DemurrerCal. Super. - 6th Dist.March 4, 2020KOOONQUI-bUJN 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 200V364701 Santa Clara - Civil Y. Ch Electronically Filed by Superior Court of CA, County of Santa Clara, Timothy Chey, Esq. (in pro per) on 6/9/2020 10:39 AM Attorney at Law (State Bar No. 172096) Reviewed By: Y. Chavez 1420 Victoria Street Case #20CV364701 Suite 804 Envelope: 4430806 Honolulu, HI 96822 Telephone: 424 244 3041 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA Case N0: 20CV364701 Kulwinder Walia DEFENDANT’S NOTICE OF Plaintiff DEMURRER AND DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT; VS. MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT THEREOF Timothy Chey, Fallen State Productions, Pursuant t0 CCP § 430.10 RiverRain Productions, N0 Motion Date Available per Defendants Court’s Instructions due t0 Covid- 19 TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD: PLEASE TAKE NOTICE due t0 the Covid-19 emergency restrictions, the Court cannot entertain a motion date. So as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard in before the Honorable Judge, at the Santa Clara Superior Court, 191 N. First Street, San Jose, CA 95 1 13, Defendants Timothy Chey, Fallen State Productions, RiverRain Productions (‘Filmmakers’) Will and hereby does move the Court for an order sustaining a Demurrer to the Complaint of Kulwinder Walia 0n the following grounds below. -1- aveZ \OOONQUI-RUJNp-a NNNNNNNNNHHHHr-nr-IHHHH WNQm-5WNHooooflQM-5WNHO This Demurrer is brought per Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10 and is based on this Notice of Demurrer and Demurrer and the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities. Defendants makes this Motion concurrently With their Motion to Strike Portions of the Complaint.1 Defendants hereby demurs to Walia's Complaint on the following grounds: DEMURRER TO THE ENTIRE COMPLAINT Defendants generally and specially demur t0 Plaintiffs' complaint because it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a single cause of action against Defendants. Code CiV. Proc. § 430.10ge) and Defendants object t0 the entire Complaint on matters of which the court is required to 0r may take judicial notice. Code CiV. Proc. S 430.30. FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION (Fraud) 1. Defendants, jointly and severally, generally demur t0 this cause of action on the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause 0f action and that they are time- barred under their respective statutes 0f limitations. See Cal. CiV. Proc. Code § 430.10(e). SECOND CAUSE 0F ACTION (Breach of Contract) 2. Defendants, jointly and severally, generally demur t0 this cause of action on the ground that it does not state facts sufficient t0 constitute a cause of action and that they are time- barred under their respective statutes of limitations. See Cal. CiV. Proc. Code § 430.10(e). THIRD CAUSE 0F ACTION (Breach of Implied Covenant 0fGood Faith and Fair Dealing) 1 In the event the Court does not dismiss this case, Defendants have also filed concurrently a Motion t0 Stay Proceedings. _ 2 _ KOOONQUI-bUJN 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 3. Defendants, jointly and severally, generally demur t0 this cause of action 0n the ground that it does not state facts sufficient t0 constitute a cause 0f action and that they are time- barred under their respective statutes 0f limitations. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 430.10(e). FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION (Anticipatory Breach) 4. Defendants, jointly and severally, demur t0 this cause 0f action on the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 430.10(e). FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION (Unjust Enrichment) 5. Defendants, jointly and severally, demur t0 this cause 0f action on the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 430.10(e). SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION (Declaratory Relief) 6. Defendants, jointly and severally, generally demur t0 this cause of action 0n the ground that it does not state facts sufficient t0 constitute a cause 0f action and that they are time- barred under their respective statutes 0f limitations. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 430.10(e). SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION (Preliminary Injunction) 7. Defendants, jointly and severally, generally demur to this cause 0f action on the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and that they are time- barred under their respective statutes of limitations. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 430.10(e). EIGHT CAUSE OF ACTION (Accounting) -3- KOOONQUI-bUJN 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 8. Defendants, jointly and severally, generally demur t0 this cause of action 0n the ground that it does not state facts sufficient t0 constitute a cause 0f action and that they are time- barred under their respective statutes 0f limitations. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 430.10(e). Plaintiff” s counsel and Defendants had their meet and confer regarding this motion both on April 13, 2020 and April 27, 2020. Plaintiff” s counsel did not respond to Defendant’s arguments and refused t0 dismiss this frivolous complaint. PRAYER WHEREFORE, the Defendants jointly and severally pray that the Court sustain its demurrer t0 each Cause 0f Action of the Amended Complaint asserted against them with prejudice and Without leave to amend. WHEREFORE, defendants pray for the following relief from this court: 1. Their demurrer t0 Walia’s Complaint be sustained without leave to amend; 2. Defendants be dismissed from this action With prejudice; 3. Defendants be awarded its fees and costs; and 4. For such other relief as the court deems just and proper. DATED: May 19, 2020 RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED BY Timothy A. Chey, Esq (in pro per) Attorney At Law KOOONQUI-bUJN 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE I. MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES .......................... 1 II. STATEMENT OF PERTINENT ALLEGATIONS ............................... 1 III. ARGUMENT ........................................................................... 1 A. Standard for Demurrer ......................................................... 2 B. Walia’s Frivolous Lawsuit Fails Because They Paid and Given Sony’s Statements and Checks ........................................................ 7 . The Contract Requires ‘First Dollar’ and the Walias Were Paid Before A11 Costs ...................................................7 . Walia’s Breach Cause of Action Fails because it Improperly Relies on an Unreasonable Interpretation of the Contract ................ 8 Plaintiff Walia’s Breach 0f Contract, Breach 0f Implied Good Faith, Fraud Claims Are Time-Barred by Statutes of Limitations .....................................2 . Walia’s Breach of Contract Cause of Action Has Expired ............ 7 . Walia’s Breach of Implied Good Faith Cause of Action Has Expired ........................................................................ 5 . Walia’s Fraud Cause 0f Action Has Expired ........................... 6 IV. THE COURT SHOULD SUSTAIN THIS DEMURRER WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND BECAUSE IT IS CLEAR FROM THE AGREEMENTS THAT THE DEFENDANTS ARE NOT LIABLE TO PLAINTIFF III. CONCLUSION ............................................................ 12 KOOONQUI-bUJN 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES PAGE(S) FEDERAL CASES Indust. Risk Insurers V. Creole Prod. Servs., Inc., 746 F.2d 526 (9th Cir. 1964) ................................................. 11 Gregory Viii. Partners, L.P. V. Chevron USA, Inc., C 11-1597PJH, 2011 WL3359928 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 2,201 1) ..............7 SPPI-Somersvilie, Inc. V. TRC Cos., Inc., Nos. C 04-264881, 07-5 825 SI, 2009 WL2390347at*7 11 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2009) .............................. 12 STATE CASES Angeles Chem. C0. V. Spencer & Jones, 44Ca1 .App.4th1 12(1 996) .................................................... 5 April Enterprises, Incorporated V. KTTV, 147 Ca1.App.3d 805 (1983) .................................................. 5 Award Metals, Inc. V. Superior Court (1991) 228 Cal.App.3dI 128, 1 135, 279 Ca1.Rptr. 459 ............................................................. 18 Barton V. New United Motor Mfg, Inc., 43 Cal. App. 4th 1200 (1996) ................................................ 18 Beck Dev. Co. V. S. Pac. Trans. Co., 44Ca1. App. 4th 1160 (1996) ................................................. 8 Bonifleldv. County ofNevada, _ 6 _ KOOONQUI-bUJN 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 94 Cal. App. 4th 298 (2001) ............ Church 0f Christ in Hollywood V. Super. Ct., 99 Cal. App. 4th 1244 (2002) ........... Churchill V. Baumann, 95 Cal. 541 (1892) ....................... Damon V. Waldteufel, 99 Cal. 234 (1893) ....................... Gentry V. eBay, Inc., 99 Cal. App. 4th 816, 824-25 (2002) .................................... 15 Qualcomm, Inc. V. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London 161 Cal. App. 4th 184, 191 (2008) ..... ....................................... 17 ................................ 8 .................................. 8 .................................... 8 .................................. 15 KOOONQUI-bUJN 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT INTRODUCTION Imagine an investor in a faith-based movie - With n0 producing, acting, directing experience - is able t0 have starring roles for himself, his Wife, his son, and his grandson; have their film released nationwide into theaters; g0 to red carpet premieres; get picked up by Sony Pictures for worldwide distribution; and now sue the Filmmakers because they want their money back. This is the exact scenario before the Court. N0 amount 0f spin from their $1,000-an-hour attorneys Will change that. The Filmmakers have given all accounting statements from Sony Pictures and royalty checks divided equally t0 all investors as ‘first-dollar’ back. There were n0 costs subtracted. The Filmmakers have gone above and beyond the call 0f duty. Film writer and director Timothy Chey did not even take a writer 0r director’s salary. The Walias have filed this very frivolous Complaint because they’re acting like this entire litigation is a loan and not an investment. They lost money 0n a movie and now demand that the Filmmaker sell his house t0 pay off their investmentz Plaintiff Kulwinder Walia needs t0 sue Sony Pictures if she’s upset how the film sold, not the Filmmakers Who sacrificed blood, sweat, and tears t0 get the film made and picked up by Sony Pictures. Sony Pictures has already been sued by the production and the case is before the Los 2 The very sloppy and malicious Complaint erroneously says Filmmaker owns a house in Hawaii When the Filmmaker does not own any homes anywhere 0n Earth. There is a Motion t0 Strike concurrently before the Court. _ 8 _ KOOONQUI-bUJN 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Angeles Superior Court. There is a Motion to Stay Proceedings filed concurrently also before this Court. Filmmakers state for the record, under the penalty 0f perjury, they have never been sued by an investor in their previous 9 films. If there is anyone Who should sue, it is the Filmmakers against the Walias.3 Mr. Walia refused to give promised monies ($200,000) t0 finish the movie resulting in bounced checks for the crew. It turned out t0 be a huge embarrassment and trouble for the Filmmaker. The Walias are worth millions through owning over 400 fast food restaurants, yet still sue a faith-based filmmaker because they lost money 0n the movie. Again, their attorneys are asking for their entire investment back like it was a guaranteed loan. This is pure and unadulterated malice and greed. Nothing more. The Court cannot 100k at this frivolous suit with a passing glance. But see it for What it is: An extortionate attempt t0 hijack the proceeds from the team of hard-working people Who invested in this worthy film, including doctors, nurses, and business owners - all Who are receiving their hard-earned investments back and all who completely understood that first-dollar would be shared pro-rata. Accordingly, Filmmakers request this Court completely dismiss plaintiff Walia’s Complaint and sanction them for this frivolous lawsuit. STATEMENT OF PERTINENT ALLEGATIONS 3 Defendants Will be forced t0 file an answer and a countersuit should Plaintiffs prevails in this malicious lawsuit. -9- KOOONQUI-bUJN 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 On 0r about January 2016, Mr. Ray Walia (now deceased) invested Defendant’s faith- based sports movie about a young man who finds Christ in jail and Wins the National Slam Dunk Competition against all odds. The director, Timothy Chey, is the well-known faith-based film producer who has produced over 13 movies including the Showtime drama, “Freedom” (Cuba Gooding, Jr, William Sadler, Sharon Leal), “David and Goliath”, Sony Pictures’ “Slamma Jamma” (Michael Irvin, Jose Canseco), and ‘The Islands’ (Mira Sorvino, John Savage). On or about February 2016, Filmmaker expressed to Mr. Walia that he was very concerned about the budget during one casting session at CAZT in Los Angeles. The Director of Photography was an A-lister who had previously done “Jurassic Park’ and “Back t0 the Future’ and wanted more camera and lighting gear. Mr. Walia then told Filmmaker not t0 worry that he would cover any shortfall and invest another $200,000. He went on to tell Filmmaker it was one of the most exciting endeavors he did as he would also star in a leading role in the film besides producing. Filmmaker obliged by putting Mr. Walia’s entire family With speaking parts in the movie. Anyone in the movie industry knows such an act is priceless. Meryl Streep’s father paid $1 million t0 her agent to get her roles. Mr. Walia also demanded that his company, Ampax Brands, have a prominent banner in the most important finale scene in the film. -10- KOOONQUI-bUJN 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 The cost of this product placement in a high-profile film would normally g0 anywhere from $300,000 to $2 million. Filmmaker would only accept $300,000 minimum and even declined Nike’s bid for low-balling Filmmaker. So the value t0 the Walias’ priceless acting roles, producing education, and a $300,000 product placement for their company in the film amounted to over $1.2 million in direct value. o Putting the entire Walia family in roles in the feature film - $550,000 o Producing education - $250,000 o Product Placement for their company - $400,000 On 0r about February 2016, Mr. Walia sent Filmmaker a revised copy of the agreement. Unbeknownst t0 Filmmaker, Mr. Walia added his grandson t0 have speaking roles in multiple scenes and changed the Court’s venue t0 Santa Clara. Mr. Walia knew the Filmmaker was extremely busy with directing, producing, and writing chores and knew Filmmaker would be too busy to check these added revisions. The Filmmaker came through With flying colors, putting the entire Walia clan in the film: o Mr. Walia played the lead role of the pastor Who counsels and inspires the basketball star in the film o Mrs. Kulwinder Walia played the lead role 0f the defense attorney o Ammar Walia (their grandson) had two speaking roles With Michael Irvin of the Dallas Cowboys and Jose Canseco (legendary baseball player) o Harry Walia (stepson ofRay and Kay) had a speaking role To put an entire family in the film is unprecedented. But Filmmaker did it, and more, to -11- KOOONQUI-bUJN 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 fulfil the obligations of the Agreement - even When he knew he was being scammed by being forced to put the son and grandson in the film. On the last day of the shoot, Filmmaker raced after Mr. Walia during a break in shooting at Venice Beach. He told Mr. Walia that the $200,000 was due that day or the checks t0 the crew would bounce. Mr. Walia nodded his head and said he would take care 0f it and deposit the $200,000 that day. Mr. Walia did not. On 0r about March 2016, the cast and crew had a wrap-up dinner. Mr. Walia sat at the head 0f the table next to Filmmaker. Mr. Walia drank heavily after 6 pm. During this dinner, in front 0fmany guests, including Filmmaker’s Wife and Appiready, Nihar, and Pavan (from Hydrabad Talkies) who sat across from Filmmaker, Mr. Walia began t0 disparage the Filmmaker, the budget and ripped into him for having too many trucks on the set. Filmmaker then reminded Mr. Walia that the entire shoot went over budget and he had to cover the shortfall or there would be massive trouble. He also informed Mr. Walia that this emergency shortfall would be paid first. Mr. Walia assented after his outburst. Filmmaker learned t0 remain cool after directing over 11 movies at that point. He’s the only director to have directed Tom Sizemore twice. Mr. Walia then knew the contract had to be adjusted to accommodate the emergency cash in March 2016. Thus, for the Walias to know claim a breach of contract is moot. And also falls outside 0f the statute of limitations. On 0r about January 1, 2018, Mr. Ray Walia died 0f pancreatic cancer. -12- KOOONQUI-bUJN 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Filmmaker flew to Mr. Walia’s funeral t0 comfort Kay Walia and Harry Walia. He was very busy, but wanted t0 show his support. Filmmaker did everything he possibly could t0 befriend the Walias - Harry and Kay - after Mr. Walia’s death inviting them t0 spend Thanksgiving With his family Which they did. On 0r about February 6, 2018, Filmmakers sent all the investors checks and statements coming from Sony Pictures. They were all ‘First-Dollar’ with n0 costs removed. The signed agreement and addendum called for ‘investor/s’ t0 be paid back - not the Walias exclusively. If this were the case, no investors would have signed up and the Walias know this. Again, or about May 3 1 , 2018, Filmmakers sent all the investors checks and statements coming from Sony Pictures. They were all ‘First-Dollar’ With n0 costs removed. The signed agreement and addendum called for ‘investor/s’ to be paid back - not the Walias exclusively. Again, if this were the case, no investors would have signed up and the Walias know this. On 0r about September 29, 2018, Filmmakers sent all the investors checks and statements coming from Sony Pictures. They were all ‘First-Dollar’ With n0 costs removed. The signed agreement and addendum called for ‘investor/s’ t0 be paid back - not the Walias exclusively. Filmmaker sent out all statements and checks With copies from Sony Pictures.Mg was deducted of any costs. The Filmmaker did not even reimburse for his writer or director’s fee. Filmmaker did the film for the Lord, not for man. Filmmaker fulfilled the terms 0f the contract, including marketing t0 his best efforts. Again, a super-human feat against a film done for such a small budget. The average budget 0f a Hollywood film is $33 million. Filmmaker brought the film in at $900,000. -13- KOOONQUI-bUJN 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Still Filmmaker gets sued. The most audacious part 0f all is Plaintiff Walias acting like their investment was a loan. Nothing could be further from the truth. This malicious complaint also alleges that Mr. Chey owns 102 Hoolako Place in Honolulu, Hawaii. Yet, the most simplest check proves that wrong. It’s owned by a Canadian man. Defendant simply rents the house from him. The Plaintiff’ s lawyers then accuse the defendant 0f having shell companies Which is also not true. These sloppy and slanderous accusations should not be tolerated by this respected Court and Honorable Judge. II. ARGUMENT A. Standard for Demurrer Obj ection to a complaint Via demurrer is sustainable if “[t]he pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause 0f action.” Code CiV. Proc. § 4230. 10(6).4 A demurrer can be made to an entire complaint 0r individual causes of action therein. (S 430.50 (a).) A cause 0f action is subj ect t0 demurrer for failure t0 state a claim if the complaint discloses an affirmative defense 0n its face, and the plaintiff has not “pleaded around” that defense. See Gentry V. eBay, Inc., 99 Cal. App. 4th 816, 824-25 (2002) (citations omitted). “[A] trial court does not err in sustaining a demurrer Without leave to amend where the complaint discloses on its face that the action is barred by the statute of limitations.” Barton V. New United Motor Mfg, Inc., 43 Cal. App. 4th 2 1200, 1204 (1996) (citation omitted). 4 A11 further section references are to the California Code of Civil Procedure unless further noted. _ 14 _ KOOONQUI-bUJN 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 “Where written documents are the foundation 0f an action and are attached t0 the complaint and incorporated therein by reference, they become a part 0f the complaint and may be considered on demurrer.” Qualcomm, Inc. V. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 161 Cal. App. 4th 184, 191 (2008) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, “When a dispute arises over the meaning 0f contract language, the first question to be decided is Whether the language is ‘reasonably susceptible’ to the interpretation urged by the party. If it is not, the case is over.” S. Cal. Edison C0. V. Super. Ct., 37 Cal. App. 4th 839, 847-48 (1995) (citation omitted). ‘Under the doctrine 0f truthful pleading, the courts ‘Will not close their eyes t0 situations Where a complaint contains allegations 0f fact inconsistent With attached documents, 0r allegations contrary t0 facts that are judicially noticed.’ [Citation] ‘False allegations of fact, inconsistent With annexed documentary exhibits [citation] or contrary to facts judicially noticed [citation], may be disregarded...” 14 Trinity Park; L.P. V. City 0f Sunnyvale, 193 Cal. App. 4th 1014, 1027 (201 1). A. Walia Cannot Establish a Claim for Fraud The Elements 0f Fraud The elements 0f fraud are: (I) a false representation; (2) knowledge 0f the falsity; (3) intent to induce reliance; (4) justifiable reliance; and (5) damage. Cicone V. Urs Corp. (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 194,200. A "representation" upon Which fraud may be predicated must be a representation as t0 a presently existing 0r a past fact. Representations as t0 facts that may exist in the future are not a sufficient basis on Which to allege a claim for fraud. Richard P. v. Vista Del Mar Child Case Serv. (1980) 106 Cal. App. 3d 860,865, 165 Cal. Rptr. 370; Church ofMerciful Savior v. -15- KOOONQUI-bUJN 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Volunteers ASS ’11 ofAmerica, Inc. ( 1960) 184 Cal. App. 2d 851, 859, 8 Cal. Rptr. 48; Daniels v. Oldenburg( 1950) 100 Cal. App. 2d 724,727,224 P. 2d 472, 474. Justifiable reliance has two components--actual reliance, and circumstances that show it was reasonable for the Victim t0 accept the representation at face value Without an independent investigation. Wilhelm V. Pray, Price, Williams & Russell (I 986) 186 Ca1.App.3d 1324, 1331-1332. A plaintiff alleging fraud must also specially plead the "detriment proximately caused" by the defendants' tortious conduct. Civil C0de§ 3333. This requires factual allegations of both the injury 0r damage suffered and its causal connection with plaintiffs reliance on defendants' representations. Service By Medallion, Inc. V. Clorox C0. (I 996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1807, 1818. B. The Instant Complaint Fa_ils T0 Allege The Elements Of Fraud As T0 Filmmakers Plaintiff Complaint in this matter entirely fails t0 establish any of the elements of fraud against defendant Kay Walia. The Complaint does not allege any misrepresentation of fact, nor does the Complaint set forth any justifiable reliance 0n any such misrepresentation, nor does it allege any damages flowing from any misrepresentation. Plaintiff s fraud claim flows from the allegation that Defendant did not give Plaintiff ‘first dollar’ back. Yet nowhere in the Complaint does it state Defendants did not give first-dollar back t0 all the investors Which Defendant surely did. Nowhere does it state that Plaintiff actually sent the Walias three checks - all 0f Which came from Sony Pictures. This is not a false representation whatsoever. Especially in light 0f Plaintiff” s very own exhibit - Mr. Walia’s -16- \OOONQUI-RUJNH NNNNNNNNNHHHHr-nr-IHHHH WNQm-5WNHooooflQM-5WNHO addendum - that shows there were other investors involved and the investors (Hydrabad Talkies) actually 0n the contract. The fatal defect to the entire Complaint is this: The Walias are breaching their signed agreement with Hydrabad Talkies by filing this malicious and frivolous complaint. Hydrabad Talkies also received all three checks that came from Sony Pictures with the exact statements from Sony Pictures (See Exhibit A). The truth is the Walias were paid first dollar back but were unhappy that Sony Pictures didn’t sell the film well. So they took out their unjustified anger 0n the filmmaker by suing him. They’re spoiled rich children who wanted t0 be movie stars and when the fun was over demanded their money back like it’s a loan. It’s that simple for the Court to see through this fog. B. Walia Cannot Establish a Claim for Breach 0f Contract The Complaint fails to state a claim for breach 0f contract at all. A pleading must allege facts and not conclusions. Material facts must be alleged directly. The essential facts 0n Which a determination 0f the controversy depends should be stated with clearness and precision so that nothing is left to surmise. Recitals, references to, 0r allegations 0f material facts which are left t0 surmise are subject t0 special demurrer for uncertainty. Ankeny v. Lockheed Missiles and Space Ca, 88 Cal. App. 3d 531 (lst Dist. 1979). The omission 0f a material allegation cannot be supplied by an inference from other factual allegations. Such inferential 0r argumentative pleading 0f necessary elements 0f a cause 0f action is not allowed. 4 Witkin, California Procedure (4th ed.), Pleading § 354. Essential facts also cannot be left to an inference t0 be -17- \OOONQUI-RUJNp-a NNNNNNNNNHHHHr-nr-IHHHH WNQm-5WNHooooflQM-5WNHO drawn from the construction 0f 0r recitals in a document attached t0 or incorporated into the complaint. Lester v. Isaac, 63 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 851 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1944)] In this case, the Complaint does not specify What terms were breached. Complaint p. 11, 1145-47. The Complaint only says Filmmaker did not give them ‘first-dollar’ back. Complaint p. 4, 1114. Yet, the Complaint fails t0 state how ‘first-dollar’ was breached when Defendants already paid the Walias three ‘first-dollar’ checks from Sony Pictures. ‘First-dollar’ in film terms simply means n0 costs were subtracted. This is the exact industry standard. Further, the Walias are breaching the contract against Appiready, the other co-signer. The Complaint also completely fails to state what term of ‘First-Dollar’ even means t0 them (See Complaint, Exhibits A and B) So here’s the precise synopsis for the Court: The Walias are angry they the film didn’t sell well so they want 100% 0f the other investor’s share, too. While the Complaint alleges Filmmaker did not give the Walias their first-dollar share (Complaint p. 6, 1121), there is no allegation as to What their version of ‘first-dollar’ is and how they would get around not paying their partner Hydrabad Talkies owned by Pavan, Appiready, and Nihar - also from India. Filmmaker paid Hydrabad Talkies and all investors 100% first-dollar back With n0 subtractions for costs or fees. Mr. Walia knew this was the case as again he signed this very agreement with Hydrabad Talkies. He knew there were other investors who all wanted shared -18- KOOONQUI-bUJN 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 first-dollar back - especially the P&A later investors. Otherwise, there would not have been any advertising money to release the film. C. Walia Cannot Establish a Claim for Breach 0f Covenant 0f Good Faith Where the facts alleged in support 0f one cause 0f action are duplicative of the facts alleged in support 0f another cause 0f action, such allegations are insufficient 0f support a separate cause 0f action. Award Metals, Inc. V. Superior Court (1991) 228 Cal.App.3dI 128, 1 135, 279 Cal.Rptr. 459. In the instant case, the claim for breach 0f the covenant 0f good faith and fair dealing arises from the same core set of facts, whatever the specifics 0f those facts may be, as the claim for breach 0f contract. This is forcefully apparent in this case Where Plaintiff does not even assert separate elements 0f this cause 0f action. Instead, Plaintiff simply incorporates every prior allegation and makes a general assertion that she has she has suffered damages. This allegation is impossibly vague, and demurrer should.be sustained on this ground alone. Further, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is implied in every contract, and "requires that neither party do anything Which Will deprive the other 0f the benefits 0f the agreement." Gibson V. GOV Employees Ins. Co., 162 CaLApp.3d 441, 445 (1984). "The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not extend beyond terms of the contract at issue." Poway Royal Mobilehome Owners Ass'n V. City 0f Poway, 149 Ca1.App.4th 1460, 1477 (2007) (citing New Plumbing Conlraclors, Inc. V. Nationwide Mutual Ins. C0., 7 Cal. App. 4th 1088, 1096 (1992)); see also Gibson, 162 Cal.App.3d at 446. "Because contracts differ, the nature and -19- \OOONQUI-RUJNp-a NNNNNNNNNHHHHr-nr-IHHHH WNQm-5WNHooooflQM-5WNHO extent of the duties owed under the implied covenant are also variable and 'Will depend on the contractual purposes.” Love V. Fire Ins. Exch., 221 Cal.App.3d 1136, 1147 (1990) (quoting Egan V. Mutual ofOmaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 818 (1979)). Conduct authorized by a written agreement cannot give rise to a claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Carma Developers (Cal.), Inc. V. Marathon Development Caiifornia, Inc., 2 Ca1.4th 342, 373 (i992). "It is universally recognized the scope 0f conduct prohibited by the covenant of good faith is circumscribed by the purposes and express terms of the contract." Id. The covenant "cannot impose substantive duties or limits on the contracting parties beyond those incorporated in the specific terms of their agreement." Guz V. Bechtel Nat‘l, Inc., 24 Ca1.4th 317, 349-50 (2000). Here, the Walias seek to have the Filmmaker breach his agreements with all his investors, including their very own co-signers, and have the audacity t0 claim Filmmaker breached the covenant of good faith? It’s reverse. D. Walia Cannot Establish a Claim for Anticipatory Breach Although California recognizes the cause of action for anticipatory breach 0f contract, an essential element 0f anticipatory breach is that the promisor expressly 0r implicitly repudiate the promise before the promisor‘s performance is due (Taylor v. Johnston (1975) 15 Cal. 3d 130, 137.) Stated another way, the doctrine of anticipatory breach by repudiation does not apply to contracts that are unilateral in their inception 0r that have become s0 by complete performance by oneparty. (Diamond v. University ofSo. California (1970) 11 Cal. App. 3d 49, 53-54.) -20- \OOONQUI-RUJNr-d NNNNNNNNNHHHHr-nr-IHHHH WNQm-5WNHooooflQM-5WNHO In the instant case, Filmmakers had already fully performed under the film’s investment agreement. In the Addendum again - signed by Mr. Walia himself - it states ‘investor/s’ which fully means more than iust Mr. Walia. Mr. Walia knew this. He couldn’t possibly believe he would take precedence over his very own co-signer. Under California law, Filmmaker’s action does not constitute an anticipatory breach. Pursuant t0 the terms described by complaint. Filmmaker paid off every single investor first- dollar. As such, Filmmaker had fully performed his contractual duties under the investment agreement rendering this purported cause of action to be unsustainable. Based upon the above, this Court should sustain Filmmaker's demurrer to the fourth cause of action for “anticipatory breach of contract” without leave to amend as Filmmaker had already fully performed and this cause of action is simply not available for Plaintiff. E. Walia Cannot Establish a Claim for Unjust Enrichment Walia purportedly alleges a cause of action for unjust enrichment. Recent case law, however, has expressly held that unjust enrichment is not a cause of action in the state of California. In Melchior v. New Line Productions, Inc. (2003) 106 Ca1.App.4th 779, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's ruling and held that unjust enrichment is not an independent cause of action: In addition, as the trial court observed, there is no cause of action in California for unjust enrichment. “The phrase ‘Unjust Enrichment’ does not describe a theory 0f recovery, but an effect: the result 0f a failure to make restitution under circumstances Where it is equitable t0 d0 so.” (Lauriedale Associates, Ltd. v. Wilson (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1439, 1448 [9 Cal. Rptr. 2d -21- \OOONQUI-RUJNp-a NNNNNNNNNHHHHr-nr-IHHHH WNQm-5WNHooooflQM-5WNHO 774].) Unjust enrichment is “ ‘a general principle, underlying various legal doctrines and remedies,’ ” rather than a remedy itself. (Dinosaur Development, Inc. v. White (1989) 216 Cal. App. 3d 1310, 1315 [265 Cal. Rptr. 525].) It is synonymous With restitution. (Melchior v. New Line Productions, Inc. (2003) 106 Cal. App. 4th 779, 794.) Further, in Jogani v. Superior Court (2008) 165 Ca1.App.4th 901, the court confirmed that unjust enrichment is not a cause of action in California: As Jogani concedes, however, unjust enrichment is not a cause 0f action. (Melchior v. New Line Productions, Inc. (2003) 106 Ca1.App.4th 779, 793 [131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 347].) Rather, it is a general principle underlying various doctrines and remedies, including quasi-contract. (Jogani v. Superior Court (2008), 165 Cal. App. 4th 901, 91 1.) Thus, as Walia’s purported fifth cause 0f action is not an independent cause 0f action in California, Filmmaker respectfully requests that this Court sustain its Demurrer without leave t0 amend. F. Walia Cannot Establish a Claim for Declaratory Relief A cause 0f action for declaratory relief is designed in large part as a practical means 0f resolving controversies, so that parties can conform their conduct t0 the law and prevent future litigation. (Meyer v. Sprint Spectrum L.P., (2009) 45 Cal. 4th 634, 648.) When discussing the issue of the court's discretion in refusing to grant declaratory relief, the California Supreme Court has held refusal is limited to cases where a declaration of rights and obligations would be unnecessary or improper at the time under all of the circumstances. (Kessloflv. Pearson (1951) 37 Cal.2d 609, 613; see also Columbia Pictures Corp. v. DeToth, -22- \OOONQUI-RUJNp-a NNNNNNNNNHHHHr-nr-IHHHH WNQm-5WNHooooflQM-5WNHO (1945) 26 Cal.2d 753, 762 (declaratory reliefmust be granted When the facts justifying that course are sufficiently alleged.) A complaint for declaratory reliefmust demonstrate: (1) a proper subject of declaratory relief, and (2) an actual controversy involving justiciable questions relating to the rights or obligations of a party. (See City ofTiburon v. Northwestern Pac. R.R. C0. (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 1 60, 1 70.) Where the allegations of the complaint reveal the controversy t0 be conj ectural, anticipated to occur in the future, or an attempt to obtain an advisory opinion from the court, the fundamental basis of declaratory relief is lacking. (See, e.g., Merkley v. Merkley (1939) 12 Cal.2d 543, 547; Silva v. City & County ofSan Francisco (1948) 87 Ca1.App.2d 784, 789; Deming v. Communist Party (1944) 64 Cal.App.2d 35, 38.) This is the exact scenario before the Court again: The Filmmaker has already given all the checks owed from Sony Pictures and Plaintiff’ s arguments have already been proven t0 be completely lacking as to what constitutes the return 0n the investment - not a loan. Again, Sony Pictures is solely responsible for the lack of sales. G. Walia Cannot Establish a Claim for a Preliminary Injunction “In deciding whether t0 issue a preliminary injunction, a trial court must evaluate two interrelated factors: (i) the likelihood that the party seeking the injunction Will ultimately prevail on the merits and (ii) the balance 0fharm presented.” (Law School Admission Council, Inc. v. State ofCaliform'a (2014) 222 Ca1.App.4th 1265, 1280.) “[A] trial court may not grant a preliminary injunction, regardless of the balance of interim harm, unless there is some -23- \OOONQUI-RUJNp-a NNNNNNNNNHHHHr-nr-IHHHH WNQm-5WNHooooflQM-5WNHO possibility that the plaintiff would ultimately prevail on the merits.” (Ibid) When a movant‘s “likelihood of prevailing is uncertain,” its “showing 0n the interim-harm factor must be strong.” (Id. at p. 1297.) It’s very clear that the harm the Walias would cause would be catastrophic to the other investors - investors who are nurses, school teachers, doctors, small business owners. For the Walias to think they are somehow entitled to any incoming Sony funds and leave the other investors out in the cold smacks of a demand s0 thoughtless and unkind, Plaintiff has never encountered this behavior before. Especially as the Walias are collectively worth more than $150 million by estimate 0f their ownership in 400 fast-food restaurants. H. Walia Is Not Entitled t0 An Accounting Where She Has Not Set Forth Any Valid Claim and Cannot Establish Her Damages Plaintiff‘s request for an accounting is also impossibly vague. Plaintiff simply asserts, without support, that she does not and cannot know how much money she is owed by defendant. This is little more than an admission that she has not been damaged at all. In any event, as set forth above, Plaintiff has not asserted any valid cause of action, and further she does not stale under which causes 0f action she believes she is entitled t0 unknown 0r unknowable damages. Nor does she state why the amount 0f her alleged damages cannot be determined as a matter 0f law. Such a vague and unfounded cause of action cannot stand, and demurrer should be sustained as to this claim. -24- \OOONQUI-RUJNr-d NNNNNNNNNHHHHr-nr-IHHHH WNQm-5WNHooooflQM-5WNHO B. Plaintiff Walia’s Breach 0f Contract, Fraud, Breach 0f Good Faith Are Time-Barred by Statutes 0f Limitations Walia’s claims for Breach 0f Contract, Fraud, Breach of Covenant Good Faith are all time barred and are thus insufficient to constitute valid causes 0f action. 1. Walia’s Breach 0f Contract Cause of Action Has Expired An action 0n a written contract must be brought within four years 0f its accrual. Code 0f Civ. Proc. § 337 (1). A breach 0f contract claim” accrues when the plaintiff discovers, 0r could have discovered through reasonable diligence, the injury and its cause.” Angeles Chem. Co. V. Spencer & Jones, 44 Cal. App. 4th 112, 119 (1996) (citing April Enterprises, Inc. V. KTTV(1983) 147 Ca1.App.3d 805, 826-833). In Gutierrez v. Mofid (1985) 39 Cal.3d 892, 897, the court stated that “the uniform California rule is that a limitations period dependent on discovery 0f the cause of action begins t0 run n0 later than the time the plaintiff learns, 0r should have learned, the facts essential t0 his claim”. Under the discovery rule, suspicion of one or more of the elements of a cause 0f action, coupled with knowledge of any remaining elements, will generally trigger the statute of limitations period. (Norgart, supra, 21 Ca1.4th at 398, fn. 3,; Jolly, supra, 44 Cal.3d at 1112.) As noted in the Complaint, the addendum that Mr. Walia sent to Filmmaker was of Mr. Walia’s own hand. (Complaint at fl] 34, 39.) As Mr. Walia drew up the addendum himself, Walia, through reasonable diligence, should have demanded that 100% of all ‘first-dollar’ go to him before Appiready (also an investor on the addendum) in February 2016. 5 Walia admits he changed the addendum in his very own email (see Exhibit B). Walia’ s breach of contract cause -25- KOOONQUI-bUJN 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 0f action, therefore, expired on February 19, 2020. Consequently, Walia’ s Breach of Contract cause of action is time-barred and thus insufficient to constitute a valid cause of action. 2. Walia’s Breach 0f the Convenant 0f Good Faith Cause 0f Action Has Expired Defendant demurs t0 the Third Cause 0f Action 0n grounds Plaintiff did not timely file her Complaint and the time by Which she must d0 so has passed. A claim for breach 0f the covenant 0f good faith and fair dealing premised upon an allegedly wrongful contract must be brought Within three years 0f any such breach occurring. Eisenberg v. Insurance C0. ofNorth America, 815 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1987) [construing Code CiV. Proc. § 339(1)]. In addition, where the underlying contract claim is time-barred, any cause of action for breach of implied covenant claim is similarly time- barred. See Smith v. City and County ofSan Francisco, 225 Ca1.App.3d 38, 49 (1990). Because Plaintiff failed to file her Complaint in this action within the two-year limitations period applicable t0 a claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, that Claim is time- barred. As with Walia’s breach 0f contract cause of action, Walia should have known all alleged wrongful conduct shortly after he signed the agreement in February 2016. Indeed, Walia admits that it had actually discovered the alleged damages (which was March 2016) when Walia confronted the Filmmaker at the wrap-up dinner party in March 2016. Assuming Walia’s negligence cause 0f action accrued When Mr. Walia invested in the film, the statute 0f limitations expired March 2019. 5 No investor would have allowed Mr. Walia to get 100% of his investment back before them. -26- KOOONQUI-bUJN 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 II. All 0f Walia’s Causes of Action Fail Because They Improperly Relies 0n an Unreasonable Interpretation 0f the Contract If a “contract is not reasonably susceptible to the meaning alleged in the complaint, it is proper t0 sustain a demurrer Without leave to amend.” See George V. Auto. Club of S. Cal., Case N0. B229287, 2011 WL 6144927, at *10 (Cal. App. Dec. 12, 201 1). There is n0 doubt that Walia knew there were other investors as his own addendum he personally drew up (See Exhibit A) has other investors listed. Further, there is no provision in any 0f the contracts or addendums that says ‘first-dollar’ only applies t0 the Walias. Thus, Walia’s lawsuit is a post-hoc attempt to unreasonably infer that the Walias would get funds before any investor. Their demand that they get their full money back for a film that is out 0f the control 0f Filmmaker is full proof that they improperly rely on an unreasonable interpretation 0f the contract. The Filmmaker reminds the Court he has never been sued by an investor his past 9m Until the Walias sued him. Because none 0f the contracts here are reasonably susceptible to the meaning alleged in the Complaint, (i.e., no film director can guarantee his movie will make money), the Court should sustain the Filmmaker’s demurrer as t0 Walia’s entire cause 0f action IV. THE COURT SHOULD SUSTAIN THIS DEMURRER WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND BECAUSE IT IS CLEAR FROM THE AGREEMENTS THAT THE DEFENDANTS ARE NOT LIABLE TO PLAINTIFF -27- \OOONQUI-RUJNp-a NNNNNNNNNHHHHr-nr-IHHHH WNQm-5WNHooooflQM-5WNHO Plaintiff cannot cure the fatal defect in her complaint simply by omitting any reference to the signed Addendum in a subsequent pleading. Because plaintiff has already alleged the existence 0f the Addendum in her complaint, and indeed attached it as an exhibit to her complaint, she is now bound by its terms for all purposes in this litigation. (Valeria v. Andrew Youngquist Corp. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1271.) The Addendum Agreement, as noted above, establishes the dispositive defenses in favor 0f Defendant filmmakers. Filmmaker paid Plaintiffs everythng their owed. “A trial court does not abuse its discretion when it sustains a demurrer Without leave t0 amend if . .. the facts and the nature of the claims are clear and no liability exists.” (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 857, 890.) The Court should therefore sustain this demurrer to plaintiffs first amended complaint without leave t0 amend. Plaintiff has alleged that all 0f her causes 0f action against the Defendants are from the Addendum and Agreement that Mr. Walia signed and that is a fatal defect that cannot be cured by amendment. III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Defendants respectfully request that the Court sustain their demurrer t0 plaintiff s complaint, without leave to amend. Dated: May 19, 2020 /anafé¥.C3ég¢ V V Timothy Chey Attorney at Law -28- KOOONQUI-bUJN 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Timothy Chey, Esq. (in pro per) Attorney at Law (State Bar N0. 172096) 1420 Victoria Street Suite 804 Honolulu, HI 96822 Telephone: 424 244 3043 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA Case N0: 20CV364701 Kulwinder Walia DECLARATION OF TIM CHEY Plaintiff IN SUPPORT OF DEMURRER AND DEMURRER TO vs. PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT; Pursuant t0 CCP § 430.10 Timothy Chey, Fallen State Productions, RiverRain Productions, No Motion Date Available per Court’s Instructions due to Covid- Defendants 19 DECLARATION OF TIMOTHY CHEY 1) I am the faith-based producer/director 0f 12 feature films. 2) I am the writer/director 0f ‘Slamma Jamma’ (starring Michael Irvin 0f the Dallas Cowboys) about a man Who finds Christ in prison and Wins the national slam dunk competition against all odds. The film was released in 502 theaters last year. -29- KOOONQUI-bUJN 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8) 9) I state, under penalty of perjury, that Mr. Ray Walia told me outside of the casting studio at 916 Formosa Avenue, Los Angeles, CA 90046, that he would personally cover any shortfalls 0n the budget of ‘Slamma Jamma’. Mr. Walia was feeling good after seeing how well the casting went and thousands of actors submitted to be in the film. Again, I testify under the penalty of perjury, that Mr. Walia guaranteed any budget shortfall 0f ‘Slamma Jamma’ and did not. Again, he did not cover the budget shortfall. We were over-budget by over $200,000 and I had to cover this out ofmy own pocket. So Mr. Walia’s breach caused me over $275,000 in damages. This was horrific and caused bounced checks to the crew. I solely took the brunt 0f Mr. Walia’s reneging on his word. I delivered every statement and check from Sony Pictures and did not subtract any costs 0r writer 0r director’s fee. Everything went back t0 the investors as ‘first-dollar’. Period. On 0r about November 2019, I sued Sony Pictures for dumping our film when they sold their division and leaving our film stranded. 10) The Walias should sue Sony Pictures - not me. I had nothing t0 do With their lack 0f sales for the film. 11)I state, under the penalty 0f perjury, that I d0 not own 102 Hoolako Place, Honolulu, Hawaii that the Complaint falsely stated I d0. The house is owned by a Canadian Who I am renting it for. It was a production house for the crew of ‘The Islands’ Which we released into theaters on December 6, 2019. 12)I state, under the penalty 0f perjury, that I d0 not have any shell companies that the Complaint falsely stated I d0. Each movie has it’s own company as is normal for every Hollywood film. 13)I am also the writer/director of ‘The Islands” (starring Mira Sorvino and John Savage) based on the true story 0f an island Chiefess who finds Christ and ends human sacrificing 200 years ago. The film hits theaters nationwide in November 2018. -30- KOOONQUI-bUJN 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 14) The Honorable Court should not tolerate these Vicious bullying tactics by the Plaintiffs. Let not the Court forget the very reason for this entire lawsuit: Plaintiffs methodically, falsely, and maliciously attempt to portray they gave a loan rather than an investment and neglect to mention how I single-handedly got Sony Pictures to distribute the film worldwide. 15) The Honorable Court must stop this abuse. 16) I’m asking the Court t0 sanction Plaintiff’ s and their attorneys for $1,000,000 (one million) for wasting the Court’s time and my precious time. 17) This is Why I stopped practicing corporate law. And devoted myself t0 making the world a better place through films. 18) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed 0n May 19, 2020, at Los Angeles, California 7M 1 imothy Chey, declarant -31- \OOONQUI#UJNr-d NNNNNNNNNHHHHr-nr-IHHHH WNQUl-bLNNF-‘OOOOQQM-bWNHO PROOF OF SERVICE KAY WALIA v. TIMOTHY CHEY, et a1. Santa Clara Superior Court Case No. 20CV364701 STATE OF CALIFORNIA ) s.s. COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA) I am employed in the County 0f Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age 0f 18 and not a party to the within action On May 21, 2020, I served the foregoing document DEFENDANT’S NOTICE OF DEMURRER AND DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT; MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 0n the interested parties in this action by placing the true copies thereof enclosed as listed below: William.Abramovitz@bakermckenzie.com Mark.Goodman@bakermckenzie.com [XX]ELECTRONIC: By E-Mail or Electronic Transmission. I caused the documents to besent to the persons at the e-mail addresses listed on the attached Service List. .I did not receive, Within a reasonable time after the transmission, an electronic message 0r other indication that the transmission was unsuccessful. [XX](STATE): I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State 0f California thatthe foregoing is true and correct. Executed on May 21, 2020 at Los Angeles, California. -32-