Opposition ObjectionsCal. Super. - 6th Dist.March 18, 202010 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 20CV365252 Santa Clara - Civil AEGIS LAW FIRM, PC SAMUEL A. WONG (State Bar N0. 217104) KASHIF HAQUE (State Bar No. 218672) Electronically Filed by Superior Court of CA, County of Santa Clara, on 12/21/2020 3:20 PM JESSICA L. CAMPBELL (State Bar N0. 280626) Reviewed By: R_ walker ALEXANDER G.L. DAVIES (State Bar N0. 328125) case #Zocv365252 9811 Irvine Center Drive, Suite 100 Irvine, California 92618-2902 Telephone: (949) 379-6250 Facsimile: (949) 379-6251 Email: adavies@aegislawfirm.com Attorneys for Plaintiff Victor Flores, Envelope: 551 1 574 Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA Victor Flores, individually and on behalf 0f all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, vs. ACCO ENGINEERED SYSTEMS, INC.; and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive, Defendants. Case N0.: 20CV365252 Assignedfor allpurposes t0: Hon. PatriciaM Lucas Dept: 3 PLAINTIFF VICTOR FLORES’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT ACCO ENGINEERED SYSTEMS, INC.’S MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT Date: January 6, 2021 Time: 2:30 pm. Department: 3 PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 I. INTRODUCTION Defendant insists 0n pursuing a disfavored and unnecessary Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff’s FAC. In doing so, Defendant disregards applicable law regarding class action cases and misinterprets applicable authority. First, a motion t0 strike is the improper procedure t0 address 0r challenge Plaintiffs proposed class and subclass definitions. Defendant’s argument is based completely on the factual contention that “the terms and conditions 0f employment vary greatly among the employees in Plaintiff s purported class” (Motion at 5:3-4), which cannot be decided 0n the pleadings. Second, Defendant has not shown that any 0f that any 0f Plaintiff’s allegations are false, improper, or irrelevant, 0r any other proper basis upon Which any cause of action Within Plaintiff s FAC should be subj ect to strike. Third, despite Defendant’s contention t0 the contrary, Plaintiff has provided a sufficient definition of the Aggrieved Employees Plaintiff seeks t0 represent and a sufficient description 0f the claims at this pre-discovery phase. Plaintiff” s PAGA notice letter t0 the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) explains that Plaintiff asserted claims and sought penalties for Aggrieved Employees under PAGA. Plaintiff’s notice letter t0 the LWDA also included Plaintiff s Complaint as an attachment, which Defendant conveniently fails to attach in its Request for Judicial Notice (RJN) in Support of its Motion t0 Strike, supplementing the explanation 0f the claims Plaintiff alleges and the employees Plaintiff seeks to represent. Finally, all 0f the Labor Code Sections cited under Plaintiffs seventh cause 0f action are recoverable through a PAGA action. Despite Defendant’s contentions regarding Plaintiff’s failure t0 state “facts and theories” in support of the alleged PAGA Violations or t0 adequately define the group 0f Aggrieved Employees, Plaintiff’s FAC and notice letter to the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) provide sufficient facts and information t0 satisfies California’s code pleading standard. Defendant attempts t0 escape liability by pointing t0 an alleged lack 0f specificity in Plaintiff’ s PAGA notice letter, and an alleged failure t0 exhaust administrative remedies, but conveniently overlooks (0r deliberately misconstrues) the allegations provided in both the FAC and in Plaintiff’s March 18, 2020 notice letter t0 -1- PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 California’s Labor and Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”). Accordingly, this Motion t0 Strike is Without merit and should be denied in its entirety. II. LEGAL STANDARD GOVERNING MOTIONS TO STRIKE Code of Civil Procedure section 436(a) allows a court t0 strike any irrelevant, false, 0r improper matter inserted in any pleading. Notwithstanding, motions to strike are disfavored since pleadings must be “liberally construed, with a View t0 substantial justice between the parties.” Code CiV. Proc., § 452. “The grounds for a motion t0 strike shall appear 0n the face 0f the challenged pleading 0r from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” Cal. Code CiV. Proc. § 437. Courts have long recognized that “the distinction between conclusions of law and ultimate facts is not at all clear and involves at most a matter of degree.” Perkins v. Superior Court, 117 Cal.App.3d 1, 6 (1981) (Where the court permitted conclusory language in a complaint because the complaint provided notice to the defendant 0f the plaintiffs precise claims against them). “Pleadings must be reasonably interpreted; they must be read as a Whole and each part must be given the meaning that it derives from the context wherein it appears.” Speegle v. Board ofFire Underwriters offhe Pacific, 29 Cal. 2d 34, 42 (1946). III. ARGUMENT A. The Court Should Not Strike Plaintiff’s Proposed Class Definition Defendant’s Motion is a thinly-veiled and premature attempt t0 pre-condition the court against class certification With n0 factual record. Defendant has failed to demonstrate that the matters they seek to strike are false, nor can they show that the allegations are irrelevant or improper. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion must fail on these grounds alone. Plaintiff’s Class and Subclass definitions are specific and ascertainable. Instead, Defendant relies 0n a consumer case (Noel v. Thrifty) and alleges that Plaintiff’s proposed class and subclass definitions are “hopelessly overbroad” but fails t0 explain how defining a class according t0 the objective criteria of Defendant’s own classification of them as hourly employees (non-exempt) and their dates of employment fails t0 satisfy the ascertainability standard. T0 the extent Defendant attempts t0 raise factual issues regarding differences between class members, there is n0 evidence before the Court establishing those differences, nor could there be as “[t]he -2- OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 grounds for a motion t0 strike shall appear 0n the face of the challenged pleading 0r from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” Cal. Code CiV. Proc. § 437. Even the case Defendant relies upon acknowledged the principle that Plaintiff must have an opportunity t0 conduct discovery before class certification issues are decided. See In re BCBG Overtime Cases 163 Cal. App. 4th 1293, 1301 (2008) (“BCBG'S motion t0 strike the class allegations was not made before Plaintiffs had a chance to conduct discovery on class certification issues.”). BCBG was an exceptional case, marked by prolonged delay 0n the part 0f the plaintiffs in bringing a motion t0 certify. The case began in 2002, and yet by 2007 the plaintiffs still had not brought a motion t0 certify a class. BCBG, 163 Ca1.App.4th at 1298. After noting that the motion had been made after the plaintiffs had a "chance t0 conduct discovery 0n class certification issues" and t0 respond With evidence of their own, and that discovery "had been going 0n for some time," the court upheld the trial court's granting 0f the motion t0 strike, in the process characterizing the trial court's action as "denying certification." Id. at 1301. Under these exceptional circumstances, the court found that defendant’s motion to strike was “not an attack on the pleadings, like a traditional motion t0 strike; rather, it was a request to initiate the class certification process." Id. at 1298. Defendant has not and cannot cite any binding authority t0 show that the definition 0f a class as all “current and former non-exempt employees” 0r a subclass as those Who have separated from their employment With Defendant Within the past three years is improperly broad and subject t0 strike. Defendant resorts to citing a federal case applying a standard not used in state court and a trial court case regarding the pleading standard for a demurrer, which is irrelevant t0 the instant motion to strike. See Motion at p. 10, lines 24-28 (citing Bush v. Vaco Technology Services, LLC (N.D. Cal. 2018) 2018 WL 2047807 and Ellis v. Google, Inc. (2017 Cal. Superior) 2017 WL 8809439. Notably, the Ellis case mistakenly relied 0n a class decision granting class certification (Ghazaryan v. Diva Limousine, Ltd, 169 Cal. App. 4th 1524, 1533, 87 Cal. Rptr. 3d 518, 525 (2008)), to make a pleadings ruling the opposite way, presumably making the mistake 0f relying 0n the reversed trial court decision in Ghazaryan. Id. at *2. -3- OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Defendant also cites an unpublished trial court decision (see Motion at p.11, lines 2-3 (citing Cascarejo v. Pacific Cheese C0., Inc. (2009 Cal. Superior) 2009 WL 6361069, *2)1, which apparently ignored the numerous binding decisions ruling that disposing of class allegations Without the opportunity t0 fully develop the record is an abuse of discretion. See Hendershot v. Ready t0 Roll Transp, Inc. 228 Cal. App. 4th 1213, 1226 (2014). (“It is an abuse of discretion for a trial court to determine class certification questions before the parties have an opportunity to conduct discovery and present evidence on certification issues.”); Carabim’ v. Superior Court 26 Cal.App.4th 239, 244 (1994) (“Due process requires an order with such significant impact on the Viability 0f a case not be made Without a full opportunity t0 brief the issues and present evidence.”); Stern v. Superior Court 105 Cal. App. 4th 223, 232-233 (2003) (“Each party, moreover, must have an opportunity t0 conduct discovery on class action issues before filing documents to support 0r oppose a class action certification motion . . . so the trial court can realistically determine if common questions are sufficiently pervasive t0 permit adjudication in a class action”). Class certification should be determined after discovery upon the submission 0f a complete evidentiary record. See Atari, Inc. v. Superior Court 166 Ca1.App.3d 867, 870 (1985). Finally, Defendant ignores the fact that binding authority has approved certification for classes 0f “non-exempt employees”. See, e.g., Brinker Rest. Corp. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 4th 1004, 1019 (2012) (“[a]11 present and former employees 0f [Brinker] who worked at a Brinker owned restaurant in California, holding a non-exempt position, from and after August 16, 2000”). There are no justifiable grounds t0 strike Plaintiffs definition of the Class 0r Subclass as the definitions are not irrelevant, false, 0r improper. B. Plaintiff Pled His PAGA Allegations in Conformity with California Law, Therefore the Court Should Not Strike His PAGA Causes 0f Action from His First Amended Complaint Plaintiff s Notice Letter t0 the LWDA and FAC plead ultimate facts necessary t0 establish 1 Plaintiff objects t0 Defendant’s RJN t0 the extent it asks the Court t0 take Judicial Notice of rulings in trial court decisions. -4- OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Plaintiff’s cause 0f action for the enforcement of the Private Attorneys’ General Act of 2004 (“PAGA”) asserted against Defendant. The allegations in the Notice Letter met the statutory requirements and were sufficient t0 allow the LWDA t0 investigate the claim and t0 permit the Defendant t0 respond. In assessing PAGA letters, courts have been carefiJI to acknowledge the inherent limitations 0n including detailed factual allegations in a notice letter before litigation and discovery. Indeed, a plaintiffs claims in the subsequent lawsuit are not severely limited t0 the facts and theories set forth in the notice letters because “0f course, no discovery has yet occurred, since Plaintiffs could not file suit until providing notice t0 the [state agency] and determining if the agency would investigate. Such a result is absurd and would undermine the principles 0f the PAGA.” Cardenas v. McLane FoodServices, 1110., 796 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1260 (201 1). Here, both the PAGA Notice Letter t0 the LWDA and Plaintiff” s FAC allege specific facts sufficient t0 meet California’s minimal PAGA notice and pleading requirements. First, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s notice letter does not define the term “Aggrieved Employees”, and 0n that basis Plaintiff failed to exhaust all administrative remedies as a matter 0f law and the PAGA claims should be dismissed. (See Motion, p. 14, lns, 1-3.) However, Plaintiff’s letter specifically states, “Claimant and other aggrieved employees worked for ACCO as non-exempt employees in California.” See RJN, Exhibit A, p.1 (emphasis added). Moreover, Defendant fails t0 cite t0 any authority requiring that the term Aggrieved Employees must be defined in a notice letter to the LWDA. In fact, the casez Which Defendant cites as its basis for this argument, involved a Plaintiff Whose notice expressly only applied t0 himself (and failed t0 specify that he sought relief for any additional 0r Aggrieved Employees whatsoever) which accordingly “failed t0 provide [the employer] With an adequate opportunity to respond to the agency since the notice suggested only an individual Violation.” See Khan v. Dunn-Edwards Corp. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 804. However, the facts in Khan are factually distinct from those in Plaintiff’s matter. As Defendant’s admit, Plaintiff’s notice letter states that Plaintiff “intends t0 seek penalties against ACCO under the Private Attorneys General Act 0f 2004, Cal. Lab. Code §§ 2 The federal cases applying federal pleadings standards are inapplicable here. -5- OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 2698 et seq., on behalf 0f himself and all other Aggrieved Employees.” Moreover, Defendant’s argument overlooks the employee definitions provided in Plaintiffs Complaint (attached to Plaintiff s LWDA Letter as Exhibit A) describing the proposed class and subclass of employees. Second, as to Defendant’s contentions regarding Plaintiffs alleged failure t0 state facts and theories supporting Plaintiff’s claims for PAGA penalties, Plaintiffs PAGA Notice Letter and FAC are sufficiently detailed to state a cause 0f action and t0 give Defendant’s notice of each and every alleged Violation. Under applicable California law, a Plaintiff need only allege “a statement of the facts constituting the cause[s] of action, in ordinary and concise language.” Code CiV. Proc., § 425.10. The complaint need only allege ultimate facts, and “each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of plaintiffs proof need not be alleged.” CA. v. William S. Hart Union High School District, 53 Cal. 4th 861, 872 (2012). In both the PAGA Notice letter and his FAC, Plaintiff alleged the essential facts needed t0 acquaint Defendant With the nature, source, and extent 0f the causes of action asserted. As to the meal period claim, Plaintiff’s Letter alleges aggrieved employees “were interrupted during their meal periods” and/or “were not scheduled t0 be relieved by other employees”, and therefore “their meal periods were missed, late, short, 0r interrupted.” The Letter also alleges second meal periods occurred for the same reasons, and ACCO failed to pay the premiums owed for those Violations. (See Motion at p.15, lines 5-13.) “Nothing in section 2699.3, subdivision (a)(1)(A), indicates the ‘facts and theories’ provided in support 0f ‘alleged’ Violations must satisfy a particular threshold of weightiness, beyond the requirements of nonfrivolousness generally applicable to any civil filing. (See Code CiV. Proc., § 1287.).” Brown v. Ralphs Grocery C0., 28 Cal. App. 5th 824, 836 (2018) (quoting Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Ca1.5th 531, 545-546). ‘6As t0 the rest break claim, Plaintiff’s Letter alleges aggrieved employees were not authorized to take their rest periods at the appropriate time intervals”, and they likewise were not paid premiums for missed rest breaks. (See Motion at p.17, lines 22-26.) After Brinker, references to the “time intervals” marking the eligibility for rest breaks are significant factual allegations. Brinker clarified When rest breaks must be provided, i.e., not only every four hours but also When -6- OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 a “major fraction” of four hours, meaning 2 additional hours has passed, making second rest breaks due When employee work over six hours, and third rest breaks due when employees work over eight hours. See Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Ca1.4th 1004, 1029. Defendant mistakenly focuses 0n Whether is legally obligated t0 schedule rest breaks, but the letter raises the factual issue 0f Whether employees were even “authorized t0 take” rest breaks at the appropriate time intervals. This is a question of Defendant’s policy and how it was enforced. The allegation is at least sufficient t0 allow discovery into Defendant’s policies and practices as t0 rest breaks, and allowed the LWDA to conclude it was not interested in investigating this type of rest break claim, as opposed t0 other claims, like unpaid rest breaks 0r rest break premiums paid at the wrong rate. See Caliber Bodyworks, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 134 Ca1.App.4th 365, 371, 375 (notice provision intended t0 “‘allow[ ] the [LWDA] t0 act first on more ‘serious’ Violations such as wage and hour Violations and give employers an opportunity to cure less 999 serious Violations ). Here, Plaintiff alleges the time intervals were not right and no premiums were paid. As t0 the overtime claim, Plaintiff’s Letter alleges aggrieved employees were paid “non- discretionary bonuses, shift premiums, and other incentive payments”, and those payments were not included in the overtime rate, resulting in ACCO’s failure “t0 pay the proper overtime rate.” (See Motion at p.18, lines 15-17.) Defendant’s argues the overtime rate is set by the CBA. (See id. at p. 18, lines 18-19.) It is unclear why that additional issue would make Plaintiff’s Letter insufficient. There is no case requiring that particular defense to be included in the Notice Letter. Further, drawing inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, as the Court must do 0n a pleadings motion, the 99 reasonable inference from the statement that “Claimant’s overtime was not paid at the right rate because non-discretionary pay was not included is that overtime was worked but not paid at the right rate because the employee earned the non-discretionary pay. N0 other explanation would make logical sense. Defendant’s requirement that Plaintiff explicitly lay out that inference is not supported by any case law. As to the wage statement allegations, Plaintiff’s Letter alleges the Violations were “as a 99 ‘6 result of’ the other Violations described in the letter, and “in addition at least some pay stubs -7- OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 contained incorrect 0r incomplete pay period dates.” (See Motion at p. 19, lines 5-13.) Given that the statute requires the “the inclusive dates of the period for which the employee is paid”, Plaintiff provides the factual allegation that some of the pay stubs contained incorrect dates and some contained incomplete dates. (See Motion at p.19, lines 5-13.) Defendant argues these allegations are insufficient but fails t0 cite a case confirming Plaintiff is required to explain how or Why the dates are incorrect at this pre-discovery phase. Defendant’s federal authority is not persuasive in light 0f the binding authority finding sufficient a notice to the LWDA stating “The Violations include, without limitation, the failure to include the name and address 0f the legal entity that is the employer.” Brown v. Ralphs Grocery C0., 28 Cal. App. 5th 824, 838 (2018), review denied (Feb. 20, 2019). This binding authority does not require a plaintiff t0 explain how 0r Why the name and address are omitted, just as Plaintiff here is not required to explain in detail how or Why the correct pay period dates are missing. As t0 the allegations regarding timely payment 0f wages, Plaintiff s Letter alleges ACCO “failed to pay all wages owed” in two time periods: “throughout Claimant and other aggrieved employees’ employment” and “following the end 0f these workers’ employment.” (See Motion at p.20, lines 22-24.) Additionally, Plaintiff’s Complaint, Which was attached t0 the Letter further explains “Defendants knew or should have known that Plaintiff and Waiting Time Subclass members were entitled t0 timely payment 0f wages due upon separation 0f employment. In Violation 0f the Labor Code, Plaintiff and Waiting Time Subclass members did not receive payment 0f all wages within permissible time periods.” Complaint 11 32. This failure t0 pay wages in am manner is merely a derivative allegation based on the other Violations in the letter, such as the overtime Violation. As long as those allegations are sufficient, Which they are, so is the timely payment claim. Likewise, the allegation of failure t0 keep accurate records is derivative 0f the underlying unpaid wage claims. Defendant admits Plaintiff’s Letter references the inaccurate overtime rate. (See Motion at p.21, lines 9-12.) Again, the logical inference is this allegation stems from the overtime rate issues described earlier in the Letter. The allegations in Plaintiff’s Notice Letter go beyond parroting the statutes and support -8- OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Plaintiff’ s cause of action for the enforcement 0fPAGA at the pleadings stage. However, even if any 0f these claims needed more factual support, Plaintiff is permitted to add factual support, which can relate back t0 the original Letter under Brown, 28 Cal. App. 5th at 842 (remanding for consideration 0f relation back issue). Regardless, Defendant admits Plaintiff’s employment was terminated in January 2020, meaning he could still have time t0 amend his Notice Letter if needed. (See Motion at p. 7, lines 8-9.) In short, Plaintiff’s FAC contains relevant allegations t0 assert Defendant’s Labor Code Violations and Plaintiff’s and the Aggrieved Employees’ resulting request for PAGA penalties. Defendant has not provided grounds to justify striking the PAGA causes 0f action from Plaintiffs operative complaint. IV. IF THE COURT IS INCLINED TO GRANT DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE, LEAVE TO AMEND SHOULD BE GRANTED Where a defect raised by a motion to strike is reasonably capable of cure, “leave t0 amend is routinely and liberally granted to give the plaintiff a chance t0 cure the defect in question.” Price v. Dames & Moore (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 355, 360; Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Ca1.App.3d 159, 168. It is generally an abuse 0f discretion t0 deny leave to amend because the drastic step 0f denial 0f the opportunity to correct the curable defect effectively terminates the action. Vaccaro v. Kaiman (1998) 63 Ca1.App.4th 761. Even the cases cited by Defendant support this position. See Cascarejo v. Pacific Cheese C0., Inc. (2009 Cal. Superior) 2009 WL 6361069; see also Bush v. Vaco Technology Services, LLC (N.D. Cal. 2018) 2018 WL 2047807. Here, should the Court be inclined t0 accept any part of Defendant’s Motion meritorious, Plaintiff can cure any perceived defects by alleging additional facts or clarifying existing ones. V. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court deny Defendant’s Motion to Strike. If the Court chooses t0 grant any part of the Motion t0 Strike, Plaintiff respectfully requests leave t0 amend. -9- OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE OONON \O 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Dated: December 21, 2020 AEGIS LAW FIRM, PC M/Qv By: Alexander G.L. Davies Attorneys for Plaintiff Victor Flores -10- OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE \OOOQONUI-PUJNH NNNNNNNNNt-I-Ht-I-Ht-I-Ht- OONQM$UJNHOKOOOQONMJ>WNHO CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, the undersigned, am employed in the County 0f Orange, State 0f California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party t0 the Within action; am employed With Aegis Law Firm PC and my business address is 9811 Irvine Center Drive, Suite 100, Irvine, California 92618. On December 21, 2020, I served the foregoing document entitled: 0 PLAINTIFF VICTOR FLORES’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT ACCO ENGINEERED SYSTEMS, INC.’S MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT on all the appearing and/or interested parties in this action by deliveringD the original a true copy thereof 0n the party(ies) addressed below as follows: Richard A. Leasia Benjamin A. Emmett LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C. 50 W. San Fernando, 7th Floor San Jose, CA 951 13-2303 Telephone: 408.998.4150 Facsimile: 408.288.5686 rleasia littler.com bemmert@littler.com Attorneysfor Defendan t: ACCO ENGINEERED SYSTEMS, INC. D (BY MAIL) I am readily familiar with the firm’s practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with the U.S. Postal Service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid at Irvine, California in the ordinary course 0f business. I am aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postage cancellation date 0r postage meter date is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing this affidavit. (Cal Code Civ. Proc. § 1013(a); Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 5(a); Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 5(c).) D (BY OVERNIGHT MAIL) I am personally and readily familiar with the business practice of Aegis Law Firm PC for collection and processing correspondence for overnight delivery, and I caused such document(s) described herein t0 be deposited for delivery to a facility regularly maintained Federal Express for overnight delivery. (Cal Code Civ. Proc. § 1013(0); Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 5(c).) X (BY ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION) I caused said document(s) to be served Via electronic transmission Via the above listed email addresses on the date below. (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1010.6(6); Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 5(b)(2)(E); Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 5(b)(3).) D (BY PERSONAL SERVICE) I delivered the foregoing document by hand delivery to the addressed named above. (Cal Code Civ. Proc. § 1011; Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 5(b)(2)(A)-) /// /// CERTIFICATE 0F SERVICE \OOOQONUI-PUJNH NNNNNNNNNt-I-Ht-I-Ht-I-Ht- OONQM$UJNHOKOOOQONMJ>WNHO I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State 0f California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on December 21, 2020, at Irvine, California. a Andrea firocco -2- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE