accordingly, the Court should hold that it lacks jurisdiction to decide the issues raised by Respondent and grant GEICO’S Petition. / / / 1 In Respondent’s Opposition, she incorrectly refers t0 herself as “Petitioner” and to GEICO as “Respondent.” 1 REPLY IN SUPPORT OF GEICO’S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION 15399915.1 11222-89142 umer Freeman Mathis & Gary, LLP Attorneys at Law 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ARGUMENT I. The Court lacks jurisdiction t0 consider Respondent’s arguments because the arbitration provision in the Policy contains an enforceable delegation clause. “A delegation clause requires issues 0f interpretation and enforceability 0f an arbitration agreement to be resolved by the arbitrator.” (Malone v. Superior Ct. (2014) 226 Cal. App. 4th 155 1, 1559.) Courts treat a delegation clause as a severable agreement. (Id.) Therefore, “whether the arbitration agreement as a whole is ultimately held to be unenforceable Will have n0 bearing 0n the enforcement 0f the delegation clause itself.” (Id. (citation omitted).) When a court is required by a valid delegation clause t0 refer disputes about arbitrability t0 an arbitrator, the court has n0 power to decide other issues even if it believes the motion for arbitration is “wholly groundless.” (Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc. (2019) 139 S. Ct. 524, 528.) Courts cannot deny enforcement of delegation clause without naming unfair terms that would impede the “overarching purpose 0f the FAA [Federal Arbitration Act].” (Tirz' v. Lucky Chances, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal. App. 4th 231, 248-50.) “There are two prerequisites for a delegation clause t0 be effective. First, the language 0f the clause must be clear and unmistakable. Second, the delegation must not be revocable under state contract defenses such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability.” (Aandemd v. Superior Ct. (2017) 13 Cal. App. 5th 880, 892 (citations omitted).) However, a delegation clause Will be deemed “presumptively valid” when the party resisting arbitration does not challenge it. (Tiri, 226 Cal. App. 4th at 244, n. 7.) A. The Policy’s reference t0 the AAA Rules, Which contain a delegation clause, constitutes “clear and unmistakable” evidence that the parties intended that the arbitrator would decide issues of arbitrability. “An arbitration provision’s reference t0, 0r incorporation of, arbitration rules that give the arbitrator the power 0r responsibility t0 decide issues of arbitrability may constitute clear and unmistakable evidence the parties intended the arbitrator t0 decide those issues.” (Aanderud, 13 Cal. App. 4th at 892-93 (citing Rodriguez v. American Technologies, Inc. (2006) 136 Cal. App. 4th 1110, 1123 (AAA rules); Dream Theater, supra, 124 Cal.App.4th at p. 557 (AAA rules); Brennan 2 REPLY IN SUPPORT OF GEICO’S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION 153999151 11222-89142 Freeman Mathis & Gary, LLP Attorneys at Law 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 v. Opus Bank (9th Cir. 2015) 796 F. 3d 1125, 1130 (AAA rules); Shaw Group, Inc. v. Triplefine Intern. Corp. (2d Cir. 2003) 322 F.3d 115, 118, 122 (International Chamber 0f Commerce Rules) (footnote omitted).) The “vast maj ority 0f circuits hold that incorporation 0fAAA rules constitutes clear and unmistakable evidence 0f the parties’ intent t0 d0 so.” (Brennan, 796 F. 3d 1125, 1130-31 (citations 0mitted).) The arbitration provision at issue in Brennan provided that disputes “shall be settled by binding arbitration in accordance with the Rules 0f the American Arbitration Association.” (Id. at 1128.) The court found this reference t0 the AAA rules constituted a “clear and unmistakable” intent to delegate jurisdictional issues t0 the arbitrator in accordance with AAA rules. (Id. at 1130.) In affirming the lower court, the court in Brennan explained: “[S]ince Brennan failed t0 make any arguments specific t0 the delegation provision, and instead argued that the [Arbitration Clause] as a whole is unconscionable under state law, we need not consider that claim.” (Id. at 1133 (internal quotations and citations 0mitted).) Here, similar t0 the provision in Brennan, the Policy provides that disputes shall “be settled according t0 American Arbitration Association rules.” (Declaration 0f Daniel C. Walsh in support 0f GEICO’S Motion t0 Compel Arbitration (“Walsh Decl.”), 1] 2, Exhibit A, p. 3 1 .) The AAA “Rule R-14: Jurisdiction” vests the arbitrator with the power t0 rule 0n “any objections with respect t0 the existence, scope, 0r validity 0f the arbitration agreement.” (Request for Judicial Notice in Support of GEICO’S Motion t0 Compel Arbitration, Exhibit 1, p. 17.) As in Brennan, the Respondent has also not made “any arguments specific t0 the delegation provision.” (Brennan, 796 F. 3d at 1133.) Therefore, this Court “need not consider [the] claim” that the arbitration provision as a whole is unconscionable. (Id.) B. There is n0 evidence the delegation clause is revocable. 1. The delegation clause is “presumptively valid” since Respondent has not “specifically” challenged it. Courts assume that a delegation clause is “presumptively valid” when it is not challenged by the party resisting arbitration. (Tiri, 226 Cal. App. 4th at 244, n. 7 (citing Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson (2010) 561 U.S. 63, 73).) “[A]ny claim 0f unconscionability must be specific t0 the 3 REPLY IN SUPPORT OF GEICO’S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION 153999151 11222-89142 1 delegation clause.” (Id. (emphasis in original).) “If the party’s challenge is directed to the 2 agreement as a Whole - even if it applies equally t0 the delegation clause - the delegation clause is 3 severed out and enforced; thus, the arbitrator, not the court, Will determine Whether the agreement 4 is enforceable.” (Malone, 226 Cal. App. 4th at 1559-60 (citation omitted).) “In contrast, if the party 5 is making a specific challenge t0 the delegation clause, the court must determine Whether the delegation clause itselfmay be enforced (and can only delegate the general issue 0f enforceability to the arbitrator if it first determines the delegation clause is enforceable).” (Id.) 8 2. The delegation clause is not unconscionable. 9 Even if the Court applied Respondent’s general unconscionability argument specifically t0 10 the delegation clause (Which it should not), the argument fails. 11 “Unconscionability consists 0f both procedural and substantive elements. The procedural 12 element addresses the circumstances of contract negotiation and formation, focusing 0n oppression 13 0r surprise due t0 unequal bargaining power. Oppression occurs Where a contract involves lack of 14 negotiation and meaningful choice, surprise where the allegedly unconscionable provision is 15 hidden within a prolix printed form. When the contract is a contract 0f adhesion imposed and 16 drafted by the party With superior bargaining power, the adhesive nature of the contract is evidence 17 of some degree of procedural unconscionability. However, the fact that an agreement is adhesive is 18 not, alone, sufficient to render it unconscionable. (Id. at 1561 (internal quotations and citations 19 omitted).) 20 “Substantive unconscionability pertains to the fairness 0f an agreement’s actual terms and 21 to assessments of whether they are overly harsh 0r one-sided. A contract term is not substantively 22 unconscionable When it merely gives one side a greater benefit; rather, the term must be so one- 23 sided as to “shock the conscience.” (Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).) 24 “The party resisting arbitration bears the burden of proving unconscionability.” (Id. 25 (internal quotations and citations omitted).) When a provision is not substantively unconscionable, 26 a court need not consider Whether it is procedurally unconscionable. (Mission Viejo Emer. Med. 27 Ass ’n v. Beta Healthcare Group (201 1) 197 Cal. App. 4th 1146, 1159.) Freeman Mathis & Gary, LLP Attorneysauaw 28 In Malone, Justice Croskey considered the following two factors t0 evaluate whether the 4 REPLY IN SUPPORT OF GEICO’S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION 153999151 11222-89142 Freeman Mathis & Gary, LLP Attorneys at Law 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 delegation clause was unconscionable: (1) whether the clause was outside the reasonable expectations 0f the parties; and (2) Whether the Clause was bilateral. (Malone, 226 Cal. App. 4th at 1570 (citation omitted).) Malone questioned whether the delegation clause could arguably be outside the reasonable expectations 0f the parties since the “AAA adopted a rule providing that arbitrators have the power to rule 0n their own jurisdiction - including issues regarding the existence, scope, and validity of the agreement - in 2000” and a similar JAMS rule “has been in existence since at least 2003.” (Id. at n.20.) Malone held that, even assuming the delegation clause was outside the reasonable expectations of the party and assuming it was a contract of adhesion, these facts were not sufficient t0 establish unconscionability, explaining: We are simply concerned With a Clause Which may have been outside the reasonable expectations of the party signing a contract 0f adhesion. This is not overly harsh or so one sided as t0 shock the conscience. The delegation clause is not unconscionable, and the trial court therefore did not err in granting the motion t0 compel arbitration t0 permit the arbitrator t0 resolve Malone’s challenges to the validity and enforceability of the arbitration agreement as a Whole. (Id. at 1570-71.) Here, Respondent likewise attempts t0 argue that the arbitration provision as a Whole is unconscionable because she did not expect it t0 incorporate the AAA Rules by reference. (Opposition, page 7, line 5 - page 8, line 18.) For the reasons outlined in Malone, Respondent’s argument that she was “surprised” t0 discover that the AAA Rules were incorporated by reference in her auto policy, even if she could establish the policy were a contract of adhesion, is insufficient to satisfy her burden 0f proving that the delegation clause in the AAA Rules is unconscionable. Because Respondent has provided n0 legal 0r evidentiary basis for striking the delegation clause from the GEICO policy, the Court must defer her arguments to the arbitrator. II. Respondent’s arguments fail 0n the merits? Even if the Court did not lack jurisdiction, Respondent’s arguments fail 0n the merits. 2 GEICO maintains that the Court lacks jurisdiction t0 consider whether the arbitration provision in the Policy is enforceable against Respondent and expressly reserves and does not waive its right t0 have this issue decided by the arbitrator. 5 REPLY IN SUPPORT OF GEICO’S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION 153999151 11222-89142 Freeman Mathis & Gary, LLP Attorneys at Law 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 A. The AAA Rules d0 not render the arbitration provision substantively unconscionable because they apply equally t0 all parties. “Substantive unconscionability pertains to the fairness of an agreement’s actual terms and to assessments 0f whether they are overly harsh 0r one-sided. A contract term is not substantively unconscionable when it merely gives one side a greater benefit; rather, the term must be so one- sided as t0 “shock the conscience.” (Malone, 226 Cal. App. 4th at 1559-60 (internal quotations and citations omitted).) Respondent has not satisfied her burden 0f demonstrating that the AAA Rules are so one- sided in favor 0f GEICO as t0 “shock the conscience,” as she fails t0 demonstrate that the AAA Rules are not applied uniformly t0 all parties. Because the arbitration provision is not substantively unconscionable, the Court need not consider Whether it is procedurally unconscionable. 1. Respondent Will incur n0 more than $200 in arbitration fees. Respondent alleges that she “will be required t0 pay fees t0 arbitrate that are above and beyond the filing costs associated with this Superior Court action.” (Opposition, page 9 line 1-3.) In support, Respondent cites the AAA Rules, attached as Exhibit A t0 GEICO’S Request for Judicial Notice, page 35, Which provides that even if Respondent initiated an arbitration, she would be required t0 pay a maximum amount of $200. Under the AAA Rules, consumers do not pay any arbitrator fees. (Id. at page 37.) Therefore, arbitration, which is capped at $200 is less costly for Respondent, than proceeding in state court Where the first appearance fee alone is more than double that amount at $435. (Superior Court of California Statewide Civil Fee Schedule, Effective January 1, 2020, item 1.) Under these facts, Respondent offers n0 basis upon which the Court could find the AAA Rules t0 be unconscionable. 2. The arbitrator’s discretion in approving discovery and subpoenas does not render the AAA Rules unconscionable. Respondent alleges that the “AAA Rules restrict any form 0f discovery, prohibiting [her] from obtaining information not only from Geico, but third parties as well.” (Opposition, page 9, lines 7-8.) However, the AAA Rules Respondent cites contain n0 such prohibition but rather grant the arbitrator With the authority t0 order discovery. Critically, Respondent fails t0 acknowledge that 6 REPLY IN SUPPORT OF GEICO’S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION 153999151 11222-89142 Freeman Mathis & Gary, LLP Attorneys at Law 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Section 11580.2 0f the California Insurance Code governs the arbitration 0f her uninsured motorist claim, Which expressly provides that the arbitrator shall order discovery consistent With California’s Discovery Act, with limited exceptions not relevant here. (Id. at subsection f; see also Workman v. Superior Court (1986) 176 Cal. App. 3d 493, 498-99.) Respondent does not argue that the discovery guidelines set forth in Section 11580.2 are substantively unconscionable. Her argument, therefore, fails. Even if the Insurance Code did not apply, California appellate courts have already rejected Respondent’s argument and held that the arbitrator’s discretion in issuing discovery under the AAA Rules does not render the rules substantively unconscionable. (See, e.g., Lane, 224 Cal. App. 4th at 692-93.) In rej ecting the same argument Respondent makes here, Lane held: “the lack 0f an express provision for discovery [in the AAA Rules] did not render the arbitration agreement substantively unconscionable.” (Id. at 693 (citation omitted).) Lane explained that the AAA Rules, “which give the arbitrator the authority” t0 order discovery between the parties satisfied the requirements 0f Armendariz [ ] for arbitration of statutory claims.” (161.) Because Respondent’s claims are not “statutory claims,” there is n0 need to meet the more stringent requirements for discovery of Armendariz, Which, in any case, are satisfied by the AAA Rules. (Boghos v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd ’s ofLondon (2005) 36 Cal. 4th 495, 507.) In Boghos, the court admonished the insured for attempting t0 import holdings from Armendariz and other cases that carve out special exceptions applicable to arbitration 0f employment disputes into the context 0f an insurance dispute. (Id.) The court found “n0 merit” in Boghos’ request, explaining: Even if the holdings in Amendarz‘z and other employment cases “might conceivably be extended beyond the employment context t0 cover other types 0funwaivable claims based 0n 0r tethered t0 statutes, Boghos’s claims for nonpayment 0f benefits and breach 0f the covenant 0f good faith and fair dealing cannot properly be so described.” (1d,) Because the sole case cited by Respondent - Trompeter v. Ally Financial, Inc. (2012) 914 F. Supp. 2d 1067 - does not discuss the scope of discovery available under the AAA Rules, she has provided this Court with no basis for rej ecting Lane’s holding, which, in any event, is irrelevant here Where the Insurance Code defines the scope 0f discovery. /// 7 REPLY IN SUPPORT OF GEICO’S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION 153999151 11222-89142 Freeman Mathis & Gary, LLP Attorneys at Law 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 3. Respondent’s argument regarding that the AAA Rules are “unreasonably favorable t0 the more powerful party” is belied by the AAA Rules themselves. Respondent’s third argument in support 0f her contention that the incorporation 0f the AAA Rules renders the arbitration provision unconscionable is difficult t0 decipher. (See Opposition, page 9, lines 20-28.) To the extent Respondent argues that the AAA Rules prevent her from “choos[ing] the arbitrator who will hear the controversy,” (id. at page 9, line 23), the argument is belied by the AAA Rules, which provide for the random assignment 0f an arbitrator only if the parties are unable to select a mutually agreeable arbitrator. (AAA Rules, Rule R-16.) Respondent cites n0 authority indicating that this selection process, Which provides the parties with more control over the assigned arbitrator than is available in the state and federal judicial system, is unconscionable. Respondent does cite t0 15 U.S. Code § 1226, which applies t0 a “motor vehicle franchise contract” (id. at subsection (a)(2)), not to the insurance policy at issue here, and Which does not appear to contain the language quoted by Respondent. B. The arbitration provision is not procedurally unconscionable. The arbitration provision in Respondent’s policy is clear and conspicuous and the AAA rules incorporated therein are easily accessible on the internet. Respondent’s failure t0 read the GEICO policy does not render it procedurally unconscionable. 1. The arbitration provision is clear and conspicuous. GEICO was unable t0 find any California case holding that an arbitration provision in an insurance policy was unenforceable. On the contrary, courts have affirmed their validity, even Where the insureds contend they were unaware of the provision’s existence. In Mission Viejo, for example, the plaintiffs alleged that they did not consent to arbitrate their disputes With their professional liability insurance carrier because they were unaware of any arbitration provision in their insurance policy and none was included in the application for insurance. (Mission Viejo, 197 Cal. App. 4th at 1149.). The court found that the arbitration provision was clear and conspicuous because: “It is included in the policy’s table 0f contents as ‘Arbitration 0f Disputes with Us.’ In the policy itself, it is the second provision 0f the ‘General Conditions’ section 0f the policy. It is 8 REPLY IN SUPPORT OF GEICO’S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION 153999151 11222-89142 Freeman Mathis & Gary, LLP Attorneys at Law 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 printed in the same typeface as the rest of the document, and the heading is underlined in capital letters.” (Id. at 1154.) Based 0n this finding, the court roundly rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the provision was unconscionable, stating: Failing t0 read a policy (or its table 0f contents) is not sufficient reason to hold a clear and conspicuous policy provision unenforceable. To hold otherwise would turn both contract and insurance law 0n its head. Insurers are not required t0 sit beside a policy holder and force them t0 read (and ask if they understand) every provision in an insurance policy. Nor are policy holders permitted t0 accept the benefits under the policy While denying the existence of inconvenient terms. (Id. at 1156.) The arbitration provision in Respondent’s Policy is clear and conspicuous for the same reasons stated in Mission Viejo: it is included in the Policy’s table 0f contents as “Disputes Between Us and Insured” under SECTION IV pertaining t0 uninsured and underinsured coverage, printed in the same typeface as the rest of the document, and the heading is in capital letters and bold font. (Walsh Decl. 1] 2, Exhibit A, p. 21, 3 1 .) Likewise, Respondent’s allegation that she did not read the Policy is insufficient t0 render the arbitration provision unenforceable since she is not “permitted t0 accept the benefits under the policy while denying the existence 0f inconvenient terms.” (Mission Viejo, 197 Cal. App. 4th at 1156.) Moreover, California Insurance Code § 11580.2 requires that insurance policies providing uninsured or uninsured motorist coverage must provide that disputes shall be resolved through arbitration. Any argument that compliance with California law is a “surprise” must necessarily fail. (See Briggs v. Resolution Remedies (2008) 168 Cal. App. 4th 1395 (finding arbitration provision language similar to the Policy at issue here complied with Insurance Code § 11580.2.) Because the arbitration provision applies equally to GEICO and Respondent, there is n0 basis for finding it unenforceable, regardless of whether the Policy is deemed a contract 0f adhesion. 2. The failure t0 attach a copy 0f the AAA rules does not render the arbitration provision unenforceable. Failure to provide a copy of the rules of the arbitration forums procedures does not render an arbitration agreement unconscionable. (Lane v. Francis Capital Mgmt. LLC (2014) 224 Cal. App. 4th 676, 689; Peng v. First Republic Bank (2013) 219 Cal. App. 4th 1462, 1472.) In Lane, 9 REPLY IN SUPPORT OF GEICO’S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION 153999151 11222-89142 Freeman Mathis & Gary, LLP Attorneys at Law 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 the court held: “There could be no surprise, as the arbitration rules referenced in the agreement were easily accessible to the parties -- the AAA rules are available on the Internet.” (Lane, 224 Cal. App. 4th at 689.) The “vast majority 0f circuits hold that incorporation ofAAA rules constitutes clear and unmistakable evidence 0f the parties’ intent t0 d0 so.” (Brennan, 796 F.3d at 1130-31 (citations omitted).) Here, as in Lane, the AAA Rules are easily accessible online and Respondent’s “surprise” regarding the incorporation 0f the AAA Rules (Opposition, page 7, line 5 - page 8, line 18) is the result 0f her failure t0 read the policy language, Which cannot support a procedural unconscionability argument. (See, e.g., Mission Viejo, 197 Cal. App. 4th at 1156.) Therefore, Respondent’s argument that the failure t0 attach the AAA rules makes the arbitration provision procedurally unconscionable, which is unsupported by valid law 0r evidence, fails. CONCLUSION Accordingly, the Court should grant GEICO’S Motion t0 Compel Arbitration. 3 Dated: July 22, 2021 FREEMAN MATHIS & GARY, LLP By: 95”} C L'gz DKNIEL C. WALSH ISIS D. MIRANDA Attorneys for Petitioner GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY 3 Multiple California courts have rejected similar attempts by insureds t0 avoid the AAA Rules incorporated by reference in their GEICO auto policy’s arbitration provision. (See, e.g., (Khanjar v. GEICO, Case N0. 34-2021-00296341 (Sacramento Sup. Ct. May 25, 2021) (granting motion to compel arbitration); Zells v. GEICO, Case N0. ZISTCP00587 (Los Angeles Sup. Ct. Mar. 25, 2021) (Same); Muska v. GEICO, Case N0. 30-2019-01060788-CU-IC-CJC (Orange Sup. Ct. Apr. 2, 2020) (same); Monesa v. GEICO, Case N0. 19STCP03260 (Los Angeles Sup. Ct. Mar 6, 2020) (same); Estrada v. GEICO, Case N0. ZOSTCV02775 (Los Angeles Sup. Ct. Mar. 4, 2020) (same); Acton v. GEICO, Case N0. MVC1914589 (Riverside Sup. Ct. Dec. 30, 2019) (same).) The same arbitration provision addressed in those cases is at issue here. 10 REPLY IN SUPPORT OF GEICO’S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION 153999151 11222-89142 Freeman Mathis & Gary, LLP Attorneys at Law 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 PROOF OF SERVICE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES I am employed in the County 0f Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age 0f 18 and not a party to the Within action; my business address is 550 S. Hope Street, 22nd Floor, Los Angeles, California 90071-2627. On July 22, 2021, I served the foregoing document(s) described as: REPLY IN SUPPORT OF GEICO’S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION on interested parties in this action by placing a true and correct copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope addressed as follows: SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST E (BY OVERNIGHT DELIVERY) I placed said documents in envelope(s) for collection following ordinary business practices, at the business offices 0fFREEMAN MATHIS & GARY, LLP and addressed as shown 0n the attached service list, for collection and delivery by FEDEX t0 receive said documents, With delivery fees provided for. I am readily familiar with the practices of FREEMAN MATHIS & GARY, LLP for collection and processing of documents for overnight delivery and said envelope(s) Will be deposited for receipt by FEDEX on said date in the ordinary course 0f business. E (STATE) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct. Executed 0n July 22, 2021, at Los Angeles, California. SOPHIA LOVOS-CASTANEDA i Type 0r Print Name Signature PROOF OF SERVICE 153999151 11222-89142 Freeman Mathis & Gary, LLP Attorneys at Law 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 SERVICE LIST Re: Geico General Insurance Company v. AnnaM Prenares Santa Clara S.C. Case N0. 20CV366495 John Kevin Crowley, Esq. Attorneyfor Respondent, 125 S. Market Street, Suite 1200 ANNAM PRENARES San Jose, CA 951 13 Telephone: (408) 288-8 1 00 Facsimile: (408) 288-9409 PROOF OF SERVICE 153999151 11222-89142