NoticeCal. Super. - 6th Dist.February 7, 202010 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 200V363241 Santa Clara - Civil SEYFARTH SHAW LLP Jonathan L. Brophy (SBN 245223) E-mail: jbrophy@seyfarth.com Michael Afar (SBN 298990) E-mail: mafar@seyfarth.com 2029 Century Park East, Suite 3500 Los Angeles, California 90067-3021 Telephone: (3 10) 277-7200 Facsimile: (3 10) 201-5219 Attorneys for Defendants CHASE DENNIS EMERGENCY MEDICAL GROUP, INC. & TEAM HEALTH HOLDINGS, INC. Y. Ch Electronically Filed by Superior Court of CA, County of Santa Clara, on 4/1/2020 12:19 PM Reviewed By: Y. Chavez Case #20CV363241 Envelope: 4220299 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA JULIE SAMORA, individually and 0n behalf 0f others similarly situated and aggrieved, Plaintiff, V. CHASE DENNIS EMERGENCY MEDICAL GROUP, INC, a California corporation; TEAM HEALTH HOLDINGS, INC., a Delaware corporation; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Defendants. Case No. 20CV363241 NOTICE TO CLERK OF THE SUPERIOR COURT AND TO PLAINTIFF OF REMOVAL OF CIVIL ACTION TO THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT Complaint Filed: February 7, 2020 NOTICE TO CLERK OF THE SUPERIOR COURT AND TO PLAINTIFF OF REMOVAL OF CIVIL ACTION TO THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 62945694v.1 aveZ 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 TO THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT AND TO PLAINTIFF AND HER ATTORNEYS OF RECORD: PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on March 23, 2020, Defendant Team Health Holdings, Inc. (“Defendant”), filed a Notice 0fRemoval with the Clerk 0f the United States District Court for the Northern District of California removing this action to that Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1446, and 1453. A true and correct copy 0f that Notice 0f Removal without exhibits is attached hereto as Exhibit A. PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446, the filing 0f the Notice 0fRemoval in the United States District Court effectuates the removal 0f this action. Accordingly, no further proceedings should take place in this Court unless and until the case has been remanded. DATED: April 1, 2020 Respectfully submitted, SEYFARTH SHAW LLP By: /s/ Michael Afar Jonathan L. Brophy Michael Afar Attorneys for Defendant TEAM HEALTH HOLDINGS, INC. 1 NOTICE TO CLERK OF THE SUPERIOR COURT AND TO PLAINTIFF OF REMOVAL OF CIVIL ACTION TO THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 62945694v.1 EXHIBIT A \OOOQQ 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Case 5:20-cv-02027-NC Document 1 Filed 03/23/20 Page 1 of 19 Seyfarth Shaw LLP Jonathan L. Brophy (SBN 245223) E-mail: jbrophy@seyfarth.com Michael Afar (SBN 298990) E-mail: mafar@seyfarth.com 2029 Century Park East, Suite 3500 Los Angeles, California 90067-3021 Telephone: (310) 277-7200 Facsimile: (3 1 0) 20 1 -52 1 9 BASS, BERRY & SIMS PLC Timothy B. McConnell (pro hac vice forthcoming) Email: timothy.mcconnell@bassberry.com Ginette R. Brown (SBN 2741 1 1) Email: ginette.brown@bassberry.com 1700 Riverview Tower 900 S. Gay Street Knoxville, TN 37902 Telephone: (865) 521-2031 Facsimile: (866) 572-7631 Attorneys for Defendants CHASE DENNIS EMERGENCY MEDICAL GROUP, INC. & TEAM HEALTH HOLDINGS, INC. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA JULIE SAMORA, individually and 0n behalf of others similarly situated and aggrieved, Plaintiff, V. CHASE DENNIS EMERGENCY MEDICAL GROUP, INC., a California corporation; TEAM HEALTH HOLDINGS, INC., a Delaware corporation; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Defendants. Case No. DEFENDANT TEAM HEALTH HOLDINGS, INC.’S NOTICE OF REMOVAL OF CIVIL ACTION TO THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1446, 1453 [Santa Clara County Superior Court; Case N0. 20CV363241] [Filed concurrently With Civil Case Cover Sheet; Certification 0f Interested Parties; Declaration of John Stair; and Corporate Disclosure Statement] Complaint Filed: February 7, 2020 DEFENDANT TEAM HEALTH’S NOTICE OF REMOVAL 62737423v.2 \OOOQON 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Case 5:20-cv-02027-NC Document 1 Filed 03/23/20 Page 2 of 19 TO THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA AND TO PLAINTIFF JULIE SAMORA AND HER COUNSEL OF RECORD: PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Defendant Team Health Holdings, Inc. (“Team Health”) files this Notice of Removal, pursuant t0 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(0), 1332(d)(2), 1441(a), 1446, and 1453, t0 effectuate the removal of the above-captioned action, Which was originally commenced in the Superior Court of the State 0f California in and for the County of Santa Clara, to the United States District Court for the Northern District 0f California. This Court has original jurisdiction over the action pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act 0f 2005 (“CAFA”) for the following reasons: I. BACKGROUND 1. On February 7, 2020 Plaintiff Julie Samora filed a class action complaint in the Superior Court 0f California for the County of Santa Clara titled Julie Samara, an individual, and 0n behalfof others similarly situated v. Chase Dennis Emergency Medical Group, Ina, a California corporation; Team Health Holdings, Ina, a Delaware corporation; andDOES I through 50, inclusive, Case No. 20CV363241 (the “C0mplaint”). A true and correct copy 0f the Complaint is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 2. Team Health was served With the Summons and Complaint and accompanying documents on February 20, 2020. True and correct copies of the (1) Service 0f Process Notice; (2) Summons; (3) Civil Case Cover Sheet; and (4) Certificate of Assignment is attached hereto as Exhibit B. 3. Team Health has not filed any other pleadings or papers in this action prior t0 this Notice 0f Removal. 4. The exhibits listed above constitute all prior pleadings, process, and orders filed with the court in this matter. II. TIMELINESS OF REMOVAL 5. The time for filing a Notice ofRemoval does not run until a party has been formally served With the summons and complaint under the applicable state law “setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action 0r proceeding is based” or, if the case stated by the initial pleading is not DEFENDANT TEAM HEALTH’S NOTICE OF REMOVAL 62737423v.2 \OOOQON 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Case 5:20-cv-02027-NC Document 1 Filed 03/23/20 Page 3 of 19 removable, after receipt of any “other paper from Which it may be first ascertained that the case is one Which is 0r has become removable.” 28 U.S.C. §§ 1446; Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 347-48 (1999) (holding that “a named Defendants’ time t0 remove is triggered by simultaneous service of the summons and complaint”). 6. The service 0f process Which triggers the 30-day period t0 remove is governed by state law. City ofClarksdale v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 428 F.3d 206, 210 (5th Cir. 2005) (“Although federal law requires the defendant to file a removal motion Within thirty days of service, the term ‘service of process’ is defined by state law”). 7. The 30-day time limit t0 remove was triggered by Plaintiff’ s service 0f the Summons and Complaint 0n February 20, 2020. See Murphy Bros, Inc. v. Michetz‘i Pipe Stringing, Ina, 526 U.S. 344, 347-48 (1999) (holding that “a named defendant’s time t0 remove is triggered by simultaneous service 0f the summons and complaint”). 8. This Notice ofRemoval is timely because it is filed Within thirty (30) days 0f service 0f the Complaint, by personal service on the agents for service 0f process for Defendants, on February 20, 2020. Cal. Code CiV. Proc. § 415. 10 (“A summons may be served by personal delivery 0f a copy of the summons and 0f the complaint t0 the person to be served. Service 0f a summons in this manner is deemed complete at the time of such delivery”); 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).1 III. CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT (“CAFA”) REMOVAL 9. This Court has original jurisdiction of this action under CAFA, codified in pertinent part at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). As set forth below, this action is properly removable, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), in that this Court has original jurisdiction over the action, because the aggregate amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000 exclusive 0f interest and costs, and the action is a class action in Which at least one class member is a citizen 0f a state different from that 0f a Defendant. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(2) & (d)(6). Furthermore, the number of putative class members is greater than 100. 1/ 30 days after February 20, 2020 is Saturday, March 21, 2020. However, “if the last day is a Saturday, Sunday, 0r legal holiday, the period continues t0 run until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, 0r legal holiday.” See Fed. R. CiV. P. 6(a)(1)(C). Thus, Team Health’s last day to file this Notice 0f Removal is Monday, March 23, 2020. 2 DEFENDANT TEAM HEALTH’S NOTICE OF REMOVAL 62737423v.2 \OOOQON 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Case 5:20-cv-02027-NC Document 1 Filed 03/23/20 Page 4 of 19 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(5)(B); see Declaration of John Stair in Support of Defendant’s Notice ofRemoval (“Stair Decl.”), 1] 9. A. Plaintiff And Defendant Are Minimally Diverse 10. CAFA requires only minimal diversity for the purpose 0f establishing federal jurisdiction; that is, at least one purported class member must be a citizen 0f a state different from any named defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A). In the instant case, Plaintiff is a citizen 0f a state (California) that is different from the state of citizenship of the Defendant Team Health (Delaware and Tennessee). 1. Plaintiff Is A Citizen Of California 11. For purposes 0f determining diversity, a person is a “citizen” 0f the state in Which he or she is domiciled. Kantor v. Wellesley Galleries, Ina, 704 F.2d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 1983) (“T0 show state citizenship for diversity purposes under federal common law a party must . . . be domiciled in the state.”). Residence is primafacie evidence of domicile. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. C0. v. Dyer, 19 F.3d 514, 520 (10th Cir. 1994) (“the place 0f residence is prima facie the domicile”); see also Zavala v. Deutsche Bank Trust C0. Americas, N0. C 13-1040 LB, 2013 WL 3474760, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 10, 2013) (Where a plaintiff s complaint alleges he resides in California, “in the absence of evidence to the contrary, [plaintiff] is a California citizen for diversity purposes”). Citizenship is determined by the individual’s domicile at the time that the lawsuit is filed. Armstrong v. Church ofScientology Int’l, 243 F.3d 546, 546 (9th Cir. 2000) (“For purposes of diversity jurisdiction, an individual is a citizen of his 0r her state of domicile, Which is determined at the time the lawsuit is filed”) (citing Lew v. Moss, 797 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1986)). 12. In her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the “at all relevant times, Plaintiff was and is a resident of the State 0f California.” (EX. A, Compl. 1] 2.) Plaintiff was also domiciled in California while she worked at Valley Health Center Downtown & East Valley Urgent Care located in San Jose, California. (Stair Decl., 11 13.) 13. Plaintiff s intent t0 remain domiciled in California is evident from the fact that she lives and has lived in California, worked in California, and brought her lawsuit against Defendants in Santa DEFENDANT TEAM HEALTH’S NOTICE OF REMOVAL 62737423v.2 \OOOQON 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Case 5:20-cv-02027-NC Document 1 Filed 03/23/20 Page 5 of 19 Clara Superior Court. Therefore, Plaintiff was at all relevant times, and still is, a citizen and resident 0f the State 0f California. 2. Defendant Team Health Is Not A Citizen Of California 14. Defendant Team Health is, and was at the time of the filing of this action, a citizen of a state other than California Within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). For purposes 0f diversity jurisdiction, a corporation is deemed a citizen 0f the state “by which it has been incorporated” and of the state “Where it has its principal place ofbusiness.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). 15. Team Health is now, and ever since this action commenced has been, incorporated under the laws of the State of Delaware, with its principal place 0f business in Knoxville, Tennessee. (Stair Decl., 1] 5.) Thus, for purposes 0f diversity jurisdiction, Defendant is a citizen of Delaware. 16. Further, as shown below, Defendant Team Health’s principal place of business is, and has been at all times since this action commenced, located in the State of Tennessee. (Stair Decl., 1H] 5-6.) Thus, for purposes 0f diversity jurisdiction, Defendant is also a citizen of Tennessee. 17. The United States Supreme Court held that when determining a corporation’s principal place of business for diversity purposes, the appropriate test is the “nerve center” test. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 80-81, 92-93 (2010). Under the “nerve center” test, the principal place 0f business is the state Where the “corporation’s officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation’s activities” and where the corporation maintains its headquarters. Id. Other relevant factors include Where corporate executives maintain their offices, Where corporate policies and procedures are made, and Where primary corporate functions are based. See H0 v. Ikon Office Solutions, Ina, 143 F. Supp. 2d 1163, 1168 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (nerve center found to be location where corporation’s headquarters were located, where the corporate officers worked, and from where corporate policies and procedures were made). 18. Under the “nerve center” test, Tennessee emerges as Team Health’s principal place 0f business. Knoxville, Tennessee is the site 0f Team Health’s corporate headquarters and executive offices, Where its high level officers direct, control, and coordinate Team Health’s activities. (Stair Decl., 1] 6.) Furthermore, many of Team Health’s executive and administrative functions, including 4 DEFENDANT TEAM HEALTH’S NOTICE OF REMOVAL 62737423v.2 \OOOQON 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Case 5:20-cv-02027-NC Document 1 Filed 03/23/20 Page 6 of 19 corporate financing and accounting, are directed from Knoxville, Tennessee. (Stair Decl., 11 7.) Accordingly, Team Health’s principal place 0f business is Knoxville, Tennessee under the “nerve center” test. See Hertz Corp, 559 U.S. at 92. 19. Therefore, for diversity of citizenship purposes, Team Health is, and has been at all times since this action commenced, a citizen of the States of Delaware and Tennessee. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). 20. Because Plaintiff is a citizen 0f California and Defendant Team Health is a citizen of Delaware and Tennessee, minimal diversity exists for purposes 0f CAFA. 21. Doe Defendants. The presence 0fDoe defendants in this case has no bearing on diversity of citizenship for removal. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(1) (“For purposes 0f removal under this chapter, the citizenship 0f defendants sued under fictitious names shall be disregarded”); Fristoe v. Reynolds Metals C0., 615 F.2d 1209, 1213 (9th Cir. 1980) (unnamed defendants are not required t0 join in a removal petition); see also Soliman v. Philip Morris, Ina, 311 F. 3d 966, 971 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Citizenship 0f fictitious defendants is disregarded for removal purposes and becomes relevant only if and when the plaintiff seeks leave t0 substitute a named defendant”). Thus, the existence ofDoe defendants one through fifty does not deprive this Court ofjurisdiction. Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chemical C0., 443 F.3d 676, 679-80 (9th Cir. 2006) (rule applied in CAFA removal). B. The Amount In Controversy Exceeds The Statutory Minimum 22. CAFA requires that the amount in controversy exceed $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). Under CAFA, the claims of the individual members in a class action are aggregated t0 determine if the amount in controversy exceeds the sum 0r value of $5,000,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(6). In addition, Congress intended for federal jurisdiction t0 be appropriate under CAFA “if the value of the matter in litigation exceeds $5,000,000 either from the Viewpoint of the plaintiff or the Viewpoint 0f the defendant, and regardless of the type of relief sought (e.g., damages, injunctive relief, or declaratory relief)” Senate Judiciary Committee Report, S. Rep. N0. 109-14, at 42 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 40. Moreover, the Senate Judiciary Committee’s Report on the final version ofCAFA makes clear that any doubts regarding the maintenance 0f interstate class DEFENDANT TEAM HEALTH’S NOTICE OF REMOVAL 62737423v.2 \OOOQON 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Case 5:20-cv-02027-NC Document 1 Filed 03/23/20 Page 7 of 19 actions in state 0r federal court should be resolved in favor 0f federal jurisdiction. Id. at 42-43 (“[I]f a federal court is uncertain about whether ‘all matters in controversy’ in a purposed class action ‘do not in the aggregate exceed the sum 0r value of $5,000,000, the court should err in favor 0f exercising jurisdiction over the case . . . . Overall, new section 1332(d) is intended to expand substantially federal court jurisdiction over class actions. Its provisions should be read broadly, With a strong preference that interstate class actions should be heard in a federal court if properly removed by any defendant”). 23. Plaintiff’ s Complaint does not allege the amount in controversy for the class she purports t0 represent. Where a complaint does not allege a specific amount in damages, the removing defendant bears the burden of proving by a preponderance 0f the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds the statutory minimum. In Standard Fire Ins. C0. v. Knowles, 568 U.S. 588 (2013), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the proper burden ofproof imposed upon a defendant to establish the amount in controversy is the preponderance of the evidence standard. Accord Rodriguez v. AT & T Mobility Servs. LLC, 728 F.3d 975, 977 (9th Cir. 2013) (“the proper burden ofproof imposed upon a defendant t0 establish the amount in controversy is the preponderance of the evidence standard”). 24. In 201 1, Congress amended the federal removal statute to specify that, Where the underlying state practice “permits recovery of damages in excess 0f the amount demanded . . . removal of the action is proper 0n the basis 0f an amount in controversy asserted . . . if the district court finds, by the preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in controversy exceeds the amount specified in section 1332(a).” Pub.L. 112-63, December 7, 201 1, 125 Stat. 758, § 103(b)(3)(C) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(2) (emphasis added»; accord Abrego v. The Dow Chem. C0., 443 F.3d 676, 683 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Where the complaint does not specify the amount of damages sought, the removing defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy requirement has been met”); Guglielmino v. McKee Foods Corp, 506 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 2007) (“the complaint fails t0 allege a sufficiently specific total amount in controversy . . . we therefore apply the preponderance of the evidence burden 0fproof t0 the removing defendant”). The defendant must show that it is “more likely than not” that the jurisdictional threshold is met. Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. C0., 102 F.3d 398, 404 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[W]here a plaintiff’s state court complaint does not specify a DEFENDANT TEAM HEALTH’S NOTICE OF REMOVAL 62737423v.2 \OOOQON 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Case 5:20-cv-02027-NC Document 1 Filed 03/23/20 Page 8 of 19 particular amount 0f damages, the removing defendant bears the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in controversy exceeds $50,000. Under this burden, the defendant must provide evidence establishing that it is ‘more likely than not’ that the amount in controversy exceeds that amount”); Schiller v. David ’S Bridal, Ina, 2010 WL 2793650, at *2 (ED. Cal. July 14, 2010) (same). 25. To satisfy this standard, the “defendants’ notice 0f removal need include only a plausible allegation that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating C0., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 135 S.Ct. 547, 554 (2014). 26. The burden 0f establishing the jurisdictional threshold “is not daunting, as courts recognize that under this standard, a removing defendant is not obligated to research, state, and prove the plaintiffs claims for damages.” Korn v. Polo Ralph Lauren Corp, 536 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1204-05 (E.D. Cal. 2008) (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis in original); see also Valdez v. Allstate Ins. C0., 372 F.3d 1115, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004) (“the parties need not predict the trier of fact’s eventual award with one hundred percent accuracy”). 27. It is well-settled that “the court must accept as true plaintiff’s allegations as plead in the Complaint and assume that plaintiff Will prove liability and recover the damages alleged.” Muniz v. Pilot Travel Ctrs. LLC, 2007 WL 1302504, at *3 (E.D. Cal. May 1, 2007) (denying motion for remand 0f a class action for claims under the California Labor Code for missed meal and rest periods, unpaid wages and overtime, inaccurate wage statements, and waiting-time penalties). 28. As explained by the Ninth Circuit, “the amount-in-controversy inquiry in the removal context is not confined t0 the face of the complaint.” Valdez, 372 F.3d at 1117; see also Rodriguez, 728 F.3d at 981 (holding that the ordinary preponderance of the evidence standard applies even if a complaint is artfully pled to avoid federal jurisdiction); Guglielmin0., 506 F.3d at 702 (holding that even if a plaintiff affirmatively pled damages less than the jurisdictional minimum and did not allege a sufficiently specific total amount in controversy, the removing defendant is still only required t0 show by a preponderance of evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold). DEFENDANT TEAM HEALTH’S NOTICE OF REMOVAL 62737423v.2 \OOOQON 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Case 5:20-cv-02027-NC Document 1 Filed 03/23/20 Page 9 of 19 29. If a plaintiff asserts statutory Violations, the court must assume that the Violation rate is 100% unless the plaintiff specifically alleges otherwise: As these allegations reveal, plaintiff includes n0 fact-specific allegations that would result in a putative class or Violation rate that is discemibly smaller than 100%, used by defendant in its calculations. Plaintiff is the “master of [her] claim[s],” and if she wanted to avoid removal, she could have alleged facts specific to her claims Which would narrow the scope 0f the putative Class or the damages sought. She did not. Muniz, 2007 WL 1302504, at *4 (citing Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987)); see also Soratorio v. Tesoro Ref. and Mktg. C0,, LLC, 2017 WL 1520416, at *3 (CD. Cal. Apr. 26, 2017) (“Plaintiff s Complaint could be reasonably read to allege a 100% Violation rate. The Complaint notes that Defendants ‘did not provide’ Plaintiff and the other class members ‘a thirty minute meal period for every five hours worked,’ and that this was Defendants’ ‘common practice.’ It also alleges that Defendants had a practice of ‘requiring employees t0 work for four hours and more Without a rest period” and that Defendants had a ‘common practice’ of failing to provide required breaks.”); Arreola v. The Finish Line, 2014 WL 6982571, *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2014) (“District courts in the Ninth Circuit have permitted a defendant removing an action under CAFA t0 make assumptions When calculating the amount in controversy-such as assuming a 100 percent Violation rate, or assuming that each member of the class will have experienced some type 0f Violation-when those assumptions are reasonable in light 0f the allegations in the complaint”); Coleman v. Estes Express Lines, Ina, 730 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1149 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (“[C]ourts have assumed a 100% Violation rate in calculating the amount in controversy when the complaint does not allege a more precise calculation”). 30. The Complaint asserts 11 causes 0f action against all Defendants for: (1) “Failure to Pay Minimum Wages”; (2) “Failure t0 Pay Overtime Wages”; (3) “Failure to Provide Required Meal Periods”; (4) “Failure t0 Provide Required Rest Periods”; (5) “Failure t0 Indemnify Employees for Necessary Expenditures Incurred in Discharge of Duties”; (6) “Failure t0 Maintain Required Records”; (7) “Failure to Furnish Accurate Itemized Wage Statements”; (8) “Failure to Timely Pay Wages During Employment”; (9) “Failure t0 Pay A11 Wages Due to Discharged and Quitting Employees”; (10) “Unfair DEFENDANT TEAM HEALTH’S NOTICE OF REMOVAL 62737423v.2 \OOOQQ 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Case 5:20-cv-02027-NC Document 1 Filed 03/23/20 Page 10 0f 19 and Unlawful Business Practices”; and (1 1) “Enforcement Action Pursuant to the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004.” 3 1. Plaintiff s Complaint seeks to certify a class 0f “all current and former non-exempt employees of Defendants in the State 0f California at any time within the period beginning four (4) years prior to the filing 0f this action and until the time it settles or proceeds to final judgment.” (EX. A, Compl. 1] 6.) 32. The alleged amount in controversy in this class action, in the aggregate, exceeds $5,000,000. The Complaint seeks relief 0n behalf of “all current and former non-exempt employees 0f Defendants in the State of California at any time within the period beginning four (4) years prior t0 the filing of this action until the time it settles or proceeds to final judgment.” (EX. A, Compl. 1] 6.) Accordingly, given that Plaintiff’ s Complaint was filed 0n February 7, 2020, for purposes 0f the calculations in this Notice of Removal the “relevant time period” is from February 7, 2016 until the present. 33. During the time period identified in the Complaint, Defendants employed approximately 363 non-exempt employees in California, Who worked a total 0f approximately 40,980 workweeks. (Stair Decl., 11 9.) Plaintiff has brought this action “on behalf of herself and all other similarly situated and aggrieved current and former non-exempt employees Who worked in the State 0f California.” (EX. A, Compl. fl 1.) Plaintiff alleges that her claims are “typical of class members’ claims because Defendants’ subjected all non-exempt employees to identical Violations 0f the California Labor Code, the applicable IWC Wage Order, and the California Business and Professions Code.” (EX. A, Compl. 1] 20(0); emphasis added.) Therefore, for purposes of calculating the amount in controversy, Team Health Will use Plaintiff’ s hourly rate of pay at the time 0f termination as representative of all class members, Which was $77.25 per hour. (Stair Decl., 11 13.) 34. Plaintiff alleges that she and the putative class she seeks t0 represent were subj ect to Defendants’ “systemic course of illegal payroll practices and policies, Which was applied to all non- exempt employees in Violation of the California Labor Code, the applicable Industrial Welfare DEFENDANT TEAM HEALTH’S NOTICE OF REMOVAL 62737423v.2 \OOOQON 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Case 5:20-cv-02027-NC Document 1 Filed 03/23/20 Page 11 of 19 Commission (“IWC”) Wage Order, and the California Business and Professions Code, which prohibits unfair business practices arising from such Violations.” (EX. A, Compl. 1] 20(b).) 35. Plaintiff seeks t0 recover, 0n behalf 0f herself and the alleged class, unpaid wages and penalties for Defendants’ alleged failure to pay minimum and overtime wages, failure t0 provide meal and rest breaks, failure t0 timely pay all wages due during employment, failure t0 pay all wages due upon resignation or termination of employment, failure to indemnify for necessary business expenses, failure to maintain accurate records, failure t0 provide accurate and complete itemized wage statements, and unfair business practices. (EX. A, Compl., Prayer for Relief.) Plaintiff also seeks attorneys’ fees and costs for all causes 0f action. (Id.) Plaintiff also seeks civil penalties under PAGA. (1d,) 36. As set forth below, the amount in controversy implicated by the Class-wide allegations exceeds $5,000,000. All calculations supporting the amount in controversy are based on the Complaint’s allegations, assuming, Without any admission, the truth 0f the facts alleged and assuming liability is established. When the amount in controversy is not apparent from the face of the Complaint, a defendant may state underlying facts supporting its assertion that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold. Abrego, 443 F.3d at 682-83. 37. The calculations below show that the alleged amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000, When considering the putative class of non-exempt employees, such as Plaintiff. 1. Unpaid Minimum Wage And Overtime Compensation 38. For her first and second causes 0f action, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “failed to compensate [her] and class members for all overtime hours worked by, among other things: failing to pay overtime at one and one-half (1 1/2) 0r double the regular rate 0fpay” (EX. A, Compl. fl 27), and “failed t0 compensate [her] and class members for all overtime hours [and minimum wages for all hours] worked by, among other things: requiring, permitting or suffering Plaintiff and class members to work off the clock; requiring, permitting or suffering Plaintiff and class members t0 work through meal and rest breaks; illegally and inaccurately recording time in Which Plaintiff and class members worked. . ..” (EX. A, Compl. W 23, 27.) 10 DEFENDANT TEAM HEALTH’S NOTICE OF REMOVAL 62737423v.2 \OOOQON 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Case 5:20-cv-02027-NC Document 1 Filed 03/23/20 Page 12 of 19 39. Plaintiff does not, however, provide any details in terms ofhow many hours per day or week she and the putative class members allegedly worked Without compensation. However, activities that take only ten minutes or less outside an employee’s scheduled working hours are generally considered de minimis outside of California, and thus not compensable. See, e.g., Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery C0., 328 U.S. 680, 692 (1946); Lindow v. United States, 738 F.2d 1057, 1062, 1063 (9th Cir. 1984) (“[i]t is only when an employee is required to give up a substantial measure 0f his time and effort that compensable working time is involved”; “most courts have found daily periods 0f 10 minutes de minimis even though otherwise compensable”). And, although the California Supreme Court has held that the de minimis doctrine may not be available in defending against unpaid wage claims under the California Labor Code in many contexts, it addressed specifically instances involving regular or routine minutes of off-the-clock work, and indicated that the defense may still be available in the context 0f “minute or irregular” instances of compensable time. Troester v. Starbucks Corp, 5 Cal. 5th 829, 835 (2018). 40. The statute of limitations for recovery 0funpaid wages under California Labor Code § 1194 is three years. See Cal. Code CiV. § Proc. 338. Plaintiff‘s UCL claim, however, extends the liability period of the overtime and minimum wage claim to four years. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17208 (“Any action to enforce any cause 0f action pursuant to [the UCL] shall be commenced Within four years after the cause 0f action accrued”). Thus, for determining the maximum possible amount in controversy for Plaintiff's overtime and minimum wage claim, should Plaintiff prevail 0n this claim, Team Health must use the UCL’S four-year statute of limitations. 41. Thus, although Defendant Team Health denies Plaintiff’s allegations 0r that she 0r the putative class are entitled to any relief, based 0n Plaintiff’ s allegations and the remaining applicability 0f the de minimis rule, Plaintiff must be asserting that employees worked, at minimum, 3O minutes of unpaid time per week. As such, an estimate 0f the amount in controversy for Plaintiff’s first and second causes of action is $2,374,278 [($77.25/h0ur * 0.5 hours per week * 40,980 workweeks * 1.5 OT premium)]. 2. Meal And Rest Period Claims 11 DEFENDANT TEAM HEALTH’S NOTICE OF REMOVAL 62737423v.2 \OOOQON 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Case 5:20-cv-02027-NC Document 1 Filed 03/23/20 Page 13 0f 19 42. For her third cause of action, Plaintiff claims that “as part of Defendants” illegal payroll policies and practices to deprive their non-exempt employees all wages earned and due, Defendants required, permitted, 0r otherwise suffered Plaintiff and Class Members to take less than the 30-minute meal period, or t0 work through them, and have failed to otherwise provide the required meal periods t0 Plaintiff and Class Members. . ..” (EX. A, Compl. fl 31.) For her fourth cause 0f action, Plaintiff claims that “as part 0f Defendants’ illegal payroll policies and practices t0 deprive their non-exempt employees all wages earned and due, Defendants failed to provide rest periods t0 Plaintiff and Class Members. . . .” (EX. A, Compl. fl 36.) For both causes 0f action, Plaintiff also claims that Defendants failed t0 compensate her and the putative class members “one additional hour 0f compensation at each employee’s regular rate 0fpay for each workday that a meal period was not provided” and “one additional hour of compensation at each employees’ regular rate 0fpay for each workday that a rest period was not provided.” (EX. A, Compl. W 32, 37.) 43. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants had a “systemic course of illegal payroll practices and policies, which was applied t0 all non-exempt employees. . .” (EX. A, Compl. 11 20(b); emphasis added). Plaintiff further alleges that her claims are “typical of class members’ claims because Defendants’ subjected all non-exempt employees to identical Violations 0f the California Labor Code, the applicable IWC Wage Order, and the California Business and Professions Code.” (EX. A, Compl. 1] 20(0); emphasis added.) 44. Plaintiff seeks separate payments for (1) denial 0f meal periods and (2) denial of rest breaks. (EX. A, Compl. W 32, 37; Prayer for Relieffl 3.) Labor Code § 226.7 requires employers t0 pay an extra hour’s pay to employees Who are not provided a meal period 0r a rest period. Plaintiff alleges each putative class member is entitled to meal break premiums for each meal period missed and rest break premiums for each rest period missed. 45. The statute 0f limitations for recovery for meal 0r rest period premium pay under California Labor Code § 226.7 pay is three years. Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Prods., Ina, 40 Cal. 4th 1094, 1099 (2007) (“[T]he remedy provided in Labor Code section 226.7 constitutes a wage or premium pay and is governed by a three-year statute 0f 1imitati0ns.”). However, Plaintiff alleges a claim for meal 12 DEFENDANT TEAM HEALTH’S NOTICE OF REMOVAL 62737423v.2 \OOOQON 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Case 5:20-cv-02027-NC Document 1 Filed 03/23/20 Page 14 of 19 and rest break premium pay as part 0f her unfair competition claim under Business and Professions Code section 17200, et seq. (EX. A, C0mp1., 1H] 63, 65.) Although Team Health contends that meal and rest break premium pay cannot be recovered under Business and Professions Code section 17200 (Pineda v. Bank ofAmerica, NA, 50 Cal. 4th 1389, 1401 (2010)), according t0 the allegations of his Complaint, Plaintiff will assert the four-year statute 0f limitations applies for purposes of removal. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17208. Thus, Team Health has calculated the maximum potential amount in controversy using this four-year statute of limitations. 46. Since Plaintiff alleges that, as a part of Defendants’ “systemic course of illegal payroll practices and policies” (EX. A, Comp1., 1] 20(b)), Defendants “required, permitted, or otherwise suffered Plaintiff and Class Members t0 take less than the 30-minute meal period, 0r t0 work through them, and have failed t0 otherwise provide the required meal periods [and rest periods] t0 Plaintiff and Class Members” (EX. A, Comp1., 1N 3 1, 37) and “subjected all non-exempt employees t0 identical Violations 0f the Labor Code. . .” (Ex. A, C0mpl., 1] 20(0)), the Complaint contemplates a 100% Violation rate. Accordingly, Team Health has assumed Plaintiff s 100 percent Violation rate for purposes of calculating the amount in controversy 0f Plaintiff s meal and rest period claims. See Mum'z, 2007 WL 1302504, at *4 (citing Caterpillar, Ina, 482 U.S. at 392 (finding a 100 percent Violation rate appropriate When “plaintiff includes n0 fact-specific allegations that would result in a putative class 0r Violation rate that is discernibly smaller than 100%”). 47. Plaintiff is silent as to the amount of alleged meal periods or rest periods she claims to have been denied, thereby precluding precise estimates of the amount in controversy. While Defendant is entitled to assume Plaintiff is alleging a 100 percent Violation rate (i.e., five missed meal periods and five missed rest periods per workweek) based on the allegations in the Complaint, Defendant has calculated the maximum potential damages provided herein based on putative class members taking less than the required meal and rest period once each workweek? 2/ Indeed Plaintiff cannot allege that this action “involves common questions 0f law and fact with respect t0 the potential class” Without also implicitly alleging that each putative class member suffered at least one meal period 0r rest period Violation per week based 0n “Defendants’ systemic course 0f illegal payroll practices and policies.” (EX. A, Compl. 1] 20(b).) 1 3 DEFENDANT TEAM HEALTH’S NOTICE OF REMOVAL 62737423v.2 \OOOQON 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Case 5:20-cv-02027-NC Document 1 Filed 03/23/20 Page 15 0f 19 48. As stated above, there are approximately 363 current 0r former non-exempt employees of Defendants in California during the time period identified in the Complaint, Who worked a total of approximately 40,980 workweeks. (Stair Decl., 1] 9.) Assuming that the employees were not provided just one meal period and one rest period each workweek, the maximum potential amount in controversy for Plaintiffs meal and rest period claims is $6,331,410 [($77.25/h0ur * 2 premium payments * 40,980 workweeks)] . 3. Wage Statement Penalties 49. For Plaintiff s sixth and seventh causes of action, she alleges that Defendants failed to maintain and provide the putative class With accurate itemized wage statements, in Violation 0f California Labor Code § 226. (EX. A, Compl. 1m 44, 48.) Plaintiff further alleges that “during the Class Period, [Defendants] knowingly and intentionally failed to provide Plaintiff and Class Members With timely, accurate, and itemized wage statements.” (EX. A, Compl. 1] 45.) 50. Labor Code § 226(6) provides a minimum of $50 for the initial Violation as t0 each employee, and $100 for each further Violation as t0 each employee, up t0 a maximum penalty of $4,000 per employee. The statute 0f limitations for recovery 0f penalties under Labor Code § 226 is one year. Caliber Bodyworks, Inc. v. Sup. CL, 134 Cal. App. 4th 365, 376 (2005); Cal. CiV. Proc. Code § 340(a). 5 1. Defendants pay their non-exempt employees every two weeks. (Stair Decl., 11 10.) Accordingly, there are approximately 26 pay periods per year. (Id.) 52. Based on Plaintiff’ s allegations that she and the putative class were subj ect t0 off-the- clock work and were not paid the correct overtime rate, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “routinely failed to provide Plaintiff and class members with timely, accurate, and itemized wage statements in writing showing all applicable hourly rates in effect during each pay period and the corresponding number of hours worked at each hourly rate. . . .” (EX. A, Compl. 1] 44.) (emphasis added). 53. Plaintiff filed her Complaint 0n February 7, 2020. Therefore, the statutory period for a claim under California Labor Code § 226 runs from February 7, 2019 t0 the present. 54. During the one-year statute 0f limitations period for the wage statement claim, Team Health estimates approximately 255 potential putative class members worked approximately 5,826 pay 14 DEFENDANT TEAM HEALTH’S NOTICE OF REMOVAL 62737423v.2 \OOOQON 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Case 5:20-cv-02027-NC Document 1 Filed 03/23/20 Page 16 0f 19 periods. (Stair Decl., 11 11.) Thus, the amount in controversy for Plaintiff’ s sixth and seventh causes of action for wage statement penalties as alleged is $569,850 [($100 X 5,826 pay periods) - ($50 for the initial pay period x 255 initial pay periods)]. 4. Waiting Time Penalties 55. For Plaintiff’s ninth cause 0f action, she alleges that “[d]uring the class period, Defendants have willfully failed t0 pay accrued wages and other compensation t0 Plaintiff and class members in accordance with California Labor Code §§ 201 and 202.” (Ex. A, Compl. 1] 59.) Plaintiff seeks waiting time penalties, not t0 exceed 3O days 0f penalties for each class member. Lab. Code § 203; EX. A, Compl. 1] 58. Pursuant t0 Labor Code § 203, an employer who willfully fails to pay all wages due at the time of termination 0r resignation results in a penalty 0f continued wages for each day a former employee is not paid, up to a thirty day maximum. See Cal. Lab. Code § 203(a). 56. The statute 0f limitations period for California Labor Code § 203 penalties extends back only three years from the date of filing of the complaint, 0r February 7, 2017. See Pineda, 50 Cal. 4th at 1399 (“if an employer failed to timely pay final wages to an employee Who quit or was fired, the employee would have had one year to sue for the section 203 penalties but, under Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (a) (Stats.1935, ch. 581, § 1, p. 1673), three years t0 sue for the unpaid final wages giving rise t0 the penalty”). 57. From February 7, 2017 t0 the present, approximately 150 non-exempt employees were separated from their employment. (Stair Decl., 11 12.) Accordingly, although Team Health disputes liability, of the maximum potential amount in controversy for Labor Code § 203 penalties is $2,781,000 [$77.25/h0ur X 8 hours/day X 30 days X 150 former employees]. 58. Although Team Health denies Plaintiff” s allegations 0r that she or the putative class are entitled t0 any relief for the above-mentioned claims, based on the forgoing calculations, the aggregate maximum potential amount in controversy for the putative class for all asserted claims, exclusive of attorneys’ fees, is approximately $12,056,538, calculated as follows: $ 2,374,278 Overtime and Unpaid Minimum Wage Claims $ 6,331,410 Meal/Rest Period Claim 15 DEFENDANT TEAM HEALTH’S NOTICE OF REMOVAL 62737423v.2 \OOOQON 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Case 5:20-cv-02027-NC Document 1 Filed 03/23/20 Page 17 of 19 $ 569,850 Wage Statement Claim $ 2,781,000 Waiting Time Penalties Claim 59. The figures above do not take into account Plaintiff’s claim for PAGA penalties, attorneys’ fees, or Plaintiff“ s claim for liquidated damages for her unpaid minimum wage claim. 5. Attorneys’ Fees 60. Plaintiff also seeks attorneys’ fees. (EX. A, Comp1., Prayer for Relief.) Requests for attorneys’ fees must also be taken into account in ascertaining the amount in controversy. Galt G/S v. JSS Scandinavia, 142 F.3d 1150, 1156 (9th Cir. 1998) (claims for statutory attorneys’ fees are to be included in amount in controversy, regardless 0f Whether award is discretionary or mandatory); Brady v. MercedeS-Benz USA, Ina, 243 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1010-11 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (“Where the law entitles the prevailing plaintiff t0 recover reasonable attorney fees, a reasonable estimate of fees likely t0 be incurred to resolution is part of the benefit permissibly sought by the plaintiff and thus contributes t0 the amount in controversy”) 61. A reasonable estimate 0f fees likely to be recovered may be used in calculating the amount in controversy. Longmire v. HMS Host USA, Ina, 2012 WL 5928485, at *9 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2012) (“[C]ourts may take into account reasonable estimates of attorneys' fees likely t0 be incurred when analyzing disputes over the amount in controversy under CAFA.”) (citing Brady, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 1010-1 1); Mum'z, 2007 WL 1302504 at *4 (attorneys’ fees appropriately included in determining amount in controversy). 62. In a recent decision, the Ninth Circuit held that “a court must include future attomeys’ fees recoverable by statute or contract when assessing whether the amount-in-controversy requirement is met.” Fritsch v. Swift Transp. C0. ofArizona, LLC, 899 F.3d 785, 2018 WL 3748667, at *6 (9th Cir. Aug. 8, 2018); see also Chavez v. JPMorgan Chase & C0., 888 F.3d 413, 414-15 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he amount in controversy is not limited to damages incurred prior to removal-for example, it is not limited t0 wages a plaintiff-employee would have earned before removal (as opposed t0 after removal). Rather, the amount in controversy is determined by the complaint operative at the time 0f removal and encompasses all relief a court may grant 0n that complaint if the plaintiff is victorious”); Lucas v. 16 DEFENDANT TEAM HEALTH’S NOTICE OF REMOVAL 62737423v.2 \OOOQON 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Case 5:20-cv-02027-NC Document 1 Filed 03/23/20 Page 18 0f 19 Michael Kors (USA), Ina, 2018 WL 2146403 (C.D. Cal. May 9, 2018) (holding that “unaccrued post- removal attorneys’ fees can be factored into the amount in controversy” for CAFA jurisdiction). 63. In the class action context, courts have found that 25 percent of the aggregate amount in controversy is a benchmark for attorneys” fees award under the “percentage of fimd” calculation and courts may depart from this benchmark When warranted. See Campbell v. Vitran Exp, Ina, 471 F. App’x 646, 649 (9th Cir. 2012) (attorneys’ fees appropriately included in determining amount in controversy under CAFA); Powers v. Eichen, 229 F.3d 1249, 1256-57 (9th Cir. 2000) (“We have also established twenty-five percent of the recovery as a ‘benchmark’ for attorneys’ fees calculations under the percentage-of-recovery approach”); Wren v. RGIS Inventory Specialists, 2011 WL 1230826 at *28- 29 (ND. Cal. Apr. 1, 201 1) (finding ample support for adjusting the 25% presumptive benchmark upward and found that plaintiffs’ request for attorneys’ fees in the amount 0f42% of the total settlement payment was appropriate and reasonable in the case); Cicero v. DirecTV, Ina, 2010 WL 2991486 at *6- 7 (C.D. Cal. July 27, 2010) (finding attorneys” fees in the amount of 30% 0f the total gross settlement amount t0 be reasonable); see also In re Quintas Secs. Litig, 148 F. Supp. 2d 967, 973 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (noting that in the class action settlement context the benchmark for setting attorneys’ fees is 25 percent 0f the common fund). Even under the conservative benchmark 0f 25 percent of the total recovery, attorneys’ fees alone would be upward 0f $3,014,134.50 in this case. 64. Although Team Health denies Plaintiff’s allegations that she 0r the putative class are entitled to any relief, based 0n Plaintiff’ s allegations and prayer for relief, the total amount in controversy exceeds $5,070,672.50, including attorneys’ fees.3 This amount far exceeds the $5,000,000 threshold set forth under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) for removal jurisdiction. 65. Accordingly, because diversity 0f citizenship exists, and the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000, this Court has original jurisdiction 0f this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). This action is therefore a proper one for removal to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). 3/ Approximately $12,056,538 for the causes 0f action alleged in the Complaint, plus $3,014,134.50 in attorneys’ fees as 25% of the total potential recovery, results in a total amount in controversy 0f at least $15,070,672.50. 17 DEFENDANT TEAM HEALTH’S NOTICE OF REMOVAL 62737423v.2 \OOOQON 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Case 5:20-cv-02027-NC Document 1 Filed 03/23/20 Page 19 0f 19 66. T0 the extent that Plaintiff has alleged any other claims for relief in the Complaint over Which this Court would not have original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over any such claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). IV. VENUE AND INTRADISTRICT ASSIGNMENT 67. Venue lies in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(a), 1441, 1446(a) and 84(0). This action originally was brought in Santa Clara County Superior Court of the State 0f California, Which is located Within the Northern District of California. 28 U.S.C. § 84(0). Therefore, venue is proper because it is the “district and division embracing the place Where such action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The County of Santa Clara is located Within the jurisdiction of the United States District Court, Northern District 0f California. V. NOTICE OF REMOVAL 68. A true and correct copy of this Notice 0fRemoval will be promptly served on Plaintiff and filed With the Clerk of the Superior Court 0f the State 0f California, County of Santa Clara. The Notice of Removal is concurrently being served 0n all parties and counsel of record. VI. PRAYER FOR REMOVAL 69. WHEREFORE, Team Health prays that the above action now pending before the Superior Court of the State 0f California for the County 0f Santa Clara be removed t0 the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. DATED: March 23, 2020 SEYFARTH SHAW LLP By: /S/Michael Afar Jonathan L. Brophy Michael Afar Attorneys for Defendants CHASE DENNIS EMERGENCY MEDICAL GROUP, INC. & TEAM HEALTH HOLDINGS, INC. 18 DEFENDANT TEAM HEALTH’S NOTICE OF REMOVAL 62737423v.2 \OOOQON 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 PROOF OF SERVICE STATE OF CALIFORNIA ) ) SS COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES ) I am a resident of the State of California, over the age of eighteen years, and not a party to the within action. My business address is 2029 Century Park East, Suite 3500, Los Angeles, California 90067-3021. On April 1, 2020, I served the Within document(s): NOTICE TO CLERK OF THE SUPERIOR COURT AND TO PLAINTIFF OF REMOVAL OF CIVIL ACTION TO THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT by placing the document(s) listed above in a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid, in the United States mail at Los Angeles, California, addressed as set forth below. D by personally delivering the document(s) listed above to the person(s) at the address(es) set forthbelow. by placing the document(s) listed above, together With an unsigned copy of this declaration, in aD sealed envelope or package provided by an overnight delivery carrier With postage paid on account and deposited for collection with the overnight carrier at Los Angeles, California, addressed as set forth below. D by transmitting the document(s) listed above, electronically, Via the e-mail addresses set forthbelow. D electronically by using the Court’s ECF/CM System. Matthew J. Matern Sara B. Tosdal Joshua D. Boxer MATERN LAW GROUP, PC MATERN LAW GROUP, PC 1330 Broadway, Suite 428 1230 Rosecrans Avenue, Suite 200 Oakland, CA 94612 Manhattan Beach, CA 90266 Telephone: 510 227 3998 Telephone: 310 531 1900 Attorneys for Plaintiff Julie Samora Attorneys for Plaintiff Julie Samora I am readily familiar with the firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with the U.S. Postal Service 0n that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid in the ordinary course 0f business. I am aware that 0n motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day after date 0f deposit for mailing in affidavit. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct. Executed 0n April 1, 2020, at Los Angeles, California.JW rFern Jenkins PROOF OF SERVICE 62959268v.1